Nothing has yet been said of the doings of the other columns: that
under General Browne advancing, by the Khyber Pass, upon
Jellalabad; that under General Stewart, by the Bolan Pass, upon
Candahar.
General Browne's force had been gathered at the frontier line, at
the mouth of the pass, awaiting the reply of the Ameer to the
British ultimatum. None having been received, up to the night of
the 20th of November, the advance took place in the morning; at the
same hour at which General Roberts advanced from Thull in the
Khurum valley.
The principal defense of the Khyber Pass was the fort Ali-Musjid.
This fort stands on a most commanding position, on a rock jutting
out from the hillside far into the valley, which its guns
commanded. It was flanked by batteries erected on the hillsides,
and was a most formidable position to capture. It was situated
about six miles up the valley.
The force under General Browne was divided into four brigades. The
first--under General Macpherson--consisted of the 4th battalion of
the Rifle Brigade, the 20th Bengal Infantry, the 4th Ghoorkas, and
a mountain battery. These were ordered to take a mountain road
and--led by a native guide--to make a long circuit, and so to come
down into the pass at a village lying a mile or two beyond
Ali-Musjid.
The second brigade--under Colonel Tytler--consisting of the 1st
battalion of the 17th Foot, the infantry of the Guides, the 1st
Sikhs, and a mountain battery, were also to take to the hills and,
working along on their crests, to come down upon the batteries
which the Afghans had erected on the hillside opposite to
Ali-Musjid.
The third brigade, consisting of the 81st Regiment, the 14th Sikhs,
and the 24th Native Infantry; and the fourth brigade, composed of
the 51st Regiment, 6th Native Infantry, and the 45th Sikhs, were to
advance straight up the valley. With them was a mountain battery, a
battery of Horse Artillery, one of Royal Artillery, and a battery
of 40-pounders, drawn by elephants.
These brigades marched forward until they reached some rising
ground in the valley, whence they could see Ali-Musjid, at a
distance of a mile and a half, in front of them. The enemy at once
opened fire. The gunners in the fort had been practising for some
weeks, and had got the range with great accuracy; and their shot
and shell fell thick along the slope. The column was therefore
marched back behind its crest, and there halted; and the men were
allowed to fall out and eat their dinners, as it was desired that
the flanking columns of Macpherson and Tytler--which had very much
further to go--should reach the positions assigned to them before
the attack began.
The artillery, however, took up their position on the crest, and
opened fire on the fort. The effect of the light guns was but
slight, but the 40-pounders produced considerable effect on the
face of the fort.
After a halt for some time, the troops were ordered to advance. The
45th Sikhs were first thrown out upon the hillside and, working
their way along on the right of the valley, opened a heavy musketry
fire against the Afghans in the batteries there. Presently the 51st
and 6th Native Infantry joined them; while the 81st, the 24th, and
14th Sikhs worked along on the left.
The scene was one of the most picturesque ever witnessed in
warfare. From the fortress, standing on the perpendicular rock in
the center of the valley, the flashes of the great guns came fast
and steadily; while the edges of the rock, and fort, were fringed
with tiny puffs of musketry. From the rising ground in the valley,
the smoke of the British guns rose up in the still air as, steadily
and fast, they replied to the fire of the fort. Both sides of the
steep hill slopes were lined with British infantry--the quick flash
of the rifles spurting out from every rock and bush; while
continuous lines of light smoke rose from the Afghan entrenchments
which faced them.
Gradually the British skirmishers advanced, until they were close
to the Afghan entrenchments on the hillsides abreast of the fort.
So far, there was no sign that Macpherson's brigade had reached the
post assigned to it, high up on the hill; or that Tytler had worked
round to the village in the enemy's rear. Some attacks which were
made upon the Afghans were repulsed, with loss. Major Birch and
Lieutenant Fitzgerald were killed, and Captain Maclean wounded; and
between thirty and forty of the rank and file were killed, or
wounded. As the fort and its defenses could not have been carried
by direct attack, without immense loss of life; it was determined
to cease operations until morning, in order to give the flanking
columns time to reach the positions assigned to them. A wing of a
regiment, from each brigade, was ordered to remain on the hillside
facing the Afghan entrenchments. The rest of the troops fell back a
short distance, and lay down as they were, for the night.
In the meantime, the brigades of Macpherson and Tytler had
encountered enormous difficulties on the line of march. The roads
they had taken were mere tracks, and there were many places where
it was almost impossible to get the mountain guns along. From
daybreak until late at night the troops labored, unceasingly. They
knew, by the dull roar echoed and re-echoed among the mountains,
that their comrades below were engaged; and the thought that a
failure might ensue, owing to their absence from the contest,
nerved them to continued exertions.
Late at night, however, Macpherson with his brigade arrived on the
top of the hill facing Ali-Musjid; and Tytler, with his column,
came down into the Khyber valley in rear of the fort. But, though
unopposed, their march had not been unnoticed and, late in the
evening, the news reached the Afghans that the British were
marching down into the valley behind them. A wild panic instantly
seized them. Clothes, ammunition, guns, everything that could
impede their flight were thrown away; and the garrison of
Ali-Musjid, and the Afghans in the hillside entrenchments fled, a
herd of frightened fugitives, up the valley. Hasty as was their
retreat, they were not in time. Tytler, with his column, debouched
into the valley before they had passed the spot where the mountain
path descended into it; and large numbers were taken prisoners.
As at the Peiwar-Khotal, the Afghans proved themselves capable of
defending a strong position, valiantly; but were converted into a
mob of panic-stricken fugitives, by their line of retreat being
threatened. A European army, under like circumstances, would have
fallen back in good order. Their force was amply sufficient to have
swept aside the little column which barred their retreat, and they
would have occupied a fresh position farther to the rear, and
renewed the conflict. Not so the Afghans. The capture of Ali-Musjid
brought with it the entire demoralization of the Afghan army which,
a few hours before, had been fully confident in its power to
repulse any attack which might be made upon it.
The British continued their advance, passed through the Khyber
Pass, and entered the broad valley near whose head stands the town
of Jellalabad. Beyond a few shots, fired at them by tribesmen high
up on the mountain side, they experienced no opposition, whatever
and, a week after the fight in the Khyber, entered Jellalabad and
encamped around it.
Further than this it was not intended to go, for the present.
Winter was now close at hand. Between Jellalabad and Cabul were a
series of most difficult passes. An army advancing up them would
have immense difficulty to encounter, and might find itself cut off
from India by the snows. In the Jellalabad valley the weather is
mild, large stores of provisions were obtainable, and here it was
determined to remain, through the winter; and to recommence the
campaign, in the spring, with the advantage of the Khyber Pass--one
of the keys of Afghanistan--being in our hands.
But a day or two after reaching Jellalabad--having defeated and
dispersed one of the two Afghan armies--the news arrived of the
capture of the Peiwar-Khotal--the second key of Afghanistan--and
the utter rout of the army defending it. Thus, in little more than
a week after the commencement of the campaign Sheer-Ali, the Ameer,
saw the entire overthrow of the army which he had, for so many
years, been occupied in organizing and training. The positions
which he had deemed impregnable had both been taken, after a single
day's fighting; and his capital lay virtually at the mercy of his
conquerors. In one short week, his hopes and plans had been
scattered to the winds.
Sheer-Ali was not wholly to be blamed. He had for many years
received an annual present of money and arms, from the British
government; but upon the other hand, he saw Russia marching with
giant steps towards his northern frontier and, contrasting the
energy and enterprise of the great northern power, with the
inactivity which he may have supposed to prevail among the men who
governed England, he became more and more anxious; and asked the
English definitely to state whether he could rely upon them for
assistance, should he be attacked by the Russians.
He received a reply from the Duke of Argyle--the British minister
for India--of a doubtful nature, couched in terms which seem to
have aroused his resentment. From this moment, there can be no
doubt that the Ameer's course was decided upon. He was between the
hammer and the anvil and, as he could obtain no guarantee of
assistance from England, he determined to throw himself into the
arms of Russia.
Letters were exchanged between him and General Kaufmann--the
Russian viceroy in Turkestan--and the latter gave him the warmest
promises of support, if he would ally himself with Russia. Although
he had, for years, declined to accept a British resident at Cabul,
or to allow Englishmen to enter the country; he now, believing in
the power and willingness of Russia to help, received the visit of
a Russian general and staff, at Cabul.
Unfortunately for the Ameer, the government of England had now
changed hands; and the ministry at once sent to Sheer-Ali, to
demand that he should receive a British resident. It was late in
the year, and the Ameer--acting, no doubt, on the advice of his
Russian friends--sought to gain time by evasive answers. The
British government--who saw through the ruse--ordered the envoy to
advance, with a strong escort. This obliged the Ameer to come to a
final decision; and the die was cast by the escort being stopped,
by force, on its arrival at Ali-Musjid.
There is no doubt that the Ameer, and his friends, calculated that
it was already too late in the season for the English to gather a
sufficient force, on the frontier, to force the passes held by the
Afghan army before the snows. The promptness of action of the
English government, the valor of their troops, and the unusually
late setting in of the winter combined to overthrow the Ameer's
plans. Had the campaign been delayed till the spring, there can be
little doubt that the British, in their advance, would have found
themselves opposed--if not by a Russian army--at least by an army
led and officered by Russians, with Russian engineers and
artillerymen. The promptness of their advance, and the capture of
the passes and the dispersion of the Afghan armies, within a week
of the opening of the campaign, altogether altered this position.
Sheer-Ali found himself a king without an army. The plains of Cabul
were thronged with the panic-stricken fugitives from the Khyber and
Peiwar; and Sheer-Ali started at night from his capital with his
Russian friends, and made for the north; sending letter after
letter ahead of him to General Kaufmann, imploring the promised aid
of Russia. The rapid course of events, however, had entirely
disconcerted the Russian plans.
In the spring, a Russian army might have advanced and cooperated
with that of the Ameer; but the winter had set in, the distance was
immense, and the Russians unprepared for instant action. The
appeals of the unfortunate prince were responded to with vague
generalities. He was no longer a powerful ally, but a broken
instrument and, heartbroken with disappointment and failure, the
unfortunate Sheer-Ali was seized by fever and died, in an obscure
village, almost alone and wholly uncared for.
His son Yakoob Khan--who had, in his youth, proved himself a brave
and able soldier; but who, having incurred his father's
displeasure, had been for years confined as a prisoner at
Herat--was now liberated, and took his place as his father's
successor. He saw at once that, with a broken and disorganized
army, he could not hope to resist the advance of the three British
armies which, coming from Jellalabad, from the heights of the
Shatur-Gardan, and from Candahar, would simultaneously advance upon
his capital, as soon as the snows melted. He therefore opened
negotiations and, early in May, himself descended from Cabul and
had an interview with General Browne, at Gundamuk; when the
preliminaries of peace were arranged, and signed.
The terms insisted upon by the British were not onerous. Yakoob was
recognized as the Ameer of Afghanistan, the annual subsidy paid to
his father was to be continued. The Khyber Pass and the Khurum
valley, as far as the Peiwar-Khotal, were to remain in the hands of
the British; and a British minister was to be stationed at Cabul.
When peace had been signed, the greater portion of the British army
retired to India; and the Khurum column, leaving two or three
regiments in that valley, also fell back.
While the first and second divisions had been gaining victories in
the Khyber and Khurum valleys, the column under General Stewart had
met with difficulties of another kind. Between the Indus, and the
foot of the range of mountains through which the Bolan Pass leads
to the lofty plateau land above, a great waste of sand stretches.
In the wet season, this tract of country is overflowed by the
Indus. In the dry season it is a parched and bare desert, with its
wells few and far apart. There were great difficulties met with in
crossing this inhospitable plain, and the losses among the baggage
animals were great; but the labors up to this point were as
nothing, to those which had to be undergone on the way up the Bolan
Pass.
This pass--whose ascent occupies three days--is in fact the mere
bed of a stream, covered deeply with boulders and stones of all
sizes, in which the baggage and artillery horses sank fetlock deep.
The difficulties encountered were enormous, and vast numbers of
camels, horses, and bullocks died by the way. Even with a double
complement of horses, it was almost impossible to drag the guns up
the deep, shingly pass; and great delays were experienced, before
the force intended for operations against Candahar were assembled,
at Quettah. So far, the advance had taken place through British
territory, as Quettah has long been occupied by us.
When the advance began, it was rapid. No opposition was experienced
by the way, until the column arrived within a few hours' march of
Candahar; and then the enemy's attack was feeble, and easily
repulsed. On the 9th of January, General Stewart entered the city.
Candahar, though not the capital, is the chief town of Afghanistan.
It stands in a slightly undulating plain; and was, at one time, a
city of great importance and wealth. Its position is the most
important in Afghanistan. It bars the road to an enemy advancing
from the north, through Herat; and threatens the flank and rear of
one advancing against India, through Cabul. The country around is
extremely fertile and, were irrigation properly used, and a railway
constructed to India, Candahar and the surrounding country would
again become one of the gardens of the world.
The authorities of the city made their submission, as the column
approached it, and the army settled down to quiet occupation;
broken only by isolated attacks, upon individual soldiers, by
fanatical Ghazis. When peace was concluded, one of the conditions
distinctly insisted upon by the British general, and agreed to by
the Ameer, was that Candahar should remain in our possession. The
alleged advantage thus gained, and the territory thus acquired,
were afterwards abandoned by the British government succeeding that
which had so vigorously carried out the war.
The occupation of Candahar by the British had been insisted on, at
first, on the ground that, if Russia should make an advance against
India, the British nation would have ample cause to rue the cession
of Candahar; for it was declared that with this city strongly
fortified, and surrounded by outlying works, 10,000 British troops
there could arrest the progress of an invading army, however large,
until England had had full time to put forth all her strength, and
to assemble an army amply sufficient to secure the safety of the
most valuable of our possessions--the empire of India.
It was said that, whatever allies Russia might have prepared for
herself, by intrigues among the princes of India, these would not
think of moving, so long as they knew that the fortress of Candahar
remained as a British bulwark against an invading force. It was
represented that, so long as this place held out, England would be
able to devote her whole force towards repelling the foreign
invader--instead of being obliged, simultaneously, to oppose him
and to put down a formidable rising in India, itself.
It was, however, not the universal opinion that the best policy of
England was to occupy this territory by an armed force; and
subsequent events, with the change of government in England, led to
a different determination.