probability, the influence of this cause has been very much
exaggerated--but there is no doubt that variation is produced, to a certain
extent, by what are commonly known as external conditions,--such as
temperature, food, warmth, and moisture. In the long run, every variation
depends, in some sense, upon external conditions, seeing that everything
has a cause of its own. I use the term "external conditions" now in the
sense in which it is ordinarily employed: certain it is, that external
conditions have a definite effect. You may take a plant which has single
flowers, and by dealing with the soil, and nourishment, and so on, you may
by and by convert single flowers into double flowers, and make thorns shoot
out into branches. You may thicken or make various modifications in the
shape of the fruit. In animals, too, you may produce analogous changes in
this way, as in the case of that deep bronze colour which persons rarely
lose after having passed any length of time in tropical countries. You may
also alter the development of the muscles very much, by dint of training;
all the world knows that exercise has a great effect in this way; we always
expect to find the arm of a blacksmith hard and wiry, and possessing a
large development of the brachial muscles. No doubt training, which is one
of the forms of external conditions, converts what are originally only
instructions, teachings, into habits, or, in other words, into
organisations, to a great extent; but this second cause of variation cannot
be considered to be by any means a large one. The third cause that I have
to mention, however, is a very extensive one. It is one that, for want of a
better name, has been called "spontaneous variation"; which means that when
we do not know anything about the cause of phenomena, we call it
spontaneous. In the orderly chain of causes and effects in this world,
there are very few things of which it can be said with truth that they are
spontaneous. Certainly not in these physical matters--in these there is
nothing of the kind--everything depends on previous conditions. But when we
cannot trace the cause of phenomena, we call them spontaneous.
Of these variations, multitudinous as they are, but little is known with
perfect accuracy. I will mention to you some two or three cases, because
they are very remarkable in themselves, and also because I shall want to
use them afterwards. Réaumur, a famous French naturalist, a great many
years ago, in an essay which he wrote upon the art of hatching
chickens--which was indeed a very curious essay--had occasion to speak of
variations and monstrosities. One very remarkable case had come under his
notice of a variation in the form of a human member, in the person of a
Maltese, of the name of Gratio Kelleia, who was born with six fingers upon
each hand, and the like number of toes to each of his feet. That was a case
of spontaneous variation. Nobody knows why he was born with that number of
fingers and toes, and as we don't know, we call it a case of "spontaneous"
variation. There is another remarkable case also. I select these, because
they happen to have been observed and noted very carefully at the time. It
frequently happens that a variation occurs, but the persons who notice it
do not take any care in noting down the particulars, until at length, when
inquiries come to be made, the exact circumstances are forgotten; and
hence, multitudinous as may be such "spontaneous" variations, it is
exceedingly difficult to get at the origin of them.
The second case is one of which you may find the whole details in the
"Philosophical Transactions" for the year 1813, in a paper communicated by
Colonel Humphrey to the President of the Royal Society--"On a new Variety
in the Breed of Sheep," giving an account of a very remarkable breed of
sheep, which at one time was well known in the northern states of America,
and which went by the name of the Ancon or the Otter breed of sheep. In the
year 1791, there was a farmer of the name of Seth Wright in Massachusetts,
who had a flock of sheep, consisting of a ram and, I think, of some twelve
or thirteen ewes. Of this flock of ewes, one at the breeding-time bore a
lamb which was very singularly formed; it had a very long body, very short
legs, and those legs were bowed. I will tell you by and by how this
singular variation in the breed of sheep came to be noted, and to have the
prominence that it now has. For the present, I mention only these two
cases; but the extent of variation in the breed of animals is perfectly
obvious to any one who has studied natural history with ordinary attention,
or to any person who compares animals with others of the same kind. It is
strictly true that there are never any two specimens which are exactly
alike; however similar, they will always differ in some certain particular.
Now let us go back to Atavism--to the hereditary tendency I spoke of. What
will come of a variation when you breed from it, when Atavism comes, if I
may say so, to intersect variation? The two cases of which I have mentioned
the history give a most excellent illustration of what occurs. Gratio
Kelleia, the Maltese, married when he was twenty-two years of age, and, as
I suppose there were no six-fingered ladies in Malta, he married an
ordinary five-fingered person. The result of that marriage was four
children; the first, who was christened Salvator, had six fingers and six
toes, like his father; the second was George, who had five fingers and
toes, but one of them was deformed, showing a tendency to variation; the
third was Andrè; he had five fingers and five toes, quite perfect; the
fourth was a girl, Marie; she had five fingers and five toes, but her
thumbs were deformed, showing a tendency toward the sixth.
These children grew up, and when they came to adult years, they all
married, and of course it happened that they all married five-fingered and
five-toed persons. Now let us see what were the results. Salvator had four
children; they were two boys, a girl, and another boy; the first two boys
and the girl were six-fingered and six-toed like their grandfather; the
fourth boy had only five fingers and five toes. George had only four
children; there were two girls with six fingers and six toes; there was one
girl with six fingers and five toes on the right side, and five fingers and
five toes on the left side, so that she was half and half. The last, a boy,
had five fingers and five toes. The third, Andrè, you will recollect, was
perfectly well-formed, and he had many children whose hands and feet were
all regularly developed. Marie, the last, who, of course, married a man who
had only five fingers, had four children; the first, a boy, was born with
six toes, but the other three were normal.
Now observe what very extraordinary phenomena are presented here. You have
an accidental variation giving rise to what you may call a monstrosity; you
have that monstrosity or variation diluted in the first instance by an
admixture with a female of normal construction, and you would naturally
expect that, in the results of such an union, the monstrosity, if repeated,
would be in equal proportion with the normal type; that is to say, that the
children would be half and half, some taking the peculiarity of the father,
and the others being of the purely normal type of the mother; but you see
we have a great preponderance of the abnormal type. Well, this comes to be
mixed once more with the pure, the normal type, and the abnormal is again
produced in large proportion, notwithstanding the second dilution. Now what
would have happened if these abnormal types had intermarried with each
other; that is to say, suppose the two boys of Salvator had taken it into
their heads to marry their first cousins, the two first girls of George,
their uncle? You will remember that these are all of the abnormal type of
their grandfather. The result would probably have been, that their
offspring would have been in every case a further development of that
abnormal type. You see it is only in the fourth, in the person of Marie,
that the tendency, when it appears but slightly in the second generation,
is washed out in the third, while the progeny of Andrè, who escaped in the
first instance, escape altogether.
We have in this case a good example of nature's tendency to the
perpetuation of a variation. Here it is certainly a variation which earned
with it no use or benefit; and yet you see the tendency to perpetuation may
be so strong, that, notwithstanding a great admixture of pure blood, the
variety continues itself up to the third generation, which is largely
marked with it. In this case, as I have said, there was no means of the
second generation intermarrying with any but five-fingered persons, and the
question naturally suggests itself, What would have been the result of such
marriage? Réaumur narrates this case only as far as the third generation.
Certainly it would have been an exceedingly curious thing if we could have
traced this matter any further; had the cousins intermarried, a
six-fingered variety of the human race might have been set up.
To show you that this supposition is by no means an unreasonable one, let
me now point out what took place in the case of Seth Wright's sheep, where
it happened to be a matter of moment to him to obtain a breed or raise a
flock of sheep like that accidental variety that I have described--and I
will tell you why. In that part of Massachusetts where Seth Wright was
living, the fields were separated by fences, and the sheep, which were very
active and robust, would roam abroad, and without much difficulty jump over
these fences into other people's farms. As a matter of course, this
exuberant activity on the part of the sheep constantly gave rise to all
sorts of quarrels, bickerings, and contentions among the farmers of the
neighbourhood; so it occurred to Seth Wright, who was, like his successors,
more or less 'cute, that if he could get a stock of sheep like those with
the bandy legs, they would not be able to jump over the fences so readily;
and he acted upon that idea. He killed his old ram, and as soon as the
young one arrived at maturity, he bred altogether from it. The result was
even more striking than in the human experiment which I mentioned just now.
Colonel Humphreys testifies that it always happened that the offspring were
either pure Ancons or pure ordinary sheep; that in no case was there any
mixing of the Ancons with the others. In consequence of this, in the course
of a very few years, the farmer was able to get a very considerable flock
of this variety, and a large number of them were spread throughout
Massachusetts. Most unfortunately, however--I suppose it was because they
were so common--nobody took enough notice of them to preserve their
skeletons; and although Colonel Humphreys states that he sent a skeleton to
the President of the Royal Society at the same time that he forwarded his
paper, I am afraid that the variety has entirely disappeared; for a short
time after these sheep had become prevalent in that district, the Merino
sheep were introduced; and as their wool was much more valuable, and as
they were a quiet race of sheep, and showed no tendency to trespasser jump
over fences, the Otter breed of sheep, the wool of which was inferior to
that of the Merino, was gradually allowed to die out.
You see that these facts illustrate perfectly well what may be done if you
take care to breed from stocks that are similar to each other. After having
got a variation, if, by crossing a variation with the original stock, you
multiply that variation, and then take care to keep that variation distinct
from the original stock, and make them breed together,--then you may almost
certainly produce a race whose tendency to continue the variation is
exceedingly strong.
This is what is called "selection"; and it is by exactly the same process
as that by which Seth Wright bred his Ancon sheep, that our breeds of
cattle, dogs, and fowls are obtained. There are some possibilities of
exception, but still, speaking broadly, I may say that this is the way in
which all our varied races of domestic animals have arisen; and you must
understand that it is not one peculiarity or one characteristic alone in
which animals may vary. There is not a single peculiarity or characteristic
of any kind, bodily or mental, in which offspring may not vary to a certain
extent from the parent and other animals.
Among ourselves this is well known. The simplest physical peculiarity is
mostly reproduced. I know a case of a woman who has the lobe of one of her
ears a little flattened. An ordinary observer might scarcely notice it, and
yet every one of her children has an approximation to the same peculiarity
to some extent. If you look at the other extreme, too, the gravest
diseases, such as gout, scrofula, and consumption, may be handed down with
just the same certainty and persistence as we noticed in the perpetuation
of the bandy legs of the Ancon sheep.
However, these facts are best illustrated in animals, and the extent of the
variation, as is well known, is very remarkable in dogs. For example, there
are some dogs very much smaller than others; indeed, the variation is so
enormous that probably the smallest dog would be about the size of the head
of the largest; there are very great variations in the structural forms not
only of the skeleton but also in the shape of the skull, and in the
proportions of the face and the disposition of the teeth.
The Pointer, the Retriever, Bulldog, and the Terrier differ very greatly,
and yet there is every reason to believe that every one of these races has
arisen from the same source,--that all the most important races have arisen
by this selective breeding from accidental variation.
A still more striking case of what may be done by selective breeding, and
it is a better case, because there is no chance of that partial infusion of
error to which I alluded, has been studied very carefully by Mr.
Darwin,--the case of the domestic pigeons. I dare say there may be some
among you who may be pigeon _fanciers_, and I wish you to understand
that in approaching the subject, I would speak with all humility and
hesitation, as I regret to say that I am not a pigeon fancier. I know it is
a great art and mystery, and a thing upon which a man must not speak
lightly; but I shall endeavour, as far as my understanding goes, to give
you a summary of the published and unpublished information which I have
gained from Mr. Darwin.
Among the enormous variety,--I believe there are somewhere about a hundred
and fifty kinds of pigeons,--there are four kinds which may be selected as
representing the extremest divergences of one kind from another. Their
names are the Carrier, the Pouter, the Fantail, and the Tumbler. In these
large diagrams that I have here they are each represented in their relative
sizes to each other. This first one is the Carrier; you will notice this
large excrescence on its beak; it has a comparatively small head; there is
a bare space round the eyes; it has a long neck, a very long beak, very
strong legs, large feet, long wings, and so on. The second one is the
Pouter, a very large bird, with very long legs and beak. It is called the
Pouter because it is in the habit of causing its gullet to swell up by
inflating it with air. I should tell you that all pigeons have a tendency
to do this at times, but in the Pouter it is carried to an enormous extent.
The birds appear to be quite proud of their power of swelling and puffing
themselves out in this way; and I think it is about as droll a sight as you
can well see to look at a cage full of these pigeons puffing and blowing
themselves out in this ridiculous manner.
This diagram is a representation of the third kind I mentioned--the
Fantail. It is, you see, a small bird, with exceedingly small legs and a
very small beak. It is most curiously distinguished by the size and extent
of its tail, which, instead of containing twelve feathers, may have many
more,--say thirty, or even more--I believe there are some with as many as
forty-two. This bird has a curious habit of spreading out the feathers of
its tail in such a way that they reach forward and touch its head; and if
this can be accomplished, I believe it is looked upon as a point of great
beauty.
But here is the last great variety,--the Tumbler; and of that great
variety, one of the principal kinds, and one most prized, is the specimen
represented here--the short-faced Tumbler. Its beak, you see, is reduced to
a mere nothing. Just compare the beak of this one and that of the first
one, the Carrier--I believe the orthodox comparison of the head and beak of
a thoroughly well-bred Tumbler is to stick an oat into a cherry, and that
will give you the proper relative proportions of the beak and head. The
feet and legs are exceedingly small, and the bird appears to be quite a
dwarf when placed side by side with this great Carrier.
These are differences enough in regard to their external appearance; but
these differences are by no means the whole or even the most important of
the differences which obtain between these birds. There is hardly a single
point of their structure which has not become more or less altered; and to
give you an idea of how extensive these alterations are, I have here some
very good skeletons, for which I am indebted to my friend, Mr. Tegetmeier,
a great authority in these matters; by means of which, if you examine them
by and by, you will be able to see the enormous difference in their bony
structures.
I had the privilege, some time ago, of access to some important MSS. of Mr.
Darwin, who, I may tell you, has taken very great pains and spent much
valuable time and attention on the investigation of these variations, and
getting together all the facts that bear upon them. I obtained from these
MSS. the following summary of the differences between the domestic breeds
of pigeons; that is to say, a notification of the various points in which
their organisation differs. In the first place, the back of the skull may
differ a good deal, and the development of the bones of the face may vary a
great deal; the back varies a good deal; the shape of the lower jaw varies;
the tongue varies very greatly, not only in correlation to the length and
size of the beak, but it seems also to have a kind of independent variation
of its own. Then the amount of naked skin round the eyes, and at the base
of the beak, may vary enormously; so may the length of the eyelids, the
shape of the nostrils, and the length of the neck. I have already noticed
the habit of blowing out the gullet, so remarkable in the Pouter, and
comparatively so in the others. There are great differences, too, in the
size of the female and the male, the shape of the body, the number and
width of the processes of the ribs, the development of the ribs, and the
size, shape, and development of the breastbone. We may notice, too--and I
mention the fact because it has been disputed by what is assumed to be high
authority,--the variation in the number of the sacral vertebrae. The number
of these varies from eleven to fourteen, and that without any diminution in
the number of the vertebrae of the back or of the tail. Then the number and
position of the tail-feathers may vary enormously, and so may the number of
the primary and secondary feathers of the wings. Again, the length of the
feet and of the beak,--although they have no relation to each other, yet
appear to go together,--that is, you have a long beak wherever you have
long feet. There are differences also in the periods of the acquirement of
the perfect plumage--the size and shape of the eggs--the nature of flight,
and the powers of flight--so-called _"homing"_ birds having enormous
flying powers; [Footnote: The _"Carrier,"_ I learn from Mr.
Tegetmeier, does not _carry_; a high-bred bird of this breed being but
a poor flier. The birds which fly long distances, and come home--"homing"
birds-and are consequently used as carriers, are not "carriers" in the
fancy sense.] while, on the other hand, the little Tumbler is so called
because of its extraordinary faculty of turning head over heels in the air,
instead of pursuing a direct course. And, lastly, the dispositions and
voices of the birds may vary. Thus the case of the pigeons shows you that
there is hardly a single particular--whether of instinct, or habit, or bony
structure, or of plumage--of either the internal economy or the external
shape, in which some variation or change may not take place, which, by
selective breeding, may become perpetuated, and form the foundation of, and
give rise to, a new race.
If you carry in your mind's eye these four varieties of pigeons, you will
bear with you as good a notion as you can have, perhaps, of the enormous
extent to which a deviation from a primitive type may be carried by means
of this process of selective breeding.
V. THE CONDITIONS OF EXISTENCE AS AFFECTING THE PERPETUATION OF LIVING
BEINGS
In the last Lecture I endeavoured to prove to you that, while, as a general
rule, organic beings tend to reproduce their kind, there is in them, also,
a constantly recurring tendency to vary--to vary to a greater or to a less
extent. Such a variety, I pointed out to you, might arise from causes which
we do not understand; we therefore called it spontaneous; and it might come
into existence as a definite and marked thing, without any gradations
between itself and the form which preceded it. I further pointed out, that
such a variety having once arisen, might be perpetuated to some extent, and
indeed to a very marked extent, without any direct interference, or without
any exercise of that process which we called selection. And then I stated
further, that by such selection, when exercised artificially--if you took
care to breed only from those forms which presented the same peculiarities
of any variety which had arisen in this manner--the variation might be
perpetuated, as far as we can see, indefinitely.
The next question, and it is an important one for us, is this: Is there any
limit to the amount of variation from the primitive stock which can be
produced by this process of selective breeding? In considering this
question, it will be useful to class the characteristics, in respect of
which organic beings vary, under two heads: we may consider structural
characteristics, and we may consider physiological characteristics.
In the first place, as regards structural characteristics, I endeavoured to
show you, by the skeletons which I had upon the table, and by reference to
a great many well-ascertained facts, that the different breeds of Pigeons,
the Carriers, Pouters, and Tumblers, might vary in any of their internal
and important structural characters to a very great degree; not only might
there be changes in the proportions of the skull, and the characters of the
feet and beaks, and so on; but that there might be an absolute difference
in the number of the vertebrae of the back, as in the sacral vertebras of
the Pouter; and so great is the extent of the variation in these and
similar characters that I pointed out to you, by reference to the skeletons
and the diagrams, that these extreme varieties may absolutely differ more
from one another in their structural characters than do what naturalists
call distinct SPECIES of pigeons; that is to say, that they differ so much
in structure that there is a greater difference between the Pouter and the
Tumbler than there is between such wild and distinct forms as the Rock
Pigeon or the Ring Pigeon, or the Ring Pigeon and the Stock Dove; and
indeed the differences are of greater value than this, for the structural
differences between these domesticated pigeons are such as would be
admitted by a naturalist, supposing he knew nothing at all about their
origin, to entitle them to constitute even distinct genera.
As I have used this term SPECIES, and shall probably use it a good deal, I
had better perhaps devote a word or two to explaining what I mean by it.
Animals and plants are divided into groups, which become gradually smaller,
beginning with a KINGDOM, which is divided into SUB-KINGDOMS; then come the
smaller divisions called PROVINCES; and so on from a PROVINCE to a CLASS,
from a CLASS to an ORDER, from ORDERS to FAMILIES, and from these to
GENERA, until we come at length to the smallest groups of animals which can
be defined one from the other by constant characters, which are not sexual;
and these are what naturalists call SPECIES in practice, whatever they may
do in theory.
If, in a state of nature, you find any two groups of living beings, which
are separated one from the other by some constantly-recurring
characteristic, I don't care how slight and trivial, so long as it is
defined and constant, and does not depend on sexual peculiarities, then all
naturalists agree in calling them two species; that is what is meant by the
use of the word species--that is to say, it is, for the practical
naturalist, a mere question of structural differences. [Footnote: I lay
stress here on the _practical_ signification of "Species." Whether a
physiological test between species exist or not, it is hardly ever
applicable by the practical naturalist.] We have seen now--to repeat this
point once more, and it is very essential that we should rightly understand
it--we have seen that breeds, known to have been derived from a common
stock by selection, may be as different in their structure from the
original stock as species may be distinct from each other.
But is the like true of the physiological characteristics of animals? Do
the physiological differences of varieties amount in degree to those
observed between forms which naturalists call distinct species? This is a
most important point for us to consider.
As regards the great majority of physiological characteristics, there is no
doubt that they are capable of being developed, increased, and modified by
selection.
There is no doubt that breeds may be made as different as species in many
physiological characters. I have already pointed out to you very briefly
the different habits of the breeds of Pigeons, all of which depend upon
their physiological peculiarities--as the peculiar habit of tumbling, in
the Tumbler--the peculiarities of flight, in the "homing" birds--the
strange habit of spreading out the tail, and walking in a peculiar fashion,
in the Fantail--and, lastly, the habit of blowing out the gullet, so
characteristic of the Pouter. These are all due to physiological
modifications, and in all these respects these birds differ as much from
each other as any two ordinary species do.
So with Dogs in their habits and instincts. It is a physiological
peculiarity which leads the Greyhound to chase its prey by sight--that
enables the Beagle to track it by the scent--that impels the Terrier to its
rat-hunting propensity--and that leads the Retriever to its habit of
retrieving. These habits and instincts are all the results of physiological
differences and peculiarities, which have been developed from a common
stock, at least there is every reason to believe so. But it is a most
singular circumstance, that while you may run through almost the whole
series of physiological processes, without finding a check to your
argument, you come at last to a point where you do find a check, and that
is in the reproductive processes. For there is a most singular circumstance
in respect to natural species--at least about some of them--and it would be
sufficient for the purposes of this argument if it were true of only one of
them, but there is, in fact, a great number of such cases--and that is,
that, similar as they may appear to be to mere races or breeds, they
present a marked peculiarity in the reproductive process. If you breed from
the male and female of the same race, you of course have offspring of the
like kind, and if you make the offspring breed together, you obtain the
same result, and if you breed from these again, you will still have the
same kind of offspring; there is no check. But if you take members of two
distinct species, however similar they may be to each other, and make them
breed together, you will find a check, with some modifications and
exceptions, however, which I shall speak of presently. If you cross two
such species with each other, then--although you may get offspring in the
case of the first cross, yet, if you attempt to breed from the products of
that crossing, which are what are called HYBRIDS--that is, if you couple a
male and a female hybrid--then the result is that in ninety-nine cases out
of a hundred you will get no offspring at all; there will be no result
whatsoever.
The reason of this is quite obvious in some cases; the male hybrids,
although possessing all the external appearances and characteristics of
perfect animals, are physiologically imperfect and deficient in the
structural parts of the reproductive elements necessary to generation. It
is said to be invariably the case with the male mule, the cross between the
Ass and the Mare; and hence it is, that, although crossing the Horse with
the Ass is easy enough, and is constantly done, as far as I am aware, if
you take two mules, a male and a female, and endeavour to breed from them,
you get no offspring whatever; no generation will take place. This is what
is called the sterility of the hybrids between two distinct species.
You see that this is a very extraordinary circumstance; one does not see
why it should be. The common teleological explanation is, that it is to
prevent the impurity of the blood resulting from the crossing of one
species with another, but you see it does not in reality do anything of the
kind. There is nothing in this fact that hybrids cannot breed with each
other, to establish such a theory; there is nothing to prevent the Horse
breeding with the Ass, or the Ass with the Horse. So that this explanation
breaks down, as a great many explanations of this kind do, that are only
founded on mere assumptions.
Thus you see that there is a great difference between "mongrels," which are
crosses between distinct races, and "hybrids," which are crosses between
distinct species. The mongrels are, so far as we know, fertile with one
another. But between species, in many cases, you cannot succeed in
obtaining even the first cross; at any rate it is quite certain that the
hybrids are often absolutely infertile one with another.
Here is a feature, then, great or small as it may be, which distinguishes
natural species of animals. Can we find any approximation to this in the
different races known to be produced by selective breeding from a common
stock? Up to the present time the answer to that question is absolutely a
negative one. As far as we know at present, there is nothing approximating
to this check. In crossing the breeds between the Fantail and the Pouter,
the Carrier and the Tumbler, or any other variety or race you may name--so
far as we know at present--there is no difficulty in breeding together the
mongrels. Take the Carrier and the Fantail, for instance, and let them
represent the Horse and the Ass in the case of distinct species; then you
have, as the result of their breeding, the Carrier-Fantail mongrel,--we
will say the male and female mongrel,--and, as far as we know, these two
when crossed would not be less fertile than the original cross, or than
Carrier with Carrier. Here, you see, is a physiological contrast between
the races produced by selective modification and natural species. I shall
inquire into the value of this fact, and of some modifying circumstances by
and by; for the present I merely put it broadly before you.
But while considering this question of the limitations of species, a word
must be said about what is called RECURRENCE--the tendency of races which
have been developed by selective breeding from varieties to return to their
primitive type. This is supposed by many to put an absolute limit to the
extent of selective and all other variations. People say, "It is all very
well to talk about producing these different races, but you know very well
that if you turned all these birds wild, these Pouters, and Carriers, and
so on, they would all return to their primitive stock." This is very
commonly assumed to be a fact, and it is an argument that is commonly
brought forward as conclusive; but if you will take the trouble to inquire
into it rather closely, I think you will find that it is not worth very
much. The first question of course is, Do they thus return to the primitive
stock? And commonly as the thing is assumed and accepted, it is extremely
difficult to get anything like good evidence of it. It is constantly said,
for example, that if domesticated Horses are turned wild, as they have been
in some parts of Asia Minor and South America, that they return at once to
the primitive stock from which they were bred. But the first answer that
you make to this assumption is, to ask who knows what the primitive stock
was; and the second answer is, that in that case the wild Horses of Asia
Minor ought to be exactly like the wild Horses of South America. If they
are both like the same thing, they ought manifestly to be like each other!
The best authorities, however, tell you that it is quite different. The
wild Horse of Asia is said to be of a dun colour, with a largish head, and
a great many other peculiarities; while the best authorities on the wild
Horses of South America tell you that there is no similarity between their
wild Horses and those of Asia Minor; the cut of their heads is very
different, and they are commonly chestnut or bay-coloured. It is quite
clear, therefore, that as by these facts there ought to have been two
primitive stocks, they go for nothing in support of the assumption that
races recur to one primitive stock, and so far as this evidence is
concerned, it falls to the ground.
Suppose for a moment that it were so, and that domesticated races, when
turned wild, did return to some common condition, I cannot see that this
would prove much more than that similar conditions are likely to produce
similar results; and that when you take back domesticated animals into what
we call natural conditions, you do exactly the same thing as if you
carefully undid all the work you had gone through, for the purpose of
bringing the animal from its wild to its domesticated state. I do not see
anything very wonderful in the fact, if it took all that trouble to get it
from a wild state, that it should go back into its original state as soon
as you removed the conditions which produced the variation to the
domesticated form. There is an important fact, however, forcibly brought
forward by Mr. Darwin, which has been noticed in connection with the
breeding of domesticated pigeons; and it is, that however different these
breeds of pigeons may be from each other, and we have already noticed the
great differences in these breeds, that if, among any of those variations,
you chance to have a blue pigeon turn up, it will be sure to have the black
bars across the wings, which are characteristic of the original wild stock,
the Rock Pigeon.
Now, this is certainly a very remarkable circumstance; but I do not see
myself how it tells very strongly either one way or the other. I think, in
fact, that this argument in favour of recurrence to the primitive type
might prove a great deal too much for those who so constantly bring it
forward. For example, Mr. Darwin has very forcibly urged, that nothing is
commoner than if you examine a dun horse--and I had an opportunity of
verifying this illustration lately while in the islands of the West
Highlands, where there are a great many dun horses--to find that horse
exhibit a long black stripe down his back, very often stripes on his
shoulder, and very often stripes on his legs. I, myself, saw a pony of this
description a short time ago, in a baker's cart, near Rothesay, in Bute: it
had the long stripe down the back, and stripes on the shoulders and legs,
just like those of the Ass, the Quagga, and the Zebra. Now, if we interpret
the theory of recurrence as applied to this case, might it not be said that
here was a case of a variation exhibiting the characters and conditions of
an animal occupying something like an intermediate position between the
Horse, the Ass, the Quagga, and the Zebra, and from which these had been
developed? In the same way with regard even to Man. Every anatomist will
tell you that there is nothing commoner, in dissecting the human body, than
to meet with what are called muscular variations--that is, if you dissect
two bodies very carefully, you will probably find that the modes of
attachment and insertion of the muscles are not exactly the same in both,
there being great peculiarities in the mode in which the muscles are
arranged; and it is very singular, that in some dissections of the human
body you will come upon arrangements of the muscles very similar indeed to
the same parts in the Apes. Is the conclusion in that case to be, that this
is like the black bars in the case of the Pigeon, and that it indicates a
recurrence to the primitive type from which the animals have been probably
developed? Truly, I think that the opponents of modification and variation
had better leave the argument of recurrence alone, or it may prove
altogether too strong for them.
To sum up,--the evidence as far as we have gone is against the argument as
to any limit to divergences, so far as structure is concerned; and in
favour of a physiological limitation. By selective breeding we can produce
structural divergences as great as those of species, but we cannot produce
equal physiological divergences. For the present I leave the question
there.
Now, the next problem that lies before us--and it is an extremely important
one--is this: Does this selective breeding occur in nature? Because, if
there is no proof of it, all that I have been telling you goes for nothing
in accounting for the origin of species. Are natural causes competent to
play the part of selection in perpetuating varieties? Here we labour under
very great difficulties. In the last lecture I had occasion to point out to
you the extreme difficulty of obtaining evidence even of the first origin
of those varieties which we know to have occurred in domesticated animals.
I told you, that almost always the origin of these varieties is overlooked,
so that I could only produce two or three cases, as that of Gratio Kelleia
and of the Ancon sheep. People forget, or do not take notice of them until
they come to have a prominence; and if that is true of artificial cases,
under our own eyes, and in animals in our own care, how much more difficult
it must be to have at first hand good evidence of the origin of varieties
in nature! Indeed, I do not know that it is possible by direct evidence to
prove the origin of a variety in nature, or to prove selective breeding;
but I will tell you what we can prove--and this comes to the same
thing--that varieties exist in nature within the limits of species, and,
what is more, that when a variety has come into existence in nature, there
are natural causes and conditions, which are amply competent to play the
part of a selective breeder; and although that is not quite the evidence
that one would like to have--though it is not direct testimony--yet it is
exceeding good and exceedingly powerful evidence in its way.
As to the first point, of varieties existing among natural species, I might
appeal to the universal experience of every naturalist, and of any person
who has ever turned any attention at all to the characteristics of plants
and animals in a state of nature; but I may as well take a few definite
cases, and I will begin with Man himself.
I am one of those who believe that, at present, there is no evidence
whatever for saying, that mankind sprang originally from any more than a
single pair; I must say, that I cannot see any good ground whatever, or
even any tenable sort of evidence, for believing that there is more than
one species of Man. Nevertheless, as you know, just as there are numbers of
varieties in animals, so there are remarkable varieties of men. I speak not
merely of those broad and distinct variations which you see at a glance.
Everybody, of course, knows the difference between a Negro and a white man,
and can tell a Chinaman from an Englishman. They each have peculiar
characteristics of colour and physiognomy; but you must recollect that the
characters of these races go very far deeper--they extend to the bony
structure, and to the characters of that most important of all organs to
us--the brain; so that, among men belonging to different races, or even
within the same race, one man shall have a brain a third, or half, or even
seventy per cent, bigger than another; and if you take the whole range of
human brains, you will find a variation in some cases of a hundred per
cent. Apart from these variations in the size of the brain, the characters
of the skull vary. Thus if I draw the figures of a Mongol and of a Negro
head on the blackboard, in the case of the last the breadth would be about
seven-tenths, and in the other it would be nine-tenths of the total length.
So that you see there is abundant evidence of variation among men in their
natural condition. And if you turn to other animals there is just the same
thing. The fox, for example, which has a very large geographical
distribution all over Europe, and parts of Asia, and on the American
Continent, varies greatly. There are mostly large foxes in the North, and
smaller ones in the South. In Germany alone the foresters reckon some eight
different sorts.
Of the tiger, no one supposes that there is more than one species; they
extend from the hottest parts of Bengal, into the dry, cold, bitter steppes
of Siberia, into a latitude of 50°,--so that they may even prey upon the
reindeer. These tigers have exceedingly different characteristics, but
still they all keep their general features, so that there is no doubt as to
their being tigers. The Siberian tiger has a thick fur, a small mane, and a
longitudinal stripe down the back, while the tigers of Java and Sumatra
differ in many important respects from the tigers of Northern Asia. So
lions vary; so birds vary; and so, if you go further back and lower down in
creation, you find that fishes vary. In different streams, in the same
country even, you will find the trout to be quite different to each other
and easily recognisable by those who fish in the particular streams. There
is the same differences in leeches; leech collectors can easily point out
to you the differences and the peculiarities which you yourself would
probably pass by; so with fresh-water mussels; so, in fact, with every
animal you can mention.
In plants there is the same kind of variation. Take such a case even as the
common bramble. The botanists are all at war about it; some of them wanting
to make out that there are many species of it, and others maintaining that
they are but many varieties of one species; and they cannot settle to this
day which is a species and which is a variety!
So that there can be no doubt whatsoever that any plant and any animal may
vary in nature; that varieties may arise in the way I have described--as
spontaneous varieties--and that those varieties may be perpetuated in the
same way that I have shown you spontaneous varieties are perpetuated; I
say, therefore, that there can be no doubt as to the origin and
perpetuation of varieties in nature.
But the question now is:--Does selection take place in nature? Is there
anything like the operation of man in exercising selective breeding, taking
place in nature? You will observe that, at present, I say nothing about
species; I wish to confine myself to the consideration of the production of
those natural races which everybody admits to exist. The question is,
whether in nature there are causes competent to produce races, just in the
same way as man is able to produce by selection, such races of animals as
we have already noticed.
When a variety has arisen, the CONDITIONS OF EXISTENCE are such as to
exercise an influence which is exactly comparable to that of artificial
selection. By Conditions of Existence I mean two things--there are
conditions which are furnished by the physical, the inorganic world, and
there are conditions of existence which are furnished by the organic world.
There is, in the first place, CLIMATE; under that head I include only
temperature and the varied amount of moisture of particular places. In the
next place there is what is technically called STATION, which means--given
the climate, the particular kind of place in which an animal or a plant
lives or grows; for example, the station of a fish is in the water, of a
fresh-water fish in fresh water; the station of a marine fish is in the
sea, and a marine animal may have a station higher or deeper. So again with
land animals: the differences in their stations are those of different
soils and neighbourhoods; some being best adapted to a calcareous, and
others to an arenaceous soil. The third condition of existence is FOOD, by
which I mean food in the broadest sense, the supply of the materials
necessary to the existence of an organic being; in the case of a plant the
inorganic matters, such as carbonic acid, water, ammonia, and the earthy
salts or salines; in the case of the animal the inorganic and organic
matters, which we have seen they require; then these are all, at least the
first two, what we may call the inorganic or physical conditions of
existence. Food takes a mid-place, and then come the organic conditions; by
which I mean the conditions which depend upon the state of the rest of the
organic creation, upon the number and kind of living beings, with which an
animal is surrounded. You may class these under two heads: there are
organic beings, which operate as _opponents_, and there are organic
beings which operate as _helpers_ to any given organic creature. The
opponents may be of two kinds: there are the _indirect opponents_,
which are what we may call _rivals_; and there are the _direct
opponents_, those which strive to destroy the creature; and these we
call _enemies_. By rivals I mean, of course, in the case of plants,
those which require for their support the same kind of soil and station,
and, among animals, those which require the same kind of station, or food,
or climate; those are the indirect opponents; the direct opponents are, of
course, those which prey upon an animal or vegetable. The _helpers_
may also be regarded as direct and indirect: in the case of a carnivorous
animal, for example, a particular herbaceous plant may, in multiplying, be
an indirect helper, by enabling the herbivora on which the carnivore preys
to get more food, and thus to nourish the carnivore more abundantly; the
direct helper may be best illustrated by reference to some parasitic
creature, such as the tape-worm. The tape-worm exists in the human
intestines, so that the fewer there are of men the fewer there will be of
tape-worms, other things being alike. It is a humiliating reflection,
perhaps, that we may be classed as direct helpers to the tape-worm, but the
fact is so: we can all see that if there were no men there would be no
tape-worms.
It is extremely difficult to estimate, in a proper way, the importance and
the working of the Conditions of Existence. I do not think there were any
of us who had the remotest notion of properly estimating them until the
publication of Mr. Darwin's work, which has placed them before us with
remarkable clearness; and I must endeavour, as far as I can in my own
fashion, to give you some notion of how they work. We shall find it easiest
to take a simple case, and one as free as possible from every kind of
complication.
I will suppose, therefore, that all the habitable part of this globe--the
dry land, amounting to about 51,000,000 square miles--I will suppose that
the whole of that dry land has the same climate, and that it is composed of
the same kind of rock or soil, so that there will be the same station
everywhere; we thus get rid of the peculiar influence of different climates
and stations. I will then imagine that there shall be but one organic being
in the world, and that shall be a plant. In this we start fair. Its food is
to be carbonic acid, water and ammonia, and the saline matters in the soil,
which are, by the supposition, everywhere alike. We take one single plant,
with no opponents, no helpers, and no rivals; it is to be a "fair field,
and no favour." Now, I will ask you to imagine further that it shall be a
plant which shall produce every year fifty seeds, which is a very moderate
number for a plant to produce; and that, by the action of the winds and
currents, these seeds shall be equally and gradually distributed over the
whole surface of the land. I want you now to trace out what will occur, and
you will observe that I am not talking fallaciously any more than a
mathematician does when he expounds his problem. If you show that the
conditions of your problem are such as may actually occur in Nature and do
not transgress any of the known laws of Nature in working out your
proposition, then you are as safe in the conclusion you arrive at as is the
mathematician in arriving at the solution of his problem. In science, the
only way of getting rid of the complications with which a subject of this
kind is environed, is to work in this deductive method. What will be the
result, then? I will suppose that every plant requires one square foot of
ground to live upon; and the result will be that, in the course of nine
years, the plant will have occupied every single available spot in the
whole globe! I have chalked upon the blackboard the figures by which I
arrive at the result:--
Plants. Plants.
1 x 50 in 1st year = 50
50 x 50 " 2nd " = 2,500
2,500 x 50 " 3rd " = 125,000
125,000 x 50 " 4th " = 6,250,000
6,250,000 x 50 " 5th " = 312,500,000
312,500,000 x 50 " 6th " = 15,625,000,000
15,625,000,000 x 50 " 7th " = 781,250,000,000
781,250,000,000 x 50 " 8th " = 39,062,500,000,000
39,062,500,000,000 x 50 " 9th " = 1,953,125,000,000,000
51,000,000 square miles--the )
dry surface of the earth x )
27,878,400--the number of ) = sq. ft. 1,421,798,400,000,000
sq. ft. in 1 sq. mile ) ---------------------
being 531,326,600,000,000
square feet less than would be required at the end of the ninth
year.
You will see from this that, at the end of the first year the single plant
will have produced fifty more of its kind; by the end of the second year
these will have increased to 2,500; and so on, in succeeding years, you get
beyond even trillions; and I am not at all sure that I could tell you what
the proper arithmetical denomination of the total number really is; but, at
any rate, you will understand the meaning of all those noughts. Then you
see that, at the bottom, I have taken the 51,000,000 of square miles,
constituting the surface of the dry land; and as the number of square feet
are placed under and subtracted from the number of seeds that would be
produced in the ninth year, you can see at once that there would be an
immense number more of plants than there would be square feet of ground for
their accommodation. This is certainly quite enough to prove my point; that
between the eighth and ninth year after being planted the single plant
would have stocked the whole available surface of the earth.
This is a thing which is hardly conceivable--it seems hardly
imaginable--yet it is so. It is indeed simply the law of Malthus
exemplified. Mr. Malthus was a clergyman, who worked out this subject most
minutely and truthfully some years ago; he showed quite clearly--and
although he was much abused for his conclusions at the time, they have
never yet been disproved and never will be--he showed that in consequence
of the increase in the number of organic beings in a geometrical ratio,
while the means of existence cannot be made to increase in the same ratio,
that there must come a time when the number of organic beings will be in
excess of the power of production of nutriment, and that thus some check
must arise to the further increase of those organic beings. At the end of
the ninth year we have seen that each plant would not be able to get its
full square foot of ground, and at the end of another year it would have to
share that space with fifty others the produce of the seeds which it would
give off.
What, then, takes place? Every plant grows up, flourishes, occupies its
square foot of ground, and gives off its fifty seeds; but notice this, that
out of this number only one can come to anything; there is thus, as it
were, forty-nine chances to one against its growing up; it depends upon the
most fortuitous circumstances whether any one of these fifty seeds shall
grow up and flourish, or whether it shall die and perish. This is what Mr.
Darwin has drawn attention to, and called the "STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE"; and
I have taken this simple case of a plant because some people imagine that
the phrase seems to imply a sort of fight.
I have taken this plant and shown you that this is the result of the ratio
of the increase, the necessary result of the arrival of a time coming for
every species when exactly as many members must be destroyed as are born;
that is the inevitable ultimate result of the rate of production. Now, what
is the result of all this? I have said that there are forty-nine struggling
against every one; and it amounts to this, that the smallest possible start
given to any one seed may give it an advantage which will enable it to get
ahead of all the others; anything that will enable any one of these seeds
to germinate six hours before any of the others will, other things being
alike, enable it to choke them out altogether. I have shown you that there
is no particular in which plants will not vary from each other; it is quite
possible that one of our imaginary plants may vary in such a character as
the thickness of the integument of its seeds; it might happen that one of
the plants might produce seeds having a thinner integument, and that would
enable the seeds of that plant to germinate a little quicker than those of
any of the others, and those seeds would most inevitably extinguish the
forty-nine times as many that were struggling with them.
I have put it in this way, but you see the practical result of the process
is the same as if some person had nurtured the one and destroyed the other
seeds. It does not matter how the variation is produced, so long as it is
once allowed to occur. The variation in the plant once fairly started tends
to become hereditary and reproduce itself; the seeds would spread
themselves in the same way and take part in the struggle with the
forty-nine hundred, or forty-nine thousand, with which they might be
exposed. Thus, by degrees, this variety with some slight organic change or
modification, must spread itself over the whole surface of the habitable
globe, and extirpate or replace the other kinds. That is what is meant by
NATURAL SELECTION; that is the kind of argument by which it is perfectly
demonstrable that the conditions of existence may play exactly the same
part for natural varieties as man does for domesticated varieties. No one
doubts at all that particular circumstances may be more favourable for one
plant and less so for another, and the moment you admit that, you admit the
selective power of nature. Now, although I have been putting a hypothetical
case, you must not suppose that I have been reasoning hypothetically. There
are plenty of direct experiments which bear out what we may call the theory
of natural selection; there is extremely good authority for the statement
that if you take the seed of mixed varieties of wheat and sow it,
collecting the seed next year and sowing it again, at length you will find
that out of all your varieties only two or three have lived, or perhaps
even only one. There were one or two varieties which were best fitted to
get on, and they have killed out the other kinds in just the same way and
with just the same certainty as if you had taken the trouble to remove
them. As I have already said, the operation of nature is exactly the same
as the artificial operation of man.
But if this be true of that simple case, which I put before you, where
there is nothing but the rivalry of one member of a species with others,
what must be the operation of selective conditions, when you recollect as a
matter of fact, that for every species of animal or plant there are fifty
or a hundred species which might all, more or less, be comprehended in the
same climate, food, and station;--that every plant has multitudinous
animals which prey upon it, and which are its direct opponents; and that
these have other animals preying upon them,--that every plant has its
indirect helpers in the birds that scatter abroad its seed, and the animals
that manure it with their dung;--I say, when these things are considered,
it seems impossible that any variation which may arise in a species in
nature should not tend in some way or other either to be a little better or
worse than the previous stock; if it is a little better it will have an
advantage over and tend to extirpate the latter in this crush and struggle;
and if it is a little worse it will itself be extirpated.
I know nothing that more appropriately expresses this, than the phrase,
"the struggle for existence "; because it brings before your minds, in a
vivid sort of way, some of the simplest possible circumstances connected
with it. When a struggle is intense there must be some who are sure to be
trodden down, crushed, and overpowered by others; and there will be some
who just manage to get through only by the help of the slightest accident.
I recollect reading an account of the famous retreat of the French troops,
under Napoleon, from Moscow. Worn out, tired, and dejected, they at length
came to a great river over which there was but one bridge for the passage
of the vast army. Disorganised and demoralised as that army was, the
struggle must certainly have been a terrible one--every one heeding only
himself, and crushing through the ranks and treading down his fellows. The
writer of the narrative, who was himself one of those who were fortunate
enough to succeed in getting over, and not among the thousands who were
left behind or forced into the river, ascribed his escape to the fact that
he saw striding onward through the mass a great strong fellow,--one of the
French Cuirassiers, who had on a large blue cloak-and he had enough
presence of mind to catch and retain a hold of this strong man's cloak. He
says, "I caught hold of his cloak, and although he swore at me and cut at
and struck me by turns, and at last, when he found he could not shake me
off, fell to entreating me to leave go or I should prevent him from
escaping, besides not assisting myself, I still kept tight hold of him, and
would not quit my grasp until he had at last dragged me through." Here you
see was a case of selective saving--if we may so term it--depending for its
success on the strength of the cloth of the Cuirassier's cloak. It is the
same in nature; every species has its bridge of Beresina; it has to fight
its way through and struggle with other species; and when well-nigh
overpowered, it may be that the smallest chance, something in its colour,
perhaps--the minutest circumstance--will turn the scale one way or the
other.
Suppose that by a variation of the black race it had produced the white man
at any time--you know that the Negroes are said to believe this to have
been the case, and to imagine that Cain was the first white man, and that
we are his descendants--suppose that this had ever happened, and that the
first residence of this human being was on the West Coast of Africa. There
is no great structural difference between the white man and the Negro, and
yet there is something so singularly different in the constitution of the
two, that the malarias of that country, which do not hurt the black at all,
cut off and destroy the white. Then you see there would have been a
selective operation performed; if the white man had risen in that way, he
would have been selected out and removed by means of the malaria. Now there
really is a very curious case of selection of this sort among pigs, and it
is a case of selection of colour too. In the woods of Florida there are a
great many pigs, and it is a very curious thing that they are all black,
every one of them. Professor Wyman was there some years ago, and on
noticing no pigs but these black ones, he asked some of the people how it
was that they had no white pigs, and the reply was that in the woods of
Florida there was a root which they called the Paint Root, and that if the
white pigs were to eat any of it, it had the effect of making their hoofs
crack, and they died, but if the black pigs ate any of it, it did not hurt
them at all. Here was a very simple case of natural selection. A skilful
breeder could not more carefully develop the black breed of pigs, and weed
out all the white pigs, than the Paint Root does.
To show you how remarkably indirect may be such natural selective agencies
as I have referred to, I will conclude by noticing a case mentioned by Mr.
Darwin, and which is certainly one of the most curious of its kind. It is
that of the Humble Bee. It has been noticed that there are a great many
more humble bees in the neighbourhood of towns, than out in the open
country; and the explanation of the matter is this: the humble bees build
nests, in which they store their honey and deposit the larvæ and eggs. The
field mice are amazingly fond of the honey and larvæ; therefore, wherever
there are plenty of field mice, as in the country, the humble bees are kept
down; but in the neighbourhood of towns, the number of cats which prowl
about the fields eat up the field mice, and of course the more mice they
eat up the less there are to prey upon the larvæ of the bees--the cats are
therefore the INDIRECT HELPERS of the bees. [Footnote: The humble bees, on
the other hand, are direct helpers of some plants, such as the heartsease
and red clover, which are fertilised by the visits of the bees; and they
are indirect helpers of the numerous insects which are more or less
completely supported by the heartsease and red clover.] Coming back a step
farther we may say that the old maids are also indirect friends of the
humble bees, and indirect enemies of the field mice, as they keep the cats
which eat up the latter! This is an illustration somewhat beneath the
dignity of the subject, perhaps, but it occurs to me in passing, and with
it I will conclude this lecture.
VI. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE POSITION OF MR. DARWIN'S WORK, "ON THE
ORIGIN OF SPECIES," IN RELATION TO THE COMPLETE THEORY OF THE CAUSES OF THE
PHENOMENA OF ORGANIC NATURE
In the preceding five lectures I have endeavoured to give you an account of
those facts, and of those reasonings from facts, which form the data upon
which all theories regarding the causes of the phenomena of organic nature
must be based. And, although I have had frequent occasion to quote Mr.
Darwin--as all persons hereafter, in speaking upon these subjects, will
have occasion to quote his famous book on the "Origin of Species,"--you
must yet remember that, wherever I have quoted him, it has not been upon
theoretical points, or for statements in any way connected with his
particular speculations, but on matters of fact, brought forward by
himself, or collected by himself, and which appear incidentally in his
book. If a man _will_ make a book, professing to discuss a single
question, an encyclopædia, I cannot help it.
Now, having had an opportunity of considering in this sort of way the
different statements bearing upon all theories whatsoever, I have to lay
before you, as fairly as I can, what is Mr. Darwin's view of the matter and
what position his theories hold, when judged by the principles which I have
previously laid down, as deciding our judgments upon all theories and
hypotheses.
I have already stated to you that the inquiry respecting the causes of the
phenomena of organic nature resolves itself into two problems--the first
being the question of the origination of living or organic beings; and the
second being the totally distinct problem of the modification and
perpetuation of organic beings when they have already come into existence.
The first question Mr. Darwin does not touch; he does not deal with it at
all; but he says:--"Given the origin of organic matter--supposing its
creation to have already taken place, my object is to show in consequence
of what laws and what demonstrable properties of organic matter, and of its
environments, such states of organic nature as those with which we are
acquainted must have come about." This, you will observe, is a perfectly
legitimate proposition; every person has a right to define the limits of
the inquiry which he sets before himself; and yet it is a most singular
thing that in all the multifarious, and, not unfrequently, ignorant attacks
which have been made upon the "Origin of Species," there is nothing which
has been more speciously criticised than this particular limitation. If
people have nothing else to urge against the book, they say--"Well, after
all, you see Mr. Darwin's explanation of the 'Origin of Species' is not
good for much, because, in the long run, he admits that he does not know
how organic matter began to exist. But if you admit any special creation
for the first particle of organic matter you may just as well admit it for
all the rest; five hundred or five thousand distinct creations are just as
intelligible, and just as little difficult to understand, as one." The
answer to these cavils is two-fold. In the first place, all human inquiry
must stop somewhere; all our knowledge and all our investigation cannot
take us beyond the limits set by the finite and restricted character of our
faculties, or destroy the endless unknown, which accompanies, like its
shadow, the endless procession of phenomena. So far as I can venture to
offer an opinion on such a matter, the purpose of our being in existence,
the highest object that human beings can set before themselves, is not the
pursuit of any such chimera as the annihilation of the unknown; but it is
simply the unwearied endeavour to remove its boundaries a little further
from our little sphere of action.
I wonder if any historian would for a moment admit the objection, that it
is preposterous to trouble ourselves about the history of the Roman Empire,
because we do not know anything positive about the origin and first
building of the city of Rome! Would it be a fair objection to urge,
respecting the sublime discoveries of a Newton, or a Kepler, those great
philosophers, whose discoveries have been of the profoundest benefit and
service to all men--to say to them--"After all that you have told us as to
how the planets revolve, and how they are maintained in their orbits, you
cannot tell us what is the cause of the origin of the sun, moon, and stars.
So what is the use of what you have done?" Yet these objections would not
be one whit more preposterous than the objections which have been made to
the "Origin of Species." Mr. Darwin, then, had a perfect right to limit his
inquiry as he pleased, and the only question for us--the inquiry being so
limited--is to ascertain whether the method of his inquiry is sound or
unsound; whether he has obeyed the canons which must guide and govern all
investigation, or whether he has broken them; and it was because our
inquiry this evening is essentially limited to that question, that I spent
a good deal of time in a former lecture (which, perhaps some of you thought
might have been better employed), in endeavouring to illustrate the method
and nature of scientific inquiry in general. We shall now have to put in
practice the principles that I then laid down.
I stated to you in substance, if not in words, that wherever there are
complex masses of phenomena to be inquired into, whether they be phenomena
of the affairs of daily life, or whether they belong to the more abstruse
and difficult problems laid before the philosopher, our course of
proceeding in unravelling that complex chain of phenomena with a view to
get at its cause, is always the same; in all cases we must invent an
hypothesis; we must place before ourselves some more or less likely
supposition respecting that cause; and then, having assumed an hypothesis,
having supposed a cause for the phenomena in question, we must endeavour,
on the one hand, to demonstrate our hypothesis, or, on the other, to upset
and reject it altogether, by testing it in three ways. We must, in the
first place, be prepared to prove that the supposed causes of the phenomena
exist in nature; that they are what the logicians call _vera
causæ_--true causes;--in the next place, we should be prepared to show
that the assumed causes of the phenomena are competent to produce such
phenomena as those which we wish to explain by them; and in the last place,
we ought to be able to show that no other known causes are competent to
produce these phenomena. If we can succeed in satisfying these three
conditions we shall have demonstrated our hypothesis; or rather I ought to
say we shall have proved it as far as certainty is possible for us; for,
after all, there is no one of our surest convictions which may not be
upset, or at any rate modified by a further accession of knowledge. It was
because it satisfied these conditions that we accepted the hypothesis as to
the disappearance of the tea-pot and spoons in the case I supposed in a
previous lecture; we found that our hypothesis on that subject was tenable
and valid, because the supposed cause existed in nature, because it was
competent to account for the phenomena, and because no other known cause
was competent to account for them; and it is upon similar grounds that any
hypothesis you choose to name is accepted in science as tenable and valid.
What is Mr. Darwin's hypothesis? As I apprehend it--for I have put it into
a shape more convenient for common purposes than I could find
_verbatim_ in his book--as I apprehend it, I say, it is, that all the
phenomena of organic nature, past and present, result from, or are caused
by, the inter-action of those properties of organic matter, which we have
called ATAVISM and VARIABILITY, with the CONDITIONS OF EXISTENCE, or, in
other words,--given the existence of organic matter, its tendency to
transmit its properties, and its tendency occasionally to vary; and,
lastly, given the conditions of existence by which organic matter is
surrounded--that these put together are the causes of the Present and of
the Past conditions of ORGANIC NATURE.
Such is the hypothesis as I understand it. Now let us see how it will stand
the various tests which I laid down just now. In the first place, do these
supposed causes of the phenomena exist in nature? Is it the fact that, in
nature, these properties of organic matter--atavism and variability--and
those phenomena which we have called the conditions of existence,--is it
true that they exist? Well, of course, if they do not exist, all that I
have told you in the last three or four lectures must be incorrect, because
I have been attempting to prove that they do exist, and I take it that
there is abundant evidence that they do exist; so far, therefore, the
hypothesis does not break down.
But in the next place comes a much more difficult inquiry:--Are the causes
indicated competent to give rise to the phenomena of organic nature? I
suspect that this is indubitable to a certain extent. It is demonstrable, I
think, as I have endeavoured to show you, that they are perfectly competent
to give rise to all the phenomena which are exhibited by RACES in nature.
Furthermore, I believe that they are quite competent to account for all
that we may call purely structural phenomena which are exhibited by SPECIES
in nature. On that point also I have already enlarged somewhat. Again, I
think that the causes assumed are competent to account for most of the
physiological characteristics of species, and I not only think that they
are competent to account for them, but I think that they account for many
things which otherwise remain wholly unaccountable and inexplicable, and I
may say incomprehensible. For a full exposition of the grounds on which
this conviction is based, I must refer you to Mr. Darwin's work; all that I
can do now is to illustrate what I have said by two or three cases taken
almost at random.
I drew your attention, on a previous evening, to the facts which are
embodied in our systems of Classification, which are the results of the
examination and comparison of the different members of the animal kingdom
one with another. I mentioned that the whole of the animal kingdom is
divisible into five sub-kingdoms; that each of these sub-kingdoms is again
divisible into provinces; that each province may be divided into classes,
and the classes into the successively smaller groups, orders, families,
genera, and species.
Now, in each of these groups the resemblance in structure among the members
of the group is closer in proportion as the group is smaller. Thus, a man
and a worm are members of the animal kingdom in virtue of certain
apparently slight though really fundamental resemblances which they
present. But a man and a fish are members of the same sub-kingdom
_Vertebrata_, because they are much more like one another than either
of them is to a worm, or a snail, or any member of the other sub-kingdoms.
For similar reasons men and horses are arranged as members of the same
Class, _Mammalia_; men and apes as members of the same Order,
_Primates_; and if there were any animals more like men than they were
like any of the apes, and yet different from men in important and constant
particulars of their organisation, we should rank them as members of the
same Family, or of the same Genus, but as of distinct Species.
That it is possible to arrange all the varied forms of animals into groups,
having this sort of singular subordination one to the other, is a very
remarkable circumstance; but, as Mr. Darwin remarks, this is a result which
is quite to be expected, if the principles which he lays down be correct.
Take the case of the races which are known to be produced by the operation
of atavism and variability, and the conditions of existence which check and
modify these tendencies. Take the case of the pigeons that I brought before
you: there it was shown that they might be all classed as belonging to some
one of five principal divisions, and that within these divisions other
subordinate groups might be formed. The members of these groups are related
to one another in just the same way as the genera of a family, and the
groups themselves as the families of an order, or the orders of a class;
while all have the same sort of structural relations with the wild
rock-pigeon, as the members of any great natural group have with a real or
imaginary typical form. Now, we know that all varieties of pigeons of every
kind have arisen by a process of selective breeding from a common stock,
the rock-pigeon; hence, you see, that if all species of animals have
proceeded from some common stock, the general character of their structural
relations, and of our systems of classification, which express those
relations, would be just what we find them to be. In other words, the
hypothetical cause is, so far, competent to produce effects similar to
those of the real cause.
Take, again, another set of very remarkable facts,--the existence of what
are called rudimentary organs, organs for which we can find no obvious use,
in the particular animal economy in which they are found, and yet which are
there.
Such are the splint-like bones in the leg of the horse, which I here show
you, and which correspond with bones which belong to certain toes and
fingers in the human hand and foot. In the horse you see they are quite
rudimentary, and bear neither toes nor fingers; so that the horse has only
one "finger" in his fore-foot and one "toe" in his hind-foot. But it is a
very curious thing that the animals closely allied to the horse show more
toes than he; as the rhinoceros, for instance: he has these extra toes well
formed, and anatomical facts show very clearly that he is very closely
related to the horse indeed. So we may say that animals, in an anatomical
sense nearly related to the horse, have those parts which are rudimentary
in him fully developed.
Again, the sheep and the cow have no cutting-teeth, but only a hard pad in
the upper jaw. That is the common characteristic of ruminants in general.
But the calf has in its upper jaw some rudiments of teeth which never are
developed, and never play the part of teeth at all. Well, if you go back in
time, you find some of the older, now extinct, allies of the ruminants have
well-developed teeth in their upper jaws; and at the present day the pig
(which is in structure closely connected with ruminants) has well-developed
teeth in its upper jaw; so that here is another instance of organs
well-developed and very useful, in one animal, represented by rudimentary
organs, for which we can discover no purpose whatsoever in another closely
allied animal. The whalebone whale, again, has horny "whalebone" plates in
its mouth, and no teeth; but the young foetal whale before it is born has
teeth in its jaws; they, however, are never used, and they never come to
anything. But other members of the group to which the whale belongs have
well-developed teeth in both jaws.
Upon any hypothesis of special creation, facts of this kind appear to me to
be entirely unaccountable and inexplicable, but they cease to be so if you
accept Mr. Darwin's hypothesis, and see reason for believing that the
whalebone whale and the whale with teeth in its mouth both sprang from a
whale that had teeth, and that the teeth of the foetal whale are merely
remnants--recollections, if we may so say--of the extinct whale. So in the
case of the horse and the rhinoceros: suppose that both have descended by
modification from some earlier form which had the normal number of toes,
and the persistence of the rudimentary bones which no longer support toes
in the horse becomes comprehensible.
In the language that we speak in England, and in the language of the
Greeks, there are identical verbal roots, or elements entering into the
composition of words. That fact remains unintelligible so long as we
suppose English and Greek to be independently created tongues; but when it
is shown that both languages are descended from one original, we give an
explanation of that resemblance. In the same way the existence of identical
structural roots, if I may so term them, entering into the composition of
widely different animals, is striking evidence in favour of the descent of
those animals from a common original.
To turn to another kind of illustration:--If you regard the whole series of
stratified rocks--that enormous thickness of sixty or seventy thousand feet
that I have mentioned before, constituting the only record we have of a
most prodigious lapse of time, that time being, in all probability, but a
fraction of that of which we have no record;--if you observe in these
successive strata of rocks successive groups of animals arising and dying
out, a constant succession, giving you the same kind of impression, as you
travel from one group of strata to another, as you would have in travelling
from one country to another;--when you find this constant succession of
forms, their traces obliterated except to the man of science--when you look
at this wonderful history, and ask what it means, it is only a paltering
with words if you are offered the reply--"They were so created."
But if, on the other hand, you look on all forms of organised beings as the
results of the gradual modification of a primitive type, the facts receive
a meaning, and you see that these older conditions are the necessary
predecessors of the present. Viewed in this light the facts of
palaeontology receive a meaning--upon any other hypothesis I am unable to
see, in the slightest degree, what knowledge or signification we are to
draw out of them. Again, note as bearing upon the same point, the singular
likeness which obtains between the successive Faunæ and Floræ, whose
remains are preserved on the rocks: you never find any great and enormous
difference between the immediately successive Faunæ and Floræ, unless you
have reason to believe there has also been a great lapse of time or a great
change of conditions. The animals, for instance, of the newest tertiary
rocks, in any part of the world, are always, and without exception, found
to be closely allied with those which now live in that part of the world.
For example, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, the large mammals are at present
rhinoceroses, hippopotamuses, elephants, lions, tigers, oxen, horses, &c.;
and if you examine the newest tertiary deposits, which contain the animals
and plants which immediately preceded those which now exist in the same
country, you do not find gigantic specimens of ant-eaters and kangaroos,
but you find rhinoceroses, elephants, lions, tigers, &c.,--of different
species to those now living--but still their close allies. If you turn to
South America, where, at the present day, we have great sloths and
armadilloes and creatures of that kind, what do you find in the newest
tertiaries? You find the great sloth-like creature, the _Megatherium_,
and the great armadillo, the _Glyptodon_, and so on. And if you go to
Australia you find the same law holds good, namely, that that condition of
organic nature which has preceded the one which now exists, presents
differences perhaps of species, and of genera, but that the great types of
organic structure are the same as those which now flourish.
What meaning has this fact upon any other hypothesis or supposition than
one of successive modification? But if the population of the world, in any
age, is the result of the gradual modification of the forms which peopled
it in the preceding age--if that has been the case, it is intelligible
enough; because we may expect that the creature that results from the
modification of an elephantine mammal shall be something like an elephant,
and the creature which is produced by the modification of an armadillo-like
mammal shall be like an armadillo. Upon that supposition, I say, the facts
are intelligible; upon any other, that I am aware of, they are not.
So far, the facts of palæontology are consistent with almost any form of
the doctrine of progressive modification; they would not be absolutely
inconsistent with the wild speculations of De Maillet, or with the less
objectionable hypothesis of Lamarck. But Mr. Darwin's views have one
peculiar merit; and that is, that they are perfectly consistent with an
array of facts which are utterly inconsistent with, and fatal to, any other
hypothesis of progressive modification which has yet been advanced. It is
one remarkable peculiarity of Mr. Darwin's hypothesis that it involves no
necessary progression or incessant modification, and that it is perfectly
consistent with the persistence for any length of time of a given primitive
stock, contemporaneously with its modifications. To return to the case of
the domestic breeds of pigeons, for example; you have the dove-cot pigeon,
which closely resembles the rock pigeon, from which they all started,
existing at the same time with the others. And if species are developed in
the same way in nature, a primitive stock and its modifications may,
occasionally, all find the conditions fitted for their existence; and
though they come into competition, to a certain extent, with one another,
the derivative species may not necessarily extirpate the primitive one, or
_vice versa_.
Now palæontology shows us many facts which are perfectly harmonious with
these observed effects of the process by which Mr. Darwin supposes species
to have originated, but which appear to me to be totally inconsistent with
any other hypothesis which has been proposed. There are some groups of
animals and plants, in the fossil world, which have been said to belong to
"persistent types," because they have persisted, with very little change
indeed, through a very great range of time, while everything about them has
changed largely. There are families of fishes whose type of construction
has persisted all the way from the carboniferous strata right up to the
cretaceous; and others which have lasted through almost the whole range of
the secondary rocks, and from the lias to the older tertiaries. It is
something stupendous this--to consider a genus lasting without essential
modifications through all this enormous lapse of time while almost
everything else was changed and modified.
Thus I have no doubt that Mr. Darwin's hypothesis will be found competent
to explain the majority of the phenomena exhibited by species in nature;
but in an earlier lecture I spoke cautiously with respect to its power of
explaining all the physiological peculiarities of species.
There is, in fact, one set of these peculiarities which the theory of
selective modification, as it stands at present, is not wholly competent to
explain, and that is the group of phenomena which I mentioned to you under
the name of Hybridism, and which I explained to consist in the sterility of
the offspring of certain species when crossed one with another. It matters
not one whit whether this sterility is universal, or whether it exists only
in a single case. Every hypothesis is bound to explain, or, at any rate,
not be inconsistent with, the whole of the facts which it professes to
account for; and if there is a single one of these facts which can be shown
to be inconsistent with (I do not merely mean inexplicable by, but contrary
to) the hypothesis, the hypothesis falls to the ground,--it is worth
nothing. One fact with which it is positively inconsistent is worth as
much, and as powerful in negativing the hypothesis, as five hundred. If I
am right in thus defining the obligations of an hypothesis, Mr. Darwin, in
order to place his views beyond the reach of all possible assault, ought to
be able to demonstrate the possibility of developing from a particular
stock by selective breeding, two forms, which should either be unable to
cross one with another, or whose cross-bred offspring should be infertile
with one another.
For, you see, if you have not done that you have not strictly fulfilled all
the conditions of the problem; you have not shown that you can produce, by
the cause assumed, all the phenomena which you have in nature. Here are the
phenomena of Hybridism staring you in the face, and you cannot say, "I can,
by selective modification, produce these same results." Now, it is admitted
on all hands that, at present, so far as experiments have gone, it has not
been found possible to produce this complete physiological divergence by
selective breeding. I stated this very clearly before, and I now refer to
the point, because, if it could be proved, not only that this _has_
not been done, but that it _cannot_ be done; if it could be
demonstrated that it is impossible to breed selectively, from any stock, a
form which shall not breed with another, produced from the same stock; and
if we were shown that this must be the necessary and inevitable results of
all experiments, I hold that Mr. Darwin's hypothesis would be utterly
shattered.
But has this been done? or what is really the state of the case? It is
simply that, so far as we have gone yet with our breeding, we have not
produced from a common stock two breeds which are not more or less fertile
with one another.
I do not know that there is a single fact which would justify any one in
saying that any degree of sterility has been observed between breeds
absolutely known to have been produced by selective breeding from a common
stock. On the other hand, I do not know that there is a single fact which
can justify any one in asserting that such sterility cannot be produced by
proper experimentation. For my own part, I see every reason to believe that
it may, and will be so produced. For, as Mr. Darwin has very properly
urged, when we consider the phenomena of sterility, we find they are most
capricious; we do not know what it is that the sterility depends on. There
are some animals which will not breed in captivity; whether it arises from
the simple fact of their being shut up and deprived of their liberty, or
not, we do not know, but they certainly will not breed. What an astounding
thing this is, to find one of the most important of all functions
annihilated by mere imprisonment!
So, again, there are cases known of animals which have been thought by
naturalists to be undoubted species, which have yielded perfectly fertile
hybrids; while there are other species which present what everybody
believes to be varieties [Footnote: And as I conceive with very good
reason; but if any objector urges that we cannot prove that they have been
produced by artificial or natural selection, the objection must be
admitted--ultra-sceptical as it is. But in science, scepticism is a duty.]
which are more or less infertile with one another. There are other cases
which are truly extraordinary; there is one, for example, which has been
carefully examined,--of two kinds of sea-weed, of which the male element of
the one, which we may call A, fertilises the female element of the other,
B; while the male element of B will not fertilise the female element of A;
so that, while the former experiment seems to show us that they are
_varieties_, the latter leads to the conviction that they are
_species_.
When we see how capricious and uncertain this sterility is, how unknown the
conditions on which it depends, I say that we have no right to affirm that
those conditions will not be better understood by and by, and we have no
ground for supposing that we may not be able to experiment so as to obtain
that crucial result which I mentioned just now. So that though Mr. Darwin's
hypothesis does not completely extricate us from this difficulty at
present, we have not the least right to say it will not do so.
There is a wide gulf between the thing you cannot explain and the thing
that upsets you altogether. There is hardly any hypothesis in this world
which has not some fact in connection with it which has not been explained,
but that is a very different affair to a fact that entirely opposes your
hypothesis; in this case all you can say is, that your hypothesis is in the
same position as a good many others.
Now, as to the third test, that there are no other causes competent to
explain the phenomena, I explained to you that one should be able to say of
an hypothesis, that no other known causes than those supposed by it are
competent to give rise to the phenomena. Here, I think, Mr. Darwin's view
is pretty strong. I really believe that the alternative is either Darwinism
or nothing, for I do not know of any rational conception or theory of the
organic universe which has any scientific position at all beside Mr.
Darwin's. I do not know of any proposition that has been put before us with
the intention of explaining the phenomena of organic nature, which has in
its favour a thousandth part of the evidence which may be adduced in favour
of Mr. Darwin's views. Whatever may be the objections to his views,
certainly all other theories are absolutely out of court.
Take the Lamarckian hypothesis, for example. Lamarck was a great
naturalist, and to a certain extent went the right way to work; he argued
from what was undoubtedly a true cause of some of the phenomena of organic
nature. He said it is a matter of experience that an animal may be modified
more or less in consequence of its desires and consequent actions. Thus, if
a man exercise himself as a blacksmith, his arms will become strong and
muscular; such organic modification is a result of this particular action
and exercise. Lamarck thought that by a very simple supposition based on
this truth he could explain the origin of the various animal species: he
said, for example, that the short-legged birds which live on fish had been
converted into the long-legged waders by desiring to get the fish without
wetting their feathers, and so stretching their legs more and more through
successive generations. If Lamarck could have shown experimentally that
even races of animals could be produced in this way, there might have been
some ground for his speculations. But he could show nothing of the kind,
and his hypothesis has pretty well dropped into oblivion, as it deserved to
do. I said in an earlier lecture that there are hypotheses and hypotheses,
and when people tell you that Mr. Darwin's strongly-based hypothesis is
nothing but a mere modification of Lamarck's, you will know what to think
of their capacity for forming a judgment on this subject.
But you must recollect that when I say I think it is either Mr. Darwin's
hypothesis or nothing; that either we must take his view, or look upon the
whole of organic nature as an enigma, the meaning of which is wholly hidden
from us; you must understand that I mean that I accept it provisionally, in
exactly the same way as I accept any other hypothesis. Men of science do
not pledge themselves to creeds; they are bound by articles of no sort;
there is not a single belief that it is not a bounden duty with them to
hold with a light hand and to part with cheerfully, the moment it is really
proved to be contrary to any fact, great or small. And if, in course of
time I see good reasons for such a proceeding, I shall have no hesitation
in coming before you, and pointing out any change in my opinion without
finding the slightest occasion to blush for so doing. So I say that we
accept this view as we accept any other, so long as it will help us, and we
feel bound to retain it only so long as it will serve our great
purpose--the improvement of Man's estate and the widening of his knowledge.
The moment this, or any other conception, ceases to be useful for these
purposes, away with it to the four winds; we care not what becomes of it!
But to say truth, although it has been my business to attend closely to the
controversies roused by the publication of Mr. Darwin's book, I think that
not one of the enormous mass of objections and obstacles which have been
raised is of any very great value, except that sterility case which I
brought before you just now. All the rest are misunderstandings of some
sort, arising either from prejudice, or want of knowledge, or still more
from want of patience and care in reading the work.
For you must recollect that it is not a book to be read with as much ease
as its pleasant style may lead you to imagine. You spin through it as if it
were a novel the first time you read it, and think you know all about it;
the second time you read it you think you know rather less about it; and
the third time, you are amazed to find how little you have really
apprehended its vast scope and objects. I can positively say that I never
take it up without finding in it some new view, or light, or suggestion
that I have not noticed before. That is the best characteristic of a
thorough and profound book; and I believe this feature of the "Origin of
Species" explains why so many persons have ventured to pass judgment and
criticisms upon it which are by no means worth the paper they are written
on.
Before concluding these lectures there is one point to which I must
advert--though, as Mr. Darwin has said nothing about man in his book, it
concerns myself rather than him;--for I have strongly maintained on sundry
occasions that if Mr. Darwin's views are sound, they apply as much to man
as to the lower mammals, seeing that it is perfectly demonstrable that the
structural differences which separate man from the apes are not greater
than those which separate some apes from others. There cannot be the
slightest doubt in the world that the argument which applies to the
improvement of the horse from an earlier stock, or of ape from ape, applies
to the improvement of man from some simpler and lower stock than man. There
is not a single faculty--functional or structural, moral, intellectual, or
instinctive, there--is no faculty whatever that is not capable of
improvement; there is no faculty whatsoever which does not depend upon
structure, and as structure tends to vary, it is capable of being improved.
Well, I have taken a good deal of pains at various times to prove this, and
I have endeavoured to meet the objections of those who maintain, that the
structural differences between man and the lower animals are of so vast a
character and enormous extent, that even if Mr. Darwin's views are correct,
you cannot imagine this particular modification to take place. It is, in
fact, an easy matter to prove that, so far as structure is concerned, man
differs to no greater extent from the animals which are immediately below
him than these do from other members of the same order. Upon the other
hand, there is no one who estimates more highly than I do the dignity of
human nature, and the width of the gulf in intellectual and moral matters
which lies between man and the whole of the lower creation.
But I find this very argument brought forward vehemently by some. "You say
that man has proceeded from a modification of some lower animal, and you
take pains to prove that the structural differences which are said to exist
in his brain do not exist at all, and you teach that all functions,
intellectual, moral, and others, are the expression or the result, in the
long run, of structures, and of the molecular forces which they exert." It
is quite true that I do so.
"Well, but," I am told at once, somewhat triumphantly, "you say in the same
breath that there is a great moral and intellectual chasm between man and
the lower animals. How is this possible when you declare that moral and
intellectual characteristics depend on structure, and yet tell us that
there is no such gulf between the structure of man and that of the lower
animals?"
I think that objection is based upon a misconception of the real relations
which exist between structure and function, between mechanism and work.
Function is the expression of molecular forces and arrangements no doubt;
but, does it follow from this, that variation in function so depends upon
variation in structure that the former is always exactly proportioned to
the latter? If there is no such relation, if the variation in function
which follows on a variation in structure may be enormously greater than
the variation of the structure, then, you see, the objection falls to the
ground.
Take a couple of watches--made by the same maker, and as completely alike
as possible; set them upon the table, and the function of each--which is
its rate of going--will be performed in the same manner, and you shall be
able to distinguish no difference between them; but let me take a pair of
pincers, and if my hand is steady enough to do it, let me just lightly
crush together the bearings of the balance-wheel, or force to a slightly
different angle the teeth of the escapement of one of them, and of course
you know the immediate result will be that the watch, so treated, from that
moment will cease to go. But what proportion is there between the
structural alteration and the functional result? Is it not perfectly
obvious that the alteration is of the minutest kind, yet that, slight as it
is, it has produced an infinite difference in the performance of the
functions of these two instruments?
Well, now, apply that to the present question. What is it that constitutes
and makes man what he is? What is it but his power of language--that
language giving him the means of recording his experience--making every
generation somewhat wiser than its predecessor--more in accordance with the
established order of the universe?
What is it but this power of speech, of recording experience, which enables
men to be men--looking before and after and, in some dim sense,
understanding the working of this wondrous universe--and which
distinguishes man from the whole of the brute world? I say that this
functional difference is vast, unfathomable, and truly infinite in its
consequences; and I say at the same time, that it may depend upon
structural differences which shall be absolutely inappreciable to us with
our present means of investigation. What is this very speech that we are
talking about? I am speaking to you at this moment, but if you were to
alter, in the minutest degree, the proportion of the nervous forces now
active in the two nerves which supply the muscles of my glottis, I should
become suddenly dumb. The voice is produced only so long as the vocal
chords are parallel; and these are parallel only so long as certain muscles
contract with exact equality; and that again depends on the equality of
action of those two nerves I spoke of. So that a change of the minutest
kind in the structure of one of these nerves, or in the structure of the
part in which it originates, or of the supply of blood to that part, or of
one of the muscles to which it is distributed, might render all of us dumb.
But a race of dumb men, deprived of all communication with those who could
speak, would be little indeed removed from the brutes. And the moral and
intellectual difference between them and ourselves would be practically
infinite, though the naturalist should not be able to find a single shadow
of even specific structural difference.
But let me dismiss this question now, and, in conclusion, let me say that
you may go away with it as my mature conviction, that Mr. Darwin's work is
the greatest contribution which has been made to biological science since
the publication of the "Regne Animal" of Cuvier, and since that of the
"History of Development," of Von Baer. I believe that if you strip it of
its theoretical part it still remains one of the greatest encyclopaedias of
biological doctrine that any one man ever brought forth; and I believe
that, if you take it as the embodiment of an hypothesis, it is destined to
be the guide of biological and psychological speculation for the next three
or four generations.