IV

THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS [Footnote: _The Natural History of Creation_.

By Dr. Ernst Haeckel. [_Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte_.--Von Dr.

Ernst Haeckel, Professor an der Universität Jena.] Berlin, 1868.]

[1869]

Considering that Germany now takes the lead of the world in scientific

investigation, and particularly in biology, Mr. Darwin must be well pleased

at the rapid spread of his views among some of the ablest and most

laborious of German naturalists.

Among these, Professor Haeckel, of Jena, is the Coryphæus. I know of no

more solid and important contributions to biology in the past seven years

than Haeckel's work on the "Radiolaria," and the researches of his

distinguished colleague Gegenbaur, in vertebrate anatomy; while in

Haeckel's "Generelle Morphologie" there is all the force, suggestiveness,

and, what I may term the systematising power, of Oken, without his

extravagance. The "Generelle Morphologie" is, in fact, an attempt to put

the Doctrine of Evolution, so far as it applies to the living world, into a

logical form; and to work out its practical applications to their final

results. The work before, us, again, may be said to be an exposition of the

"Generelle Morphologie" for an educated public, consisting, as it does, of

the substance of a series of lectures delivered before a mixed audience at

Jena, in the session 1867-8.

"The Natural History of Creation,"--or, as Professor Haeckel admits it

would have been better to call his work, "The History of the Development or

Evolution of Nature,"--deals, in the first six lectures, with the general

and historical aspects of the question and contains a very interesting and

lucid account of the views of Linnæus, Cuvier, Agassiz, Goethe, Oken, Kant,

Lamarck, Lyell, and Darwin, and of the historical filiation of these

philosophers.

The next six lectures are occupied by a well-digested statement of Mr.

Darwin's views. The thirteenth lecture discusses two topics which are not

touched by Mr. Darwin, namely, the origin of the present form of the solar

system, and that of living matter. Full justice is done to Kant, as the

originator of that "cosmic gas theory," as the Germans somewhat quaintly

call it, which is commonly ascribed to Laplace. With respect to spontaneous

generation, while admitting that there is no experimental evidence in its

favour, Professor Haeckel denies the possibility of disproving it, and

points out that the assumption that it has occurred is a necessary part of

the doctrine of Evolution. The fourteenth lecture, on "Schöpfungs-Perioden

und Schöpfungs-Urkunden," answers pretty much to the famous disquisition on

the "Imperfection of the Geological Record" in the "Origin of Species."

The following five lectures contain the most original matter of any, being

devoted to "Phylogeny," or the working out of the details of the process of

Evolution in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, so as to prove the line of

descent of each group of living beings, and to furnish it with its proper

genealogical tree, or "phylum."

The last lecture considers objections and sums up the evidence in favour of

biological Evolution.

I shall best testify to my sense of the value of the work thus briefly

analysed if I now proceed to note down some of the more important

criticisms which have been suggested to me by its perusal.

I. In more than one place, Professor Haeckel enlarges upon the service

which the "Origin of Species" has done, in favouring what he terms the

"causal or mechanical" view of living nature as opposed to the

"teleological or vitalistic" view. And no doubt it is quite true that the

doctrine of Evolution is the most formidable opponent of all the commoner

and coarser forms of Teleology. But perhaps the most remarkable service to

the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of

Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both which

his views offer.

The Teleology which supposes that the eye, such as we see it in man or one

of the higher _Vertebrata_, was made with the precise structure which

it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal which possesses it to

see, has undoubtedly received its death-blow. Nevertheless it is necessary

to remember that there is a wider Teleology, which is not touched by the

doctrine of Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental

proposition of Evolution. That proposition is, that the whole world, living

and not living, in the result of the mutual interaction, according to

definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the

primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is

no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic

vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the

properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say the state

of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what

will happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter's day.

Consider a kitchen clock, which ticks loudly, shows the hours, minutes, and

seconds, strikes, cries "cuckoo!" and perhaps shows the phases of the moon.

When the clock is wound up, all the phenomena which it exhibits are

potentially contained in its mechanism, and a clever clockmaker could

predict all it will do after an examination of its structure.

If the evolution theory is correct, the molecular structure of the cosmic

gas stands in the same relation to the phenomena of the world as the

structure of the clock to its phenomena.

Now let us suppose a death-watch, living in the clock-case, to be a learned

and intelligent student of its works. He might say, "I find here nothing

but matter and force and pure mechanism from beginning to end," and he

would be quite right. But if he drew the conclusion that the clock was not

contrived for a purpose, he would be quite wrong. On the other hand,

imagine another death-watch of a different turn of mind. He, listening to

the monotonous "tick! tick!" so exactly like his own, might arrive at the

conclusion that the clock was itself a monstrous sort of death-watch, and

that its final cause and purpose was to tick. How easy to point to the

clear relation of the whole mechanism to the pendulum, to the fact that the

one thing the clock did always and without intermission was to tick, and

that all the rest of its phenomena were intermittent and subordinate to

ticking! For all this, it is certain that kitchen clocks are not contrived

for the purpose of making a ticking noise.

Thus the teleological theorist would be as wrong as the mechanical

theorist, among our death-watches; and, probably, the only death-watch who

would be right would be the one who should maintain that the sole thing

death-watches could be sure about was the nature of the clock-works and the

way they move; and that the purpose of the clock lay wholly beyond the

purview of beetle faculties.

Substitute "cosmic vapour" for "clock," and "molecules" for "works," and

the application of the argument is obvious. The teleological and the

mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the

contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly

does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the

phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more completely is

he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to

disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to

evolve the phenomena of the universe. On the other hand, if the teleologist

assert that this, that, or the other result of the working of any part of

the mechanism of the universe is its purpose and final cause, the mechanist

can always inquire how he knows that it is more than an unessential

incident--the mere ticking of the clock, which he mistakes for its

function. And there seems to be no reply to this inquiry, any more than to

the further, not irrational, question, why trouble one's self about matters

which are out of reach, when the working of the mechanism itself, which is

of infinite practical importance, affords scope for all our energies?

Professor Haeckel has invented a new and convenient name "Dysteleology,"

for the study of the "purposelessnesses" which are observable in living

organisms--such as the multitudinous cases of rudimentary and apparently

useless structures. I confess, however, that it has often appeared to me

that the facts of Dysteleology cut two ways. If we are to assume, as

evolutionists in general do, that useless organs atrophy, such cases as the

existence of lateral rudiments of toes, in the foot of a horse, place us in

a dilemma. For, either these rudiments are of no use to the animal, in

which case, considering that the horse has existed in its present form

since the Pliocene epoch, they surely ought to have disappeared; or they

are of some use to the animal, in which case they are of no use as

arguments against Teleology. A similar, but still stronger, argument may be

based upon the existence of teats, and even functional mammary glands, in

male mammals. Numerous cases of "Gynæcomasty," or functionally active

breasts in men, are on record, though there is no mammalian species

whatever in which the male normally suckles the young. Thus, there can be

little doubt that the mammary gland was as apparently useless in the

remotest male mammalian ancestor of man as in living men, and yet it has

not disappeared. Is it then still profitable to the male organism to retain

it? Possibly; but in that case its dysteleological value is gone.

[Footnote: The recent discovery of the important part played by the Thyroid

gland should be a warning to all speculators about useless organs. 1893.]

II. Professor Haeckel looks upon the causes which have led to the present

diversity of living nature as twofold. Living matter, he tells us, is urged

by two impulses: a centripetal, which tends to preserve and transmit the

specific form, and which he identifies with heredity; and a centrifugal,

which results from the tendency of external conditions to modify the

organism and effect its adaptation to themselves. The internal impulse is

conservative, and tends to the preservation of specific, or individual,

form; the external impulse is metamorphic, and tends to the modification of

specific, or individual, form.

In developing his views upon this subject, Professor Haeckel introduces

qualifications which disarm some of the criticisms I should have been

disposed to offer; but I think that his method of stating the case has the

inconvenience of tending to leave out of sight the important fact--which is

a cardinal point in the Darwinian hypothesis--that the tendency to vary, in

a given organism, may have nothing to do with the external conditions to

which that individual organism is exposed, but may depend wholly upon

internal conditions. No one, I imagine, would dream of seeking for the

cause of the development of the sixth finger and toe in the famous Maltese,

in the direct influence of the external conditions of his life.

I conceive that both hereditary transmission and adaptation need to be

analysed into their constituent conditions by the further application of

the doctrine of the Struggle for Existence. It is a probable hypothesis,

that what the world is to organisms in general, each organism is to the

molecules of which it is composed. Multitudes of these, having diverse

tendencies, are competing with one another for opportunity to exist and

multiply; and the organism, as a whole, is as much the product of the

molecules which are victorious as the Fauna, or Flora, of a country is the

product of the victorious organic beings in it.

On this hypothesis, hereditary transmission is the result of the victory of

particular molecules contained in the impregnated germ. Adaptation to

conditions is the result of the favouring of the multiplication of those

molecules whose organising tendencies are most in harmony with such

conditions. In this view of the matter, conditions are not actively

productive, but are passively permissive; they do not cause variation in

any given direction, but they permit and favour a tendency in that

direction which already exists.

It is true that, in the long run, the origin of the organic molecules

themselves, and of their tendencies, is to be sought in the external world;

but if we carry our inquiries as far back as this, the distinction between

internal and external impulses vanishes. On the other hand, if we confine

ourselves to the consideration of a single organism, I think it must be

admitted that the existence of an internal metamorphic tendency must be as

distinctly recognised as that of an internal conservative tendency; and

that the influence of conditions is mainly, if not wholly, the result of

the extent to which they favour the one, or the other, of these tendencies.

III. There is only one point upon which I fundamentally and entirely

disagree with Professor Haeckel, but that is the very important one of his

conception of geological time, and of the meaning of the stratified rocks

as records and indications of that time. Conceiving that the stratified

rocks of an epoch indicate a period of depression, and that the intervals

between the epochs correspond with periods of elevation of which we have no

record, he intercalates between the different epochs, or periods, intervals

which he terms "Ante-periods." Thus, instead of considering the Triassic,

Jurassic, Cretaceous, and Eocene periods, as continuously successive, he

interposes a period before each, as an "Antetrias-zeit," "Antejura-zeit,"

"Antecreta-zeit," "Anteo-cenzeit," &c. And he conceives that the abrupt

changes between the Faunæ of the different formations are due to the lapse

of time, of which we have no organic record, during their "Ante-periods."

The frequent occurrence of strata containing assemblages of organic forms

which are intermediate between those of adjacent formations, is, to my

mind, fatal to this view. In the well-known St. Cassian beds, for example,

Palaeozoic and Mesozoic forms are commingled, and, between the Cretaceous

and the Eocene formations, there are similar transitional beds. On the

other hand, in the middle of the Silurian series, extensive unconformity of

the strata indicates the lapse of vast intervals of time between the

deposit of successive beds, without any corresponding change in the Fauna.

Professor Haeckel will, I fear, think me unreasonable, if I say that he

seems to be still overshadowed by geological superstitions; and that he

will have to believe in the completeness of the geological record far less

than he does at present. He assumes, for example, that there was no dry

land, nor any terrestrial life, before the end of the Silurian epoch,

simply because, up to the present time, no indications of fresh water, or

terrestrial organisms, have been found in rocks of older date. And, in

speculating upon the origin of a given group, he rarely goes further back

than the "Ante-period," which precedes that in which the remains of animals

belonging to that group are found. Thus, as fossil remains of the majority

of the groups of _Reptilia_ are first found in the Trias, they are

assumed to have originated in the "Antetriassic" period, or between the

Permian and Triassic epochs.

I confess this is wholly incredible to me. The Permian and the Triassic

deposits pass completely into one another; there is no sort of

discontinuity answering to an unrecorded "Antetrias"; and, what is more, we

have evidence of immensely extensive dry land during the formation of these

deposits. We know that the dry land of the Trias absolutely teemed with

reptiles of all groups except Pterodactyles, Snakes, and perhaps Tortoises;

there is every probability that true Birds existed, and _Mammalia_

certainly did. Of the inhabitants of the Permian dry land, on the contrary,

all that have left a record are a few lizards. Is it conceivable that these

last should really represent the whole terrestrial population of that time,

and that the development of Mammals, of Birds, and of the highest forms of

Reptiles, should have been crowded into the time during which the Permian

conditions quietly passed away, and the Triassic conditions began? Does not

any such supposition become in the highest degree improbable, when, in the

terrestrial or fresh-water Labyrinthodonts, which lived on the land of the

Carboniferous epoch, as well as on that of the Trias, we have evidence that

one form of terrestrial life persisted, throughout all these ages, with no

important modification? For my part, having regard to the small amount of

modification (except in the way of extinction) which the Crocodilian,

Lacertilian, and Chelonian _Reptilia_ have undergone, from the older

Mesozoic times to the present day, I cannot but put the existence of the

common stock from which they sprang far back in the Palæozoic epoch; and I

should apply a similar argumentation to all other groups of animals.

[The remainder of this essay contains a discussion of questions of taxonomy

and phylogeny, which is now antiquated. I have reprinted the considerations

about the reconciliation of Teleology with Morphology, about

"Dysteleology," and about the struggle for existence within the organism,

because it has happened to me to be charged with overlooking them.

In discussing Teleology, I ought to have pointed out, as I have done

elsewhere (_Life and Letters of Charles Darwin_, vol. ii. p. 202),

that Paley "proleptically accepted the modern doctrine of Evolution,"

(_Natural Theology_, chap. xxiii.). 1893.]

V

MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS [Footnote: _Contributions to the Theory of Natural

Selection_. By A. R. Wallace. 1870.--2. _The Genesis of Species_.

By St. George Mivart, F.R.S. Second Edition. 1871.--3. _Darwin's Descent

of Man_. Quarterly Review, July 1871.]

[1871]

The gradual lapse of time has now separated us by more than a decade from

the date of the publication of the "Origin of Species"--and whatever may be

thought or said about Mr. Darwin's doctrines, or the manner in which he has

propounded them, this much is certain, that, in a dozen years, the "Origin

of Species" has worked as complete a revolution in biological science as

the "Principia" did in astronomy--and it has done so, because, in the words

of Helmholtz, it contains "an essentially new creative thought." [Footnote:

Helmholtz: _Ueber das Ziel und die Fortschritte der

Naturwissenschaft_. Eröffnungsrede für die Naturforscherversammlung zu

Innsbruck. 1869.] And as time has slipped by, a happy change has come over

Mr. Darwin's critics. The mixture of ignorance and insolence which, at

first, characterised a large proportion of the attacks with which he was

assailed, is no longer the sad distinction of anti-Darwinian criticism.

Instead of abusive nonsense, which merely discredited its writers, we read

essays, which are, at worst, more or less intelligent and appreciative;

while, sometimes, like that which appeared in the "North British Review"

for 1867, they have a real and permanent value.

The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart contain discussions

of some of Mr. Darwin's views, which are worthy of particular attention,

not only on account of the acknowledged scientific competence of these

writers, but because they exhibit an attention to those philosophical

questions which underlie all physical science, which is as rare as it is

needful. And the same may be said of an article in the "Quarterly Review"

for July 1871, the comparison of which with an article in the same Review

for July 1860, is perhaps the best evidence which can be brought forward of

the change which has taken place in public opinion on "Darwinism."

The Quarterly Reviewer admits "the certainty of the action of natural

selection" (p. 49); and further allows that there is an _à priori_

probability in favour of the evolution of man from some lower animal form,

if these lower animal forms themselves have arisen by evolution.

Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart go much further than this. They are as stout

believers in evolution as Mr. Darwin himself; but Mr. Wallace denies that

man can have been evolved from a lower animal by that process of natural

selection which he, with Mr. Darwin, holds to have been sufficient for the

evolution of all animals below man; while Mr. Mivart, admitting that

natural selection has been one of the conditions of the evolution of the

animals below man, maintains that natural selection must, even in their

case, have been supplemented by "some other cause"--of the nature of which,

unfortunately, he does not give us any idea. Thus Mr. Mivart is less of a

Darwinian than Mr. Wallace, for he has less faith in the power of natural

selection. But he is more of an evolutionist than Mr. Wallace, because Mr.

Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an intelligent agent--a sort of

supernatural Sir John Sebright--to produce even the animal frame of man;

while Mr. Mivart requires no Divine assistance till he comes to man's soul.

Thus there is a considerable divergence between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart.

On the other hand, there are some curious similarities between Mr. Mivart

and the Quarterly Reviewer, and these are sometimes so close, that, if Mr.

Mivart thought it worth while, I think he might make out a good case of

plagiarism against the Reviewer, who studiously abstains from quoting him.

Both the Reviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr. Darwin with being, "like so

many other physicists," entangled in a radically false metaphysical system,

and with setting at nought the first principles of both philosophy and

religion. Both enlarge upon the necessity of a sound philosophical basis,

and both, I venture to add, make a conspicuous exhibition of its absence.

The Quarterly Reviewer believes that man "differs more from an elephant or

a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread,"

and Mr. Mivart has expressed the opinion that there is more difference

between man and an ape than there is between an ape and a piece of granite.

[Footnote: See the _Tablet_ for March 11, 1871.]

And even when Mr. Mivart (p. 86) trips in a matter of anatomy, and creates

a difficulty for Mr. Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between the

eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as Gegenbaur and others have clearly

shown) does not exist, the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the argument without

hesitation (p. 66).

There is another important point, however, in which it is hard to say

whether Mr. Mivart diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not.

The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has, "with needless opposition, set

at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion" (p. 90).

It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr. Darwin's views being false,

the opposition to "religion" which flows from them must be needless. But I

suspect this is not the right view of the meaning of the passage, as Mr.

Mivart, from whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so much inspiration,

tells us that "the consequences which have been drawn from evolution,

whether exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of religion, by no

means follow from it, and are in fact illegitimate" (p. 5).

I may assume, then, that the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that

there is no necessary opposition between "evolution whether exclusively

Darwinian or not," and religion. But then, what do they mean by this last

much-abused term? On this point the Quarterly Reviewer is silent. Mr.

Mivart, on the contrary, is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his

remarks leaves no doubt that by "religion" he means theology; and by

theology, that particular variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded

by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, and held by the members of

that religious community to be the sole form of absolute truth and of

saving faith.

According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon

matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly asserting "derivative

creation" or evolution; "and thus their teachings harmonise with all that

modern science can possibly require" (p. 305).

I confess that this bold assertion interested me more than anything else in

Mr. Mivart's book. What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic doctrine,

and of the influence exerted by Catholic authority in former times, had not

led me to expect that modern science was likely to find a warm welcome

within the pale of the greatest and most consistent of theological

organisations.

And my astonishment reached its climax when I found Mr. Mivart citing

Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom

enjoyed by Catholics--the popular repute of that learned theologian and

subtle casuist not being such as to make his works a likely place of refuge

for liberality of thought. But in these days, when Judas Iscariot and

Robespierre, Henry VIII. and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of

admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and consequently the victims

of vulgar prejudice, it was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might be

in like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart's unhesitating declaration, I

hastened to acquaint myself with such of the works of the great Catholic

divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not merely to acquaint myself

with the true teachings of the infallible Church, and free myself of an

unjust prejudice; but, haply, to enable myself, at a pinch, to put some

Protestant bibliolater to shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom

from the trammels of verbal inspiration.

I regret to say that my anticipations have been cruelly disappointed. But

the extent to which my hopes have been crushed can only be fully

appreciated by citing, in the first place, those passages of Mr. Mivart's

work by which they were excited. In his introductory chapter I find the

following passages:--

"The prevalence of this theory [of evolution] need alarm no one, for it is,

without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most

orthodox Christian [Footnote: It should be observed that Mr. Mivart employs

the term 'Christian' as if it were the equivalent of 'Catholic.'] theology"

(p. 5).

"Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much

time to the study of Christian philosophy; but they have no right to assume

or accept without careful examination, as an unquestioned fact, that in

that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas

'creation' and 'evolution,' as applied to organic forms.

"It is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many

distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas,

_i.e._ both 'creation' and 'evolution.'

"As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed: 'The

creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after

manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual "catastrophes." Creation

is not a miraculous interference with the laws of Nature, but the very

institution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention,

was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion they admitted,

without difficulty, the most surprising origin of living creatures,

provided it took place by _law_. They held that when God said, "Let

the waters produce," "Let the earth produce," He conferred forces on the

elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the

various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains

attached to the elements throughout all time.' The same writer quotes St.

Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, 'in the institution of

Nature, we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of Nature.' And,

again, St. Basil speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the

production of all organisms.

"So much for the writers of early and mediæval times. As to the present

day, the author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed

in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge,

who would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory.

Nay, they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing

the generation of animals of complex organisation by the skilful artificial

arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a fish

by means analogous to those by which we now produce urea.

"And this because they know that the possibility of such phenomena, though

by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old

philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even centuries before Bacon, and

that their place in the system can be at once assigned them without even

disturbing its order or marring its harmony.

"Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned,

however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers.

In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps no post-mediæval

theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world

than Suarez, who has a separate section [Footnote: Suarez,

_Metaphysica_. Edition Vivés. Paris, 1868, vol. i Disput. xv. § 2.] in

opposition to those who maintain the distinct creation of the various

kinds--or substantial forms--of organic life" (pp. 19-21).

Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express himself in the same sense, in

his last chapter, entitled "Theology and Evolution" (pp. 302-5).

"It appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the

general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to

justify this view of the matter?

"Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations,

it might hardly be expected _à priori_ that writers of earlier ages

should have given expression to doctrines harmonising in any degree with

such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it

would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, to

cite one or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer of the earlier

Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognised

than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the mediæval period for

St. Thomas Aquinas: and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken

as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been

questioned.

"It must be borne in mind that for a considerable time even after the last

of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to

the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants

inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed

under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonise with modern ideas

concerning 'Creation' and organic Life.

"Now St. Augustin insists in a very remarkable manner on the merely

derivative sense in which God's creation of organic forms is to be

understood; that is, that God created them by conferring on the material

world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions."

Mr. Mivart then cites certain passages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas

Aquinas, and Cornelius à Lapide, and finally adds:--

"As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2, No. 9, p.

508, t. i. edition Vivés, Paris; also Nos. 13-15. Many other references to

the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice.

"It is then evident that ancient and most venerable theological authorities

distinctly assert derivative creation, and thus their teachings harmonise

with all that modern science can possibly require."

It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez's fifteenth

Disputation, though he adds, "Many other references to the same effect

could easily be given." I shall look anxiously for these references in the

third edition of the "Genesis of Species." For the present, all I can say

is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or

elsewhere, for any passage in Suarez's writings which, in the slightest

degree, bears out Mr. Mivart's views as to his opinions. [Footnote: The

edition of Suarez's _Disputationes_ from which the following citations

are given, is Birckmann's, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1680.]

The title of this fifteenth Disputation is "De causa formali substantiali,"

and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers) is

headed, "Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex

materia?"

The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated

thus: According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two

components--the one its "matter" (_materia prima_), the other its

"substantial form" (_forma substantialis_). Of these the matter is

everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indistinguishable from

the matter of any other body. That which differentiates any one natural

body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter

of that body, as the human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man,

and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body.

Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then

removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain

"_intimius principium_" in the water, which brings it back to the cool

condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition

is removed. This _intimius principium_ is the "substantial form" of

the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause

(_radix_) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of

its density, and of all its other properties.

It will thus be seen that "substantial forms" play nearly the same part in

the scholastic philosophy as "forces" do in modern science; the general

tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into

material particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles

assume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are

characteristic of each particular kind of matter.

But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one

spiritual and the other material. The former division is represented by the

human soul, the _anima rationalis_; and they affirm as a matter, not

merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of

nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing

for all eternity, apart from the _materia prima_ of which the

corporeal frame of man is composed. And the _anima rationalis_, once

united with the _materia prima_ of the body, becomes its substantial

form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man--of all the

vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits--just as the substantial

form of water is the source of all its qualities.

The "material substantial forms" are those which inform all other natural

bodies except that of man; and the object of Suarez in the present

Disputation, is to show that the axiom "_ex nihilo nihil fit_," though

not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms

of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which constitute the ordinary

course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily

comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron to be exposed to the air.

The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a

substantial form, which is the cause of its properties, _e.g._

brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted

into a mass of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other

respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view,

this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial

form, the grave problem arises, how did this new substantial form come into

being? Has it been created? or has it arisen by the power of natural

causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, "_ex

nihilo nihil fit_," is false, even in relation to the ordinary course of

nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin

of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonisation

of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the Schoolmen, as the smoothing

down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Churchmen,

and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle's

fundamental propositions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of

the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed

them in flat Pantheism.

So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis; and I quote the

principal part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech

which is a "darkening of counsel."

"13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [sc. materialibus]

dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia præjacentis

materiæ educi: ideoque in effectione harum formarum nil fieri contra illud

axioma, _Ex nihilo nihil fit_, si recte intelligatur. Hæc assertio

sumitur ex Aristotele 1. Physicorum per totum et libro 7. Metaphyss. et ex

aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex

nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod

talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum propriè dicitur de re subsistente,

quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem proprie quod subsistit et

habet esse; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo

parte, formæ substantiales materiales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non

fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1 parte, quæstione 45,

articulo 8, et quæstione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendis magis explicabitur.

Sumendo ergo ipsum _fieri_ in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex

nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte præsupposita, ex

quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex

nihilo, quia fiunt ex præsupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non

fiunt, secundum se totæ, sed secundum aliquid sui. Formæ autem harum rerum,

quamvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non

habebant, quia vero ipsæ non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo

fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verbum illud _fieri_ negari

non potest: quin forma facta sit, eo modo quo nunc est, et antea non erat,

ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo

addendum est, sumpto _fieri_ in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non

tamen negare habitudinem materialis causæ intrinsecè componentis id quod

fit, sed etiam habitudinem causæ materialis per se causantis et

sustentantis formam quæ fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus

materiam et esse causam compositi et formæ dependentis ab illa: ut res ergo

dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causalitatis negari debet; et eodem

sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: _Ex nihilo nihil

fit_, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex

præsupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si

utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo rectè concluditur,

formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia,

quæ in suo genere per se concurrit, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium

formarum; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixae materiæ, a qua

sustententur in esse: ita nec fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et

penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et hæc est propria et per se

differentia inter effectionem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut

infra ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam naturaliam

agentium, non vero posterior.

"14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non creari, sed educi

de potentia materiæ." [Footnote: Suarez, _loc. cit._ Disput. xv. §

ii.]

If I may venture to interpret these hard sayings, Suarez conceives that the

evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature, is

conditioned not only by the existence of the _materia prima_, but also

by a certain "concurrence and influence" which that _materia_ exerts;

and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any

rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out

of nothing.

But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this

argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the

ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants

primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to

discover, he does not so much as allude in his "Metaphysical Disputations."

Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he has

devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all

the problems which arise out of the account of the Creation which is given

in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of wonderment to me that Mr.

Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves "Mr. Darwin and others" for not

acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow

himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself for a knowledge of the

existence of that "Tractatus de opere sex Dierum," [Footnote: _Tractatus

de opere sex Dierum, seu de Universi Creatione, quatenus sex diebus

perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i. refertur, et praesertim de

productione hominis in statu innocentiae._ Ed. Birckmann, 1622.] in

which the learned Father, of whom he justly speaks, as "an authority widely

venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned," directly opposes

all those opinions for which Mr. Mivart claims the shelter of his

authority.

In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise,

Suarez inquires in what sense the word "day," as employed in the first

chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of

Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval

of their allegorising interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose

out of St. Thomas's modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to

controvert St. Augustin--"voluisse Divus Thomas pro sua modestia

subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantiæ

arguere."

Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term

"day" should be taken in its natural sense; and he winds up the discussion

with the very just and natural remark that "it is not probable that God, in

inspiring Moses to write a history of the Creation which was to be believed

by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaning of

which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe." [Footnote:

"Propter hæc ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem

et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia verisimile non est Deum

inspirasse Moysi, ut historiam de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi

adeo necessariam per nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix

inveniri et difficillime ab aliquo credi posset." (_Loc. cit._ Lib. I.

cap. xi. 42.)]