After she began her career as a novelist George Eliot wrote about twenty

essays, nearly all of which are included in her last book, _Impressions of

Theophrastus Such_. Previous to this, however, she had published in the

first number of the _Fortnightly Review_, issued May 15, 1865, and edited

by Lewes, an article on "The Influence of Rationalism," in review of Mr.

W.H. Lecky's book on that subject. A year after the appearance of _Felix

Holt_ she wrote out her views on the subject of political reform, in the

shape of an "Address to Workingmen by Felix Holt," which appeared in

_Blackwood's Magazine_ for January, 1868. These essays are significant,

because of the light they afford concerning the author's views on religious

and political subjects. The first is a piece of thorough reviewing, and

shows what George Eliot might have done in that direction. She is a

merciless critic, and yet one inclined to appreciate all that is best in an

author. Her sympathies with positivism and with the "scientific method" in

philosophy find expression in the pages of this essay. In it she gives a

most expressive utterance to her ideas about the universality of law and

the influence of tradition. Her point of view is so antagonistic to Mr,

Lecky's that she does not do full justice to his work. His idealism is

repugnant to her, and he does not give prominence enough to please her to

those positivist influences in which she so strongly believed. Her

dissatisfaction with his idealism appears in her very first words.

There is a valuable class of books on great subjects which have

something of the character and functions of good popular lecturing.

They are not original, not subtle, not of close logical texture, not

exquisite either in thought or style; but by virtue of these negatives

they are all the more fit to act on the average intelligence. They have

enough of organizing purpose in them to make their facts illustrative,

and to leave a distinct result in the mind even when most of the facts

are forgotten; and they have enough of vagueness and vacillation in

their theory to win them ready acceptance from a mixed audience. The

vagueness and vacillation are not devices of timidity; they are the

honest result of the writer's own mental character, which adapts him to

be the instructor and the favorite of "the general reader." For the

most part, the general reader of the present day does not exactly know

what distance he goes; he only knows that he does not go "too far." Of

any remarkable thinker, whose writings have excited controversy, he

likes to have it said "that his errors are to be deplored." leaving it

not too certain what those errors are; he is fond of what may be called

disembodied opinions, that float in vapory phrases above all systems of

thought or action; he likes an undefined Christianity which opposes

itself to nothing in particular, an undefined education of the people,

an undefined amelioration of all things: in fact, he likes sound

views--nothing extreme, but something between the excesses of the past

and the excesses of the present. This modern type of the general reader

may be known in conversation by the cordiality with which he assents to

indistinct, blurred statements. Say that black is black, he will shake

his head and hardly think it; say that black is not so very black, he

will reply, "Exactly." He has no hesitation, if you wish it, even to

get up at a public meeting and express his conviction that at times,

and within certain limits, the radii of a circle have a tendency to be

equal; but, on the other hand, he would urge that the spirit of

geometry may be carried a little too far. His only bigotry is a bigotry

against any clearly defined opinion; not in the least based on a

scientific scepticism, but belonging to a lack of coherent thought--a

spongy texture of mind, that gravitates strongly to nothing. The one

thing he is staunch for is the utmost liberty of private haziness.

But precisely these characteristics of the general reader, rendering

him incapable of assimilating ideas unless they are administered in a

highly diluted form, make it a matter of rejoicing that there are

clever, fair-minded men who will write books for him--men very much

above him in knowledge and ability, but not too remote from him in

their habits of thinking, and who can thus prepare for him infusions

of history and science that will leave some solidifying deposit, and

save him from a fatal softening of the intellectual skeleton. Among

such serviceable writers, Mr. Lecky's _History of the Rise and

Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe_ entitles him to a

high place. He has prepared himself for its production by an unusual

amount of well-directed reading; he has chosen his facts and quotations

with much judgment; and he gives proof of those important moral

qualifications, impartiality, seriousness and modesty. This praise is

chiefly applicable to the long chapter on the history of Magic and

Witchcraft, and to the two chapters on the antecedents and history of

Persecution.

A further evidence of her wide culture and reading, and of her large

critical ability, may also be found in the first number of the _Fortnightly

Review_, for which she wrote the first of the "notices of new books" which

it published. This was a review of Mr. Owen Jones's _Grammar of Ornament_.

The author was one of her friends, and the decorator of the rooms in which

her Sunday receptions were held. She praised the book very highly. The

first paragraph of this notice betrays her appreciation of the aesthetic

movement in England, and her sympathy with its objects and spirit. The

moral value of aesthetic influences is characteristically expressed. The

influence of the environment, as she understood it, is here seen. The

largeness of her faith in the moral efficiency of material causes is

nowhere so strongly expressed by her as in the words which follow.

The inventor of movable types, says the venerable Teufelsdröckh, was

disbanding hired armies, cashiering most kings and senates, and

creating a whole new democratic world. Has any one yet said what great

things are being done by the men who are trying to banish ugliness

from our streets and our homes, and to make both the outside and the

inside of our dwellings worthy of a world where there are forests, and

flower-tressed meadows, and the plumage of birds; where the insects

carry lessons of color on their wings, and even the surface of a

stagnant pool will show us the wonders of iridescence and the most

delicate forms of leafage? They, too, are modifying opinions, for they

are modifying men's moods and habits, which are the mothers of

opinions, having quite as much to do with their formation as the

responsible father--Reason. Think of certain hideous manufacturing

towns where the piety is chiefly a belief in copious perdition, and

the pleasure is chiefly gin. The dingy surface of wall pierced by the

ugliest windows, the staring shop-fronts, paper-hangings, carpets,

brass and gilt mouldings, and advertising placards, have an effect

akin to that of malaria; it is easy to understand that with such

surroundings there is more belief in cruelty than in beneficence, and

that the best earthly bliss attainable is the dulling of the external

senses. For it is a fatal mistake to suppose that ugliness which is

taken for beauty will answer all the purposes of beauty; the subtle

relation between all kinds of truth and fitness in our life forbids

that bad taste should ever be harmless to our moral sensibility or our

intellectual discernment; and--more than that--as it is probable that

fine musical harmonies have a sanative influence over our bodily

organization, it is also probable that just coloring and lovely

combinations of lines may be necessary to the complete well-being of

our systems, apart from any conscious delight in them. A savage may

indulge in discordant chuckles and shrieks and gutturals, and think

that they please the gods, but it does not follow that his frame would

not be favorably wrought upon by the vibrations of a grand church

organ. One sees a person capable of choosing the worst style of

wall-paper become suddenly afflicted by its ugliness under an attack of

illness. And if an evil state of blood and lymph usually goes along

with an evil state of mind, who shall say that the ugliness of our

streets, the falsity of our ornamentation, the vulgarity of our

upholstery, have not something to do with those bad tempers which

breed false conclusions?

The address to workingmen which George Eliot put into the mouth of Felix

Holt is a suggestive and valuable piece of political writing. Tradition is

therein presented as a moral and political influence. The spiritual

treasures mankind possesses she says are the products of tradition, and

these must be preserved. This can be done only by keeping the old

institutions and forms until they can be organically supplanted by others.

All the various portions of society are mutually dependent, and the

destruction of any one of them will be to the injury of all. This she says

to workingmen as a reason why they should not antagonize the social orders

above them, whose work is as important as their own. The organs of society

are the various social classes of which it is composed, and society is to

be improved by turning class interests into the functions by which Humanity

is to be developed. The spiritual treasures of the past are only to be

preserved by order and good government; hence all revolutionary methods are

suicidal. Life is to be advanced by giving social influence into the hands

of the wisest. True principles must regulate society, and these George

Eliot would have rest on science and altruism.

Such are some of the ideas of this remarkable essay, one of the most

suggestive and instructive of all she wrote. The emphasis she laid on

retribution, tradition, heredity and duties appears here in all its force.

Perhaps nothing else she wrote so clearly brings out some of the

characteristics of her mind. Her intense distrust of individualism does not

permit her to say a single word of the _rights_ of the laboring classes.

The right of rebellion and revolution is totally disregarded, rather it is

not recognized that any rights whatever exist. The workingman is not to

think of himself or his class, but of society and humanity; he is to become

an altruistic worker for the common good. While this is fine in theory, yet

history indicates that the aristocratic classes have yielded to the broader

social spirit only when they have been compelled to do so. The concessions

must come from above, not from beneath. George Eliot's political

philosophy, if carried into actual life, would keep the proletariate where

they are, and strengthen the social power of the aristocratic classes.

These words may indicate the drift of the essay:

But I come back to this: that, in our old society there are old

institutions, and among them the various distinctions and inherited

advantages of classes, which have shaped themselves along with all the

wonderful slow-growing system of things made up of our laws, our

commerce and our stores of all sorts, whether in material objects, such

as buildings and machinery, or in knowledge, such as scientific thought

and professional skill. Just as in that case I spoke of before, the

irrigation of a country, which must absolutely have its water

distributed or it will bear no crop; these are the old channels, the

old banks and the old pumps, which must be used as they are until new

and better have been prepared, or the structure of the old has been

gradually altered. But it would be fool's work to batter down a pump

only because a better might be made, when you have no machinery ready

for a new one: it would be wicked work, if villages lost their crops by

it. Now the only safe way by which society can be steadily improved and

our worst evils reduced, is not by any attempt to do away directly with

the actually existing class distinctions and advantages, as if

everybody could have the same sort of work or lead the same sort of

life (which none of my hearers are stupid enough to suppose), but by

turning of Class Interests into Class Functions or duties. What I mean

is, that each class should be urged by the surrounding conditions to

perform its particular work under the strong pressure of responsibility

to the nation at large; that our public affairs should be got into a

state in which there should be no impunity for foolish or faithless

conduct. In this way, the public judgment would sift out incapability

and dishonesty from posts of high charge, and even personal ambition

would necessarily become of a worthier sort, since the desires of the

most selfish men must be a good deal shaped by the opinions of those

around them: and for one person to put on a cap and bells, or to go

about dishonest or paltry ways of getting rich that he may spend a vast

sum of money in having more finery than his neighbors, he must be

pretty sure of a crowd who will applaud him. Now changes can only be

good in proportion as they help to bring about this sort of result:

in proportion as they put knowledge in the place of ignorance, and

fellow-feeling in the place of selfishness. In the course of

substitution class distinctions must inevitably change their character,

and represent the varying Duties of men, not their varying Interests.

But this end will not come by impatience. "Day will not break the

sooner because we get up before the twilight." Still less will it come

by mere undoing, or change merely as change. And moreover, if we

believed that it would be unconditionally hastened by our getting the

franchise, we should be what I call superstitious men, believing in

magic, or the production of a result by hocus-pocus. Our getting the

franchise will greatly hasten that good end in proportion only as every

one of us has the knowledge, the foresight, the conscience, that will

make him well-judging and scrupulous in the use of it. The nature of

things in this world has been determined for us beforehand, and in such

a way that no ship can be expected to sail well on a difficult voyage,

and reach the right port, unless it is well-manned: the nature of the

winds and the waves, of the timbers, the sails and the cordage, will

not accommodate itself to drunken, mutinous sailors.

You will not suspect me of wanting to preach any cant to you, or of

joining in the pretence that everything is in a fine way and need not

be made better. What I am striving to keep in our minds is the care,

the precaution, with which we should go about making things better, so

that the public order may not be destroyed, so that no fatal shock may

be given to this society of ours, this living body in which our lives

are bound up. After the Reform Bill of 1832, I was in an election riot,

which showed me clearly, on a small scale, what public disorder must

always be; and I have never forgotten that the riot was brought about

chiefly by the agency of dishonest men who professed to be on the

people's side. Now the danger hanging over change is great, just in

proportion as it tends to produce such disorder by giving any large

number of ignorant men, whose notions of what is good are of a low and

brutal sort, the belief that they have got power into their hands and

may do pretty much as they like. If any one can look round us and say

that he sees no signs of any such danger now, and that our national

condition is running along like a clear broadening stream, safe not to

get choked with mud, I call him a cheerful man; perhaps he does his own

gardening, and seldom takes exercise far away from home. To us who have

no gardens, and often walk abroad, it is plain that we can never get

into a bit of a crowd but we must rub clothes with a set of roughs, who

have the worst vices of the worst rich--who are gamblers, sots,

libertines, knaves, or else mere sensual simpletons and victims. They

are the ugly crop that has sprung up while the stewards have been

sleeping; they are the multiplying brood begotten by parents who have

been left without all teaching save that of a too-craving body, without

all well-being save the fading delusions of drugged beer and gin. They

are the hideous margin of society, at one edge drawing towards it the

undesigning ignorant poor, at the other darkening imperceptibly into

the lowest criminal class. Here is one of the evils which cannot be got

rid of quickly, and against which any of us who have got sense, decency

and instruction have need to watch. That these degraded fellow-men

could really get the mastery in a persistent disobedience to the laws

and in a struggle to subvert order, I do not believe; but wretched

calamities would come from the very beginning of such a struggle, and

the continuance of it would be a civil war, in which the inspiration on

both sides might soon cease to be even a false notion of good, and

might become the direct savage impulse of ferocity. We have all to see

to it that we do not help to rouse what I may call the savage beast in

the breasts of our generation--that we do not help to poison the

nation's blood, and make richer provision for bestiality to come. We

know well enough that oppressors have sinned in this way--that

oppression has notoriously made men mad; and we are determined to

resist oppression. But let us, if possible, show that we can keep sane

in our resistance, and shape our means more and more reasonably towards

the least harmful, and therefore the speediest, attainment of our end.

Let us, I say, show that our spirits are too strong to be driven mad,

but can keep that sober determination which alone gives mastery over

the adaptation of means. And a first guarantee of this sanity will be

to act as if we understood that the fundamental duty of a government is

to preserve order, to enforce obedience of the laws. It has been held

hitherto that a man can be depended on as a guardian of order only when

he has much money and comfort to lose. But a better state of things

would be, that men who had little money and not much comfort should

still be guardians of order, because they had sense to see that

disorder would do no good, and had a heart of justice, pity and

fortitude to keep them from making more misery only because they felt

some misery themselves. There are thousands of artisans who have

already shown this fine spirit, and have endured much with patient

heroism. If such a spirit spread and penetrated us all, we should soon

become the masters of the country in the best sense and to the best

ends. For, the public order being preserved, there can be no government

in future that will not be determined by our insistence on our fair and

practicable demands. It is only by disorder that our demands will be

choked, that we shall find ourselves lost amongst a brutal rabble, with

all the intelligence of the country opposed to us, and see government

in the shape of guns that will sweep us down in the ignoble martyrdom

of fools.

The eighteen essays published as the _Impressions of Theophrastus Such_

purport to have been the work of a bachelor of singular habits and tastes,

who had written a book which proved a failure, and who left this volume to

appear posthumously. He had been in the habit of giving an account to

himself of the characters he met with, and he begins his book by describing

his own weaknesses. He classes himself as one of the blunderers he would

portray, as having the faults and foibles he finds in others. Expressively

the author says, "If the human race has a bad reputation, I perceive that I

cannot escape being compromised." This may be taken as the sentiment of

George Eliot herself; and it is she who really speaks in these words

concerning the satirical criticisms of those she describes:

If I laugh at you, O fellow-men! if I trace with curious interest your

labyrinthine self-delusions, note the inconsistencies in your zealous

adhesions, and smile at your helpless endeavors in a rashly chosen

part, it is not that I feel myself aloof from you: the more intimately

I seem to discern your weaknesses, the stronger to me is the proof that

I share them. How otherwise could I get the discernment?--for even what

we are averse to, what we vow not to entertain, must have shaped or

shadowed itself within us as a possibility before we can think of

exorcising it. No man can know his brother simply as a spectator.

After the second essay Theophrastus disappears, and no further hint is

given that it is he who is the reputed author. This slight fictitious

machinery is too weak to carry the load put upon it. The reader soon feels

that it is George Eliot who is talking, and the opinions put forth, the

sentiments expressed, are recognized as her own. Indeed, it would have been

better, so the reader may probably come to say to himself, if this

attempted disguise had been entirely dispensed with. By the time he has

reached the sixth essay, "Only Temper," the discerning reader, familiar

with George Eliot's books, will be ready to affirm that this is no other

than the author herself speaking very frankly and finely her own

sentiments. In this essay the moral temper of her mind appears, and her

strong inclination to subordinate the individual to the social requirements

of life.

These papers are modelled on those of the great essay-making period in

English literature. Old-fashioned names are adopted, which have a greater

or less significance in connection with the purpose of the essay. The man

with the excitable temper is called Touchwood, while the man who slides

into a deferential acceptance of opinions made for him is Mixtus. This

method of the old essayists seems antiquated, cumbersome and unsuitable to

the subjects discussed. The persons described lose their individuality by

its use, and the reader forgets that they were meant to be creatures of

flesh and blood. For the most part, they are mere abstractions, mere

figures of straw, to be knocked over by the ingenious pen of the author.

Some special fault or sin is given the name of a personality, but it is too

much isolated from actual existence to produce the impression of a living

thing.

These essays much resemble occasional chapters in her novels, and might

have been studies for a new work. They are studies simply, done with a fine

skill and polish, but fragmentary. The large setting of her novels is

needed to give them relief and proportion. They disappoint as they are, for

the satire is too apparent, and we do not see these characters in action,

where their follies would obtain for them a more living interest. They are

studies of individual character, portraying types of social and literary

weakness, such as may have come under George Eliot's observation. They are

careful dissections of motives and conduct, and full of a minute analysis

of the moral and intellectual nature of her characters. There is abundance

of candid criticism, shrewd observation and compressed wisdom of statement.

Occasionally she is at her very best; but she uses many long, cumbersome

sentences, the satire is too harsh and the wisdom too unwieldy. Her

sympathy, love, pathos and pity are not so apparent as in her novels; she

takes less delight in these creations, and evidently created them for

purposes of dissection. She is never so weak in her other writings as in

these essays, so wanting in genius and large-heartedness. She scourges many

of the intellectual follies of the time, the conceit of culture, the pride

of literature, and the narrowness of politics; but in most of the essays

this is all.

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