This larger or social heredity is that which claims much the larger share

of George Eliot's attention, and it is far more clearly and distinctively

presented in her writings. She gives a literary expression here to the

teachings of the evolutionists, shows the application to life of what has

been taught by Spencer, Haeckel and Lewes. In his _Foundations of a Creed_,

Lewes has stated this theory in discussing "the limitations of knowledge."

"It is indisputable," he says, "that every particular man comes into the

world with a heritage of organized forms and definite tendencies, which

will determine his feeling and thinking in certain definite ways, whenever

the suitable conditions are present. And all who believe in evolution

believe that these forms and tendencies represent ancestral experiences and

adaptations; believe that not only is the pointer born with an organized

tendency to point, the setter to set, the beaver to build, and the bird to

fly, but that the man is born with a tendency to think in images and

symbols according to given relations and sequences which constitute logical

laws, that _what_ he thinks is the necessary product of his organism and

the external conditions. This organism itself is a product of its history;

it _is_ what it has _become_; it is a part of the history of the human

race; it is also specially individualized by the particular personal

conditions which have distinguished him from his fellow-men. Thus

resembling all men in general characters, he will in general feel as

they feel, think as they think; and differing from all men in special

characters, he will have personal differences of feeling and shades of

feeling, thought and combinations of thought.... The mind is built up

out of assimilated experiences, its perceptions being shaped by its

pre-perceptions, its conceptions by its pre-conceptions. Like the body,

the mind is shaped through its history." In other words, experience is

inherited and shapes the mental and social life. What some philosophers

have called intuitions, and what Kant called the categories of the mind,

Lewes regarded as the inherited results of human experience. By a slow

process of evolution the mind has been produced and shaped into harmony

with its environment; the results of inherited experience take the form of

feelings, intuitions, laws of thought and social tendencies. Its intuitions

are to be accepted as the highest knowledge, because the transmitted

results of all human experience.

As the body performs those muscular operations most easily to which it

is most accustomed, so men as social beings perform those acts and think

those thoughts most easily and naturally to which the race has been longest

accustomed. Man lives and thinks as man has lived and thought; he inherits

the past. In his social life he is as much the child of the past as he is

individually the son of his father. If he inherits his father's physiognomy

and habits of thought, so does he socially inherit the characteristics of

his race, its social and moral life. George Eliot was profoundly convinced

of the value of this fact, and she has presented it in her books in all

its phases. In her _Fortnightly Review_ essay on "The Influence of

Rationalism," she says all large minds have long had "a vague sense" "that

tradition is really the basis of our best life." She says, "Our sentiments

may be called organized traditions; and a large part of our actions gather

all their justification, all their attractions and aroma, from the memory

of the life lived, of the actions done, before we were born." Tradition is

the inherited experience of the race, the result of its long efforts, its

many struggles, after a larger life. It lives in the tendencies of our

emotions, in the intuitions and aspirations of our minds, as the wisdom

which our minds hold dear, as the yearnings of our hearts after a wider

social life. These things are not the results of our own reasonings, but

they are the results of the life lived by those who have gone before us,

and who, by their thoughts and deeds, have shaped our lives, our minds, to

what they are. Tradition is the inherited experience, feeling, yearning,

pain, sorrow and wisdom of the ages. It furnishes a great system of

customs, laws, institutions, ideas, motives and feelings into which we are

born, which we naturally adopt, which gives shape and strength to our

growing life, which makes it possible for us to take up life at that stage

it has reached after the experiences of many generations. George Eliot says

in _Middlemarch_ that "a kind Providence furnishes the limpest personality

with a little gum or starch in the form of tradition." We come into a world

made ready for us, and find prepared for our immediate use a vast complex

of customs and duties and ideas, the results of the world's experience.

George Eliot believed, with Comte, that with each generation the influence

of the past over the present becomes greater, and that men's lives are more

and more shaped by what has been. In _The Spanish Gypsy_ she makes Don

Silva say that

The only better is a Past that lives

On through an added Present, stretching still

In hope unchecked by shaming memories

To life's last breath.

This deep conviction of the blessed influence of the past upon us is well

expressed in the little poem on "Self and Life," one of the most fully

autobiographical of all her poems, where she makes Life bid Self remember

How the solemn, splendid Past

O'er thy early widened earth

Made grandeur, as on sunset cast

Dark elms near take mighty girth.

Hands and feet were tiny still

When we knew the historic thrill,

Breathed deep breath in heroes dead,

Tasted the immortals' bread.

In expressive sentences, in the development of her characters, and in many

other ways, she affirms this faith in tradition. In one of the mottoes

in _Felix Holt_ she uses a fine sentence, which is repeated in "A Minor

Prophet."

Our finest hope is finest memory.

The finest hope of the race is to be found in memory of its great deeds, as

its saddest loss is to be found in forgetfulness of a noble past. In _The

Mill on the Floss_, when describing St. Ogg's, she attributes its sordid

and tedious life to its neglect of the past and its inspiring memories.

The mind of St. Ogg's did not look extensively before or after. It

inherited a long past without thinking of it, and had no eyes for the

spirits that walk the streets, Since the centuries when St. Ogg with

his boat, and the Virgin Mother at the prow, had been seen on the wide

water, so many memories had been left behind, and had gradually

vanished like the receding hill-tops! And the present time was like the

level plain where men lose their belief in volcanoes and earthquakes,

thinking to-morrow will be as yesterday, and the giant forces that used

to shake the earth are forever laid to sleep. The days were gone when

people could be greatly wrought upon by their faith, still less change

it: the Catholics were formidable because they would lay hold of

government and property, and burn men alive; not because any sane and

honest parishioner of St. Ogg's could be brought to believe in the

Pope. One aged person remembered how a rude multitude had been swayed

when John Wesley preached in the cattle-market; but for a long while it

had not been expected of preachers that they should shake the souls of

men. An occasional burst of fervor in Dissenting pulpits on the subject

of infant baptism was the only symptom of a zeal unsuited to sober

times when men had done with change. Protestantism sat at ease,

unmindful of schisms, careless of proselytism; Dissent was an

inheritance along with a superior pew and a business connection; and

Churchmanship only wondered contemptuously at Dissent as a foolish

habit that clung greatly to families in the grocery and chandlering

lines, though not incompatible with prosperous wholesale dealing.

[Footnote: Chapter XII.]

This faith in tradition, as giving the basis of all our best life, is

perhaps nowhere so expressively set forth by George Eliot as in _The

Spanish Gypsy_. It is distinctly taught by all the best characters in the

words they speak, and it is emphatically taught in the whole purpose and

spirit of the poem. Zarca says his tribe has no great life because it has

no great national memories. He calls his people

Wanderers whom no God took knowledge of

To give them laws, to fight for them, or blight

Another race to make them ampler room;

Who have no whence or whither in their souls,

No dimmest lure of glorious ancestors

To make a common breath for piety.

As his people are weak because they have no traditional life, he proposes

by his deeds to make them national memories and hopes and aims.

No lure

Shall draw me to disown them, or forsake

The meagre wandering herd that lows for help--

And needs me for its guide, to seek my pasture

Among the well-fed beeves that graze at will.

Because our race has no great memories,

I will so live, it shall remember me

For deeds of such divine beneficence

As rivers have, that teach, men what is good

By blessing them. I have been schooled--have caught

Lore from Hebrew, deftness from the Moor--

Know the rich heritage, the milder life,

Of nations fathered by a mighty Past.

The way in which such a past is made is suggested by Zarca, in answer to a

question about the Gypsy's faith; it is made by a common life of faith and

brotherhood, that gives origin to a common inheritance and memories.

O, it is a faith

Taught by no priest, but by their beating hearts

Faith to each other: the fidelity

Of fellow-wanderers in a desert place

Who share the same dire thirst, and therefore share

The scanty water: the fidelity

Of men whose pulses leap with kindred fire,

Who in the flash of eyes, the clasp of hands,

The speech that even in lying tells the truth

Of heritage inevitable as birth,

Nay, in the silent bodily presence feel

The mystic stirring of a common life

Which makes the many one: fidelity

To that deep consecrating oath our sponsor Fate

Made through our infant breath when we were born

The fellow-heirs of that small island, Life,

Where we must dig and sow and reap with brothers.

Fear thou that oath, my daughter--nay, not fear,

But love it; for the sanctity of oaths

Lies not in lightning that avenges them,

But in the injury wrought by broken bonds

And in the garnered good of human trust.

And you have sworn--even with your infant breath

You too were pledged.

George Eliot's faith in tradition, as furnishing the basis of our best

life, and the moral purpose and law which is to guide it, she has

concentrated into one question asked by Maggie Tulliver.

If the past is not to bind us, where can duty lie? We should

have no law but the inclination of the moment.

Although this question is asked in regard to an individual's past, the

answer to it holds quite as good for the race as for the individual. She

repudiates all theories which give the individual authority to follow

inclination, or even to follow some inner or personal guide. The true

wisdom is always social, always grows out of the experiences of the race,

and not out of any personal inspiration or enlightenment. Tradition

furnishes the materials for reason to use, but reason does not penetrate

into new regions, or bring to us wisdom apart from that we obtain through

inherited experiences. George Eliot compares these two with each other in

_The Spanish Gypsy_ in the words of Sephardo.

I abide

By that wise spirit of listening reverence

Which marks the boldest doctors of our race.

For Truth, to us, is like a living child

Born of two parents: if the parents part

And will divide the child, how shall it live?

Or, I will rather say: Two angels guide

The path of man, both aged and yet young,

As angels are, ripening through endless years.

On one he leans: some call her Memory,

And some, Tradition; and her voice is sweet,

With deep mysterious accords: the other,

Floating above, holds down a lamp which streams

A light divine and searching on the earth,

Compelling eyes and footsteps. Memory yields,

Yet clings with loving check, and shines anew

Reflecting all the rays of that bright lamp

Our angel Reason holds. We had not walked

But for Tradition; we walk evermore

To higher paths, by brightening Reason's lamp.

Man leans on tradition, it is the support of his life, by its strength he

is able to move forward. Reason is a lamp which lights the way, gives

direction to tradition; it is a beacon and not a support. Tradition not

only brings us the wisdom of all past experience, but it develops into a

spiritual atmosphere in which we live, move and have our being. This was

Comte's idea, that the spiritual life is developed out of tradition, that

the world's experiences have produced for us intangible hopes, yearnings

and aspirations; awe, reverence and sense of subtle mystery: mystic trust,

faith in invisible memories, joy in the unseen power of thought and love;

and that these create for us a spiritual world most real in its nature, and

most powerful in its influence. On every hand man is touched by the

invisible, mystical influences of the past, spiritual voices call to him

out of the ages, unseen hands point the way he is to go. He breathes this

atmosphere of spiritual memories, he is fed on thoughts other men have made

for his sustenance, he is inspired by the heroisms of ages gone before. In

an article in the _Westminster Review_ in July, 1856, on "The Natural

History of German Life," in review of W.H. Riehl's books on the German

peasant, and on land and climate, she presents the idea that a people can

be understood only when we understand its history. Society, she says, has

developed through many generations, and has built itself up in many

memories and associations. To change it we must change its traditions.

Nothing can be done _de novo_; a fresh beginning cannot be had. The dream

of the French Revolution, that a new nation, a new life, a new morality,

was to be created anew and fresh out of the cogitations of philosophers, is

not in any sense to be realized. Tradition forever asserts itself, the past

is more powerful than all philosophers, and new traditions must be made

before a new life can be had for society. These ideas are well expressed by

George Eliot in her review of Riehl's books.

He sees in European society _incarnate history_, and any attempt to

disengage it from its historical elements must, he believes, be simply

destruction of social vitality. What has grown up historically can only

die out historically, by the gradual operation of necessary laws. The

external conditions which society has inherited from the past are but

the manifestation of inherited internal conditions in the human beings

who compose it; the internal conditions and the external are related to

each other as the organism and its medium, and development can take

place only by the gradual consentaneous development of both. As a

necessary preliminary to a purely rational society, you must obtain

purely rational men, free from the sweet and bitter prejudices of

hereditary affection and antipathy; which is as easy as to get running

streams without springs, or the leafy shade of the forest without the

secular growth of trunk and branch.

The historical conditions of society may be compared with those of

language. It must be admitted that the language of cultivated nations

is in anything but a rational state; the great sections of the

civilized world are only approximately intelligible to each other, and

even that, only at the cost of long study; one word stands for many

things, and many words for one thing; the subtle shades of meaning, and

still subtler echoes of association, make language an instrument which

scarcely anything short of genius can wield with definiteness and

certainty. Suppose, then, that the effort which has been again and

again made to construct a universal language on a rational basis has

at length succeeded, and that you have a language which has no

uncertainty, no whims of idiom, no cumbrous forms, no fitful shimmer of

many-hued significance, no hoary archaisms "familiar with forgotten

years,"--a patent deodorized and non-resonant language, which effects

the purpose of communication as perfectly and rapidly as algebraic

signs. Your language may be a perfect medium of expression to science,

but will never express _life_, which is a great deal more than science.

With the anomalies and inconveniences of historical language, you will

have parted with its music and its passion, with its vital qualities

as an expression of individual character, with its subtle capabilities

of wit, with everything that gives it power over the imagination; and

the next step in simplification will be the invention of a talking

watch, which will achieve the utmost facility and despatch in the

communication of ideas by a graduated adjustment of ticks, to be

represented in writing by a corresponding arrangement of dots. A

"melancholy language of the future!" The sensory and motor nerves that

run in the same sheath are scarcely bound together by a more necessary

and delicate union than that which binds men's affections, imagination,

wit and humor with the subtle ramifications of historical language.

Language must be left to grow in precision, completeness and unity, as

minds grow in clearness, comprehensiveness and sympathy. And there is

an analogous relation between the moral tendencies of men and the

social conditions they have inherited. The nature of European men has

its roots intertwined with the past, and can only be developed by

allowing those roots to remain undisturbed while the process of

development is going on, until that perfect ripeness of the seed which

carries with it a life independent of the root....

It has not been sufficiently insisted on, that in the various branches

of social science there is an advance from the general to the special,

from the simple to the complex, analogous with that which is found in

the series of the sciences, from mathematics to biology. To the laws of

quantity comprised in mathematics and physics are superadded, in

chemistry, laws of quality; to those again are added, in biology, laws

of life; and lastly, the conditions of life in general branch out into

its special conditions, or natural history, on the one hand, and into

its abnormal conditions, or pathology, on the other. And in this series

or ramification of the sciences, the more general science will not

suffice to solve the problems of the more special. Chemistry embraces

phenomena which are not explicable by physics; biology embraces

phenomena which are not explicable by chemistry; and no biological

generalization will enable us to predict the infinite specialties

produced by the complexity of vital conditions. So social science,

while it has departments which in their fundamental generality

correspond to mathematics and physics, namely, those grand and simple

generalizations which trace out the inevitable march of the human race

as a whole, and, as a ramification of these, the laws of economical

science, has also, in the departments of government and jurisprudence,

which embrace the conditions of social life in all their complexity,

what may be called its biology, carrying us on to innumerable special

phenomena which outlie the sphere of science, and belong to natural

history. And just as the most thorough acquaintance with physics, or

chemistry, or general physiology, will not enable you at once to

establish the balance of life in your private vivarium, so that your

particular society of zoophytes, molluscs and echinoderms may feel

themselves, as the Germans say, at ease in their skins; so the most

complete equipment of theory will not enable a statesman or a political

and social reformer to adjust his measures wisely, in the absence of a

special acquaintance with the section of society for which he

legislates, with the peculiar characteristics of the nation, the

province, the class whose well-being he has to consult. In other words,

a wise social policy must be based not simply on abstract social

science but on the natural history of social bodies.

Her conception of the corporate life of the nice has been clearly expressed

by George Eliot in the concluding essay in _Theophrastus Such_. In that

essay she writes of the powerful influence wrought upon national life by

"the divine gift of memory which inspires the moments with a past, a

present and a future, and gives the sense of corporate existence that

raises man above the otherwise more respectable and innocent brute." The

nations which lead the world on to a larger civilization are not merely

those with most genius, originality, gift of invention or talent for

scientific observation, but those which have the finest traditions. As a

member of such a nation, the individual can be noble and great. We should

almost be persuaded, reading George Eliot's eloquent rhetoric on this

subject, that personal genius is of little moment in comparison with a rich

inheritance of national memories. It is indeed true that Homer, Virgil,

Dante, Milton and Shakspere have used the traditions of their people for

the materials of their immortal works, but what would those traditions have

been without the genius of the men who deal with the traditions in a

fashion quite their own, giving them new meaning and vitality! The poet,

however, needs materials for his song, and memories to inspire it. The

influence of these George Eliot well understands in calling them "the deep

suckers of healthy sentiment."

The historian guides us rightly in urging us to dwell on the virtues of

our ancestors with emulation, and to cherish our sense of a common

descent as a bond of obligation. The eminence, the nobleness of a

people, depends on its capability of being stirred by memories, and for

striving for what we call spiritual ends--ends which consist not in an

immediate material possession, but in the satisfaction of a great

feeling that animates the collective body as with one soul. A people

having the seed of worthiness in it must feel an answering thrill when

it is adjured by the deaths of its heroes who died to preserve its

national existence; when it is reminded of its small beginnings and

gradual growth through past labors and struggles, such as are still

demanded of it in order that the freedom and well-being thus inherited

may be transmitted unimpaired to children and children's children; when

an appeal against the permission of injustice is made to great

precedents in its history and to the better genius breathing in its

institutions. It is this living force of sentiment in common which

makes a national consciousness. Nations so moved will resist conquest

with the very breasts of their women, will pay their millions and their

blood to abolish slavery, will share privation in famine and all

calamity, will produce poets to sing "some great story of a man," and

thinkers whose theories will bear the test of action. An individual

man, to be harmoniously great, must belong to a nation of this order,

if not in actual existence yet existing in the past--in memory, as a

departed, invisible, beloved ideal, once a reality, and perhaps to be

restored.... Not only the nobleness of a nation depends on the presence

of this national consciousness, but also the nobleness of each

individual citizen. Our dignity and rectitude are proportioned to our

sense of relationship with something great, admirable, pregnant with

high possibilities, worthy of sacrifice, a continual inspiration to

self-repression and discipline by the presentation of aims larger and

more attractive to our generous part than the securing of personal ease

or prosperity. [Footnote: Theophrastus Such, chapter XVIII.]

Zealous as is George Eliot's faith in tradition, she is broad-minded enough

to see that it is limited in its influence by at least two causes,--by

reason and by the spirit of universal brotherhood. We have already seen

that she makes reason one of man's guides. In _Romola_ the right of the

individual to make a new course for action is distinctly expressed. Romola

had "the inspiring consciousness," we are told, "that her lot was vitally

united with the general lot which exalted even the minor details of

obligation into religion," and so "she was marching with a great army, she

was feeling the stress of a common life." Yet she began to feel that she

must not merely repeat the past; and the influence of Savonarola, in

breaking with Rome for the sake of a pure and holy life, inspired her.

To her, as to him, there had come one of those moments in life when the

soul must dare to act on its own warrant, not only without external law

to appeal to, but in face of a law which is not unarmed with divine

lightnings--lightnings that may yet fall if the warrant has been false.

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