I--PLAN OF A TREATISE ON MORALS

That great science which regards nature and the operations of

the human mind, is popularly divided into Morals and Metaphysics.

The latter relates to a just classification, and the assignment

of distinct names to its ideas; the former regards simply the

determination of that arrangement of them which produces the greatest

and most solid happiness. It is admitted that a virtuous or moral

action, is that action which, when considered in all its accessories

and consequences, is fitted to produce the highest pleasure to the

greatest number of sensitive beings. The laws according to which

all pleasure, since it cannot be equally felt by all sensitive

beings, ought to be distributed by a voluntary agent, are reserved

for a separate chapter.

The design of this little treatise is restricted to the development

of the elementary principles of morals. As far as regards that

purpose, metaphysical science will be treated merely so far as a

source of negative truth; whilst morality will be considered as a

science, respecting which we can arrive at positive conclusions.

The misguided imaginations of men have rendered the ascertaining of

what IS NOT TRUE, the principal direct service which metaphysical

science can bestow upon moral science. Moral science itself is the

doctrine of the voluntary actions of man, as a sentient and social

being. These actions depend on the thoughts in his mind. But there

is a mass of popular opinion, from which the most enlightened persons

are seldom wholly free, into the truth or falsehood of which it

is incumbent on us to inquire, before we can arrive at any firm

conclusions as to the conduct which we ought to pursue in the

regulation of our own minds, or towards our fellow beings; or before

we can ascertain the elementary laws, according to which these

thoughts, from which these actions flow, are originally combined.

The object of the forms according to which human society is administered,

is the happiness of the individuals composing the communities which

they regard, and these forms are perfect or imperfect in proportion

to the degree in which they promote this end.

This object is not merely the quantity of happiness enjoyed by

individuals as sensitive beings, but the mode in which it should

be distributed among them as social beings. It is not enough, if

such a coincidence can be conceived as possible, that one person

or class of persons should enjoy the highest happiness, whilst

another is suffering a disproportionate degree of misery. It is

necessary that the happiness produced by the common efforts, and

preserved by the common care, should be distributed according to

the just claims of each individual; if not, although the quantity

produced should be the same, the end of society would remain

unfulfilled. The object is in a compound proportion to the quantity

of happiness produced, and the correspondence of the mode in which

it is distributed, to the elementary feelings of man as a social

being.

The disposition in an individual to promote this object is called

virtue; and the two constituent parts of virtue, benevolence and

justice, are correlative with these two great portions of the only

true object of all voluntary actions of a human being. Benevolence

is the desire to be the author of good, and justice the apprehension

of the manner in which good ought to be done.

Justice and benevolence result from the elementary laws of the

human mind.

A Defence of Poetry and Other Essays · 第 13 / 23 题