SIR: In a meeting of the general and medical officers called
by you at the Palace this morning we were all, as you know,
unanimous in our views of what should be done with the army.
To keep us here, in the opinion of every officer commanding
a division or a brigade, will simply involve the destruction
of thousands. There is no possible reason for not shipping
practically the entire command North at once. Yellow-fever
cases are very few in the cavalry division, where I command
one of the two brigades, and not one true case of yellow
fever has occurred in this division, except among the men
sent to the hospital at Siboney, where they have, I believe,
contracted it.
But in this division there have been 1,500 cases of malarial
fever. Hardly a man has yet died from it, but the whole
command is so weakened and shattered as to be ripe for dying
like rotten sheep, when a real yellow-fever epidemic instead
of a fake epidemic, like the present one, strikes us, as it
is bound to do if we stay here at the height of the sickness
season, August and the beginning of September. Quarantine
against malarial fever is much like quarantining against the
toothache.
All of us are certain that as soon as the authorities at
Washington fully appreciate the condition of the army, we
shall be sent home. If we are kept here it will in all human
possibility mean an appalling disaster, for the surgeons here
estimate that over half the army, if kept here during the
sickly season, will die.
This is not only terrible from the stand-point of the
individual lives lost, but it means ruin from the stand-point
of military efficiency of the flower of the American army,
for the great bulk of the regulars are here with you. The
sick list, large though it is, exceeding four thousand,
affords but a faint index of the debilitation of the army.
Not twenty per cent are fit for active work.
Six weeks on the North Maine coast, for instance, or
elsewhere where the yellow-fever germ cannot possibly
propagate, would make us all as fit as fighting-cocks, as
able as we are eager to take a leading part in the great
campaign against Havana in the fall, even if we are not
allowed to try Porto Rico.
We can be moved North, if moved at once, with absolute
safety to the country, although, of course, it would have
been infinitely better if we had been moved North or to
Porto Rico two weeks ago. If there were any object in
keeping us here, we would face yellow fever with as much
indifference as we faced bullets. But there is no object.
The four immune regiments ordered here are sufficient to
garrison the city and surrounding towns, and there is
absolutely nothing for us to do here, and there has not
been since the city surrendered. It is impossible to move
into the interior. Every shifting of camp doubles the
sick-rate in our present weakened condition, and, anyhow,
the interior is rather worse than the coast, as I have
found by actual reconnaissance. Our present camps are as
healthy as any camps at this end of the island can be.
I write only because I cannot see our men, who have fought
so bravely and who have endured extreme hardship and danger
so uncomplainingly, go to destruction without striving so
far as lies in me to avert a doom as fearful as it is
unnecessary and undeserved.
Yours respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.
After Colonel Roosevelt had taken the initiative, all the American
general officers united in a "round robin" addressed to General
Shafter. It reads:
We, the undersigned officers commanding the various
brigades, divisions, etc., of the Army of Occupation in
Cuba, are of the unanimous opinion that this army should be
at once taken out of the island of Cuba and sent to some
point on the Northern sea-coast of the United States; that
can be done without danger to the people of the United
States; that yellow fever in the army at present is not
epidemic; that there are only a few sporadic cases; but that
the army is disabled by malarial fever to the extent that
its efficiency is destroyed, and that it is in a condition
to be practically entirely destroyed by an epidemic of
yellow fever, which is sure to come in the near future.
We know from the reports of competent officers and from
personal observations that the army is unable to move into
the interior, and that there are no facilities for such a
move if attempted, and that it could not be attempted until
too late. Moreover, the best medical authorities of the
island say that with our present equipment we could not live
in the interior during the rainy season without losses from
malarial fever, which is almost as deadly as yellow fever.
This army must be moved at once, or perish. As the army
can be safely moved now, the persons responsible for
preventing such a move will be responsible for the
unnecessary loss of many thousands of lives.
Our opinions are the result of careful personal observation,
and they are also based on the unanimous opinion of our
medical officers with the army, who understand the situation
absolutely.
J. FORD KENT,
Major-General Volunteers Commanding First Division, Fifth Corps.
J. C. BATES,
Major-General Volunteers Commanding Provisional Division.
ADNAH R. CHAFFEE,
Major-General Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.
SAMUEL S. SUMNER,
Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Cavalry.
WILL LUDLOW,
Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding First Brigade, Second
Division.
ADELBERT AMES,
Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding Third Brigade, First
Division.
LEONARD WOOD,
Brigadier-General Volunteers Commanding the City of Santiago.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
Colonel Commanding Second Cavalry Brigade.
Major M. W. Wood, the chief Surgeon of the First Division, said:
"The army must be moved North," adding, with emphasis, "or it will be
unable to move itself."
General Ames has sent the following cable message to Washington:
CHARLES H. ALLEN,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy:
This army is incapable, because of sickness, of marching
anywhere except to the transports. If it is ever to return
to the United States it must do so at once.