The origin and proper value of the word “Argument” has been thus
explained by the Rev. Dr. Donaldson, in a paper read to the Cambridge
Philosophical Society:
The author first investigated the etymology and meaning of the Latin
verb _arguo_, and its participle _argutus_. He showed that _arguo_ was a
corruption of _argruo_ = _ad gruo_; that _gruo_ (in _argruo_, _ingruo_,
_congruo_) ought to be compared with κρούω, which means “to dash one
thing against another,” especially for the purpose of making a shrill,
ringing noise; that _arguo_ means “to knock something for the purpose of
making it ring, or testing its soundness,” hence “to test, examine, and
prove any thing;” and that _argutus_ signifies “made to ring,” hence
“making a distinct, shrill noise,” or “tested and put to the proof.”
Accordingly _argumentum_ means _id quod arguit_, “that which makes a
substance ring, which sounds, examines, tests, and proves it.”
It was then shown that these meanings were not only borne out by the
classical usage of the word, but also by the technical application of
“argument” as a logical term. For it is not equivalent to
“argumentation,” or the process of reasoning; it does not even denote a
complete syllogism; though Dr. Whately and some other writers on logic
had fallen into this vague use of the word, and though it was so
understood in the disputations of the Cambridge schools. The proper use
of the word “argument” in logic is to denote “the middle term,” _i. e._
“the term used for proof.” In a sense similar to this the word is
employed by mathematicians; and there can be no doubt that the oldest
and best logicians confine the word to this, which is still its most
common signification.
The author shows, by a collection of examples from the best English
poets, that the established meanings of the word “argument” are
reducible to three: (1) a proof, or means of proving; (2) a process of
reasoning, or controversy, made up of such proofs; (3) the
subject-matter of any discourse, writing, or picture. He maintains that
the second of these meanings should be excluded from scientific
language.
By this we are reminded of Swift’s dictum, of much wider
application—that “Argument, as generally managed, is the worst sort of
conversation; as it is generally in books the worst sort of reading.”