The plain and obvious meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in
common speech, is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has,
to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from hindrance
or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he
wills. (I say not only doing, but conducting; because a voluntary
forbearing to do, sitting still, keeping silence, etc., are instances
of persons' conduct, about which liberty is exercised; tho they are
not so properly called doing.) And the contrary to Liberty, whatever
name we call that by, is a person's being hindered or unable to
conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.
[Footnote 15: From "The Freedom of the Will." It is not alone as a
contribution to theology that this work has been much admired. It is
probably the most famous theological treatise yet produced in America;
one writer has called it "one of the most famous philosophical works
in the world." But as an intellectual achievement solely, and for the
perfection of its style, it has been quite as generally praised.]
If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word liberty, in
the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever
learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny: then it will follow
that in propriety of speech neither liberty, nor its contrary, can
properly be ascribed to any being or thing but that which has such a
faculty, power or property as is called will. For that which is
possest of no such thing as will, can not have any power or
opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act
contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it.
And therefore to talk of liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the
very will itself is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense and
nonsense by the original and proper signification of words. For the
will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing
itself has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of
volition or choice is the man or the soul, and not the power of
volition itself. And he that has the liberty of doing according to his
will, is the agent or doer who is possest of the will; and not the
will which he is possest of. We say with propriety that a bird let
loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird's power of
flying has a power and liberty of flying. To be free is the property
of an agent, who is possest of powers and faculties, as much as to be
cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the
properties of men or persons and not the properties of properties.
There are two things that are contrary to this which is called liberty
in common speech. One is constraint; the same is otherwise called
force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person's being
necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is
restraint; which is his being hindered, and not having power to do
according to his will. But that which has no will, can not be the
subject of these things. I need say the less on this head, Mr. Locke
having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his
"Essay on the Human Understanding."
But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called
liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct
as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it;
without taking into the meaning of the word anything of the cause or
original of that choice; or at all considering how the person came to
have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive or
internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal
antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether
it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not
connected. Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will,
yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his
pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and perfectly free,
according to the primary and common notion of freedom.
What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by liberty,
according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and
primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians,
Pelagians and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely
different signification. These several things belong to their notion
of liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the
will, or a certain sovereignty the will has over itself, and its own
acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be
dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor
determined by anything prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs
to liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous to the
act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing
that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of
the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all
necessity, or any fixt and certain connection with some previous
ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of liberty
so much to consist in these things that unless the will of man be free
in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever he may be at
liberty to act according to his will.
A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a
moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a
moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral
agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of
such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or
punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced in
his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of
understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the
moral faculty.
The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence
on the earth, in warming it, and causing it to bring forth its fruits;
but it is not a moral agent. Its action, tho good, is not virtuous or
meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part
of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral agent.
What it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment.
The brute creatures are not moral agents. The actions of some of them
are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful; yet, seeing
they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from
choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and
reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being
influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful
or virtuous; nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral
treatment for what they do, as moral agents are for their faults or
good deeds.
Here it may be noted that there is a circumstantial difference between
the moral agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial,
because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements they are
capable of being influenced by, arising from the difference of
circumstances. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is not capable
of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings
and promises, rewards and punishments as the subject is; tho both may
be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore
the moral agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity
of a ruler toward His creatures, and never as a subject, differs in
that respect from the moral agency of created intelligent beings.
God's actions, and particularly those which are to be attributed to
Him as moral governor, are morally good in the highest degree. They
are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as
influenced in the highest degree by that which, above all others, is
properly a moral inducement, viz., the moral good which He sees in
such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a
moral agent, the source of all moral ability and agency, the fountain
and rule of all virtue and moral good; tho by reason of His being
supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the influence
of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments,
counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral agent are in
God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding, to
perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of
discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are
praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a
capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of
acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing
those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein
does very much consist that image of God wherein He made man (which we
read of Gen. i. 26, 27, and chapter ix. 6), by which God distinguishes
man from the beasts, viz., in those faculties and principles of
nature, whereby he is capable of moral agency. Herein very much
consists the natural image of God; as His spiritual and moral image,
wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency,
that he was endowed with.