The Crisis
(1805)
“_We know the success of a man’s measures is the criterion by which
we judge of the wisdom or folly of his measures. I have done my
best._”
NELSON.
Napoleon had now completed further plans. These he fondly hoped
would lead to the downfall of British rule in the United Kingdom and
the eventual dismemberment of the Empire. His strategy, if somewhat
involved, was deeply laid. Instead of concentrating his fleet in
European waters, that very essential part of the programme was to be
undertaken in the Atlantic. By means of feints and false intelligence
it was anticipated that Nelson would again suppose that the East
was the destination of the French armament. Again much depended on
whether Napoleon’s commanders at Rochefort and Toulon would prove
sufficiently clever to elude the blockading squadrons and to carry out
the subsequent junction. The former was to make for Martinique, the
latter for Cayenne. Having spread ruin and disaster in the British West
Indies, they were to unite, release the squadron at Ferrol, and return
to Rochefort to threaten Cornwallis, who would thus be precluded from
lending assistance elsewhere. Ganteaume at Brest was to play the chief
part. He was to make a descent on Ireland while his colleagues were
crossing the Atlantic and then cover the invading army from Boulogne.
On the 11th January 1805 Missiessy, in command at Rochefort, made good
his escape, and eventually reached the West Indies. A week after his
colleague had left port Villeneuve was also at sea. The great war game
had begun. “Our frigates saw part of them all day, and were chased by
some of the ships,” Nelson informs Sir John Acton. The Admiral received
the report of the enemy’s sailing at Madalena at 3 P.M. on the 19th.
Three hours later “the whole fleet was at sea,” steering for the south
end of Sardinia, “where I could have little fear but that I should meet
them; for, from all I have heard from the captains of the frigates,
the enemy must be bound round the south end of Sardinia, but whether
to Cagliari, Sicily, the Morea, or Egypt, I am most completely in
ignorance.” He warns Acton to be on his guard for Sicily and to send
information to Naples. On the 21st a French frigate was discerned off
the south end of Sardinia, but became lost in the fog, and a little
later Nelson heard that one of the French sail-of-the-line had put in
at Ajaccio in a distressed condition. On the 27th he was off Palermo.
“One of two things must have happened,” he conjectures, “that either
the French fleet must have put back crippled, or that they are gone
to the eastward, probably to Egypt, therefore I find no difficulty in
pursuing the line of conduct I have adopted. If the enemy have put back
crippled, I could never overtake them, and therefore I can do no harm
in going to the eastward; and if the enemy are gone to the eastward, I
am right.” He sent vessels to call at Elba, San Fiorenzo, Malta, Tunis,
Pantellaria, Toro and other places to obtain information. He believed
that eleven sail-of-the-line and nine smaller vessels were at sea. “I
shall only hope to fall in with them.”
On the 11th February Nelson was still in “total ignorance” regarding
the whereabouts of the French fleet, but was more than ever confirmed
in his opinion that Egypt was its destination. He had set off for the
Morea, and then proceeded to Egypt, but the enemy had eluded him.
It was not until he arrived off Malta on the 19th that he received
authentic information that the Toulon fleet had put back to port “in a
very crippled state.” He himself was able to report that the health of
his men was excellent, and “although we have experienced a great deal
of bad weather, have received no damage, and not a yard or mast sprung
or crippled, or scarcely a sail split.” “I have consulted no man,” he
had written to Lord Melville on the anniversary of the battle of Cape
St Vincent, “therefore the whole blame in forming my judgment must rest
with me. I would allow no man to take from me an atom of my glory had I
fallen in with the French fleet, nor do I desire any man to partake of
any of the responsibility--all is mine, right or wrong.”
Misfortune had dogged Villeneuve almost from the moment he had left
Toulon. After encountering a gale in the Gulf of Lyons his ships were
in such a pitiful state that there was no alternative but to return.
He complained bitterly, and not without reason, to the Minister of
Marine about the wretched condition of the fleet at his disposal. The
vessels, according to his report, were built of superannuated or bad
materials, and lost masts or sails “at every puff of wind.” In addition
they were short-handed, the sailors were inexperienced, and the decks
were encumbered with troops. Napoleon, who never appreciated the many
difficulties of navigation, let alone of naval warfare, entertained the
notion that the Navy could be run with practically as much precision as
the Army; conditions of weather he almost contemptuously dismissed as
of little account. He abruptly tells Villeneuve the plain unvarnished
truth, namely that the great evil of the service “is that the men who
command it are unused to all the risks of command.” Almost in despair
he asks, “What is to be done with admirals who allow their spirits
to sink, and determine to hasten home at the first damage they may
receive?”
Villeneuve was not a courageous commander. He hated taking risks. It
may be that he realised his own personal limitations to some extent; it
is certain that he fully appreciated those of his men and of his ships.
The only training-place for sailors is the sea, and such excursions as
had been made were as nothing compared to the daily encounters with
storm, wind and tide which fell to the lot of the blockading squadron
below the horizon.
Such obvious facts appealed to that sense of grim humour which is
so essentially characteristic of Nelson. He thoroughly enjoyed his
adversary’s discomfiture, and poked fun at Napoleon, his men and
his methods, on every possible occasion. “Bonaparte,” he writes to
Collingwood on the 13th March, “has often made his brags that our fleet
would be worn out by keeping the sea; that his was kept in order and
increasing by staying in port; but he now finds, I fancy, if _Emperors_
hear truth, that his fleet suffers more in one night than ours in a
year.”
Napoleon, now the Imperial Incarnation of the Revolution, for he had
crowned himself Emperor of the French on the 2nd December 1804, was
not to be thwarted because his subordinates had failed to bring his
giant schemes to a successful issue on two distinct occasions. He was
obsessed by a desire to “leap the ditch.” To humble that Island Power
which was ever in his way, to strike at the very heart of that England
whose wealth was lavished in fostering coalition after coalition, were
now his fondest hopes. He thought, talked, and wrote of little else.
While his third plan was more involved than the others, it had the
advantage of calling a greater number of ships into service. Villeneuve
was to start from Toulon with eleven ships, release the Spanish
squadron of six sail-of-the-line under the command of Admiral Gravina,
and one French ship, at Cadiz, and then make for Martinique, where he
would find Missiessy’s squadron of five sail. In a similar manner the
twenty-one ships of Ganteaume’s fleet at Brest were to rally Gourdon’s
fifteen vessels at Ferrol and also proceed to the West Indies. Thus
no fewer than fifty-nine sail and many smaller vessels would be
congregated for the final effort. While Nelson was searching for them,
this immense armament, with Ganteaume in supreme command, would recross
the Atlantic, appear off Boulogne, and convoy the flotilla to England.
It is unnecessary to give the alternative plans furnished to the
admirals. To do so would only tend to involve the broad outline of the
manœuvre as detailed above and serve no essential purpose.
Spurred on by Napoleon’s displeasure, Villeneuve put to sea on the
night of the 30th March 1805, and was sighted “with all sail set” by
two British frigates on the following morning. It was not until the
4th April that Nelson, then off Toro, received this useful if vague
intelligence, for the frigate which had followed in the tracks of
the Toulon fleet had lost sight of the enemy. Her captain “thinks
they either bore away to the eastward or steered S.S.W., as they were
going when first seen,” Nelson informs the Admiralty. He “covered
the Channel from Barbary to Toro with frigates and the fleet” in the
hope of discovering them or obtaining reliable information as to
their whereabouts. On the 18th April he says, “I am going out of the
Mediterranean after the French fleet. It may be thought that I have
protected too well Sardinia, Naples, Sicily, the Morea, and Egypt, from
the French; but I feel I have done right, and am therefore easy about
any fate which may await me for having missed the French fleet. I have
left five frigates, besides the sloops, &c., stationed at Malta for the
present service of the Mediterranean, and with the Neapolitan squadron
will, of course, be fully able to prevent any force the French have
left to convoy troops to Sicily.”
Nelson only succeeded in making sixty-five leagues in nine days “owing
to very bad weather.” It was not until the 18th April, when Villeneuve
had been at sea nearly three weeks, that he had news of the enemy
having passed through the Straits on the 8th. “I am proceeding with the
fleet under my command as expeditiously as possible to the westward in
pursuit of them.” Sir John Orde had so far forgotten or neglected his
duty that when Villeneuve made his appearance at Cadiz the commander of
the blockading squadron made off without either sending word to Nelson
or leaving a frigate to keep in touch with the enemy. Consequently
Nelson was still uncertain as to their destination. “The circumstance
of their having taken the Spanish ships which were [ready] for sea
from Cadiz, satisfies my mind that they are not bound to the West
Indies (nor probably the Brazils); but intend forming a junction with
the squadron at Ferrol, and pushing direct for Ireland or Brest, as I
believe the French have troops on board.” When off Tetuan on the 4th
May he rightly observes, “I cannot very properly run to the West Indies
without something beyond mere surmise; and if I defer my departure,
Jamaica may be lost. Indeed, as they have a month’s start of me, I see
no prospect of getting out time enough to prevent much mischief from
being done.” Gibraltar Bay was reached on the 6th May, and at 6 P.M.,
Nelson was making his way through the Gut owing to there being “every
appearance of a Levanter coming on.” Off Cape St Vincent he hoped to be
met by a frigate from Orde with intelligence of the enemy’s route and
also by a frigate from Lisbon. “If nothing is heard of them from Lisbon
or from the frigates I may find off Cape St Vincent, I shall probably
think the rumours which are spread are true, that their destination
is the West Indies, and in that case think it my duty to follow them,
or to the Antipodes, should I believe that to be their destination. I
shall detach a sloop of war to England from off the Cape, when my mind
is made up from either information or the want of it.”
Nelson’s idea as to the destination of the allied fleet was
corroborated by Commodore Donald Campbell, a Scotsman who had entered
the Portuguese navy. After clearing transports and taking on board
sufficient provisions for five months, he set out from Lagos Bay with
ten sail-of-the-line and a number of smaller craft on his long chase.
“My lot is cast,” he hurriedly informs Ball, “and I am going to the
West Indies, where, although I am late, yet chance may have given them
a bad passage and me a good one. I must hope the best.”
Many minds, many opinions. What had become of the Allied fleet? Even
more important, what had it accomplished? Such questions must have been
ever present in the mind of Nelson and his officers. Everything about
the enemy was so vague as almost to suggest a phantom fleet. “I still
think Jamaica is their object,” is Nelson’s comment on the 27th of May
when making for Barbadoes, “but many think Surinam or Trinidad; and
Bayntun, that they will land their troops at the city of San Domingo.
In short, everyone has an opinion, but it will soon be beyond doubt.
Our passage, although not very quick, has been far from a bad one. They
started from Cadiz thirty-one days before we did from St Vincent, and I
think we shall gain fourteen days upon them in the passage; therefore
they will only arrive seventeen days before us at Martinique, for I
suppose them bound there. I shall not anchor at Barbadoes.... I have
prayed Lord Seaforth to lay an embargo, that the French may not know of
my approach, and thus again elude our vigilance. My mind is not altered
that Egypt was their destination last January.” Eight days later,
when the fleet was in Carlisle Bay, Barbadoes, and Nelson’s force had
been augmented by the addition of two battleships under Cochrane, we
are informed that “There is not a doubt in any of the admirals’ or
generals’ minds, but that Tobago and Trinidad are the enemy’s objects;
and although I am anxious in the extreme to get at their eighteen
sail-of-the-line, yet, as Sir William Myers has offered to embark
himself with 2000 troops, I cannot refuse such a handsome offer; and,
with the blessing of God on a just cause, I see no cause to doubt of
the annihilation of both the enemy’s fleet and army.”
It happened that the general had received a letter on the previous
night from Brigadier-General Brereton, stationed at St Lucia, informing
him that the enemy’s fleet, “steering to the southward,” had been
reported as passing that island during the late hours of the 28th May.
According to Brereton’s supposition its destination “must be either
Barbadoes or Trinidad.”
Knowing full well that if the intelligence proved false it would lose
him the French fleet, but having no alternative, Nelson set off for
Tobago, where he learnt from the captain of an American vessel that
his ship had been boarded by a French sail-of-the-line the day before.
Then he received a signal from a passing ship that the enemy was at
Trinidad, where he anchored on the 7th June. Another report came to
land that on the 4th the enemy had been at Fort Royal and was likely
to sail during the night for the attack of Grenada. He was at the
latter island on the 9th, and heard that the enemy had not only passed
Dominica three days before, “standing to the northward,” but had been
lucky enough to capture a convoy of ships laden with sugar. Nelson
peeped in at Montserrat on the 11th; on the 13th the troops were being
disembarked at St John’s, Antigua, at which place the fleet had arrived
the previous evening. “At noon I sailed in my pursuit of the enemy;
and I do not yet despair of getting up with them before they arrive at
Cadiz or Toulon, to which ports I think they are bound, or at least
in time to prevent them from having a moment’s superiority. I have no
reason to blame Dame Fortune. If either General Brereton could not have
wrote, or his look-out man had been blind, nothing could have prevented
my fighting them on 6 June; but such information, and from such a
quarter, close to the enemy, could not be doubted.” He had already
sent a fast-sailing brig with despatches to the Admiralty informing
them of the probable return of the combined fleet to Europe, although
so late as the 18th July he was not sure that the enemy had not tricked
him and gone to Jamaica. With commendable alacrity Admiral Stirling was
told to form a junction with Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and to await
the enemy, for the commander of the brig has sighted the quarry and
was of opinion from the course they were making that the neighbourhood
of Cape Finisterre was their desired haven. It has remained for two
modern historians to point out that Nelson had discerned the likelihood
of Ferrol as an anchorage for Villeneuve’s fleet, and had forwarded a
warning to the Admiral stationed off that port.[65]
On the date just mentioned Nelson joined Collingwood off Cadiz, but
no accurate news awaited him. Indeed, the former pinned his faith
to an attack on Ireland as the grand _finale_ of Napoleon’s naval
manœuvres. At Gibraltar the Admiral went on shore for the first time
since the 16th June, 1803--over two years. From thence he proceeded to
Cornwallis’s station off Ushant, and received orders from the Admiral
to sail with the _Victory_ and the _Superb_ for Spithead. He struck his
flag on the 19th August 1805 and set off for Merton.
To what extent had Napoleon’s plans succeeded? Villeneuve had reached
Martinique on the 14th May, only to find that Missiessy had not awaited
his coming according to instructions. Ganteaume was also unable to
carry out his part of the plan, consequently Villeneuve was alone in
the West Indies and might become Nelson’s prey at any moment. The
prospect did not please him. When he heard that the great British
commander had not only arrived at Barbadoes but had been reinforced
by Cochrane he set the bows of his ships in the direction of home,
contrary to the Emperor’s orders to wait for a stated period for
Ganteaume’s arrival. So far from raiding the British West Indies,
Villeneuve only succeeded in capturing the Diamond Rock at Martinique
and Missiessy in taking Dominica, although the latter had reinforced
the French colonies.
After a perilous voyage Villeneuve was approaching Ferrol in thick
weather on the 22nd July when he came face to face with the squadron of
fifteen battleships and four smaller vessels which had been sent by the
Admiralty to await his coming. The action which followed was anything
but decisive. The fleet Nelson had longed to annihilate was allowed to
escape by Calder, whose only prizes were the Spanish _San Rafael_ (84)
and _El Firme_ (74). After leaving three of his less seaworthy ships at
Vigo, the French commander eventually reached Coruña.
Another Act of the great Atlantic Drama was over.