The Campaign of the Baltic
(1800-1)
“_The service of my King and Country is the object nearest my
heart._”
NELSON.
Ostensibly Nelson had come back to England because of illness. That
his health was improved by the prolonged journey home via the overland
route is quite possible. The relief from worry as to the Mediterranean
in general and to Keith in particular no doubt conduced largely to so
desirable a result. It is evident that he had returned to a normal
condition of mind and of body; otherwise we should not find him writing
to the Secretary of the Admiralty on the day of his arrival in England
that his health was “perfectly re-established” and that he wished “to
serve immediately.”
Nelson did not have to wait long for his wishes to be fulfilled. On
the first day of the new year he was made a Vice-Admiral of the Blue,
not as a reward for his services but in a general promotion. A little
over a fortnight later he hoisted his flag on the _San Josef_ (112),
one of the prizes of the battle off Cape St Vincent, commanded by
the devoted Hardy. Nelson then made the request, apparently on the
principle of “nothing venture nothing have,” that the Lords of the
Admiralty would not consider his “necessary coming from Italy as a
dereliction of the service, but only a remove from the Mediterranean to
the Channel.” Although he was a favourite of the rank and file of the
Navy, he was certainly not esteemed so highly by “the powers that be.”
No doubt he was himself partly responsible. His friend Collingwood’s
“Correspondence” at the time affords a little sidelight on the matter.
“We are at present lying completely ready,” he writes on the 25th
January, “and, on the least motion made by the enemy, should sail;
so you may conceive what an anxious time I have of it. Lord Nelson
is here; and I think he will probably come and live with me when the
weather will allow him; but he does not get in and out of ships well
with one arm. He gave me an account of his reception at Court, which
was not very flattering, after having been the admiration of that of
Naples. His Majesty merely asked him if he had recovered his health;
and then, without waiting for an answer, turned to General ----, and
talked to him near half an hour in great good humour. It could not be
about his successes.”
The early days of the nineteenth century were overshadowed by a
storm-cloud which burst with sudden fury and dispersed almost as
rapidly, giving place to a short-lived peace followed by twelve years
of incessant tempest. So far back as 1780 Russia, Sweden and Denmark
had entered into a league of Armed Neutrality by which, in the terse
summing-up of Laughton, they had “bound themselves to resist the right
of ‘visit and search’ claimed by the belligerents, and to enforce
the acceptance of certain principles of so-called international law;
among others, the security of a belligerent’s property under a neutral
flag,--‘a free ship makes free goods’; that a blockade to be binding
must be maintained by an adequate force; and that ‘contraband of war’
must be distinctly defined beforehand. As these principles, if admitted
by England, amounted to the import by France of naval stores,--masts,
hemp, tar--from the Baltic, to be paid for by French exports, the
English Government was resolved to contest them.” From 1793 to 1800
Sweden and Denmark were neutral, but Great Britain, secure in her
maritime supremacy, had continued to search merchant-ships, whether
convoyed by a vessel of war or not. Matters were brought to a crisis
by the capture of the Danish frigate _Freya_ on the 25th July 1800,
and the subsequent passage of the Sound by a British squadron. At the
moment Denmark was not prepared for hostilities, and entered into a
convention with Great Britain, which admitted the right of search.
When, a little later, the half-crazy Czar, Paul I., dissatisfied
with England as an ally, and led on by specious promises on the part
of Napoleon, definitely renewed the League, the two Baltic Powers
willingly joined him. He laid an embargo on all British ships in
Russian ports, and generally showed that it was a case of “off with the
old love and on with the new.”
It was thought in England that negotiations, backed by a strong fleet,
would be sufficient to sever Denmark from the alliance. With this
object in view fifteen sail-of-the-line[52] having a considerable
number of soldiers on board for use if necessary, and attended by a
collection of smaller vessels, sailed early in March. When Nelson heard
of Sir Hyde Parker’s appointment as Commander-in-chief, he was no more
pleased than when Keith had returned to his former station in the
previous year, but he wisely smothered his disappointment. His “sole
object,” he informs Lord St Vincent, “and to which all my exertions and
abilities tend, is to bring this long war to an honourable termination;
to accomplish which, we must all pull in the collar, and, as we have
got such a driver who will make the lazy ones pull as much as the
willing, I doubt not but we shall get safely, speedily, and honourably
to our journey’s end.” This is Nelson at his best, the Nelson who
could sacrifice himself for King and Country. It was not until the
17th February that he received definite instructions to “put himself
under the command” of Parker. Shortly afterwards he changed his ship
for the _St George_ (98). “The _St George_ will stamp an additional
ray of glory to England’s fame, if Nelson survives;” he writes to Lady
Hamilton, “and that Almighty Providence, who has hitherto protected
me in all dangers, and covered my head in the day of battle, will
still, if it be his pleasure, support and assist me.” To his old friend
Berry he says, “I hope we shall be able as usual to get so close to
our Enemies that our shot cannot miss their object, and that we shall
again give our Northern Enemies that hail-storm of bullets which is so
emphatically described in the ‘Naval Chronicle,’ and which gives our
dear Country the Dominion of the Seas. We have it, and all the Devils
in Hell cannot take it from us, if our Wooden walls have fair play.”
As this letter was penned on the 9th March, before the armament left
Yarmouth, it is clear that the Admiral did not set much store by the
proposed negotiations, for which purpose Mr Vansittart,[53] reputed to
be a skilful diplomatist, sailed with the fleet when it weighed anchor
three days later.
The first general rendezvous was the Skaw, which was made on the 19th.
A period of heavy weather--bad winds, sleet, snow, frost, and rain--had
set in. Believers in omens not unnaturally predicted the ill-success of
the expedition, which was intensified by the loss of the _Invincible_
(74) with some 400 souls. She struck a sandbank, floated off into deep
water, and then went down. Nelson’s own ship was not in the best of
condition; she was both leaky and uncomfortable. However, a vessel
is but a means to an end, and so long as the _St George_ could float
and her men could fire a broadside Nelson was content. In his eager,
passionate way, the Admiral strongly disapproved of what he had been
able to ascertain of Parker’s plans: “honour may arise from them, good
cannot. I hear we are likely to anchor outside Cronenburg Castle,
instead of Copenhagen, which would give weight to our negotiation: a
Danish Minister would think twice before he would put his name to war
with England, when the next moment he would probably see his Master’s
Fleet in flames, and his Capital in ruins; but ‘out of sight out of
mind,’ is an old saying. The Dane should see our Flag waving every
moment he lifted up his head.”
A council of war was held on the 23rd. On the following day Nelson
wrote a lengthy letter to the Commander-in-chief detailing his opinion
of what should be done, Vansittart’s latest report being to the effect
that the Danish Government was hostile “in the greatest possible
degree.” He urged that not a moment should be lost in attacking the
enemy. He brings all the persuasiveness of which he was capable to bear
on Parker. “Here you are,” he says, “with almost the safety, certainly
with the honour of England more intrusted to you, than ever yet fell
to the lot of any British Officer.” This is exaggerating somewhat, but
doubtless the writer felt deeply the urgency of the matter. “On your
decision depends,” he adds with nearer approach to truth, “whether
our Country shall be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or whether she
shall rear her head higher than ever: again do I repeat, never did our
Country depend so much on the success of any Fleet as on this.” He then
proceeds to sketch a plan of campaign, starting with the supposition
that the fleet enters by the Passage of the Sound. He allows for a
certain amount of damage “amongst our masts and yards” taking place
before Cronenburg is reached. There the ships and Crown Island are
attacked, “Ships crippled, and perhaps one or two lost.” This mode
Nelson calls “taking the bull by the horns,” and does not prevent the
ships from Revel, or the Swedish squadron, from joining their allies.
He therefore proposes passing Cronenburg, “taking the risk of damage,”
to “pass up the deepest and straightest Channel above the Middle
Grounds; and coming down the Garbar or King’s Channel, to attack their
Floating batteries, &c., &c., as we find it convenient. It must have
the effect of preventing a junction between the Russians, Swedes, and
Danes, and may give us an opportunity of bombarding Copenhagen.” He
also suggests a passage to the northward of Southolm. An alternative
mode of attack is by the passage of the Belt, an attack on Draco, thus
preventing the junction of the Russians, and “with every probability of
success against the Danish Floating batteries.” His concluding words
are in the true Nelson spirit: “Supposing us through the Belt with
the wind first westerly, would it not be possible to either go with
the Fleet, or detach ten Ships of three and two decks, with one Bomb
and two Fire-Ships, to Revel, to destroy the Russian Squadron at that
place? I do not see the great risk of such a detachment, and with the
remainder to attempt the business at Copenhagen. The measure may be
thought bold, but I am of opinion the boldest measures are the safest;
and our Country demands a most vigorous exertion of her force, directed
with judgment.” Nelson concludes with the assurance that “no exertion
of head or heart” shall be wanting on his part.
The proposed terms were definitely refused by Denmark, but Nelson’s
“bold measure” of detaching part of the British fleet to attack the
Russian squadron at Revel while the other attacked the Capital did not
appeal to the unimaginative Parker. Copenhagen must first be overcome.
The pilots also assured the Commander-in-chief that the passage of the
Belt was the safest, which drew from Nelson the abrupt but thoroughly
characteristic reply, “Let it be by the Sound, by the Belt, or any how,
only lose not an hour!” Eventually the Sound was chosen.
Having shifted his flag from the _St George_ to the _Elephant_ (74),
a more serviceable ship for the difficult passage, the British fleet,
in order of battle, slowly threaded its way through the shoals on the
30th March, Nelson commanding the van, Parker the centre, and Graves
the rear. The guns of Cronenburg Castle, dominating the Sound, blazed
away, as did those on the armed hulks with which the Danes had hoped
to defend the narrow channel, but the Swedish guns maintained a stolid
silence. The fleet then anchored a few miles below Copenhagen. Parker,
Nelson, and several other officers boarded a lugger to reconnoitre the
enemy’s defences. Various soundings were made to the accompaniment of
gun-firing, and it was found that the enemy had placed a formidable
flotilla, including two 70-gun ships, a frigate, and two dismasted
64-gun ships, in the front of the harbour and arsenal. The Trekroner
Battery had also been strengthened. A second council of war was held
on the 31st, some interesting particulars of which are furnished by
Colonel William Stewart, who was in command of some of the troops.
After some difficulties had been stated anent “the three Powers we
should either have to engage, in succession or united, in those seas,”
Stewart tells us that “Lord Nelson kept pacing the cabin, mortified
at everything that savoured either of alarm or irresolution. When the
above remark was applied to the Swedes, he sharply observed, ‘The more
numerous the better’; and when to the Russians, he repeatedly said,
‘So much the better, I wish they were twice as many, the easier the
victory, depend on it.’”
“At the battle of Copenhagen,” writes Mr Ferguson, surgeon of the
_Elephant_, “I was amongst the companions of the hero. The attempt was
arduous in the extreme: no common mind would have dared to conceive it;
but it was suited to the exalted enterprise of Lord Nelson. As _his_
was the invigorating spirit of the council that planned the attack, so
in the execution _he_ only could have commanded success. During the
interval that preceded the battle, I could only silently admire when
I saw the first man in all the world spend the hours of the day and
night in boats, amid floating ice, and in the severest weather; and
wonder when the light shewed me a path marked by buoys, which had been
trackless the preceding evening.
“On the first day of April, in the afternoon, we took our departure
with twelve sail-of-the-line, and a proportionate number of smaller
vessels, from the main body of the fleet, then lying about four miles
below Copenhagen; and coasted along the outer edge of the shoal called
the middle ground, until we doubled its farthest extremities, when the
fleet cast anchor. This shoal, of the same extent as the sea front of
the town, lies exactly before it, at about three-quarters of a mile in
distance; the interval between it and the shore had deep water, and is
called the King’s Channel.
“In this channel the Danes had arranged their defence, as near the town
as possible. It consisted of nineteen ships and floating batteries,
flanked at the town’s extremity by two artificial islands at the mouth
of the harbour, called the Crown batteries, and extending for a mile
along the whole front of the town, leaving intervals for the batteries
on shore to play.
“As our anchor dropped at eight in the evening, Nelson emphatically
called out, ‘I will fight them the moment I have a fair wind.’ He spent
the whole night in consultation.
“About half-past nine a.m. of the 2nd of April, the signals of the
different ships having been made, repeated, and answered, we had the
mortification to see the _Agamemnon_ get upon the shoal on the first
attempt to leave her anchorage, where she remained immovable. A similar
misfortune followed in succession to the _Russell_ and _Polyphemus_;
and in addition to all this, the _Jamaica_ frigate, with a convoy of
gunboats and the small craft having fallen in with the counter current,
and being unable to stem it, made the signal of inability to proceed. A
mind less invincible than Nelson’s might have been discouraged: though
the battle had not commenced, yet he had approached the enemy; and he
felt that he could not retreat or wait for reinforcements, without
compromising the glory of his country. The signal to bear down was
still kept flying. His agitation during these moments was extreme; I
shall never forget the impression it made on me. It was not, however,
the agitation of indecision, but of ardent animated patriotism, panting
for glory, which had appeared within his reach, and was vanishing from
his grasp.”