The Neapolitan Rebels and their French Allies
(1799)
“_Speedy rewards and quick punishments are the foundation of good
government._”
NELSON.
In the middle of March 1799 Troubridge returned from the Levant, his
command there having been given to Sir Sidney Smith. Vexatious as was
the arrangement to both Nelson and Lord St Vincent, it had one point
of importance in its favour--and was to have far-reaching results
later--in that it enabled the Admiral to send the trusted captain with
several vessels to blockade Naples. Troubridge was to “seize and get
possession” of the islands of Procida, Ischia, and Capri, to use his
influence with the inhabitants there and elsewhere, “in order to induce
them to return to their allegiance to his Sicilian Majesty, and to
take arms to liberate their Country from French tyranny and oppressive
contributions.” On the 3rd April, Troubridge was able to tell Nelson
that “All the Ponza Islands have the Neapolitan flag flying. Your
Lordship never beheld such loyalty; the people are perfectly mad with
joy, and are asking for their beloved Monarch.” That Nelson’s hands
were “full,” as he wrote to his brother, is sufficiently evident. He
had become “a Councillor and Secretary of State,” to use his own words,
and his public correspondence, “besides the business of sixteen Sail
of the Line, and all our commerce, is with Petersburg, Constantinople,
the Consul at Smyrna, Egypt, the Turkish and Russian Admirals, Trieste,
Vienna, Tuscany, Minorca, Earl St Vincent and Lord Spencer.” Moreover,
he was now Commander-in-Chief of the Neapolitan Navy, and had been
promoted to Rear-Admiral of the Red. His health during this trying
period was far from good. He complained to his friend the Duke of
Clarence of being “seriously unwell,” and he told Lord St Vincent, “I
am almost blind and worn out, and cannot, in my present state, hold out
much longer.” He seemed to be growing more despondent daily, the good
news of the success of the Austrian arms in Italy “does not even cheer
me.”
Victory no longer attended the French cause in the northern part of
the peninsula, and the forces of the Republic were to evacuate it and
to join the main French army. On the 7th May, Ferdinand’s kingdom was
relieved of its unwelcome visitors, save only the garrisons which were
left at Capua and Caserta, and at the Castle of St Elmo. The internal
condition of the State, however, was still far from settled. Commodore
Caracciolo, representing the Jacobins, commanded a miniature fleet
in Naples Bay; Cardinal Ruffo led a nondescript band called by the
high-sounding title of “the Christian Army,” against the Neapolitan
republicans, who were in some force. The unhappy position of the Royal
Family at this time is well described by the Queen in a letter to the
Marquise d’Osmond, mother of the Comtesse de Boigne. It is from the
Appendix to the first volume of the “Recollections” of the last-named
that the extract is taken. The communication is dated from Palermo, the
2nd May 1799.
“We continue to live between hope and dread:” she says, “the news
varies every day. We are expecting help from Russia: if it comes
it will be of the greatest service to us. The English render us
the greatest services. Were it not for them both Sicilies would be
democratised, I should be dead of grief or drowned in the sea, or
else, with my dear family, imprisoned in a castle by our rebellious
subjects. You can read in the gazettes, without my naming them to you,
how many ungrateful subjects we have. It suffices to tell you that
in their writings and their ingratitude they have surpassed their
foster-mother France, but with us the classes are different. Here it is
the class which has the most to lose which is the most violent; nobles,
bishops, monks, ordinary lawyers, but not the high magistracy, nor the
people. The latter are loyal, and show it on every occasion.... My dear
children have behaved like angels in all our unfortunate circumstances.
They suffer every kind of privation they did not know before, without
complaining, out of love for me, so that I may notice nothing. They are
always good-humoured, though they have no amusements.”
While Troubridge was clearing the way for the return of the royal
exiles to Naples, Nelson received the startling intelligence that the
Brest fleet of nineteen sail-of-the-line had not only escaped but had
been seen off Oporto making for the Mediterranean. So far as it went,
the news was correct enough, but the French ships numbered twenty-five
instead of nineteen. Nelson’s despondency and ill-health vanished;
he lost not an instant in making his arrangements. Troubridge was
recalled from Naples, and the “band of brothers” were ordered to join
Rear-Admiral Duckworth off Port Mahon, Nelson’s belief being that the
first item on the French naval programme was the recovery of Minorca.
Shortly afterwards he came to think that Sicily was the object of the
enemy, whereupon he cancelled his former instructions and made the
island of Maritimo the _rendez-vous_. This station he reached on the
23rd May with seven ships, which he hoped to bring up to sixteen,
Duckworth having decided to wait for Lord St Vincent and not to
reinforce Nelson. Ball, who had been ordered to abandon the blockade of
Malta, had not arrived, and the delay filled the Admiral with anxiety.
“I can only have two queries about him--either that he has gone round
to Messina, imagining that the French Fleet were close to him, or he is
taken. Thus situated,” he writes to Lord St Vincent, “I have only to
remain on the north side of Maritimo, to keep covering Palermo, which
shall be protected to the last, and to wait intelligence or orders for
regulating my further proceedings.
“Your Lordship,” he adds, “may depend that the Squadron under my
command shall never fall into the hands of the Enemy; and before we are
destroyed, I have little doubt but the Enemy will have their wings so
completely clipped that they may be easily overtaken.”
On the 28th May, Nelson heard from the Commander-in-chief that Bruix
and the French fleet had been sighted off Cadiz on the 4th inst. by
Keith’s blockading squadron, the intention being to form a junction
with the Spanish fleet. In reply to Lord St Vincent’s despatch, Nelson
was able to tell his senior officer that “we are completely on our
guard,” that he had determined to go to Palermo to get provisions and
wine for six months, and to hold his vessels “in momentary readiness
to act as you may order or the circumstances call for. My reason for
remaining in Sicily is the covering the blockade of Naples, and the
certainty of preserving Sicily in case of an attack, for if we were to
withdraw our Ships, it would throw such a damp on the people that I am
sure there would be no resistance. But from the favourable aspect of
affairs in Italy, I am sure no attack will be made here, whilst the
French know we have such a force to act against them. If Captain Ball
has not entirely given up the blockade of Malta, and the poor Islanders
have not given up to the French, I intend to continue the blockade...;
for as the danger from your happy arrival is not so great, I will run
the risk of the Ships for a short time. The Russians will, I am told,
be off there in a week or fortnight. In all this plan I am subject to
your Lordship’s more able judgment. I shall send a Frigate off Cape
Corse, in case the French Fleet should come to be eastward of Corsica,
and if I can find a small craft, one shall be on the west side of
Sardinia, but the Bay of Naples draws me dry.” Two days later, in
writing to the same correspondent to announce the safe arrival of the
_Vanguard_ at Palermo, Nelson makes his usual acknowledgments of the
services of those under his command: “I have our dear Troubridge for
my assistant; in everything we are brothers. Hood and Hallowell are as
active and kind as ever: not that I mean to say any are otherwise; but
you know these are men of resources. Hardy was bred in the old school,
and I can assure you, that I never have been better satisfied with the
real good discipline of a Ship than the _Vanguard’s_. I hope from my
heart that you will meet the Dons alone: if the two Fleets join, I am
ready, and with some of my Ships in as high order as ever went to sea.”
As it happened, Keith was able to prevent the junction of the enemy’s
fleets. His position was between them--between “the devil and the deep
sea,” as he termed it. When the look-out frigates of the French fleet
were sighted between Corsica and Genoa, orders were received from Lord
St Vincent for Keith to return to Port Mahon, which the former thought
might be the object of attack. Further despatches came to hand a little
later, urging Keith to proceed to Minorca. The Commander-in-chief and
Keith were really playing at cross-purposes, for while St Vincent was
acting only on supposition, Keith was in touch with the enemy. It is
probable in such a case that Nelson would have led his squadron into
action, but Keith was not the type of man to risk acting on his own
initiative to any great extent, and left the Frenchmen to proceed to
Spezia.
On the 8th June, Nelson vacated the _Vanguard_, hoisted his flag on
the _Foudroyant_ (80), and was strengthened by the arrival of two
ships from Lord St Vincent’s fleet. He also heard of the impending
resignation of the Commander-in-chief, his indifferent health making
him “literally incapable of any service,” as he afterwards wrote to
Nelson. The unexpected news considerably distressed the Admiral. He
felt sincere admiration and regard for the gallant old sailor, who had
served his King so long and so faithfully, sentiments recorded in a
letter dated from Palermo, the 10th June 1799, as follows:--
“We have a report that you are going home. This distresses us most
exceedingly, and myself in particular; so much so, that I have
serious thoughts of returning, if that event should take place.
But for the sake of our Country, do not quit us at this serious
moment. I wish not to detract from the merit of whoever may be
your successor; but it must take a length of time, which I hope
the war will not give, to be in any manner a St Vincent. We look
up to you, as we have always found you, as to our Father, under
whose fostering care we have been led to fame. If, my dear Lord, I
have any weight in your friendship, let me entreat you to rouse the
sleeping lion. Give not up a particle of your authority to any one;
be again our St Vincent, and we shall be happy. Your affectionate
NELSON.”
To the Admiral’s supreme disgust his own claims to the appointment were
disregarded. Lord St Vincent’s command was given to Lord Keith, who
had the additional good fortune to find that the French fleet was in
Vado Bay. Nelson, urged on by Ferdinand and perhaps by Lady Hamilton,
was on his voyage to Naples with a body of troops to render assistance
to the royalists, when two British sail-of-the-line hove in sight. One
of them bore an important despatch from Keith, to the effect that not
only was the enemy at sea but likely to be bound towards Nelson. The
latter immediately returned to Palermo, disembarked the soldiers and
their munitions, and cruised off Maritimo. Here he hoped to be joined
by the _Alexander_ and _Goliath_, which he had ordered to proceed
from Malta some days before. Provided they arrived his force would
be raised to eighteen battleships, including three Portuguese--four
less than the enemy. “I shall wait off Maritimo,” he says, in reply
to Keith, “anxiously expecting such a reinforcement as may enable me
to go in search of the Enemy’s fleet, when not one moment shall be
lost in bringing them to battle; for I consider the best defence for
his Sicilian Majesty’s Dominions, is to place myself alongside the
French.” No further ships arrived, and Nelson therefore returned to
Palermo. Keith’s neglect aroused Nelson’s wrath to such an extent, that
while he was at sea he sent a copy of the above letter to the Earl
of St Vincent, complaining that the Commander-in-chief had not sent
him “a force fit to face the Enemy: but, as we are, I shall not get
out of their way; although, as I am, I cannot think myself justified
in exposing the world (I may almost say), to be plundered by these
miscreants. I trust your Lordship will not think me wrong in the
painful determination I conceived myself forced to make, for agonized
indeed was the mind of your Lordship’s faithful and affectionate
servant.”
Mahan remarks that Nelson’s station off Maritimo was strategically
sound, enabling him to intercept the approach of the enemy “to either
Naples or Sicily,” and it was while he was cruising here that he
received a despatch from his former Commander-in-chief to the effect
that Keith was searching for the French, and that reinforcements were
making their way to Port Mahon. Nelson was convinced that the enemy was
steering for Naples. After a brief visit to the King at Palermo and
receiving Sir William and Lady Hamilton on board the _Foudroyant_, he
sailed for the capital.
On Troubridge’s withdrawal from Naples, the blockade had been placed in
the hands of Captain Foote of the _Seahorse_, a frigate of thirty-eight
guns, who concerted with Ruffo and his Russian and Turkish allies
to rid the city of the insurgents. Fort St Elmo, garrisoned by the
few remaining French, and the castles of Uovo and Nuovo, held by
the rebels, alone held out. The Cardinal arranged an armistice with
the insurgents, and although there was further trouble, the matter
was patched up and negotiations were again begun. Subsequently a
capitulation was signed on the 23rd June. Nelson received the news
before his squadron anchored in the Bay of Naples on the following
day, and, not knowing the exact terms on which it had been granted,
characterised them as “infamous.”
The main conditions were that the forts Nuovo and Uovo should be
delivered up with their effects; that the troops should keep possession
of the places until the ships which were to be provided for those who
wished to proceed to Toulon were ready to sail; that the garrisons
should march out with the honours of war; that “Persons and Property,
both movable and immovable, of every individual of the two Garrisons,
shall be respected and guaranteed,” a clause applicable also to
prisoners which the allies had made during the blockade of the forts;
and that “All the other hostages and State prisoners, confined in the
two Forts, shall be set at liberty, immediately after the present
Capitulation is signed.” Nelson at once ordered Foote to haul down
the flag of truce flying from the _Seahorse_. Sufficient of his story
has been told to show that the Admiral had little or no pity for
rebels. So far back as the 6th June, he had written to Foote that the
intelligence sent to him by that officer of the hanging of thirteen
Jacobins “gave us great pleasure,” and he also expressed the hope
that three priests who had been condemned would “dangle on the tree
best adapted to their weight of sins.” Without further ado he sent a
declaration to “the Rebellious Subjects” in the two forts that “They
must surrender themselves to His Majesty’s Royal mercy,” and addressed
a summons to the Commanding Officer of the French at the Castle of St
Elmo, that he must either accede to the terms made by Ruffo and the
Russian Commander, or “take the consequences, as I shall not agree
to any other.” A paper signed by Nelson and explained to Ruffo, but
rejected by him, announced that “the British Admiral proposes to the
Cardinal to send, in their joint names, to the French and Rebels,
that the arrival of the British fleet has completely destroyed the
compact, as would that of the French if they had had the power (which,
thank God, they have not) to come to Naples.... That as to Rebels and
Traitors, no power on earth has a right to stand between their gracious
King and them: they must instantly throw themselves on the clemency of
their Sovereign, for no other terms will be allowed them; nor will the
French be allowed even to name them in any capitulation. If these terms
are not complied with, in the time ... viz., two hours for the French,
and instant submission on the part of the Rebels--such very favourable
conditions will never be again offered.”
Nelson knew the man with whom he was dealing, and as the following
characteristic letter to Rear-Admiral Duckworth shows, he was quite
prepared for any eventuality. With insurgents on land and the
possibility of a French fleet at sea in the near vicinity, it was
incumbent on the British Admiral not to run unnecessary risks:--
“As you will believe, the Cardinal and myself have begun our career by
a complete difference of opinion. He will send the Rebels to Toulon,--I
say they shall not go. He thinks one house in Naples more to be prized
than his Sovereign’s honour. Troubridge and Ball are gone to the
Cardinal, for him to read my declaration to the French and Rebels, whom
he persists in calling patriots--what a prostitution of the word! I
shall send Foote to get the Gun-boats from Procida. I wish the Fleet
not to be more than two-thirds of a cable from each other. I shall send
you a sketch of the anchorage, in forty fathom water. The _Foudroyant_
to be the Van-ship. If the French fleet should favour us with a visit,
I can easily take my station in the centre.”
The Cardinal positively refused to entertain Nelson’s opinions, but
after some hesitation decided to discuss affairs with him on the
_Foudroyant_. The interview, which was stormy on both sides and
somewhat protracted, owing to the necessity of employing Lord and Lady
Hamilton as interpreters, took place on the afternoon of the 25th. Both
of them held steadfastly to his own point of view. Nelson therefore
wrote that “in his opinion” the Treaty with the rebels “cannot be
carried into execution, without the approbation of his Sicilian
Majesty.”
Uovo and Nuovo were taken possession of by British seamen under
Troubridge on the evening of the 26th inst., and on the following day,
Nelson communicated the fact to the Admiralty, adding: “This morning I
am going to send a detachment under Captain Troubridge, to cut down the
dangerous Tree of Anarchy, and to burn it before the King’s palace. The
moment I can find the City a little quieted, guns shall be got against
St Elmo, when, I am sure, the French will be glad to surrender.... In
my present position, I have not the smallest alarm should the Enemy
favour us with a visit, inferior as my force is to oppose them.” The
castle capitulated on the 12th July 1799, to Nelson’s “brave friend”
Troubridge, whose “great character,” “ability and resources” were duly
detailed to Lord Keith, while the Admiral told Earl Spencer that,
“On land the captain of the _Culloden_ is a first-rate general!”
Troubridge’s reward was a baronetcy, to which no one ever had a clearer
title.
Was Nelson justified in cancelling the agreement entered into by Ruffo
and his allies and the enemy? The question has been discussed with
great vehemence and at prodigious length. Mahan’s opinion is that “his
conduct throughout was open and consistent.” He is convinced that the
Admiral acted up to his firm belief “that he not only had a right to
suspend the Capitulation, because, though signed, it had not been
executed, but that it was his bounden duty so to do; having both legal
power and adequate force to prevent its execution.” Nelson “regarded
himself as, and for the time being actually was, the representative of
the King of the Two Sicilies, as well as the admiral of the British
fleet. As representative, he was charged with the interests and honour
of the Sovereign and had authority over all Neapolitan officials;
as admiral, he wielded power to enforce obedience, if refused.
Considering the terms of the Capitulation to be contrary to the
interests and the honour of the Kingdom, he was under an obligation to
prevent their going into effect, until the King’s decision, becoming
known, should supersede his own discretion.”
Laughton, whose biography of Nelson is much shorter than Mahan’s, and
is therefore not so comprehensive, dismisses the matter by saying,
“it is perfectly well established as the usage of civilised war that
terms granted by a military officer are conditional on the approval
of his superiors, unless he has distinct authority to negotiate, or
the capitulation has been effected wholly or in part. In the present
instance Cardinal Ruffo had not only no authority to negotiate, but
he had express orders from the King not to do so.” By the fourth
Article of the “Instructions to the troops of his Majesty, ordered to
repair to the Bay of Naples,” dated Palermo, June 10th, 1799, “All the
military and political operations shall be agreed upon by the Prince
Royal and Admiral Lord Nelson. The opinion of this latter always to
have a preponderance, on account of the respect due to his experience,
as well as to the forces under his command, which will determine the
operations; and also because we are so deeply indebted to him for the
zeal and attachment of which he has given so many proofs.” By the tenth
Article, “The acts of clemency concerning the noted offenders, and
the pardoning of the same, are reserved for the King, excepting those
stipulated in the articles of capitulation.”
[Illustration: The Execution of Caracciolo
Stephen Reid]
About seventy Jacobins were executed for their misdeeds, but Nelson
was only concerned in the death of one of them. Commodore Francesco
Caracciolo, the commander of the Republican Navy, had previously
accompanied the Sicilian Court to Palermo, but when an edict was issued
by the French that the property of all absentees would be confiscated,
he had obtained King Ferdinand’s permission to return. Marshal
Macdonald, then Commander-in-chief of the French Army of Naples, refers
to the matter in his “Recollections.” “I had resolved,” he writes,
“to induce Admiral Caracciolo to take service in the new fleet; he
equipped a flotilla which secured respect for the port and coasts of
Naples, frequently threatened by attempts of the English, who occupied
the islands and were stationed in the roads.”[42] When Caracciolo’s
position on sea became untenable, he sought a safer asylum in one of
the forts, whence he eventually fled to the mountains disguised as a
peasant. Here he was discovered and captured. The refugee was brought
on board the _Foudroyant_ on the morning of the 29th June. Nelson at
once instructed Count Thurn, Commander of the Sicilian frigate _La
Minerva_, who had been in action with Caracciolo, to assemble five of
the senior officers under his command to inquire if the prisoner were
guilty of rebellion against his lawful Sovereign, and having fired at
his Sicilian Majesty’s colours on board _La Minerva_. The trial duly
took place; the sentence was death. This was to be carried out “by
hanging him at the fore yard-arm of His Sicilian Majesty’s Frigate _La
Minerva_, under your command, at five o’clock this evening; and to
cause him to hang there until sunset, when you will have his body cut
down, and thrown into the sea.” Such were Nelson’s instructions, which
were obeyed. Parsons, who had charge of Caracciolo, describes him as “a
short, thick-set man, of apparent strength, but haggard with misery and
want; his clothing in wretched condition, but his countenance denoting
stern resolution to endure that misery like a man.” The sympathetic
narrator persists in calling him “veteran” and “old man.” The Commodore
was only forty-seven years of age, although his wan appearance may have
made him look considerably older. “At two o’clock in the afternoon,”
Parsons adds, “the veteran, with a firm step, walked into Lord Nelson’s
barge, and with a party of thirty of our seamen, under one of our
lieutenants, was taken to his [Count Thurn’s] flagship, the gun fired,
and the brave old man launched into eternity at the expiration of
the two hours from the time the sentence had passed. The seamen of our
fleet, who clustered on the rigging like bees, consoled themselves that
it was only an Italian prince, and the admiral of Naples, that was
hanging--a person of very light estimation compared with the lowest
man in a British ship. His Majesty of Naples, the Prime Minister, Sir
John Acton, and many of the foreign ambassadors, joined and took up
their quarters in the _Foudroyant_ two days after the execution; and
my Lord Nelson removed to the first lieutenant’s cabin as his sleeping
apartment, giving his cabin to the king’s use, and the larboard side of
the maindeck for his cooks, who condescended to officiate as ours; and
never did midshipmen fare so sumptuously as during the king’s long stay
on board the _Foudroyant_. The day was passed in administering justice
(Italian fashion) to the wretches who fell into the grasp of Cardinal
Ruffo’s lambs, enlivened by the bombardment of St Elmo, which we were
battering in breach. At noon, dinner was served to the royal party and
their guests on the quarter-deck; Lady Hamilton’s graceful form bending
over her harp, and her heavenly music gave a gusto to the dessert. As
the sun went down, the opera singers, in a large, decked galley, came
alongside, and all that could delight the ear or please the eye was
there to fascinate and charm.”
There is more than a suspicion of irony in the above passage. It is
useful because one can readily believe that it was the point of view
of the majority of the British petty officers and seamen. They failed
to understand why so much deference should be shown to King Ferdinand
and his Queen, who doubtless in their opinion would have shown more
royal qualifications had they remained in their capital instead of
making a hasty flight to Palermo. This is not the place to discuss the
merits and demerits of monarchy and republic, both of which have their
advantages. Certainly the foreign policy of Great Britain at the end of
the eighteenth century did not allow an ally to be dethroned without
making an effort on his behalf.
Southey, when dealing with the execution of Caracciolo, has seen fit to
introduce Nelson’s relations with Lady Hamilton into the matter, which
may be forgiven a man who published his narrative in 1813, when current
scandal and gossip were often the chief “authorities” of the historian.
“Doubtless” he remarks, “the British Admiral seemed to himself to be
acting under a rigid sense of justice, but to all other persons it
was obvious that he was influenced by an infatuated attachment--a
baneful passion, which destroyed his domestic happiness, and now, in
a second instance, stained ineffaceably his public character.” Now
Lady Hamilton, as a matter of actual fact, had nothing whatever to do
with the hanging of the traitor and did not converse with the Admiral
during Caracciolo’s detention. The rebel was tried by those of his own
nationality, and according to Mahan, “there is no ground for doubting
that he (Nelson) had authority to order a court-martial, and to carry
its sentence into execution, nor that Caracciolo came within the
jurisdiction of a court-martial properly constituted.” It is only just
to add, however, that in the opinion of the same eminent authority
there was no real necessity for such undue haste on Nelson’s part. “He
should have remembered that the act would appear to the world, not as
that of the Neapolitan plenipotentiary, but of the British officer,
and that his nation, while liable like others to bursts of unreasoning
savagery, in its normal moods delights to see justice clothed in
orderly forms, unstained by precipitation or suspicion of perversion,
advancing to its ends with the majesty of law, without unseemly haste,
providing things honest in the sight of all men. That he did not do
so, when he could have done so, has been intuitively felt; and to the
instinctive resentment thus aroused among his countrymen has been due
the facility with which the worst has been too easily believed.”