CHAPTER VIII

In Chase of the French Fleet

(1798)

“_No Frigates!--to which has been, and may again, be attributed the

loss of the French Fleet._”

NELSON.

The year 1797 had been a particularly trying one for Nelson both as

regards health and reputation; the succeeding twelve months were to

test his powers of endurance and his skill even more. The services of

the one-eyed, one-armed little man were not to be dispensed with, as

he had suggested in a moment of despondency. He neither retired to “a

very humble cottage,” although he had purchased a small property known

as Round Wood, near Ipswich, nor made room for “a better man.” Truth

to tell, there was no better man, and for once the Admiralty knew

its business. Nelson hoisted his flag as Rear-Admiral of the Blue on

board the _Vanguard_ (74) at Spithead on the 29th March 1798, sailed

for Lisbon with a convoy on the 10th April, and joined his old fleet

off Cadiz on the last day of that month, the times “big with events.”

Within forty-eight hours he was ordered by St Vincent to ascertain the

destination of an immense armament which was preparing at Toulon and

other ports in the Mediterranean. For this important service a squadron

of three sail-of-the-line, including his own ship, three frigates

and a sloop were placed at his disposal. A small French corvette was

captured, and by closely examining each member of the crew it was

ascertained that although Bonaparte had appeared at the great French

port it was not believed he would embark. The most important point of

all, namely, the destination of the expedition, was not revealed: “all

is secret.”

While off Toulon, Nelson encountered one of the worst gales he

ever experienced. His own account of the fight with this universal

enemy lacks the picturesque details given by Captain Berry, of the

_Vanguard_, and we shall therefore quote from Berry’s letter. Nelson

tells his wife that “it was the Almighty’s goodness, to check my

consummate vanity”; his more matter-of-fact captain sees only a natural

cause. Just before sunset on Sunday, the 20th of May, it became evident

that the spell of fine weather, which had been enjoyed hitherto, was

over. The wind increased in violence so much that it became necessary

to furl all the sails with the exception of a main storm-staysail.

“At about two,” says Berry, “the main-topmast went over the side,

with the top-sailyard full of men. I dreaded the inquiry of who were

killed and drowned; fortunately only one man fell overboard, and

one fell on the booms, and was killed on the spot. At half-past two

the mizen-topmast went over the side; the foremast gave an alarming

crack, and at a quarter past three went by the board with a most

tremendous crash, and, what was very extraordinary, it fell in two

pieces across the forecastle. Our situation was really alarming: the

wreck of the fore-topmast and foremast hanging over the side, and

beating against the Ship’s bottom; the best bower-anchor was flung

out of its place, and was also thumping the bottom; the wreck of the

main topmast swinging violently against the main-rigging, every roll

endangering the loss of the mainmast, which we expected to fall every

moment: thus circumstanced, we endeavoured, though with but little

hopes of success, to wear,[24] having no head-sail, and knowing we

were driving on an Enemy’s shore. Fortunately there was a small rag

of the sprit-sail left, and by watching a favourable moment, we got

her on the other tack. The bowsprit did not go, though it was sprung

in three different places. The Ship rolled and laboured dreadfully,

but did not make any water, more than we shipped over all. We cut the

anchor from the bows, and got clear of the wreck, with the loss of a

boat and top-sailyard, etc., and were not apprehensive of our bottom

being damaged.... For want of masts we rolled dreadfully. The storm

did not abate till Tuesday afternoon, which enabled the _Alexander_ to

take us in tow. Our situation on Tuesday night was the most alarming

I ever experienced....” At one time Nelson was of opinion that both

ships would go down, and wished the _Vanguard_ to be cast off. Captain

Alexander Ball, with whom the Rear-Admiral had struck up a slight

acquaintance at St Omer on the occasion of his visit to France in

1783, would not hear of it, and brought the vessels safely to the

shelter of the islands of San Pietro. After being patched up the three

sail-of-the-line again proceeded on their way to Toulon, minus the

smaller craft which had parted company long since, and eventually

returned to St Vincent’s fleet.

Fortune had played Nelson false. The Toulon fleet had escaped on the

19th May. While the three English battle-ships were riding out the

gale it was making for Genoa, Ajaccio, and Civita Vecchia to rally

transports. The destination of the expedition was Egypt; Malta the

first object of prey. Shortly after the signature of the Treaty of

Campo Formio on the 17th October 1797, which pacified the Continent for

a time, Napoleon had returned in triumph to Paris from his victorious

Italian Campaign. He was then appointed by the French Directory

Commander of the Army of England, so called because the purpose for

which it was brought into being was the subjugation of that country.

Napoleon certainly devoted much of his time to the project, but

soon came to the conclusion that the plan was not practicable at

the moment. He dreamed of Oriental conquest, of occupying Egypt and

invading India: “We may change the face of the world!” How could the

command of the Channel be secured when Admiral Lord Bridport commanded

a formidable fleet in those waters and frequently appeared off Brest,

when Admiral Lord Duncan patrolled the North Sea, and the naval

highways of Spithead, the Downs, the Nore, St George’s Channel, and the

Bay of Biscay were strongly guarded by British fleets or divisions?

The Mediterranean seemed the only vulnerable point, for the Earl of St

Vincent’s fleet was alone stationed within striking distance of that

great inland sea.

It is necessary at this point to briefly refer to the naval strength of

Great Britain as compared with that of France. At the beginning of 1798

the Republic possessed fifty-seven sail-of-the-line, forty-six frigates

and seventy-two smaller vessels, to which must be added nine remnants

of the Venetian navy and whatever forces could be commanded from Spain

and Holland. Fourteen sail-of-the-line, seventeen frigates, and three

cutters were on the stocks in French shipyards. During the same year

England had no fewer than one hundred and twenty line-of-battle ships

and over five hundred smaller vessels at her disposal. The recent

mutiny at the Nore had shown that there was some dissatisfaction in

the British naval service, but the ships were not undermanned as in

France, they were in finer condition, and the victories off Cape St

Vincent and Camperdown had acted as a stimulant. If those before the

mast occasionally grumbled, nothing further was heard of organised

insubordination.

The Admiralty had now sent a reinforcement of eight battle-ships

and two fire-ships to the Admiral, who was told “to lose no time

in detaching from your Fleet a Squadron, consisting of twelve

Sail-of-the-line, and a competent number of Frigates, under the

command of some discreet Flag-Officer, into the Mediterranean, with

instructions to him to proceed in quest of the said Armament;[25] and

on falling in with it, or any other Force belonging to the Enemy, to

take or destroy it.” The officer was also “to remain upon this service

so long as the provisions of the said Squadron will last, or as long

as he may be enabled to obtain supplies from any of the ports in the

Mediterranean.” According to later orders supplies were to be exacted

“from the territories of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the King of the

Two Sicilies, the Ottoman Territory, Malta, and ci-devant Venetian

Dominions now belonging to the Emperor of Germany.” The Dey of Algiers,

the Bey of Tunis, and the Bashaw of Tripoli were also believed to

be friendly. Lord Spencer, First Lord of the Admiralty, suggested

Nelson as the most likely man for this extremely important service.

Several eminent personages claimed to have aided him in his selection,

including Sir Gilbert Elliot and the King.

Sir Horatio was accordingly given command of a squadron which numbered

thirteen line-of-battle ships, all carrying seventy-four guns, and

one fifty-gun ship, the _Leander_. St Vincent’s selection awoke the

ire of Nelson’s two seniors in the Earl’s fleet, namely, Sir William

Parker and Sir John Orde. As we have seen, the Admiral had scarcely a

voice in the matter, and subsequent events abundantly confirmed the

wisdom of the appointment. Unfortunately there were no frigates, “the

eyes of a fleet.” As to the destination of Napoleon and his army of

adventurers, the Rear-Admiral was not far wrong when he wrote to Lord

Spencer on the 15th June, after interrogating the captain of a Tunisian

cruiser who had seen them on the 4th off Trapani, that “If they pass

Sicily, I shall believe they are going on their scheme of possessing

Alexandria, and getting troops to India--a plan concerted with Tippoo

Saib, by no means so difficult as might at first view be imagined; but

be they bound to the Antipodes, your Lordship may rely that I will not

lose a moment in bringing them to Action, and endeavour to destroy

their Transports.” Off Messina he heard that the French had taken

possession of Malta. After discussing the matter with his captains he

decided to sail for Alexandria, which he reached two days before the

enemy’s arrival. He then “stretched the Fleet over to the Coast of

Asia,” and “passed close to the southern side of Candia, but without

seeing one Vessel in our route.” This was the position on the 12th

July, when he was still “without the smallest information of the French

Fleet since their leaving Malta.” A week later the squadron anchored

in Syracuse harbour to obtain water and provisions, set off again on

the 25th, and on the 28th the important news was obtained that about a

month before the French fleet had been seen sailing in the direction of

the south-east from Candia. To Nelson this intelligence meant but one

destination--Alexandria. His surmise was correct: “I attacked at sunset

on the 1st of August, off the Mouth of the Nile.”

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