JACOBIN OR AMERICAN?
One of the first duties of Jefferson in taking charge of foreign affairs
was to explain to his French friends, who on the other side of the
Atlantic had been accustomed to look up to him as a guide and
counsellor, the reasons which had determined his choice to remain in
America. To Madame de Corny, the Duchesse Danville, the Duc de La
Rochefoucauld, Madame d'Houdetot, he wrote gracefully worded notes, in
the best style of the society of the time. In France, among other
things, he had learned how to turn a charming compliment. More official
but still very graceful is the letter he sent to Montmorin to take
formal leave of the French Court and at the same time introduce himself
in his new capacity. But besides the compliments, there appears in the
letter a reaffirmation that the best foundation for international
friendship lay in satisfactory commercial relations. "May this union of
interests forever be the patriotic creed of both countries."[265] The
new Secretary of State had not forgotten that the most important
questions relative to Gallo-American commerce had not yet been settled,
and that it would be no negligible part of his duties to carry out the
principles he had always defended when in Paris.
To Lafayette, closer to his heart than any other Frenchman, he explained
more fully his view of the situation and stated once more the principles
which would direct him in his policy towards France:
Wherever I am, or ever shall be, I shall be sincere in my friendship
to you and to your nation. I think with others, that nations are to
be governed with regard to their own interests, but I am convinced
that it is their interests, in the long run, to be grateful, faithful
to their engagements, even in the worst of circumstances, and
honorable and generous always. If I had not known that the head of
our government was in these sentiments, and that his national and
private ethics were the same, I would never have been where I
am.[266]
This was more than a banal compliment. To the homely wisdom of Doctor
Franklin that honesty is the best policy, Jefferson had added a new
element. He had combined in one formula two principles which often seem
contradictory and which at any rate are difficult to reconcile. Not a
mere idealist, nor simply a practical politician, he was, during the
rest of his political life, to make persistent efforts to propagate that
gospel of practical idealism which remains to this day one of the
fundamental tenets of Americanism. In that respect, party lines count
little, and Lincoln was quite as much a disciple and a continuator of
Jefferson as Woodrow Wilson.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in many circumstances it
would take more than superhuman virtue and intelligence rightly to
operate that ideal combination and maintain an equal balance between
national selfishness and philosophical idealism. When it came to
practice, Jefferson showed himself just as canny as any European
diplomat and never neglected an opportunity to further the interests of
his country. This appeared in the very first letters he sent to Europe
after taking charge of the foreign policies of the United States.
Communications were slow at the time. Jefferson was kept regularly
informed of developments in France by Short, his former secretary, left
in charge in Paris, who sent him weekly letters; but they averaged
eleven weeks and a half in transit, while of his answers "the quickest
were of nine weeks and the longest of near eighteen weeks coming."
Information through the British papers took about five or six weeks to
reach America but was not to be relied upon, and Jefferson gave definite
instructions to Short for "news from Europe is very interesting at this
moment, when it is so doubtful whether a war will take place between our
two neighbors."[267]
This was indeed at the time his main preoccupation. War between Spain
and England seemed not only possible but probable, and Jefferson saw in
it an opportunity to press the claims of the United States to the
navigation of the Mississippi. The question was not "the claims of Spain
to our territory north of the thirty first degree and east of the
Mississippi (they never merited the respect of an answer), but the
navigation of the Mississippi and that was not simply to recognize the
American rights on the river." Navigation "cannot be practiced without a
port, where the sea and river vessels may meet and exchange loads, where
those employed about them may be safe and unmolested." The right to use
a thing comprehends a right to the means necessary to its use, and
without which it would be useless. Jefferson added that he could not
answer that "the forbearance of our western citizens would last
indefinitely, and that a moment of impatience, hazard or other
considerations might precipitate action on their part." On the other
hand, the United States were in no position to antagonize openly even
weak Spain, and in case nothing should develop Carmichael was instructed
to bide his time:
You will be pleased to observe, that we press these matters warmly
and firmly, under this idea, that the war between Spain and Great
Britain will be begun before you receive this; and such a moment must
not be lost. But should an accommodation take place, we retain,
indeed, the same object and the same resolutions unalterably; but
your discretion will suggest, that patience and persuasion must
temper your conferences, till either of these may prevail, or some
other circumstances turn up, which may enable us to use other means
for the attainment of an object which we are determined, in the end,
to obtain at every risk.[268]
Naturally this is no worse than the ordinary run of instructions sent at
that time to diplomatic agents by other foreign secretaries, and
Jefferson's policy was no more underhanded than the policies of any
other nation of the Old World. It cannot be said, however, that it
rested upon higher and nobler moral principles. Perhaps America had no
diplomatic tradition at that time, but she was not deficient in tactics,
and neither Jefferson nor his agents were exactly innocent tools in the
hands of wily European diplomats.
But this is not all. Jefferson unfolded his whole plan in a letter to
Short written a week later. In case of a war between England and Spain,
France would be called into the war as an ally on the side of Spain. She
would have a right to insist that Spain should do everything in her
power to lessen the number of her potential enemies and to eliminate
every cause of friction with the United States. "She cannot doubt that
we shall be of that number, if she does not yield our right to common
use of the Mississippi, and the means of using and securing it." The
point made by the United States was that "they should have a port near
the mouth of the river, so well separated from the territories of Spain
and her jurisdiction, as not to engender daily disputes and broils
between us." Such a claim was not an arbitrary one, but resulted from
the configuration of the land. "Nature has decided what shall be the
geography of that in the end, whatever it might be in the beginning, by
cutting off from the adjacent countries of Florida and Louisiana, and
enclosing between two of its channels, a long and narrow slip of land,
called the Island of New Orleans." Jefferson conceded that the idea of
ceding that territory might be disagreeable to Spain at first, because
it constituted their principal settlement in those parts, with a
population of ten thousand white inhabitants, but "reason, and events,
however, may, by little and little, familiarize them to it." The idea,
however, might seem excessive to Montmorin, particularly as it was
thought that France had not entirely given up the project of recovering
the country along the Mississippi. But fortunately the National Assembly
seemed opposed to conquest and the subject might be broached merely in
general terms at the beginning. Furthermore, Lafayette could be used
once more as an intermediary without officially compromising the United
States.[269]
Finally Gouverneur Morris was told to warn England that should they
entertain any design against any Spanish colony, the United States would
contemplate a change of neighbors with extreme uneasiness. While the
United States would remain neutral if "they execute the treaty fairly
and attempt no conquests adjoining us," Jefferson added, "it will be
proper that these ideas be conveyed in delicate and friendly terms; but
that they be conveyed, if the war takes place; for it is in this case
alone, and not till it be begun, that we should wish our dispositions to
be known."[270] That question being disposed of satisfactorily, at least
in theory, for after all, the war did not break out, Jefferson abandoned
temporarily his plans to obtain New Orleans. How he resumed them and
pushed them to a successful conclusion ten years later is too well known
to need recalling here.
It is not until February 4, 1791, that Jefferson expressed in writing
his hope to see a republican form of government established in France.
This was in direct contradiction with all the advice and counsel he had
given to his French friends when he was in Paris, with his repeated
affirmations that the French were not ready for self-government, and
with the conclusions contained in his letter written to Jay in the
summer of 1789. None of the developments that had taken place in France
was of such a character as to change Jefferson's attitude on the
matter. But in the meantime, he had come to the conclusion that the fate
of the republican government in the United States depended largely on
the failure or success of the French Revolution. If it proved impossible
for the French to establish a stable form of self-government, if they
could not withstand the attacks of their foreign enemies, the conclusion
would inevitably be drawn in America that there was an inherent defect
and weakness in all republican governments. Thus the French Revolution
had already become an international issue, for the cause of liberty
could not remain secure for any length of time in America if it were
crushed in Europe. On that particular point Jefferson himself was very
explicit:
I look with great anxiety for the firm establishment of the new
government in France, being perfectly convinced that if it takes
place there, it will spread sooner or later all over Europe. On the
contrary, a check there would retard the revival of liberty in other
countries. I consider the establishment and success of their
government as necessary to stay up our own, and to prevent it from
falling back to that kind of half-way house, the English
constitution. It cannot be denied that we have among us a sect who
believe that to contain whatever is perfect in human institutions;
that the members of this sect have, many of them, names and offices
which stand high in the estimation of our countrymen. I still rely
that the great mass of our community is untainted with these
heresies, as is its head. On this I build my hope that we have not
labored in vain, and that our experiment will still prove that men
can be governed by reason.[271]
On receiving the news that the National Assembly of France had gone into
mourning over the death of Franklin, Jefferson sent to its President one
of those letters worded in the "felicitous style" which he had perfected
in France. His feelings were sincere, he had great respect and affection
for the Doctor, but he knew what was expected of him, and with great
skill, without promising anything, or using any expression that might be
taken as a definite promise and turned against him later, he made a
vague but satisfactory appeal to a sort of international friendship,
praising the Assembly for having set the first example and brought "into
our fraternity the good and the great wherever they have lived or died."
He ended with a reaffirmation of the good dispositions of his government
towards France: "That these separations may disappear between us in all
times and circumstances, and that the union of sentiment which mingles
our sorrows on this occasion, may continue long to cement the friendship
and interests of our two nations, is our constant prayer."[272]
This openly declared sympathy for France and his hopes for a new form of
government did not in the least obscure his views on the commercial
difficulties between the two countries. The bone of contention was still
the question of commerce with the West Indies. The National Assembly, on
ratifying the consular conventions, had showed little disposition to
admit the right of the United States to send consular agents to the West
Indies. In his opinion the word _"Etats du roi"_ did not mean merely
France, but all colonial possessions of France as indicated in the
translation "French dominions." He was not ready officially to press the
matter so as to cause difficulties between the two nations and was
willing to have the two agents already appointed, "Skipwith at
Martinique and Bourne at St. Dominique", ask for a regular
exequatur.[273]
He elaborated on his policy with reference to the West Indies in another
letter to Short, written three months later. In it will be found
expressed more discreetly, but no less firmly, the philosophy outlined
already with reference to Spain and the Mississippi. He maintained first
of all that the United States had no design whatever on the West
Indies, for "If there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other
in the mind of every American, it is that we should have nothing to do
with conquest." This principle once established, he proceeded to examine
the situation from a practical point of view. The regulations imposed by
the French on their colonies are such that they cannot trade directly
with their neighbors; for the supplies necessary to relieve their mutual
wants have to be carried first to France in order to be exported either
to the colonies or to the American continent. This is contrary to the
natural order of things: "An exchange of surplusses and wants between
neighbor nations, is both a right and a duty under the moral law, and
measures against right should be mollified in their exercise, if it be
wished to lengthen them to the greatest term possible." It seemed to
Jefferson that such a right ought to be recognized by any unprejudiced
mind; but, unfortunately, "Europeans in general have been too long in
the habit of confounding force with right with respect to America."
Circumstances are such that these rights cannot be pressed very strongly
and "can be advanced only with delicacy", but what the United States
cannot do themselves, Lafayette perhaps can present informally to his
friends. He alone can make them understand that, while they are
establishing a new regime for their colonial possessions of the West
Indies, "in policy, if not in justice, they should be disposed to avoid
oppression, which, falling on us, as well as on their colonies, might
tempt us to act together."[274]
Was this a veiled threat? Not exactly. It was an extension of
Montesquieu's theory of laws to international relations, an application
of the theories of the French economists on free trade. But even
supposing that the theory itself had some remote French origin, to a
large extent it was new and typically American. Only former colonies
which had won their complete independence could maintain that, in
matters of trade, the colonies were completely independent of the
metropolis, and that commercial and geographical considerations should
outweigh political regulations. The United States were strongly inclined
to use every favorable opportunity to make this principle obtain in
their relations with their neighbors, and what was a far more dangerous
thing, they considered this policy both "a right and a duty under the
moral law." It was not political imperialism to be sure, but in our days
it certainly would be called commercial imperialism under a moral
disguise. At that time, it was really a theory far in advance of both
the theory and practice of any European nation, and it is very doubtful
whether Jefferson would have found justification for it in any of the
authorities on the law of nations he had consulted with reference to the
navigation of the Mississippi.[275]
There is no doubt that Jefferson fully realized all the implications of
his doctrine, for he submitted it to the President before sending it to
Short in cipher; but he insisted that, if the contents of his letter
were permitted to leak out at a favorable opportunity, "the National
Assembly might see the impolicy of insisting on particular conditions,
which, operating as grievances on us, as well as on their colonists,
might produce a concert of action."[276]
The news of the flight of the king was for him another evidence of the
"fruits of that form of government, which heaps importance on idiots,
and which the Tories of the present day are trying to preach into our
favor." Then he added significantly: "I still hope the French revolution
will issue happily. I feel that the permanence of our own leans in some
degree on that; and that a failure there would be a powerful argument to
prove there would be a failure here."[277]
Meanwhile his actions were far more cautious than his theories would
lead one to believe. When the Santo Domingo Assembly placed their
situation before the Government of the United States, asking for
ammunition, arms, and provisions to be charged against the money owed
France by the United States, Jefferson answered that although the United
States had with them "some common points of union in matters of
commerce" he could not do anything without the approbation of Ternant.
When the colonists asked him what would be the attitude of the United
States in case they became independent, Jefferson did not conceal the
fact that they would lay themselves open to any attack by a strong
nation and that their interest, as well as the interests of the United
States, was to see them retain their connection with their mother
country; and he finally decided to give them such small supplies from
time to time "as will keep them from real distress, and to wait with
patience for what would be a surplus, till M. Ternant can receive
instructions from France.... It would be unwise in the highest degree,
that the colonists should be disgusted with either France or us."[278]
He was soon to be deprived, however, of direct news from France, for
Short was transferred from Paris to the Hague and Gouverneur Morris
appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to France.[279] He had to explain his
policy to the new minister, which he did on March 10, 1792, this time
insisting that nothing in the conduct or the views of the United States
should cause any apprehension to the French Government and that he
should allay all fears on that score.[280] But with Lafayette he still
insisted that if he did not mention the point again, it was largely
because he considered that it had been won:
We have been less zealous in aiding them, lest your government should
feel any jealousy on our account. But, in truth, we as sincerely
wish their restoration and connection with you, as you do yourselves.
We are satisfied that neither your justice nor their distresses will
ever again permit their being forced to seek at dear and distant
markets those first necessaries of life which they may have at
cheaper markets, placed by nature at their door, and formed by her
for their support.[281]
It was not until the latter part of 1792 that reiterated letters from
Morris, describing the situation and asking for instructions, forced
Jefferson to make a very important declaration on relations that could
be transacted with revolutionary governments. There again he displayed
the resourcefulness of a good lawyer combined with the idealism of a
political philosopher. Having no hint of the form of government that the
French were to adopt, he thought it necessary to lay down certain
principles to direct the conduct of the American plenipotentiary in
Paris. They were substantially as follows: The permanent principle of
the United States was to recognize any government "which is formed by
the will of the nation substantially declared." If the government to be
formed by the French presented such a character, there was no reason to
doubt that the United States would grant recognition, and Morris could
proceed without further ado to transact with them "every kind of
business." On the other hand, the government established might present
an entirely different complexion and in that case the recognition might
be more doubtful; but even then it was to be considered as a _de facto_,
if not a _de jure_ government, and it was the duty of the American
minister to discuss some matters with them in order to obtain
concessions "reforming the unfriendly restrictions on our commerce and
navigation."[282] The question as to Morris' safety was left entirely to
him to determine and could not very well be the object of precise
instructions.
Two weeks later, Jefferson himself had an opportunity to make a
practical application of his policy. Although they had received no
formal authority from the National Assembly, the United States were
willing to contribute aids from time to time to Santo Domingo, and were
placing at their disposal for December the sum of forty thousand
dollars. But Jefferson insisted that such moneys as were thus obtained
were to be spent in America where supplies could be had cheapest, "and
where the same sum would consequently effect the greatest measure of
relief to the colony." Incidentally, it was spent also for the greatest
benefit of the American merchants, and strengthened the commercial
connection between the islands and the American continent, a point not
to be mentioned to the French envoy, but well worth keeping in
mind.[283]
At the beginning of 1793, Jefferson was not only inclined to treat
favorably the new French Government but resented strongly any criticism
of it. When he discovered that in several letters his friend and
disciple Short had censured the proceedings of the French Jacobins,
Jefferson, fearing that he had been corrupted by aristocratic
friendships, undertook to set him right on the matter. He took the
following view of the situation:
The contest had been between the Feuillant patriots favoring a free
constitution with an hereditary executive and the Jacobins who
thought that expunging that office was an absolute necessity. The
Feuillants had their day and their experiment had failed miserably.
The nation was with them in opinion and had finally won. Certainly in
the struggle many guilty persons fell without the forms of trial and
innocents with them. But altogether they are to be considered as
soldiers who have fallen during a battle; their memory will be
embalmed by truth and time.
Meanwhile the only thing to consider was that the liberty of the whole
world depended on the issue of the contest:
Was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own
affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this
cause, but rather than it should have failed I would have seen half
the earth desolated; were there but an Adam and an Eve left in every
country, and left free, it would be better than as it is now.
Short was then severely rebuked for having expressed in conversations
sentiments offensive to the French patriots. He was reminded that there
were in the United States "some characters of opposite principles
hostile to France, and fondly looking to England as the staff of their
hopes. Their prospects have certainly not brightened.... The successes
of republicanism in France have given the _coup de grace_ to their
prospects, and I hope to their projects." This was to be kept in mind by
Short, and, as Jefferson intended to retire at an early date, he called
his attention to the fact that not knowing who his successor would be
and into whose hands his further communications would fall, he had
better be prudent and not let his "too great sensibility to the
misfortunes of some dear friends obscure his republicanism."[284]
In a communication to Gouverneur Morris, Jefferson was more reserved but
no less insistent upon the principle that the French Government was a
government _de jure_ as well as _de facto_:
We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own
government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to
whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and
that it may transact its business with foreign nations through
whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly,
Committee, President, or anything else it may choose. The will of the
nation is the only essential thing to be regarded. Such being the
case, the United States not only should continue to pay the
installment on the debt but use their utmost endeavors to make
punctual payments. Urged by the strongest attachment to that country,
and thinking it is even providential that moneys lent to us in
distress could be repaid under like circumstances, we had no
hesitation to comply with the application, and arrangements are
accordingly taken, for furnishing this sum at epochs accommodated to
the demands and our means of paying it.
This was the doctrine of national gratitude reaffirmed and illustrated,
but naturally relations could not be placed on an entirely sentimental
basis. Morris was instructed at the same time "to use and improve every
possible opportunity which may occur in the changeable scenes which are
passing, and to seize them as they occur, for placing our commerce with
that nation and its dependencies, on the freest and most encouraging
footing possible."[285]
A week later news of the execution of the king arrived at Philadelphia.
For the fate of Louis XVI, Jefferson felt and expressed little personal
regret. He never held the monarch in high esteem: furthermore, the
example set by France might teach a good lesson to other autocrats and
"soften the monarchical governments, by rendering monarchs amenable to
punishment like other criminals, and doing away with that rage of
insolence and oppression, the inviolability of the King's person."[286]
Here again it is evident that domestic considerations were uppermost in
Jefferson's mind. Never could one correct too vigorously those who
wished to establish a monarchy in the United States. Whether he was
justified or not, Jefferson sincerely believed that the American
republic was in danger, and his attitude at that time reflects his fear
of the monocrats more than any real sympathy for the French Terrorists.
Thus spoke Jefferson, the party man, and he made no mystery of his
sentiments either in his conversations or in his private letters. The
Secretary of State, however, could not easily afford to adopt publicly
the same attitude. Early in February Colonel W. S. Smith had brought the
intelligence that the French Minister Ternant, whose royalist opinions
shocked the French sympathizers in Philadelphia, would be recalled and
Citizen Genet would be sent in his place by the Republic. It was already
known that Genet would bring very advantageous propositions to the
United States, for he would come
with full powers to give us all the privileges we can desire in their
countries, and particularly in the West Indies; that they even
contemplate to set them free the next summer; that they proposed to
emancipate South America, and will send forty-five ships of the line
there next spring, and Miranda at the head of the expedition; that
they desire our debt to be paid them in provisions, and have
authorized him to negotiate this.[287]
On the other hand it was to be feared that Genet would remind the
American Government of the existence of the Treaty of 1778, by which the
United States agreed to give distinct advantages to French privateers
and to guarantee the integrity of the French West Indies. It was not
until April that it was known war had been declared between France and
England. Were the United States going to be dragged into the European
convulsions and would they have to side openly with their former ally?
Acting on the information received from Colonel Smith, Jefferson quickly
wrote to Carmichael and Short, asking them to refrain from mentioning
the Louisiana question to Spain, and chiefly to be very careful not to
"bind us to guarantee any of the Spanish colonies against their own
independence, nor indeed against any other nation." Jefferson believed
that there was a possibility of seeing France encourage the Spanish
colonies to revolt and would not have objected "to the receiving those
on the east side into our confederation." This was an eventuality not to
be lightly dismissed, and once more Jefferson's uppermost preoccupation
was not to please the French Revolutionists but to further the interests
of his country.[288] But before deciding upon any course of action it
was advisable to temporize and to find out from what quarter the wind
was about to blow. The only thing to do for the present was to wait and
to avoid any unpleasant complications with the powers at war; and first
of all to see to it that the United States should enjoy the rights and
privileges of a complete neutrality. Jefferson began sending
instructions to that effect to Samuel Shaw, consul at Canton,
China.[289] Two days later he wrote even more explicitly to Dumas: "We
wish not to meddle with the internal affairs of any country, nor with
the general affairs of Europe. Peace with all nations, and the right
which that gives us with all nations are our objects. It will be
necessary for all our public agents to exert themselves with vigilance
for securing to our vessels all the rights of neutrality, and from
preventing the vessels of other nations from usurping our flags."[290]
As the cabinet met only one month later (April 18) at the request of
Washington to discuss the proclamation of neutrality, it is not without
importance to call attention to the date and the text of that letter.
Winning Jefferson over to the position finally adopted by the American
Government could not present insuperable difficulties since he had
already outlined the same policy even before consulting with the
President, and on his own initiative had sent instructions to the
agents.
When the Cabinet met to consider the emergency, and the several
secretaries were invited by Washington to submit their opinions in
writing, the course to be followed was officially agreed upon and
Washington issued the famous Proclamation of Neutrality on April
22,--the very same day the new minister from France landed at
Charleston. Jefferson did not lose any time notifying the American
agents abroad of the policy of the United States, repeating
substantially the instructions already sent to Dumas one month
before.[291] At the same time Ternant was officially notified that
credits opened in favor of the West Indies had to be stopped;[292] as
the emergency had passed and a regular government had been established
in France, money could be appropriated from the regular installments
paid on the debt.
[Illustration: THOMAS JEFFERSON
_From the portrait by Rembrandt Peale_]
According to a letter written to Monroe,[293] Jefferson saw with a
secret pleasure, the monocrat papers publish the most furious philippics
against England, and the old spirit of 1776 rekindled from Charleston to
Boston. He expressed the pious wish that "we may be able to repress the
spirit of the people within the limits of fair neutrality." But he
revolted against what he considered a subservient attitude to England on
the part of Hamilton. It is one of the few occasions in which he
departed in a letter (I do not count the "Anas") from his judicial
attitude: "In the meantime," he said, "Hamilton is panick struck, if we
refuse our breech to every kick which Great Britain may choose to give
it. In order to preserve even a sneaking neutrality a fight is necessary
in every council for our votes are generally two and a half against one
and a half."
Jefferson's private opinion might have favored the French Revolution, as
it undoubtedly did. I do not see, however, that in any important
circumstance he departed from the strict line of neutrality which he had
traced for the country.
He sent instructions to Thomas Pinckney[294] to the effect that, in
order to avoid any violation of neutrality, passports could be issued to
vessels only in American ports; that "in other lands American citizens
were free to purchase and use any foreign built vessels, as those were
entitled to the same protection as home built vessels." That all vessels
belonging to citizens of the United States loaded with grain to the port
of one of the belligerents could not be stopped by the other
belligerent if going to an unblockaded port.
Then Genet, still at Charleston and before being regularly accredited,
took upon himself to outfit privateers and to commission them. "The
British ship _Grange_, while lying at anchor in the bay of Delaware,
within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, was taken
possession of by the _Embuscade_, a frigate of the French Republic,
brought to port where she was detained as a prize and the crew kept
prisoners."[295] Ternant was asked to detain the vessel, waiting for a
decision to be taken concerning the representations of the British
minister, Hammond. But it will be seen in Jefferson's letter to
Hammond[296] that he did not hesitate to grant that the capture of the
_Grange_ was not "warranted by the usage of nations, nor by the existing
treaties between the United States and France", nor, Jefferson added,
"by any law of the land." On the other hand he maintained that agents of
the French Government were free to purchase "arms and military
accoutrements" with an intent to export them to France, and that
citizens of the United States could sell such articles, being duly
warned, however, that they were subject to confiscation should they fall
into the hands of a belligerent.
Indeed, it took all the calamitous blunders of Genet to turn Jefferson
against him. From Charleston, where he had landed, to Philadelphia, his
march had been a triumph. The citizens of Philadelphia, hearing that the
President might refuse to receive him, had even decided to give him an
ovation and to meet him at Gray's Ferry. He delivered his credentials on
May 18, and at once communicated the object of his mission in a style
which now appears grandiloquent, but simply reflected that enthusiasm
for America which was running so high in France at the time. "In short,"
wrote Jefferson to Madison, "he offers everything, and asks
nothing."[297] This was too good to be true, and too wonderful to last
long.
Less than three weeks later (June 5) Jefferson had to send to Genet
strong representations on his attitude and pointed out several breaches
of neutrality, particularly in the arming of French privateers in
American ports, stating rather stiffly that it was "the _right_ of every
nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exercised by any other
nation within its limits and the duty of a neutral nation to prohibit
such as would injure one of the warring powers."
But in a letter to Hammond he stated that the measures could not be
retrospective. In the first days of the war, French citizens, duly
commissioned by the authorities of their country, had captured British
vessels. It was impossible for the United States to rescue those vessels
from the captors. All that could be done was to prevent the repetition
of such an incident and to order the departure of all French privateers
from the ports of the United States. It was fine legal reasoning, not
without some of that hairsplitting for which Jefferson reproached
Randolph. Whether Randolph had a hand or not in the reaching of that
decision is another question. Jefferson indorsed it in transmitting it
both to Hammond and Genet.
Another proposition of Genet did not meet with more favorable approval.
The Republic was hard pressed for money, and the new plenipotentiary had
been requested to make every possible effort "to obtain payment in one
lump sum of all the annuities coming to France, taking the debt in
produce if necessary, or changing it into bonds to be sold to the
public." To this Jefferson was unequivocally opposed, although he
referred the President to Hamilton. He recommended payment in advance of
the installments due for the year, but strongly objected to changing the
form of the debt.[298] He wrote, furthermore, to Gouverneur Morris to
acquaint him with the situation and to request him "to prevent any such
proposition in the future from being brought forward."[299]
As a matter of fact, although Jefferson expressed pious and fervent
wishes for the success of the French, I cannot see that he officially
did much to further their cause. He was not even pleased by the
agitation and propaganda in their behalf carried on in America by
enthusiastic patriots. This appears very clearly in a letter to his
son-in-law, Thomas Mann Randolph, which, better than any official
document, indicates his state of mind at the end of June, 1793:
The French have been guilty of great errors in their conduct towards
other nations, not only in insulting uselessly all crowned heads, but
endeavoring to force liberty on their neighbors in their own form.
They seem to be correcting themselves on the latter point; the war
between them and England embarrasses our government daily and
immensely. The predilection of our citizens for France renders it
very difficult to suppress their attempts to cruise against the
English on the ocean, and to do justice to the latter in cases where
they are entitled to it.[300]
Monroe had sent him a long dissertation on the proclamation of
neutrality which he judged both "unpolitick and unconstitutional"; for,
if the President "possesses the right to say we shall be neutral, he
might say we should not be."[301]
To this Jefferson answered that his friends' apprehensions were somewhat
exaggerated, for the United States being at peace with England, the
so-called proclamation of neutrality--which, by the way, did not contain
the word neutrality--did nothing but maintain a _status quo_. This was a
fine legal distinction, not very convincing, but very characteristic of
Jefferson's state of mind at that time and of his reluctance to favor
the French side. Had he ever wished to do it, the attitude of the French
envoy would have soon forced him to adopt a different policy.
The case of Citizen Genet is too well known to require elaborate
treatment. Less than six weeks after his arrival in Philadelphia,
Jefferson had given him up as hopeless and dangerous:
Never in my opinion, was so calamitous an appointment made, as that
of the present minister of France here. Hot headed, all imagination,
no judgment, passionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the
President in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of
appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the
most unreasonable & groundless propositions, & in the most
dictatorial style.[302]
The case of the _Little Sarah_, a British prize, taken to Philadelphia
and refitted as a privateer by Genet's orders, brought the matter to a
head. Genet was warned that the vessel could not sail; he refused to
give definite assurances that it would not be ordered to sea. Washington
was away at the time, and Knox and Hamilton proposed mounting a battery
of cannon to prevent the sailing of the vessel, a measure strongly
opposed by Jefferson, determined to avoid at all cost measures
tantamount to a declaration of war. The _Little Sarah_ and the
_Democrat_ escaped, and Washington in vehement words manifested his
disapproval of the weakness shown on this occasion. The least the
American Government could do was to ask that Genet be recalled, and it
was so decided at a meeting of the Cabinet on August 3. In a long letter
intended for the French Government, but sent to Gouverneur Morris and
communicated to Genet himself, Jefferson drew up a terrible indictment
of the French minister. Hamilton and Knox were decidedly in favor of
stronger measures and of deciding then and there upon the "_renvoi_" of
Genet. Jefferson, following his constant policy, was against a measure
that could be construed as the recognition that a state of war existed
between the two countries. This has been sometimes interpreted as
evincing partiality to France on his part, but entries in the "Anas"
under August 20 and August 23 demonstrate beyond any doubt that he was
also guided by his uppermost desire to promote the interests of his
country.
There was at least some reason to believe that Genet's conduct would not
receive the support of his Government, and on the other hand he had
brought over with him certain proposals worth considering for a treaty
referring to the commerce with the West Indies. Although the Cabinet had
never considered the question formally, Jefferson estimated the matter
of such importance that he had taken it upon himself to discuss it with
Genet in several conversations. To leave the friendly overtures of the
French Republic without any answer would not only be insulting but
highly unpolitic, since the Executive might be accused "of neglecting
the interests of the United States." Under these circumstances some
means had to be found of sparing the feelings of the French Government,
so as not to lose entirely the chances of concluding a treaty so
advantageous to the United States. As Secretary of State, Jefferson had
to find a satisfactory formula. This was to ask the French Government to
recall Genet, but at the same time to appoint his successor and to renew
to this successor the powers granted originally to Genet. Such was the
tenor of his letter to Morris, a very clever solution to a very
difficult situation. As for Genet himself, he was to be tolerated until
the arrival of his successor.
Unfortunately the "citizen" did not know how to keep quiet or when to
quit. Not a dishonest man in ordinary life, not even an unintelligent
man, he was the greatest bungler ever sent by a friendly nation to
another. When he arrived in May, 1793, he had public opinion largely in
his favor. Members of Congress and of the government, except possibly
Hamilton, were not hostile to France; the French envoy could have
obtained distinct advantages for his country if he had proceeded slowly
and with ordinary caution. Two months later he had succeeded in turning
against himself and against the country he represented the whole of
public opinion, in sowing germs of distrust never to be eradicated, in
fixing and crystallizing all sorts of prejudices and unfavorable
generalizations about France.
Jefferson had made all possible efforts to keep the disaffection of the
American Government toward the French minister as much under cover as
possible. But Citizen Genet threw down the gauntlet by publishing part
of his official correspondence, thus forcing an appeal to the people and
running the risk of arousing the "disgusts" Jefferson had so much wished
to avoid.[303] A week later, he had to admit to Madison that Genet's
conduct "has given room to the enemies of France to come forward in a
style of acrimony against that nation which they never dared to have
done. The disapprobation of the agent mingles with the reprehension of
his nation and gives a toleration to that which it never had
before."[304]
By a strange irony of fate, one of the last acts of Jefferson as
Secretary of State was a final protest against Genet's attitude. Six
months before he had been notified that he could not be received by the
Executive and that all communications from him had to be made in
writing. Deciding to appeal to Congress over the head of the President,
Genet had copies of his instructions printed, demanding that they should
be laid before both houses. A more stupid and childish step could hardly
be imagined. Jefferson, requested by the President to draw up an answer
to Genet, wrote at first a scathing denunciation of the French minister
which was probably thought too strong, for it is marked "not inserted"
on the manuscript:[305]
The terms in which you permit yourself in this and some other of your
letters to speak of the President of the U. S., and the influence and
impressions you venture to ascribe to him, are calculated to excite
sentiments which need no explanation. On what grounds of truth they
are hazarded, how to reconcile them to decorum, to the respect due to
the person and character of our chief magistrate, and to the nation
over which he presides and that too from the representative of a
friendly people, are questions left to your mature reflection.
The letter which was finally sent, more moderate in its terms, was
nevertheless a formal reminder of diplomatic proprieties:
Your functions as the missionary of a foreign mission here, are
confined to the transactions of the affairs of your nation with the
Executive of the United States; that the communications, which are to
pass between the Executive and Legislative branches, cannot be a
subject for your interference, and that the President must be left to
judge for himself what matters his duty or the public good may
require him to propose to the deliberations of Congress. I have
therefore the honor of returning you the copies sent for
distribution.[306]
That very same day Jefferson resigned his office into the hands of
Washington, assuring him that in his retirement he was taking with him
"a lively sense of the President's goodness, and would continue
gratefully to remember it."[307]