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MEDIAEVAL SOCIALISM
by
BEDE JARRETT, O.P., M.A.
[Illustration: Logo]
London: T. C. & E. C. Jack
67 Long Acre, W.C., and Edinburgh
New York: Dodge Publishing Co.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION 5
II. SOCIAL CONDITIONS 17
III. THE COMMUNISTS 29
IV. THE SCHOOLMEN 41
V. THE LAWYERS 55
VI. THE SOCIAL REFORMERS 68
VII. THE THEORY OF ALMS-GIVING 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY 91
INDEX 93
MEDIAEVAL SOCIALISM
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The title of this book may not unnaturally provoke suspicion. After all,
howsoever we define it, socialism is a modern thing, and dependent
almost wholly on modern conditions. It is an economic theory which has
been evolved under pressure of circumstances which are admittedly of no
very long standing. How then, it may be asked, is it possible to find
any real correspondence between theories of old time and those which
have grown out of present-day conditions of life? Surely whatever
analogy may be drawn between them must be based on likenesses which
cannot be more than superficial.
The point of view implied in this question is being increasingly adopted
by all scientific students of social and political opinions, and is most
certainly correct. Speculation that is purely philosophic may indeed
turn round upon itself. The views of Grecian metaphysicians may continue
for ever to find enthusiastic adherents; though even here, in the realm
of purely abstract reasoning, the progressive development of science, of
psychology, and kindred branches of knowledge cannot fail by its
influence to modify the form and arrangement of thought. But in those
purely positive sciences (if indeed sciences they can properly be
called) which deal with the life of man and its organisation, the very
principles and postulates will be found to need continual readjustment.
For with man's life, social, political, economic, we are in contact with
forces which are of necessity always in a state of flux. For example,
the predominance of agriculture, or of manufacture, or of commerce in
the life of the social group must materially alter the attitude of the
statesman who is responsible for its fortunes; and the progress of the
nation from one to another stage of her development often entails (by
altering from one class to another the dominant position of power) the
complete reversal of her traditional maxims of government. Human life is
not static, but dynamic. Hence the theories weaved round it must
themselves be subject to the law of continuous development.
It is obvious that this argument cannot be gainsaid; and yet at the same
time we may not be in any way illogical in venturing on an inquiry as to
whether, in centuries not wholly dissimilar from our own, the mind of
man worked itself out along lines parallel in some degree to
contemporary systems of thought. Man's life differs, yet are the
categories which mould his ideas eternally the same.
But before we go on to consider some early aspects of socialism, we must
first ascertain what socialism itself essentially implies. Already
within the lifetime of the present generation the word has greatly
enlarged the scope of its significance. Many who ten years ago would
have objected to it as a name of ill-omen see in it now nothing which
may not be harmonised with the most ordinary of political and social
doctrines. It is hardly any longer the badge of a school. Yet it does
retain at any rate the bias of a tendency. It suggests chiefly the
transference of ownership in land and capital from private hands into
their possession in some form or other by the society. The means of this
transference, and the manner in which this social possession is to be
maintained, are very widely debated, and need not here be determined; it
is sufficient for the matter of this book to have it granted that in
this lies the germ of the socialistic theory of the State.
Once more it must be admitted that the meaning of "private ownership"
and "social possession" will vary exceedingly in each age. When private
dominion has become exceedingly individual and practically absolute, the
opposition between the two terms will necessarily be very sharp. But in
those earlier stages of national and social evolution, when the
community was still regarded as composed, not of persons, but of groups,
the antagonism might be, in point of theory, extremely limited; and in
concrete cases it might possibly be difficult to determine where one
ended and the other began. Yet it is undeniable that socialism in itself
need mean no more than the central principle of State-ownership of
capital and land. Such a conception is consistent with much private
property in other forms than land and capital, and will be worked out in
detail differently by different minds. But it is the principle, the
essence of it, which justifies any claims made to the use of the name.
We may therefore fairly call those theories socialistic which are
covered by this central doctrine, and disregard, as irrelevant to the
nature of the term, all added peculiarities contributed by individuals
who have joined their forces to the movement.
By socialistic theories of the Middle Ages, therefore, we mean no more
than those theories which from time to time came to the surface of
political and social speculation in the form of communism, or of some
other way of bringing about the transference which we have just
indicated. But before plunging into the tanglement of these rather
complicated problems, it will make for clearness if we consider quite
briefly the philosophic heritage of social teaching to which the Middle
Ages succeeded.
The Fathers of the Church had found themselves confronted with
difficulties of no mean subtlety. On the one hand, the teaching of the
Scriptures forced upon them the religious truth of the essential
equality of all human nature. Christianity was a standing protest
against the exclusiveness of the Jewish faith, and demanded through the
attendance at one altar the recognition of an absolute oneness of all
its members. The Epistles of St. Paul, which were the most scientific
defence of Christian doctrine, were continually insisting on the fact
that for the new faith there was no real division between Greek or
barbarian, bond or free. Yet, on the other hand, there were equally
unequivocal expressions concerning the reverence and respect due to
authority and governance. St. Peter had taught that honour should be
paid to Caesar, when Caesar was no other than Nero. St. Paul had as
clearly preached subjection to the higher powers. Yet at the same time
we know that the Christian truth of the essential equality of the whole
human race was by some so construed as to be incompatible with the
notion of civil authority. How, then, was this paradox to be explained?
If all were equal, what justification would there be for civil
authority? If civil authority was to be upheld, wherein lay the meaning
of St. Paul's many boasts of the new levelling spirit of the Christian
religion? The paradox was further complicated by two other problems. The
question of the authority of the Imperial Government was found to be
cognate with the questions of the institution of slavery and of private
property. Here were three concrete facts on which the Empire seemed to
be based. What was to be the Christian attitude towards them?
After many attempted explanations, which were largely personal, and,
therefore, may be neglected here, a general agreement was come to by the
leading Christian teachers of East and West. This was based on a
theological distinction between human nature as it existed on its first
creation, and then as it became in the state to which it was reduced
after the fall of Adam. Created in original justice, as the phrase ran,
the powers of man's soul were in perfect harmony. His sensitive nature,
_i.e._ his passions, were in subjection to his will, his will to his
reason, his reason to God. Had man continued in this state of innocence,
government, slavery, and private property would never have been
required. But Adam fell, and in his fall, said these Christian doctors,
the whole conditions of his being were disturbed. The passions broke
loose, and by their violence not unfrequently subjected the will to
their dictatorship; together with the will they obscured and prejudiced
the reason, which under their compulsion was no longer content to follow
the Divine Reason or the Eternal Law of God. In a word, where order had
previously reigned, a state of lawlessness now set in. Greed, lust for
power, the spirit of insubordination, weakness of will, feebleness of
mind, ignorance, all swarmed into the soul of man, and disturbed not
merely the internal economy of his being, but his relations also to his
fellows. The sin of Cain is the social result of this personal upheaval.
Society then felt the evils which attended this new condition of things,
and it was driven, according to this patristic idea, to search about for
remedies in order to restrain the anarchy which threatened to overwhelm
the very existence of the race. Hence was introduced first of all the
notion of a civil authority. It was found that without it, to use a
phrase which Hobbes indeed has immortalised, but which can be easily
paralleled from the writings of St. Ambrose or St. Augustine, "life was
nasty, brutish, and short." To this idea of authority, there was quickly
added the kindred ideas of private property and slavery. These two were
found equally necessary for the well-being of human society. For the
family became a determined group in which the patriarch wielded absolute
power; his authority could be effective only when it could be employed
not only over his own household, but also against other households, and
thus in defence of his own. Hence the family must have the exclusive
right to certain things. If others objected, the sole arbitrament was an
appeal to force, and then the vanquished not only relinquished their
claims to the objects in dispute, but became the slaves of those to whom
they had previously stood in the position of equality and rivalry.
Thus do the Fathers of the Church justify these three institutions. They
are all the result of the Fall, and result from sin. Incidentally it may
be added that much of the language in which Hildebrand and others spoke
of the civil power as "from the devil" is traceable to this theological
concept of the history of its origin, and much of their hard language
means no more than this. Private property, therefore, is due to the
Fall, and becomes a necessity because of the presence of sin in the
world.
But it is not only from the Fathers of the Church that the mediaeval
tradition drew its force. For parallel with this patristic explanation
came another, which was inherited from the imperial legalists. It was
based upon a curious fact in the evolution of Roman law, which must now
be shortly described.
For the administration of justice in Rome two officials were chosen, who
between them disposed of all the cases in dispute. One, the _Praetor
Urbanus_, concerned himself in all litigation between Roman citizens;
the other, the _Praetor Peregrinus_, had his power limited to those
matters only in which foreigners were involved; for the growth of the
Roman _Imperium_ had meant the inclusion of many under its suzerainty
who could not boast technical citizenship. The _Praetor Urbanus_ was
guided in his decisions by the codified law of Rome; but the _Praetor
Peregrinus_ was in a very different position. He was left almost
entirely to his own resources. Hence it was customary for him, on his
assumption of office, to publish a list of the principles by which he
intended to settle all the disputes between foreigners that were brought
to his court. But on what foundation could his declaratory act be based?
He was supposed to have previously consulted the particular laws of as
many foreign nations as was possible, and to have selected from among
them those which were found to be held in common by a number of tribes.
The fact of this consensus to certain laws on the part of different
races was supposed to imply that these were fragments of some larger
whole, which came eventually to be called indifferently the Law of
Nature, or the Law of Nations. For at almost the very date when this
Law of Nations was beginning thus to be built up, the Greek notion of
one supreme law, which governed the whole race and dated from the lost
Golden Age, came to the knowledge of the lawyers of Rome. They proceeded
to identify the two really different concepts, and evolved for
themselves the final notion of a fundamental rule, essential to all
moral action. In time, therefore, this supposed Natural Law, from its
venerable antiquity and universal acceptance, acquired an added sanction
and actually began to be held in greater respect than even the declared
law of Rome. The very name of Nature seemed to bring with it greater
dignity. But at the same time it was carefully explained that this _Lex
Naturae_ was not absolutely inviolable, for its more accurate
description was _Lex_ or _Jus Gentium_. That is to say, it was not to be
considered as a primitive law which lay embedded like first principles
in human nature; but that it was what the nations had derived from
primitive principles, not by any force of logic, but by the simple
evolution of life. The human race had found by experience that the
observance of the natural law entailed as a direct consequence the
establishment of certain institutions. The authority, therefore, which
these could boast was due to nothing more than the simple struggle for
existence. Among these institutions were those same three (civil
authority, slavery, private property), which the Fathers had come to
justify by so different a method of argument. Thus, by the late Roman
lawyers private property was upheld on the grounds that it had been
found necessary by the human race in its advance along the road of life.
To our modern ways of thinking it seems as though they had almost
stumbled upon the theory of evolution, the gradual unfolding of social
and moral perfection due to the constant pressure of circumstances, and
the ultimate survival of what was most fit to survive. It was almost by
a principle of natural selection that mankind was supposed to have
determined the necessity of civil authority, slavery, private property,
and the rest. The pragmatic test of life had been applied and had proved
their need.
A third powerful influence in the development of Christian social
teaching must be added to the others in order the better to grasp the
mental attitude of the mediaeval thinkers. This was the rise and growth
of monasticism. Its early history has been obscured by much legendary
detail; but there is sufficient evidence to trace it back far into the
beginnings of Christianity. Later there had come the stampede into the
Thebaid, where both hermit life and the gathering together of many into
a community seem to have been equally allowed as methods of asceticism.
But by the fifth century, in the East and the West the movement had been
effectively organised. First there was the canonical theory of life,
introduced by St. Augustine. Then St. Basil and St. Benedict composed
their Rules of Life, though St. Benedict disclaimed any idea of being
original or of having begun something new. Yet, as a matter of fact, he,
even more efficiently than St. Basil, had really introduced a new force
into Christendom, and thereby became the undoubted father of Western
monasticism.
Now this monasticism had for its primary intention the contemplation of
God. In order to attain this object more perfectly, certain subsidiary
observances were considered necessary. Their declared purpose was only
to make contemplation easier; and they were never looked upon as
essential to the monastic profession, but only as helps to its better
working. Among these safeguards of monastic peace was included the
removal of all anxieties concerning material well-being. Personal
poverty--that is, the surrender of all personal claim to things the care
of which might break in upon the fixed contemplation of God--was
regarded as equally important for this purpose as obedience, chastity,
and the continued residence in a certain spot. It had indeed been
preached as a counsel of perfection by Christ Himself in His advice to
the rich young man, and its significance was now very powerfully set
forth by the Benedictine and other monastic establishments.
It is obvious that the existence of institutions of this kind was bound
to exercise an influence upon Christian thought. It could not but be
noticed that certain individual characters, many of whom claimed the
respect of their generation, treated material possessions as hindrances
to spiritual perfection. Through their example private property was
forsworn, and community of possession became prominently put forward as
being more in accordance with the spirit of Christ, who had lived with
His Apostles, it was declared, out of the proceeds of a common purse.
The result, from the point of view of the social theorists of the day,
was to confirm the impression that private property was not a thing of
much sanctity. Already, as we have seen, the Fathers had been brought to
look at it as something sinful in its origin, in that the need of it was
due entirely to the fall of our first parents. Then the legalists of
Rome had brought to this the further consideration that mere expedience,
universal indeed, but of no moral sanction, had dictated its institution
as the only way to avoid continual strife among neighbours. And now the
whole force of the religious ideals of the time was thrown in the same
balance. Eastern and Western monasticism seemed to teach the same
lesson, that private property was not in any sense a sacred thing.
Rather it seemed to be an obstacle to the perfect devotion of man's
being to God; and community of possession and life began to boast itself
to be the more excellent following of Christ.
Finally it may be asserted that the social concept of feudalism lent
itself to the teaching of the same lesson. For by it society was
organised upon a system of land tenure whereby each held what was his of
one higher than he, and was himself responsible for those beneath him in
the social scale. Landowners, therefore, in the modern sense of the
term, had no existence--there were only landholders. The idea of
absolute dominion without condition and without definite duties could
have occurred to none. Each lord held his estate in feud, and with a
definite arrangement for participating in the administration of justice,
in the deliberative assembly, and in the war bands of his chief, who in
turn owed the same duties to the lord above him. Even the king, who
stood at the apex of this pyramid, was supposed to be merely holding his
power and his territorial domain as representing the nation. At his
coronation he bound himself to observe certain duties as the condition
of his royalty, and he had to proclaim his own acceptance of these
conditions before he could be anointed and crowned as king. Did he break
through his coronation-oath, then the pledge of loyalty made by the
people was considered to be in consequence without any binding force,
and his subjects were released from their obedience. In this way, then,
also private property was not likely to be deemed equivalent to absolute
possession. It was held conditionally, and was not unfrequently
forfeited for offences against the feudal code. It carried with it
burdens which made its holding irksome, especially for all those who
stood at the bottom of the scale, and found that the terms of their
possession were rigorously enforced against them. The death of the
tenant and the inheriting of his effects by his eldest son was made the
occasion for exactions by the superior lord; for to him belonged certain
of the dead man's military accoutrements as pledges, open and manifest,
of the continued supremacy to be exercised over the successor.
Thus the extremely individual ideas as regards the holding of land which
are to-day so prevalent would then have been hardly understood. Every
external authority, the whole trend of public opinion, the teaching of
the Christian Fathers, the example of religious bodies, the inherited
views that had come down to the later legalists from the digests of the
imperial era, the basis of social order, all deflected the scale against
the predominance of any view of land tenure or holding which made it an
absolute and unrestricted possession. Yet at the same time, and for the
same cause, the modern revolt against all individual possession would
have been for the mediaeval theorists equally hard to understand.
Absolute communism, or the idea of a State which under the magic of that
abstract title could interfere with the whole social order, was too
utterly foreign to their ways of thinking to have found a defender. The
king they knew, and the people, and the Church; but the State (which the
modern socialist invokes) would have been an unimaginable thing.
In that age, therefore, we must not expect to find any fully-fledged
Socialism. We must be content to notice theories which are socialistic
rather than socialist.