_Murat leaves the Grand Army abruptly--Eugene appointed in his
place--Measures taken by the King of Prussia for his
disenthraldom--He leaves Berlin for Breslau--Treaty signed between
Russia and Prussia early in March--Alexander arrives at Breslau on
15th; on the 16th Prussia declares War against France--Warlike
preparations of Prussia--Universal enthusiasm--Blucher appointed
Generalissimo--Vindication of the Crown Prince of Sweden for joining
the Confederacy against France--Proceedings of Austria--Unabated
spirit and pretensions of Napoleon--A Regency is appointed in France
during his absence, and Maria Louisa appointed Regent, with nominal
powers._
The command of the relics of the grand army had been conferred upon
Murat, when Napoleon left them at Smorgoni. It was of too painful and
disagreeable a nature to afford any food to the ambition of the King of
Naples; nor did he accept it as an adequate compensation for various
mortifications which he had sustained during the campaign, and for
which, as has already been noticed, he nourished considerable resentment
against his brother-in-law. Having, besides, more of the soldier than of
the general, war lost its charms for him when he was not displaying his
bravery at the head of his cavalry; and to augment his impatience, he
became jealous of the authority which his wife was exercising at Naples
during his absence, and longed to return thither. He, therefore, hastily
disposed of the troops in the various Prussian fortresses recently
enumerated, where the French maintained garrisons, and suddenly left the
army upon the 16th January. Napoleon, incensed at his conduct, announced
his departure, and the substitution of Eugene, the Viceroy of Italy, in
the general command of the army, with this note of censure:--"The
viceroy is more accustomed to the management of military affairs on a
large scale, and besides, enjoys the full confidence of the
Emperor."[247] This oblique sarcasm greatly increased the coldness
betwixt the two brothers-in-law.[248]
Meantime, the Russians continued to advance without opposition into
Prussia, being desirous, by their presence, to bring that country to the
decision which they had long expected. The manner in which Prussia had
been treated by France; the extreme contributions which had been levied
from her; the threats which had been held out of altogether annihilating
her as a state; the occupation of her fortresses, and the depriving her
of all the rights of independence, constituted an abuse of the rights of
conquest, exercised in consequence of superior force, which was sure to
be ended so soon as that force ceased to be predominant. Napoleon, it is
true, had the affectation to express confidence in the friendship of
Prussia in his adversity, which he had never cultivated in prosperity.
It would have been as reasonable in the patron of a Turkish cruiser, to
expect his galley-slaves to continue, out of a point of honour, to pull
the oars, after the chain was broken which fettered them to their
benches.
[Sidenote: EXERTIONS OF PRUSSIA.]
Accordingly, King Frederick took his measures to shake himself free of
the French yoke; but he did so with wisdom and moderation. Whatever
wrongs the Prussians had sustained from the French, the King of Prussia
had sought no means of avenging them, even when routed armies, falling
back on his dominions in a defenceless condition, might have been
destroyed, in their desolate state, by his peasantry alone. Popular
violence, arising from the resentment of long-suffered injuries, did
indeed practise cruelties on the French at Königsberg and elsewhere; but
it was against the will of the government, which suppressed them as much
as possible. The King did not take any measures to intercept the retreat
even of Napoleon himself, although there was ground to expect he might
have come to that resolution. He renewed the armistice concluded by
D'Yorck; he suffered the distressed and frozen remains of the grand army
to augment the hostile garrisons which had occupied his own strongest
fortresses. He observed, in short, all the duties of an ally, though an
unwilling one, until the war, in which he was engaged as an auxiliary,
was totally ended, by the defeat and dispersion of the army of his
principal. It is the more proper to enter at large into this topic,
because the French historians usually mention the conduct of the King of
Prussia on this occasion as defection, desertion, or some such word,
indicating a breach of faith. Nothing can be more unjust.
It was not, surely, to be expected, that Frederick was to submit his own
dominions to the devastation of the Russians, by continuing a war in
which his share was only secondary; nor was it rational to believe, that
a country so much oppressed would neglect the means of emancipation
which now presented themselves. It is, therefore, no marvel that Prussia
should have taken this favourable opportunity for throwing off a yoke
which she had found so oppressive. Nay, it is believed, on good grounds,
that the course adopted by the King of Prussia was not only that of
wisdom and patriotism, but even of necessity; for it is very probable,
that, if he had refused to lead his subjects against the French, they
might, in that moment of excitation, have found some one else to have
placed at the head of the government. He had, as we have already said,
denounced the convention entered into by D'Yorck and Massenbach, and
ordered them both to Berlin for the purpose of undergoing trial. But the
generals had remained quietly in command of their troops, affording a
strong example, that, had Frederick laboured ever so much for that
purpose, it would have been vain, if not hazardous, to have opposed his
royal authority to the impulse of the national spirit.
Before the King took his final resolution, he resolved, as a measure of
prudence, to secure his own person, lest, like Ferdinand and the Spanish
Bourbons, he should be seized upon as a hostage. He therefore suddenly
left Berlin on 22d January, 1813, and betook himself to Breslau,[249]
where there were no French soldiery. Immediately afterwards he published
an address to his people, calling his armies together, and giving the
signal to the patriotism of thousands who longed to arise in arms. The
French ambassador was, nevertheless, invited to follow the King to
Breslau, where a variety of discussions immediately took place betwixt
him and the Prussian cabinet.
To the complaints of exactions and oppressions of every kind, the French
negotiators could only reply by reminding the Prussians, that Napoleon
had, after decisive victory, suffered the nation to retain the name of
independence, and the King to wear a precarious crown. A robber would
have the same defence against restoring the booty he had acquired from a
traveller, if he stated, that though he had despoiled, he had not
murdered him. It was by the right of the strongest that France had
acquired that influence over Prussia which she exercised so severely;
and, according to the dictates of common sense and human nature, when
the advantage was on Prussia's side, she had a right to regain by
strength what she had lost by weakness. Every obligation, according to
the maxim of the civil law, is made void in the same manner in which it
is rendered binding; as Arthegal, the emblematic champion of justice in
Spenser's allegory, decrees as law, that what the sea has brought the
sea may resume.
On the 1st of March, or about that period, Prussia, returning to a
system which nothing but the extremity of her circumstances had ever
interrupted, signed a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with
Russia. On the 15th March, the Emperor Alexander arrived at Breslau. The
meeting was affecting betwixt the two sovereigns, who had been such
intimate friends, and had always retained the same personal attachment
for each other, although the circumstances of controlling necessity had
made them enemies, at a period when it was of importance to Russia to
have as few foes as possible thrown into the scale against her. The King
of Prussia wept. "Courage, my brother," said Alexander; "these are the
last tears which Napoleon shall cause you to shed."
[Sidenote: PRUSSIA DECLARES WAR.]
On the 16th March, Prussia declared war against France. There is, in the
paper containing this denunciation, much reasoning respecting the extent
of contributions due and received, which might have been summed up in
the declaration, that "France had made Prussia her subject and her
slave, but that now Prussia was enabled to act for herself, and shake
off the fetters which violence had imposed on her." This real note was
touched where the manifesto declares, that, "Abandoned to herself, and
hopeless of receiving any effectual succour from an ally who had
declined to render her even the demands of justice, Prussia must take
counsel of herself, in order to raise anew and support her existence as
a nation. It was in the love and courage of his people that the King
sought means to extricate himself, and to restore to his monarchy the
independence which is necessary to ensure the future prosperity of the
kingdom."
The Emperor Napoleon received that declaration of war, with the calmness
of one by whom it had been for some time expected. "It was better," he
said, "to have a declared enemy than a doubtful ally."[250] By the
Prussians at large it was heard with all the rapture of gratified hope,
and the sacrifices which they made, not willingly only, but eagerly,
show more completely than any thing else can, the general hatred against
France, and the feelings which that nation had excited during her career
of success.
From a country so trampled down and exhausted as Prussia, it might have
been thought slender means of warfare could be provided. But vengeance
is like the teeth of the dragon, a seed which, wherever sown, produces a
crop of warriors. Freedom too, was at stake; and when a nation is
warring for its own rights, who shall place a limit to its exertions?
Some preparation had been made by the monarch. The jealousy of France
had limited the exercise of the Prussian militia to 25,000 men yearly.
But the government had contrived to double this amount, by calling out
the militia twice in the year, and training on the second occasion the
same number, but different individuals from those who had been first
summoned. Thus, a certain portion of discipline had become general among
the Prussian youth, and, incited by the desire of their country's
freedom, they rushed to battle against France as to a holy warfare. The
means of providing artillery had also been sedulously augmented. This
was not to be a war of posts or fortresses, but of fields of battle and
of bayonets. Many, therefore, of the brass pieces of ordnance, which
garnished the walls of such towns and fortresses as were yet unoccupied
by the French, had been recast, and converted into field-pieces. Money
was scarce, but England was liberal; and besides, the Prussian nobles
and burgesses taxed themselves to the uttermost. Even the ladies gave up
their diamonds and gold ornaments, for chains and bracelets beautifully
wrought out of iron, the state enjoying the advantage of the exchange.
In a future age, these relics, when found in the female casket, will be
more valuable than the richest Indian jewels.
Meanwhile the resentment and desire of revenge, which had so long
smouldered in the bosoms of the Prussians, broke forth with the force of
a volcano. The youth of every description rushed to fill the ranks, the
distinctions of birth were forgotten, nay, in a great measure abolished;
no question was asked of the Prussian, but whether he was able and
willing to assist in the liberation of his country. The students, the
cultivation of whose minds generally adds to their feeling for national
freedom and national honour, arrayed themselves into battalions and
squadrons. Some formed the Black Bands, who at this time distinguished
themselves; others assumed the arms and dress of the Cossacks, whose
name had become so terrible to the French. In general, these volunteers
were formed into mounted and dismounted squadrons of chasseurs, whose
appearance differed from that of the line only in their uniform being
dark green instead of blue. Their discipline, formed on a system devised
by Scharnhorst, was admirably calculated to give fresh levies the degree
of training and discipline necessary to render them serviceable, without
pretending to give them the accuracy in details which experience alone
can teach.
In a few weeks numerous armies were on foot, and Prussia, like a strong
man rousing himself from slumber, stepped forward to assume her rank
among independent nations. There could not be a greater contrast than
between the same nation in her hour of presumption, her period of
depression, and her present form of regeneration. To the battle of Jena
the Prussians had marched as to an assured conquest, with a splendid
army, well disposed, and admirably appointed, but conducted with that
negligence which is inspired by a presumptuous degree of confidence, and
that pride which goes before destruction. In the campaign of 1812, the
Black Eagles stooping their dishonoured crests beneath those of France,
they went a discouraged and reluctant band of auxiliaries, to assist in
the destruction of that power, whose subjugation they were well aware
must lead to their own irretrievable bondage. And now, such was the
change of a few weeks, nay, not many days, that Prussia again entered
the lists with an army, still deficient in its material provisions, but
composed of soldiers whose hearts were in the trim, whom misfortunes had
taught caution, and oppression had roused to resistance; who knew, by
melancholy experience, the strength of their powerful adversary, but
were not the less disposed to trust in their own good swords and good
cause.
[Sidenote: BLUCHER.]
A leader was selected, admirably formed by nature to command a national
army at such a crisis. This was the celebrated Blucher, one of the few
Prussian generals, who, even after the battle of Jena, continued to
maintain the fame of the Great Frederick, under whom he had been
trained, and to fight until every ray of hope had been entirely
destroyed. This high-spirited and patriotic officer had remained in
obscurity during the long period of the French domination. He was one of
those ardent and inflexible characters that were dreaded by Napoleon,
whose generosity, however it might display itself otherwise, was seldom
observed to forgive those who had shown a steady and conscientious
opposition to his power. Such men he held his enemies in every sense,
personal as well as political; and, watched closely by the police, their
safety could only be ensured by living strictly retired. But now the old
warrior sprang eagerly from his obscure retreat, as in the ancient Roman
shows a lion might have leaped from his dark den into the arena of the
crowded amphitheatre, on which he was soon to act his terrible part.
Blucher, was, indeed, by character and disposition, the very man whom
the exigence and the Prussian nation required to support a national war.
He was not possessed of war as a science, nor skilled in planning out
the objects of a campaign. Scharnhorst, and after him Gneisnau, were
intrusted with that part of the general's duty, as being completely
acquainted with strategie; but in the field of battle no man possessed
the confidence of his soldiers so completely as General Blucher. The
first to advance, the last to retreat, he was seldom too much elated by
victory, and never depressed by bad success. Defeated to-day, he was as
ready to renew the battle to-morrow. In his army was no instance of
whole divisions throwing down their arms, because they conceived their
line broken or their flank turned. It was his system, that the greater
part of fighting consists in taking and giving hard blows, and on all
occasions he presented himself with a good grace to the bloody exercise.
He was vigilant, too, as taught by the exercise of his youth in the
light cavalry; and so enterprising and active, that Napoleon was heard
to complain, with his accustomed sneer, that "he had more trouble from
that old dissipated hussar, than from all the generals of the allies
beside." Deeply resenting the injuries of his country, and his own
exile, Blucher's whole soul was in the war against France and her Ruler;
and utterly devoid of the milder feelings of modern military leaders, he
entered into hostilities with the embittered and personal animosity
which Hannibal entertained of old against the Roman name and
nation.[251]
Such were the character and energies of the veteran to whom Prussia now
confided the defence of her dearest rights, the leading of her youth,
and the care of her freedom.[252]
Sweden, or, we ought rather to say, the Crown Prince, had joined the
confederacy, as already mentioned, and the spleen of Buonaparte,
personal as well as public, had been directed even more against him than
against the King of Prussia. The latter was represented as a rebellious
and ungrateful vassal, the first as a refugee Frenchman who had
renounced his country.
The last accusation, so grossly urged, was, if possible, more
unreasonably unjust than the first. The ties of our native country,
strict and intimate as they are, may be dissolved in more ways than one.
Its lawful government may be overthrown, and the faithful subjects of
that government, exiled to foreign countries for their adherence to it,
may lawfully bear arms, which, in that case, are not directed against
the home of their fathers, but against the band of thieves and robbers
by which it is temporarily occupied. If this is not the case, what are
we to think of the Revolution of 1688, and the invasion of King William?
In like manner, it is possible for a native of France or Britain so to
link himself with another country, as to transfer to it the devotion
which, in the general case, is only due to the land of his birth. In
becoming the heir of the crown of Sweden, Bernadotte had become in fact
a Swede; for no one, circumstanced as he was, is entitled, in
interweaving his personal fortunes with the fate of the nation which
adopts him, to make a reserve of any case in which he can be called to
desert their interest for that of another country, though originally his
own.
In assuming a French general for their Crown Prince, Sweden no doubt
intended to give a pledge that she meant to remain on terms of amity
with France; but it would be a wide step to argue from thence that it
was her purpose to subject herself as a conquered province to that
empire, and to hold the prince whom she had chosen to be no better than
the lieutenant of Napoleon. This was indeed the construction which the
French Emperor put upon the kingdoms of his own creation--Holland,
Westphalia, Spain, and so forth. But in these countries the crowns were
at least of his conferring. That of Sweden, on the other hand, was given
by the Diet at Orebro, representing the Swedish people, to a person of
their own election; nor had Buonaparte any thing to do in it farther,
than by consenting that a French subject should become King of Sweden;
which consent, if available for any thing, must be certainly held as
releasing Bernadotte from every engagement to France, inconsistent with
the duties of a sovereign to an independent kingdom.
When, therefore, at a period only a few months afterwards, Napoleon
authorised piracies upon the Swedish commerce, and seized, with armed
hand, upon the only portion of the Swedish territories which lay within
his grasp, nothing could be more unreasonable than to require, that
because the Crown Prince was born in Bearn, he should therefore submit
to have war made upon him in his capacity of King of Sweden, without
making all the resistance in his power. Supposing, what might easily
have chanced, that Corsica had remained a constituent part of the
British dominions, it would have been ridiculous to have considered
Napoleon, when at the head of the French government, as bound by the
duties of a liege subject of George III., simply because he was born at
Ajaccio. Yet there is no difference betwixt the cases, excepting in the
relative size and importance of France and Corsica; a circumstance which
can have no influence upon the nature of the obligations incurred by
those who are born in the two countries.
It may be readily granted, that a person in the situation of the Crown
Prince must suffer as a man of feeling, when opposed to the ranks of his
own countrymen. So must a judge, if unhappily called upon to sit in
judgment and pronounce sentence upon a brother, or other near relation.
In both cases, public duty must take place of private or personal
sentiment.
[Sidenote: PROCEEDINGS OF AUSTRIA.]
While the powers of the North formed this coalition, upon terms better
concerted, and with forces of a different character from those which had
existed upon former less fortunate occasions, Austria looked upon the
approaching strife with a hesitating and doubtful eye. Her regard for a
sovereign allied to her royal family by so close a tie as Napoleon, had
not prevented her cabinet from feeling alarm at the overgrown power of
France, and the ambition of her ruler. She had reluctantly contributed
an auxiliary force to the assistance of France in the last campaign, and
had taken the posture of a neutral so soon as circumstances permitted.
The restoration of independence to the world must restore to Austria the
provinces which she had lost, especially Illyria and the Tyrol, and at
the same time her influence both in Italy and Germany. But this might be
obtained from Napoleon disabled, and willing to purchase his ransom from
the reprisals of allied Europe, by surrender of his pretensions to
universal monarchy; and Austria therefore concluded it best to assume
the office of mediator betwixt France and the allies, reserving to
herself to throw her sword into the scales, in case the forces and
ambition of Napoleon should again predominate; while, on the other hand,
should peace be restored by a treaty formed under her auspices, she
would at once protect the son-in-law of her Emperor, regain her lost
provinces and decayed influence, and contribute, by destroying the
arrogant pretensions of France, to the return of tranquillity to Europe.
Otto, the French minister at Vienna, could already see in the Austrian
administration a disposition to revive the ancient claims which had been
annulled by the victories of Napoleon, and wrote to his court, even in
the beginning of January, that they were already making a merit of not
instantly declaring war against France. A mission of General Bubna to
Paris put a more favourable character upon the interference of the
Austrian ministers. He informed the French Cabinet that the Emperor
Francis was about to treat with France as a good ally, providing Austria
was permitted also to treat with others as an independent nation.[253]
It was in short the object of Austria, besides recovering her own losses
(of which that cabinet, constantly tenacious of its objects, as it is
well known to be, had never lost sight,) to restore, as far as possible,
some equilibrium of power, by which the other states, of which the
European republic was composed, might become, as formerly, guarantees
for the freedom and independence of each other. Such was not the system
of Napoleon. He would gladly gratify any state who assisted him in
hostilities against and the destruction of another, with a handsome
share of the spoil; but it was contrary to his policy to allow any one a
protecting veto in behalf of a neutral power. It was according to his
system, in the present case, to open to Austria his determination to
destroy Prussia entirely, and to assure her of Silesia as her share of
the booty, if she would be his ally in the war. But he found, to his
surprise, that Austria had adopted a different idea of policy, and that
she rather saw her interest in supporting the weak against the strong,
than, while grasping at selfish objects, in winking at the engrossing
ambition of the ruler of France. Neither did he leave the Austrian
Cabinet long in the belief, that his losses had in any degree lowered
his lofty pretensions, or induced him to descend from the high claims
which he had formed of universal sovereignty. From his declarations to
the Senate and Representative Body of France, one of two things was
plain; either that no sense of past misfortunes, or fear of those which
might arrive, would be of any avail to induce him to abandon the most
unjustifiable of his usurpations, the most unreasonable of his
pretensions; or else that he was determined to have his armed force
re-established, and his sword once more in his hand; nay, that he had
settled that a victory or two should wash out the memory of his retreat
from Moscow, before he would enter into any treaty of pacification.
The notes in the _Moniteur_, during this winter of 1812-13, which were
always written by himself, contained Buonaparte's bold defiance to
Europe, and avowed his intention to maintain, abreast of each other, the
two wars of Spain and Germany. He proposed at once to open the campaign
in Germany (though he had lost the alliance both of Prussia and
Austria,) with an army of double the amount of that which marched
against Russia, and to reinforce and keep up the armies of Spain at
their complete establishment of 300,000 men. "If any one desired," he
said, "the price at which he was willing to grant peace, it had been
expressed in the Duke of Bassano's letter to Lord Castlereagh, before
commencement of the campaign of 1812."[254]
When that document is referred to, it will be found to contain no
cession whatever on the part of France, but a proposal that England
should yield up Spain (now almost liberated,) to his brother Joseph,
with the admission that Portugal and Sicily, none of which kingdoms
Napoleon had the means of making a serious impression upon, might remain
to their legitimate sovereigns. In other words, he would desist from
pretensions which he had no means to make good, on condition that every
point, which was yet doubtful, should be conceded in his favour.
It was extravagant to suppose that Britain, after the destruction
occasioned by the Russian retreat, would accept terms which were refused
when Napoleon was at the head of his fine army, and in the full hope of
conquests. When, therefore, Austria offered herself as a mediator at the
court of St. James's, the English ministers contented themselves with
pointing out the extravagant pretensions expressed by France, in
documents understood to be authentic, and demanding that these should be
disavowed, and some concessions made or promised by Napoleon, ere they
would hamper themselves by any approach to a treaty.
Upon the whole, it was clear, that the fate of the world was once more
committed to the chance of war, and that probably much more human blood
must be spilled, ere any principles could be settled, on which a general
pacification might be grounded.
[Sidenote: MARIA LOUISA APPOINTED REGENT.]
A step of state policy was adopted by Napoleon, obviously to conciliate
his father-in-law, the Austrian Emperor. A regency was established
during his absence, and the Empress, Maria Louisa, was named regent. But
her authority was curtailed of all real or effectual power; for he
reserved to himself exclusively the privilege of presenting all decrees
to be passed by the Senate, and the Empress had only the right to
preside in that body.[255]
FOOTNOTES:
[247] Moniteur, 27th January, 1813. On the 24th, Napoleon wrote thus to
his sister, the Queen of Naples:--"Your husband quitted the army on the
16th. He is a brave man in the field of battle; but he is more cowardly
than a woman or a monk when not in presence of the enemy. He has no
moral courage."--BARON FAIN, _Manuscript de_, 1813, tom. i., p. 90.
[248] "The Emperor was very much dissatisfied with his conduct; and it
is well for the King of Naples that he did not pass through France,
where he would certainly have met with a very unfavourable
reception."--SAVARY, tom. iii., p. 43.
[249] "Upon receiving the news that the King of Prussia had escaped,
Napoleon regretted he had not treated him as he had done Ferdinand VII.
and the Pope. 'This is not the first instance,' said he, 'that in
politics, generosity is a bad counsellor.' He generous towards
Prussia!!"--FOUCHÉ, tom. ii., p. 127.
[250] See Savary, tom. iii., p. 44.
[251]
"Sworn from his cradle Rome's relentless foe,
Such generous hate the Punic champion bore;
Thy lake, O Thrasymene, beheld it glow,
And Cannæ's walls and Trebia's crimson'd shore."
SHENSTONE.--S.
[252] "Blucher," said Napoleon, at St. Helena, "is a very brave soldier,
_un bon sabreur_. He is like a bull who shuts his eyes, and, seeing no
danger, rushes on. He committed a thousand faults; and, had it not been
for circumstances, I could repeatedly have made _him_ prisoner. He is
stubborn and indefatigable, afraid of nothing, and very much attached to
his country."--_Napoleon in Exile_, vol. i., p. 200.
[253] Fouché, tom. ii., p. 124.
[254] Fouché, tom. ii., p. 125.
[255] "As the Empress-Regent could not authorise, by her signature, the
presentation of any _senatus consultum_, nor the promulgation of any
law, the part she had to act was limited to her appearance at the
council-board. Besides, she was herself under the tutorship of
Cambacérès, who was himself directed by Savary. In fact, after the
regency was set in motion, the soul of the government did not the less
travel with Napoleon, who did not fail of issuing forth numerous decrees
from all his moveable headquarters."--FOUCHÉ, tom. ii., p. 137.