_Napoleon divides his Army into four Corps, which leave Smolensk on
their retreat towards Poland--Cautious proceedings of
Koutousoff--The Viceroy's division is attacked by Miloradowitch, and
effects a junction with Napoleon at Krasnoi, after severe
loss--Koutousoff attacks the French at Krasnoi, but only by a
distant cannonade--The division under Davoust is reunited to
Napoleon, but in a miserable state--Napoleon marches to Liady; and
Mortier and Davoust are attacked, and suffer heavy loss--Details of
the retreat of Ney--He crosses the Losmina, with great loss of men
and baggage, and joins Napoleon at Orcsa, with his division reduced
to 1500 men--The whole Grand Army is now reduced to 12,000 effective
men, besides 30,000 stragglers--Dreadful distress and difficulties
of Buonaparte and his Army--Singular scene betwixt Napoleon and
Duroc and Daru--Napoleon moves towards Borizoff, and falls in with
the corps of Victor and Oudinot--Koutousoff halts at Kopyn, without
attacking Buonaparte--Napoleon crosses the Beresina at
Studzianka--Partouneaux's division cut off by Witgenstein--Severe
fighting on both sides of the river--Dreadful losses of the French
in crossing it--According to the Russian official account, 36,000
bodies were found in the Beresina after the thaw._
[Sidenote: NAPOLEON LEAVES SMOLENSK.]
Cooped up, as we have said, in the ruins of Smolensk, and the slender
provision of food and supplies which that place offered to his army
almost entirely exhausted, Napoleon had now seriously to consider in
what direction he should make an effort to escape. As he had heard of
the loss of Witepsk, by which town he had advanced, and understood that
Witgenstein was in possession of the line of the Dwina, he naturally
determined to take the road to Wilna, by Krasnoi, Borizoff, and Minsk.
The two latter towns were stored with the provisions which he so much
wanted; and, ignorant as yet of what had happened on the south of
Lithuania, he might expect to find the banks of the Beresina in
possession of the Austro-Saxon army under Schwartzenberg.
For this effort he proceeded, as well as circumstances would admit, to
re-organise his army. It was reduced to about 40,000 men, with a
disproportioned train of baggage and of artillery, although much of the
former, and three hundred and fifty cannon, had already been left
behind. This force the Emperor divided into four corps, which were to
leave Smolensk, placing a day's interval betwixt the march of each. He
himself led the van, with 6000 of his Guard, and about as many soldiers,
the relics of different corps, amalgamated into battalions as well as
circumstances would permit. The Emperor's division left Smolensk on the
evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th November.
The division of the Viceroy Eugene, consisting of about the same number
as that of Napoleon, but inferior in quality, as comprehending none of
the Imperial Guard, could not be collected till late on the 15th
November, when the wearied wretches were once more put into march, by
promises of a safe arrival in that Lithuania, which so few of them were
ever to see again.
On the 16th, Davoust, after some high words with Ney, who would have
hurried his departure, set out with another fourth part of the grand
army, approaching to, or exceeding 10,000 men in number.
Ney remained till the 17th of November. As he had once more the perilous
task of covering the retreat, which duty he had performed so admirably
betwixt Wiazma and Smolensk, his division was fortified with about 4000
of the Imperial Guard, to whom, as better fed than the other troops,
besides their high character as veterans, more could be trusted even in
the most desperate circumstances. Ere the French left the town, they
obeyed the strict commands of the Emperor, in blowing up the towers with
which Smolensk was surrounded, that it might not again, as Napoleon
expressed himself, form an obstacle to a French army. Such was the
language of this extraordinary man, as if affecting to provide for
re-entering into Russia, at a time when it was the only question
whether he himself, or any individual of his army, should ever be able
to leave the fatal country.--We must next attend to the motions of the
Russians.
The general voice of the Russian army had demanded Prince Golitcheff
Koutousoff, as a chief who would put an end to Barclay de Tolly's system
of retreat, and oppose the invaders in a pitched battle. He had done so
at Borodino, but it was his last effort of the kind. His character was
naturally the reverse of enterprising. Age had increased his disposition
to extreme prudence, and the success which attended his procrastinating
and cautious measures, while stationed at Taroutino, in the
neighbourhood of Moscow, had riveted him to his own system, of risking
as little as possible. It was in vain pointed out to him, that the
Russian troops were in high condition, and that against an enemy so
utterly broken and dispirited as the French then were, every thing might
be trusted to those brave soldiers, who had not shrunk from an equal
conflict with the same troops when in their vigour; and who, if then
worsted, had left the enemy very little to boast of, having insulted his
camp, and occupied the field of battle, even on the very night of his
victory. Could Suwarrow have been recalled from the dead, or even the
noble Bagration (the god of the army, as his name signifies in Russian;)
or had Barclay de Tolly, Bennigsen, or Miloradowitch, been permitted to
act when the moment of action approached, it seems probable that
Napoleon would have revisited the Kremlin, not as a conqueror but as a
prisoner. But Koutousoff, trusting to the climate of Russia, was
contented to let the French army decay under its influence. He had
determined not to encounter the slightest risk, but to glean up the
wreck of the elements, rather than anticipate their work by the sword.
His general plan was to maintain himself on the flank of Napoleon's
army, and from time to time to attack them by his vanguard, but by no
means to enter into a general action. He surrounded their corps with
Cossacks, who brought with them light field-guns mounted on sledges,
which did infinite damage on points where the heavy French guns could
not be easily pointed, so as to reply to them. This system may be traced
in the preceding pages, and still more in those which are about to
follow. It has been applauded by many competent judges, as gaining every
thing without putting any thing in hazard; but it is ridiculed by
others, and especially by the French, who acknowledge themselves obliged
to the tardiness of Koutousoff, and the blunders of the Admiral
Tchitchagoff, for the escape of the poor remnant of the grand army which
was preserved, and especially for the personal safety of the Emperor
himself. With these explanations we resume our melancholy and momentous
story.[205]
[Sidenote: KRASNOI.]
Without any purpose of departing from his maxims of caution, Koutousoff
commenced the attack on the retreating army by a movement which appeared
to indicate a more vigorous plan of procedure. He put his army in motion
towards Krasnoi, upon a parallel line with that of Buonaparte, moving on
the left flank of the French, so as to place Napoleon's line of advance
at his mercy, whenever he should think proper to assail it. At the same
time, he detached several large bodies to operate on the march of the
enemy's column.
Miloradowitch, with a large vanguard, pushed forward upon the high-road
leading from Smolensk to Krasnoi. Buonaparte had already reached the
latter point, at the head of his division, but Eugene, who brought up
the rear of the column, was effectually cut off. They were summoned to
lay down their arms, but the viceroy manfully rejected the proposal.
Immediately each surrounding hill poured forth, like a volcano, a
torrent of fire upon them. The French and Italians maintained their
ground with unavailing bravery. Numbers were killed, others made
prisoners, and the division almost entirely destroyed.
Still the viceroy made his defence good, till night, the friend of the
overmatched, approached to protect him; when, at the head of his
division, diminished to one half, he quitted the high-road, leaving his
fires burning to mislead the enemy, and, gaining the open fields,
accomplished, with great loss and ineffable fatigue, his junction with
Napoleon at Krasnoi, which he reached by a circuitous route. The
challenge of a sentinel during this delicate manœuvre might have been
utter destruction--and in fact they did encounter such a challenge. They
were saved from the consequences by a ready-witted Pole, who, answering
the sentinel in Russian, imposed silence on him, pretending that they
were the corps of Owaroff, employed upon a secret expedition.
At length, upon the next morning (17th November,) Eugene reached the
headquarters of his father-in-law, who had been very anxious on his
account. When the diminished division of Eugene was united to that of
the Emperor, they did not exceed 15,000 men in total amount. Yet on
being joined by Eugene, the active genius of Napoleon, in these most
disadvantageous circumstances, displayed its ascendency. He had caused
General Roguet, with a detachment of the Young Guard, in the night
between the 15th and 16th, to beat up the quarters of a Russian
detachment, which approached his own too closely; and having thus taught
the hunters to respect the lair of the lion, he embraced the audacious
resolution of remaining at Krasnoi in defiance of the Russian army, till
the detachments of Davoust and Ney should again join him. Whatever had
been his reasons for separating from these divisions, he now saw the
necessity of once more uniting his forces.
Even the cold and cautious spirit of Koutousoff could not miss the
opportunity occasioned by this halt of 15,000 men, in the face of
perhaps three times their number. But neither the persuasions of his
own officers, nor the reproaches of Sir Robert Wilson, the English
commissioner, could prevail on the old general to attack with the
vivacity which the occasion demanded. He would only consent to wage a
distant engagement with artillery. At daybreak on the 17th, Eugene,
whose forces the preceding battle had altogether disabled, was directed
to take the advance towards Liady, the next miserable stage of the
French army, while Buonaparte drew his sword, and saying he had already
played the Emperor, and must now once more be the general, led in person
his 6000 guards, attended by Mortier at the head of 5000 soldiers more,
to meet as great odds as it should please Koutousoff to despatch against
him.[206] In the sort of battle which followed, the Russians acted with
great caution. The name of Napoleon almost alone protected his army. The
French suffered, indeed, from the fire of 100 pieces of artillery, and
from charges of cavalry, which they had no means of answering or
repelling; but though gaps were made in their line, and some of their
squares were forced by the cavalry, yet neither success nor repulse
could induce Koutousoff to hazard a serious attack upon Napoleon, for
the purpose of altogether destroying the invader and his army. Even
Boutourlin, a friendly critic, where the reputation of the old Russian
general is concerned, regrets he had not taken the bold course of
placing his army across the direct line of Buonaparte's retreat, when
the French, overcome at once by physical suffering and moral depression,
must, even supposing them equal in numbers, have been extremely inferior
to their opponents. Upon the whole, Koutousoff seems to have acted
towards Napoleon and the grand army, as the Greenland fishers do to the
whale, whom they are careful not to approach in his dying agonies, when
pain, fury, and a sense of revenge, render the last struggles of the
leviathan peculiarly dangerous.
The battle, or cannonade of Krasnoi, was concluded by the appearance of
Davoust and his column, surrounded and followed by a large body of
Cossacks, from whom he endeavoured to extricate himself by a precipitate
march. When they came in sight of Krasnoi, most of the soldiers, who had
been horribly harassed since they left Smolensk, broke their ranks, and
hurried across the fields to escape the Russians, and gain the cover of
the town, in the streets of which their officers rallied them with
difficulty. In this miserable condition was the third corps of the army,
according to its latest division, when it was reunited to the main
body. Upon inquiring after Ney and the rear-guard, Napoleon had the
mortification to learn that Ney was probably still at Smolensk, or, if
upon the road, that he must be surrounded with difficulties out of which
it was impossible he could extricate himself.
[Sidenote: MARCHES ON LIADY--NEY'S RETREAT.]
In the meantime, Napoleon learned that the Russians were acting with
more vigour, and that Prince Galitzin was about to occupy Krasnoi; and
further, that if he did not advance with all despatch on Liady,[207] he
might probably find it in possession of the enemy. Gladly as Napoleon
would have kept the field, in order to protect the approach of Ney, he
now saw that such perseverance must necessarily expose himself and the
remnant of his army to the greatest peril, without, in all human
probability, being of use to his maréchal. Under this conviction, he put
himself at the head of the Old Guard, to march on as fast as possible,
and secure Liady, and with it the passage of the Dneiper, from which he
might otherwise have been excluded.[208] Davoust and Mortier were left
to defend Krasnoi, if practicable, till night-fall, and then to follow
under cover of the darkness. The retreat of Napoleon seemed to remove
the charm which had chilled the Russians and warmed the French. A very
fierce assault was made on the second and third divisions, and Mortier
and Ney, having both suffered greatly, made their escape to Liady with
much difficulty. The French left on this fatal field forty-five pieces
of cannon, upwards of 6000 prisoners, with a great number of slain, and
as many wounded, who were necessarily left to the mercy of the Russians.
To complete their losses, Ney's division of the army was, by the
direction of the other columns upon Liady, left with the whole Russian
army betwixt himself and Napoleon. The retreat of that celebrated
soldier must next be narrated.
On the 17th of November, Ney, last of the invading army, left Smolensk
at the head of 7 or 8000 fighting men, leaving behind 5000 sick and
wounded, and dragging along with them the remaining stragglers whom the
cannon of Platoff, who entered the town immediately on Ney's departure,
had compelled to resume their march. They advanced without much
interruption till they reached the field of battle of Krasnoi, where
they saw all the relics of a bloody action, and heaps of dead, from
whose dress and appearance they could recognise the different corps in
which they had served in Napoleon's army, though there was no one to
tell the fate of the survivors. They had not proceeded much farther
beyond this fatal spot, when they approached the banks of the Losmina,
where all had been prepared at leisure for their reception.
Miloradowitch lay here at the head of a great force; and a thick mist,
which covered the ground, occasioned Ney's column to advance under the
Russian batteries before being aware of the danger.
A single Russian officer appeared, and invited Ney to capitulate. "A
Maréchal of France never surrenders," answered that intrepid general.
The officer retired, and the Russian batteries opened a fire of
grape-shot, at the distance of only 250 yards, while at the concussion
the mist arose, and showed the devoted column of French, with a ravine
in front manned by their enemies, subjected on every side to a fire of
artillery, while the hills were black with the Russian troops placed to
support their guns. Far from losing heart in so perilous a situation,
the French Guards, with rare intrepidity, forced their way through the
ravine of the Losmina, and rushed with the utmost fury on the Russian
batteries. They were, however, charged in their turn with the bayonet,
and such as had crossed the stream suffered dreadfully. In spite of this
failure, Ney persevered in the attempt to cut his passage by main force
through this superior body of Russians, who lay opposed to him in front.
Again the French advanced upon the cannon, losing whole ranks, which
were supplied by their comrades as fast as they fell. The assault was
once more unsuccessful, and Ney, seeing that the general fate of his
column was no longer doubtful, endeavoured at least to save a part from
the wreck. Having selected about 4000 of the best men, he separated
himself from the rest, and set forth under shelter of the night, moving
to the rear, as if about to return to Smolensk. This, indeed, was the
only road open to him, but he did not pursue it long; for as soon as he
reached a rivulet, which had the appearance of being one of the feeders
of the Dnieper, he adopted it for his guide to the banks of that river,
which he reached in safety near the village of Syrokovenia. Here he
found a single place in the river frozen over, though the ice was so
thin that it bent beneath the steps of the soldiers.
Three hours were permitted, to allow stragglers from the column during
the night-march to rally at this place, should their good fortune enable
them to find it. These three hours Ney spent in profound sleep, lying on
the banks of the river, and wrapped up in his cloak. When the stipulated
time had elapsed, the passage to the other side began and continued,
although the motion of the ice, and the awful sound of its splitting
into large cracks, prevented more than one from crossing at once. The
waggons, some loaded with sick and wounded, last attempted to pass; but
the ice broke with them, and the heavy plunge and stifled moaning,
apprised their companions of their fate. The Cossacks, as usual,
speedily appeared in the rear, gleaned up some hundreds of prisoners,
and took possession of the artillery and baggage.
Ney had thus put the Dnieper betwixt him and the regulars of the Russian
army, by a retreat which has few parallels in military history. But he
had not escaped the Cossacks, who were spread abroad over the face of
the country, and soon assembled around the remains of his column, with
their light artillery and long lances. By these enemies they were
several times placed in the utmost jeopardy; nevertheless, at the head
of a reduced band of 1500 men, the maréchal fought his way to Orcsa, to
which town Napoleon had removed from Liady, having crossed the Dnieper.
Ney arrived on the 20th November, and found Eugene, Mortier, and
Davoust. The Emperor was two leagues in advance when they met. Napoleon
hailed Ney with the undisputed title, the Bravest of the Brave, and
declared he would have given all his treasures to be assured of his
existence.[209] His comrades hastened to welcome and to relieve him, and
being now in Poland, provisions and accommodation had become more plenty
among them.[210]
[Sidenote: JUNCTION OF THE GRAND ARMY--BORIZOFF.]
All Napoleon's grand army was now united. But the whole, which had at
Smolensk amounted to 40,000, consisted now of scarcely 12,000 men who
retained the name and discipline of soldiers, so much had want and the
sword thinned the ranks of these invincible legions. There were besides,
perhaps 30,000 stragglers of every description, but these added little
or nothing to the strength of the army; and only served to encumber its
numbers, as they were under no discipline, but plundered the country
without mercy.
At this dreadful crisis, too, Napoleon had the mortification to learn
the fall of Minsk, and the retreat of Schwartzenberg to cover Warsaw,
which, of course, left him no hopes of receiving succour from the
Austrians. He heard also that Victor and Oudinot had quarrelled in what
manner Witgenstein should be attacked, and had on that account left him
unattacked on any point. That general was therefore at freedom to
threaten the left of the grand army, should it remain long on the
Dnieper; while Koutousoff might resume, at his pleasure, his old station
on Napoleon's left, and Tchitchagoff might occupy the Beresina in his
front. In the bitterness of his heart the Emperor exclaimed, "Thus it
befalls, when we commit faults upon faults."[211]
Minsk being out of the question, Napoleon's next point of direction was
Borizoff. Here there was, over the Beresina, a bridge of 300 fathoms in
length, the possession of which appeared essential to his final escape
from Russia. But while Napoleon was considering what should be his next
movement, after crossing the Beresina at Borizoff, he was once more
surprised with the additional evil tidings, that this town also, with
the bridge so necessary to him, was lost; that Borizoff was taken, as
formerly mentioned, and Dombrowski defeated under its walls. "Is it then
written," he said, looking upwards and striking the earth with his cane,
"Is it written, that we shall commit nothing but errors!"
About the same gloomy period, Ségur relates the following
anecdote:--Napoleon had stretched himself on a couch, and apparently
slumbered, while his faithful servants, Duroc and Daru, sitting in his
apartment, talked over their critical situation. In their whispered
conversation, the words "prisoner of state," reached the sleepless ear
of Napoleon. "How!" said he, raising himself, "do you think they would
dare?"--In answer, Daru mentioned the phrase, well known to the Emperor,
of state policy, as a thing independent of public law or of morality.
"But France," said the Emperor, to whom state policy sounded at present
less pleasantly than when it was appealed to for deciding some great
movement of his own--"what will France say?"--"Who can answer that
question, Sire?" continued Duroc; but added, "it was his warmest wish
that the Emperor, at least, could reach France, were it through the air,
if earth were stopped against his passage."--"Then I am in your way, I
suppose?" said the Emperor. The reply was affirmative. "And you,"
continued the Emperor, with an affectation of treating the matter
lightly, "have no wish to become a prisoner of state?"--"To be a
prisoner of war is sufficient for me," said Daru. Napoleon was silent
for a time; then asked if the reports of his ministers were burnt.--"Not
yet," was the reply.--"Then let them be destroyed," he continued; "for
it must be confessed we are in a most lamentable condition."[212]
This was the strongest sign he had yet given, of Napoleon's deep feeling
of the situation to which he had reduced himself. In studying the map,
to discover the fittest place to pass the Beresina, he approached his
finger to the country of the Cossacks, and was heard to murmur, "Ah,
Charles XII.; Pultawa." But these were only the momentary ejaculations
dictated by a sense of his condition; all his resolutions were calmly
and firmly taken, with a sense of what was due to himself and to his
followers.[213]
It was finally determined, that, in despite of Tchitchagoff and his
army, which occupied the left bank, the passage of the Beresina should
be attempted, at a place above Borizoff called Studzianka, where the
stream was only fifty-five fathoms across, and six feet deep. There were
heights, it is true, on the opposite bank, surrounding a piece of meadow
ground, and these the adventurers must look to find strongly occupied;
so that those who adventured on the passage must expect to land in that
marshy meadow, under a heavy fire from that position. Lastly, this
perilous attempt must, in all probability, be made in the very teeth of
the Moldavian army. With Napoleon's ten or twelve thousand fighting men,
and twice or three times the number of disorderly stragglers, the
attempt to force such a passage would have been utter insanity. But the
star of Napoleon had not yet set.
[Sidenote: SUCCESS OF VICTOR AND OUDINOT.]
The first dawn of reviving fortune was marked by the success of Victor
and Oudinot. They were advancing with the hope of saving Borizoff, when
they received intelligence that Dombrowski was routed by Witgenstein,
and that the fragments of the Polish corps were close at hand, followed
by the victorious Russians. Oudinot instantly gathered the scattered
Poles under his protection, and moving on to meet the Russian advanced
guard, they drove them back with considerable loss. Witgenstein, in
consequence of this check, found himself obliged to abandon Borizoff,
and once more to place the Beresina betwixt himself and the French. But
in repassing that river, he took care to destroy the bridge at Borizoff,
so that the town, though secured by the French, was no longer useful to
them as a place of passage, and the Emperor, when he learned the news,
was still compelled to abide by the plan of crossing, as he best could,
at Studzianka. The task was rendered more easy, by the prospect of his
scattered and broken army being reinforced by the troops of Victor and
Oudinot, who were on the same side of the fatal river with himself, and
might form an immediate junction with him.
Meantime, as a preparation for the march, the Emperor limited all the
officers, even of the highest rank, to one carriage; and ordered one
half of the waggons to be destroyed, that all the horses and
draught-oxen might be applied to getting forward the ammunition and
artillery. There is reason to think these commands were very imperfectly
obeyed. Another order, marking strongly the exigencies of the time,
respected such officers as still retained their horses. The cavalry,
under Latour Maubourg, had, since leaving Smolensk, been reduced from
1800 to 150. To supply this deficiency, about 500 officers, all who
remained mounted, were formed into a body called the Sacred Squadron,
to attend upon the Emperor's person. Grouchy and Sebastiani had the
command of this body, in which officers formed the privates, and
generals of division served as captains. But it was not long ere fatigue
and want of forage, no respecters of rank or condition, dismounted the
greater part of the Sacred Squadron.[214]
The army thus in some small degree re-organised, and refreshed by the
better quarters and nourishment which they had received since the battle
of Krasnoi, now plunged into the immense pine forests which conceal the
course of the Beresina, to disguise their adventurous march the more
completely from the enemy. They were moving towards Borizoff, when loud
shouts from the forest at first spread confusion among their ranks,
under the idea of an unexpected attack; but this fear was soon changed
into joy, when they found themselves on the point of uniting with the
army of Victor and Oudinot, amounting to 50,000 men, complete and
provided with every thing. Yet whatever the joy on the part of the grand
army, it was at least equalled by the astonishment of their comrades,
when they recognised the remains of the innumerable host which had left
them in such splendid equipment, and now returned in the guise, and with
the gait and manner, of spectres raised from a churchyard. They filed
past their happier comrades with squalid countenances, their uniform
replaced by women's pelisses, or what various rags each could pick up;
their feet bare and bleeding, or protected by bundles of filthy rags
instead of shoes. All discipline seemed gone; the officer gave no
command, the soldier obeyed none. A sense of common danger led them to
keep together and to struggle forward, and mutual fatigue made them take
repose by the same fires; but what else they had learned of discipline
was practised rather by instinct than by duty, and in many cases was
altogether forgotten.[215]
The army of the two Maréchals, however, though scarce recovered from
their astonishment, joined the ranks of the grand army, and, as if
disorder had been infectious, very soon showed a disposition to get rid
of that military discipline, which their new associates had flung
aside.--Leaving Napoleon on his advance to the river, it is now
necessary to notice the motions of the Russians.
The glory and the trophies of the march of the grand army had been
enough entirely to satisfy Koutousoff. They were indeed sufficient to
gorge such a limited ambition as that general might be supposed to
possess at his advanced age, when men are usually more bent on saving
than on winning. From the 15th to the 19th November, the Russians had
obtained possession of 228 guns, had made 26,000 prisoners, of whom 300
were officers, besides 10,000 men slain in battle, or destroyed by
fatigue. Satisfied with such advantages, the cautious veteran proceeded
by short journeys to Kopyn, on the Dnieper, without crossing that
river, or attempting to second the defence of the Beresina by an attack
on the rear of the enemy.
It is true, that the Russian army had sustained great losses; not less,
it was said, than 30,000 sick and wounded, were for the present unable
to serve, although the greater part of them afterwards recovered. It is
no less true, that the Russian soldiers suffered greatly from want of
hospitals, being unprovided for a struggle on such an extensive scale as
Napoleon's invasion gave rise to. Nor can it be denied that Koutousoff's
minute attention to the proper providing of his army with all
necessaries was highly laudable. Yet we must still be of opinion, that
an object so important as the capture of Buonaparte and the destruction
of his army, would have vindicated, even if the soldier himself had been
appealed to, two or three forced marches, with the hardships attending
them. Such, however, was not Koutousoff's opinion; he halted at Kopyn,
and contented himself with despatching his Cossacks and light troops to
annoy Napoleon's rear.
[Sidenote: STUDZIANKA.]
The danger not being pressing on the part of the grand army of Russia,
Napoleon had only to apprehend the opposition of Tchitchagoff, whose
army, about 35,000 men in all, was posted along the Beresina to oppose
the passage of Buonaparte wherever it should be attempted.
Unfortunately, the admiral was one of an ordinary description of people,
who, having once determined in their own mind, that an adversary
entertains a particular design, proceed to act upon that belief as an
absolute certainty, and can rarely be brought to reason on the
possibility of his having any other purpose. Thus, taking it for granted
that Napoleon's attempt to cross the Beresina would take place _below_
Borizoff, Tchitchagoff could not be persuaded that the passage might be
as well essayed _above_ that town. Napoleon, by various inquiries and
reports transmitted through the Jews, who, for money, served as spies on
both sides, contrived to strengthen Tchitchagoff in the belief that he
was only designing a feint upon Studzianka, in order to withdraw the
attention of the Russians from the Lower Beresina. Never was a stratagem
more successful.[216]
On the very day when Napoleon prepared for the passage at Studzianka,
Tchitchagoff, instead of noticing what was going forward above Borizoff,
not only marched down the river with all the forces under his own
immediate command, but issued orders to the division of Tschaplitz,
which amounted to six thousand men, and at present watched the very spot
where Napoleon meant to erect his bridges, to leave that position, and
follow him in the same direction. These were the very orders which
Buonaparte would have dictated to the Russian leader, if he had had his
choice.
When the French arrived at Studzianka, their first business was to
prepare two bridges, a work which was attended with much danger and
difficulty. They laboured by night, expecting in the morning to be
saluted with a cannonade from the Russian detachment under Tschaplitz,
which occupied the heights already mentioned, on the opposite bank. The
French generals, and particularly Murat, considered the peril as so
eminent, that they wished Buonaparte to commit himself to the faith of
some Poles who knew the country, and leave the army to their fate; but
Napoleon rejected the proposal as unworthy of him.[217] All night the
French laboured at the bridges, which were yet but little advanced, and
might have been easily demolished by the artillery of the Russians. But
what was the joy and surprise of the French to see, with the earliest
beams of the morning, that artillery, and those Russians in full march,
retreating from their position! Availing himself of their disappearance,
Buonaparte threw across a body of men who swam their horses over the
river, with each a voltigeur behind him. Thus a footing was gained on
the other bank of this perilous stream. Great part of Victor's army had
moved up the river towards Studzianka, while the last division lay still
at Borizoff, of which town that maréchal had possession. This
constituted a rear-guard to protect the army of Napoleon during the
critical moment of its passage, from the interruption which might be
expected from the corps of Witgenstein.
During the 26th and 27th, Napoleon pushed troops across the river, those
of Oudinot forming the advance; and was soon so secure, that Tschaplitz,
discovering his error, and moving back to regain his important position
at Studzianka, found the French too strongly posted on the left bank of
the Beresina, for his regaining the opportunity which he had lost. He
halted, therefore, at Stakhowa, and waited for reinforcements and
orders. Meanwhile, the passage of the Beresina continued, slowly indeed,
for the number of stragglers and the quantity of baggage was immense;
yet by noon Napoleon and his guards had crossed the river.[218] Victor,
whose division constituted the rear-guard of the grand army, had
relieved the Imperial Guards in their post on the left bank; and
Partouneaux, who formed the rear of the whole army, was moving from
Borizoff, where he had been stationed with the purpose of fixing the
enemy's attention upon the spot. No sooner had he left the town than it
was again in the hands of the Russians, being instantly occupied by
Platoff.
But the indefatigable Witgenstein was in motion on the left bank,
pressing forward as Victor closed up towards Napoleon; and, throwing
himself betwixt Studzianka and Borizoff, on a plain called
Staroi-Borizoff, he cut off Partouneaux's division from the rest of the
French army. That general made a gallant resistance, and attempted to
force his way at the sword's point through the troops opposed to him. At
length the Hettman Platoff, and the Russian partisan Seslawin, coming
up, the French general found himself entirely overpowered, and after a
brave resistance laid down his arms. Three generals, with artillery, and
according to the Russian accounts, about 7000 men, fell into the hands
of the Russians--a prize the more valuable, as the prisoners belonged
chiefly to the unbroken and unexhausted division of Victor, and
comprehended 800 fine cavalry in good order.[219]
[Sidenote: PASSAGE OF THE BERESINA.]
To improve this advantage, the Russians threw a bridge of pontoons
across the Beresina at Borizoff, and Tchitchagoff and Witgenstein having
communicated, resolved on a joint attack upon both banks of the river at
once. With this purpose, upon the 28th of November, Admiral Tchitchagoff
moved to Stakhowa, upon the right bank, to reinforce Tschaplitz, and
assault that part of the French army which had crossed the Beresina; and
Witgenstein with Platoff marched towards Studzianka, to destroy the
Emperor's rear-guard, which no exertion on the part of Napoleon or his
generals had yet been able to get across the river. Thus, the
extraordinary good fortune of finding a place of passage, and of being
enabled by an uncommon chance to complete his bridges without
opposition, was so far from placing Napoleon in safety, that his dangers
seemed only to multiply around him. But yet upon his side of the river,
now the right bank, his own presence of mind, and the bravery of his
soldiers, gave him a decided superiority, and the tardiness, to say the
least, of Tchitchagoff's motions, insured his safety.
Tschaplitz, who seems to have been a brave and active officer, commenced
the battle by advancing from Stakhowa. But he was worsted by the French,
who were superior in numbers, and he received no succours from the
admiral, though repeatedly demanded.[220] In this manner were the French
enabled to force their way towards a village called Brelowau, through
deep morasses, and over long bridges or railways, formed of the trunks
of pine-trees, where a bold attack might have rendered their advance
impossible. The least exertion on the part of Tchitchagoff might have
caused these bridges to be burnt; and as combustibles were laid ready
for the purpose, it required but, according to Ségur's expression, a
spark from the pipe of a Cossack, to have set them on fire. The
destruction of this railway, enclosing the French between the morass and
the river, must have rendered the passage of the Beresina entirely
useless. But it was not so decreed; and the French, under Oudinot, were
enabled to preserve the means of a movement so essential to their
safety. Meanwhile, the scene on the left bank had become the wildest and
most horrible which war can exhibit.
On the heights of Studzianka, Victor, who commanded the French
rear-guard, amounting perhaps to 8000 or 10,000 men, was prepared to
cover the retreat over the bridges. The right of this corps d'armée
rested on the river; a ravine full of bushes covered their front, but
the left wing had no point of support. It remained, according to the
military phrase, _in the air_, and was covered by two regiments of
cavalry. Behind this defensive line were many thousands of stragglers,
mingled with the usual followers of a camp, and with all those
individuals who, accompanying, for various reasons, the French from
Moscow, had survived the horrors of the march. Women, children,
domestics, the aged and the infants, were seen among the wretched mass,
and wandered by the side of this fatal river, like the fabled spectres
which throng the banks of the infernal Styx, and seek in vain for
passage. The want of order, which it was impossible to preserve, the
breaking of the bridges, and the time spent in the repair--the fears of
the unhappy wretches to trust themselves to the dangerous and crowded
passages, had all operated to detain them on the right bank. The
baggage, which, in spite of the quantity already lost, of the difficulty
of transportation, and of Napoleon's precise orders, amounted still to a
very great number of carts, wains, and the like, and which was now
augmented by all that belonged to the troops of Oudinot and Victor, was
seen, some filing towards the bridges, and the greater part standing in
confusion upon the shore. The artillery itself, such as remained, was in
no better state.
Such was the condition of matters at the bridge, when Witgenstein, warm
from his victory over Partouneaux, marching down the left bank of the
Beresina, engaged in a fierce combat with the rear-guard under Victor;
and the balls of the Russians began to fall among the mingled and
disordered mass which we have endeavoured to describe. It was then that
the whole body of stragglers and fugitives rushed like distracted beings
towards the bridges, every feeling of prudence or humanity swallowed up
by the animal instinct of self-preservation. The horrible scene of
disorder was augmented by the desperate violence of those who,
determined to make their own way at all risks, threw down and trampled
upon whatever came in their road. The weak and helpless either shrunk
back from the fray, and sat down to wait their fate at a distance, or,
mixing in it, were thrust over the bridges, crushed under carriages, cut
down perhaps with sabres, or trampled to death under the feet of their
countrymen. All this while the action continued with fury, and, as if
the Heavens meant to match their wrath with that of man, a hurricane
arose, and added terrors to a scene which was already of a character so
dreadful.
[Sidenote: DREADFUL LOSSES OF THE FRENCH.]
About mid-day the French, still bravely resisting, began to lose ground.
The Russians, coming gradually up in strength, succeeded in forcing the
ravine, and compelling them to assume a position nearer the bridges.
About the same time, the larger bridge, that constructed for artillery
and heavy carriages, broke down, and multitudes were forced into the
water. The scream of mortal agony, which arose from the despairing
multitude, became at this crisis for a moment so universal, that it rose
shrilly audible over the noise of the elements and the thunders of war,
above the wild whistling of the tempest, and the sustained and redoubled
hourras of the Cossacks. The witness from whom we have this information,
declares that the sound was in his ears for many weeks. This dreadful
scene continued till dark, many being forced into the icy river, some
throwing themselves in, betwixt absolute despair, and the faint hope of
gaining the opposite bank by swimming, some getting across only to die
of cold and exhaustion. As the obscurity came on, Victor, with the
remainder of his troops, which was much reduced, quitted the station he
had defended so bravely, and led them in their turn across. All night
the miscellaneous multitude continued to throng along the bridge, under
the fire of the Russian artillery, to whom, even in the darkness, the
noise which accompanied their march made them a distinct mark. At
daybreak, the French engineer, General Eblé, finally set fire to the
bridge. All that remained on the other side, including many prisoners,
and a great quantity of guns and baggage, became the prisoners and the
prey of the Russians. The amount of the French loss was never exactly
known; but the Russian report, concerning the bodies of the invaders
which were collected and burnt as soon as the thaw permitted, states
that upwards of 36,000 were found in the Beresina.[221]
FOOTNOTES:
[205] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 220.
[206] Colonel Boutourlin praises the address of Koutousoff, who, he
says, managed with such skill as always to present a superior force to
that which the French had upon the field of battle, although his army
was on the whole inferior to that of Napoleon. Without admitting the
exactness of the last statement, which there is considerable cause to
dispute, little merit can be assumed for the Russian general's dexterity
in obtaining a numerical superiority at Wiazma, Krasnoi, and elsewhere,
when it is considered that Napoleon himself had divided his army into
four columns, and placed one day's march betwixt each. The Russians had,
therefore, only one column of ten or twelve thousand men to deal with at
once.--S.
[207] "He called Mortier, and squeezing his hand sorrowfully, told him,
that he had not a moment to lose; that the enemy were overwhelming him
in all directions; that Koutousoff might have already reached Liady,
perhaps Orcsa, and the last winding of the Boristhenes before him; that
he would, therefore, proceed thither rapidly with his old guard, in
order to occupy the passage. Then, with his heart full of Ney's
misfortunes, and despair at being forced to abandon him, he withdrew
slowly towards Liady."--SÉGUR, tom. ii., p. 227.
[208] "Napoleon marched on foot at the head of his guard, and often
talked of Ney; he called to mind his _coup-d'œil_ so accurate and
true, his courage proof against every thing, in short all the qualities
which made him so brilliant on the field of battle. 'He is lost. Well! I
have three hundred millions in the Tuileries; I would give them all if
he were restored to me.'"--RAPP, p. 242.
[209] "When Napoleon heard that Ney had just reappeared, he leaped and
shouted for joy, and exclaimed, 'I have then saved my eagles! I would
have given three hundred millions from my treasury sooner than have lost
such a man.'"--SÉGUR, tom. ii., p. 268; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 190.
[210] Jomini, tom. iv., p. 189; Ségur, tom. ii., pp. 245-266.
[211] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 279.
[212] "Napoleon's confidence increased with his peril; in his eyes, and
in the midst of these deserts of mud and ice, that handful of men was
always the grand army! and himself the conqueror of Europe! and there
was no infatuation in this firmness: we were certain of it, when, in
this very town, we saw him burning with his own hands every thing
belonging to him which might serve as trophies to the enemy, in the
event of his fall. There also were unfortunately consumed all the papers
which he had collected in order to write the history of his life; for
such was his intention when he set out for that fatal war. He had then
determined to halt as a threatening conqueror on the borders of the
Dwina and the Boristhenes, to which he now returned as a disarmed
fugitive. At that time he regarded the ennui of six winter months, which
he would have been detained on these rivers as his greatest enemy; and
to overcome it, this second Cæsar intended there to have dictated his
Commentaries."--SÉGUR, tom. ii., p. 235.
[213] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 278.
[214] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 282.
[215] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 283.
[216] "The Emperor came out from his barrack, cast his eyes on the other
side of the river. 'I have outwitted the admiral' (he could not
pronounce the name Tchitchagoff;) 'he believes me to be at the point
where I ordered the false attack; he is running to Borizoff.' His eyes
sparkled with joy and impatience; he urged the erection of the bridges,
and mounted twenty pieces of cannon in battery. These were commanded by
a brave officer with a wooden leg, called Brechtel; a ball carried it
off during the action, and knocked him down. 'Look,' he said, to one of
his gunners, 'for another leg in waggon, No. 5.' He fitted it on, and
continued his firing."--RAPP, p. 246.
[217] "Ney took me apart: he said to me in German, 'Our situation is
unparalleled; if Napoleon extricates himself to-day, he must have the
devil in him.' We were very uneasy, and there was sufficient cause.
Murat came to us, and was not less solicitous. 'I have proposed to
Napoleon,' he observed to us, 'to save himself, and cross the river at a
few leagues distance from hence. I have some Poles who would answer for
his safety, and would conduct him to Wilna, but he rejects the proposal,
and will not even hear it mentioned. As for me, I do not think we can
escape.' We were all three of the same opinion."--RAPP, p. 245.
[218] "When Napoleon saw them fairly in possession of the opposite bank,
he exclaimed, 'Behold my star again appear!' for he was a strong
believer in fatality,"--SÉGUR, tom. ii., p. 295.
[219] "Napoleon was deeply affected with so unexpected a
misfortune--'Must this loss come to spoil all after having escaped as by
a miracle, and having completely beaten the Russians.'"--RAPP, p. 246.
[220] The conduct of the admiral was so unaccountable on this occasion,
that some attempted to explain it on his naval habits, and to suppose
that he was prevented from sending the reinforcements by the wind being
contrary.--S.
[221] Ségur, tom. ii., p. 317; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 195.