_Gustavus IV. of Sweden is Dethroned and succeeded by his Uncle--The
Crown Prince killed by a fall from his horse--Candidates proposed
for the Succession--The Swedes, thinking to conciliate Napoleon, fix
on Bernadotte--Buonaparte reluctantly acquiesces in the
choice--Parting Interview between Bernadotte and
Napoleon--Subsequent attempts of the latter to bind Sweden to the
policy of France--The Crown Prince unwillingly accedes to the
Continental System--Napoleon makes a Tour through Flanders and
Holland--returns to Paris, and takes measures for extending the
Continental System--Seizure of the Valois--Coast along the German
Ocean annexed to France--Protest by the Czar against the
appropriation of Oldenburg--Russia allows the importation, at
certain Seaports, of various articles of British
Commerce--Negotiations for Exchange of Prisoners between France and
England; and for a general Peace, broken off by Buonaparte's
unreasonable Demands._
[Sidenote: GUSTAVUS IV. OF SWEDEN DETHRONED.]
In the destruction of the kingdom of Holland, a new sceptre, and that of
Napoleon's own forming, was broken, as he wrenched it out of the hands
of his brother. In the case of Sweden, and in hopes of ensuring the
patronage of the French Emperor, or averting his enmity, a diadem was
placed on the brows of one, who, like Napoleon himself, had commenced
his career as a soldier of fortune.
We have repeatedly observed, that the high spirit and intrepid
enterprise of Gustavus IV., unsupported as they were either by
distinguished military abilities, or by effectual power, seemed as if he
aped the parts of Gustavus Adolphus or Charles XII., without considering
the declined condition of the country he governed, or the inferiority of
his own talents. Sweden had suffered great losses by the daring manner
in which this prince maintained the ancient principles of aristocracy
against the overwhelming power of France.
Pomerania, being the only dominion belonging to Sweden on the south side
of the Baltic, had been taken possession of by France in the war of
1806-7; and Russia, who had been a party to that war, and who had
encouraged Gustavus to maintain it, had, since changing her politics at
the treaty of Tilsit, herself declared war against Sweden, for the sole
and undisguised purpose of possessing herself of Finland, which she had
succeeded in appropriating. Sweden had, therefore, lost, under this
ill-fated monarch, above one-third of her territories, and the
inhabitants became anxious to secure, even were it by desperate
measures, the independence of that which remained. There were fears
lest Russia should aspire to the conquest of the rest of the ancient
kingdom--fears that France might reward the adhesion and the sufferings
of Denmark, by uniting the crown of Sweden with that of Denmark and
Norway, and aiding the subjugation of the country with an auxiliary
army. While these calamities impended over their ancient state, the
Swedes felt confident that Gustavus was too rash to avert the storm by
submission, too weak, and perhaps too unlucky, to resist its violence.
This conviction led to a conspiracy, perhaps one of the most universally
known in history.
The unfortunate king was seized upon and made prisoner in March, 1809,
without any other resistance than his own unassisted sword could
maintain; and so little were the conspirators afraid of his being able
to find a party in the state desirous of replacing him in the
government, that they were content he should have his liberty and a
suitable pension on his agreeing to consider himself as an exile from
Sweden;[72] in which sentence of banishment, with little pretence to
justice, his wife, sister of the Empress of Russia, and his children,
comprehending the heir of his crown, were also included.[73]
The Duke of Sudermania, uncle of the dethroned prince, was called to the
throne, and the succession of the kingdom was destined to Christian of
Augustenberg, a prince of the house of Holstein. Peace was made by the
new King with Russia, at the expense of ceding Finland and the isle of
Aland to that power. Soon afterwards a treaty was signed at Paris, by
which Charles XIII. promised to adhere to the Continental System, and to
shut his ports against all British commerce, with certain indulgences on
the articles of salt and colonial produce. In requital, Napoleon
restored to Sweden her continental province of Pomerania, with the isle
of Rugen, reserving, however, such dotations or pensions as he had
assigned to his soldiers or followers, upon those territories. But
though the politics of Sweden were thus entirely changed, its revolution
was destined to proceed.
The King being aged, the eyes of the people were much fixed on the
successor, or Crown Prince, who took upon himself the chief labour of
the government, and appears to have given satisfaction to the nation.
But his government was of short duration. On the 28th of May, 1810,
while reviewing some troops, he suddenly fell from his horse, and
expired on the spot, leaving Sweden again without any head excepting
the old King. This event agitated the whole nation, and various
candidates were proposed for the succession of the kingdom.
Among these was the King of Denmark, who, after the sacrifices he had
made for Buonaparte, had some right to expect his support. The son of
the late unfortunate monarch, rightful heir of the crown, and named like
him Gustavus, was also proposed as a candidate. The Duke of Oldenburg,
brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, had partisans. To each of these
candidates there lay practical objections. To have followed the line of
lawful succession, and called Gustavus to the throne (which could not be
forfeited by his father's infirmity, so far as he was concerned,) would
have been to place a child at the head of the state, and must have
inferred, amid this most arduous crisis, all the doubts and difficulties
of choosing a regent. Such choice might, too, be the means, at a future
time, of reviving his father's claim to the crown. The countries of
Denmark and Sweden had been too long rivals for the Swedes to subject
themselves to the yoke of the King of Denmark; and to choose the Duke of
Oldenburg would have been, in effect, to submit themselves to Russia, of
whose last behaviour towards her Sweden had considerable reason to
complain.
[Sidenote: BERNADOTTE.]
In this embarrassment they were thought to start a happy idea, who
proposed to conciliate Napoleon by bestowing the ancient crown of the
Goths upon one of his own field-marshals, and a high noble of his
empire, namely, John Baptiste Julian Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo.
This distinguished officer was married to a sister of Joseph
Buonaparte's wife (daughter of a wealthy and respectable individual,
named Cléry,) through whom he had the advantage of an alliance with the
Imperial family of Napoleon, and he had acquired a high reputation in
the north of Europe, both when governor of Hanover, and administrator of
Swedish Pomerania. On the latter occasion, Bernadotte was said to have
shown himself in a particular manner the friend and protector of the
Swedish nation; and it was even insinuated, that he would not be averse
to exchange the errors of Popery for the reformed tenets of Luther. The
Swedish nation fell very generally into the line of policy which
prompted this choice. Humiliating as it might, at another period, have
been to a people proud of their ancient renown, to choose for their
master a foreign soldier, differing from them in birth and religious
faith, such an election yet promised to place at the head of the nation
a person admirably qualified to comprehend and encounter the
difficulties of the time; and it was a choice, sure, as they thought, to
be agreeable to him upon whose nod the world seemed to depend.
Yet, there is the best reason to doubt, whether, in preferring
Bernadotte to their vacant throne, the Swedes did a thing which was
gratifying to Napoleon. The name of the Crown Prince of Sweden elect,
had been known in the wars of the Revolution, before that of Buonaparte
had been heard of. Bernadotte had been the older, though certainly not
therefore the better soldier. On the 18th Brumaire, he was so far from
joining Buonaparte in his enterprise against the Council of Five
Hundred, notwithstanding all advances made to him, that he was on the
spot at St. Cloud armed and prepared, had circumstances permitted, to
place himself at the head of any part of the military, who might be
brought to declare for the Directory. And although, like every one else,
Bernadotte submitted to the Consular system, and held the government of
Holland under Buonaparte, yet then, as well as under the empire, he was
always understood to belong to a class of officers, whom Napoleon
employed indeed, and rewarded, but without loving them, or perhaps
relying on them, more than he was compelled to do, although their
character was in most instances a warrant for their fidelity.
These officers formed a comparatively small class yet comprehending some
of the most distinguished names in the French army, who, in seeing the
visionary Republic glide from their grasp, had been, nevertheless,
unable to forget the promises held out to them by the earlier dawn of
the Revolution. Reconciled by necessity to a state of servitude which
they could not avoid, this party considered themselves as the soldiers
of France, not of Napoleon, and followed the banner of their country
rather than the fortunes of the Emperor. Without being personally
Napoleon's enemies, they were not the friends of his despotic power; and
it was to be expected, should any opportunity occur, that men so
thinking would make a stand, for the purpose of introducing some
modifications into the arbitrary system which the Emperor had
established.
Napoleon, always deeply politic, unless when carried off by sudden
bursts of temperament, took, as already mentioned, great care, in his
distribution of duties and honours, at once to conceal from the public
the existence of a difference in opinion among his general officers, and
also to arm the interests of those patriots themselves against their own
speculative opinions, by rendering the present state of things too
beneficial to them for their being easily induced to attempt any change.
Still it may nevertheless be conceived, that it was not out of this
class of lukewarm adherents he would have voluntarily selected a
candidate for a kingdom, which, being removed at some distance from the
influence of France, he would more willingly have seen conferred on some
one, whose devotion to the will of his Emperor was not likely to be
disturbed by any intrusion of conscientious patriotism.
But, besides the suspicion entertained by Napoleon of Bernadotte's
political opinions, subjects of positive discord had recently arisen
between them. Bernadotte had been blamed by the Emperor for permitting
the escape of Romana and the Spaniards, as already mentioned. At a later
period, he was commander of the Saxon troops in the campaign of Wagram;
and, notwithstanding a set of very scientific manœuvres, by which he
detained General Bellegarde on the frontiers of Bohemia, when his
presence might have been essentially useful to the Archduke Charles, he
was censured by Napoleon as tardy in his movements.
The landing of the English at Walcheren induced Fouché, as has been
already said, with the concurrence of Clarke, then minister at war, to
intrust Bernadotte with the charge of the defence of Flanders and
Holland. But neither in this service had he the good fortune to please
the Emperor. Fouché, at whose instance he had accepted the situation,
was already tottering in office; and the ill-selected expression, "that
however necessary Napoleon was to the glory of France, yet his presence
was not indispensable to repel invasion,"[74] was interpreted into a
magnifying of themselves at the expense of the Emperor. Napoleon made
his displeasure manifest by depriving Bernadotte of the command in
Belgium, and sending him back to the north of Germany; and it is said
that the general, on his part, was so little inclined to make a secret
of his resentment, that he was remarked as a fiery Gascon, who, if he
should ever have an opportunity, would be likely to do mischief.
[Sidenote: SWEDEN.]
But while such were the bad terms betwixt the Emperor and his general,
the Swedes, unsuspicious of the true state of the case, imagined, that
in choosing Bernadotte for successor to their throne, they were paying
to Buonaparte the most acceptable tribute. And notwithstanding that
Napoleon was actually at variance with Bernadotte, and although, in a
political view, he would much rather have given his aid to the
pretensions of the King of Denmark,[75] he was under the necessity of
reflecting, that Sweden retained a certain degree of independence; that
the sea separated her shores from his armies; and that, however willing
to conciliate him, the Swedes were not in a condition absolutely to be
compelled to receive laws at his hand. It was necessary to acquiesce in
their choice, since he could not dictate to them; and by doing so he
might at the same time exhibit another splendid example of the height to
which his service conducted his generals, of his own desire to assist
their promotion, and of that which might be much more doubtful than the
two first propositions--of his willingness to pay deference to the
claims of a people in electing their chief magistrate. When, therefore,
Bernadotte, protesting that he would be exclusively guided by Napoleon's
wishes in pursuing or relinquishing this important object, besought him
for his countenance with the States of Sweden, who were to elect the
Crown Prince, Buonaparte answered, that he would not interfere in the
election by any solicitations or arguments, but that he gave the Prince
of Ponte Corvo his permission to be a candidate, and should be well
pleased if he proved a successful one. Such is Napoleon's account of the
transaction.[76] We have, however, been favoured with some manuscript
observations, in which a very different colour is given to Napoleon's
proceedings, and which prove distinctly, that while Napoleon treated the
Crown Prince Elect of Sweden with fair language, he endeavoured by
underhand intrigues to prevent the accomplishment of his hopes.[77]
The Swedes, however, remained fixed in their choice, notwithstanding the
insinuations of Desaugier, the French envoy, whom Napoleon afterwards
affected to disown and recall, for supporting in the diet of Orebro, the
interest of the King of Denmark, instead of that of Bernadotte.
Napoleon's cold assent, or rather an assurance that he would not
dissent, being thus wrung reluctantly from him, Bernadotte, owing to his
excellent character among the Swedes, and their opinion of his interest
with Napoleon, was chosen Crown Prince of Sweden, by the States of that
kingdom, 21st August, 1810. Napoleon, as he himself acknowledges, was
enabled to resist, though with difficulty, a strong temptation to
retract his consent, and defeat the intended election. Perhaps this
unfriendly disposition might be in some degree overcome by the
expectation, that by their present choice the Emperor of France would
secure the accession of Sweden to the anti-commercial system; whereas,
by attempting a game which he was not equally sure of winning, he might,
indeed, have disappointed a man whom he loved not, but by doing so must
run the risk of throwing the States of Sweden, who were not likely to be
equally unanimous in behalf of any other French candidate, into the arms
of England, his avowed foe; or of Russia, who, since the treaty of
Schoenbrun, and Napoleon's union with the House of Austria, could only
be termed a doubtful and cloudy friend.
But he endeavoured to obtain from Bernadotte some guarantee of his
dependence upon France and its Emperor. He took the opportunity of
making the attempt when Bernadotte applied to him for letters of
emancipation from his allegiance to France, which could not decently be
withheld from the Prince Royal of another country. "The expediting of
the letters patent," said Napoleon, "has been retarded by a proposal
made by the Council, that Bernadotte should previously bind himself
never to bear arms against Napoleon." Bernadotte exclaimed against a
proposal which must have left him in the rank of a French general. The
Emperor was ashamed to persist in a demand so unreasonable, and
dismissed him with the almost prophetic words--"Go--our destinies must
be accomplished." He promised the Prince Royal two millions of francs as
an indemnity for the principality of Ponte Corvo, and other possessions
which had been assigned to him in Holland, and which he restored on
ceasing to be a subject of France. It is singular enough that Napoleon,
while at St. Helena, permitted himself to assert that he had made a
present of this money (of which only one million was ever paid,) to
enable Bernadotte to take possession of his new dignity with becoming
splendour.
To bring the affairs of Sweden to a close for the present, we may here
add, that, though that nation were desirous to escape the renewal of the
desperate and hopeless struggle with France, they were most unwilling,
nevertheless, to lose the advantages of their commerce with England. The
conduct of the national business soon devolved entirely upon the Crown
Prince, the age and infirmities of the King not permitting him to
conduct them any longer. It became Bernadotte's, or, as he was now
named, Charles John's difficult and delicate task, to endeavour at once
to propitiate France, and to find excuses which might dispose Buonaparte
to grant some relaxation on the subject of the Continental System. But
as it was impossible for the Prince of Sweden to disguise his motive for
evading a cordial co-operation in Napoleon's favourite measure, so the
latter, about three months after the accession of his former companion
in arms to supreme power, grew impatient enough to overwhelm the Swedish
minister, Baron Lagerbjelke, with a tirade similar to his celebrated
attack on Lord Whitworth. He discoursed with the utmost volubility for
an hour and a quarter, leaving the astonished ambassador scarce an
opening to thrust in a word by way of observation, defence, or answer.
"Do they believe in Sweden that I am to be so easily duped? Do they
think I will be satisfied with this half state of things? Give me no
sentiments! it is from facts we form our opinions. You signed the peace
with me in the beginning of the year, and engaged yourself then to break
off all communication with Britain; yet you retained an English agent
till late in the summer, and kept the communication open by way of
Gottenburg. Your small islands are so many smuggling magazines; your
vessels meet the English and exchange freights. I have not slept an hour
to-night on account of your affairs; yet you ought to suffer me to take
repose, I have need of it. You have vessels in every port in England.
You talk of the necessity of buying salt, forsooth. Is it for salt you
go into the Thames?--You talk of suffering, by superseding the trade. Do
you not believe that I suffer? That Germany, Bourdeaux, Holland, and
France suffer? But it must all be ended. You must fire on the English,
and you must confiscate their merchandise, or you must have war with
France. Open war, or constant friendship--this is my last word, my
ultimate determination. Could they think in Sweden that I would modify
my system, because I love and esteem the Prince Royal? Did I not love
and esteem the King of Holland? He is my brother, yet I have broken with
him: I have silenced the voice of nature to give ear to that of the
general interest." These, and many violent expressions to the same
purpose, Buonaparte poured out in an elevation of voice that might be
heard in the adjoining apartments.
The Emperor's remonstrances, transmitted by the ambassador, were
seconded at the Court of Stockholm by the arguments of Denmark and
Russia; and the Crown Prince was at last obliged to give the national
adherence of Sweden to the Continental System, and to declare war
against England.[78] The British Government were fully sensible of the
constraint under which Sweden acted, and, so far from acting hostilely
towards that kingdom, did not seem to make any perceptible change in the
relations which had before subsisted between the countries.
In the meantime, Bernadotte and Napoleon, for a time, veiled under the
usual forms of courtesy their mutual dislike and resentment. But the
Crown Prince could not forgive the Emperor for an attempt to lord it
over him like a superior over a vassal, and compelling him,
notwithstanding his entreaties, to distress his subjects, and to render
his government unpopular, by sacrificing a lucrative trade. Napoleon, on
the other hand, was incensed that Bernadotte, whose greatness he
considered as existing only by his own permission, should affect to
differ in opinion from him, or hesitate betwixt obliging France and
injuring Sweden.
On other occasional differences betwixt the sovereigns, it appeared that
there was no eager desire on the part of the Crown Prince of Sweden to
oblige the Emperor of France. Repeated demands for sailors and soldiers
to be engaged in the French service, were made by Napoleon. These
Bernadotte always contrived to evade, by referring to the laws of
Sweden, as a limited monarchy, which did not permit him, like the
absolute Majesty of Denmark, to dispose of her sailors at pleasure; and
by enlarging on the nature of the Swedes, who, bold and willing soldiers
at home, were too much attached to their own climate and manners, to
endure those of any other country. In these, and such like excuses, no
one could read more readily than Napoleon, a fixed resolution on the
part of his old companion in arms, not to yield to the influence of
France in any point in which he could avoid it. And though an outward
show of friendship was maintained between the countries, and even
between the sovereigns, yet it was of that insincere kind which was sure
to be broken off on the slightest collision of their mutual interests.
It remained, however, undisturbed till the eventful year of 1812.--We
return to the affairs of France.
[Sidenote: TOUR THROUGH BELGIUM.]
The Emperor undertook a tour through the provinces of Flanders and
Holland with his young Empress, with the view of enforcing his views and
purposes in church and state. In the course of this journey, one or two
remarkable circumstances took place. The first was his furious
reproaches to the clergy of Brabant, who, more rigorous Papists than in
some other Catholic countries, had circulated among their congregations
the bull of excommunication fulminated by the Pope against Napoleon. The
provocation was certainly considerable, but the mode of resenting it was
indecently violent. He was especially angry that they appeared without
their canonical dresses. "You call yourselves priests," he said; "where
are your vestments? Are you attorneys, notaries, or peasants? You begin
by forgetting the respect due to me; whereas, the principle of the
Christian Church, as these gentlemen" (turning to the Protestant
deputies) "can teach you, is, as they have just professed, to render
unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. But you--you will not pray for
your sovereign, because a Romish priest excommunicated me. But who gave
him such a right? Perhaps it is your wish to bring back tortures and
scaffolds, but I will take care to baffle you. I bear the temporal
sword, and know how to use it. I am a monarch of God's creation, and you
reptiles of the earth dare not oppose me. I render an account of my
government to none save God and Jesus Christ. Do you think I am one
formed to kiss the Pope's slipper? Had you the power, you would shave my
head, clap a cowl on me, and plunge me in a cloister. But if you preach
not the Gospel as the Apostles did, I will banish you from the empire,
and disperse you like so many Jews.--And, Monsieur le Préfet, see that
these men swear to the Concordat; and take care that the orthodox Gospel
be taught in the ecclesiastical seminaries, that they may send out men
of sense, and not idiots like these." Thus closed this edifying
admonition.
The Dutch were under the necessity of assuming the appearance of great
rejoicing; yet even the danger of indulging their blunt humour, could
not altogether restrain these downright merchants. When the Emperor made
a stir about establishing a Chamber of Commerce at Amsterdam, one of the
burgomasters gravely observed, there was no need of a chamber, since a
closet would hold all the commerce left them. In like manner, when
Napoleon was vaunting, that he would soon have a fleet of two hundred
sail; "And when you have got them," said a plain-spoken citizen, "the
English will have double the number."
But, more formidable than blunt truths and indifferent jests, there
appeared, while Buonaparte was in Holland, one of those stern
invocations exciting the people against foreign tyranny, which have
often occasioned the downfall of unjust power, and always rendered those
who possess it unhappy and insecure. "People of Holland," said this
singular paper (which may be compared to the tract called Killing no
Murder, which drove sleep from Cromwell's pillow,) "why do you fear your
oppressor?--he is one, you are many. Appeal to his very soldiers; their
desertions in Spain show how they hate him; and even his generals would
abandon him, could they secure their own rank and grandeur independent
of his. But above all, arise to the task of your own redemption; rise in
the fulness of national strength. A general revolt of the Continent will
ensue; the oppressor will fall, and your triumph will be a warning to
tyrants, and an example to the world." This address produced no
perceptible effect at the time, but, with other papers of the kind, it
made a profound impression on the public mind.
On his return to Paris, Napoleon set himself still farther to impose the
extension of the Continental System, which he was induced to attempt by
the appropriation of Holland, and the revolution in Sweden. Holding his
plan as much more decisive than it could have been, even if his power
and his spleen had been adequate to effect his purpose, he cast his eyes
in every direction, to close every aperture, however small, through
which British commerce, the victim he hoped entirely to smother, might
draw ever so slight a gasp of breath.
It was a feature of Buonaparte's ambition--as indeed it is of inordinate
ambition in general--that whatever additions were made to his Empire
extended his wish of acquisition. Holland, whose traders were princes,
and she herself the Queen of Commerce, had been already devoured, with
her ample sea-coast and far-famed harbours. But other cities, less
wealthy and famed, yet still venerable from their ancient importance,
must become a part of France, ere Buonaparte thought his blockade
against British commerce complete and impervious.
The seizure of the poor regions called the Valais, which had hitherto
been suffered to exist as a free republic, gave France the absolute
command of the road over the Simplon; the property, and perhaps the
command of which passage, it being the great means of communication
betwixt France and Italy, Napoleon did not incline should remain with a
petty republic. It was a sufficient reason, at this unhappy period, for
depriving any country of its independence, that France was to be
benefited by the change. It was not in this case a bloodless one. The
poor mountaineers drew to arms, and it required some fighting before
they were compelled to submission, and their barren mountains were
annexed to France.
But it was of much greater importance, in Napoleon's eye, to prevent the
commerce which he had expelled from Holland from shifting its residence
to the trading towns of the north of Germany, composing what was called
the Hanseatic League. A new appropriation of territory, therefore,
united to France the whole sea-coast along the German Ocean,
comprehending the mouths of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; the
Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe. And it was the Emperor's proposal to unite
these maritime territories to France by a canal, which was to join the
Baltic ocean to the Seine. A considerable proportion of the kingdom of
Westphalia, and of the Grand Duchy of Berg, both principalities of
Napoleon's own creation, fell under this appropriation, and formed
another example, had not that of Holland been sufficient, to show how
little respect Napoleon was disposed to pay even to those rights which
emanated from himself, when they interfered with fresher plans and wider
prospects of ambition.
Had Prussia retained her ancient influence as protector of the North,
Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, would not have been thus unceremoniously
melted down and confounded with the French Empire. But while these
venerable and well-known free cities sunk without protection or
resistance under a despotism which threatened to become universal, a
petty state of far less consequence, scarce known as having an
independent existence by any who was not intimate with the divisions of
the north of Germany, found a patron, and a powerful one. This was
Oldenburg, a dukedom, the present prince of which was related to the
Emperor of Russia, as both were descended of the House of Holstein
Gottorp, and was, moreover, Alexander's brother-in-law. This state of
Oldenburg had been studiously excepted from the changes made in the
North of Germany, after the treaty of Tilsit, which made the present
confiscation of its territory an act of more marked slight towards the
court of Russia. A formal expostulation being transmitted to Napoleon,
he proposed to repair the injury of the Duke of Oldenburg, by assigning
to him the town and territory of Erfurt, with the lordship of
Blankenheim. But the duke felt himself too strongly supported to be
under the necessity of surrendering his dominions, and receiving others
in exchange. The offer of indemnity was haughtily rejected; France
persevered in her purpose of usurping Oldenburg; and the Emperor
Alexander, in a protest, gravely but temperately worded, a copy of which
was delivered to every member of the diplomatic body, intimated that he
did not acquiesce in the injury done to a prince of his family, although
he continued to adhere to that great line of political interest which
had occasioned the alliance between France and Russia.
The real truth was, that Napoleon, secure of the friendship of Austria
by the late alliance, had not, it would seem, regarded Russia as any
longer worthy of the same observance which he had originally found it
politic to pay to the Emperor Alexander. The Czar himself felt this; and
the very large proportion of his subjects, composing the party of Old
Russians, as they termed themselves, who were favourable to the English
alliance, and detested the connexion with France, improved the
opportunity by pointing out the evils which all classes in the country
endured, from the Czar's having, in complaisance to the plans of
Napoleon, decreed the abolition of English commerce. They showed that
this compliance with the views of France had been attended with great
detriment to his own subjects, who could neither sell their commodities,
and the produce of their estates, for which Britain always offered a
market, nor acquire the colonial produce and British manufactured goods,
which the consumption of Russia almost peremptorily demanded.
[Sidenote: RUSSIAN PROTEST.]
An ukase was issued on the 31st of December, 1810, which was drawn up
with considerable art; for while in words it seemed to affirm the
exclusion of British manufactures from the empire in general, it
permitted importations to be made at Archangel, Petersburgh, Riga,
Revel, and five or six other seaports, where various articles of
merchandise, and, in particular, colonial produce, unless proved to
belong to Britain, might be freely imported. So that, while appearing to
quote and respect the Continental System, Napoleon could not but be
sensible that Russia virtually renounced it. But as Alexander had not
ventured to avail himself of the seizure of Oldenburg as a reason for
breaking off his alliance with France, so Napoleon, on his part, though
the changed tone of Russian policy could not escape him, paused,
nevertheless, in coming to a final rupture with an enemy so powerful,
upon the subject of the ukase of December 1810.
[Sidenote: EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.]
Meantime, the French Emperor became probably sensible that peace with
England was the surest ground upon which he could secure his throne. In
the month of April, 1810, some attempt at obtaining terms of
pacification had been made during the mission of Mr. Mackenzie, who was
sent to Morlaix as agent on the part of the British Government. It had
been not the least cruel peculiarity of this inveterate war, that no
cartel for exchange of prisoners had been effected on either side, and,
of course, that those unhappy persons whom chance had thrown into the
power of the enemy, had no visible alternative but to linger out their
lives in a distant and hostile country, or at least remain captives till
the conclusion of hostilities, to which no one could presume to assign a
date. The original impediment to such an exchange, which has in all
civilized countries been considered as a debt indispensably due to
soften the rigours of war and lessen the sufferings of its victims, was
a demand of Napoleon that the persons possessing no military character,
whom he had made prisoners contrary to the law of nations at the
commencement of hostilities, should be exchanged against French sailors
and soldiers. The British ministers for a long time resisted so unusual
an application, to which policy, indeed, forbade them to accede. At
length, however, the sufferings of individuals, and of their families,
induced the British government to allow the French Emperor the advantage
of his oppressive act in detaining these unfortunate persons, and agree
that they should be included in the proposed cartel. But when the
commissioners met at Morlaix, Mr. Mackenzie found himself as far from
approaching an agreement as ever. The number of French prisoners in
Britain was more by many thousands than that of the British in France;
and Buonaparte, who seldom made a bargain in which he did not secure the
advantage to himself, insisted that the surplus of French prisoners
should be exchanged for Germans, Spaniards, Portuguese, or others who
should be captive in France.
This was readily agreed to, so far as regarded foreign troops in British
pay; but it was equally unreasonable and contrary to usage to require
that we should restore to France her native subjects, whose services she
might use to augment her military force, while we received in exchange
foreigners, unconnected with us by service or allegiance, and who,
perhaps, when set at liberty, might be as apt to join the French ranks,
as those of the nation in whose name they had obtained freedom.
After much wrangling and dispute, Mr. Mackenzie, to show the sincere
desire which the British government entertained of releasing the
prisoners on both sides, made a proposal that the exchange should
commence by liberating as many French prisoners as could be balanced by
British captives in the French prisons; that after this, captives of
every nation should be exchanged indifferently on both sides; and
whatever number of prisoners might remain on either side, after the
general balance had been struck, should also be set at liberty, upon an
engagement not to serve till regularly exchanged. To this proposal--a
more liberal one could hardly be made--the French only answered by
starting new demands, and making new objections. Among these, perhaps,
it will scarcely be believed, that Moustier, the French commissioner,
had the modesty to propose that Lord Wellington and his army, lying in
the lines at Torres Vedras, should be reckoned as French prisoners in
the proposed cartel! Mr. Mackenzie answered with becoming spirit, that
he would neither be the medium through which his Government should be
insulted by such a proposal, nor would he proceed in the negotiation
until this impertinence were atoned for.
It is needless to proceed farther in the elusory detail of a treaty,
which Napoleon had previously determined should be brought to no useful
issue. He had calculated which country could best support the absence of
their prisoners, or rather to whom their services were of most
consequence. He felt that he himself, by the conscription, as well as by
the auxiliary troops which he could summon at pleasure from his
neighbours or dependents, could always command a sufficiency of men even
for his gigantic undertakings; while to Britain, whose soldiers could
only be obtained by a high bounty, the deliverance of her prisoners was
proportionally more valuable. Whatever was his view in establishing the
negotiation, which was probably only to satisfy the French army, by
evincing a seeming interest in the unfortunate portion of their brethren
in arms who were immured in English prisons, they gave way to the
consideration, that while things remained as they were, Britain
suffered more in proportion than France.
Some proposals for a general peace had been made during the conferences
at Morlaix; and the British Government had stated three different
principles, any of which they expressed themselves willing to admit as a
basis. These were, first, the state of possession before the war; or,
secondly, the present state of possession; or, thirdly, a plan of
reciprocal compensations. But none of these principles suited the French
Government to act upon; so that the treaty for a general peace, and that
for restoring, taking into calculation the prisoners on both sides,
upwards of a hundred thousand human beings to liberty, their country,
and their home, proved both of them altogether nugatory.
The note of defiance was therefore resumed, so soon as it had been
ascertained that Britain would reject any terms of peace which were not
founded on equal and liberal principles. An oration of Count Semonville
demonstrated, that it was all owing to the persevering ambition of
England that Buonaparte had been obliged to possess himself of the
sea-coast of Europe--that all his encroachments on the land were the
necessary consequences of her empire of the seas. He then demanded, in
prophetic fury, to know what in future would be the bounds of
possibility. "It is the part of England," he said, "to reply. Let her
turn her eyes on the past, and learn to judge from thence the events of
the future. France and Napoleon will never change."
FOOTNOTES:
[72] Annual Register, vol. li., p. 475.
[73] "A conspiracy of no common kind tore him from the throne, and
transported him out of his states. The unanimity evinced against him is,
no doubt, a proof of the wrongs he had committed. I am ready to admit,
that he was inexcusable and even mad; but it is, notwithstanding,
extraordinary and unexampled, that, in that crisis a single sword was
not drawn in his defence, whether from affection, from gratitude, from
virtuous feeling, or even from mere simplicity, if it must be so; and
truly, it is a circumstance which does little honour to the atmosphere
of kings."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. iii., p. 169.
[74] Fouché, tom. i., p. 337.
[75] "The real king," he said, "according to my political system and the
true interests of France, was the king of Denmark; because I should then
have governed Sweden by the influence of my simple contact with the
Danish provinces."
[76] "I, the elected monarch of the people, had to answer, that I could
not set myself against the elections of other people. It was what I told
Bernadotte, whose whole attitude betrayed the anxiety excited by the
expectation of my answer. I added, that he had only to take advantage of
the good-will of which he had been the object; that I wished to be
considered as having had no weight in his election, but that it had my
approbation and my best wishes. I felt, however, shall I say it, a
secret instinct, which made the thing disagreeable and painful.
Bernadotte was, in fact, the serpent which I nourished in my
bosom."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. iii., p. 171.
[77] See REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF NAPOLEON TOWARDS THE CROWN PRINCE
OF SWEDEN, in the Appendix to this Volume, No. I.
[78] Annual Register, vol. lii., p. 518.