_Almost all the foreign French Settlements fall into the hands of
the British--French Squadron destroyed at the Isle of Aix, by Lord
Cochrane--and at the Isle of Rosas, by Lord Collingwood--Return to
the Proceedings in Spain--Soult takes Oporto--Attacked and Defeated
by Sir Arthur Wellesley--Ferrol and Corunna retaken by the
Patriots--Battle of Talavera, gained by Sir Arthur
Wellesley--Created Lord Wellington--The French Armies take many
towns and strong Places--Supreme Junta retreat to Cadiz--The
Guerilla System--Growing disappointment of Buonaparte--His immense
exertions--Battle of Busaco--Lord Wellington's famous Retreat on
Torres Vedras._
Notwithstanding the credit which Napoleon had acquired, by dictating to
the House of Austria the triumphant treaty of Schoenbrun, and also by
allying himself with that ancient Imperial House, which had, on
different occasions, showed towards him the signs of persevering enmity,
this period of his history did not pass without his experiencing several
reverses of fortune. The few foreign settlements which hitherto remained
united to France, were now successively taken by the British. Cayenne,
Martinico, Senegal, and Saint Domingo, were conquered and occupied in
the West Indies; while Lord Collingwood, with troops furnished from
Sicily, occupied the islands of Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, and Cerigo.
A French squadron of men-of-war being blockaded in the roadstead of the
isle of Aix, the determined valour of Lord Cochrane was employed for
their destruction. Fire-ships were sent against the French vessels, and
though the execution was less complete than had been expected, owing to
some misunderstanding between Lord Cochrane and Admiral Gambier, who
commanded in chief, yet the greater part of the French ships were burnt,
or driven ashore and destroyed. Lord Collingwood also destroyed an
important French convoy, with the armed vessels who protected it, in
the isle of Rosas. Every thing announced that England retained the full
command of what has been termed her native element; while the
transactions in Spain showed, that, under a general who understood at
once how to gain victories, and profit by them when obtained, the land
forces of Britain were no less formidable than her navy. This subject
draws our attention to the affairs of the Peninsula, where it might be
truly said "the land was burning."
The evacuation of Corunna by the army of the late Sir John Moore, and
their return to England, which their disastrous condition rendered
indispensable, left Soult in seeming possession of Galicia, Ferrol and
Corunna having both surrendered to him. But the strength of the Spanish
cause did not lie in walls and ramparts, but in the indomitable courage
of the gallant patriots. The Galicians continued to distinguish
themselves by a war of posts, in which the invaders could claim small
advantages; and when Soult determined to enter Portugal, he was obliged
to leave Ney, with considerable forces, to secure his communication with
Spain.
[Sidenote: SOULT OCCUPIES OPORTO.]
Soult's expedition began prosperously, though it was doomed to terminate
very differently. He defeated General Romana, and compelled him to
retreat to Senabria. The frontier town of Chaves was taken by Soult,
after some resistance, and he forced his way towards Oporto. But no
sooner had the main body of Soult's army left Chaves, than, in spite of
the efforts of the garrison, the place was relieved by an
insurrectionary army of Portuguese, under General Silviera. The invader,
neglecting these operations in his rear, continued to advance upon
Oporto, carried that fine city by storm, after a desultory defence of
three days, and suffered his troops to commit the greatest cruelties,
both on the soldiers and unarmed citizens.[39]
But when Marshal Soult had succeeded thus far, his situation became
embarrassing. The Galicians, recovering their full energy, had retaken
Vigo and other places; and Silviera, advancing from Chaves to the bridge
of Amarante, interposed betwixt the French general and Galicia, and
placed himself in communication with the Spaniards.
While Soult was thus cooped up in Oporto, the English Ministry,
undaunted by the failure of their late expedition, resolved to continue
the defence of the Portuguese, and to enter into still closer alliance
with the Supreme Junta of Spain. Consulting their own opinion and the
public voice, all consideration of rank and long service was laid aside,
in order to confer the command of the troops which were to be sent to
the continent, on Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose conduct in the battle of
Vimeiro, and the subsequent explanations which he afforded at the Court
of Inquiry, had taught all Britain to believe, that if Portugal could be
defended at all, it must be by the victor of that day. He was scarce
landed at Lisbon [April 22] ere he fully justified the good opinion of
his countrymen. He crossed the Douro at different points with a celerity
for which the French were unprepared, and, after a brilliant action
under the walls of Oporto, compelled Soult to evacuate that city, and
commence a retreat, so disastrous as to resemble that of Sir John Moore.
In this retrograde movement, the French left behind them cannon,
equipments, baggage--all that can strengthen an army, and enable it to
act as such; and, after all these sacrifices, their leader could hardly
make his escape into Galicia, with scarce three-fourths of his army
remaining, where he found great difficulty in remodelling his forces.
Ney, whom he had left as governor of that province, was hard pressed by
the patriots, who defeated the French in several battles, and eventually
retook the towns of Ferrol and Corunna.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was prevented from completing Soult's defeat by
pursuing him into Galicia, because, after the Spaniards had sustained
the severe defeat of Tudela, the French had penetrated into Andalusia in
great strength, where they were only opposed by an ill-equipped and
dispirited army of 40,000 men, under the rash and ill-starred General
Cuesta. It was evident, that Marshal Victor, who commanded in Andalusia,
had it in his power to have detached a considerable part of his force on
Lisbon, supposing that city had been uncovered, by Sir Arthur
Wellesley's carrying his forces in pursuit of Soult. This was to be
prevented, if possible. The English general formed the magnificent plan,
for which Napoleon's departure to the Austrian campaign afforded a
favourable opportunity, of marching into Andalusia, uniting the British
forces with those of Cuesta, and acting against the invaders with such
vigour, as might at once check their progress in the South, and endanger
their occupation of Madrid. Unhappily an ill-timed jealousy seems to
have taken possession of Cuesta, which manifested itself in every
possible shape, in which frowardness, and a petty obstinacy of spirit,
could be exhibited. To no one of the combined plans, submitted to him by
the English general, would he give assent or effectual concurrence; and
when a favourable opportunity arrived of attacking Victor, before he was
united with the forces which Joseph Buonaparte and Sebastiani were
bringing from Madrid to his support, Cuesta alleged he would not give
battle on a Sunday.[40]
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF TALAVERA.]
The golden opportunity was thus lost; and when the allies were obliged
to receive battle instead of giving it, on the 28th July, 1809, it was
without the advantages which the former occasion held out. Yet the
famous battle of Talavera de la Reina, in which the French were
completely defeated, was, under these unfavourable circumstances,
achieved by Sir Arthur Wellesley. The event of this action, in which the
British forces had been able to defend themselves against double their
own number, with but little assistance from the Spanish army, became,
owing to the continued wilfulness of Cuesta, very different from what
such a victory ought to have produced. The French troops, assembling
from every point, left Sir Arthur no other mode of assuring the safety
of his army, than by a retreat on Portugal; and for want of means of
transport, which the Spanish general ought to have furnished, more than
fifteen hundred of the wounded were left to the mercy of the French.[41]
They were treated as became a courteous enemy, yet the incident afforded
a fine pretext to contest the victory, which the French had resigned by
flying from the field.
The assertions of the bulletins in the _Moniteur_ could not deceive men
on the true state of affairs. The Spanish Junta were sensible of the
services rendered by the English general, and, somewhat of the latest,
removed Cuesta from the command, to manifest their disapprobation of his
unaccountable conduct. At home, Sir Arthur Wellesley was promoted to the
peerage, by the title of Lord Wellington, who was destined to ascend,
with the universal applause of the nation, as high as our constitution
will permit. But Buonaparte paid the greatest compliment to the victor
of Talavera, by the splenetic resentment with which he was filled by the
news. He had received the tidings by his private intelligence, before
the officer arrived with the regular despatches. He was extremely ill
received by the Emperor; and, as if the messengers had been responsible
for the tidings they brought, a second officer, with a duplicate of the
same intelligence, was treated still more harshly, and for a time put
under arrest. This explosion of passion could not be occasioned by the
consequences of the action, for the experienced eye of Napoleon must
have discriminated the circumstances by which the effects of victory
were in a great measure lost to the allied armies; but he saw in the
battle of Talavera, an assurance given to both English and Spanish
soldiers, that, duly resisted, the French would fly from them. He
foresaw, also, that the British Government would be tempted to maintain
the contest on the continent, and that the Spaniards would be encouraged
to persevere in resistance. He foresaw, in short, that war of six
desperate and bloody campaigns, which did not terminate till the battle
of Tholouse, in 1814.
But it needed no anticipation to fill Napoleon's mind with anxiety on
the subject of Spain. It is true, fortune seemed every where to smile on
his arms. Zaragossa, once more besieged, maintained its former name, but
without the former brilliant result. After a defence as distinguished as
in the first siege, the brave garrison and citizens, deprived of means
of defence, and desperate of all hope of relief, had been compelled to
surrender some months before.[42]
Gerona, Tarragona, Tortosa, though still vigorously defended, were so
powerfully invested, that it seemed as if Catalonia, the most warlike of
the Spanish departments, was effectually subdued; and, accordingly,
these fortresses also were afterwards obliged to capitulate.
Andalusia, the richest province which sustained the patriot cause,
certainly was conquered, in consequence of a total defeat encountered by
the Spanish grand army, under Areizaga, at Ocana, November 1809, after
the English troops had retreated to the Portuguese frontier.[43] Joseph
Buonaparte, whose road was cleared by this last success, entered Cordoba
in triumph upon the 17th of January, 1810, and proud Seville itself upon
the 1st of February following. Yet the chief prize of victory had not
yet been gained. The Supreme Junta had effected their retreat to Cadiz,
which city, situated in an island, and cut off from the mainland, on one
side by a canal, and on the other three by the ocean, was capable of the
most strenuous defence.
Cadiz contained a garrison of 20,000 men, English, Spanish, and
Portuguese, under the command of General Graham, a distinguished
officer, whose merits, like those of Buonaparte, had been first
distinguished at the siege of Toulon. Marshal Soult, as first in command
in Spain, disposed himself to form the siege of this city, the capture
of which would have been almost the death-knell to the cause of the
patriots.
But although these important successes read well in the _Moniteur_, yet
such was the indomitable character of the Spaniards, which Napoleon had
contrived fully to awaken, that misfortunes, which would have crushed
all hope in any other people, seemed to them only an incentive to
further and more desperate resistance. When they talked of the state of
their country, they expressed no dismay at their present adverse
circumstances. It had cost their ancestors, they said, two centuries to
rid themselves of the Moors; they had no doubt that in a shorter time
they should free themselves of the yoke of France; but they must reckon
on time and opportunity, as well as valour. The events of the war in
many respects gave credit to their hopes. The Spaniards, often found
weak where they thought themselves strongest, proved sometimes most
powerful, where, to all human appearance, they seemed weakest. While
they lost Andalusia, believed to be so defensible, the mountainous
province of Galicia, through which the French had so lately marched
triumphantly in pursuit of the British, taking in their progress the
important maritime towns of Corunna and Ferrol, was wrenched from the
conquerors by the exertions of Romana, assisted by the warlike natives
of the country, and at the head of an undisciplined and ill-equipped
army.
[Sidenote: CATALONIA--THE GUERILLAS.]
In Catalonia, too, the French had hardly time to accomplish the conquest
of towns and fortresses to which we have alluded, when they found
themselves checked, baffled, and sometimes defeated, by the Catalans,
under Lacy, O'Donnell, and D'Eroles, who maintained the patriotic cause
at the head of those energetic marksmen, the Somatenes, or Miquelets.
Nay, while the French were extending their seeming conquests to the
Mediterranean Sea, and thundering at the gates of Cadiz, so little were
they in peaceful possession of Navarre, and the other provinces
adjoining to France, that not an officer with despatches could pass from
Burgos to Bayonne without a powerful escort, and bands of Spaniards even
showed themselves on the French frontier, and passed it for the purpose
of skirmishing and raising contributions. Such being the case on the
frontiers nearest to France, it may be well supposed, that the midland
provinces were not more subordinate. In fact, through the whole
Peninsula the French held no influence whatever that was not inspired by
the force of the bayonet and sabre; and where these could not operate,
the country was in universal insurrection.
The basis of this extensive and persevering resistance was laid in the
general system of Guerilla, or partisan warfare, to which the genius of
the Spanish people, and the character of their country, are peculiarly
fitted, and which offered a resistance to the invaders more formidable
by far than that of regular armies, because less tangible, and less
susceptible of being crushed in general actions. It was with the
defenders of Spain, as with the guardian of the enchanted castle in the
Italian romance. An armed warrior first encountered the champion who
attempted the adventure, and when he had fallen under the sword of the
assailant, the post which he had occupied appeared manned by a body of
pigmies, small in size, but so numerous and so enterprising as to annoy
the knight-errant far more than the gigantic force of his first
adversary. The qualities of a partisan, or irregular soldier, are
inherent in the national character of the Spaniard. Calm, temperate,
capable of much fatigue, and veiling under a cold demeanour an ardent
and fiery character, they are qualified to wait for opportunities of
advantage, and are not easily discouraged by difficulty or defeat. Good
marksmen in general, and handling the lance, sword, and dagger with
address, they are formidable in an ambush, and not less so in a close
mêlée, where men fight hand to hand, more as nature dictates than
according to the rules of war. The obstinacy of the Castilian character
also, had its advantages in this peculiar state of warfare. Neither
promises nor threats made any impression on them; and the severities
executed in fulfilment of menaces, only inflamed the spirit of hostility
by that of private revenge, to which the Spaniard is far more accessible
than either to the voice of caution or persuasion.
Neither were the officers less qualified for the task than the men. The
command of a guerilla was of a character not to be desired by any who
did not find himself equal to, and in some measure called upon to
accept, the dangerous pre-eminence. There were few Spanish officers
possessed of the scientific knowledge of war, and of course few adequate
to lead armies into the field; but the properties necessary for a
guerilla leader are imprinted in the human mind, and ready for exercise
whenever they are required. These leaders were, as it chanced: some of
them men of high birth and military education; some had been smugglers
or peasants, or had practised other professions; as was discovered from
their noms-de-guerre, as the Curate, the Doctor, the Shepherd, and so
forth.[44] Many of their names will be long associated with the
recollection of their gallant actions; and those of others, as of Mina
and the Empecinado,[45] will, at the same time, remind us of the gross
ingratitude with which their heroic efforts have been rewarded.
These daring men possessed the most perfect knowledge of the passes,
strengths, woods, mountains, and wildernesses, of the provinces in which
they warred; and the exact intelligence which they obtained from the
peasantry, made them intimately acquainted with the motions of the
enemy. Was too weak a French detachment moved, it ran the risk of being
cut off; was the garrison too feeble at the place which it left, the
fort was taken. The slightest as well as the most important objects, met
the attention of the guerillas; a courier could not move without a large
escort, nor could the intrusive King take the amusement of hunting,
however near to his capital, unless, like Earl Percy in the ballad,
attended by a guard of fifteen hundred men. The Juramentados, those
Spaniards that is, who had sworn allegiance to King Joseph, were of
course closely watched by the guerillas, and if they rendered themselves
inconveniently or obnoxiously active in the cause they had espoused,
were often kidnapped and punished as traitors; examples which rendered
submission to, or active co-operation with the French, at least as
imprudent as boldly opposing the invaders.
[Sidenote: THE GUERILLAS.]
The numbers of the guerillas varied at different times, as the chiefs
rose or declined in reputation, and as they possessed the means of
maintaining their followers. Some led small flying armies of two
thousand and upwards. Others, or the same chiefs under a reverse of
fortune, had only ten or twenty followers. The French often attempted to
surprise and destroy the parties by which they suffered most, and for
that purpose detached moveable columns from different points, to
assemble on the rendezvous of the guerilla. But, notwithstanding all
their activity and dexterity on such expeditions, they rarely succeeded
in catching their enemy at unawares; or if it so happened, the
individuals composing the band broke up, and dispersed by ways only
known to themselves; and when the French officers accounted them totally
annihilated, they were again assembled on another point, exercising a
partisan war on the rear, and upon the communications, of those who
lately expected to have them at their mercy. Thus invisible when they
were sought for, the guerillas seemed every where present when damage
could be done to the invaders. To chase them was to pursue the wind, and
to circumvent them was to detain water with a sieve.
Soult had recourse to severity to intimidate these desultory but most
annoying enemies, by publishing a proclamation [May 9] threatening to
treat the members of the guerillas, not as regular soldiers, but as
banditti taken in the fact, and thus execute such of them as chanced to
be made prisoners. The chiefs, in reply to this proclamation, published
a royal decree, as they termed it, declaring that each Spaniard was, by
the necessity of the times, a soldier, and that he was entitled to all
military privileges when taken with arms in his hands. They therefore
announced, that having ample means of retaliation in their power, they
would not scruple to make use of them, by executing three Frenchmen for
every one of their followers who should suffer in consequence of Soult's
unjust and inhuman proclamation.[46] These threats were fulfilled on
both sides. It is said, a horrid example of cruelty was given by a
French general, who in a manner crucified, by nailing to trees, eight
prisoners, whom he had taken from the guerillas of the Empecinado. The
daring Spaniard's passions were wound up too high to listen either to
pity or fear; he retaliated the cruelty by nailing the same number of
Frenchmen to the same trees, and leaving them to fill the forest of
Guadarama with their groans. But these excesses became rare on either
side; for the mutual interest of both parties soon led them to recur to
the ordinary rules of war.
We have given a slight sketch of the peculiar character of this singular
warfare, which constitutes a curious and interesting chapter in the
history of mankind, and serves to show how difficult it is to subject,
by the most formidable military means, a people who are determined not
to submit to the yoke. The probability of the case had not escaped the
acute eye of Buonaparte himself, who, though prescient of the
consequences, had not been able to resist the temptation of seizing upon
this splendid sovereignty, and who was still determined, as he is said
to have expressed himself, to reign at least over Spain, if he could not
reign over the Spanish people. But even this stern wish, adopted in
vengeance rather than in soberness of mind, could not, if gratified,
have removed the perplexity which was annexed to the affairs of the
Peninsula.
Buonaparte, in the spirit of calculation which was one of his great
attributes, had reckoned that Spain, when in his hands, would retain the
same channels of wealth which she had possessed from her South American
provinces. Had he been able to carry into execution his whole plan--had
the old king really embarked for Peru or Mexico, it might have happened,
that Napoleon's influence over Charles, his Queen, and her favourite
Godoy, could have been used to realize these expectations. But, in
consequence of the rupture which had taken place, the Spanish colonies,
at first taking part with the patriots of the mother country, made large
remittances to Cadiz for the support of the war against the French; and
when afterwards, adopting another view of the subject, the opportunity
appeared to them favourable for effecting their own independence, the
golden tide which annually carried tribute to Old Spain was entirely
dried up.
This Buonaparte had not reckoned upon, and he had now to regret an
improvident avidity, similar to that of Esop's boy, who killed the bird
which laid eggs of gold. The disappointment was as great as unexpected.
Napoleon had, from his private treasure, and the means he possessed in
France, discharged the whole expense of the two large armies, by whom
the territory of Spain was first occupied; and it was natural for him to
suppose, that in this, as in so many other cases, the French troops
should, after this first expedition, be paid and maintained at the
expense of the provinces in which they were quartered. This was the
rather to be expected, when Andalusia, Grenada, Valencia, fertile and
rich provinces, were added to the districts overrun by the invading
army. But, so general was the disinclination to the French, so universal
the disappearance of specie, so unintermitting the disturbances excited
by the guerillas, that both King Joseph, his court, and the French army,
were obliged to have constant recourse to Napoleon for the means of
supporting themselves; and such large remittances were made for these
purposes, that in all the countries occupied by the French, the Spanish
coin gradually disappeared from the circulation, and was replaced by
that of France. The being obliged, therefore, to send supplies to the
kingdom from which he had expected to receive them, was a subject of
great mortification to Napoleon, which was not, however, the only one
connected with the government he had established there.
[Sidenote: SITUATION OF KING JOSEPH.]
In accepting the crown of Spain at the hands of Napoleon, Joseph, who
was a man of sense and penetration, must have been sufficiently aware
that it was an emblem of borrowed and dependent sovereignty, gleaming
but with such reflected light as his brother's Imperial diadem might
shed upon it. He could not but know, that in making him King of Spain,
Napoleon retained over him all his rights as a subject of France, to
whose Emperor, in his regal as well as personal capacity, he still,
though a nominal monarch, was accounted to owe all vassalage. For this
he must have been fully prepared. But Joseph, who had a share of the
family pride, expected to possess with all others, save Buonaparte, the
external appearance at least of sovereignty, and was much dissatisfied
with the proceedings of the marshals and generals sent by his brother to
his assistance. Each of these, accustomed to command his own separate
corps d'armée, with no subordination save that to the Emperor only,
proceeded to act on his own authority, and his own responsibility,
levied contributions at pleasure, and regarded the authority of King
Joseph as that of a useless and ineffective civilian, who followed the
march along with the impediments and baggage of the camp, and to whom
little honour was reckoned due, and no obedience. In a word, so
complicated became the state of the war and of the government, so
embarrassing the rival pretensions set up by the several French
generals, against Joseph and against each other, that when Joseph came
to Paris to assist at the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa, he made
an express demand, that all the French troops in Spain should be placed
under his own command, or rather that of his Major-General; and in case
this was declined, he proposed to abdicate the crown, or, what was
equivalent, that the French auxiliaries should be withdrawn from Spain.
Buonaparte had on a former occasion, named his brother generalissimo of
the troops within his pretended dominions; he now agreed that the French
generals serving in Spain should be subjected, without exception, to the
control of Marshal Jourdan, as Major-General of King Joseph. But as
these commanders were removed from Buonaparte's immediate eye, and were
obliged to render an account of their proceedings both to the intrusive
king and to Napoleon, it was not difficult for them to contrive to play
off the one against the other, and in fact to conduct themselves as if
independent of both.
These very embarrassing circumstances were increased by the presence of
the English army, which, having twice driven the French from Portugal,
showed no intention of returning to their ships, but lay on the
frontiers of the latter kingdom, ready to encourage and assist the
continued resistance of Spain. It was not the fault of the
commander-in-chief that their duties were, for the present, in a great
measure limited to those of an army of observation. If the troops which
assisted in the ill-advised Walcheren expedition had been united to
those under the command of Lord Wellington, they would, at a loss
infinitely less, and yet greatly more honourably incurred, have driven
the French beyond the Ebro, or, more probably, have compelled them to
evacuate Spain. But the British Cabinet, though adopting new and more
bold, as well as more just ideas of the force of the country, could not
be expected perhaps all at once, and amid the clamour of an Opposition
who saw nothing but reckless desperation in whatever measures were
calculated to resist France, to hazard so much of the national force
upon one single adventure, although bearing in their own eyes a
promising aspect. Statesmen, and even those of no mean character, are
apt to forget, that where a large supply of men and money is necessary
to ensure the object aimed at, it is miserable policy to attempt to
economize either; and that such ill-timed thrift must render the
difficulties attending the expedition either altogether insurmountable,
or greatly add to the loss which must be encountered to overcome them.
In the meantime, Buonaparte, with respect to the Peninsula, convulsed as
it was by civil war in every province--half-subdued and
half-emancipated--causing him an immense expense, as well as endless
contradiction and mortification--stood much in the condition, to use a
popular simile, of one, who, having hold of a wolf, feels it equally
difficult to overpower the furious animal, and dangerous to let him go.
His power over the general mind, however, rested a great deal on the
opinion commonly received, that he was destined to succeed in whatever
enterprise he undertook. He himself entertained some such ideas
concerning the force of his own destiny; and as it was no part either of
his temper or his policy to abandon what he had once undertaken, he
determined to make a gigantic effort to drive the Leopards and their
Sepoy general, as the French papers called the British and Lord
Wellington, out of Portugal; to possess himself of Lisbon; and to shut
that avenue against foreign forces again attempting to enter the
Peninsula.
In obedience to the Emperor's commands, an army, to be termed that of
Portugal, was assembled, on a scale which the Peninsula had scarcely yet
seen. It was called by the French themselves 110,000 men, but certainly
rather exceeded than fell short of the number of 80,000. This large
force was put under the command of Massena, Prince of Essling, the
greatest name in the French army, after that of Napoleon, and so
favoured by fortune, that his master was wont to call him the Spoilt
Child of Victory.[47]
Lord Wellington's British troops did not exceed 25,000 in number, and
there were among them so many invalids, that his motions were
necessarily entirely limited to the defensive. He had, however, a
subsidiary force under his command, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese, in
whom other generals might have rested little confidence; but they were
receiving British pay and British allowances, were disciplined in the
British manner, and commanded by British officers; and Lord Wellington,
who had seen the unwarlike Hindu behave himself in similar
circumstances, like a companion not unworthy of the English soldier, had
little doubt of being able to awaken the dormant and suppressed, but
natural ardour of the natives of Portugal. This force had been, in a
great measure, trained under the auspices of Marshal Beresford, an
officer who has eternal claims on the gratitude of his country, for the
generous manner in which he devoted himself to a labour, which had at
first little that was flattering or promising; and for the very great
perfection to which, by dint of skill, good temper, and knowledge of
human nature, he was able to bring his task to completion at such an
important crisis.
It was, however, of the utmost importance to avoid trusting too much to
the Portuguese troops, which were so recently levied and trained, until
they had acquired something of the practice, as well as the theory, of
the military profession.
Thus, between the weak state of the British, and the imperfect
discipline of the Portuguese, Lord Wellington was reduced to temporary
inactivity, and had the mortification to see the frontier places of
Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida taken almost in the presence of his army. The
fears of the British nation were as usual excited in an unreasonable
degree by these two sinister events; but they had both come within the
calculations of Lord Wellington, whose advance to the frontier was
without the intention of incurring any risk for the preservation of
those places, but merely, by inducing the garrisons to hold out, to
protract as long as possible a defence, the duration of which must be
equally advantageous to the allies, and wasteful to the French.
[Sidenote: TORRES VEDRAS.]
The position on which he meant to maintain the defence of Portugal, had
been long since fixed upon, and the fortifications had been as long in
progress. It was that of Torres Vedras, where, as appears from his own
evidence before the Cintra Court of Inquiry, he had expected Junot to
make a defence, after the battle of Vimeiro. All Lord Wellington's
previous movements were adjusted carefully, for the purpose of drawing
the enemy from his supplies and communications to that point, beyond
which he proposed the invader should pass no farther.
Admirably as Lord Wellington's premises were connected with the
conclusion he aimed at, chance, or rather the presumption of the French
general, favoured him with an unexpected opportunity of adding glory to
a retreat, which was dictated by prudence. Massena, if he did justice to
British courage, thought himself entitled to set the military skill of
their general at utter defiance. He saw, indeed, their retrograde
movements, from the banks of the Coa towards Lisbon, conducted with all
the deliberate and guarded caution of a game at chess; but still these
movements were retrograde, nor could he resist the temptation, by a bold
and sudden attack, to attempt to precipitate the retreat of the British,
and drive them, if not into the sea, at least into their ships, to which
he doubted not they were ultimately bound.
This led to the battle of Busaco, which was fought on the 27th of
September 1810. Upon that memorable day the British army was assembled
on the Sierra, or ridge of the hills called Busaco. Massena, by turning
the extremity of the ridge, might have compelled the English general to
recommence his retreat; but he meditated a direct attack on the
position. It was made by five strong divisions of the French. Two
attacked on the right, one of which, forcing its way to the top of the
ridge, was bayoneted and driven headlong down; the other, suffering
great loss from the fire, gave way before reaching the top. Three
divisions attacked on the left, with nearly the same fate. Defeated upon
such unfavourable ground, the enemy lost, it was computed, at least 2000
men slain, besides very many wounded. The moral effect of the battle of
Busaco was immense. It assured both the English themselves, and the
people of Portugal, that the retreat of Lord Wellington's army was not
the effect of fear, but of a deliberate choice. It evinced, also, what
degree of trust might be securely reposed in the Portuguese levies.
"They had shown themselves worthy of contending," said Lord Wellington,
in his official despatch, "in the same ranks with British troops;" and
they felt their own confidence rise as their merits became
acknowledged.[48]
The French army, declining any farther attack on the Sierra, proceeded
to turn its extremity, and move upon Lisbon by the way of Coimbra. Here
Massena established a strong rear-guard with his hospitals and wounded,
but the inspiration occasioned by the victory of Busaco had not yet
subsided among the Portuguese. Colonel Trant, a British officer, who
commanded a body of Portuguese militia, rushed gallantly into Coimbra,
and carried the place by a sudden attack. About 5000 men, many of course
wounded, with all the French hospital stores, fell into the hands of the
Portuguese; and Massena who could not recover the place, suffered all
the loss of stores and provisions which that city afforded as a depôt,
and which the fertile district in the neighbourhood might have enabled
him to collect.
Great was the surprise of both armies when the retreat of the British,
and advance of the French, suddenly terminated. The former entered a
regular position, which, by the utmost exertion of skill and labour, had
been rendered almost impregnable, being most formidably protected by
field-works and heavy guns. They found that the Tagus and port of Lisbon
afforded them assurance of subsistence, even in plenty, and that their
inferiority in numbers was completely made-up to them by the strength of
their position.
The French, on the contrary, who had fondly expected to enter Lisbon as
conquerors, found themselves in a country wasted by the hands of its
cultivators; without hospitals or magazines in their rear; in front a
foe, of whom they had lately felt the strength; and around, a hostile
population, for the greater part in arms. If, in such a situation,
Massena could be said to besiege Lisbon, he was, nevertheless, in the
utmost danger of suffering those extremities of famine which usually
fall to the lot of the beleaguered party. He seemed, by some strange
transmutation, to have changed lots with the natives of Lisbon, and to
suffer all the evils which he expected to inflict.
The war now paused on both sides. Lord Wellington had reached the point
of his defence. Massena seemed at a loss where to commence his attack.
The deer was turned to bay, but the dog sprung not. The eyes of all
Europe were rested upon the Tagus, on whose banks were to be decided the
pretensions to superiority asserted by two great generals in the name of
two mighty nations. But that event was suspended for several months,
during which it is fitting that we should resume the narrative of other
matters.
FOOTNOTES:
[39] "It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the
slaughter. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, closed not
for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those who were
drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that 10,000
Portuguese died on that unhappy day! The loss of the French did not
exceed 500 men."--NAPIER, vol. ii., p. 207. See also SOUTHEY, vol. iii.,
p. 249.
[40] Southey, vol. iv., p. 10. The reader is requested to compare this
account with that given by Lord Burghersh, in his "Memoir on the Early
Campaigns of Wellington," p. 77--where the details are somewhat
differently represented--ED. (1842.)
[41] "Victor sent soldiers to every house, with orders to the
inhabitants immediately to receive and accommodate the wounded of the
two nations, who were lodged together, one English and one Frenchman;
and he expressly directed that the Englishman should always be served
first."--SOUTHEY, vol. iv., p. 49.
[42] Southey, vol. iii., p. 168.
[43] Southey, vol. iv., p. 159.
[44] Napier, vol. ii., p. 349; Southey, vol. iii., p. 511.
[45] "Various explanations have been offered of this name. One account
says, that upon finding his family murdered by the French, Juan Martin
Diaz smeared his face with pitch and made a solemn vow of vengeance.
Another, that he was so called because of his swarthy complexion. But in
the account of his life it is said, that all the inhabitants of
Castrillo de Duero, where he was born, have this nickname
indiscriminately given them by their neighbours, in consequence of a
black mud, called _pecina_, deposited by a little stream which runs
through the place; and the appellation became peculiar to him from his
celebrity."--SOUTHEY, vol. iii., p. 511.
[46] Southey, vol. iv., p. 405.
[47] Southey, vol. iv., p. 415.
[48] Southey, vol. iv., p. 482.