THE RECIPROCITY TREATY OF 1874
Mr. Brown's position in regard to reciprocity has already been
described. He set a high value upon the American market for Canadian
products, and as early as 1863 he had urged the government of that day
to prepare for the renewal of the treaty. He resigned from the
coalition ministry, because, to use his own words, "I felt very
strongly that though we in Canada derived great advantage from the
treaty of 1854, the American people derived still greater advantage
from it. I had no objection to that, and was quite ready to renew the
old treaty, or even to extend it largely on fair terms of reciprocity.
But I was not willing to ask for a renewal as a favour to Canada; I
was not willing to offer special inducements for renewal without fair
concessions in return; I was not willing that the canals and inland
waters of Canada should be made the joint property of the United
States and Canada and be maintained at their joint expense; I was not
willing that the custom and excise duty of Canada should be
assimilated to the prohibitory rates of the United States; and very
especially was I unwilling that any such arrangement should be entered
into with the United States, dependent on the frail tenure of
reciprocal legislation, repealable at any moment at the caprice of
either party." Unless a fair treaty for a definite term of years could
be obtained, he thought it better that each country should take its
own course and that Canada should seek new channels of trade.
The negotiations of 1866 failed, mainly because under the American
offer, "the most important provisions of the expiring treaty, relating
to the free interchange of the products of the two countries, were
entirely set aside, and the duties proposed to be levied were almost
prohibitory in their character." The free-list offered by the United
States reads like a diplomatic joke: "burr-millstones, rags,
fire-wood, grindstones, plaster and gypsum." The real bar in this and
subsequent negotiations, was the unwillingness of the Americans to
enter into any kind of arrangement for extended trade. They did not
want to break in upon their system of protection, and they did not set
a high value on access to the Canadian market. In most of the
negotiations, the Americans are found trying to drive the best
possible bargain in regard to the Canadian fisheries and canals, and
fighting shy of reciprocity in trade. They considered that a free
exchange of natural products would be far more beneficial to Canada
than to the United States. As time went on, they began to perceive the
advantages of the Canadian market for American manufactures. But when
this was apparent, Canadian feeling, which had hitherto been
unanimous for reciprocity, began to show a cleavage, which was sharply
defined in the discussion preceding the election of 1891. Reciprocity
in manufactures was opposed, because of the competition to which it
would expose Canadian industries, and because it was difficult to
arrange it without assimilating the duties of the two countries and
discriminating against British imports into Canada.
In earlier years, however, even the inclusion of manufactures in the
treaty of reciprocity was an inducement by which the Americans set
little store. The rejected offer made by Canada in 1869, about the
exact terms of which doubt exists, included a list of manufactures. In
1871 the American government declined to consider an offer to renew
the treaty of 1854 in return for access to the deep sea fisheries of
Canada. The Brown Treaty of 1874, which contained a list of
manufactures, was rejected at Washington, while in Canada it was
criticized as striking a blow at the infant manufactures of the
country.
The Brown mission of 1874 was a direct result of the Treaty of
Washington. Under that treaty there was to be an arbitration to
determine the value of the American use of the Canadian inshore
fisheries for twelve years, in excess of the value of the concessions
made by the United States. Before the fall of the Macdonald
government, Mr. Rothery, registrar of the High Court of Admiralty in
England, arrived in Canada as the agent of the British government to
prepare the Canadian case for arbitration. In passing through Toronto
Mr. Rothery spoke to several public men with a view to acquiring
information as to the value of the fisheries. Mr. Brown availed
himself of that opportunity to suggest to him that a treaty of
reciprocity in trade would be a far better compensation to Canada than
a cash payment. Mr. Rothery carried this proposal to Washington, where
it was received with some favour.
Meantime the Mackenzie government had been moving in the matter, and
in February 1874, Mr. Brown was informed that there was a movement at
Washington for the renewal of the old reciprocity treaty, and was
asked to make an unofficial visit to that city and estimate the
chances of success. On February 12th, he wrote: "We know as yet of but
few men who are bitterly against us. I saw General Butler, at his
request, on the subject, and I understand he will support us. Charles
Sumner is heart and hand with us, and is most kind to me personally."
On February 14th, he expressed his belief that if a bill for the
renewal of the reciprocity treaty could be submitted to congress at
once, it would be carried.
A British commission was issued on March 17th, 1874, appointing Sir
Edward Thornton, British minister at Washington, and Mr. Brown, as
joint plenipotentiaries to negotiate a treaty of fisheries, commerce
and navigation with the government of the United States. This mode of
representation was insisted upon by the Mackenzie government, in view
of the unsatisfactory result of the negotiations of 1871, when Sir
John A. Macdonald, as one commissioner out of six, made a gallant but
unsuccessful fight for the rights of Canada. Mr. Brown was selected,
not only because of his knowledge of and interest in reciprocity, but
because of his attitude during the war, which had made him many warm
friends among those who opposed slavery and stood for the union.
Negotiations were formally opened on March 28th. The Canadians
proposed the renewal of the old reciprocity treaty, and the
abandonment of the fishery arbitration. The American secretary of
state, Mr. Fish, suggested the enlargement of the Canadian canals, and
the addition of manufactures to the free list. The Canadian
commissioners having agreed to consider these proposals, a project of
a treaty was prepared to form a basis of discussion. It provided for
the renewal of the old reciprocity treaty for twenty-one years, with
the addition of certain manufactures; the abandonment of the fishery
arbitration; complete reciprocity in coasting; the enlargement of the
Welland and St. Lawrence canals; the opening of the Canadian, New
York, and Michigan canals to vessels of both countries; the free
navigation of Lake Michigan; the appointment of a joint commission for
improving waterways, protecting fisheries and erecting lighthouses on
the Great Lakes. Had the treaty been ratified, there would have been
reciprocity in farm and other natural products, and in a very
important list of manufactures, including agricultural implements,
axles, iron, in the forms of bar, hoop, pig, puddled, rod, sheet or
scrap; iron nails, spikes, bolts, tacks, brads and springs; iron
castings; locomotives and railroad cars and trucks; engines and
machinery for mills, factories and steamboats; fire-engines; wrought
and cast steel; steel plates and rails; carriages, carts, wagons and
sleighs; leather and its manufactures, boots, shoes, harness and
saddlery; cotton grain bags, denims, jeans, drillings, plaids and
ticking; woollen tweeds; cabinet ware and furniture, and machines made
of wood; printing paper for newspapers, paper-making machines, type,
presses, folders, paper cutters, ruling machines, stereotyping and
electrotyping apparatus. In general terms, it was as near to
unrestricted reciprocity as was possible without raising the question
of discriminating against the products of Great Britain.
Mr. Brown found that American misapprehensions as to Canada, its
revenue, commerce, shipping, railways and industries were "truly
marvellous." It was generally believed that the trade of Canada was of
little value to the United States; that the reciprocity treaty had
enriched Canada at their expense; and that the abolition of the treaty
had brought Canada nearly to its wits' end. There was some excuse for
these misapprehensions. Until confederation, the trade returns from
the different provinces were published separately, if at all. No clear
statement of the combined traffic of the provinces with the United
States was published until 1874, and even Canadians were ignorant of
its extent. American protectionists founded a "balance of trade"
argument on insufficient data. They saw that old Canada sold large
quantities of wheat and flour to the United States, but not that the
United States sent larger quantities to the Maritime Provinces; that
Nova Scotia and Cape Breton sold coal to Boston and New York, but not
that five times as much was sent from Pennsylvania to Canada. Brown
prepared a memorandum showing that the British North American
provinces, from 1820 to 1854, had bought one hundred and sixty-seven
million dollars worth of goods from the United States, and the United
States only sixty-seven million dollars worth from the provinces; that
in the thirteen years of the treaty, the trade between the two
countries was six hundred and thirty million dollars according to the
Canadian returns, and six hundred and seventy million dollars
according to the American returns; and that the so-called "balance of
trade" in this period was considerably against Canada. It was shown
that the repeal of the treaty did not ruin Canadian commerce; that the
external trade of Canada which averaged one hundred and fifteen
million dollars a year from 1854 to 1862, rose to one hundred and
forty-two million dollars in the year following the abrogation, and
to two hundred and forty million dollars in 1873. In regard to wheat,
flour, provisions, and other commodities of which both countries had a
surplus, the effect of the prohibitory American duties had been to
send the products of Canada to compete with those of the United States
in neutral markets.
This memorandum was completed on April 27th and was immediately handed
to Mr. Fish. It was referred to the treasury department, where it was
closely examined and admitted to be correct. From that time there was
a marked improvement in American feeling.
Brown also carried on a vigorous propaganda in the newspapers. In
New York the _Tribune_, _Herald_, _Times_, _World_, _Evening
Post_, _Express_, _Journal of Commerce_, _Graphic_, _Mail_,
and other journals, declared in favour of a new treaty; and in Boston,
Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati and other large cities, the press was
equally favourable. A charge originated in Philadelphia and was
circulated in the United States and Canada, that this unanimity of
the press was obtained by the corrupt use of public money. Mr. Brown,
in his speech in the senate of Canada denied this; said that not a
shilling had been spent illegitimately, and that the whole cost of the
negotiation to the people of Canada would be little more than four
thousand dollars.
In his correspondence Brown speaks of meeting Senator Conkling,
General Garfield and Carl Schurz, all of whom were favourable.
Secretary Fish is described as courteous and painstaking, but timid
and lacking in grasp of the subject, and Brown speaks impatiently of
the delays that are throwing the consideration of the draft treaty
over to the end of the session of congress.
It did not reach the senate until two days before adjournment. "The
president" wrote Mr. Brown on June 20th, "sent a message to the senate
with the treaty, urging a decision before the adjournment of congress.
I thought the message very good; but it has the defect of not speaking
definitely of this message as his own and his government's and calling
on the senate to sustain him. Had he done this, the treaty would have
been through now. But now, with a majority in its favour, there seems
some considerable danger of its being thrown over until December." The
treaty was sent to the Foreign Relations Committee of the senate.
"There were six present; three said to be for us, one against, and two
for the measure personally, but wanted to hear from the country before
acting. How it will end, no one can tell." As a matter of fact it
ended there and then, as far as the United States were concerned.
Of the objections urged against the treaty in Canada, the most
significant was that directed against the free list of manufactures.
This was, perhaps, the first evidence of the wave of protectionist
sentiment that overwhelmed the Mackenzie government. In his speech in
the senate, in 1875, justifying the treaty, Mr. Brown said: "Time was
in Canada when the imposition of duty on any article was regarded as a
misfortune, and the slightest addition to an existing duty was
resented by the people. But increasing debt brought new burdens; the
deceptive cry of 'incidental protection' got a footing in the land;
and from that the step has been easy to the bold demand now set up by
a few favoured industries, that all the rest of the community ought to
be, and should rejoice to be, taxed seventeen and a half per cent, to
keep them in existence."
Brown joined issue squarely with the protectionists. "I contend that
there is not one article contained in the schedules that ought not to
be wholly free of duty, either in Canada or the United States, in the
interest of the public. I contend that the finance minister of Canada
who--treaty or no treaty with the United States--was able to announce
the repeal of all customs duties on the entire list of articles in
Schedules A, B, and C,--even though the lost revenue was but shifted
to articles of luxury, would carry with him the hearty gratitude of
the country. Nearly every article in the whole list of manufactures is
either of daily consumption and necessity among all classes of our
population, or an implement of trade, or enters largely into the
economical prosecution of the main industries of the Dominion." The
criticism of the sliding scale, of which so much was heard at the
time, was only another phase of the protectionist objection. The
charge that the treaty would discriminate in favour of American
against British imports was easily disposed of. Brown showed that
every article admitted free from the United States would be admitted
free from Great Britain. But as this meant British as well as American
competition, it made the case worse from the protectionist point of
view. The rejection of the treaty by the United States left a clear
field for the protectionists in Canada.
Four years after Mr. Brown's speech defending the treaty, he made his
last important speech in the senate, and almost the last public
utterance of his life, attacking Tilley's protectionist budget, and
nailing his free-trade colours to the mast.