CONFEDERATION
"Events stronger than advocacy, events stronger than men," to repeat
D'Arcy McGee's phrase, combined in 1864 to remove confederation from
the field of speculation to the field of action. For several years the
British government had been urging upon Canada the necessity for
undertaking a greater share of her own defence. This view was
expressed with disagreeable candour in the London _Times_ and
elsewhere on the occasion of the defeat of the Militia Bill of 1862.
The American Civil War emphasized the necessity for measures of
defence. At the time of the _Trent_ seizure, Great Britain and the
United States were on the verge of war, of which Canada would have
been the battleground. As the war progressed, the world was astonished
by the development of the military power of the republic. It seemed
not improbable, at that time, that when the success of the North was
assured, its great armies would be used for the subjugation of Canada.
The North had come to regard Canada as a home of Southern sympathizers
and a place in which conspiracies against the republic were hatched by
Southerners. Though Canada was not to blame for the use that was made
of its soil, yet some ill-feeling was aroused, and public men were
warranted in regarding the peril as real.
Canada was also about to lose a large part of its trade. For ten years
that trade had been built up largely on the basis of reciprocity with
the United States, and the war had largely increased the American
demand for Canadian products. It was generally expected, and that
expectation was fulfilled, that the treaty would be abrogated by the
United States. It was feared that the policy of commercial
non-intercourse would be carried even farther, the bonding system
abolished, and Canada cut off from access to the seaboard during the
winter.[14]
If we add to these difficulties the domestic dissensions of Canada, we
must recognize that the outlook was dark. Canada was then a fringe of
settlement, extending from the Detroit River to the Gulf of St.
Lawrence, having no independent access to the Atlantic except during
the summer. She had been depending largely upon Great Britain for
defence, and upon the United States for trade. She had received
warning that both these supports were to be weakened, and that she
must rely more on her own resources, find new channels of trade and
new means of defence. The country lay in the midst of the continent,
isolated from the west, isolated in part from the east, with a
powerful and not too friendly neighbour to the south. Upper and Lower
Canada, with their racial differences as sharply defined as in the
days of Lord Durham, regarded each other with distrust; one political
combination after another had failed to obtain a working majority of
the legislature, and domestic government was paralyzed. Such a
combination of danger and difficulty, within and without, might well
arouse alarm, rebuke faction and stimulate patriotism.
The election of 1863 was virtually a drawn battle. The Reformers had a
large majority in Upper Canada, their opponents a like majority in
Lower Canada, and thus not only the two parties, but the two
provinces, were arrayed against each other. The Reform government,
headed by Sandfield Macdonald and Dorion, found its position of
weakness and humiliation intolerable, and resigned in March, 1864. The
troubled governor-general called upon A. T. Fergusson Blair, a
colleague of Sandfield Macdonald, to form a new administration. He
failed. He called upon Cartier with a like result. He finally had a
little better success with Sir E. P. Tache, a veteran who had been a
colleague of Baldwin, of Hincks, and of Macdonald. Tache virtually
restored the Cartier-Macdonald government, taking in Foley and McGee
from the other side. In less than three months, on June 14th, this
government was defeated, and on the very day of its defeat relief
came. Letters written by Brown to his family during the month
preceding the crisis throw some light on the situation.
On May 13th he writes: "Things here are very unsatisfactory; no one
sees his way out of the mess--and there is no way but my
way--representation by population. There is great talk to-day of
coalition--and what do you think? Why, that in order to make the
coalition successful, the imperial government are to offer me the
government of one of the British colonies. I have been gravely asked
to-day by several if it is true, and whether I would accept. My reply
was, I would rather be proprietor of the _Globe_ newspaper for a few
years than be governor-general of Canada, much less a trumpery little
province. But I need hardly tell you, the thing has no foundation,
beyond sounding what could be done to put me out of the way and let
mischief go on. But we won't be bought at any price, shall we?" On May
18th he writes that he has brought on his motion for constitutional
changes, and on May 20th that it has carried and taken Cartier and
Macdonald by surprise. "Much that is directly practical may not flow
from the committee, but it is an enormous gain to have the
acknowledgment on our journals that a great evil exists, and that some
remedy must be found."
On June 14th Mr. Brown, as chairman of a committee appointed to
consider the difficulties connected with the government of Canada,
brought in a report recommending "a federative system, applied either
to Canada alone, or to the whole British North American provinces."
This was the day on which the Tache government was defeated. On the
subject of the negotiations which followed between Mr. Brown and the
government, there is a difference between the account given by Sir
John Macdonald in the House, and accepted by all parties as official,
and a letter written by Mr. Brown to a member of his family. The
official account represents the first movement as coming from Mr.
Brown, the letter says that the suggestion came from the
governor-general. It would seem likely that the idea moved gradually
from informal conversations to formal propositions. The governor had
proposed a coalition on the defeat of the Macdonald-Dorion government,
and he repeated the suggestion on the defeat of the Tache-Macdonald
government; but his official memorandum contains no reference to
constitutional changes. It would seem that there was a great deal of
talk of coalition in the air before Brown made his proposals, and
perhaps some talk of offering him an appointment that would remove him
from public life. But the Conservative ministers were apparently
thinking merely of a coalition that would break the dead-lock, and
enable the ordinary business of the country to proceed. Brown's idea
was to find a permanent remedy in the form of a change in the
constitution. When he made his proposal to co-operate with his
opponents for the purpose of settling the difficulties between Upper
and Lower Canada, his proposal fell upon minds familiarized with the
idea of coalition, and hence its ready acceptance. On his part, Mr.
Brown was ready to abate certain party advantages in order to bring
about constitutional reform. Mr. Ferrier, in the debate on
confederation, says that it was he who suggested that the proposal
made by Mr. Brown to Mr. Pope and Mr. Morris should be communicated to
the government. Ferrier gives a lively account of the current gossip
as to the meeting between Brown and the ministers. "I think I can
remember this being said, that when Mr. Galt met Mr. Brown he received
him with that manly, open frankness which characterizes him; that when
Mr. Cartier met Mr. Brown, he looked carefully to see that his two
Rouge friends were not behind him, and that when he was satisfied they
were not, he embraced him with open arms and swore eternal friendship;
and that Mr. Macdonald, at a very quick glance, saw there was an
opportunity of forming a great and powerful dependency of the British
empire.... We all thought, in fact, that a political millennium had
arrived."
In a family letter written at this time Mr. Brown said: "June 18th,
past one in the morning. We have had great times since I wrote you. On
Tuesday we defeated the government by a majority of two. They asked
the governor-general to dissolve parliament, and he consented; but
before acting on it, at the governor's suggestion, they applied to me
to aid them in reconstructing the government, on the basis of settling
the constitutional difficulties between Upper and Lower Canada. I
refused to accept office, but agreed to help them earnestly and
sincerely in the matter they proposed. Negotiations were thereupon
commenced, and are still going on, with considerable hope of finding a
satisfactory solution to our trouble. The facts were announced in the
House to-day by John A. Macdonald, amid tremendous cheering from both
sides of the House. You never saw such a scene; but you will have it
all in the papers, so I need not repeat. Both sides are extremely
urgent that I should accept a place in the government, if it were only
for a week; but I will not do this unless it is absolutely needed to
the success of the negotiations. A more agreeable proposal is that I
should go to England to arrange the new constitution with the imperial
government. But as the whole thing may fail, we will not count our
chickens just yet."
Sir Richard Cartwright, then a young member of parliament, relates an
incident illustrating the tension on men's minds at that time. He
says: "On that memorable afternoon when Mr. Brown, not without
emotion, made his statement to a hushed and expectant House, and
declared that he was about to ally himself with Sir Georges Cartier
and his friends for the purpose of carrying out confederation, I saw
an excitable, elderly little French member rush across the floor,
climb up on Mr. Brown, who, as you remember, was of a stature
approaching the gigantic, fling his arms about his neck and hang
several seconds there suspended, to the visible consternation of Mr.
Brown and to the infinite joy of all beholders, pit, box and gallery
included."[15]
The official account given by Mr. Macdonald in the House, is that
immediately after the defeat of the government on Tuesday night (the
14th), and on the following morning, Mr. Brown spoke to several
supporters of the administration, strongly urging that the present
crisis should be utilized in settling forever the constitutional
difficulties between Upper and Lower Canada, and assuring them that he
was ready to co-operate with the existing or any other administration
that would deal with the question promptly and firmly, with a view to
its final settlement. Mr. Morris and Mr. Pope, to whom the suggestion
was made, obtained leave to communicate it to Mr. John A. Macdonald
and Mr. Galt. On June 17th Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Galt called upon Mr.
Brown. In the conversation that ensued Mr. Brown expressed his extreme
reluctance to entering the ministry, declaring that the public mind
would be shocked by such an arrangement. The personal question being
dropped for the time, Mr. Brown asked what remedy was proposed. Mr.
Macdonald and Mr. Galt replied that their remedy was a federal union
of all the British North American provinces. Mr. Brown said that this
would not be acceptable to Upper Canada. The federation of all the
provinces ought to come and would come in time, but it had not yet
been thoroughly considered by the people; and even were this
otherwise, there were so many parties to be consulted that its
adoption was uncertain and remote. He expressed his preference for
parliamentary reform, based on population. On further discussion it
appeared that a compromise might be found in an alternative plan, a
federal union of all the British North American provinces or a federal
union of Upper and Lower Canada, with provision for the admission of
the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory when they desired.
There was apparently a difference of opinion as to which alternative
should be presented first. One memorandum reduced to writing gave the
preference to the larger federation; the second and final memorandum
contained this agreement: "The government are prepared to pledge
themselves to bring in a measure next session for the purpose of
removing existing difficulties by introducing the federal principle
into Canada, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime
Provinces and the North-West Territory to be incorporated into the
same system of government. And the government will, by sending
representatives to the Lower Provinces and to England, use its best
endeavours to secure the assent of those interests which are beyond
the control of our own legislation to such a measure as may enable all
British North America to be united under a general legislature based
upon the federal principle."
It was Mr. Brown who insisted on this mode of presentation. At the
convention of 1859 he had expressed in the strongest language his hope
for the creation of a great Canadian nationality; and he had for years
advocated the inclusion of the North-West Territories in a greater
Canada. But he regarded the settlement of the difficulties of Upper
and Lower Canada as the most pressing question of the hour, and he did
not desire that the solution of this question should be delayed or
imperilled. Galt's plan of federation, comprehensive and admirable as
it was, had failed because the assent of the Maritime Provinces could
not be secured; and for five years afterwards no progress had been
made. It was natural that Brown should be anxiously desirous that the
plan for the reform of the union of the Canadas should not fail,
whatever else might happen.
On June 21st, Mr. Brown called a meeting of the members of the
Opposition for Upper Canada. It was resolved, on motion of Mr. Hope
Mackenzie, "that we approve of the course which has been pursued by
Mr. Brown in the negotiations with the government, and that we approve
of the project of a federal union of the Canadas, with provision for
the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory,
as one basis on which the constitutional difficulties now existing
could be settled." Thirty-four members voted for this motion, five
declining to vote. A motion that three members of the Opposition
should enter the government was not so generally supported, eleven
members, including Alexander Mackenzie and Oliver Mowat, voting in the
negative. The Lower Canadian Reformers held aloof, and in the
subsequent debate in the legislature, strongly opposed confederation.
There were many evidences of the keen interest taken by the
governor-general (Monk) in the negotiations. On June 21st he wrote to
Mr. Brown: "I think the success or failure of the negotiations which
have been going on for some days, with a view to the formation of a
strong government on a broad basis, depends very much on your
consenting to come into the cabinet.
"Under these circumstances I must again take the liberty of pressing
upon you, by this note, my opinion of the grave responsibility which
you will take upon yourself if you refuse to do so.
"Those who have hitherto opposed your views have consented to join
with you in good faith for the purpose of extricating the province
from what appears to me a very dangerous position.
"They have frankly offered to take up and endeavour to settle on
principles satisfactory to all, the great constitutional question
which you, by your energy and ability, have made your own.
"The details of that settlement must necessarily be the subject of
grave debate in the cabinet, and I confess I cannot see how you are to
take part in that discussion, or how your opinions can be brought to
bear on the arrangement of the question, unless you occupy a place at
the council table.
"I hope I may, without impropriety, ask you to take these opinions
into consideration before you arrive at a final decision as to your
own course."
Mr. Brown wrote home that he, in consenting to enter the cabinet, was
influenced by the vote of the Reform members, by private letters from
many quarters, and still more by the extreme urgency of the
governor-general. "The thing that finally determined me was the fact,
ascertained by Mowat and myself, that unless we went in the whole
effort for constitutional changes would break down, and the enormous
advantages gained by our negotiations probably be lost. Finally, at
three o'clock yester-day, I consented to enter the cabinet as
'president of the council,' with other two seats in the cabinet at my
disposal--one of which Mowat will take, and probably Macdougall the
other. We consented with great reluctance, but there was no help for
it; and it was such a temptation to have possibly the power of
settling the sectional troubles of Canada forever. The announcement
was made in the House yester-day, and the excitement all over the
province is intense. I send you an official copy of the proceedings
during the negotiations, from which you will see the whole story. By
next mail I intend to send you some extracts from the newspapers. The
unanimity of sentiment is without example in this country, and were it
not that I know at their exact value the worth of newspaper
laudations, I might be puffed up a little in my own conceit. After the
explanations by ministers I had to make a speech, but was so excited
and nervous at the events of the last few days that I nearly broke
down. However, after a little I got over it, and made (as Mowat
alleges) the most telling speech I ever made. There was great cheering
when I sat down, and many members from both sides crowded round me to
congratulate me. In short, the whole movement is a grand success, and
I really believe will have an immense influence on the future
destinies of Canada."
The formation of the coalition cabinet was announced on June 30th.
Foley, Buchanan and Simpson, members of the Upper Canadian section of
the Tache-Macdonald ministry, retired, and their places were taken by
the Hon. George Brown, Oliver Mowat, and William Macdougall. Otherwise
the ministry remained unchanged. Sir E. P. Tache, though a
Conservative, was acceptable to both parties, and was well fitted to
head a genuine coalition. But it must have been evident from the first
that the character of a coalition would not be long maintained. The
Reform party, which had just defeated the government in the
legislature, was represented by only three ministers out of twelve;
and this, with Macdonald's skill in managing combinations of men, made
it morally certain that the ministry must eventually become
Conservative, just as happened in the case of the coalition of 1854.
Brown had asked that the Reformers be represented by four ministers
from Upper Canada and two from Lower Canada, which would, as nearly as
possible, have corresponded with the strength of his party in the
legislature. Galt and Macdonald represented that a change in the
personnel of the Lower Canadian section of the cabinet would disturb
the people and shake their confidence. The Lower Canadian Liberal
leaders, Dorion and Holton, were adverse to the coalition scheme,
regarding it as a mere device for enabling Macdonald and his friends
to hold office.
Mowat and Brown were re-elected without difficulty, but Macdougall met
with strong opposition in North Ontario. Brown, who was working hard
in his interests, found this opposition so strong among Conservatives
that he telegraphed to Macdonald, who sent a strong letter on behalf
of Macdougall. Brown said that the opposition came chiefly from
Orangemen. The result was that Macdougall, in spite of the assistance
of the two leaders, was defeated by one hundred. He was subsequently
elected for North Lanark. In other bye-elections the advocates of
confederation were generally successful. In the confederation debate,
Brown said there had been twenty-five contests, fourteen for the
Upper House and eleven for the Lower House, and that only one or two
opponents of confederation had been elected.
There had been for some years an intermittent movement for the union
of the Maritime Provinces, and in 1864 their legislatures had
authorized the holding of a convention at Charlottetown. Accordingly
eight members of the Canadian ministry visited Charlottetown, where
they were cordially welcomed. They dwelt on the advantage of
substituting the larger for the smaller plan of union, and the result
of their representations was that arrangements were made for the
holding of a general conference at Quebec later in the year. The
Canadian ministers made a tour through the Maritime Provinces,
speaking in public and familiarizing the people with the plan. At a
banquet in Halifax, Mr. Brown gave a full exposition of the project
and its advantages in regard to defence, commerce, national strength
and dignity, adding that it would end the petty strifes of a small
community, and elevate politics and politicians.
The scheme was destined to undergo a more severe ordeal in the
Maritime Provinces than these festive gatherings. For the present,
progress was rapid, and the maritime tour was followed by the
conference at Quebec, which opened on October 10th, 1864.
FOOTNOTES:
[14] Sir Richard Cartwright says also that the credit of Canada was
very low, largely because of the troubles of the Grand Trunk Railway
Company. _Memories of Confederation_, p. 3.
[15] _Memories of Confederation._ An address delivered before the
Canadian Club of Ottawa, January 20th, 1906.