Produced by Turgut Dincer, Charlie Howard, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive)
EUROPE SINCE 1918
BOOKS BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS
THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE
THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA
THE NEW MAP OF ASIA
THE BLACKEST PAGE IN MODERN HISTORY
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND AND THE NEAR EAST
AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS
EUROPE SINCE 1918
VENIZELOS (in the Modern Statesmen Series)
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORLD WAR
THE LITTLE CHILDREN OF THE LUXEMBOURG
SONGS FROM THE TRENCHES
PARIS REBORN
RIVIERA TOWNS
FRANCE AND OURSELVES
PORTS OF FRANCE
EUROPE SINCE 1918
BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS
Author of “The New Map of Europe,” “An Introduction to World
Politics,” etc.
[Illustration]
THE CENTURY CO.
_New York and London_
Copyright, 1923, by
THE CENTURY CO.
PRINTED IN U. S. A.
TO
HENRY MORGENTHAU
Who does not share my lack of faith in the Versailles Covenant and
whose judgments of men and events are less harsh and sweeping than
mine, because he is older and wiser than the writer and because he has
not allowed the dark clouds of these days to obscure his vision of the
goal.
FOREWORD
The world of 1914, as we see it now, reminds us of Humpty Dumpty.
Having climbed upon its wall with difficulty, to keep from being
involved in every petty quarrel between nations and coalitions, the
world had somehow managed to sit there for a hundred years. The _status
quo_ was revised here and there occasionally by violence. But the
violence did not set back the hands of the clock, defy economic laws,
or, with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine, make for international
political instability. The developments of the nineteenth century were
a logical growth, the result of the working out of economic laws, which
means that thoughtful men and strong men led virile national groups
successfully because they knew how to adapt their foreign policies
to, and shape them by, changing political, economic, and social world
conditions.
None was satisfied with Humpty Dumpty, but, for fear of the
consequences, all bolstered him up and steadied him whenever he showed
signs of toppling. When he did fall, the first dismay gave way to
rejoicing. Now was our chance to make him over again into what we
wanted him to be.
We forgot our nursery-rime. A new world order became our battle-cry.
The Central Empires stood for the old order; the Entente Allies were
determined to make a clean sweep of the international conditions that
caused wars. Glibly repeated from mouth to mouth “A war to end war”
was the phrase that appealed to our imagination. How? By emancipating
subject races, by resurrecting submerged nations, by guaranteeing
collectively the independence of weak states and the sanctity of
treaties and international law.
We forgot our nursery-rime, I say. Some of us had no intention of
actually letting Humpty Dumpty fall to pieces, and all of us thought
we could put him together again according to our own plan and in a way
that would suit us. But when we entered the fray idealistic principles
and formulæ became weapons and not goals. Before November 11, 1918, we
used our principles solely to break down the morale of our enemies; and
since the defeat of Germany instead of making peace we have continued
to juggle with our ideals as we did in war-time. So the world is still
actually at war. The treaties forced upon the vanquished enemies have
not been taken seriously. One of them has already come up for drastic
revision and the others are not being fully enforced.
In justification of their unwillingness to apply in making peace the
principles they had solemnly pledged themselves to use as the basis
of the treaties, Entente statesmen had no grounds for claiming either
(a) that the American President and his nation, late comers in the
war, wrongly interpreted and formulated the Entente war aims, or (b)
that the fulfilment of their promises was contingent upon American
coöperation. Self-determination, the resurrection of subject nations,
the rectification of frontiers to satisfy irredentist aspirations, may
have been doctrines promulgated in a small measure as a gallery appeal
to public opinion at home and abroad; but the main reason was to break
down the internal military unity of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and
Turkey. These doctrines were not inspired by President Wilson or other
American ideologues, nor were they proclaimed with the idea that the
United States would help to carry them out.
It was not intended that they should be carried out. But the new forces
set loose were too strong to control. Peoples all over the world
clamored for rights and privileges that it was the purpose to grant
only to peoples that had been subject to the vanquished powers. To
this cause of confusion, unrest, conspiracy, and open rebellion, were
added the falling out of the victors over the spoils of war and the
determination of France and some of the smaller nations to apply the
law of retaliation to their now defenseless oppressors.
These are the three reasons why Europe since 1918 has not found peace.
The League of Nations is impotent, with or without the United States as
a member, to restore Europe to peace until the three Furies--Vanity,
Greed, and Revenge--cease raging.
After the World War the movement in the United States to induce the
American people to underwrite the Paris peace settlement did not
succeed. The overwhelming rejection of their panacea for the ills of
the world did not discourage the supporters of the Versailles Covenant.
After four years they are returning to the campaign for American
participation in the Versailles League. Since they cannot disguise
the seriousness of conditions in Europe as the fourth year of the
functioning of the League of Nations draws to a close, the earnest
League propagandists, to get away from the remorseless logic of “By
their fruits ye shall know them,” now assert that Europe’s troubles
are our fault. We refused to ratify the treaty and enter the League of
Nations; _ergo_, all these things have happened.
The writer, an observer and student of European affairs for fifteen
years, has never had an ax to grind or theories and national causes to
advance and champion. In the Near East during the years leading up to
the World War, in Paris during the World War and the Peace Conference,
and following the aftermath of the war since the treaties were signed,
his sole ambition has been to record what he has observed. He is not
pro-anything. He feels, as he did when he wrote “The New Map of Europe”
in 1914, “The New Map of Africa” in 1916, and “The New Map of Asia” in
1919, that a host of people are seeking an unbiased presentation of
contemporary events, so that sentimentality will not obscure common
sense in forming their opinion on the important problem of America’s
place in the world and America’s duty toward the world. We must know
how things actually are in order that we may help effectively to make
them what they ought to be.
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS.
Princeton, September, 1923.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I THE ARMISTICE OF NOVEMBER 11, 1918 3
II THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 18
III THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT PARIS 37
IV THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES 71
V THE FAILURE OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES TO WIN POPULAR
APPROVAL 94
VI NEW LIGHT ON THE TRAGEDY OF PARIS 111
VII THE TREATIES OF ST.-GERMAIN AND TRIANON 119
VIII THE BALKAN SETTLEMENT AND ITS EFFECT UPON BULGARIA AND
ALBANIA 133
IX THE PROPOSED DEVOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 148
X THE INTERNAL EVOLUTION AND FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA UNDER
THE SOVIETS 167
XI THE NEW BALTIC REPUBLICS 205
XII THE RESURRECTION OF POLAND 231
XIII THE CREATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 257
XIV THE EVOLUTION OF SERBIA INTO JUGOSLAVIA 273
XV GREATER RUMANIA 295
XVI THE TABLES TURNED ON HUNGARY 317
XVII AUSTRIA WITHOUT HER PROVINCES 330
XVIII FROM GIOLITTI TO MUSSOLINI IN ITALY 346
XIX BELGIUM AFTER THE WORLD WAR 368
XX GERMANY FROM 1918 TO 1923 386
XXI THE EXPANSION AND DEBACLE OF GREECE 415
XXII THE TURKISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 442
XXIII THE ENTENTE POWERS AND THE QUESTION OF THE STRAITS 469
XXIV THE EASTERN QUESTION BEFORE THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE 491
XXV THE DISARMAMENT QUESTION BEFORE THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 505
XXVI THE CONTINUATION CONFERENCES FROM 1920 TO 1923 519
XXVII THE UNSHEATHED SWORD OF FRANCE 544
XXVIII FRANCE AND BELGIUM IN THE RUHR 561
XXIX INTERALLIED DEBTS 585
XXX THE NEXT MOVES IN THE INTERNATIONAL GAME 599
INDEX 611
EUROPE SINCE 1918
The great World War, which has just closed, was born of the feeling
on the part of the Germans that they had not been given their share
of the world’s loot. So far as it is possible to see, the struggle
has taught us nothing, and we are to go on sowing dragons’ teeth.
MELVILLE E. STONE.
General Manager of The Associated Press,
in “Collier’s Weekly,” March 26, 1921.
The war was not a deliberate crime. It was something that flowed
out of the conditions of European life. The Treaty of Versailles
was a voluntary destruction of civilization. French civilization
depends upon European civilization, and there will be no
civilization in Europe until the Treaty of Versailles is revised.
ANATOLE FRANCE.
Undoubtedly we shall from this time forward have a much more
adequate conception of the essential unity of the whole story of
mankind, and a keener realization of the fact that all its factors
must be weighed and appraised if any of them are to be accurately
estimated and understood. I feel strongly that such a broader view
of history, if it can be planted in the community’s mind through
the efforts of educators and writers, will contribute greatly to
uphold the hands and strengthen the efforts of those who have to
deal with the great problems of human destiny, particularly with
those of preserving peace and outlawing war.
WARREN G. HARDING.
EUROPE SINCE 1918
CHAPTER I
THE ARMISTICE OF NOVEMBER 11, 1918
October, 1918, brought a sweeping and unexpected change in the fortunes
of Germany. In London and Paris it was not believed that the crash
would come so soon. British and French political and journalistic
circles were discussing the all-absorbing subject of Foch’s forward
movement on the western front. During the war, already lasting over
four years, there had been so little of military victories to record
and comment upon that none seemed to be thinking of the inevitable
day of Germany’s collapse. The armistices with Bulgaria, Turkey,
and Austria-Hungary were regarded as military agreements, and the
newspapers were silent about post-armistice events in southeastern
Europe and the Ottoman Empire.
Public opinion, therefore, was unprepared for Germany’s direct and
definite demand for an armistice based upon the acceptance by all
belligerents of President Wilson’s peace program.
The speech of President Wilson at the opening of the Fourth Liberty
Loan Campaign on September 27 was made the day after the collapse
of Bulgaria. The superiority of numbers had already begun to tell
against Germany on the western front. The President of the United
States weighed fully every word uttered on that occasion. It was clear
that the enemies of Germany had reached no understanding as to their
attitude in case Germany should express the willingness to lay down her
arms and confess that she was beaten. When, two days later, Bulgaria
signed an armistice, and the Germans knew they could no longer hope
for a drawn battle, it was excellent strategy to make the request for
peace in the form of a direct appeal to President Wilson in which the
Imperial German Government expressed its willingness to make peace
“on the basis of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points and subsequent
discourses, _notably that of September 27_.”
When the news of this appeal was published in Paris, a French statesman
who had been at the head of the Government at one time during the war
said to me: “France is as unprepared for peace as she was for war.
In 1914 we had no definite understanding with any other nation than
Russia. You remember how nervous we were about England’s attitude
during those awful first three days. In 1918, with the military victory
ours, we and our numerous allies have no terms of peace, agreed upon in
common by us all, to impose upon our enemies. It looks as if we shall
soon have power to dictate peace, but we are not ready to state to the
enemy--and to our own people, for that matter--what terms we propose to
dictate. Nor is there any overwhelming public sentiment to guide us.
The speeches of your Wilson have had a splendid effect in demoralizing
the Germans. For this reason, it would have been folly for any French
or British statesman to differ publicly with Mr. Wilson. We must not
give German statesmen and generals ammunition to use in fighting the
demoralization that is so evident on their front as well as in their
rear. On the other hand, because of this silence, we are in danger of
being stampeded into agreeing to accept Mr. Wilson’s ideas of peace,
which are altogether ridiculous.”
Unpreparedness for peace was not due to lack of foresight on the part
of Entente statesmen. Up to the end, Germany was a redoubtable enemy
who hoped for a military stalemate through lack of harmony among the
members of the coalition. She knew that the nations banded against
her had only one common interest, her defeat. The Entente Powers
themselves realized that they were not going to think alike about terms
of peace, as they were interested in the war in varying degrees and for
different reasons. So they wisely stuck by the old adage, “First catch
your hare!” In order to catch the hare, the enemies of Germany had
been going the limit in abandonment of prejudices, sacrifice of pride,
change of national habits, and repression of national instincts. Mutual
forbearance was taxed to the uttermost in keeping up and coördinating
the military effort. Loans were arranged without discussion as to
interest charges and method of amortization. The coalition would not
have stood the additional test of having to try to agree upon a common
peace policy.
The demand for the armistice came too soon after the tide had turned.
With the danger of weakening or disrupting military effort by frictions
and misunderstanding scarcely behind them, the members of the Supreme
Council at Versailles were suddenly confronted with the problem of
making an armistice that contained definite obligations as to the
general tenor of the peace settlement. The Allies had had no time
to work out a common program to present to the conquered foes. The
embarrassment at Versailles was great. Every one was willing to end the
war immediately to save further bloodshed and expense. But none was
willing to connect the question of an armistice with that of peace.
And yet the inquiry in Germany’s demand for an armistice could not be
ignored!
The Turkish and Bulgarian armistices had been imposed without involving
the principles of the peace settlement. They were concluded without
the participation of the United States. But in the Austro-Hungarian
and German armistices we entered directly. Numerous questions arose
which compromised the interests or admitted the pretensions of each of
the Allies. How make an armistice with Austria-Hungary without taking
into consideration Italia Irredenta and the conflicting aspirations of
the nations we had promised to free from the Hapsburg yoke? How make
an armistice with Germany without defining our attitude toward British
naval and colonial ambitions and French contentions as to adequate
guarantees and reparations?
These considerations put the American delegates at Versailles in an
unenviable and delicate position. The general lines of American policy
were already announced. When we entered the war, President Wilson drew
a distinction between the German Government and the German people, a
distinction heartily approved at the time by the major portion of the
American press and by American public opinion. In official speeches
and official notes, specific statements had been made, reiterated, and
elaborated concerning the objects for which we were fighting and the
principles we intended to follow in reëstablishing peace. It could
not be argued that new conditions had arisen to change our attitude.
The United States came into the war a long time after its issues were
clearly defined. From the beginning we had recognized that Germany and
Austria-Hungary were the aggressors. We were aware of their violations
of international law, of their cruelties on land and sea, of the
martyrdom imposed by them upon Belgium, Northern France, and Serbia.
We knew all about the destruction wrought by their armies, airplanes,
and submarines. We had been stirred with indignation by the Armenian
massacres. We knew their ideas of peace, had they been victorious.
For the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk had been signed and
published.
No argument or explanation that has been brought to bear to justify the
treaties imposed upon our enemies at Paris is built upon facts that
have come to light since the armistice. The responsibility of Germany
and the heinousness of her crimes were known and felt by the members of
the Supreme Council at Versailles, to whom President Wilson referred
Germany’s request for an armistice. To the Supreme Council Mr. Wilson
left the decision. Were the Entente Powers willing to grant Germany an
armistice with the understanding that after she had rendered herself
defenseless peace would be concluded “on the basis of the Fourteen
Points and President Wilson’s subsequent discourses, notably that
of September 27, 1918”? It was not the American Government that had
suggested this understanding as to the nature of the peace. Nor did the
American Government attempt to influence the decision of the Supreme
Council. Marshal Foch and his advisers had it in their power to reject
the German plea unconditionally and continue the war. Of all the armies
in the field that of the United States was the least willing to quit.
Or the Supreme Council could have declared openly its inability to
agree upon an eventual peace treaty along Wilsonian lines. This need
not have been done baldly. Diplomatic formulæ could have been found to
make the rejection noncommittal, thus avoiding a frank declaration of
disagreement with American ideals.
Colonel House and General Bliss, enjoying the confidence of President
Wilson, were in a position to point out to their colleagues what they
all knew, that during eighteen months the will and energy of a hundred
million Americans had been concentrated upon bringing Germany to her
knees, and that it was because of the American effort that Germany was
suing for peace. The events of October, 1918, were not a miracle. They
were not due to an unexpected turn in the fortunes of battle. For until
the American armies in France had passed the million mark Germany was
able to help her allies and at the same time to hold the position she
had established in France and Belgium in 1914. Were not the defection
of Bulgaria, Turkey, and Austria-Hungary and the retreat of the German
army from France and Belgium the result primarily of the uninterrupted
growth of the American Expeditionary Force? Was it not also true that
President Wilson had simply taken Entente statesmen at their word,
relying upon the sincerity of their own definition of their objects in
the war, when he elaborated his Fourteen Points? What was more natural,
then, than that the German demand for an armistice should come through
Washington and be coupled with the condition that peace be made in
conformity with the avowed common ideals of the victors?
But our delegates at Versailles showed admirable tact and diplomatic
correctness. It was true that American intervention had turned the
scales in favor of the Entente. But it was equally true that our
associates had born the brunt of the battle for three years without
our military aid, holding the Central Empires in check by sacrificing
the best of their blood. Countries invaded and ravaged, civilian
population maltreated, cities and factories and mines destroyed, debts
beyond belief--all this had been suffered to make possible the common
victory. The popular resentment against Germany was as great in the
United States as in Europe. We were holding no brief for Germany. If
the Supreme Council should be of the opinion that it would be best to
continue the war and go to Berlin, the United States would not stand
in the way. It was intimated that we were willing to do our part. No
pressure of any kind, direct or indirect, was exercised by the American
Government or its representatives at Versailles to induce the Entente
Powers to grant Germany’s plea.
The accusations that have since been freely made to the effect that
the United States provoked and encouraged the German demand for an
armistice and insisted that the Wilsonian program be adopted as a
basis of the Paris settlement in the pre-armistice negotiations are
unsupported by any evidence. Volumes have been written to defend or
explain the armistice with Germany. It is popularly regretted as
premature and as due to a mistaken idealism inspired by Americans. The
factors in the decision of the Supreme Council are not obscure. Italy
did not want the war to go on any longer; her objectives had been
gained by the antecedent armistice of November 3 with Austria-Hungary,
and her statesmen were bent upon using all their troops to occupy
“unredeemed Italy” and the Dalmatian islands and coast. Great Britain
and France were more exhausted, materially and morally, than they cared
to admit. If Germany accepted the naval and military clauses of the
armistice they had in mind to propose, it would be foolish to continue
to exhaust themselves.
Given the attitude of Italy, with which it was impossible to find
fault, British and French statesmen and generals were virtually
unanimous in believing that, if they could get what they wanted by
the terms of the armistice, carrying the war into Germany would be a
game not worth the candle. For they were not at all sure that a speedy
military victory was possible. Another winter of fighting would involve
tremendous sacrifices. Discontent in the rear had to be reckoned with.
And, above all, it might happen that the final act in the great drama
would find the American army holding the center of the stage. This
would be disastrous to French and British prestige and would give
President Wilson the upper hand in formulating the peace treaties. As
one eminent Englishman put it when I was talking over the situation
with him the first week of November: “There is that parable about the
laborers in the vineyard. We know well enough that Berlin ought to be
the end of the day. But if we work till nightfall, you, who came in at
the eleventh hour, would get the same reward as the rest of us--perhaps
all the pennies!”[1]
The pre-armistice agreement was carefully considered. There was nothing
hasty about the action of the Supreme Council. The British and French
knew just what they were doing. The British excluded Mr. Wilson’s point
on the freedom of the seas. This we agreed to. The French and Belgians
insisted upon a definition of the stipulation that “the invaded
territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed.”
On November 5, 1918, the Entente Powers sent to Washington the
following message:
The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the
correspondence which has passed between the President of the United
States and the German Government.
Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their
willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the
terms of peace laid down in the President’s Address to Congress of
January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his
subsequent Addresses. They must point out, however, that Clause
2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the
seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could
not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete
freedom on this subject when they enter the Peace Conference.
Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his Address to
Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that the
invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and
freed, and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be
allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they
understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage
done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property,
by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.
This answer was immediately communicated to Germany by the United
States. In an accompanying note, Mr. Lansing said:
I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence
with the German authorities to the Governments with which the
Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent,
with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed
to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their
military advisers and the military advisers of the United States
be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany
the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect
the interest of the peoples involved, and ensure to the associated
Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the
details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed,
provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military
point of view.
I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement
with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the
memorandum above quoted.
I am further instructed by the President to request you [he was
writing to the Swiss Minister at Washington through whom the
negotiations were carried on] to notify the German Government that
Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United
States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited
representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to
them the terms of an armistice.
On November 6 an armistice commission was appointed by Germany,
which received the Allied military conditions at the Allied General
Headquarters on November 8. Seventy-two hours were given for acceptance
or rejection. At 5 A. M. on November 11 the armistice that ended the
World War was signed at Rethondes in the Forest of Compiègne.
The armistice provided for the cessation of hostilities at eleven
o’clock on the day of signature; the evacuation of Belgium, northern
France, Luxemburg, and Alsace-Lorraine in fifteen days; repatriation
of civilian and military prisoners; abandonment of a large quantity
of artillery and airplanes; evacuation of the left bank of the Rhine,
with three bridge-heads on the right bank, within a month; evacuation
of the countries occupied in eastern and southeastern Europe; annulment
of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk; evacuation of German
forces in East Africa; reparation of damages; restitution of money and
securities taken from Belgium; surrender of Russian and Rumanian gold
to the Allies; delivery of all submarines and most of the German Navy
in Allied ports; release of Russian war-ships and all merchant-ships;
and cancellation of restrictions placed upon neutral shipping and trade
by the German Government and private German firms. Two additional
stipulations of prime importance in bringing pressure to bear upon
Germany were that the blockade of Germany be maintained throughout the
Peace Conference and that there be no reciprocity in the liberation of
prisoners of war.
The acceptance of the armistice terminated the hostilities and
prevented the invasion of Germany. It left Germany defenseless. Under
no circumstances would she be able to renew the war. For the sake of
avoiding worse evils the German Government signed these humiliating
conditions. On the other hand, the Germans felt that they gained the
assurance of a peace such as President Wilson had outlined, in which,
to use the President’s own words, “the impartial justice meted out must
involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and
those to whom we do not wish to be just: it must be a justice that
plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the
several peoples concerned.”
What the Germans failed to grasp was the fact that the long and bitter
struggle had drawn their enemies down to their level, and that their
own faithlessness was going to be met by a desire for revenge on the
part of those who had originally drawn the sword in the defense of the
pledged word among nations.