toast is proposed, and also the kind manner in which it is always
received. I beg to thank you especially, Mr. President, for your
kind reference to Captain Percy Scott, which was so well deserved.
He was indeed a handy man. (Cheers.) Personally I have not the same
pleasurable feelings on this occasion as I enjoyed last year, when
I had no speech to make. I remember quite well remarking to my
neighbour: “How good the whitebait is, how excellent the champagne,
and how jolly not to have to make a speech.” He glared at me and
said: “I have got to make a speech, and the whitebait to me is _bête
noire_, and the champagne is real pain.” (Laughter.) He was so ready
with his answer that I thought to myself: “You’ll get through it all
right,” and sure enough he did, for he spoke thirty minutes by the
clock without a check. (Laughter.) I am only going to give you three
minutes (cries of “No.”) Yes. I always think on these occasions of
the first time I went to sea on board my first ship, an old sailing
two-decker, and I saw inscribed in great big gold letters the one word
“Silence.” (Laughter.) Underneath was another good motto: “Deeds, not
words.” (Cheers.) I have put that into every ship I have commanded
since. (Cheers.) This leads me to another motto which is better
still, and brings me to the point of what I have to say in reply to
the toast that has been proposed. When I was Commander-in-Chief in
the Mediterranean I went to inspect a small Destroyer, only 260 tons,
but with such pride and swagger that she might have been 16,000 tons.
(Laughter.) The young Lieutenant in command took me round. She was
in beautiful order, and I came aft to the wheel and saw there the
inscription: “Ut Veniant Omnes.” “Hallo,” I said, “what the deuce is
that?” (Laughter.) Saluting me, he said: “Let ’em all come, Sir.”
(Great laughter and cheers.) Well, that was not boasting; that was
the sense of conscious efficiency--(cheers)--the sense that permeates
the whole Fleet--(cheers)--and I used to think, as the Admiral, it
will be irresistible provided the Admiral is up to the mark. The Lord
Chief Justice, sitting near me now, has kindly promised to pull me
down if I say too much! (Laughter.) But what I wish to remark to you
is this--and it is a good thing for everybody to know it--there has
been a tremendous change in Navy matters since the old time. In regard
to Naval warfare history is a record of exploded ideas. (Laughter and
cheers.) In the old days they were sailors’ battles; now they are
Admirals’ battles. I should like to recall to you the greatest battle
at sea ever fought. What was the central episode of that? Nelson
receiving his death-wound! What was he doing? Walking up and down
on the quarter-deck arm-in-arm with his Captain. It is dramatically
described to us by an onlooker. His Secretary is shot down; Nelson
turns round and says: “Poor Scott! Take him down to the cockpit,” and
then he goes on again walking up and down, having a yarn with his
Captain. What does that mean? It means that in the old days the Admiral
took his fleet into action; each ship got alongside the enemy; and,
as Nelson finely said, “they got into their proper place.” (Cheers.)
And then the Admiral had not much more to do. The ships were touching
one another nearly, the Bos’un went with some rope and lashed them
together so as to make them quite comfortable--(laughter)--and the
sailors loaded and fired away till it was time to board. But what is
the case now? It is conceivable that within twenty minutes of sighting
the enemy on the horizon the action will have begun, and on the
disposition of his Fleet by the Admiral--on his tactics--the battle
will depend, for all the gunnery in the world is no good if the guns
are masked by our own ships or cannot bear on the enemy! In that way
I wish to tell you how much depends on the Admirals now and on their
education. Therefore, joined with this spirit, of which the remark of
the young Lieutenant I mentioned to you is an indication, permeating
the whole Service, we require a fearless, vigorous, and progressive
administration, open to any reform--(loud cheers)--never resting on its
oars--for to stop is to go back--and forecasting every eventuality. I
will just take two instances at hazard.
_Look at the Submarine Boat and Wireless Telegraphy.
When they are perfected we do not know what a Revolution will
come about._
In their inception they were the weapons of the weak.
Now they loom large as the weapons of the strong.
_Will any Fleet be able to be in narrow waters?_
Is there the slightest fear of invasion with them, even for the most
extreme pessimist? I might mention other subjects; but the great fact
which I come to is that we are realizing--the Navy and the Admiralty
are realizing--_that on the British Navy rests the British Empire_.
(Loud cheers.) Nothing else is of any use without it, not even
the Army. (Here the gallant Admiral, amid laughter, turned to Mr.
Brodrick, the Secretary for War, who sat near him.) We are different
from Continental nations. No soldier of ours can go anywhere unless a
sailor carries him there on his back. (Laughter.) I am not disparaging
the Army. I am looking forward to their coming to sea with us again as
they did in the old days. Why, Nelson had three regiments of infantry
with him at the battle of Cape St. Vincent, and a Sergeant of the
69th Regiment led the boarders, and, Nelson having only one arm, it
was the Sergeant who helped him up. (Cheers.) The Secretary for War
particularly asked me to allude to the Army or else I would not have
done it. (Loud laughter.) In conclusion, I assure you that the Navy
and the Admiralty recognise their responsibility. I think I may say
that we now have a Board of Admiralty that is united, progressive, and
determined--(cheers)--and you may sleep quietly in your beds--(loud
cheers).
II.--THE LORD MAYOR’S BANQUET, 1907.
As to the strength, the efficiency, and the sufficiency of the
Navy, I am able to give you indisputable proofs. Recently, in the
equinoctial season in the North Sea we have had twenty-six of the
finest battleships in the world and twenty-five of the finest cruisers,
some of them equal to foreign battleships, and over fifty other
vessels, under eleven Admirals, and all working under a distinguished
Commander-in-Chief, under very trying circumstances and in a very
stormy time, and I look in vain to see any equal to that large Fleet
anywhere. (Cheers.) That is only a fraction of our power. (Cheers.)
And that large Fleet is _nulli secundus_, as they say, whether it is
ships or officers or men. (Cheers.) Now, I turn to the other point,
the gunnery of the Fleet. The gunnery efficiency of the Fleet has
surpassed all records--it is unparalleled--and I am lost in wonder
and admiration at the splendid unity of spirit and determination that
must have been shown by everybody from top to bottom to obtain these
results. (Cheers.) I am sure that your praise and your appreciation
will go forth to them, because, remember, the best ships, the biggest
Navy--my friend over there talked about the two-Power standard--a
million-Power standard (laughter) is no use unless you can hit.
(Cheers.) You must hit first, you must hit hard, and you must keep
on hitting. (Cheers.) If these are the fruits, I don’t think there
is much wrong with the government of the Navy. (Cheers.) Figs don’t
grow on thistles. (Laughter and cheers.) But a gentleman of fine
feeling has lately said that the recent Admiralty administration has
been attended with the devil’s own luck. (Laughter.) That interesting
personality (laughter)--his luck is due to one thing, and one thing
only--hesitates at nothing to gain his object. That is what the Board
of Admiralty have done, and our object has been the fighting efficiency
of the Fleet and its instant readiness for war; and we have got it.
(Cheers.) And I say it because no one can have a fuller knowledge than
myself about it, and I speak with the fullest sense of responsibility.
(Cheers.) So I turn to all of you, and I turn to my countrymen and
I say--Sleep quiet in your beds (laughter and cheers), and do not be
disturbed by these bogeys--invasion and otherwise--which are being
periodically resuscitated by all sorts of leagues. (Laughter.) I do
not know what league is working this one. It is quite curious what
reputable people lend themselves to these scares. This afternoon I read
the effusions of a red-hot and most charmingly interesting magazine
editor. He had evidently been victimised by a _Punch_ correspondent,
and that _Punch_ correspondent had been gulled by some Midshipman Easy
of the Channel Fleet. He had been there. And this is what the magazine
editor prints in italics in this month’s magazine--that an army of
100,000 German soldiers had been practising embarking in the German
Fleet. The absolute truth is that one solitary regiment was embarked
for manœuvres. That is the truth. To embark 100,000 soldiers you want
hundreds and thousands of tons of transport. You might just as well
talk of practising embarking St. Paul’s Cathedral in a penny steamer.
(Laughter.) I have no doubt that equally silly stories are current in
Germany. I have no doubt that there is terror there that the English
Fleet will swoop down all of a sudden and gobble up the German Fleet.
(Laughter.) These stories are not only silly--they are mischievous,
very mischievous. (Hear, hear.) If Eve had not kept on looking at that
apple (laughter)--and it was pleasant to the eyes--she would not have
picked it, and we should not have been now bothered with clothes.
(Loud laughter.) I was very nearly forgetting something else that
the _Punch_ correspondent said. I put it in my pocket as I came away
to read it out to you. He had been a week in the Channel Fleet and he
had discussed everything, from the admiral down to the bluejacket.
He does not say anything about that Midshipman Easy. “In one matter
I found unanimity of admission. It was that in respect to the number
of fighting ships, their armament, and general capacity the British
Navy was never in so satisfactory a condition as it floats to-day.”
(Cheers.) So we let him off that yarn about the 100,000 German troops.
(Laughter.)
III.--THE HOUSE OF LORDS, NOVEMBER 16, 1915.
Lord Fisher, rising from the cross-benches immediately before public
business was called, said:--“I ask leave of your lordships to make a
statement. Certain references were made to me in a speech delivered
yesterday by Mr. Churchill. I have been 61 years in the service of
my country, and I leave my record in the hands of my countrymen. The
Prime Minister said yesterday that Mr. Churchill had said one or two
things which he had better not have said, and that he necessarily
and naturally left unsaid some things which will have to be said. I
am content to wait. It is unfitting to make personal explanations
affecting national interests when my country is in the midst of a great
war.”
Lord Fisher, having delivered his brief statement, immediately left the
House.
IV.--THE HOUSE OF LORDS, MARCH 21, 1917.
Lord Fisher addressed the House of Lords.
Immediately prayers were over he rose from a seat on one of the
cross-benches. He said:--
“With your Lordships’ permission, I desire to make a personal
statement. When our country is in great jeopardy, as she now is, it is
not the time to tarnish great reputations, to asperse the dead, and to
discover our supposed weaknesses to the enemy; so I shall not discuss
the Dardanelles Reports--I shall await the end of the war, when all the
truth can be made known.”
CHAPTER VII
THE ESSENTIALS OF SEA FIGHTING
Sir William Allan, M.P., with the torso of a Hercules and the voice
of a bull and the affectionate heart of Mary Magdalene, did not know
Latin, and he asked me what my motto meant:
“Fiat justitia--ruat cœlum.”
I had sent it to him when he was malignantly attacking me because, as
Controller of the Navy, I had introduced the water-tube boiler. Sir
William Allan was himself a boiler-maker, and he had to scrap most of
his plant because of this new type of boiler.
I said the translation was: “Do right, and damn the odds.”
This motto has stood me in good stead, for by attending to it I fought
a great battle in a righteous cause with Lord Salisbury, when he was
Prime Minister, and conquered. I have related this elsewhere. Years
after, Lord Salisbury, in remembrance of this, recalled me from being
Commander-in-Chief in America to be British delegate at the First
Peace Conference at The Hague in 1899, and from thence I went as
Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet.
While I was in command of the Mediterranean Fleet, from 1899 to
1902, when I became Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty, I arranged to
have lectures for the officers of the Fleet. I extract now from the
notes of my lectures some points which may be of general interest, as
illustrating the new strategy and tactics necessitated by the change
from wind to steam.
After setting forth a few of the problems which would have to be
solved in sea-fighting under the new conditions, the lecturer went on
to elaborate the themes from such rough notes as I give here of the
principal ideas.
All Officers without exception should be unceasingly occupied
in considering the various solutions of these problems, as who
can tell who will be in command after the first five minutes of
a close engagement, whether in an individual ship or in command
of the whole Fleet! Otherwise we may have a stampede like
that of riderless horses! The Captain or Admiral is _hors de
combat_, and the next Officer, and, perhaps, the next, and the
next don’t know what to do when moments mean victory or defeat!
“The man who hesitates is lost!” and so it will be with the
Fleet if decision is wanting!
“Time, Twiss, time is everything!” said Nelson (speaking to
General Twiss when he was chasing the French Fleet under
Villeneuve to the West Indies); “a quarter of an hour may mean
the difference between Victory and Defeat!”
This was in sailing days. Now it will be quarters of a minute,
not quarters of an hour!
It is said to have been stated by one of the most eminent of
living men, that sudden war becomes daily more probable because
public opinion is becoming greater in power, and that popular
emotion, once fairly aroused, sweeps away the barriers of calm
deliberation, and is deaf to the voice of reason.
Besides cultivating the faculty of Quick Decision and
consequent rapid action, we must cultivate Rashness.
Napoleon was asked the secret of victory. He replied,
“_L’audace, l’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace!_”
There is a rashness which in Peace is Folly, but which in War
is Prudence, and there are risks that must be undertaken in War
which are Obligatory, but which in peace would be Criminal!
As in War, so in the preparation for War, Rashness must have
its place. We must also reflect how apt we are to suppose that
the enemy will fit himself into our plans!
The first successful blow on either side will probably
determine the final issue in sea-fighting. Sustained physical
energy will be the required great attribute at that time
for those in command as well as those who administer.
Collingwood wrote two years before Trafalgar, when blockading
Rochefort--and Nelson then off Toulon, Pellew off Ferrol,
and Cornwallis off Brest--that “_Admirals needed to be made
of iron!_” The pressure then will test the endurance of the
strongest, and the rank of Admiral confers no immunity from the
operation of the natural law of _Anno Domini_! Nelson was 39
years old at the Battle of the Nile, and died at 47. What is
our average age of those actively responsible for the control,
mobilisation, and command of our Fleets? As age increases,
audacity leaks out and caution comes in.
An instant offensive is obligatory. Mahan truly says:--
“The assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. War, once
declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy
must not be fended off, but smitten down. You may then spare
him every exaction, relinquish every gain. But till down he
must be struck incessantly and remorselessly.”[1]
All will depend on the instant start, the sudden blow! Napoleon
again, “_Frappez vite et frappez fort!_” That was the whole of
his orders.
The question of armament is all-important!
If we have the advantage of speed, _which is the first
desideratum in every class of fighting vessel_ (_Battleships
included_), _then, and then only_, we can choose our distance
for fighting. If we can choose our distance for fighting, then
we can choose our armament for fighting! But how in the past
has the armament been chosen? Do we arrange the armament to
meet the proposed mode of fighting? Doesn’t it sometimes look
like so many of each sort, as if you were peopling the Ark, and
wanted representatives of all calibres?
_Whoever hits soonest and oftenest will win!_
“The effectiveness of a fighting weapon,” wrote Mahan,
“consists more in the method of its use and in the practised
skill of the human element that wields it than in the material
perfection of the weapon itself. The sequel of a long period of
peace is a demoralisation of ideals. Those who rise in peace
are men of formality and routine, cautious, inoffensive, safe
up to the limits of their capacity, supremely conscientious,
punctilious about everything but what is essential, yet void
altogether of initiative, impulse and originality.
“This was the difference between Hawke and Matthews. Hawke
represented the spirit of war, the ardour, the swift
initiative, the readiness of resource, the impatience of
prescription and routine, without which no great things are
done! Matthews, the spirit of peace, the very reverse of all
this!”
Peace brings with it the reign of old men.
The sacred fire never burnt in Collingwood. Nelson, with the
instinct of genius, intended the Fleet to anchor, turning
the very dangers of the shoals of Trafalgar into a security.
Collingwood, simply a naval machine, and never having been his
own master all his life, and not being a genius, thought a
shoal was a thing to be avoided, and, consequently, wrecked the
ships unfitted to cope with a gale, and so to weather these
shoals! Collingwood ought to have had the moon given him for
his crest, for all his glory was reflected from Nelson, the sun
of glory! Collingwood was an old woman!
History is a record of exploded ideas. In what sense? Fighting
conditions are all altered. The wind formerly determined the
course of action; now it is only the mind of man. One man and
the best man is wanted--not a fossil; not a careful man. Fleets
were formerly days coming into action, now only minutes.
Two Fleets can now be fighting each other in twenty minutes
from first seeing each other’s smoke.
Formerly sea battles were Sailors’ battles, now they are
Officers’.
At Trafalgar, Nelson was walking up and down the Quarter-Deck
and having a yarn with his Flag Captain, Hardy, at the very
zenith of the Action! It was the common sailors only who were
then at work. How different now! _The Admiral everything!_
Now, the different phases of a Naval War are as capable of as
exact a demonstration as a proposition in Euclid, because steam
has annihilated wind and sea. We are now trained to a higher
standard, and the arts of strategy and tactics have accordingly
been immensely magnified. Make an initial mistake in strategy
or tactics, and then it may be said of them as of women by
Congreve:
“Hell has no fury like a woman scorn’d.”
The last place to defend England will be the Shores of England.
The Frontiers of England are the Coasts of the Enemy. We ought
to be there five minutes before war breaks out.
Naval Supremacy once destroyed is destroyed for ever. Carthage,
Spain, Holland, the great commercial nations of the past, had
the sea wrested from them, and then they fell.
A successful Mercantile Marine leads to a successful War Navy.
It is solely owing to our command of the sea that we have been
able to build up our magnificent Empire.
Admiral Mahan’s most famous passage is:--
“The world has never seen a more impressive demonstration of
the influence of Sea Power upon its history. Those far-distant,
storm-beaten ships of Nelson, upon which the Grand Army never
looked, stood between it and the dominion of the World.”
“SECRECY AND SECRETIVENESS.”
There are three types of Secrecy:--
I. The Ostrich.
II. The Red Box.
III. The Real Thing.
I. The ostrich buries his head in the sand of the desert when
pursued by his enemy, and because he can’t see the enemy
concludes the enemy can’t see him! Such is the secrecy of
the secretive and detestable habit which hides from our own
officers what is known to the world in other Navies.
II. The secrecy of the Red Box is that of a distinguished
Admiral who, with great pomp, used to have his red despatch box
carried before him (like the umbrella of an African King), as
containing the most secret plans; but one day, the box being
unfortunately capsized and burst open, the only contents that
fell out were copies of “La Vie Parisienne”!
Such, it is feared, was the secrecy of those wonderful detailed
plans for war we hear of in the past as having been secreted in
secret drawers, to be brought out “when the time comes,” and
when no one has any time to study them, supposing, that is,
they ever existed; and, remember, it is detailed attention to
minutiæ and the consideration of trifles which spells success.
III. There is the legitimate secrecy and secretiveness of
hiding from your dearest friend the moment and the nature
of your rush at the enemy, and which of all the variety of
_operations you have previously practised with the Fleet_ you
will bring into play! But all your Captains will instantly know
your mind and intentions, for you will hoist the signal or
spark the wireless message, Plan A, or Plan B ..., or Plan Z!
“After I have made known my intentions,” began Nelson’s
last order; and it expressed the experience of a hundred
battles--that the Second in Command (and in these days it may
well be amplified into the individual officers in command) are
to fulfil the spirit of the peace manœuvre teaching, and assist
by the teaching in carrying out the meaning of brief signals
to the destruction of the enemy’s Fleet. The secret of success
lies in the first part of the sentence: “_After I have made
known my intentions._”
Confidence is a plant of slow growth. Long and constant
association of ships of a Fleet is essential to success. A
new-comer is often more dangerous than the enemy.
An Army may be improvised in case of war, but not a Navy.
Immense importance of constant readiness at all times. A Fleet
always ready to go to sea at an hour’s notice is a splendid
national life preserver! Here comes in the water-tube boiler!
Without previous notice or even an inkling, we have been ready
to start in one hour with water-tube boiler ships. You can’t
exaggerate this! One bucket of water ready on the spot in the
shape of an instantly ready Fleet will stop the conflagration
of war which all the Fire Brigades of the world won’t stop
a little later on! Never forget that from the very nature
of sea fighting an initial Naval disaster is irretrievable,
irreparable, eternal. Naval Colensos have no Paardebergs!
_Suddenness_ is the secret of success at sea, because
suddenness is practicable, and remember that rashness may be
the height of prudence. How very rash Nelson was at the Nile to
go in after dark to fight the French Fleet with no chart of the
shoals of Aboukir!
But you must be sure of your Fleet and they must be sure of
you! Every detail previously thought out. Trust no one! (My
friend, Maurice Bourke, used to tell a story of the Yankee
barber, who put up in his shop: “To trust is to bust, and to
bust is hell!” which means “no credit given”). Make the very
best of things as they are. Criminal to wait for something
better. “We strain at the gnat of perfection and swallow the
camel of unreadiness.”
“THE GREAT SILENT NAVY.”
The usual motto is “Silence” or “Deeds, not words,” which
you will see ornamenting some conspicuous place in a
ship.[2] It has been said by landsmen that the most striking
feature to them in a British man-of-war when at sea is the
noiseless, ceaseless, sleepless, yet unobtrusive, energy that
characterises everyone and everything on board! If so, we
sailors don’t notice it, and it is the result of nature! Gales
of wind, sudden fogs, immense speeds, the much multiplied
dangers of collision and wreck from these terrific speeds, as
in Destroyers and even in large ships, all these circumstances
automatically react on all on board and are nature’s education
by environment. There is no place for the unthinking or the
lethargic. He is a positive danger! Every individual in a
man-of-war has his work cut out! “Think and act for yourself”
is to be the motto of the future, not “Let us wait for orders!”
Such may be said of sea fights! No mountains delay us, and,
as Scripture says, the way of a ship is trackless! The enemy
will suddenly confront us as an Apparition! At every moment
we must be ready! Can this be acquired by grown men? No! it
is the force of habit. You must commence early. Our Nelsons
and Benbows began the sea life when they first put their
breeches on! The brother of the Black Prince (John of Gaunt)
joined the Navy and was in a sea fight when he was 10 years of
age! Far exceeding anything known in history does our future
Trafalgar depend on promptitude and rapid decision, and on
every eventuality having been foreseen by those in command. But
these attributes cannot be acquired late in life, nor by those
who have lived the life of cabbages! So begin early and work
continuously. Then if there is war your opportunity must come!
Like Kitchener, you will then walk over the cabbages!
[Illustration: A GROUP AT LANGHAM HOUSE. PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN AND SENT TO
SIR JOHN FISHER BY THE EMPRESS MARIE OF RUSSIA.
1. Mrs. Neeld.
2. Miss Diana Neeld.
3. The Princess Victoria.
4. Lady Fisher.
5. Queen Alexandra.
6. Miss Kitty Fullerton.
7. Sir John Fisher.
]
CHAPTER VIII
JONAH’S GOURD
“Came up in a night
And perished in a night.”
JONAH, chap. iv, verse 10.
The above words came into my mind late last night when tired out with
destroying masses of papers and letters (mostly malignant abuse or the
emanations of senile dotage), I sat back in my chair and soliloquised
over what had happened to all these pestilent attackers of mine; and
I said to myself in those immortal words in Jonah, “_Doest thou well
to be angry?_” and for a few brief moments I really quite felt like
Stephen praying for his enemies when they stoned him! What has become
of all these stone-throwers and backbiters, I asked myself! Like
Jonah’s Gourd--“A worm has smote them all”--and they have withered into
obscurity. But yet it’s interesting, as this is a Book of Records,
to tear out one sheet or so and reproduce here some replies to the
nefarious nonsense one had to deal with at that time of democratising
the Navy. I reprint verbatim a few pages I wrote in October, 1906.
These particular words that follow here were directed against those
who assailed my principles of (1) The fighting efficiency of the Fleet,
(2) Its instant readiness for war.
ADMIRALTY POLICY: REPLIES TO CRITICISMS.
[In the autumn of 1906 there was considerable criticism of
the Government’s naval policy, particularly in the daily and
weekly Press. Just before the dissolution of Mr. Balfour’s
administration, Lord Cawdor, then First Lord, had issued a
memorandum on “Admiralty Work and Progress,” dated November
30th, 1905, in which it was stated that “At the present time
strategic requirements necessitate an output of four large
armoured ships annually.” In July, 1906, however, it was
announced in Parliament that only three battleships would
be included in the current programme, the reason for the
abandonment of the fourth ship being that there was a temporary
cessation of warship building on the Continent caused by the
advent of the “Dreadnought” and the “Invincibles.” Coming in
the first year of office of the new Liberal administration,
however, the reduction in the British programme aroused genuine
disquiet among certain people, and by others was utilised
for a political attack on the Government, who were alleged
to be jeopardising the security of the country. In addition,
there was another body of opinion strongly adverse to certain
features in the design of the new “Dreadnoughts.” The following
notes were prepared by Lord Fisher at the time for use by
Lord Tweedmouth and Mr. Edmund Robertson (afterwards Lord
Lochee), who were then First Lord and Parliamentary Secretary
respectively.]
The most brilliant preacher of our generation has said what a stimulus
it is to have always some friends to save us from that “Woe unto you
when all men shall speak well of you”! When criticism goes, life is
done! You must squeeze the fragrant leaf to get the delicious scent!
Hence, it may be truly said that the Board of Admiralty should just
now heartily shake hands with themselves, because Korah, Dathan, and
Abiram (in the shape of three Retrograde Don Quixotes) are trying to
raise a rebellion, but the earth will now open and swallow them all up
quick as in the days of Moses. They and all their company, with their
small battleships and their slow speeds, and their invasion fright
and foreign shipbuilding houses of cards are each and all capable of
absolute pulverisation! Why people don’t laugh at it all is the wonder!
Here, for instance, is a military correspondent lecturing the Board of
Admiralty on types of ships; and Admirals, whose names were bywords of
inefficiency and ineptitude when they were afloat, and who never--one
single one of them--left anything better than they found it, are being
seriously quoted by serious magazines and serious newspapers as “a most
distinguished Admiral,” etc., etc. “These prophets prophesy falsely and
the people love to have it so,” as Jeremiah says! This is because of
the inherent pessimistic British instinct!
Perhaps the most laughable and silly emanation of these Rip Van Winkles
is the outcry against large ships and high speeds, and an Admiral has
gone so far as to resort to mathematics and trigonometrical absurdities
to prove that slow speed and 6-inch guns are of primary importance
in a sea fight!!! Archbishop Whately dealt with a similar critic
by a celebrated _jeu d’esprit_ entitled “Historic Doubts relative
to Napoleon Buonaparte.” The Archbishop by a process of fallacious
reasoning demonstrated with all the exactitude of a mathematical
problem the impossibility of the existence of such a person as
Buonaparte! But as someone has well said, if these strange oddities can
convert our enemies (the Germans) to the priceless advantage of slow
ships and small guns they are patriots in disguise, and Providence is
employing them (as it employs worms and other such things) in assisting
to work out the unfailing and invincible supremacy of the British Navy.
But to say no more--the plain man sees that it is of vital importance
that we should obtain the highest possible speed in order that, in face
of emergencies on the south or east or west of the British Isles, we
may be able to concentrate adequate Naval Force with as little delay
as possible, and that had the British Admiralty held the opinions
expressed by “the Blackwood Balaam” our battleships would still be
steaming at about 10 knots an hour, because he must remember that the
progress which has been made from 10 knots to 22 knots (as attained in
“Dreadnought” at deep, or war load draught) has been gradual, and at
any period during this progression it was quite open to other Balaams
to retard the action of the Admiralty by pointing out that the slight
gain in speed which has been chronicled year by year in battleships was
really not worth the price which was being paid for it! But, Blessed
be God! In this and all other criticisms of Admiralty Policy the
public pulse is totally unaffected, and the reputation of the Admiralty
unlowered.
For 12 months past not a single battleship has been laid down in
Europe, and this simply and solely owing to the dramatic appearance
of the “Dreadnought,” which upset all the calculations in Foreign
Admiralties and deserved the calculated letter written by Lord Selborne
to the Committee on Designs. The Admiralty has done more than all the
Peace party with all their dinners to arrest the contest for Sea Power!
In the criticisms we are dealing with, “Party” as usual has come before
“Patriotism,” but the Sea Lords can, each one of them, confidently say,
with the poet’s version of a patriot’s motto,
“Sworn to no party, of no sect am I,
I can’t be silent and I will not lie,”
and so the Sea Lords have no desire to avoid any odium the Tory
papers[3] may be pleased to bring upon them. There is undoubted
authority for stating that a skilfully organised “Fleet Street”
conspiracy aided by Naval Malcontents is endeavouring to excite the
British public against the Board of Admiralty, but it has fallen flat.
There is, however, a very serious danger in the propagation of the
view so ably combated by Sir C. Dilke in his speech at Coleford, Forest
of Dean, on September 27th last, that this country requires a military
force of 640,000 men!
His comparison of Navy and Army expenditure is illuminating but has
been totally ignored by the Press and the country. The “Fiery Cross”
has been sent round to resuscitate the “Invasion Bogey.”
There has been for many years past a general feeling in this country
that questions of international relationship and of national defence
should be withdrawn as far as possible from the arena of party
politics. Such divergences of opinion as must exist on these topics
have no obvious connection with the divisions of our internal politics;
and it is surely legitimate to go further than this, and say that the
main problems in these departments can be dealt with in such a way as
to win the assent of every reasonable man, whatever his opinions may be
on Trade Unionism or Elementary Education.
At any rate successive Boards of Admiralty have for something like 20
years acted on the assumption--which has hitherto been justified--that
their policy would be accepted by the public as based on a fully
considered estimate of the requirements of national defence, and, if
criticised (as it was bound to be from time to time), criticised on
other than partisan grounds. Between the date of the Naval Defence Act
and 1904 the Navy Estimates were approximately trebled. The increase
was continuous under four successive First Lords, and under both
Liberal and Conservative Governments. In 1904 the maximum of the curve
of expenditure was reached, and the Navy Estimates began to decline,
at first rapidly, under a Conservative Government, then more slowly,
and in part subject to certain provisos, under the present Liberal
Government. And this, it appears, is the moment chosen for the first
considerable outbreak of political rancour in naval affairs since the
modern Navy came into existence!
It is, however, of such supreme importance to the Navy that the
Admiralty Board should not be suspected of being governed in its
decisions on matters of national defence by partisan considerations
that it may be well to set out again, and very explicitly, what are the
reasons which have led the Board to adopt the policy now impugned.
Here we have to go back to first principles. It has become too much
the fashion to employ the phrase “a two-Power standard” as a mere
shibboleth. The principle this phrase embodies has been of the utmost
value in the past, and is likely to be so in the future; but if used
unintelligently at the present moment it merely gives the enemy cause
to blaspheme. Great Britain must, it is agreed, maintain at all costs
the command of the sea. Therefore we must be decisively stronger than
any possible enemy. Who then is the possible enemy? Ten years ago,
or even less, we should probably have answered, France and Russia in
alliance. As they were then respectively the second and third naval
Powers, the two-Power standard had an actuality which it has since
lost. The United States and Germany are competing for the second place
which France has already almost yielded. Russia’s fleet has practically
disappeared. Japan’s has sprung to the front rank. Of the four Powers
which are primarily in question, Japan is our ally, France is our
close friend, America is a kindred State with whom we may indeed have
evanescent quarrels, but with whom, it is scarcely too much to say, we
shall never have a parricidal war. The other considerable naval Powers
are Italy and Austria, of whom we are the secular friends, and whose
treaty obligations are in the highest degree unlikely to force them
into a rupture with us which could in no possible way serve their own
interests.
There remains Germany. Undoubtedly she is a possible enemy.[4] While
there is no specific cause of dispute there is a general commercial
and--on the German side--political rivalry which has unfortunately
but indisputably caused bad blood between the two countries. For the
moment, it would be safe to build against Germany only. But we cannot
build for the moment: the Board of Admiralty are the trustees of
future generations of their countrymen, who may not enjoy the same
comparatively serene sky as ourselves. The ships we lay down this
year may have their influence on the international situation twenty
years hence, when Germany--or whoever our most likely antagonist may
then be--may have the opportunity of the co-operation (even if only
temporary) of another great naval Power. Hence a two-Power standard,
rationally interpreted, is by no means out of date. But it is not
a rational interpretation to say that we must instantly lay down as
many ships as any other two Powers are at this moment laying down. We
must take long views; we must be sure what other Powers are doing; we
must take the average of their efforts, and average our own efforts in
response.
Now this matter of averaging the shipbuilding, of equalising the
programme over a number of years, deserves further consideration. Some
Powers, notably Germany, attempt to achieve this end by creating long
statutory programmes. The British Admiralty has abandoned the idea
since the Naval Defence Act. For us, in fact, it would be a thoroughly
vicious system. For a Power which is trying to “set the pace,” and
which is glad to avoid annual discussion of the financial aspect of
the question, it, no doubt, has its advantages. But Great Britain does
not build to a naval strength that can be determined _a priori_; she
builds simply and solely to maintain the command of the sea against
other Powers. For this end the Admiralty must have its hands free to
determine from year to year what the shipbuilding requirements are.
But, again, this does not mean that our efforts must be spasmodic, that
because foreign Powers lay down six ships one year and none the next,
therefore we must do the same. For administrative reasons, which should
be obvious, and which in any case this is not the place to dilate upon,
it is very necessary that shipbuilding should approximate year by year,
so far as practicable, to some normal figure, and that increases or
decreases, when they become necessary, should be made gradually. This
double principle, of determining the programme from year to year, and
yet averaging the number of ships built over a number of years, has to
be firmly grasped by anyone who desires to understand the Admiralty
shipbuilding policy.
With this preamble we are in a position to discuss the actual
situation. And first we have to consider what is the existing relative
strength of Great Britain and the other naval Powers. About this
there is really no difference of opinion--British naval supremacy was
never better assured than at the present moment. Even admitting the
combination of two of the three next naval Powers (France, Germany,
and the United States) to be conceivable, it is certain that any two
of them would hesitate to attack us, and it is more than probable
that if they did they would be defeated, even without the assistance
of our Japanese allies. The alleged alarm as to our naval strength
is therefore admittedly in regard to the future, not in regard to
the present. And here (to digress for a moment) we may remark that
agitations have occurred in earlier years when it was supposed that
some foreign Power or combination of Powers was actually in a position
to sweep us off the Channel, but never before have we been invited to
panic by prophecy. Is there not something slightly absurd in alarm--not
calculation, for that is justifiable enough, but alarm--about our
position in 1920? At any rate, it is clear that it is the future which
we are called on to consider.
In this connection two facts have to be remembered: first, that we
start in a position of security, and need therefore be in no undue
haste to build more ships; _secondly, that we are on the threshold of
a new era in naval construction_, and can therefore not rest content
with the advantage which we secured in an era which is passing away.
The problem need not be complicated by a somewhat futile attempt to
bring the existing and the new ships of our own and foreign navies to a
common denominator; we must build new ships to meet new ships, always,
however, remembering that until the new ships are in commission we have
got plenty of the old ones to fight with.
But here it is really impossible to avoid commenting on the gross
insincerity of some recent attacks on the Admiralty. It was no doubt
only to be expected that the four ships of the Cawdor memorandum,
which were explicitly stated to be a maximum, should always be quoted
as a minimum by anyone who wishes to belabour the present Board.
But there is a further point which the convenient shortness of the
journalistic memory has suffered to be overlooked. When the Cawdor
memorandum was issued, it was generally (though wrongly) assumed that
only two of the four ships would be battleships, and two “armoured
cruisers.” _And at that time the public had certainly no idea what the_
“_Invincible_” Fast Battle Cruiser type was like, with its 6 knots
superiority of speed to everything afloat, and the biggest guns alive.
The “Invincibles” are, as a matter of fact, perfectly fit to be in line
of battle with the battle fleet, and _could more correctly be described
as battleships which, thanks to their speed, can drive anything afloat
off the seas_. But this was not known, and the calculations generally
made in the Press added only two units per annum to our battle fleet.
Yet there was no outcry; that was reserved to a later date, when it was
beginning to be understood that the “Invincibles” could be reckoned
side by side with the “Dreadnought,” and it had been announced that
three new “Dreadnoughts,” instead of two, were to be laid down this
winter. Surely the ways of the party journalist are past finding out.
In this connection it may be well also to make some observations
on the diminution by the authority of the Board of programmes of
shipbuilding already approved by Parliament. The allegation that
there is anything unconstitutional in the procedure may be left to
the constitutional lawyer to pulverise. Probably all that is usually
meant by the statement is that it is desirable to let Parliament know
of the change in the programme as soon as convenient after it has been
decided, and to this there would usually be no possible objection.
But the idea that, because Parliament has voted a certain sum of
money for the current year’s programme, and certain commitments for
future years (a much more important matter), therefore the Board is
bound to build ships it really does not want, is not only pernicious,
but also ridiculous in the extreme. The only legitimate ground for
complaint, if any, would be that the Board had misled Parliament in
the first instance by overestimating the requirements. The Board are
faced each summer with the necessity of saying what they expect
to have to lay down 18 months later. This, of course, is prophecy.
Generally it is found to be pretty accurate, but the advent of the
new era in shipbuilding (which is principally due to the lessons of
the only big naval war of modern times) has made prophecy more than
usually difficult. Moreover, if the matter is at all in doubt, the
prophet has special inducements to select the higher rather than the
lower figure. Increase of a programme during a given year will involve
a supplementary estimate with all its accompanying inconveniences.
If on the other hand it is found that the original programme was
unnecessarily extensive, it is a comparatively simple matter to cut it
down. It is best of course to have the right number of new ships in the
Navy Estimates; but it is next best to have a number in excess of that
ultimately required, which can be pruned as requisite.
Let us repeat: sufficient unto the year is the shipbuilding thereof.
Panic at the present time is stupid. The Board of Admiralty is not to
be frightened by paper programmes. They will cautiously do all that
they judge necessary to secure the existing naval supremacy of this
country: the moment that is threatened they will throw caution to the
winds and outbuild our rivals at all costs.
H.M. SHIPS “DREADNOUGHT” AND “INVINCIBLE.”
The accompanying papers[5] contain arguments in support of the
“Dreadnought” and “Invincible.”
The features of these novel designs, which have been most adversely
criticised, are:--
1. The uniform Big Gun armament.
2. The great increase in speed.
It is admitted that strategically speed is of very great importance.
It enables the fleet or fleets possessing it to concentrate at any
desired spot as quickly as possible, and it must therefore exercise an
important influence on the course of a naval war, rapid concentration
being one of the chief factors of success.
Many adverse critics of high speed maintain that it is the weapon
of the weaker Fleet, the only advantage conferred being the ability
to refuse an action by running away: two cases may be cited from
the actions of the late war in the East showing the fallacy of this
argument and that the Japanese successes were solely due to a command
of speed.
In the battle of the 10th August, 1904, after the preliminary
manœuvres, the Russian Admiral turned to the eastward at 2.30 p.m. to
escape to Vladivostok. The Japanese Fleet was then on the starboard
quarter of the Russian and practically out of range. Captain Pakenham,
the British Naval Attaché, who was on board Admiral Togo’s flagship, in
his report, states that the “‘Tzæsarevitch’ (leading the Russian line)
was almost out of sight.” A slightly superior speed in the Russian line
would have ensured their escape, but the excess of speed lay with the
Japanese and they slowly drew up into range and reopened the action;
but it was late in the evening before they drew far enough ahead to
concentrate a heavy fire on the leader of the Russian line and so
break up their formation. When this was accomplished it was nearly
dark and the Russians, though thrown into confusion and beaten, were
not destroyed, for the approaching darkness and the destroyer threat
necessitated the Japanese Battle Fleet hauling off, yet the retreat to
Vladivostok was prevented.
A higher speed in the Japanese line would have wrought confusion to the
Russians earlier in the day, and probably have allowed a sufficient
period of daylight for their total destruction.
Again. At the opening of the Battle of the Sea of Japan in May, the
Japanese Fleet, due to skilful handling, held a commanding position,
giving a concentration of fire on the heads of the Russian lines. Had
they not possessed superior speed, the Japanese would rapidly have lost
this advantage, as the Russians turned away to starboard and compelled
the Japanese to move along a circle of larger radius; their greater
speed enabled the Japanese to maintain their advantage and so continue
the concentration of fire on the Russian van until so much damage had
been inflicted that the Russians lost all order and were crushed.
These, therefore, are two of the most convincing instances that
could now be given, where speed was of overwhelming tactical value
to the victorious side, and such evidence is unanswerable and is a
justification of the speeds adopted in the designs of the new ships.
DEFECTS AND REPAIRS
[Lord Fisher found fruitful scope for his reforming energy in
the Royal dockyards, and was very keen on making them efficient
in working as well as economical in administration. The former
tendency had been for ships to accumulate defects until they
went into dock, when their stay was accordingly prolonged,
and the longer they were in dockyard hands the more work was
provided for the officials and workmen, so that there was a
double incentive to spend money. In the following memorandum,
Lord Fisher insists that this drain upon the limited funds
available for the Navy must stop, and explains how the
Admiralty meant to discriminate between vessels which it was
essential to keep thoroughly efficient and others which were
not worth any, or so much, money for repairs. Elsewhere in this
volume Lord Fisher has shown how he got rid of 6,000 redundant
dockyard workmen.]
The head has got to wag the tail. The tail sometimes now wags the head.
It is for the Admiralty, and the Admiralty alone, to decide _whether_,
_how_, or _when_ the defects and repairs of the Fleet are to be taken
in hand.
[Illustration: SIR JOHN FISHER GOING ON BOARD THE ROYAL YACHT.]
_The sole governing condition is what the Admiralty require for
fighting purposes!_ It is desirable to put an extreme case to
accentuate this:--
In the secrets of Admiralty Fighting Policy undesirable to make known
to our enemies there are certain vessels never going to be used for
actual fighting, but they serve an extremely useful purpose for
subsidiary purposes. In such vessels there are defects and repairs of
a particular character that might stand over till Doomsday! whilst
there are other vessels where only defects affecting purely seagoing
and actually direct fighting efficiency should be attended to. All
this entirely depends on our probable enemy and may vary from time
to time, and the sole judge can only be the Admiralty. But what it
is feared now obtains is a blind rushing at all defects and repairs
of all kinds and classes in all vessels. It is perfectly natural
that the Commander-in-Chief and Admirals Superintendent may wish for
the millennium of having all their vessels perfect--but this cannot
be. What does it lead to? Extreme local pressure accentuated by
Parliamentary action to enter more Dockyard workmen. What does this
mean? It means in some recent cases that practically the upkeep of
three cruisers is swallowed up in pay to Dockyard workmen! No--the
Admiralty Policy is sound, consistent and irrefutable, which is _never_
to exceed the normal number of Dockyard workmen as now fixed by the
recent Committee, and have such a great margin of Naval strength--such
as we now possess--as admits of a leisurely and economical refit of
ships without extravagant overtime or inefficient hustling of work.
Therefore, what it comes to is this:--The Admiralty decide what vessels
they require first and what defects and repairs in those vessels are
most material, and they give orders accordingly. It is _not_ the
responsibility of the local authorities at all to say that this vessel
or that vessel must be completed at once, for, as before-mentioned, it
may be that in the Admiralty scheme of fighting those vessels are not
required at all.
The Controller has great difficulties to contend with because he has
not the free hand of a private employer who can discharge or enter
men just as he requires. To get rid of a Dockyard workman involves
agitation in every direction--in Parliament, at the Treasury and
locally, and even Bishops throw themselves into the fray, like the
Bishop of Winchester at Portsmouth, instead of looking after his own
disorganised and mutinous Established Church. There is now a plethora
of shipwrights at Chatham, because the Treasury will not allow their
transfer to other yards, and a paucity of boilermakers because unwanted
men occupy their places, and the scandal exists of men being entered at
Devonport with men having no work at Chatham. But, of course, this is
one of the blessings of Parliamentary Government, Treasury Control, and
a Free Press!
Where the special influence of the Commander-in-Chief is desired by
the Admiralty is to bring before them cases where defects have not
been dealt with in the initial stages by the ship’s artificers and so
allowed to increase as to necessitate Dockyard intervention. Such cases
would be drastically dealt with by the Admiralty if only they could
be informed of them, but there is an amiable desire to avoid severe
punishments, and the dire result is that the zealous and efficient are
on the same footing as the incompetent and the careless who get more
leave and time with their friends because their vessels are longer in
Dockyard hands.
It is desired to give prominence to the following facts:--It is a
matter of everyday occurrence that vessels come home from Foreign
stations, often immense distances, as from China or Australia, and
are inspected by the Commander-in-Chief on arrival home and reported
thoroughly efficient, and praise is given by the Admiralty accordingly,
and the full-power steam trial is conducted with great care, and the
mere fact of the vessel having steamed home those thousands of miles is
itself a manifest evidence of her propelling machinery being efficient,
and yet instantly after paying off we are asked to believe that such a
vessel instantly drops down to a totally incapable condition of either
seagoing or fighting efficiency, by our being presented with a bill of
thousands upon thousands of pounds.
The attention of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Home Ports and of
the Admirals Superintendent will be specially drawn to a new series
of instructions which will specifically detail their responsibility
in carrying out the orders of the Admiralty in regard to defects and
repairs. It is admitted that no comprehensive statement has as yet been
issued as to the order and urgency in which both Fleet and Dockyard
labour should be applied.
This statement is now about to be issued--it is based, and can only be
based, on the knowledge of what vessels are most required for war at
that particular time, and so must emanate direct from the Admiralty,
who alone can decide on this matter. For instance, at this present
moment there are vessels, even in the first line as some might suppose,
which would not be employed until the last resort, whilst there are
others almost believed to be out of the fighting category which under
certain present conditions might be required for the first blow.
This fact came so notably into prominence some months since that it
has led to the adoption of what may be termed the “sliding scale”
of nucleus crews, with the Torpedo craft and Submarines at almost
full complement down to the vessels in “Special Reserve” with only a
“skeleton” crew capable of raising steam periodically and working only
the heavy armament. So no local knowledge could determine from day to
day which are the first vessels required. This is changing from day to
day and it is the duty of the necessarily _very few_ to determine the
daily fighting requirements. The ideal is for only _one_ to know, and
the nearer this is adhered to the more likely are we to surprise our
enemies.
THE USE OF THE GUNBOAT.
[The notes and letters which follow were prepared by
Lord Fisher in the course of his advocacy that the Navy
Estimates and the Service itself should not be saddled with
establishments not directly contributing to the fighting
efficiency of the Fleet and its instant readiness for war.
Such services, he maintained, not only reduced the sum of
money available for the real work of the Navy, but constituted
elements of weakness in the event of hostilities. The first
document concerns the maintenance of small craft on foreign
stations, on which a number of “gunboats” were kept to fulfil
duties for departments other than the Admiralty. Lord Fisher
differentiates between vessels which the Board should rightly
supply, and others which had no naval value but were retained
for duties connected with the Foreign or Colonial Offices--for
which, if necessary, a proper fighting ship could be lent
temporarily and then returned to her squadron. The second
document deals with the Coastguard, which no longer served the
purpose of a reserve for the Navy, and which had come to be
mainly employed on duties connected with revenue, life-saving,
etc., although paid for out of Navy Votes and employing Navy
personnel. Thirdly, the Admiralty letter on Observatories shows
that heavy expense was borne upon naval funds for duties no
longer necessary to the Royal Navy.]
In the Cawdor memorandum of last year (1905) will be found an
exposition of the Admiralty policy in this matter, and attention may
particularly be drawn to the following passage:--
“Gunboats, and all vessels of like class, have been gradually losing
value except for definite purposes under special conditions. As far
as this country is concerned, the very places consecrated as the
sphere of gunboat activity are those remote from the covering aid of
large ships. Strained relations may occur at the shortest notice; the
false security of the period of drifting imperceptibly into actual
hostilities is proverbial, and the nervous dread of taking any action
that might even be construed into mere precautionary measures of
defence, which experience has shown to be one of the peculiar symptoms
of such a period, is apt to deprive these small vessels of their last
remaining chance of security by not allowing them to fall back towards
material support. The broadcast use of gunboats in peace time is a
marked strategic weakness, and larger vessels can generally do the work
equally well, in fact far better, for they really possess the strength
necessary to uphold the prestige of the flag they fly, whereas the
gunboat is merely an abstract symbol of the power of the nation, not a
concrete embodiment of it.
“It might be thought that the withdrawal of the small non-effective
vessels and the grouping of fleets and squadrons at the strategic
positions for war involved the loss of British prestige, and of the
‘Showing the Flag’ (as it was termed). But the actual fact is that
never before in naval history has there been a more universal display
of sea power than during this year by this country. The Channel Fleet
in the North Sea and Baltic receiving the courtesies of Holland,
Denmark, and Germany; the Atlantic Fleet at Brest; the Mediterranean
Fleet at Algiers; the Fourth Cruiser Squadron, consisting of five
powerful fighting vessels, now in the West Atlantic; a powerful
squadron of six of the finest armoured cruisers in the world visiting
Lisbon, Canada, Newfoundland, and United States; a squadron of
cruisers, under a Commodore, proceeding from Labrador to Cape Horn and
back by the coast of Africa, and two cruisers visiting the Pacific
Coast and the adjacent islands; the movements of the Cape Squadron and
of the Eastern Fleet in China, Australia, and the Indian Ocean: so
imposing and ubiquitous a display of the flag and of naval power has
never before been attained by our own Navy.”
The statement goes on to explain the special circumstances--use
in shallow inland waters, etc., etc., which alone are held by the
Admiralty to justify the use of gunboats.
This policy is from time to time impugned by people who have no need
to count the cost of the alternative policy. Doubtless it would be
convenient, as a temporary emergency arises here or there over the
surface of the globe, if at that very spot some British cruiser or
gunboat promptly appeared ready to protect British interests, or to
sink in the attempt. Indeed, for some time this was the ideal at
which the Admiralty aimed. But since the redistribution of the Fleet
the Empire has had to do without the ubiquitous gunboat, and, if the
truth be told, scarcely seems to have missed it. There are one or two
valuable cases in point. For a long time the Foreign Office, or rather
the Ambassador at Constantinople, pressed for the restoration of the
second stationnaire. The Admiralty sternly refused. The only noticeable
result of this dangerous policy so far has been that the French have
followed our example and withdrawn their second vessel.
An even more remarkable case occurred in Uruguay. A poaching Canadian
sealer had been captured by the Uruguayan authorities, and language
was used as if the disruption of the Empire would follow a refusal on
the part of the Admiralty to liberate her crew by force. For a time
the Admiralty was practically in revolt against H.M. Government, and
then--everything blew over. The dispute was settled by diplomatic
action and the local courts of law.
The question of the small vessel for police duties will long be with
us. Vice-Consuls and Resident Commissioners will, no doubt, continue
to act on the great principle: When in doubt wire for a gunboat.
The Foreign and Colonial Offices, to whom the dispatch of a gunboat
means no more than persuading a gentleman in Whitehall to send a
telegram saying she is to go, will probably never quite realise why the
gentleman should be so perverse as to refuse. But the matter is really
now a “chose jugée”; the Admiralty battle has been fought and won,
and it only remains for the Admiralty to adhere to its principles and
decline to give way simply for the sake of a quiet life.
COAST GUARD
_June, 1906._
The Coast Guard Service was transferred from the control of the
Commissioners of Customs to that of the Admiralty by the Coast Guard
Service Act, 1856, in order to make better provision for--
(i) The defence of the coasts of the realm;
(ii) The more ready manning of His Majesty’s Navy in case of
war or sudden emergency;
(iii) The protection of the Revenue;
and there is little doubt that at that time the Coast Guard force was
required for these three purposes.
Since that date, however, these requirements have been greatly
modified by the great developments that have taken place in steam, in
electricity, and generally in the conduct of Naval warfare, and also as
regards the inducements and facilities for smuggling.
It is now considered that about 170 War Signal and Wireless Telegraphy
Stations in the United Kingdom are sufficient to give warning of the
approach of an enemy’s ships, and that, as far as the use of the Coast
Guard for Coast Defence is concerned, the remaining 530 Stations and
their personnel are quite unnecessary.
_As an Active Service force the Coast Guard is far from fulfilling
modern fighting requirements, which are so exacting that a man’s
efficiency depends upon his being_ continuously _associated with highly
technical duties on board ship, and employment in the Coast Guard_
(_even with the arranged periodical training in the Fleet_) _is found
to be inconsistent with these requirements._
Again, as a Reserve, though it fulfils the requirements of such a
force, yet its cost (largely due to the heavy expense of housing the
men and their families) is out of all proportion to that at which the
efficient Royal Fleet Reserve can now be maintained.
The Coast Guard being treated as an Active Service force in the
Estimates, the numbers are included in the number of men voted for the
Fleet, and help to make up the total of 129,000; but as the 4,000 Coast
Guard men are appropriated for duties away from the chief Naval ports,
they are not available for the ordinary work of the Fleet, and the
peace resources are correspondingly reduced, while the extra charges
for the Coast Guard tend largely to increase the expense of maintaining
the Active Service force.
If, on the other hand, the Coast Guard be treated as a Reserve only,
the expense is still more disproportionate, as, in comparison with
the small retainers, charges for a week’s annual drill and small
prospective pension, which make up the whole expense entailed in
the maintenance of the Royal Fleet Reserve, there are the Full Pay,
Victualling, Housing, and numerous miscellaneous allowances and charges
of a permanent force maintained in small units under the most expensive
conditions.
Therefore, the maintenance of the Coast Guard by the Admiralty not
only entails a reduction of the number of highly-trained active
service ratings in the Fleet at sea, but also an unnecessarily large
expenditure on a Reserve.
As regards the use of the Coast Guard for the protection of the
Revenue, the arrangements made when the Coast Guard was transferred
to the control of the Admiralty might now be considerably modified.
A large proportion of the coast of the United Kingdom is still
patrolled nightly by the Coast Guard as a precaution against smuggling,
but looking to the increase in population and the number of towns
and villages round the coasts, the development of telegraphic
communication, and the great reduction in the inducements to smuggling,
this service seems to be no longer required; and some other adequate
arrangement for the protection of the Revenue might be made by a small
addition to the present Customs Force, assisted by the local Police, in
addition to the watch still kept at those Coast Guard Stations which
would be maintained as Naval Signal Stations.
Even in the cases in which the existing Coast Guard may be considered
to afford valuable protection to the Revenue, it must be remembered
that in case of War or for Great Manœuvres, the men would be withdrawn
to the Fleet from all stations except the Naval War Signal Stations.
In any case the employment of highly-trained seamen to perform simple
police duties on shore cannot be justified, and the expense is much
greater than it would be were a civilian force to be employed.
Certain other duties, principally in connection with life-saving and
wrecks, under the Board of Trade, have also been undertaken by the
Coast Guard; but these, however valuable, do not constitute a _raison
d’être_ for the Coast Guard, and it is quite feasible to make adequate
local arrangements for carrying out these services, should the Coast
Guard be removed. No more striking illustration of the feasibility of
this can be given than the National Lifeboat Organisation, and to that
body, aided perhaps by a Government grant, these services could, no
doubt, be easily, economically, and efficiently transferred.
Owing to the growing naval armaments of other Nations, and the
consequent necessary increase in the Navy, the Admiralty has found it
necessary carefully to consider the whole question of the expenditure
under the Naval Votes in order to eliminate therefrom any services
which are unnecessary from the point of view of immediate readiness and
efficiency for war. About £1,000,000 of the Naval Votes is diverted
to services which only indirectly concern the Navy, and are not
material to the fighting efficiency of the Service. Of this about half
(£500,000) is annually absorbed by the Coast Guard.
From a Naval point of view the greater part of this heavy annual
expenditure is wholly unnecessary, and it is also very doubtful, from
what has been before pointed out, whether for Revenue purposes a
force such as the Coast Guard is now required; while if it be still
required in certain localities, it would be more economical to replace
the present expensive Naval detachments by a Civilian service. By
such a transfer the whole of the present expense of training men as a
fighting force would be saved and there would be no deterioration in an
important part of the Naval active personnel such as is now inevitable.
There can be no comparison between the cost of a Revenue force and
that of a Naval force, the cost of Naval training, which is very
considerable, being dispensed with in the former case. Therefore,
there is no doubt that, from the point of efficiency and economy, the
substitution of civilians for Naval ratings would be a great saving to
the State.
OBSERVATORIES.
_21st August, 1906._
In the past Greenwich Observatory has been of great importance to the
Navy, inasmuch as all the data necessary for the navigation of ships
by astronomical observation have been compiled there. The testing of
chronometers has been carried out at Greenwich since their invention in
1762, while the Cape Observatory was instituted in 1820 in order to
supply data concerning Southern stars not visible from Greenwich.
In recent years, however, the familiarity with Ocean routes that has
been attained; the greatly extended area of coast surveys, and the
admirable system of lights and beacons established throughout the
navigational zones of the world, have in the course of years caused the
work of the Observatories to become of less importance to practical
navigation, and more a matter of scientific research. The photographic
mapping of the heavens, by which stars invisible to the naked eye are
discovered, is not a necessity to navigation, nor to the Naval Service.
At the present time, therefore, it may be said that the only work
done by the Observatories which is directly useful to the Navy, is
the testing and storing of chronometers; observing the astronomical
changes connected with the heavenly bodies for the purpose of obtaining
data for the correction of the Nautical Almanack; supplying accurate
time for time signals and meridian distance work, and taking magnetic
observations.
This sphere of usefulness is not of advantage to the Navy alone.
The Mercantile Marine derives equal benefit from the work of the
Observatories. Greenwich time is indispensable to Railway Companies to
enable them to work their complicated systems with accuracy, and it is
equally indispensable to the Postal Authorities for the proper working
of every post and telegraph office in the Kingdom. Although the staff
of the Observatories is very largely occupied upon services of this
public character, neither the Board of Trade, nor Lloyd’s, nor the
various Mercantile Shipping Associations, nor the Railway Companies,
nor the General Post Office, have made any contribution towards their
cost, while, on the other hand, in one case, that of the Post Office,
the Admiralty is charged with a heavy annual payment for postal and
telegraphic communications. The London Water Companies are greatly
assisted by the Greenwich rainfall observations, but they pay nothing
for them, neither do they supply the Admiralty with water gratuitously.
It is fitting that the British Empire should possess a National
Observatory, but it is not equitable that Naval funds should bear the
whole expense.
When criticism is directed against the magnitude of the Navy Estimates,
it rarely happens that the critic takes the trouble to ascertain of
what Items the Votes are made up; on the other hand, money voted for
the Royal Observatories is passed by the House without much question,
because it happens to form part of Estimates which are of such great
magnitude.
The present procedure tends therefore to obscure the actual sum total
of the Navy Estimates, and at the same time it prevents the application
to the Royal Observatories of the same Parliamentary criticism which is
applied to the Civil Service Estimates.
CHAPTER IX
NAVAL PROBLEMS
[The three privately printed volumes entitled “Naval
Necessities,” 1904, 1905, and 1906, contain papers written
or collected by Sir John Fisher, as Commander-in-Chief at
Portsmouth and as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, bearing upon
the Naval Reforms which he then introduced or contemplated. The
following selections from these papers tell their own story.]
_Sir John Fisher to Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty._
DEAR LORD SELBORNE, ...
You remember you glanced through some manuscript in my office
at Portsmouth the day you embarked in “Enchantress,” and I
gathered that you saw much in them that commended itself to
you. Well! having thus more or less got a favourable opinion
from you, I elaborated that manuscript which you had read, and
printed it with my confidential printer; ... then I gave it
secretly to the five best brains in the Navy below the rank of
Admiral to thresh out; and associated two other brains for the
consideration of the types of future fighting vessels; then
I selected out of those seven brains the one with the most
facile pen and ... said to him: “Write a calm and dispassionate
précis for me to give the First Lord.” You may be confident (as
confident as I know you are) that the First Sea Lord won’t ever
sell you! that these seven brains may be absolutely relied
upon for secrecy. I have tested each of them for many years!
These are the seven brains: Jackson, F.R.S., Jellicoe, C.B.,
Bacon, D.S.O., Madden, M.V.O., Wilfred Henderson (who has all
the signs of the Zodiac after his name!), associated with Gard,
M.V.O., Chief Constructor of Portsmouth Dockyard, and who
splendidly kept the Mediterranean Fleet efficient for three
years, and Gracie, the best Marine Engineer in the world!
This is the “modus operandi” I suggest to you. If these
proposals in their rough outline commend themselves to you and
our colleagues on the Board, then let me have these seven,
assisted by Mr. Boar (who is a mole in the Accountant-General’s
Department--you know of him only by upheavals of facts and
figures!), and secretly these eight will get out a detailed
statement supported by facts and figures for consideration
before we take a step further!...
Please now just a few words of explanation at the possibly
apparent (but in no ways real) slight put on those at the
Admiralty who might be thought the right persons to conduct
these detailed inquiries instead of the eight brains I’ve
mentioned!
In the first place, any such heavy extraneous work (such as is
here involved) means an utter dislocation of the current work
of the Admiralty if carried out by the regular Admiralty staff!
and as any such _extraneous_ work must of necessity give place
to any very pressing _current_ work, then the extraneous work
doesn’t get done properly--so both suffer!--But further! these
seven other spirits (not more wicked than any of those at the
Admiralty!) will be absolutely untrammelled by any remarks of
their own in the official records in the Admiralty, and will
not be cognisant (and so not influenced!) by the past written
official minutes of the High and Mighty Ones, and so we shall
get the directness and unfettered candour that we desire!
(Parenthesis:--A most distinguished man at the War Office
used to think he had gained his point and blasted the Admiralty
by collecting extracts 20 years old with opposing decisions!
absolutely regardless that what is right to-day may be wrong
to-morrow! but he traded on what we all dislike--_the charge of
inconsistency!_--Why! the two most inconsistent men who ever
lived, the two greatest men who ever lived and the two most
successful men who ever lived, were Nelson and Napoleon!)
Nelson most rightly said that no sailor could ever be such a
born ass as to attack forts with ships (_he was absolutely
right_), and then he went straight at them at Copenhagen.
Napoleon said, “_L’audace, l’audace, toujours l’audace!_” and
then he went and temporised at Warsaw for three solid weeks
(was it a Polish Countess?), and so got ruined at Moscow in
consequence of this delay.
_Circumstances alter cases!_ That’s the answer to the charge
of inconsistency. So please let us have this excellent and
unparalleled small working Committee to thresh out all these
details (when the general outlines have been considered), but
this very special point will no doubt be borne in mind:--“Until
you have these details how can you say you approve of the
outline?” So what has to be said finally is that if the
facts and figures corroborate what is sketched out, then the
proposals can be considered for adoption, so the ultimate
result is this:--“Let the Committee get on at once.”
J. A. FISHER.
19/10/04.
[Illustration: SIR JOHN FISHER AND SIR COLIN KEPPEL (CAPTAIN OF THE
ROYAL YACHT).]
MAIN PRINCIPLES OF SCHEME.
_Future Types of Fighting Vessels._
Four classes only of fighting vessels.
Uniform armament (except torpedo attack guns) in all classes of
fighting vessels.
Inviolate watertight bulkheads.
Subdivision of magazines.
Protection of magazines.
Abolish Ram.
No guns on main deck (so splendid light and airy accommodation for
officers, and crew, with huge square ports and magnificent deck space).
Reduction of all weights and scantlings.
“_Out of Date_” _Fighting Ships_.
Removal as soon as possible of all “out of date” ships (that is, ships
unfit for fighting).
To abolish gradually the employment of all _slow_ vessels below 1st
Class Armoured Cruisers.
To substitute efficient fighting vessels with nucleus crews for all the
stationary obsolete vessels now in commission, and also for all the
training vessels and all the Coastguard Cruisers.
_Revision of Stations._
South Atlantic, West Indies, and Cape to form a squadron under chief
command of the Admiral of the Cape Station, who will be a Vice-Admiral
in the future with three Rear-Admirals under him.[6]
The Commander-in-Chief in China to have the chief command and strategic
handling of the squadrons in China, Australia, East Indies, and
Pacific. He can be a full Admiral with two Vice-Admirals and two
Rear-Admirals under him. _The object is to employ Flag Officers as
much as possible at sea._
Effective Cruisers to be substituted for the present varying types of
vessels forming all these squadrons.
_Personnel._
Reduction in entry of Boys, and increase of entry of Non-continuous
Service Men and of “Northampton” lads.
Introduction of new system of Reserve (long service tempered by short
service!)
_Nucleus Crews._
Two-yearly commissions to be instituted, and with no material change of
officers and men during the two years.
All the fighting vessels in Reserve to have an efficient nucleus
crew of approximately two-fifths of the full crew, together with all
important Gunnery ratings as well as the Captain of the ship and the
principal Officers.
The periodical exercise and inspection of the ships by the responsible
Flag Officer who will take them to the war.
This Flag Officer will suffer for any want of efficiency and
preparation for war of these vessels. These vessels to be collected
in squadrons at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham, according to the
Station to which they are going as the reinforcements.
_Signals._
Revision of our methods of Signalling to be based on the class of
Signals that will be used in war.
To abolish all systems and all Signals that are only of use in peace
time.
The Signal and Exercise Books of the Fleet to be ruthlessly revised and
cut down with this in view.
The present establishment of Signalmen on board all vessels to be
reduced to the numbers that _are necessary_ in war (present system of
superabundance of Signalmen embarked in Flagships criminally wrong).
_Defence of Naval Ports._
Modern conditions necessitate certain floating defences requiring
seamen to manipulate them. Soldiers apparently can’t do it!
Divided control of defence of Naval Ports impossible between Navy and
Army.
Admiralty must have sole responsibility that all our Naval Arsenals are
kept open for egress and ingress of our Fleet in war.
Local defences should, therefore, apparently be under the Naval
Commander-in-Chief.
But all these arrangements for any such transfer of responsibility
from War Office to Admiralty must be so planned as to obviate all
possibility of Fleet men being used for shore work in war, _and there
must be no risk of lessening the sea experience of the officers and men
of the Fleet_; hence it will be imperative that there should be an
entire transference of the whole of the Garrison Artillery from Army to
Navy, as well as the responsibility for all ordnance.
All this involves so immense an addition to the responsibilities of the
Admiralty, apart from the one chief function of the Navy of seeking out
and fighting the enemy’s fleets, that we have to hesitate; but we can’t
let matters go on as at present.
NOTES BY SIR JOHN FISHER ON NEW PROPOSALS.
_Organisation for War._
“_If the Trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare
himself to the battle?_”
(St. Paul, I Corinthians, xiv. 8.)
The object of the following remarks is to make clear what has now to be
done to organise and prepare for war. What are the two great essentials?
_I._ _The Sufficiency of Strength and the Fighting Efficiency
of the Fleet._
_II._ _Absolute Instant Readiness for War._
To get these two essentials an immense deal is involved! It is believed
they can both be got with a great reduction in the Navy Estimates!
This reduction, combined with an undeniable increase in the fighting
efficiency of the Navy, involves great changes and depends absolutely
on one condition:--
_The Scheme herein shadowed forth must be adopted as a whole!_
Simply because all portions of it are absolutely essential--and it is
all so interlaced that any tampering will be fatal!
The country will acclaim it! the income-tax payer will worship it! the
Navy will growl at it! (they always do growl at first!)
_But we shall be Thirty per cent. more fit to fight and we
shall be ready for instant war!_
and in time when we get rid of our redundancies in useless ships and
unnecessary men it will probably be 30 per cent. cheaper!
The outline of the various proposals will first be given. _No one
single point must be taken as more important than another. Each is part
of a whole_; As St. Paul well observes in the xii. Chapter of the I
Corinthians:--
“_The eye cannot say unto the hand, I have no need of thee: nor
again the head to the feet, I have no need of you. Nay, much
more those members of the body which seem to be more feeble,
are necessary._”
So is it of this scheme! All its parts are essential for the perfection
we must have if England is to remain the “Mistress of the Seas”!
The British Nation floats on the British Navy! So we must have no doubt
whatever about its fighting supremacy and its instant readiness for
war! To ensure this and at the same time _to effect the economy which
the finances of the country render imperative_ there must be drastic
changes! To carry these out we must have the three R’s! We must be
Ruthless, Relentless, Remorseless! We must tell interested people whose
interests are going to be ignored that what the Articles of War have
said since the time of Queen Elizabeth is truer than ever!
“_It is the Navy whereon under the good providence of God, the wealth,
peace, and safety of this country doth chiefly depend!_”
If the Navy is not supreme, no Army however large is of the slightest
use. It’s not _invasion_ we have to fear if our Navy is beaten,
_It’s Starvation!_
What’s the good of an army if it has got an empty belly? In Mr. John
Morley’s famous and splendid words at Manchester on November 8th, 1893:
“_Everybody knows, Liberals as well as Tories, that it is indispensable
that we should have not only a powerful Navy, but I may say, an
all-powerful Navy._” And when we have that--then History may repeat
itself, and Mahan’s glorious words _will be applicable in some other
great national crisis!_ the finest words and the truest words in the
English language!
“_Nelson’s far-distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand
Army never looked, stood between it and the dominion of the
world._”--(Mahan, Vol. II, page 118.)
And the Navy must always so stand! Supreme--unbeaten! So we must
have no tinkering! No pandering to sentiment! No regard for
susceptibilities! No pity for anyone! We must be Ruthless, Relentless,
and Remorseless! And we must therefore have The Scheme! The Whole
Scheme!! And Nothing But The Scheme!!!
Just let us take one instance as an illustration of a mighty reform
(lots more will follow later, but the sledge hammer comes in handy
here!). During the 12 months ending June 30th, 1904 (this last month!)
the ships of the Home Fleet, the Channel Fleet, and the Cruiser
Squadron were in Portsmouth Dockyard for over 30 per cent. of the year!
Disorganised and unfit for sea! See what this means! A battleship costs
over £100,000 a year for its up-keep, irrespective of repairs, but it’s
not the money waste! _it’s the efficiency waste!_
_Every day those Fleets and Squadrons are not together, they are
deteriorating!_
It is only human nature that when in Portsmouth Dockyard, from the
Admiral downwards, all are hankering after their homes! and somehow
or other they get there! the fictions are endless and ingenious, and
extend from “the cradle to the grave!” From an unexpected confinement
to the serious illness of an aged relative! (nearly always a
grandmother! and the baby is always the first one!)
What is the remedy?
It’s Nelsonic--and so simple!
Nelson could not leave Toulon with all his Fleet for nearly four months
out of the year! No! he stayed there for two years without putting
his foot on shore! What he did was to send one or two ships away at a
time to get provisions and water, and to effect any needed repairs.
Let us do the same! We want a fixed base for each Fleet (and so fixed
for war reasons). Thus, for example, the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar,
the Home Fleet at Bantry, or the Forth, and so on. But this is going
into unnecessary detail, and anticipating other parts of the scheme
which must be adopted to make this work! Thus it will be seen later on,
that to enable this great economy in money to be effected (_putting
aside increase of fighting efficiency!_), we must have two years’
commissions! But we can’t have two years’ commissions unless we have
fewer ships in commission! But we can’t have fewer ships in commission
unless we have a redistribution of our Fleet! But we can’t have a
redistribution of our Fleet until we rearrange our strategy! and this
strategy, strange to say, depends on our reserves, and our reserves
depend on a fresh allocation of our personnel, and on a fresh system of
service. _We must have the new scheme of Long Service tempered by Short
Service!_ And this again largely hangs on the types of fighting ships
we are going to have! _But what is the type of ship?_ Not one that goes
to the bottom in two minutes from the effect of one torpedo, and drowns
nearly a thousand men, and takes three years to replace, and costs over
a million sterling! _How many types do we want!_ This is quite easy to
answer if we make up our minds _how we are going to fight_! Who has
made up his mind? _How many of our Admirals have got minds?_
It will be obvious then that the whole of this business is a regular
case of “the house that Jack built,” for one thing follows on another,
_they are all interlaced and interdependent_! That’s why it was said to
begin with:--
_The Scheme! The Whole Scheme!! And Nothing but the Scheme!!!_
One essential feature which has been overlooked must be mentioned
before going further _because imperatively necessary to ensure instant
readiness for war_, but it hangs on all the other points previously
mentioned and which are going to be examined in detail.
The reduction in the number of ships in commission _which is as
necessary for fighting efficiency_ (_when the whole Navy is mobilised
for war_) _as it is conducive to an immense economy must be accompanied
by and associated with two vital requisites_:
I. Every fighting ship in reserve must have a nucleus crew.
II. The reinforcements for the fighting fleets and squadrons must be
collected together while in the reserve at the most convenient ports
and be placed under the Flag Officer who will take them to their war
stations, and this Flag Officer to understand he will be shot like a
dog in case of any inefficiency in these ships in war.
Unless this is carried out the great strategic scheme in contemplation
could not be entertained nor could the number of ships in commission
be reduced as is absolutely essential for the efficiency of those in
reserve, _not on the score of economy at all, but the reduction of
ships in commission is imperative for the fighting efficiency of the
whole fleet when mobilised_.
So we thus get one more illustration of the interdependence of all
portions of the scheme and beg again to refer to St. Paul as previously
quoted.
It is convenient here to mention that the paucity of efficient
Admirals is a most serious matter, and will probably compel the
manufacture of Commodores or of Acting Admirals under a resuscitated
Order-in-Council. The least capable in the respective ranks of the
Navy are the Admirals. It’s not their own fault solely, they have had
no education, and this blot will continue till we have a Naval War
College established at Portsmouth, and Flag Officers and Captains,
hoping for employment, can practically prove their capacity by
manœuvring two fleets of destroyers against each other. This will be
much cheaper and less risky to the Empire than their manœuvring with
the big ships. _Experiments on the scale of 12 inches to a foot are not
economical!_
Mr. Childers was our Attila! He was the “scourge” of the Navy in
many ways, but most of all by his disastrous and frightfully costly
retirement schemes. _The secret of efficiency lies in large lists of
Officers!_ You have then a large field of selection, and a great flow
of promotion, and also no Officer considers it a stigma to be passed
over in company with forty others, and so not to pose as a solitary
monument of ineptitude as he appears at present to himself and his
friends when passed over with the present small lists of Flag Officers.
Also “_Selection by non-employment_” goes so easily with large lists
(and with large lists is accepted as a necessity, and not resented as a
personal affront!).
PURGING THE NAVY OF OBSOLETE VESSELS.
Out of 193 ships at present in commission (not counting destroyers)
organised in fleets, 63 _only_ are of such calibre as not to cause
an Admiral grave concern if allowed to wander from the protection of
larger ships. There are among these several ships which should be paid
off as soon as possible, being absolutely of no fighting value. And
there are, further, several ships having trained naval crews doing the
work usually performed by small merchant tramps. Further still, there
are in our Home Ports many ships taking up valuable berthing space,
requiring maintenance and repair, which never under any circumstances
whatever would be used in war time.
The above useless vessels being in commission means awful waste of
money.
Every ship that has defects taken in hand, and which would not be of
use in war, is a waste of money to the country.
Of course objections will be raised, and it will be shown that the Navy
cannot be run without them, but wipe them out, and in a year no one
will remember that they ever existed.
It is well to review generally our distant stations and the composition
of their squadrons.
The Navy and the country have grown so accustomed to the territorial
nomenclature of our distant squadrons that their connection with the
sea is considerably obscured, and their association with certain
lands has led to a tacit belief that those particular squadrons are
for the protection of the lands they frequent, and not generally for
the destruction of the enemy’s fleet wherever it may happen to be. Of
course no such idea is accepted by the Admiralty, but, in spite of the
broad principles of strategy involved, certain fleets are composed
largely with a view to work in restricted waters, which vessels would
be a source of danger and weakness on the sudden outbreak of war with a
combination of Powers.
Take the combination of ships on each of the following stations: North
America, Cape of Good Hope, East Indies, and Australia. Remember the
“Variag.” What happened in the small area of the theatre of operations
in the present war will be repeated in the larger theatre of operations
of a conflict of European Powers when the whole world will be involved.
What will happen to our “Odins,” “Redbreasts,” “Fantomes,” “Dwarfs,”
etc.? aye! and what will happen to our “Scyllas,” “Katoombas,” and
“Hyacinths,” if caught sight of by first class cruisers of modern
armament on foreign stations?[7] Lucky if they can reach a neutral
port, disarm, and have their crews interned for the remainder of the
war. Lucky, indeed, if a far worse fate does not befall them. At all
events, such wholesale scattering of the British foreign fleets would
lead to irreparable loss of prestige among the smaller States where
these little vessels were usually located.
Now is there any necessity for such numbers of useless fighting ships?
Cannot more efficient classes be substituted for them, or, at all
events, some of them?
What we have to face is the probability of a serious combination of
strong Powers against us, for then we will be unable to spare two
first class cruisers to go in search of individual enemy’s first class
cruisers, who, if not caught, may sweep round and lick up or force
into neutral ports all our inefficient small fry.
Surely the three Atlantic squadrons should be of such strength as
to be able to rendezvous and form a fleet more or less absolutely
self-protective, to say nothing of being offensive. Such a squadron,
under one admiral in war time, would be an effective Atlantic squadron,
and would protect our interests by holding the ocean against enemy’s
cruisers.
Such squadrons can be formed without increasing the personnel of the
Navy, and, moreover, the crews would be in ships that would be used in
war instead of being in “floating anxieties.”
Now for the present, sufficient cruisers, first class, do not exist to
meet the requirements of supplying ships to take the place of smaller
obsolete ones, and also for reserve purposes.
For the present a large proportion of cruisers, second class, must
be retained, but it is hoped that these will in time be replaced by
cruisers, first class, in the proportion of one cruiser, first class,
to three cruisers, second or third class. No one can argue that one
first class cruiser is not a superior fighting unit to three cruisers
second or third class. Also one defect list instead of three!
If it should be insisted on that certain ports require certain small
vessels, then they should be earmarked for that purpose, and only such
places be recognised which larger vessels cannot frequent, such as the
rivers on the West Coast of Africa (our territory), shallow rivers in
China where no question of neutrality can arise, or special places of
this nature. It should be overwhelmingly proved to the satisfaction of
the Admiralty that essential conditions necessitate the presence of
useless fighting ships before they relax their efforts to have such
useless ships removed.
It should be accepted as a principle that the great aim and object of
the Admiralty is to have nothing floating on the waters except the
four fundamental types of fighting vessels, and that (for the present)
lack of ships of the necessary classes prevents this being realised,
but that as the delivery of ships takes place, the substitution will
automatically follow.
The Foreign Office will in time be bound to recognise the real
efficiency of the scheme, even if a consul is robbed of the shadow of
support of a gunboat under his window, but has the substantial strength
of a first class cruiser substituted at the end of a telegraph wire.
_The danger that is eternally present to the Navy is over confidence in
our preparedness for war._
The chief cause of unpreparedness for war is want of appreciation of
the cumulative effect of daily small changes in our ships and armament
on the whole question of strategy and shipbuilding.
Changes have slipped so gradually from wooden sailing ships through
slow steam iron vessels to our present splendid ships of war that
the tendency has always been to subordinate our strategy to our ship
construction, rather than to mould our war ship design to suit our
strategy.
_Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed._
_Ship design, as dictated by strategy, should govern tactics._
_Tactics should govern details of armaments._
In approaching the important question of ship design the first
essential is to divest our minds totally of the idea that a single type
of ship as now built is necessary, or even advisable, then to consider
the strategic use of each different class, especially weighing the
antagonistic attributes of nominally similar classes in the old wars.
To commence with the battleship.
The sole reason for the existence of the old line of battleship was
that that ship was the only vessel that could not be destroyed except
by a vessel of equal class. This meant that a country possessing the
largest number of best equipped battleships could lay them alongside
the enemy, or off the ports where the enemy were. Transports with
the escort of a few battleships could then proceed to make oversea
conquests. Squadrons of battleships or cruisers escorting the convoy
of merchant ships and keeping the line of communications open. In each
case the battleship, being able to protect everything it had under
its wing from any smaller vessel, was the ultimate naval strength of
the country. _Then_ it was that, by means of the battleship only,
was the command of the sea gained and held. _Let us be quite clear
on the matter, it was solely from the fact that the battleship was
unassailable by any vessel except a battleship that made the command of
the sea by battleships a possibility!_
Hence battleships came to symbolise naval sea strength and supremacy.
For this reason battleships have been built through every change of
construction and material, although by degrees other vessels not
battleships have arisen which can attack and destroy them.
Here therefore there is good ground for inquiry whether the naval
supremacy of a country can any longer be assessed by its battleships.
To build battleships merely to fight enemy’s battleships, so long
as cheaper craft can destroy them, and prevent them of themselves
protecting sea operations, is merely to breed Kilkenny cats unable to
catch rats or mice. For fighting purposes they would be excellent, but
for gaining practical results they would be useless.
This at once forces a consideration as to how a battleship differs from
an armoured cruiser. Fundamentally the battleship sacrifices speed for
a superior armament and protective armour. It is this superiority of
speed that enables an enemy’s ships to be overhauled or evaded that
constitutes the real difference between the two. At the present moment
_naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the
building of battleships_ so long as other countries do not do so.
_But it is evidently an absolute necessity in future construction
to make the speed of the battleship approach as nearly as
possible that of the armoured cruiser._
Next consider the case of the armoured cruiser.
In the old days the frigate was the cruiser, she was unarmoured, that
is, her sides were so much thinner than those of the battleship that
she was not able to fight in the line of battle, but the weak gun fire
of those days permitted close scouting by such unprotected vessels,
she could approach a battleship squadron very closely without fear of
damage, she could sail round a fleet and count their numbers without
danger to herself, unless chased off by other frigates, she was a scout
and a commerce destroyer. Similarly with present day armoured cruisers,
they can force their way up to within sight of a fleet, and observe
them, unless chased off by other armoured cruisers, but to do this they
have to be given a certain amount of protective armour.
The range of eyesight has remained constant, that of gunfire has
increased. Speed is a necessity to ensure safety, armour protection to
ensure vision.
It is evident, from the above considerations, that the functions of the
frigate have devolved on the armoured cruiser to a greater extent than
have the functions of the line of battleship devolved on the modern
battleship.
But how about the unarmoured cruisers and those of low speed?
With loss of protection a cruiser loses her power of reasonable
approach for observation purposes, and if to this be added a loss of
reasonable speed her safety is gone. Cruisers without high speed and
protection are entirely and absolutely useless.
Every vessel that has not high scouting speed, or the highest defensive
and offensive powers, _is useless for fighting purposes_.
This is true of every class of vessel between the first class armoured
cruiser and the fast torpedo vessel.
NUCLEUS CREWS.
It is impossible to exaggerate the vital importance to the nation of
having all the reserve ships absolutely ready for instant war.
Our reserve ships, as they are now, are not, and cannot be made really
efficient fighting units under several months of commission. There
is no doubt that great strides towards rapid mobilisation have been
made of late years, but merely to hustle a complement of the required
ratings into a ship, is not to make her a really efficient fighting
machine.
_The keystone of our preparedness for war has now to be
inserted, namely, the provision of efficient nucleus crews._
_This can be done to-morrow._
A nucleus crew should consist of approximately two-fifths of her
engine-room complement, the whole of her turret crews, gun layers
and sight-setters for all guns, all important special ratings, and
two-fifths of her normal crew, her captain, and all important officers.
The ship can proceed half-yearly, or quarterly, as may be required, to
sea with her fighting ship’s company to carry out firing exercises, or
to work under the Admiral or Commodore who will command her and her
consorts in war, and be as nearly perfectly efficient as any ship, not
always at sea, can be.
No more men above our present requirements need be entered, training in
gunnery and torpedo schools need not be interfered with, and a saving
of money to the taxpayer effected.
SUBSIDIARY SERVICES OF WAR.
We are now busily engaged in perfecting each and all of these
subsidiary services; but they are not yet perfect. In some important
respects we are as yet far from it (Rome was not built in a day!), but
we now emphasise the fact in order that matters may be pushed on by all
concerned, from the Prime Minister downwards, with the utmost energy
and vigour!
The items are not taken in the order of their relative importance, but
for convenience of argument.
There is the service of all the auxiliary vessels of the Fleet for
supplying coal, ammunition, stores, provisions, water, materials for
repairs, &c., and also the multitudes of fast mercantile vessels we
require as Scouts; and there is also the nature of the employment of
the armed mercantile cruisers to be settled. All these points have
been carefully considered in the past, but in all and every one of
them there is that most deadly of all deadly drawbacks to fighting
readiness, the leaving certain things to be dealt with “_when the time
comes_.” The time will come like the Day of Judgment! There won’t be
time for doing anything, not even for repentance! We must go to the
very utmost limit of preparedness, not one little item must be left to
be dealt with “when the time comes.” We want all these vessels, without
any exception whatever, to be as ready for a sudden emergency as is
now the main Fighting Fleet! So therefore, day by day, we must know by
name each vessel for every service, and the orders for every captain
of every single one of this multitude of mercantile auxiliaries must
be prepared, and he (each several captain) must thoroughly understand
these orders beforehand; they must be explained to him by “one who
knows,” and when that captain leaves England for his next trade voyage
(and his ship is therefore no longer available), then the operation
must be repeated with the captain of the substituted vessel! It must
be laid down where every ship is to load, what route she is to follow,
what eventualities she has to guard against! _All, and together, must
be detailed and day by day kept perfect!_
Again, who are the officers at every port superintending the imparting
of this information every day of the year, to the daily fresh captains
of daily fresh ships, replacing others daily, going on their usual
trade voyages? Who is the Flag Officer in supreme charge of all these
superintending Port Officers? What are the names of the retired
Commissioned or Warrant Officers who may be allocated to take passage
in all the more important auxiliary vessels? such, for instance, and
above all, as the Ammunition and Repair ships, so as to ensure the
proper control and distribution of the cargo, as well as the efficient
and prompt action of the ship herself, to be at the right place at
the right time. Every Commander-in-Chief must know in minute detail
every particular about every one of these vessels that are coming to
him. He must know it _now_. He must know it _day by day_! He must
have his own agent at home to look after his interests and to be
responsible to him (the Commander-in-Chief) for the completeness of all
the arrangements,--if not complete, then this agent must report the
Superintending Port Officers for their incompetency.
All this scheme above sketched out may involve immense labour and great
expense, _but it has got to be done_! Not a bit of use having the Fleet
at all, if you don’t feed it, and also feed it well!
Quite as a separate service, apart from all that has been mentioned
above, is the dissemination of intelligence and its suppression.
We must not (as has been hitherto accepted) permit the splendid costly
fighting vessels of the Fleet to be criminally wasted by being sent
here and there as messengers! Fast unarmoured mercantile steamers
must constitute the squadrons of the Sea Intelligence Department, and
instead of our Admirals running after information with costly armoured
cruisers, we must run after the Admirals with the information, with
easily obtainable cheap (because non-fighting), fast mercantile vessels.
All this is but a brief review of what is in progress, and what has to
be done, but _there remains above all_ that daily consideration at the
Admiralty, and by every Admiral in command, of what would have to be
done _that very day_ in case of war, with the most unexpected, as well
as the most expected opponent!
A RETROSPECT (JULY, 1906).
The most striking fact to an outsider is the astonishing confidence and
loyalty of the Navy in its rulers which has been exhibited during the
last two years of relentless reorganisation.
Naval Officers, as a class, are conservative and dislike change, and
as a rule are prepared to resist it. The manner in which the recent
changes have been received, root and branch and sweeping as they were,
shows, as nothing else can, the necessity for reforms. Compare the
insignificant agitation (which has, however, now entirely collapsed),
in the Navy over the vast and drastic reforms of the last two years
with the agitation in the Army over the trifling matter of getting rid
of two battalions of Guards!
So let us be grateful--adequately grateful--to the officers and men of
the Navy for their splendid loyalty during the introduction of reforms,
some of which have hit them very hard, notably the sudden bringing
home and paying off of the large number of vessels that were wiped
out of the Navy as not being up to the required standard of fighting
efficiency. And there was also the redistribution of the Fleet, which
deprived many officers of advantageous appointments and seriously
disturbed domestic arrangements.
But the fact is that the Navy sees the fighting advantages we have
gained, and so has loyally responded to the demands on its sense of
duty.
As an excellent writer in the “North American Review” for June so aptly
expresses it, the Navy saw that it was steam-manship that was wanted,
and so, as a body, they welcomed the new scheme of training both of
officers and men. They saw also that to have every vessel of the Navy,
large and small, mobilised and efficient to fight within three hours
in the dead of night, as practically exemplified in the recent Grand
Manœuvres, is a result which justifies all the drastic measures of the
Board of Admiralty.
The Navy also recognises the incomparable fighting advantages of the
new era in giving us an unparalleled gunnery efficiency, as exemplified
in the fact that before that new era there were 2,000 more misses than
hits in the annual gunlayers’ competition, while in the year after
there were 2,000 more hits than misses! In the new order the best ship
is the one that can catch the enemy soonest, and hit him hardest and
oftenest; under the old system these considerations were certainly not
the primary ones.
The Navy sees also that, while the fighting efficiency of the British
Fleet and its instant readiness for war has become a household
word amongst the Admiralties of the world, at the same time vast
economies--to be reckoned in many millions--have been effected; for
instance, our harbours, docks, and basins are ridded of obsolete
vessels and thus made adequate for the accommodation of our fighting
fleet, for which there was no room previously, and no less a sum than
13 millions sterling was at one time contemplated as necessary to give
the required accommodation. The whole of that 13 millions in proposed
works has been cancelled.
Nor have the officers and men been forgotten. The men have had a
quarter of a million sterling practically added to their pay; one item
alone is £75,000 a year for increase of pensions to petty officers,
and another £47,000 a year in giving them their food allowance when
on leave, and other similar and just concessions make up the balance.
Further improvements in the position of the lower deck are now under
consideration and will shortly be ready for announcement, _i.e._,
Ratings Committee.
The officers, again, no longer pay for the bands out of their own
pockets, and the system of Nucleus Crews gives them an amount of Home
Service combined with sea-time, with all its domestic advantages,
beyond anything ever before obtaining in the Navy.
Again, it is recognised by all but a few misguided misanthropes that
the new shipbuilding policy is a magnificent departure in fighting
policy. _We ask the officers who are going to fight, what they
want, and we build thereto._ Formerly vessels were simply belated
improvements on their predecessors. Admirals had to make the best
use they could of the heterogeneous assemblage of vessels which the
idiosyncrasies of talented designers and Controllers of the Navy had
saddled us with, to the embarrassment of those whose business it was
to use them in battle, and to the bitter bewilderment of types in the
brain of the Board of Admiralty! Theory was entirely divorced from
practice, with the lamentable result that when the two were recently
brought together, and the “Dreadnought” was evolved, it was found that
the whole Navy had practically become obsolete!
“First catch your hare” is the recipe in Mrs. Glasse’s Cookery Book
for “jugged hare,” and so speed has been put in the forefront in every
class of vessel from battleship to submarine, and as it’s no use having
the speed without the wherewithal to demolish the enemy, the armament
of our new ships, as so fully exemplified in the “Dreadnought,” has
received such a development that that vessel is equal to any two and a
half battleships at present existing.
The efficacy of the Nucleus Crew system has also been obvious to the
whole Fleet in the unprecedented exemptions from machinery defects, and
the unexampled gunnery efficiency, coupled with a saving of about 50
per cent. in repairs of ships, which incidentally has led in a large
measure to the reduction of 6,000 Dockyard workmen. _And it must never
be forgotten that every penny not spent in a fighting ship or on a
fighting man is a penny taken away from the day of battle!_
The management of the Royal Dockyards has now been placed on a much
sounder footing, more akin to the organisation in similar commercial
establishments, where any undue extravagance or unnecessary executive
machinery means loss of money to the shareholders, and is visited by
pains and penalties on the officials directly responsible. At the same
time the desirable possibilities of ready expansion in war time to
suit the varying requirements of a purely naval repairing and building
establishment have been maintained.
The Navy also sees the great strategic advantages of our Fleets
exercising where they are likely to fight. As Nelson said, “_The battle
ground should be the drill ground_.”
The placid waters and lovely weather of the Mediterranean do not fit
our seamen for the fogs and gales of the North Sea, or accustom them
to the rigours of a northern winter, when the icicles hang down over
the bed or the hammock of the Torpedo Boat Commander and his men, as
in the North Sea last winter when we sent 147 Torpedo Craft suddenly
to exercise at sea; and though sent on a full power trial of many
hours, on first being mobilised, not a single defect or breakdown was
experienced. Since that date the arrangements for the Torpedo Craft
have been still further perfected, and now the Destroyers are all
organised according to the strategic requirements of the situation of
the moment, and are definitely detailed in flotillas and divisions,
with their store and repair ships and reserves, according to the
approved modern methods of torpedo warfare as exemplified in the
Russo-Japanese War.
The Navy also sees and welcomes the untold advantage given by the
Nucleus Crew system of instant war readiness, as exemplified when last
July all our vessels, large and small, in reserve went to sea unnoticed
by the Press and engaged in fighting Manœuvres in the Channel with 200
pendants under the chief command of the Admiral of the Channel Fleet.
No calling out of Reserves or such disorganisation as was incidental to
the old system, when the crews of ships in commission had to be broken
up to leaven the ships of the Reserve that then had no crews at all.
CHAPTER X
NAVAL EDUCATION
I.--COMMON ENTRY.
(_Written in 1905_).
On the 25th of December, 1902, the new system of entry and training of
officers for the Navy was inaugurated.
The fundamental principles of this great reform are:--
(_a_) The common entry and training of officers of the three
principal branches of the Service, viz., Combatant or
Executive, Engineer, and Marine.
(_b_) The practical amalgamation of these three branches of officers.
(_c_) The recognition of the fact that the existence of the Navy
depends on machinery, and that, therefore, all combatant
officers must be Engineers.
(_d_) The adoption of the principle that the general education
and training of all these officers must be completed before
they go to sea, instead of, as heretofore, dragging on in
a perfunctory manner during their service as midshipmen,
to be finally completed by a short “cram” at Greenwich and
Portsmouth.
When the details of the new scheme were published, it was stated
that at about the age of 20 these officers, who up till then had all
received an identical training, would be appropriated by selection to
the three branches, viz., Executive, Marine, or Engineer; however,
this is unlikely to be carried out in its entirety, and when the time
comes, the march of progress will have prepared us to recognise that
differentiation to this extent is unnecessary, and that the Fleet
will be officered by the combatant officer, who will be equally an
Executive, Marine, or Engineer Officer.
Let us assume this to be true. In spite of the great revolution that
has been brought about since Christmas, 1902, in the Navy, and the
consequent awakening and development of the minds of all officers,
there is not one in one hundred who realises fully what the effects of
this great reform will be.
The Cadets who are at present at Osborne College are being educated
primarily as Mechanical Engineers concurrently with the special
training necessary to make them good seamen, good navigators, and
good commanders. The most important training they have to receive is
undoubtedly that of the Mechanical Engineer, which will ultimately make
them capable of dealing with and handling ANYTHING of a mechanical
nature. In process of learning this they acquire a mathematical
training of a very high order, and, as pure mathematics are the same
all the world over, the various other subjects which the Naval Officer
of the future will be required to be proficient in only necessitate
a little training in the special application of the mathematics of
which they possess a firm grasp. Navigation and nautical astronomy are
simplicity exemplified once the student has learned trigonometry and
algebra. Gunnery, torpedo, and electricity are simply special cases of
mechanical problems. Modern seamanship is practically nothing else but
a practical application of simple mechanical “chestnuts.”
What, therefore, is the meaning of it all?
It means that the Naval Officer of the future will regard machinery,
mechanical work, and mechanical problems as his “bread and butter.” He
will think no more of handling machinery of any sort than the ordinary
mortal does of riding a bicycle; guns, gun-mountings, torpedoes, and
electrical instruments and machines he will regard as special types,
but differing no whit in principle from the primitive stock. Mystery
will disappear. At present it is an unfortunate thing that departmental
jealousy leads the members of each and every department of the
Service to make a mystery of their particular speciality. The Gunnery
Lieutenant, Torpedo Lieutenant, Engineer, and Marine Officer each
resent discussion by “outsiders” of any point in connection with their
speciality, as a piece of unwarrantable presumption, with the result
that each knows all about his own job, and pursues it diligently,
taking care not to poach on anybody else’s preserves, but without any
regard as to whether the Service might not gain in efficiency by a
little more co-operation and collaboration.
From one point of view they are right in being exclusive, because they
know that no one else knows anything about their work, and therefore
discussion with “outsiders” is mere waste of breath, but in future all
this will be changed. Specialities will disappear; the Naval Officer of
the future will see no greater difference between a gun-mounting and a
torpedo, than an Engineer sees between the main engines and the feed
pump.
However, although specialities will disappear, it will always be
necessary to have “experts” in each department. We shall still require
our Lieutenants G., T., and E.; but as at the present time when a
Lieutenant G. is promoted to Commander he drops the G., so also it
seems logical to conclude that the future Lieutenant E. on promotion to
Commander should drop the E.