The fighting west of Pozo Bello may be taken first, as it was a logical

continuation of the engagement in the early morning. Here Montbrun

had under his hand four cavalry brigades--those of Wathier, Fournier,

Cavrois, and Ornano--about 2,700 sabres, with Lepic’s 800 guard

cavalry as his reserve--though, as it turned out in the end, the use

of that reserve was to be denied him. In front of him were the two

battalions recently evicted from Pozo Bello, with the British cavalry

brigades of Slade and Arentschildt (about 1,400 sabres) and Bull’s

horse-artillery troop, which had drawn up to protect the retreat of the

routed battalions towards the main body of the 7th Division. General

Houston with that force (one British battalion, two foreign, and four

Portuguese battalions[405]) was engaged in taking up new ground, on the

slope which is separated from Pozo Bello by the shallow trough forming

the valley of the Dos Casas brook. Montbrun’s object was, of course,

to break the British horsemen, and then to fall upon and destroy the

shaken infantry which they were protecting, before they could cross

the valley. There resulted a very fierce and long-sustained cavalry

combat, infinitely creditable to the four British regiments, who had to

fight a detaining action against numbers about double their own. They

were bound to retire in the end--and indeed had no other intention--but

it was their duty to hold off the enemy till the infantry behind them

had got into order. This was done, though at great cost, the regiments

retiring by alternate squadrons, while the rear squadron at each change

of front charged, often winning a temporary and partial success over

the enemy in its immediate front, but always forced to give back as the

French reserve came up. ‘When we charged,’ wrote a participant in this

long combat, ‘they would often turn their horses, and our men shouted

in the pursuit--but go which way they might, we were but scattered

drops amid their host, and could not possibly arrest their progress.

We had again to go about and retire[406].’ The British cavalry, though

losing heavily, never got out of hand, and could be still used as

efficient units down to the end of this phase of the battle. Of their

total casualty list of 157 nearly all must have been lost in this

hard work; it is noticeable that only one officer and four men were

taken prisoners, a sufficient proof that there was no such rout as

French accounts describe--for a rout always implies a serious loss in

‘missing.’

[405] 51st Foot, _Chasseurs Britanniques_, the incomplete

battalion of Brunswick Oels (short of two companies detached),

and the 7th and 19th Portuguese, commanded on this day by Doyle,

colonel of the 19th.

[406] Unpublished Diary of Hall of the 14th Light Dragoons.

After a running fight, the British cavalry was driven back on to the

7th Division, which (now joined by the two detached battalions) was

drawn up on the best position that Houston could select on the slope

above the valley: his centre was in a projecting angle among some rocks

which crop up in the generally bare hillside--his wings thrown back,

and partly covered by stone walls forming the boundaries of meadows.

The much-tried British squadrons, clearing off to the side, took

position on the left rear of the infantry, leaving the 7th Division

in face of the now rather confused mass of Montbrun’s horsemen, whose

order was none the better for the long and well-contested combat in

which they had been engaged. The French general made a serious attempt

to break into the 7th Division: while skirmishers demonstrated against

its front, and a light battery just sent forward by Masséna shelled its

centre, a brigade of dragoons turned its right wing and tried to roll

it up. This attack was foiled by the _Chasseurs Britanniques_, who,

drawn up behind a long stone wall, had apparently escaped Montbrun’s

notice; receiving a staggering volley at close range, just when they

supposed that they had come upon an unprotected flank, the advancing

squadrons fell back in confusion. Another charge, made against the

51st, was also beaten off by musketry[407]. The French then came to a

stand--it was clear that they wanted infantry if they were to get any

advantage over the 7th Division, which was now well settled down into

its position. But Marchand’s and Mermet’s battalions had not followed

Montbrun across the valley, but had begun to march straight against the

centre of Wellington’s new line, west of Fuentes de Oñoro.

[407] See Journal of Wheeler of the 51st, pp. 13-14.

At this moment a new force came upon the scene; Craufurd and the

Light Division were at hand, marching along the higher slope of the

watershed between the Turon and the Dos Casas, in order to connect

with the 7th Division. But Craufurd had not come to form up and hold

the ground where Houston was already engaged. Wellington’s orders were

that the 7th Division should move to its rear, cross the Turon, and

prolong, to the west of that stream, the new line already formed by

the 1st and 3rd Divisions. It was to make this movement covered by

the Light Division and the cavalry, who were to hold the slope till

Houston was well on his way and out of danger. They were then to retire

behind the 1st Division. This was a dangerous task for Craufurd and

his men, but Wellington had selected them precisely because he knew

that they were to be trusted. While Montbrun was busy rearranging

his disordered brigades, Houston slipped down the reverse slope of

the hillside where he had been lying, crossed the Turon, and finally

drew up with one brigade (Sontag’s) on the well-marked heights west

of that stream, and the other (Doyle’s Portuguese) in the village of

Freneda, a mile further to the right. Thus Wellington had once more

an outlying flank-guard, covering the roads which lead to the Coa and

the Bridge of Castello Bom. With the exception of the two battalions

cut up at the opening of the fight, the 7th Division had suffered very

slightly--apparently the French cavalry had not harmed it, but their

attached battery had caused some casualties, which came in all to no

more than 90 men[408] out of the 3,800 in the seven battalions which

had not fought at Pozo Bello.

[408] The 51st lost 6 men; Brunswick Oels, 18; _Chasseurs

Britanniques_, 58; 7th Portuguese, 8 men; 19th, 2 men--of these

92 only 19 were prisoners, so that it is clear that the French

cavalry never got in among them, or cut them up in the style

described by Pelet, Fournier, Fririon, or Masséna himself.

When a body of 4,000 infantry attacked by cavalry has only 90

casualties, we know that no part of it can have been ridden over

or seriously broken.

On the departure of the 7th Division all the peril and responsibility

now fell on Craufurd and the already much-tried cavalry, who had

to make their way back for a full mile along the open slope of the

hillside, to join their comrades in the new position south of Fuentes.

Montbrun, though he had failed in his attack on infantry in position,

thought that he ought to have better fortune against men retreating

over a rolling upland, so urged the pursuit with great energy. Craufurd

formed his men in battalion squares, save a few companies of the rifles

and Caçadores, whom he threw into thickets and enclosures to the right

and left, where he thought them safe against horsemen. The main body

retreated in a line of squares, with the cavalry and the battery of

horse artillery in the intervals. Whenever the French came forward, the

guns played upon them, and the British cavalry charged by squadrons

to check the onslaught. So beautifully was the retreat managed, that

Montbrun never got a chance to charge the infantry at advantage.

‘The steadiness and regularity with which the troops performed their

movement, the whole time exposed to a cannonade, and followed across

a plain by a numerous cavalry, ready to pounce on the squares if the

least disorder should be detected, was acknowledged by hundreds of

unprejudiced spectators (who witnessed it from the heights) to have

been a masterpiece of military evolution. ‘We sustained a very trifling

loss from the cannonade[409],’ writes one Light Division officer.

Another (Napier himself) in more stirring phrases tells how ‘many times

Montbrun threatened to charge Craufurd’s squares, but always found them

too dangerous to meddle with. They appeared but as specks, with close

behind them 5,000 [read 3,500] horsemen, trampling, bounding, shouting

for the word to charge. Fifteen guns were up with the French cavalry,

the eighth corps[410] was in order of battle behind them, the woods on

their right were filled with Loison’s skirmishers, and if that general,

pivoting upon Fuentes, had come forth with the 6th Corps, while Drouet

assailed the village and the cavalry made a general charge, the loose

crowd of non-combatants and broken troops would have been violently

dashed against the 1st Division, to intercept its fire and break its

ranks, and the battle might have been lost[411].’ But Montbrun knew as

well as Craufurd that intact infantry of good quality cannot be broken

when it is securely formed in square, and any attempt to molest the

Light Division by artillery fire was checked by the self-sacrificing

efforts of the British cavalry and guns, who fought their best to keep

off the enemy. Bull’s guns were incessantly unlimbering and firing

a few rounds in the intervals of the squares, and then retreating

rapidly to a new position. On the only occasion when a French battery

got close up it was charged in front, with desperate gallantry, by a

squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons, who suffered terribly, but won

the necessary minutes for the square to which it was neighbour to get

out of range[412]. At last the whole retiring force, horse and foot,

came into Wellington’s lines, with the French close in their rear,

and found safety with the 1st Division. Two incidents marked the last

moments of the retreat: at one point occurred an episode which Napier

has immortalized, with some inaccuracy of detail, in one of his most

brilliant ‘purple passages.’ Captain Norman Ramsay, with two guns of

Bull’s troop, had halted, not for the first time, for a shot or two at

the pursuing cavalry; lingering a moment too long, he found himself cut

off, just as he had limbered up, by a swarm of _chasseurs_, who rode

in from the flank. But he put his guns to the gallop, and, charging

himself in front of them with the mounted gunners, was cutting his way

through the French when he was brought off by friends. On one side a

squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons under Brotherton, on the other a

squadron of the Royals, had turned back when they saw the artillery in

danger. They fell upon the _chasseurs_ before Ramsay had suffered any

hurt, and saved him and his guns, which were brought into the lines of

the 1st Division amid loud cheers from all who had seen the affair[413].

[409] Leach (of the 95th), _Life of an Old Soldier_, p. 214.

[410] By some error Napier says the _8th_ Corps, but the only

division of that corps present (Solignac) was in reserve far off.

[411] Napier, iii. 152.

[412] See Brotherton’s Memoir, in Hamilton’s _History of the

14th Light Dragoons_, pp. 84-5: ‘At Fuentes d’Oñoro we had a

very fine fellow, Captain Knipe, killed through his gallant

obstinacy, if I may so call it. We had, the night before, been

discussing the best mode for cavalry to attack batteries in the

open field. He maintained, contrary to us all, that they ought

to be charged in front, instead of by gaining their flank and

avoiding their fire. The experiment next day was fatal to him. He

had the opportunity of charging a French battery, which he did by

attacking immediately in front. Their discharge of round shot he

got through with little loss, but they most rapidly reloaded with

grape, and his party got a close and murderous discharge, which

almost entirely destroyed it--he himself receiving a grape shot

through the body.’ As Montbrun had not got up his guns during

the first cavalry charges, this must have been during Craufurd’s

fight.

[413] Napier makes two serious errors--he represents Ramsay

as having a whole battery, instead of two guns only: and he

underrates the assistance given by the cavalry, which is detailed

in Brotherton’s memoir, as well as in the regimental history of

the Royals (p. 118).

A little to the left of the point where this happy escape took place

there was an episode of a less fortunate kind. The skirmishing line

of the 1st Division was extended along the foot of the slope on

which its brigades were arrayed. When the rolling mass composed of

the Light Division squares, their attendant cavalry, and the French

in hot pursuit, drew near to the position, the officer in charge of

the pickets of the Guards’ brigade (Lieutenant-Colonel Hill of the

3rd Guards) directed them to close up into solid order, for safety’s

sake: this they did, forming a small square. In this formation

they beat off the rather disorderly charge of the French horse;

but Colonel Hill then very unwisely extended them again, and thus

exposed them in the most dangerous order to a second charge of a

French regiment (13th _Chasseurs_) which came in from the side after

the main attack was over. The three companies were taken in flank,

rolled up, and very badly mauled, sixty or eighty men being killed or

wounded, and Hill himself with another officer and nineteen men being

taken prisoners[414]. The rest had time to club together and defend

themselves, till they were rescued by the charge of a squadron of the

Royals under Colonel Clifton and a troop of the 14th Light Dragoons,

which brought off most of the survivors. The total loss was about 100

men[415].

[414] The account of this in Wellington’s dispatch is hopelessly

obscure, because instead of writing ‘the pickets of the 1st

Division under Lieut.-Col. Hill,’ he wrote by a slip of the pen

‘the _regiments_ of the 1st Division under Lieut.-Col. Hill.’

Hill of course (being a regimental major though a titular

Lieut.-Colonel, after the Guards system) did not command

whole regiments, as Wellington’s words imply, but simply the

skirmishing line of pickets. The facts are made quite clear

by Stepney of the Coldstreams and Stothert’s diary (who calls

them ‘the pickets of the Guards’), Grattan (who calls them ‘the

advance,’ or ‘the light troops of the 1st Division’), and Hall’s

unpublished diary, which gives the whole story in a nutshell:

‘The enemy made a dart at the pickets of the 1st Division, with

the expectation of sweeping off the line before our cavalry could

support them. They succeeded in part, by coming up unexpectedly,

but when they were perceived the men, by collecting into knots

(or ‘hiving’ as they called it) repulsed them with the bayonet.

A troop of the 14th Light Dragoons and some of the Royals were

ordered out to the skirmish and suffered some loss.’

It is this incident which General Fournier, who led the charge,

transforms in his dispatch (in the _Archives de la Guerre_) into

the breaking two squares of the Light Division and taking General

Craufurd prisoner--a wild story. Fririon makes the charge capture

‘300 Hussars of the English Royal Guard!’ Both say that three

battalions of the Guards laid down their arms.

[415] Deducting the regiments in Fuentes de Oñoro (71st and 79th)

the 1st Division lost about 400 men in the whole day, of whom

probably 100 in this petty disaster.

This was only one of several partial attacks made by the French

cavalry against the front of Wellington’s new position[416]. Montbrun

seems to have thought that he could continue to press the Allies--not

recognizing that he had hitherto had to do with troops voluntarily

retiring, but had now run against a battle-line which intended to

stand. Indeed, he wished to try the effect of a general charge against

the front of the 1st Division, and with that object sent orders to his

reserve, Lepic’s brigade of Guard cavalry, to come to the front, and

head an advance, which the rallied squadrons of his main body would

support. Lepic, however, refused to move, saying that personally he

was only too ready to attack, but that he had received specific orders

not to use his brigade save at the direct command of his immediate

superior, Marshal Bessières[417]. While the Marshal was being sought

(he was ultimately found, after much delay, behind Pozo Bello), the

moment which Montbrun supposed suitable for a charge passed away.

[416] One was repelled by the 42nd, which met it in line.

[417] Of this episode, only hinted at by Fririon, and not

mentioned at all by Masséna in his official dispatch, we have

a vivid description in Marbot, which might be doubted if it

were not borne out by hints in Napier and Thiébault and by the

direct statement of Marshal Jourdan in his memoirs. If Lepic had

charged, it is hard to see what effect he could have produced,

for all Peninsular experience went to prove that infantry in

battle order on a good position could not be broken by cavalry,

however daring. The 1st and 3rd Divisions were well established

on their ground, with a steep slope below them, and could not

have been moved. Lepic’s refusal to charge, however, always

takes a prominent part in the description of Fuentes de Oñoro by

French writers, not eye-witnesses, who are anxious to prove that

Wellington ought to have lost the battle.

With this episode the advance of Montbrun’s cavalry ended, frittering

itself away on the edge of the new position of the Allies. Its total

effect had been to roll in the flanking force which Wellington had

thrown out, and to gain some three miles of ground. The loss of the

British had been appreciable, but can hardly be called severe--under

250 in the 7th Division, about 150 in the cavalry, and 200 in the 1st

Division. Montbrun’s squadrons on their side had 359 casualties, to

which may be added perhaps a hundred in Marchand’s division of the

6th Corps, which fought in the attack on Pozo Bello. The strategical

advantage obtained by forcing Wellington to throw back his right wing,

and to leave the roads towards Castello Bom exposed to the possibility

of flanking cavalry raids, was considerable. But it was less important

than it appeared, since the mere threatening of his communications was

useless, unless he could be forced or manœuvred out of his position;

and this was not to be done. He himself saw this clearly, writing in

his dispatch which describes the battle: ‘I had occupied Poço Velho

and that neighbourhood, in hopes that I should be able to maintain the

communication across the Coa by Sabugal, &c., as well as to provide for

the blockade of Almeida, which objects, as was now obvious, were become

incompatible with each other. I therefore abandoned that which was the

less important[418].’ He then proceeds to show how his new position

still covered the blockade of Almeida, and (by means of the troops

placed beyond the Turon) rendered it hard for the enemy to make any

real attempt towards Castello Bom--since this could not be done save by

an isolated detachment. Indeed, Masséna had still to beat the allied

army, and the preliminary operations now ended had done nothing more

than thrust it back into its fighting position.

[418] To Lord Liverpool, 8th May. _Dispatches_, vii. p. 531.

That, according to Masséna’s design, the second act of the battle

was to consist in a vigorous attempt to break Wellington’s new line,

is clear from his own dispatch. And the point to be pierced was the

projecting angle of its centre, in, and to the right of, Fuentes

village. Here the attack was to be concentric and enveloping, Ferey’s

division and the two divisions of the 9th Corps being intended to

storm the village, after which Marchand’s and Mermet’s divisions,

supported by Solignac’s, were to assail the heights to its south-west,

where Picton and Spencer were now in line. Six of the eight infantry

divisions of the French army were to attack on a front of not much over

a mile. This was a powerful combination, but the position which it

was to assail was also very strong. The village, with its barricaded

streets and its tiers of houses trending up the hill, was susceptible

of indefinite defence. The hillside above it and to its right was a

perfect fighting-ground--with the ravine in its front, fine artillery

emplacements along the sky-line, and a flat plateau behind, on which

the main line and the reserves could stand sheltered, till the moment

when they were required to deal with an infantry attack.

Masséna’s plan was to storm the village first, and then, when Ferey and

Drouet should have pushed through it, and have got a lodgement on the

plateau, to deliver the frontal attack with the other three divisions.

He did not intend Marchand and Mermet to move till the projecting

angle of Wellington’s line was turned and broken in by the success of

the other attack. For to send forward these two divisions of the 6th

Corps for an assault on the fine position opposite them, while it was

held by intact troops with their flanks properly covered, would have

been to invite a repetition of Bussaco. The plateau was held by a

perfectly adequate force, the four brigades of the 1st Division (minus

three battalions detached to hold Fuentes de Oñoro[419]), Ashworth’s

Portuguese brigade, and the whole 3rd Division, over 13,000 men, on

a short front, while the Light Division had now returned to take its

place in reserve. Wellington had these troops drawn up in a double

line, the 1st Division next the Turon, Ashworth’s brigade in the

centre, and the 3rd Division above Fuentes, whose defence it was to

feed, if necessary, by detaching battalions from its second line, which

was formed by Mackinnon’s brigade. Owing to the numerical inferiority

of the French artillery, Wellington had also been able to concentrate

a larger number of guns (six batteries) on the critical point of

the battlefield than his enemy could bring against him, so that the

‘artillery preparation,’ to maul his line before a general attack, was

bound to fail. The French guns were overpowered in the contest.

[419] 2/24th and 1/79th from Nightingale’s brigade, and the

1/71st from Howard’s, in all 1,850 bayonets, leaving the

remainder of the 1st Division with 5,700 bayonets, the 3rd

Division with 5,400, and Ashworth with 2,500 as the main line

holding the plateau, with 3,700 of Craufurd’s Light Division in

reserve.

It must not be supposed that Masséna waited for the arrival of

Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry in front of the position before

commencing his attack. The troops opposite Fuentes had been ordered

to storm the village when Montbrun’s operations had begun to develop

successfully, but ‘sans rien hasarder[420],’ i. e. they were not to

move if the attempt to turn the British right failed. But when the

cavalry were seen sweeping the hillsides beyond Pozo Bello, and driving

the enemy before them, the attack on Fuentes was begun by Ferey’s

division, which was already in possession of the few houses on the

east side of the Dos Casas brook. The assault commenced at about two

hours after dawn, when the combat was already in full progress to the

south, by a brisk attack which drove the defenders of the village (the

71st and 79th) out of its lower portion. Two companies of the latter

regiment, barricaded in some buildings near the water, were completely

surrounded and forced to surrender, after all their officers had been

wounded. Ninety-four men were taken prisoners. The remainder of this

Highland battalion and of its countrymen of the 71st rallied in the

upper end of the village, and when joined by the regiment in reserve

(the 2/24th) came forward again, and drove the French into the lower

houses by the river. The fight came to a standstill for a moment,

Ferey’s division (which had already suffered so severely on the 3rd)

being now a spent force so far as initiative went.

[420] Masséna’s dispatch, see Appendix, no. XIII. Drouet is

therefore wrongly blamed by French critics who say that he

attacked an hour or two late--he had to wait to see the turning

movement in successful progress.

But Drouet, who had been told to give Ferey his best support, then fed

the fight with three _bataillons d’élite_, composed of the eighteen

grenadier companies of his two divisions[421]. These picked troops, who

were mistaken for men of the Imperial Guard by their opponents because

of their bearskins and tall plumes, came on with great courage, and

cleared all the middle slopes of the village, driving the garrison up

to the summit of the double-headed hill, near the church and the rocks.

The fighting was very deadly to both sides, but more so to the French,

who had to dislodge an obstinate foe from barricaded houses and lines

of stone walls. It ended in the establishment of the attacking force on

the brink of the summit, but further the grenadiers could not go--the

head of the village and the plateau above it was still maintained by

the 71st, 79th, and 24th, and Wellington began to feed the defending

force by drafting into the upper end of Fuentes, one after another, the

light companies of several brigades of the 1st and 3rd Divisions--the

same detachments who had defended the village upon May 3--in succession

those of Löwe’s German brigade, of Howard’s brigade, of Ashworth’s and

Power’s Portuguese, were sent to the critical point. The whole of the

6th Caçadores followed.

[421] British narratives persistently state that infantry of the

Imperial Guard fought in Fuentes village. But it is absolutely

certain that there were none of those troops with Masséna’s army.

The explanation lies in the fact that the grenadier company in

a French regiment wore bearskins, and that a mass of grenadier

companies therefore could easily be mistaken for Guards. All 71st

and 79th diaries speak of fighting with ‘the Imperial Guards’ for

this reason.

But the progress of the attack had been so far encouraging that at this

moment--about noon--Drouet resolved to finish the affair by putting in

heavy supports from Conroux’s and Claparéde’s divisions for a final

blow[422], which should heave the French line up on to the plateau,

clear the allied troops out of the last few houses of the village, and

definitively break Wellington’s line at its projecting point. Eight

or ten fresh battalions charged across the brook in column, through

the narrow streets encumbered by dead and wounded, and, ascending the

slope, drove their enemies out of the church and the rocks beside

it. This was the critical moment of the day--the only one at which

Wellington lost possession of the whole of the advanced post which so

perfectly defended his centre.

[422] Masséna’s dispatch speaks only of Claparéde’s division

as being put in, but as Martinien’s lists show, Conroux must

have been still more heavily engaged, for his division lost 31

officers killed and wounded, Claparéde’s only 25. Moreover, it

was one of Conroux’s battalions (9th Léger) with which the 88th

were engaged mainly, and this battalion alone lost 8 officers.

About three battalions of each division remained in reserve and

had few or no casualties, viz. the 64th, 88th, 95th, 96th, 100th,

103rd of the Line.

‘Such a series of attacks,’ writes an eye-witness[423], ‘constantly

supported by fresh troops, required exertions more than human to

withstand: every effort had been made to maintain the post, but

efforts, however great, have their limits. Our soldiers had now been

engaged in this unequal contest for upwards of eight hours; the heat

was excessive, and their ammunition was nearly expended. The town

presented a shocking sight: our Highlanders lay dead in heaps, while

the other regiments, though less remarkable in dress, were scarcely so

in the number of their slain. The French grenadiers, with their immense

caps and gaudy plumes, lay in piles of ten and twenty together--some

dead, others wounded, with barely strength sufficient to move, their

exhausted state and the weight of their cumbrous accoutrements making

it impossible for them to crawl out of the dreadful fire of grape and

round shot which the enemy poured into the town. The Highlanders had

been driven to the churchyard at the very top of the village, and were

fighting with the French grenadiers across the graves and tombstones.

The 9th French Light Infantry (the leading battalion of Conroux’s

division) had penetrated as far as the church, and were preparing to

debouch upon the rear of our centre.’

[423] Grattan of the 88th; see his _Adventures_, &c., pp. 66-7.

This part of the British army, the second or reserve line of the 3rd

Division--whose front line was nearer the edge of the position, facing

Marchand--was composed of Mackinnon’s brigade, the 1/45th, 74th, and

1/88th. On these troops devolved the responsibility of stopping the

gap, by recovering the church and the head of the village. The moment

for their action had evidently come. Mackinnon sent for leave to charge

to Wellington by Sir Edward Pakenham, who galloped back in a few

minutes, for he had found his chief only a few yards away, watching

for the crisis. ‘He says you may go--come along[424],’ was the prompt

reply, and Mackinnon moved down with the 74th and 88th in column

of sections, left in front, leaving the 45th in reserve on his old

position.

[424] This again from Grattan, who tells how his colonel, Wallace

of Bussaco fame, said that he would rather have to retake Fuentes

than to cover a retreat to the Coa.

There was a fearful clash by the church at the mouth of the village

street, between the 88th, the leading British regiment, and the 4th

battalion of the 9th Léger at the head of Conroux’s column. They met

front to front, both in column, and are said to have fought with

the bayonet for some moments--the rarest thing in war; it was only

in a street combat like this that such a chance could happen. After

a sharp bicker the French battalion gave way and turned back. At the

same moment the 74th charged down another lane which led into the

village, and all the broken remnants of the Highland regiments and the

light companies cheered and advanced among the lanes and houses. The

enemy yielded at every point, seeing their main column beaten back,

and the advance of the British line swept the whole village as far as

the brook: some of the pursuers, going too far, were killed even on

its further side. It was impossible to maintain the houses near the

water, which were too much exposed to the fire of the French artillery

on the opposite bank. But the 74th and 88th made a firm lodgement in

the middle and upper parts of the village, and were not molested by

any further attempt on the part of Drouet to expel them, though his

guns made their position sufficiently uncomfortable. The commander of

the 9th Corps contented himself with bringing forward his last intact

battalions to the front, to cover the routed masses, while they were

getting into order again to the rear of their original position.

The attempt to storm Fuentes had failed with loss, and by about two

o’clock the decisive fighting was over. The 9th Corps had lost 835 men

in the street-fighting, Ferey’s division at least 400 more[425]. On

the part of the defenders, the 71st and 79th, the original garrison of

the village, had 458 casualties, including 119 prisoners taken at the

moment of the first storm--this was a loss of 30 per cent., as they

had 1,419 officers and men on the field. Cameron, the colonel of the

79th, was shot from a house during the last victorious charge. The

74th and 88th, who finally recovered Fuentes by their decisive charge,

lost only 116 men in doing so. The 2/24th, with the light companies

and Caçadores who had formed the earlier reinforcements, seem to have

had about 160 casualties, but it is impossible to separate the losses

of the light companies in the village from those of the battalions

to which they belonged, who were drawn up in the main position and

suffered certain casualties there. On the whole the defenders of

Fuentes seem to have lost about 800 men, its assailants about 1,300,

out of the 4,000 and the 7,000 men whom they respectively engaged

within it: such is the value of the defensive, even when the fighting

comes to close quarters among houses and enclosures.

[425] It is unfortunately impossible to disentangle the losses

of the various battalions of the 9th Corps, as there is no

regimental return, but only a corps return of its losses

available. But some aid is given by Martinien’s invaluable _Liste

des officiers tués et blessés pendant les Guerres de l’Empire_,

which shows that the battalions that suffered most were the

4/9th Léger with 8 officers hurt out of 21 present, the 4/63rd

Ligne with 7 out of 19, the 4/24th Ligne and 4/28th Léger, each

with 6 out of 17, and the 4/16th Léger with 6 out of 16. These,

clearly, were the units that were most engaged. Some belonged to

Conroux’s, some to Claparéde’s division.

Masséna had evidently considered the capture of the village of Fuentes

as the necessary preliminary for a general attack upon Wellington’s

line. While Ferey and Drouet had been making their last efforts,

Marchand’s and Mermet’s divisions had been halted before the position

of Picton’s and Ashworth’s troops, while Montbrun’s cavalry was facing

the 1st Division. Solignac was visible more to the rear, in front of

Pozo Bello, acting as general reserve. The twenty-four guns belonging

to these units[426] were all brought to the front, and cannonaded

so much of the British line as was visible, doing some little harm.

But they were gradually overpowered by the six batteries[427] which

Wellington had brought up to his front, and finally ceased to fire. The

infantry columns of Marchand and Mermet also suffered appreciably from

the shot and shell, for they were well within range, though too far

off for infantry fire to tell upon them[428]. It is clear that Masséna

refused to attack the front of the 3rd and 1st Divisions till their

flank should be turned on the Fuentes side, and since that necessary

preliminary was never accomplished, the frontal assault was never

delivered, though three divisions stood ready to make it. The only

move on this side, during the hours after noon, was that on the extreme

left of the French line some voltigeurs, apparently from Mermet’s

division, were sent down into the ravine of the Turon, and tried to

push up it, as if to turn the right flank of the Guards brigade. They

were, however, soon stopped by five companies of the 95th Rifles, whom

Craufurd had left to block the passage up this low-lying part of the

British position; no serious attempt was made to reinforce the attack,

which soon died down into a mere _tiraillade_.

[426] Six guns of the cavalry, fourteen of the 6th Corps, four of

the 8th Corps.

[427] Bull’s horse artillery troop, Thompson’s and Lawson’s

companies, and three Portuguese batteries, those of Sequeira,

Rosado, and Preto.

[428] Fririon notes that they suffered more than was necessary

from being in dense masses (p. 207). These two divisions had on

the 3rd and 5th May 14 officers killed and 38 wounded, according

to Martinien’s lists. As the total loss of the corps on both

days was 59 officers and nearly 900 men, and we have to allow

for Ferey’s loss of 400 men in Fuentes village, it seems that

Marchand and Mermet must have lost at least as many more.

Masséna’s account of his reasons for refusing to commit himself to

the decisive attack runs as follows in his dispatch to the Emperor:

‘The English general had united in his centre very large forces and

much artillery. I wished to try to pierce his centre, and to drive

the English army towards the lower Coa. The spirit of the troops was

admirable; but I had to assure myself, before making this vigorous

blow, as to the state of my ammunition, for during the course of

this campaign I had seen myself checked repeatedly by insurmountable

difficulties. It resulted from the report which the officer commanding

the artillery submitted to me, that there only remained in the reserve

park four cartridges per man, which might give thirty shots, counting

what was still in the men’s cartridge-boxes. I did not think myself in

a situation to recommence the attack with such a meagre supply, and

decided to send all the empty caissons back to Rodrigo, in order to

bring up more ammunition. Meanwhile I took the necessary measures to

preserve the advantage already gained over the enemy[429].’

[429] Masséna to Napoleon, Fuentes de Oñoro, May 7: the main

battle-report.

It is clear that we have not here the whole of the Marshal’s motives

explained. Granting that the reserve of cartridges had run low, the

troops with which he had to deliver the decisive blow were precisely

those who had still plenty of ammunition. Mermet’s[430] and Solignac’s

divisions had not fired a shot; Marchand’s had only been engaged for a

few minutes in Pozo Bello, with the two battalions of the 7th Division

which it had evicted from that village. It is true that Ferey’s,

Claparéde’s, and Conroux’s troops, which had made the successive

attacks on Fuentes, must have been not only exhausted in morale but

very short of ammunition by this moment. But why had not the attack by

the three intact divisions been made before the troops to their right

had been completely used up? Clearly because Masséna refused to deliver

the frontal assault till the flanking movement had been successful, and

Wellington’s left-centre had been driven from the village. There were

several hours about noon during which the troops of Marchand, Mermet,

and Solignac remained halted in front of the allied line, while furious

fighting was going on in Fuentes. If the Marshal did not let them

loose upon the enemy during that long space of time, it was because he

thought the attack hopeless. The explanation appears clearly enough in

the narrative of his aide-de-camp Pelet: ‘The Marshal came to the front

when this sort of defile had become already impregnable; a _tiraillade_

was already established; he threw himself off his horse, and,

accompanied only by myself, walked several times up and down the front

of the line, to look for a point where he could break in. But the whole

position seemed equally strong; the fire of the enemy upon Fuentes, and

the reinforcements which he had sent into the village, drew in that

direction the bulk of the French divisions. Everything had come to turn

upon the _affaire de poste_ in that direction. It was necessary to

force the village and the ravine at its back, where all the ground was

in favour of the enemy. The day slipped by in vain attacks[431].’

[430] Save the few voltigeur companies from Mermet sent down to

skirmish with the 95th rifles in the ravine of the Turon, as

mentioned just above.

[431] Pelet, _Appendice sur la Guerre d’Espagne_, p. 341.

If Masséna did not move his main body at noon, when the British were

waging a doubtful contest in Fuentes, it would have been idle to strike

after two o’clock, when the attack on the village had utterly failed.

The fact was that he had staked everything on the capture of Fuentes,

and had seen at an early hour that he dared not send forward Marchand,

Mermet, and Solignac, till the village should have been taken and

Wellington’s flank turned. But though three divisions had been used up

one after another against that strong post, they had failed to master

it. The game was up; for to deliver the front attack when the flank

attack had failed would have been hopeless. The only chance that

the Marshal had of success was to make the two attacks simultaneous:

but he had such a respect for Wellington’s main position that he would

not assail it till it was turned. It never was turned, and so he

never engaged the three divisions that were so long facing it. As a

subsidiary reason for his refusal to strike home, we must undoubtedly

add the fact that he had discovered that he was too weak in guns to

make any proper artillery preparation for an attack on the British

centre. In the course of a long duel his twenty-four pieces had been

overpowered by the thirty-six which Wellington had placed over against

them. They were badly mauled, and largely out of action, by the moment

that the fighting in Fuentes village was over. If the infantry had

advanced, it would have been shot to pieces by the victorious British

artillery, before it could reach the crest of the strong position where

the Anglo-Portuguese battalions lay ranged behind the sky-line.

[Illustration: FUENTES DE OÑORO. May 5th 1811.]

On the northern flank of the British position, where the 5th Division,

about Fort Concepcion, and the 6th Division in front of San Pedro,

watched Reynier’s corps across the steep ravine of the Dos Casas,

nothing of importance happened throughout the day. The opposing

forces were almost equal, each about 10,000 strong, and Reynier had

been ordered to make no more than ‘a general demonstration all along

his line, to support the attack of the main army.’ It was true that

he was also directed to make a parallel movement along the river,

if Wellington should draw in towards Fuentes de Oñoro the troops

immediately opposed to him[432]. But this was never done: Wellington

kept the 5th and 6th Divisions almost in their original positions

throughout the day. A regiment from the latter (the 53rd)[433] was

moved to the edge of the plateau at the north end of Fuentes village,

to keep back any attempt to turn the place on that side--but such an

attempt was not made, and the rest of the division kept its original

place opposite Reynier. The ‘demonstration’ which that general had

been ordered to make was duly carried out, but amounted to nothing

more than the sending of the 31st Léger and two guns from Heudelet’s

division to skirmish, at the edge of the ravine, with the light troops

of the 5th Division on the other side[434]. Some more of the French

regiments deployed, but never came within gunshot. The figures of the

losses on the two sides show how little serious was the engagement:

the 31st Léger lost 4 officers and 48 men killed or wounded; the

light companies of the British 3/1st, 1/9th, 2/30th, and 2/44th, and

of the Portuguese 8th Caçadores lost 27 men. The 6th Division had no

losses at all in its British brigades, and only four men in the 12th

Portuguese line. Reynier has been blamed by some French critics for

not pushing forward a pronounced attack, but it is hard to see how

he could have done more. He was ordered to demonstrate only, not to

commit himself to a real action, unless the British should withdraw

from his front and go towards Fuentes. And as Wellington kept 10,000

men in his front all day, covered by a difficult ravine, he would only

have lost lives, and gained nothing, by engaging. The two divisions

opposite him were numerically as strong as himself, and lay in a most

formidable position. An attack would have been beaten off, while if he

had manœuvred towards Fuentes to join Drouet, the 5th Division could

have crossed the ravine and taken him in the rear. Such a movement

would also have exposed the convoy intended for Almeida, which lay at

Gallegos, to Reynier’s left rear.

[432] Masséna’s orders (_Archives de la Guerre_) were

that Reynier ‘fera pour seconder l’attaque de l’armée une

démonstration générale sur la ligne, et suivra l’ennemi dans tous

ses mouvements--c’est-à-dire que si les forces qu’il a devant lui

se porteraient au secours du gros de l’armée ennemie, qui est

dans la direction de Fuentes d’Oñoro, il les suivrait dans sa

marche, pour les prendre par la gauche.’

[433] See Rogerson’s regimental history of the 53rd, p. 58.

[434] The 8th Caçadores, according to Wellington’s dispatch,

partly crossed the ravine and fought on the other side. Note that

he calls them the ‘2nd battalion Lusitanian Legion,’ though that

had now ceased to be their official designation.

Thus ended the battle of Fuentes de Oñoro: the fight, which had been

hot and well contested down to two o’clock, dying down into a mere

skirmishing between outposts before dusk. The total losses of the

5th had been, on the part of the Allies, 1,452 officers and men, of

whom 192 were killed, 958 wounded, and 255 taken prisoners. That of

the French was 2,192, of whom 267 were killed, 1,878 wounded, and

47 prisoners. On both sides the larger half of the casualties was

incurred in the street fighting that raged up and down the village of

Fuentes for so many hours; as has been already explained, the Allies

lost here 800 men, the French about 1,300. The remaining losses among

Wellington’s men are mainly accounted for by the hustling of the 7th

Division about Pozo Bello, which cost 237 men, by the cutting up of

the light troops of the Guards brigade, where about 100 casualties

took place, and by the hard fighting of the cavalry during the early

part of the day, while they were covering the retreat of the Light

and 7th Divisions, in which they lost 160 men. On the other side the

French, besides their casualties in Fuentes village, had 359 officers

and men of their cavalry put out of action, and some 400 of Marchand’s

and Mermet’s infantry killed or hurt, partly in the storming of Pozo

Bello, but mainly in the cannonade in the afternoon, while they were

standing in column facing Wellington’s second position, which they

were never allowed to attack[435]. Of the 255 prisoners taken from the

Allies, nearly 100 were lost about Pozo Bello by the 7th Division, and

94 belonged to the two companies of the 79th captured in Fuentes de

Oñoro during Ferey’s first attack. Undoubtedly the most surprising item

in the statistics of the day is the small loss incurred by the Light

Division during its retreat to the British lines, wherein, though beset

by 3,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, it counted only 67

casualties[436]. But steady infantry, such as the Light Division, was

invulnerable even to the most daring horsemen, so long as it preserved

its formation in square.

[435] Marchand’s division shows in Martinien’s lists surprisingly

heavy casualties, considering that it was but partially engaged

on the 3rd in support of Ferey, and on the 5th was only actively

employed in storming Pozo Bello. It had 13 officers killed and

31 wounded, which ought to imply at least 600 or 700 casualties

among the rank and file. Apparently there was a disproportionate

loss in officers, as the whole casualties of the 6th Corps on

May 5 were only 944 men, of whom at least 400 were in Ferey’s

division.

[436] Only 9 hurt in the 43rd, 21 in the 52nd, 13 in the Rifles,

24 in the two Caçador battalions. And many of these were

undoubtedly lost in skirmishing, not in the retreat in squares.

On the morning after the battle, dawn showed the two armies still

holding their positions of the preceding night. Masséna had not drawn

back, and the line of his pickets was still covering all the ground

taken from the British on the 5th. The divisions were encamped close

behind, Marchand’s, Mermet’s, and Solignac’s in the edge of the wood

on the near side of Pozo Bello, Ferey’s, Conroux’s, and Claparéde’s on

the heights facing Fuentes de Oñoro, Reynier’s far away to the right.

Nor had Wellington moved a man; but from several hours before daylight

his troops had been employed in entrenching the new front that they

had taken up. This was wellnigh the only occasion during the whole

Peninsular War when Wellington used field-fortification on a large

scale. A trench with the earth thrown outward was constructed from near

Fuentes de Oñoro down to the banks of the Turon--a distance of over a

mile. There was special protection for the six batteries of artillery

distributed down the front, and a great _abattis_ blocking the ravine

of the Turon. The village of Villar Formoso on that stream, somewhat to

the rear of the line, and that of Freneda, on the extreme right, where

the 7th Division lay, had also been put in a state of defence.

Masséna, having failed when the enemy was maintaining a hastily assumed

position, had no intention of attacking it when it was entrenched.

In his dispatch of the 7th he writes: ‘The enemy has passed the

night after the battle in fortifying the crest of the plateau which

he occupies. There are five large works, much artillery is visible,

and trenches for the firing line. He has put up _épaulements_ in the

ravines and behind the rocks; he has barricaded the upper part of

Fuentes de Oñoro village, and Villaformosa; thus he has called to his

aid all the resources of fortifications against an attack that must

be made by main force.’ The idea of relieving Almeida had vanished

from the Marshal’s mind--as is sufficiently marked by the fact that

he ordered the great convoy at Gallegos, which had been collected for

throwing into the fortress, to be distributed for the daily necessities

of the army, which would otherwise have had to be fed by provisions

sent forward from Ciudad Rodrigo. In his report of the battle he states

that his intention is now to withdraw the garrison of Almeida, if he

can manage it, and to have the place blown up. There is no prospect of

dislodging the allied army by a second general engagement; but, by

manœuvring, an opportunity of bringing off Brennier and his men may be

secured. The primary object of the campaign is therefore abandoned; but

the new secondary object of saving the garrison of Almeida may possibly

be secured. In this, as we shall see, the Marshal was to succeed, owing

to the culpable negligence of some of Wellington’s subordinates. The

main purpose of the expedition of the Army of Portugal had been foiled;

after the battle the idea of retaining Almeida, as a foothold beyond

the frontier, was given up.

Fuentes de Oñoro has been called the most hazardous of all Wellington’s

fights, and he has often been censured for fighting at all. Success

is not always the best criterion of a general’s dispositions, and in

this case the fact that Masséna was foiled is not enough to vindicate

all his adversary’s arrangements. But when the case against Wellington

is stated by critics like Napier, Fririon, or Pelet, it is necessary

to set forth his defence, which seems an adequate one. Napier blames

his old chief for accepting battle. ‘A mistaken notion of Masséna’s

sufferings during the late retreat induced Wellington to undertake two

operations at the same time[437], which was above his strength, and

this error might have been his ruin, for Bessières, who only brought

1,500 cavalry and six guns to the battle of Fuentes Oñoro, might have

brought 10,000 men and sixteen guns.’ He erred in sending out Houston’s

division to Pozo Bello, and so extending his line to an unwieldy

length, across ground which, beyond Fuentes, was suitable for cavalry

and lacked defensive strength. By engaging the 7th and Light Divisions

on this _terrain_ he gave the enemy ‘great advantages, which Napoleon

would have made fatal.’ He took up a position which would have allowed

Masséna to detach some of his numerous squadrons round his right flank,

by the Sabugal and Sequeiro bridges, to destroy his magazines at Guarda

and Celorico, break his communication, and cut up the transport in

the rear of the allied army. But, says Napier, ‘with an overwhelming

cavalry on suitable ground, the Prince of Essling merely indicated, as

it were, the English general’s errors, and stopped short when he should

have sprung forward.’

[437] The blockade of Almeida and the siege of Badajoz by

Beresford.

To this it may be answered, firstly, that Wellington would not have

fought, if Bessières had brought 10,000 men instead of the two cavalry

brigades which actually accompanied him. He states in his dispatch to

Lord Liverpool of May 1st that he is prepared to abandon the blockade

of Almeida ‘if the enemy have such a superiority of force as to render

the result of contest for that point doubtful.’ He also states that he

is aware that Masséna might be reinforced by detachments of the troops

under Bessières, which would include some of the Imperial Guard. On

May 2nd[438] his intelligence through Spanish sources was sufficiently

good to enable him to know that very little of the Army of the North

had actually moved. If one or both of the Guard infantry divisions

had marched for the frontier a week before the campaign began, it is

perfectly certain that he must have heard of it, for such a force would

have taken long to advance from Valladolid to Ciudad Rodrigo, or still

longer from Burgos to Ciudad Rodrigo. There were secret agents at

Salamanca and most of the other towns of the Douro valley, who would

certainly have taken care that such a piece of information should reach

the hands of Wellington. He fought because he was aware that the force

opposed to him practically consisted of the Army of Portugal alone.

It will be remembered that, before his short visit to the Alemtejo

in April, he gave Sir Brent Spencer elaborate directions as to the

position which he was to take up, in case the French should come in

overwhelming force to relieve Almeida during his own absence. Spencer

was directed to leave the road open, and to draw back to a defensive

position covering the allied lines of communication[439]. And this no

doubt is the policy which Wellington would have adopted, if Bessières

had brought up the infantry of the Imperial Guard to Masséna’s help.

Of this the best proof is that he actually followed this plan in

September, at the time of the El Bodon fighting, when Dorsenne,

Bessières’s successor, came up to the help of the Army of Portugal with

a large force.

[438] _Dispatches_, vii. 515.

[439] See p. 298 above.

Napier’s second criticism is of more validity. The placing of the

7th Division at Pozo Bello did extend the front of the army into

indefensible ground. But, as has already been pointed out, Wellington’s

intention was not to fight with the 7th Division in such a position,

if the enemy made a wide flanking movement with a very large force.

Houston’s battalions and their cavalry supports were to guard against

any attempt to turn Fuentes de Oñoro by a mere detachment, operating

on a short circle. For this the force sufficed: that, though it was

assailed by three infantry divisions and 3,000 cavalry, it came off

with a loss of only 400 men, and assumed the new position allotted to

it in due course, is surely a testimony to the fundamental soundness

of Wellington’s tactics. Flanking detachments must withdraw if

hopelessly outnumbered; but that is no reason for saying that such

detachments must never be made. Montbrun’s cavalry sought every

possible opportunity to act against the 7th and Light Divisions, but

had no success save in the one case where they caught two battalions

in scattered fragments evacuating a village--even there, owing to the

splendid succour afforded by the British cavalry, they did not destroy

the unlucky troops, but only cut up 150 of them. The moral is the old

one, that cavalry unsupported is helpless against a steady force of all

arms, even when it is in movement over open ground. Inferior though the

British horsemen were in number, they gave an invaluable support to the

infantry, which was never seriously incommoded during its retreat.

But, it is urged[440], the Light and 7th Divisions might have been in

great peril if Marchand’s and Mermet’s infantry had followed Montbrun’s

cavalry with all speed, and pursued the retiring British, instead

of drawing up in front of Wellington’s left centre, to the south of

Fuentes village. Masséna seems to contradict the possibility of this in

his dispatch, where he says that ‘the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 6th

Corps followed the movement of the cavalry _as much as it was possible

for infantry in column to do_,’ and again: ‘This superb movement [of

the cavalry] was stopped; and _before our infantry could arrive_ the

enemy had the time to cover the crest of his plateau with several lines

of English infantry and a formidable force of artillery[441].’ It seems

probable that there was actually not time for Marchand and Mermet,

coming out by narrow swampy paths from the woods of Pozo Bello[442],

and forced to get into order in the open ere they could move on, to

catch up Craufurd and Houston before they were safe in their appointed

positions. Moreover, if they had hurried after Montbrun they would have

been making a flank march across the front of Wellington’s new line,

and exposing themselves to the possibility of a ruinous counter-stroke,

like that delivered at Salamanca a year later.

[440] Both by Napier, iii. 152, and by Fririon, p. 207.

[441] See his dispatch in the Appendix to Belmas, i. p. 539.

[442] Moreover, Marchand’s leading brigade, that of Maucune, must

have been in great disorder, after having driven the British

advanced guard out of the woods and the village, and would need

time to re-form.

Apparently then, on Masséna’s own showing, the advance of Montbrun was

too rapid for the infantry to join him, and if so, the dismal picture

drawn by Napier of the cavalry and the Light Division overwhelmed by a

combination of Montbrun and Marchand, and hurled in disorder against

the 1st Division in its position on the plateau, must be overdrawn. It

is rash to criticize Wellington as a tactician, when (as in this case)

he was moving troops under his own eye, on ground where calculations

of time and pace were simple. If, from his commanding position on the

edge of the plateau, he had judged that the French infantry were close

enough to Montbrun to give him effective support, he certainly would

not have sent out Craufurd to succour Houston, but would have allowed

the latter to make the best retreat that he could towards the Turon and

Freneda. But Wellington evidently judged that the 7th Division could

be brought off without too much risk, and he knew that Craufurd and

his veterans could be trusted even in the most delicate situations. No

amount of cavalry could harm them, and if the French infantry were far

enough away, the operation would be in reality much less hazardous than

it looked.

When once the Light and 7th Divisions had got to their appointed

places in the new line, it is hard to see that Masséna could have

done anything against Wellington’s front, which was well established

on a commanding ground, with a steep slope in front, and a superior

artillery ranged along the crest. The Marshal himself, as we have

seen, after inspecting the new position in person, thought that

Fuentes village was the crucial point, and had turned three divisions

against it. Undoubtedly, if he could have taken it, the position of

the Allies would have been much altered for the worse. But it was a

very strong post--as is sufficiently shown by the fact that 4,000

men held it against nearly double numbers for six or seven hours.

Indeed, its importance may be compared with that of Hougoumont in

the battle of Waterloo--it forced the attacking party to use up a

disproportionate number of men against an outwork, whose occupation was

absolutely necessary as a preliminary for the general attack which was

contemplated. The infantry of the French left could not assail the 1st

and 3rd Divisions with any reasonable prospect of success till Fuentes

was carried, and, as it was never carried, the attack could not be

delivered.

As to Napier’s suggestion that Masséna might have used some of his

superabundant cavalry for a raid against the Sequeiro and Sabugal

bridges, and the communications of the allied army, it is clear that

the move was feasible, but there is no reason to suppose that it

would have been effective. The moment that the force--say a couple

of brigades--got to the Coa it would have been in the narrow and

difficult roads of the mountains--liable to be stopped by the breaking

of the first bridge, or the barricading of the road by the first bands

of Ordenança that it ran against. Cavalry raids to the rear may be

effective in the plains, but in a country like northern Portugal they

are of very doubtful expediency. The military historian will remember

how fruitless in the end were all the brilliant expeditions of J. E.

B. Stuart and Morgan in the American Civil War; though they did much

damage to trains and convoys, they had practically no effect on the

general results of the campaign. Moreover, any expedition to places so

remote as Celorico or Guarda would have taken many days, and Masséna

had no time to waste; considerations of supply pressed him to make a

speedy end to the campaign. On the whole, Napier’s criticism seems

unconvincing on this point.

As to Pelet’s and Fririon’s and Delagrave’s carpings at Wellington,

they seem to be based on a radical ignorance of the force which he

had at his disposal. He may be proved as rash or as timid as the

critic pleases, if it is presupposed that he had 50,000 men, as some

French writers assert, or horsemen superior in numbers to his enemy,

as others have the face to set forth[443]. If the allied army had

possessed an adequate cavalry, or two infantry divisions more than

it actually contained, we may be sure that the fight would have taken

a very different aspect. It was the balance of numbers which forced

Wellington to assume a purely defensive position. The critic who urges

that Masséna might have left the 2nd and 9th Corps alone in front of

the allied position, and have marched with 15,000 men of the 6th and

8th Corps on Castello Bom, taking Freneda on the way, is perhaps the

most unreasonable of all--for he would have had the Marshal divide

his forces into two groups separated from each other by many miles,

with nothing to close the gap. This would surely have led to prompt

disaster. It is clear that Wellington could have overwhelmed the

containing force, or have crushed the turning force, at his choice.

This plan ignores the serious chance of a counter-attack on the part

of the British general--a possibility which does indeed seem to have

escaped the imaginations of many a French general down to the day of

Salamanca. It was deeply rooted in their minds that he was a fighter on

the defensive; they had yet to learn that when the chance was given him

he could be as formidable on the offensive.

[443] Pelet thinks that ‘l’excessive supériorité du général

anglais lui donnait le moyen de tout entreprendre. Il s’est

montré, dans cette campagne, et même ailleurs, fort étranger à la

stratégie comme à la tactique.’ He concludes that Wellington with

his superior numbers should have attacked the French centre or

Reynier! He was ‘plus fort des deux cinquièmes que les Français.’

(_Appendice sur la Guerre d’Espagne_, pp. 340-2.) Fririon states

as an incontestable fact that the French cavalry was inferior

to the English in numbers (_Journal historique de la Campagne

de Portugal_, p. 207). Marbot, on the other hand, thinks that

Wellington was over rash in fighting at all on such a position

(_Mémoires_, ii. 460), coming to much the same conclusion as

Napier. Belmas’s arguments, like those of Pelet, are all vitiated

by his giving Wellington 45,000 men--9,000 more than he actually

possessed. Delagrave thinks, like Pelet, that Wellington showed

‘timidity which passed into cowardice.’ Yet he allows that

Masséna had 41,000 infantry and cavalry, without counting gunners

or sappers, and Wellington only 40,000 (p. 239).

SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER IV

BRENNIER’S ESCAPE FROM ALMEIDA. MAY, 1811

The 6th of May went by without any sign of movement on the part of

the French. Wellington watched with anxiety for the indications of

an extension of the enemy’s front to north or south. But not even

a cavalry picket was shown to the right of Nava de Aver, or to the

left of Fort Concepcion; reconnaissance on the flank showed that the

French remained concentrated in their old positions. It was clearly

improbable that Masséna was about to risk another frontal attack: and

if, as was more likely, he was intending to try some other way of

reaching Almeida than that which runs through Fuentes de Oñoro, it was

odd that he should not start upon it at once. On the 8th, however,

it became obvious that the enemy considered himself beaten, and was

already retreating; at dawn it was found that the 6th and 9th Corps

had disappeared from in front of Fuentes de Oñoro and the entrenched

position to its right. Only part of the 2nd Corps was still keeping

its ground in front of Alameda. The columns of Drouet and Loison

were detected by exploring officers in the woods towards Espeja and

Gallegos; Reynier was acting as a covering force to protect their

withdrawal, and would have vanished at once if he had been attacked in

force.

Masséna, in fact, had only lingered on the fighting-ground during

the 6th and 7th in order to organize his retreat. He had ordered the

great convoy of food, which had been brought up to Gallegos, to be

distributed among the corps, since there was no longer any hope of

throwing it into Almeida, and had sent back his artillery caissons

to Rodrigo to be refilled. They were not to return, as he intended

to pick them up during his retreat. But the main reason why the army

had remained near Fuentes for two days was that an effort had been

made to communicate with General Brennier by stealth, since force had

not availed. By offering a reward of 6,000 francs, the Marshal had

succeeded in finding three soldiers who volunteered to attempt to pass

through the British lines by night bearing a cipher dispatch. Chance

has preserved their names, Zaniboni, Lami, and Tillet. The first two

disguised themselves as Spanish peasants, but were both detected and

shot as spies. The third, a private in the 6th Léger, retained his

uniform and crawled for some miles down the bed of the Dos Casas ravine

in the dark, only emerging from it when he got some way beyond Fort

Concepcion. From thence he made his way to Almeida before dawn, by

creeping on all fours though fields of corn. The dispatch which he bore

to the governor directed him to evacuate the place and escape as best

he could; he was recommended to try a northerly line, and to make for

the bridge of Barba del Puerco, where Reynier’s corps was to be placed

from the 8th onward. By taking this route he would avoid the main body

of the allied army, as there seemed to be nothing but cavalry vedettes

north of Fort Concepcion. Brennier was instructed to acknowledge the

receipt of the message, by firing three heavy salvos at five minutes’

intervals from his heaviest guns at 10 o’clock at night. This he did,

and it was their sound which enabled Masséna to retreat during the

dark hours which followed, with a knowledge that his orders had been

received and that the garrison would try to escape. During the next

day (May 8th) the 6th and 9th Corps recrossed the Azava and retired to

Ciudad Rodrigo. Reynier with the 2nd Corps, moving later, and taking a

separate route, marched by the bridge of Barba del Puerco, further down

the Agueda, and placed himself at San Felices, just beyond the stream.

Wellington, on seeing the French fall back to their point of starting,

thought that Almeida and its garrison were now his own--and so they

should have been if his subordinates had acted with common ability. He

pushed forward his advanced posts to the Azava and the Agueda in face

of the retiring enemy, but sent back the whole 6th Division to relieve

Pack’s Portuguese in the task of blockading Almeida. General Campbell

took over the command from Pack on the 10th, and disposed his three

brigades round the place in what he considered a satisfactory and

scientific fashion. It appears, however, that he cantoned them, for

convenience sake, much too far out, and neglected the usual precaution

of pushing pickets close up to the walls every night, to watch the

garrison during the dark hours. The regiments were placed in villages

three or four miles from the town, and the connecting screen of pickets

between them was thin. Pack’s Portuguese were moved by Campbell to

Cinco Villas, four miles north-west of Almeida. Of Burne’s brigade the

2nd regiment was nearest Almeida, on the road that goes out towards

the north, the 36th at Malpartida close by. The other British brigade

(Hulse’s) was facing the south side of the fortress at a considerable

distance; the Portuguese of the division (Madden’s brigade) were at or

near Junca on the east front.

Brennier was determined to do his very best to carry out the dangerous

task which had been set him. Not only would he carry off his garrison,

but he would leave Almeida a wreck behind him. The 8th and 9th of May

were employed in driving mines into the whole of the enceinte, and in

disabling as much of the artillery as was possible in the time. Some

of the pieces were merely spiked, others had their bores choked also;

many were disabled by the ingenious plan of firing several pairs of

guns simultaneously, with the muzzles of some placed at right angles

to those of the others, so that while half the shots flew outwards,

the other half struck and disabled the guns against which they were

aimed. The besiegers had detected that there was something odd in these

salvos, but thought that they were signals to Masséna--as indeed the

firing on the night of the 7th had actually been.

At about 11.30 on the night of the 10th, the French came out of the

north gate of Almeida in two columns, one formed of the battalion of

the 82nd Line, the other of the provisional battalion, artillery, and

sappers who formed the larger half of the garrison, which numbered

something over 1,300 men. The two columns, which marched close

together, parallel with each other, struck the cordon of the blockading

line near the point where the pickets of the 1st Portuguese, belonging

to Pack’s brigade, joined with those of the 2nd Queen’s of Burne’s.

Rushing violently on, they pierced the line, with nothing more than

a splutter of musketry from the few Portuguese sentries immediately

opposed to them, who were trampled down or driven off. Five minutes

after, a tremendous series of explosions from Almeida startled the

whole of the blockading force: the mines left behind by Brennier had

worked, and the greater part of the eastern and northern fronts of

the place had been blown up. On the south side something had gone

wrong with the fuses, and little damage was done: but the fortress was

effectively ruined.

Brennier should have been caught if the officers entrusted with the

blockade had shown ordinary wisdom, for he was plunging into the midst

of 6,000 men, and, if Wellington’s orders had been properly carried

out, he could never have reached his destination. The main blame for

his successful evasion seems to rest on the shoulders of Colonel

Iremonger of the Queen’s regiment, and General Erskine. The former, who

was nearest of all the blockading battalions to the point of Brennier’s

exit, merely put his men under arms, and sent out patrols both towards

Almeida and to right and left. They came back after long delay,

reporting that the town seemed to have been evacuated, and that the

French had apparently got off to the north and were out of sight. Even

at dawn Colonel Iremonger had made no movement, yet his battalion of

all the division had the best chance of pursuing the enemy. Erskine’s

responsibility is still heavier: he had been directed by a written

order, on the afternoon of the 10th, to extend the line of the 4th

Division as far as the bridge of Barba del Puerco, and in particular

to send the 4th regiment under Colonel Bevan to the rocky defile which

overhangs that bridge.[444] Having, apparently, received the dispatch

at four o’clock, he detained it (unopened according to some accounts)

till long after dusk, when he forwarded directions to the 4th regiment

to move to Barba del Puerco. Colonel Bevan, not receiving the order

till late at night, took upon himself the responsibility of ordering

that the battalion should only move at daybreak. Wherefore there were

no troops holding the defile at the critical moment.

[444] Wellington says (to Lord Liverpool, May 15): ‘Sir W.

Erskine was dining with Sir Brent Spencer at head quarters, and

received his orders about 4 o’clock. He says that he sent them

off forthwith to the 4th regiment, which was stationed between

Aldea de Obispo and Barba del Puerco.... The 4th regiment, it is

said, did not receive their orders before midnight, and, though

they had only 2½ miles to march, missed the road, and did not

arrive at Barba del Puerco till after the French.’ (_Dispatches_,

vii. 566.) Tomkinson’s contemporary comment on this is (pp. 102-3

of his diary): ‘The order reached Sir W. Erskine’s quarters

about 2 p.m.: he put it in his pocket, and did not dispatch the

letter to Colonel Bevan before midnight, and to cover himself,

when required to explain by Lord Wellington, said that the 4th

unfortunately missed its way, which was _not_ the case.’ Many

years later (1836) in his _Conversations with Lord Stanhope_

(which see, p. 89) Wellington said that he believed Bevan had

his orders ‘about four or five in the afternoon, but the people

about him said “Oh! you need not march till daybreak,” and so by

his fault the French got to Barba del Puerco.’ Napier (_History_,

iii. p. 156) says plainly that ‘Erskine sent no order to the 4th

regiment.’ Colonel Bevan always maintained that he got nothing

from Erskine till nearly midnight.

For the first few miles of his retreat Brennier was followed only by

General Pack, who had caught up eighty men of the main picket of the

1st Portuguese, and hurried after the retreating columns, after sending

word to Campbell at Malpartida of the enemy’s general direction. Pack

kept up a running fire for several hours, and took many stragglers and

all the French baggage; but, by the orders of their commander, the

retreating columns did not wait to beat off the teasing force which

pursued them, or even fire a shot in return. Towards daybreak Pack

found himself near Villa de Ciervo, with only a major and eleven men

left in his company, but still close on the heels of the French. In

this village there was a troop of the 1st Royals, watching the line of

the Agueda; they turned out on hearing the firing, demonstrated against

the flying enemy, and detained him for a few useful minutes; but fifty

dragoons could do nothing against two battalion columns. However, with

the growing light, more British troops were seen hurrying up. General

Campbell, on getting Pack’s message, had come on rapidly with the 36th

regiment from Malpartida, and was within a mile of Brennier, when the

latter turned down to the defile which leads to the bridge of Barba

del Puerco. At the same time the 4th, so unhappily absent up to this

moment, were perceived approaching from the south, parallel with the

course of the Agueda, while a squadron of Barbaçena’s dragoons and some

Portuguese infantry were visible in a north-westerly direction. If

Brennier had allowed himself to be detained for half an hour longer, at

any moment in his retreat, he would have been a lost man. But, as it

was, his leading column was nearing the bridge before the British got

within touch of him.

General Campbell had ordered the 36th to throw off their packs and run,

when he saw how close the French were to safety, and the regiment,

followed by the 4th, which came up a minute later, struck the second

French column just as it was descending to the bridge. Fired upon and

charged on the steep road, the battalion broke, and many men, trying

to find short cuts down the precipitous hillside, lost their footing,

and fell down the rocks. There were some broken necks and many broken

limbs, while other fugitives fell into the river and were drowned.

Meanwhile a heavy fire was opened on the pursuers from the opposite

bank. Reynier, who (as he had been ordered) kept a good watch on the

bridge from San Felices, had sent down three battalions of the 31st

Léger and some guns to receive the flying garrison. They had lined the

bank, and were ready to defend the defile. Colonel Cochrane, of the

36th, without Campbell’s orders, took upon himself to try to force a

passage through the covering force, and led a mixed mass of his own

regiment and the 4th across the bridge, and up the opposite slope. They

were repulsed with loss by the 31st Léger; the casualties in this rash

enterprise were the only ones suffered by the British that morning, and

amounted to eighteen killed and wounded, and an officer and sixteen men

taken prisoners. Pack’s Portuguese had lost some fifteen men when their

picket line was forced at midnight, so that the total casualties of the

Allies were about fifty.

Brennier’s columns had of course suffered far more--but it was a

scandal that a single man had escaped. He states his loss in his report

to Marmont at 360 men out of 1,300, of whom over 200 were prisoners and

150 killed or wounded. The _commandant de place_ of Almeida and twelve

other officers were taken. Reynier says that when General Campbell

had withdrawn his troops from the water’s edge, and up the cliff, out

of the range of the French cannon, he sent a party across the bridge

to bring in the wounded, and that they found quite a heap of men with

broken limbs at the foot of the precipice, whom they dragged out from

among the dead and brought back with them. There were some few English

and Portuguese in this ghastly pile, who had lost their footing in

reckless pursuit of the flying enemy and had fallen with them[445].

[445] Marbot’s well-known narrative of this disaster (ii. 473)

errs in exaggerating the numbers, but Reynier’s dispatch shows

that there was a solid foundation for what might otherwise have

appeared a rather lurid picture.

Wellington gave it as his opinion that the escape of the garrison

of Almeida was ‘the most disgraceful military event’ that had yet

occurred to the British army in the Peninsula, and it is easy to

understand his wrath. Campbell had been warned that Brennier might

very probably attempt to escape; Erskine had been told to guard the

defile of Barba del Puerco. The former kept his troops too far back

from the place, and so disposed them that there was nothing directly

behind the cordon of pickets, at the point where Brennier broke out,

save the main-guard of the 1st Portuguese. He also watched the south

and west sides of Almeida with unnecessary numbers--for it was unlikely

that the governor would choose either of those points for his sortie.

But he clearly did his best to pursue when the alarm came, and was

the first to appear at Barba del Puerco with the 36th. The colonel

of the 2nd regiment was much more to blame than his chief, since he

was close to the original point where the French appeared, but merely

collected his battalion at its head quarters and made no attempt to

pursue. In his exculpatory letter to General Campbell he ‘thinks that

he has explained everything satisfactorily[446],’ but he clearly does

not show that he made an adequate attempt to face the situation, which

demanded a rapid pursuit. An extraordinary chance happened to another

regiment of the 6th Division: Colonel Douglas, with the 8th Portuguese,

was at Junca, some way to the east of Almeida. He started off at the

first alarm, and with proper military instinct marched for Barba del

Puerco. Having good guides he reached the bridge before daybreak, but

could see nothing of Brennier (who was still some miles away near Villa

de Ciervo). Finding the defile all quiet, and no French visible save

Reynier’s cavalry picket on the other side of the water, he concluded

that he had come upon the wrong track, and turned back across the Dos

Casas to look for the garrison elsewhere[447]. If he had been a trifle

less prompt, he would have found Brennier running into his arms. This

was sheer bad luck. But clearly the main blame lay with Erskine, who

kept an important order back for six or seven hours, and was the person

directly responsible for the fact that the bridge of Barba del Puerco

was not watched, according to the precise direction issued by the

Commander-in-Chief.

[446] Colonel Iremonger to Campbell, printed in _History of the

2nd Regt._, vol. iii. p. 190.

[447] Wellington to Lord Liverpool, vii. p. 566.

Wellington summed up the affair in a confidential letter to his

brother[448] with the bitter words: ‘I begin to be of the opinion that

there is nothing so stupid as “a gallant officer.” They (the blockading

force) had about 13,000 men[449] to watch 1,400, and on the night of

the 10th, to the infinite surprise of the enemy, they allowed the

garrison to slip through their fingers and escape.... There they were,

sleeping in their spurs even, but the French got off.’ The two officers

who bore the brunt of their chief’s wrath were not--as might have been

expected--Erskine and Iremonger, but Cochrane and Bevan. The former,

for his ill-advised attempt to cross the bridge, got a withering rebuke

in a general order. The latter found that his statement that Erskine’s

dispatch did not reach him till midnight was disbelieved: threatened

with being brought before a court of inquiry, he committed suicide at

Portalegre, while the army was on its march to the south a few weeks

later. Public opinion in the army held that he had been sacrificed

to the hierarchical theory that a general must be believed before a

lieutenant-colonel[450].

[448] _Supplementary Dispatches_, vii. p. 123.

[449] Counting the 4th Division, which was hardly, however, part

of the ‘blockading force.’

[450] For statements showing that every one believed Erskine

to be the responsible person see Stepney, p. 105: ‘instead of

promulgating the orders the general, it is said, put them in

his pocket and forgot them.’ George Simmons (p. 174): ‘Bevan

was too late owing to Sir W. Erskine, by accident, not sending

him an order in time.’ Charles Napier (_Diary_, p. 173), ‘It is

said that Sir Wm. Erskine is to blame, and next to him General

Campbell.’

It will have been noted that Brennier’s report of his hazardous

exploit, for which Napoleon very deservedly promoted him to the rank

of general of division, was sent in, not to Masséna but to Marmont.

The Prince of Essling had ceased to command the Army of Portugal a few

hours before the explosion at Almeida. It will be remembered that the

Emperor had made up his mind to supersede the old Marshal on April 20,

and had entrusted the dispatch to General Foy, who (travelling with his

usual headlong speed) reached Ciudad Rodrigo on the afternoon of May

10th. Marmont, who declares that he had no idea that he was to take

over any charge greater than that of the 6th Corps, had reached Rodrigo

two days before, and had reported his arrival to Masséna when the

latter entered the fortress on May 8th. When Foy delivered the fatal

dispatch to his old chief, the latter vented himself in loud outbursts

of wrath, and declared that he had been maligned to the Emperor[451].

He accused Foy of having given an ill account of his late campaign to

their master, and so of having caused his fall. And he added insult to

injury by pointing out that the envelope of the dispatch was torn, and

insinuating that the bearer had picked it open, in order to read its

contents on his journey. Aghast at these accusations, which seem to

have been no more than the angry inspirations of the moment, Foy wrote

a long letter of remonstrance and self-justification to the Marshal,

but got no satisfaction thereby. Masséna’s own character was such that

it was natural for him to suspect double dealing and dishonourable

conduct on the part of others. The reasons which probably brought

about his recall at this particular moment have been explained in an

earlier chapter[452]. They were the Emperor’s verdict on the campaign

of Portugal. His lieutenant had failed and had lost the confidence of

his army, therefore he must be recalled. Masséna had done far more than

any other general could have accomplished, and he had, in effect, been

sent to essay the impossible. His master far more than himself was

responsible for the failure; but this the Emperor could not, or perhaps

would not, see. The recall was now necessary, for the old Marshal’s

bolt was shot, and it was clear that after Fuentes de Oñoro he could

not have got any more good work out of his army.

[451] See Foy’s _Vie Militaire_, p. 114, and Appendix no. 49.

[452] See pp. 295-6 above.

His successor, Marmont, was a far younger man, aged only thirty-six,

and promoted to his marshalship so late as 1809. He was one of

Napoleon’s earliest followers, and had seen his first service under

him as lieutenant of artillery at Toulon. Having fought all through

the Italian campaign of 1796-7, he had followed his chief to Egypt,

and had been one of the few officers selected to accompany him in his

surreptitious return to France in 1799. He had served in the campaigns

of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram, but not in the Prusso-Russian War

of 1806-7, during which he had been acting as Governor of Dalmatia. It

was his good service both as general and organizer in that province

which had won him his Illyrian title of ‘Duke of Ragusa.’ Personally

Marmont was the exact antithesis of his predecessor in command: he

was no rough and unscrupulous adventurer, but a well-educated and

cultured gentleman, whose ancestors had served the old monarchy in the

army and the law. Of all the marshals, he and St. Cyr are the only

two whose writings give the impression of real literary ability. His

autobiography displays his character in all its strength and weakness;

it shows him brilliant, active, ingenious, and plausible, but absurdly

vain and self-satisfied. The Spanish chapters of it form one of the

best and most convincing indictments of Napoleon’s policy in the

Peninsula, and he supports every deduction by original documents in

the true historical method. But he is such a whole-hearted admirer of

himself and his achievements that he can never realize his own faults

and failures. Nothing that he ever did was wrong--even the loss of the

battle of Salamanca, entirely his own work, can be shifted on to the

shoulders of his subordinates. And he has no sympathy and admiration

for any other person in the world. As a bitter critic remarked at

the time of the publication of his bulky memoirs, ‘Marmont is not

only autolatrous, but his autolatry is exclusive and intolerant. Many

conceited men are not incapable of recognizing merit in others; they

can adjust themselves to their equals and respect them. Marmont gets

irritated and angry whenever he runs against another man of parts. He

is a self-lover who has become a general misanthrope; the iconoclast of

the reputations of all other notable persons.’

But Marmont’s jealousy was reserved for those who were important

enough to be considered as rivals. To his subordinates and inferiors

he was kindly and considerate in a patronizing sort of manner. The

diarists who served under him speak with amusement rather than anger

of his grand airs, his elaborate parade and pomp, and the ostentatious

splendour of his field equipage[453]. He was clearly not disliked as

Masséna had been, for he took care of his men as well as of himself,

and was not considered a hard master[454].

[453] ‘Son tapis chargé de pâtés et d’autres pièces froides très

belles, servis sur des plats d’argent, était entouré d’assiettes,

de gobelets, de couverts du même métal. On dîna debout--ce

qui ne suffit pas pour donner à ce repas de luxe un caractère

suffisamment militaire.’ Thiébault, iv. p. 514.

[454] Parquin, who served for some time in his escort squadron,

calls him ‘très aimé pour les soins qu’il prenait du soldat’

(_Mémoires_, p. 298), and rather admires him for having nothing

but silver plate with him when on campaign.

The military capacity of this clever, vain, ostentatious young marshal

has often been undervalued. He was an excellent strategist, who could

grasp and face a situation with firmness and rapidity. He could form

a good plan of campaign, and manœuvre his troops skilfully, as was

sufficiently shown in his movements in June 1811 and July 1812. As an

organizer he cannot be too highly praised: the way in which he refitted

the Army of Portugal within a month of Fuentes, and made it efficient

for a long and difficult march across central Spain, was deserving

of the highest approval. His weak point was in tactical execution.

When he had got his army to the striking point, he was seized with

irresolution, which contrasted strangely with the skill and decision

which he had shown up to that moment. In personal courage he was the

equal of any of his colleagues--but he could not keep a clear head

on a battle morning. Foy, who served under him during the whole of

his command in Spain, sums him up as follows in his diary: ‘Bold and

enterprising till the moment of danger, he suddenly becomes cold and

apathetic when the armies are in presence. In discussion he will not

face the difficulty, but tries to evade it. He is a good, estimable,

and respectable man, but he himself (and many others) have been

entirely deceived as to the value of his talents. He was never born

to be the general of an army. His face expresses too faithfully the

hesitation of his mind. He asks advice too often, too publicly, and of

too many persons. A witty friend said to me in 1806: “Marmont is like

Mont Cenis: in good weather his brow is high and imposing, in times

of storm the clouds wrap it completely round[455].” ... Yet so mobile

is his imagination that, when the crisis is over, he forgets all his

indecision and mental anguish, he effaces from his memory past facts,

and turns to his profit and glory all that has happened, even events

that were unfortunate and disgraceful[456].’

[455] Foy’s _Vie Militaire_, p. 171.

[456] Ibid., p. 177, note (1).

Marmont had commanded an army corps with credit; he had even conducted

a little campaign of his own against the Austrians on the Dalmatian

frontier, in 1809, so as to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion. But

he was very far from being fit to contend with Wellington, who was

as good a strategist as himself and a practical tactician of a very

different class of merit. He lacked both the imperturbable coolness and

the iron resolution of his opponent--and the first time that they met

in serious combat he was ‘found out,’ and dashed to destruction.

Meanwhile Marmont’s first seven weeks of command were infinitely

creditable to him. He reorganized the Army of Portugal with a rapidity

that disarranged Wellington’s calculations, and he led it to the

strategical point where it was needed, with great swiftness and

skill--as we shall presently see.

The Emperor, in the dispatch which explained to Marmont his duties,

had bidden him drop the organization into corps on which the Army

of Portugal had been hitherto formed, and send home the superfluous

corps-commanders, and any other generals whose absence he desired more

than their presence. Such advice squared with the Duke of Ragusa’s own

ideas, for he disliked to have about him officers who were too high in

rank and seniority to be his humble assistants. Junot and Loison went

back to France at once, and with them nearly all the old divisional

generals: Marmont worked the army with promoted brigadiers. We hear

for the future nothing more of many familiar names--Marchand, Merle,

Mermet, Heudelet, &c. Of the old divisional commanders only Clausel and

Solignac remained. The rest of the new divisions, into which the old

corps were redistributed, were given to men who had entered Portugal

in 1810 at the head of brigades only--Ferey, Brennier, Sarrut, Foy,

Maucune. Reynier stopped a few months more with the army and went off

in July, there being no place for him in the new system. Of the old

superior officers only Montbrun, commanding all the cavalry, remained

with Marmont till the end of the campaign of 1811--there was no one who

could be substituted for him in command of that arm.

In the reorganization of the army the old regimental association in

brigades and divisions were mainly adhered to. The two senior divisions

of the 6th Corps (Marchand’s and Mermet’s original commands) simply

became the 1st and 2nd Divisions of the Army of Portugal, under Foy

and Clausel. The two divisions of the 2nd Corps (late Merle’s and

Heudelet’s) became the 4th and 3rd Divisions of the new organization,

under Sarrut and Ferey[457]. The 8th Corps and Loison’s original

division of the 6th Corps were amalgamated, and made into the 5th and

6th Divisions (Maucune and Brennier). A few small abnormal units, such

as the Légion du Midi and the Hanoverian Legion, horse and foot, were

disbanded, and ceased to exist. All the isolated fourth battalions

of the old 8th Corps had gone down to skeleton units of 200 or 300

strong--their rank and file were drafted into other regiments, their

cadres sent home to France to recruit. In each Line regiment Marmont

reduced the number of field battalions to three or two, and, having

filled them up to a strength of 700 men each, sent back the cadres and

the small remainder of rank and file from the junior battalions to

their dépôts. A fortnight after Fuentes there were not more than 28,000

infantry with the eagles in the Army of Portugal, but there was a great

mass of convalescents in the base hospitals, and of newly arrived

drafts in the governments of Leon and Old Castile, whom Marmont strove,

not at first with great success, to draw to himself and embody in

their regiments. It was hard to get them forward, when every officer

commanding a small post in the rear detained drafts to strengthen his

garrison, and when the Governors of Salamanca and Valladolid wanted to

keep as many recovered convalescents with them as they could retain,

because their governments were undermanned.

[457] But, for reasons unknown, the 17th Léger, from the original

division of Heudelet, changed places with the 26th Line from

Loison’s old division, and went into the new 6th Division.

The cavalry units were in a far worse state than those of the infantry.

Already at Fuentes most of the regiments had shown only two squadrons

for want of horses, and had left behind them in their cantonments

dismounted men in vast numbers. Marmont, seeing it was impossible to

find chargers for them in Spain, was forced to send them all back on

foot to Bayonne, to draw horses from the interior of France. In June

he could put only 2,500 mounted men in the field. The artillery in a

similar fashion was hopelessly short of teams: it could produce only

36 guns (six batteries) properly horsed, though Masséna had started

from Santarem in March with more than 100. Marmont says that the army

returns showed that Masséna had entered Portugal in 1810 with 4,200

artillery horses--of these only 1,400 survived the retreat, and of them

in May only 400 were fit for service[458]. As to the train, it had

vanished altogether, so far as horses and waggons went; the Marshal

says that precisely four waggons were fully horsed and ready for work

when he took over the command. But rest, the return to a land where

food was to be got with ease and regularity, and the opening up of the

dépôts of Salamanca and Valladolid, where uniforms, boots, and pay had

been accumulating, soon did wonders for the army, under the Marshal’s

careful and judicious supervision. By June he was able to take the

field with an army that was restored in morale, and fit for good

service.

[458] Marmont to Berthier, May 14, from Salamanca.

SECTION XXVI: CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. MAY 16TH, 1811

Soult, it will be remembered, had quitted Estremadura, and handed over

the charge of the troops left therein to Mortier, on March 14th. He

received the news of Beresford’s irruption into the province and of

the combat of Campo Mayor on March 30th, so that from the beginning of

April onward he was aware that it would be incumbent on him to support

the 5th Corps and to relieve Badajoz within a few weeks. That he was

not forced to march back from Seville to the north at once was due to

the breaking of the Jerumenha bridges, which (as we have seen) delayed

Beresford’s advance and the investment of Badajoz for many days. But

by the end of April the danger had grown pressing: Latour-Maubourg

had been thrust out of Estremadura, and (deceived by the movements

of Colborne) reported that the Allies were about to invade Andalusia

also. He had fallen back to Constantina, well within the limits of

that kingdom, and not over forty miles from Seville. Nothing definite

had been heard of Badajoz and its garrison, since the communications

between that fortress and the south had been cut by Beresford’s cavalry

on April 10th. Though its governor, Phillipon, was known to be a man

of resource, and though provisions and military stores (the leavings

of Imaz) were abundant, yet the garrison was small for such a large

place, and Soult was not aware how far the damaged fortifications had

been repaired since his departure. It was clear that he must strike at

Beresford without delay, or the news that Badajoz had been attacked and

captured might come to hand some black morning.

The Marshal’s situation, therefore, on May 1st was not unlike what

it had been at the end of the preceding December, when by the

Emperor’s orders he had been directed to make his first irruption into

Estremadura. He must once more collect from the 70,000 men of the

1st, 4th, and 5th Corps a force sufficient to beat whatever number

of troops the Allies had placed in that province. The task would

clearly be more difficult than it had been in January, for, instead

of 16,000 or 20,000 Spaniards, there were now in Estremadura some

20,000 Anglo-Portuguese, besides the 8,000 men of whom Ballasteros and

Castaños could dispose. Moreover, there was Blake to be taken into

consideration; but the Marshal--badly informed as to the movements of

that general and his corps--thought that he was still so far from the

rest of the Allies that he would not be able to join Beresford for

battle, if the attack upon the latter was pressed with great swiftness

and decision. The only favourable feature in the situation was that

Badajoz was now in French hands, and could not be used (as in February)

for a general rallying-place for the Allies. Campo Mayor and Olivenza

would be of little or no use to Beresford, and, if he made Elvas his

_point d’appui_, he must first evacuate all that lay on the south bank

of the Guadiana. The only alternative for the British general would be

to concentrate and fight at some point where he could cover the siege

of Badajoz. This was the probable course for him to adopt, and Soult

had to calculate the force that he would require in order to make

victory reasonably certain. He fixed it at about 25,000 men--too low

an estimate, as it turned out. It is interesting to note that at the

very moment when Soult was ordering his concentration at Seville, a

dispatch was on the way to him from Napoleon at Paris, dictating the

course which he ought to pursue under the exact circumstances which had

now arisen. ‘Wellington,’ wrote the Emperor on March 30th, ‘has only

32,000 British troops: he cannot make a detachment of more than 8,000

or 9,000 of them, with 5,000 or 6,000 Portuguese added. It is necessary

to keep permanently about Badajoz the value of 15,000 men of all arms,

in good state and of the best regiments, so that at the least movement

of the English on this side the Duke of Dalmatia, taking with him 8,000

or 10,000 men, should be able to concentrate in Estremadura a total of

from 25,000 to 30,000 men. If this exceptional crisis arises, only a

corps of observation must be left on the side of Granada, and it must

be placed under the orders of the Duke of Belluno (Victor). The Duke

of Dalmatia must keep in correspondence, via Madrid, with the Army

of Portugal and the Army of the Centre. The King ought always to keep

a division of 6,000 men between the Tagus and Badajoz, ready to unite

with the Duke of Dalmatia, if it becomes necessary to resist a movement

of the English against Andalusia. But to arrive at this result it is

necessary that the country-side should be entirely disgarrisoned, that

all hospitals and magazines should be concentrated in Seville, and that

Cadiz, Seville, and Badajoz should be the only points to guard, with a

corps of observation at Granada. In this case the Duke of Belluno would

take command of the troops at Seville and Granada, as well as of the

force besieging Cadiz, and the Duke of Dalmatia would only have charge

of the army opposed to the English. Counting the division from the Army

of the Centre, he can easily unite 30,000 to 35,000 men.... In this

case he would be able to resist even 30,000 English, if Lord Wellington

marched against him with his entire army. But this supposition can

never be realized; because, if it happened, the Prince of Essling

(Masséna) would be able to march on Lisbon, and the English would find

themselves cut off from that place, and between two fires[459].’

[459] Memorandum from Berthier of March 30.

From the first part of Napoleon’s calculations it is clear that he

thought Soult would require about 25,000 men--the 15,000 who were to

be left about Badajoz and the 10,000 who were to be brought up from

Andalusia: they are increased to 30,000 by erroneous addition only.

As a matter of fact Soult, in order to cover Seville and to rescue

Victor, had left only 11,000 men in Estremadura on March 14th, and

3,000 of these were now shut up in Badajoz. But on the other hand he

collected from Andalusia (including Maransin’s column)[460] 16,000

men, so that his fighting force was within a few hundreds of the

25,000 named by the Emperor. The 35,000 spoken of in a later sentence

would only be required, so Napoleon thought, if Wellington came down

to invade Andalusia with all his British troops. We may point out, by

the way, that the Imperial calculations were all wrong in detail, as

was bound to be the case when they were made at Paris on data many

weeks old. Wellington, owing to the reinforcements which had landed

at Lisbon in the first days of March, had now nearly 40,000 British

troops. He had detached 12,000 of them under Beresford[461], and

these were accompanied not by 6,000 Portuguese at the most, as the

Emperor guessed, but by a full 10,000. There was therefore a serious

miscalculation. We may add that if Wellington had taken the unlikely

step of concentrating his whole army against Andalusia, he would

have had not only 38,000 British troops with him, but nearly 25,000

Portuguese troops of good quality[462]. The united force could have

smashed up in one morning’s work the 35,000 French under Soult, whom

the Emperor thought enough to restrain them. But, as Napoleon truly

observed, it was practically impossible for Wellington to make this

move, so long as Masséna’s force was still opposed to him in the north.

It was only when the Army of Portugal moved down to the Guadiana in

June that the British general concentrated practically his whole force

in one line, behind the Caya, in the southern sphere of operations. And

when he had done so the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia united, though

about 60,000 strong, did not dare to attack him. But of this more anon.

[460] Which belonged to the 5th Corps, and joined it before Soult

concentrated at Seville.

[461] Including Alten’s brigade, added later.

[462] The force under Beresford comprised (figures of March):

British--2nd Division, 5,500; 4th Division, 4,200; Alten’s

brigade, 1,100; Cavalry, 1,200; Artillery, &c., 500. Total,

12,500. Portuguese--Hamilton’s division, 5,000; Harvey’s brigade

of the 4th Division, 2,900; Collins’s brigade (an extemporized

unit of which more anon) 1,400; Otway’s and Madden’s cavalry,

1,000; Artillery, 250. Total, 10,550. The whole, therefore, was

about 23,000 instead of the 16,000 on which Napoleon calculated.

At Albuera there were absent from the above one British brigade

(Kemmis of the 4th Division) and one Portuguese cavalry brigade

(Madden), nearly 2,000 men in all. Yet Beresford put 20,000

Anglo-Portuguese in line.

In early May Soult, under-valuing Beresford’s fighting force, thought

that 25,000 men would suffice to sweep him behind the Guadiana, even

when he had the help of Castaños and Ballasteros. The force was

collected in the following fashion: Latour-Maubourg at Constantina had

8,000 men, who had just been rejoined by Maransin’s column, thus the

5th Corps was once more concentrated and complete (with the exception

of five battalions in Badajoz, and one or two more which Soult was

bringing up from Seville). When all came in, the corps amounted to

10,000 men of all arms. The remaining part of the expedition was

made up by requisitioning from Victor’s 1st Corps and the lines

before Cadiz four battalions and two regiments of cavalry[463], and

from Sebastiani’s 4th Corps four battalions and three regiments

of cavalry[464]. Of the independent division under Godinot, which

garrisoned the kingdom of Cordova, Soult took nearly the whole--nine

battalions and two regiments of cavalry[465]. The borrowed troops were

divided into two large brigades (one might better have been called

a small division) under Generals Godinot and Werlé[466], and three

provisional brigades of cavalry. They took five batteries (thirty guns)

with them, to add to the eighteen guns of Latour-Maubourg, and some

companies of sappers and train. The total force available came to just

under 25,000 men, unequally divided in numbers between the 5th Corps

and the Andalusian reserves. The cavalry was very strong in proportion,

about 4,400 sabres[467].

[463] viz. 16th Léger (3 batts.), _grenadiers réunis_ (1 batt.),

4th and 14th Dragoons. The 2nd Hussars and 26th Dragoons were

already with Latour-Maubourg, never having returned to the 1st

Corps since January. The _grenadiers réunis_ were formed of the

six grenadier companies of the 45th, 63rd, and 95th of the Line.

[464] viz. 58th Ligne (3 batts.), one battalion of _grenadiers

réunis_ (Poles), 1st Lancers of the Vistula, 20th Dragoons, and

27th _Chasseurs_.

[465] viz. 12th Léger, 51st and 55th Line (3 batts. each), 17th

and 27th Dragoons.

[466] Godinot had the 16th Léger and 51st Line, Werlé the 55th,

58th Line, and 12th Léger. The two grenadier battalions made a

general reserve of 1,000 men.

[467] N.B.--For further details as to the composition of Soult’s

army see Appendix XVI.

It will be noted that Soult had (as in January) refrained from

adopting the general plan which Napoleon favoured, that of abandoning

all Andalusia save Seville and the Cadiz Lines, and leaving only a

corps of observation at Granada. It is true that the Duke of Dalmatia

took very little from Victor, and left the 1st Corps almost intact

in the lines, but Sebastiani’s 4th Corps was also left only slightly

diminished, and was expected to hold down all eastern Andalusia,

instead of being requisitioned for 10,000 men and reduced to a flying

column as the Emperor would have wished. The unit that had been most

heavily drawn upon was the garrison of the kingdom of Cordova, and

the result of this was that (as in January) very few troops could be

detailed for the defence of Seville, since nearly all that had been

in its neighbourhood were summoned off to Estremadura. The great city

which formed Soult’s base was once more left inadequately defended by

dépôts and drafts, and _Juramentados_ of doubtful fidelity. The Marshal

had lately raised some companies of so-called Swiss[468], deserters of

all nations, and these were also utilized. But the total left under

General Daricau was dangerously small. So keenly was this realized

that the governor was directed to retire within the great fortified

enclosure of the Carthusian convent (_La Cartuja_) if pressed, and all

the military stores had been placed in this immense building, which had

been surrounded with a bastioned enceinte, and armed with cannon, so as

to form a sort of citadel. The Castle of the Inquisition at Cordova in

a similar fashion had been fortified, and converted into a work that

could be held against any irregular force, and similar precautions had

been taken at Jaen, Andujar, Ronda, Alcala Real, and Niebla, to provide

centres of resistance against possible assaults by guerrilleros.

Probably, however, Napoleon was right, and if the minor places and

eastern Andalusia had been evacuated, Soult might have brought 10,000

more infantry against Beresford, in which case the latter would never

have dared to fight him, and must have retired behind the Guadiana.

There would have been no battle of Albuera--but on the other hand all

the evacuated districts would have flared up into insurrection, and it

is difficult to see how Soult could have reconquered them, since he was

to be for several months tied up in operations against the British,

from which he could not have withdrawn a man.

[468] I cannot find any proper account of these ‘compagnies

helvétiques’ who were not part of the organized Swiss troops

in French service. But they are several times mentioned in

narratives of 1811. See for example Lapéne, p. 238. Presumably

they were in King Joseph’s service.

But having taken another decision, and resolved to surrender nothing,

the Marshal had only gathered 12,000 men to reinforce the 5th Corps.

They required many days to concentrate, and it was only on May 8th that

he reviewed them in their new provisional brigading at Seville, and

delivered an allocution in which he announced to them that they were

destined to save Badajoz and drive the British from Estremadura, and

that the force would march at midnight on the 10th[469]. This threat

did not escape the Spanish patriots in the city, who passed the news on

so swiftly that Ballasteros was able to forward it to Beresford by the

afternoon of the 12th.

[469] For details of the allocution to the officers ‘rangés en

cercle,’ see Lapéne, p. 145.

Having once started, Soult hoped to surprise his enemy by the swiftness

of his movements. The head of the column which marched at 12 p.m. on

the night of the 9th-10th was at Santa Olalla, more than thirty miles

away, on the 11th. The pace had to slacken in crossing the Sierra

Morena, but on the 12th head quarters were at Monasterio (fifteen miles

further on) from which Ballasteros’s scouts withdrew. Latour-Maubourg

and the 5th Corps, far away to the right, had advanced at the same time

from Cazalla and Constantina, and driven Castaños’s advanced posts from

Guadalcanal and then from Llerena. On the 13th the two French forces

joined at Fuente Cantos, and their leading cavalry squadrons reached

Los Santos, from which the 13th Light Dragoons retired. As Wellington

had directed, nearly a month before, in his Elvas memorandum, the

Spaniards made no attempt to check the advance: their cavalry withdrew

as the French pushed forward; their infantry were prepared to fall back

on the rendezvous at Albuera.

From the 13th the British cavalry as well as the Spanish were in

touch with Soult; General Long had been lying about Villafranca and

Los Santos till that day, with three British and four Portuguese

regiments[470]. He retired to Fuente del Maestre, and then to Santa

Marta, contenting himself with reporting the successive advances of

the French to Beresford, who was apparently not over well contented

with his operations on this and the two following days, and thought

that he might have gone back more slowly, and have compelled the

leading squadrons of the enemy to deploy and lose time. At Fuente del

Maestre the allied cavalry split itself up, Madden with two Portuguese

regiments covering the roads to Almendralejo and Solana, while Long and

the main body stayed on the high-road to Badajoz via Santa Marta and

Albuera[471].

[470] I cannot exactly make out on what day Madden’s weak cavalry

brigade (4 squadrons 5th and 8th Portuguese) joined Beresford.

It was not with him at Campo Mayor on March 25th, but was up by

April 10. Probably it joined before April 1st, as it had been at

Elvas since the battle of the Gebora.

[471] For these movements the best authority is Long’s journal,

on pp. 109-11 of C. B. Long’s _Vindication_ of his relative.

Having such long warning of his adversary’s movements, Beresford was

able to carry out the concentration of his fighting force at leisure.

There was still some uncertainty as to which road the enemy might

choose, three[472] being open to him when his advance had reached

Los Santos, viz. (1) the obvious central and shortest route by

Albuera-Badajoz, (2) the eastern route Solana-Talavera Real-Badajoz,

(3) the western route Almendral-Valverde-Badajoz. The former was rather

circuitous, its main advantage to the French being that it was all

across open flat country, where their superior cavalry would have had

excellent ground; but the Albuera route was not perceptibly inferior

in this respect, as subsequent operations showed. To take the third or

western road, that by Almendral-Valverde (though this is not so long

as that by Solana) would have forced Soult to execute a flank march

across Beresford’s front, and (what probably weighed more with the

French Marshal) would have fixed the decisive spot, where the fate

of the campaign would be settled, nearer to the point towards which

Blake’s army was known to be marching: and Soult still hoped to fight

his battle in that general’s absence.

[472] D’Urban in his narrative points out seven, but four of

these were practically impossible.

On the 13th of May Beresford marched out from his lines in front of

Badajoz to Valverde, a point convenient for occupying a position

across two of the possible roads, and not very remote from the third

and least likely one. He took with him the 2nd Division and Hamilton’s

Portuguese, with three batteries. The rest of the army remained before

Badajoz, covering the removal of artillery and stores, but ready to

come up at any moment. On the same afternoon he had a conference with

General Blake, who rode over from Barcarrota. On the following day

Soult’s movement seemed to be growing much slower--the heads of his

columns only reached Fuente del Maestre and Villafranca. The fact, duly

reported to Beresford, that part of the French army had reached the

latter place, which is off the main _chaussée_ to the right, seemed to

make it possible that Soult was, after all, going to move by Talavera

Real. Beresford waited for a more precise indication of his adversary’s

final route, and sent pressing orders to Madden to cover with his

scouts all the open country between Talavera Real and Almendralejo.

Blake on this day, finding that his cavalry could discover no signs

of the French in his front, to the west of the great _chaussée_, drew

in from Barcarrota to Almendral, as he promised to do when he met

Beresford at Valverde on the 12th.

It being perfectly clear by this time that the French were not about

to take the western route, Beresford on the 15th marched the 2nd

Division and Hamilton’s Portuguese to Albuera, where they were joined

by more troops from in front of Badajoz, Alten’s German brigade, and

a provisional brigade of Portuguese under Colonel Collins[473]. Only

the 4th Division and the Spanish brigade belonging to Castaños, lately

arrived from Merida, now remained in front of the fortress--all on the

south bank save Kemmis’s brigade of the first-named unit. The last of

the stores were moved on this day from the trenches to Elvas, and the

flying bridge opposite the mouth of the Caya was taken up. This last

proved a mistake--it was intended that Kemmis should join the army by

using a ford below Badajoz, which had been practicable for the last ten

days; but on the night of the 15th-16th the water rose, and the brigade

was forced to march round by the next passage, that at Jerumenha, which

involved a circuit of thirty miles, and made it late for the battle.

Only three companies, which chanced to be on the south bank of the

Guadiana when the freshet came down, were able to march off with Cole

and the rest of the division, when the order came.

[473] This brigade, which appears for the Albuera campaign, was

composed of the 5th Line (2 batts.) from the garrison of Elvas,

joined by the 5th Caçadores, a detached light battalion which

had been serving with the cavalry south of the Tagus since last

November (see vol. iii. p. 557). This temporary brigade must not

be confused with other units headed by Collins before and after.

About 15,000 men were already in line at Albuera when Soult’s intention

at last became perfectly clear: his _chasseurs_ and hussars vigorously

attacked Long’s horsemen at Santa Marta, and began to drive them along

the _chaussée_. Long made no stand, though, having three British

and two Portuguese regiments (Otway) besides some 600 of Castaños’s

cavalry, he was in considerable strength. ‘He was driven rather faster

than one could have wished, and retiring precipitately crossed the

Albuera stream, and gave up the whole right bank to the enemy. This

haste is a bad thing, because the woods there mask all the enemy’s

movements,’ wrote D’Urban in his diary. Beresford was so vexed with him

that he that night assigned to the command of the cavalry of the whole

allied army General Lumley, who was Long’s senior, leaving the latter

in nominal command of the British horse alone. Lumley, though then in

charge of an infantry brigade in the 2nd Division, was an old light

dragoon, and showed himself next day well able to manage a mass of

mounted men[474].

[474] In a private letter to Sir H. Taylor, D’Urban uses even

stronger language: ‘Our cavalry instead of retiring leisurely,

had fallen back (indeed I may say _fled_) rapidly before the

advanced guard of the enemy. The left bank of the Albuera was

given up without the slightest attempt at dispute. This error on

the part of the officer commanding the cavalry was so completely

of a piece with his conduct upon more than one previous occasion,

that it became imperatively necessary to relieve him.’ (D’Urban

MSS.)

No enemy, save Briche’s light cavalry, came up during the 15th--Soult’s

infantry were far behind, and bivouacked that night at Santa Marta.

Beresford was therefore able to complete his concentration at leisure.

Blake’s army was directed to march up in the afternoon from Almendral,

only five miles away; Cole and the Spanish brigade of Carlos de España,

Castaños’s only infantry force, were directed to break up from the

Badajoz lines and march at 2 a.m. to Albuera. The Spaniards, for some

unknown reason, were very late; Blake only arrived at 11 p.m., and

his troops, encamping in the dark, could not take up the position

assigned to them till daylight. However, he had arrived, which was the

main thing, bringing with him the three infantry divisions of Zayas,

Ballasteros, and Lardizabal, and 1,000 horse under Loy, but only one

battery. Cole reported that he would be on the ground soon after dawn,

but that Kemmis was cut off from him by the rise of the river, so that

he could only bring two brigades instead of three. Orders were also

sent to Madden to close up with his Portuguese horse--but he could not

be found, having most unaccountably crossed the Guadiana to Montijo

with the bulk of his brigade, an eccentric and unjustifiable movement.

Two of his squadrons, however, were met, and sent to join Otway that

night.

The position of Albuera is not a strong or a well-marked one, yet it

is far the best that can be discovered across the Seville _chaussée_

for many miles south of Badajoz. It consists of a long rolling line of

low hills, extending for several miles along the brook which takes its

name from the village. This stream is in spring an insignificant thread

of water, fordable anywhere by infantry or cavalry, and allowing even

guns and waggons to pass at many points, though there are occasionally

long stretches of bank with an almost precipitous drop of ten or twelve

feet, which would stop anything on wheels. The ground on the south-east

or French bank slopes up in a very gentle rise, and is covered in many

places with groves of olives, which make it impossible to take any

general view of the country-side, or to get more than vague and partial

notions as to any movements of troops that may be going on in it. On

the north-west or English bank the rolling heights are completely bare

of trees; except at the village of Albuera there is neither house,

wall, nor bush upon them--nothing taller than a few withered shrubs

three feet high[475].

[475] This account of the Albuera position was written on the

spot, and involved a good deal of walking on a blazing April day.

See note at end of the chapter.

The so-called heights of Albuera are simply an undulation along the

bank of the stream, which rises very slightly above the level of the

plateau that stretches from the position to the descent into the

valley of the Guadiana, thirteen miles away. This ridge or undulation

extends in either direction as far as the eye can reach, with varying

altitude, sometimes only 60 feet, sometimes perhaps 150 feet above the

water’s edge. There are therefore many ‘dips’ on the summit of the

position. The main battle-spot was on the two slopes of one of these

dips, where, between two of the higher knolls of the ridge, there is

a depression perhaps a third of a mile in width. The back-descent of

the heights, to the north-west, in the direction of Badajoz, is even

gentler than that towards the Albuera stream. The ‘ravine of the Arroyo

river,’ marked in Napier’s and other maps, is an absurd exaggeration.

There is simply a slightly curved ‘bottom,’ where a lush growth of

grass along a certain line may indicate the course of a rivulet in

very wet weather. This line has no marked banks, and is as much like

a high-road as a ravine: it would not, even after rain, present any

obstacle to infantry or cavalry moving in mass[476], and it is a

mistake to make it take any prominent part in the history of the battle.

[476] Either Napier never saw the ground of Albuera (as Beresford

suggests in the _Strictures on Napier’s History_, p. 207) or else

he had forgotten it. The only good plan available was D’Urban’s,

and this Napier used (a copy of it is among his portfolio of maps

in the Bodleian Library), memory or hypothesis exaggerating into

hills and ravines the very gentle ups and downs shown on the map.

There is no ravine or ‘dead ground’ of any kind anywhere on either the

French or the English side of the Albuera. The slopes are so gentle

that any spot can be seen from any other. But the French side is

wooded, so that movements of troops are hard to follow, while the other

bank is absolutely bare. There is, however, a ‘sky-line’ on the English

heights, between the dip where the main battle took place and Albuera

village. An observer standing on the point where Soult formed his front

of battle cannot get a view of the English line near the village--to

do so he must ride sideways down towards the water, to look along the

trough of the depression. Hence Soult during the battle cannot have

seen a good deal of what was going on behind the allied front line, but

Beresford, on the sky-line above the north-eastern edge of the dip,

could make out all Soult’s dispositions when the battle smoke did not

hinder him.

Albuera is a big well-built village, with a disproportionately high

church tower. It stands on a knoll of its own, in front of the main

line of the ridge, to which it serves as an outwork, as Hougoumont

did to Wellington’s position at Waterloo. It is well away from the

river bank, perhaps 150 or 200 yards from it; the bridge which brings

the Seville _chaussée_ across the stream is not exactly opposite the

village, but decidedly to the south-east of it.

The Albuera stream is formed by two minor brooks, the Nogales and the

Chicapierna, which meet a little south of the village. Between them

is a low wooded hill, which conceals from an observer on the British

heights the upper course of the Nogales, and part of the woods beyond,

in which the French formed their order of battle. It was behind this

long low knoll that Soult hid his main attacking column. But the

elevation itself is insignificant, and much less effective than the

more distant woods in covering his movement.

Beresford drew up his army on the hypothesis that Soult’s aim would be

to pierce his centre, by capturing Albuera village, and storming the

heights beyond, over which the high-road passes. Years after the battle

had become a matter of history he still maintained[477] that this would

have been his adversary’s best policy, since the place where the road

crosses the position is the lowest and weakest part of the heights, and

a blow piercing the centre of a hostile army is always more effective

than the mere tactical success of turning one of his flanks, which

still leaves everything to be decided by hard fighting, if the attacked

party throws back his threatened wing, and stands to defend himself in

the new position. The ground on the allied right wing he held, on the

other hand, to be higher and stronger: and even if the French got upon

the crest of the heights, the range gave, by reason of its successive

dips, several positions on which a new line could well be formed. I

leave these considerations to the critic, and am not fully convinced by

them.

[477] _Strictures on Napier’s History_, vol. iii. pp. 233-4.

Beresford’s line was drawn up as follows: on the extreme left, to

the north-east of Albuera, were Hamilton’s Portuguese division, with

Collins’s brigade in support, amounting to eleven strong battalions

in two lines. Beyond them, to guard the flank, were Otway’s weak

Portuguese cavalry brigade and the two stray squadrons of Madden’s. The

whole made only 800 sabres.

The centre was formed of William Stewart’s English division, the

2nd, comprising the three brigades of Colborne, Hoghton, and

Abercrombie[478], ten battalions. In front of them Alten’s two German

battalions occupied Albuera village. The 2nd Division was drawn up

across the high-road, on the reverse slope of the heights; Beresford

had learned from Wellington to hide his men till the actual moment of

conflict, and, as he says with some pride, not a man of Stewart’s or

Hamilton’s divisions was visible, and the only troops under the enemy’s

eye were Otway’s cavalry and the two German battalions in Albuera.

[478] Who took over Lumley’s brigade when the latter was promoted

to command the cavalry that morning.

In the rear of Stewart, as general reserve, was Cole’s division from

the siege of Badajoz, which had marched at 2 o’clock a.m. according

to orders and reached the field at 6.30 in the morning. There was

some error in ‘logistics’ here, for Cole ought to have been earlier

on the field. He had fifteen miles to cover, and should have been

started sooner, for preference on the preceding evening, so as to

allow his men time to rest and cook on reaching the position. Having

marched till dawn they then had to lie down in formation, and eat as

best they might, for the French were on the move not very long after

they came up. The division, as already mentioned, consisted only of

Myers’s fusilier brigade (1 and 2/7th Royal Fusiliers and 1/23rd Royal

Welsh Fusiliers) and Harvey’s Portuguese brigade (11th, 23rd, and 1st

battalion Lusitanian Legion). Kemmis with the other British brigade,

save three companies which had followed Myers, was making a fruitless

march against time, round by Jerumenha. With Cole there had also come

up Castaños’s sole contribution of infantry--the weak brigade of Carlos

de España, three battalions with 1,700 bayonets[479].

[479] The remainder of Murillo’s division of 3,000 men, which

formed the infantry of the 5th Army, was at Merida, save one

battalion in garrison at Olivenza.