property, unite to support a _common authority_, they evidently desire
to be able to labour, and to enjoy the fruits of their labour in all
security, and not to place their faculties and their properties at
the mercy of that authority. Even antecedent to all form of regular
government, I do not believe that individuals could be properly deprived
of the _right of defence_--the right of defending their persons, their
faculties, and their possessions.
Without pretending, in this place, to philosophise upon the origin and
the extent of the rights of governments--a vast subject, well calculated
to deter me--permit me to submit the following idea to you. It seems to
me that the rights of the state can only be the reduction into method
of personal rights _previously existing_. I cannot, for myself, conceive
_collective right_ which has not its root in _individual right_, and
does not presume it. Then, in order to know if the state is legitimately
invested with a right, it is incumbent on us to ask whether this right
dwells in the individual in virtue of his being and independently of all
government.
It is upon this principle that I denied some time ago the right of
labour. I said, since Peter has no right to take directly from Paul what
Paul has acquired by his labour, there is no better foundation for this
pretended right through the intervention of the state: for the state
is but the _public authority_ created by Peter and by Paul, at their
expense, with a defined and clear object in view, but which never can
render that just which is in itself not so. It is with the aid of this
touchstone that I test the distinction between property secured and
property controlled by the state. Why has the state the right to
secure, even by force, every man's property? Because this right exists
previously in the individual. No one can deny to individuals the _right
of lawful defence_--the right of employing force, if necessary, to
repel the injuries directed against their persons, their faculties,
and their effects. It is conceived that this individual right, since
it resides in all men, can assume the collective form, and justify
the employment of public authority. And why has the state no right to
_equalize_ or apportion worldly wealth? _Because, in order to do so, it
is necessary to rob some in order to gratify others_. Now, as none of
the thirty-five millions of Frenchmen have the right to take by force,
under the pretence of rendering fortunes more equal, it does not appear
how they could invest public authority with this right.
And remark, that the right of distributing* the wealth of individuals is
destructive of the right which secures it. There are the savages. They
have not yet formed a government; but each of them possesses the _right
of lawful defence_. And it is easy to perceive that it is this right
which will become the basis of legitimate public authority. If one of
these savages has devoted his time, his strength, his intelligence to
make a bow and arrows, and another wishes to take these from him, all
the sympathies of the tribe will be on the side of the victim; and if
the cause is submitted to the judgment of the elders, the robber
will infallibly be condemned. From that there is but one step to the
organization of public power. But I ask you--Is the province of this
public power, at least its lawful province, to repress the act of him
who defends his property in virtue of his abstract right, or the act of
him who violates, contrary to that right, the property of another? It
would be singular enough if public authority was based, not upon
the rights of individuals, but upon their permanent and systematic
violation! No; the author of the book before me could not support such
a position. But it is scarcely enough that he could not support it; he
ought perhaps to condemn it. It is scarcely enough to attack this gross
and absurd Communism disseminated in low newspapers. It would perhaps
have been better to have unveiled and rebuked that other and more
audacious and subtle Communism, which, by the simple perversion of
the just idea of the rights of government, insinuates itself into some
branches of our legislation, and threatens to invade all.
* It is not easy here, and in some other places, to convey
the exact meaning without using circuitous language.
For, Sir, it is quite incontestable that by the action of the
tariffs--by means of Protection--governments realize this monstrous
thing of which I have spoken so much. They abandon the right of lawful
defence, previously existing in all men, the source and foundation of
their own existence, to arrogate to themselves a _pretended right of
equalizing the fortunes of all by means of robbery_, a right which, not
existing before in any one, cannot therefore exist in the community.
But to what purpose is it to insist upon these general ideas? Why should
I show the absurdity of Communism, since you have done so yourself
(except as to one of its aspects, and, as I think, practically the most
threatening) much better than it was in my power to effect?
Perhaps you will say to me that the principle of the system of
Protection is not opposed to the principle of property. See, then, the
means by which this system operates.
These are two: by the aid of premiums or bounties, or by restriction.
As to the first, that is evident. I defy any one to maintain that the
end of the system of premiums, pushed to its legitimate conclusion,
is not absolute Communism. Men work under protection of the public
authority, as you say, charged to secure to each one his own--_suum
cuique_. But in this instance the state, with the most philanthropic
intentions in the world, undertakes a task altogether new and different,
and, according to me, not only exclusive, but destructive of the
first. It constitutes itself the judge of profits; it decides that this
interest is not sufficiently remunerated, and that that is too much
so; it stands as the distributor of fortunes, and makes, as M. Billault
phrases it, the pendulum of civilization oscillate from the liberty
of individual action to its opposite. Consequently it imposes upon the
community at large a contribution for the purpose of making a present,
under the name of premiums, to the exporters of a particular kind of
produce. The pretext is to favour industry; it ought to say, _one_
particular interest at the expense of _all_ the others. I shall not stop
to show that it stimulates the off-shoot at the expense of that branch
which bears the fruit; but I ask you, on entering on this course, does
it not justify every interest to come and claim a premium, if it can
prove that the profits gained by it are not as much as those obtained
by other interests? Is it not the duty of the state to listen, to
entertain, to give ear to every demand, and to do justice between the
applicants. I do not believe it; but those who do so, should have the
courage to put their thoughts in this form, and to say--Government is
not charged to render property secure, but to distribute it equally. In
other words, there is no such thing as property.
I only discuss here a question of principle. If I wished to investigate
the subject of premiums for exportation, as shown in their economical
effects, I could place them in the most ridiculous light, for they are
nothing more than a gratuitous gift made by France to foreigners. It is
not the seller who receives it, but the purchaser, in virtue of that law
which you yourself have stated with regard to taxes; the consumer in
the end supports all the charges, as he reaps all the advantages of
production. Thus we are brought to the subject of premiums, one of the
most mortifying and mystifying things possible. Some foreign governments
have reasoned thus: 'If we raise our import duties to a figure equal to
the premium paid by the tax-payers in France, it is clear that nothing
will be changed as regards our consumers, for the net price will remain
the same. The goods reduced by five francs on the French frontier, will
pay five francs more at the German frontier; it is an infallible means
of paying our public expenses out of the French Treasury.' But other
governments, they assure me, have been more ingenious still. They have
said to themselves, 'The premium given by France is properly a present
she makes us; but if we raise the duty, no reason would exist why more
of those particular goods should be imported than in past times; we
ourselves place a limit on the generosity of these excellent French
people; let us abolish, on the contrary, provisionally, these duties;
let us encourage, for instance, an unusual introduction of cloths, since
every yard brings with it an absolute gift.' In the first case, our
premiums have gone to the foreign exchequer; in the second they have
profited, but upon a larger scale, private individuals.
Let us pass on to restriction.
I am a workman--a joiner, for example--I have a little workshop, tools,
some materials. All these things incontestably belong to me, for I have
made them, or, which comes to the same thing, I have bought and paid for
them. Still more, I have strong arms, some intelligence, and plenty of
good will. On this foundation I endeavour to provide for my own wants
and for those of my family. Remark, that I cannot directly produce
anything which is useful to me, neither iron, nor wood, nor bread, nor
wine, nor meat, nor stuffs, &c., but I can produce the _value_ of them.
Finally, these things must, so to speak, circulate under another form,
from my saw and my plane. It is my interest to receive honestly the
largest possible quantity in exchange for the produce of my labour. I
say honestly, because it is not my desire to infringe on the property
or the liberty of any one. But I also demand that my own property and
liberty be held equally inviolable. The other workmen and I, agreed upon
this point, impose upon ourselves some sacrifices; we give up a portion
of our labour to some men called public _functionaries_, because theirs
is the special _function_ to secure our labour and its produce from
every injury that might befal either from within or from without.
Matters being thus arranged, I prepare to put my intelligence, my arms,
my saw, and plane into activity. Naturally my eyes are always fixed
on those things necessary to my existence, and which it is my duty to
produce indirectly in creating what is equal to them in _value_. The
problem is, that I should produce them in the most advantageous manner
possible. Consequently I look at _values_ generally, or what, in other
words, may be called the current or market price of articles. I am
satisfied, judging from these materials in my possession, that my means
for obtaining the largest quantity possible of fuel, for example,
with the smallest possible quantity of labour, is to make a piece of
furniture, to send it to a Belgian, who will give me in return some
coal.
But there is in France a workman who extracts coal from the earth. Now,
it so happens that the officials, whom the miner and I _contribute_ to
pay for preserving to each of us his freedom of labour, and the free
disposal of its produce (which is property), it so happens, I say, that
these officials have become newly enlightened and assumed other duties.
They have taken it into their heads to compare my labour with that of
the miner. Consequently, they have forbidden me to warm myself with
Belgian fuel: and when I go to the frontier with my piece of furniture
to receive the coal, I find it prohibited from entering France, which
comes to the same thing as if they prohibited my piece of furniture
from going out. I then reason with myself--if we had never paid
the government in order to save us the trouble of defending our own
property, would the miner have had the right to go to the frontier to
prohibit me from making an advantageous exchange, on the ground that
it would be better for him that this exchange should not be effected?
Assuredly not. If he had made so unjust an attempt, we would have joined
issue on the spot, he, urged on by his unjust pretensions, I, strong in
my right of legitimate defence.
We have appointed and paid a public officer for the special purpose
of preventing such contests. How does it happen, then, that I find the
miner and him concurring in restraining my liberty and hampering my
industry, in limiting the field of my exertions? If the public officer
had taken my part, I might have conceived his right; he would have
derived it from my own; for lawful defence is, indeed, a right. But on
what principle should he aid the miner in his injustice? I learn, then,
that the public officer has changed his nature. He is no longer a
simple mortal invested with rights delegated to him by other men, who,
consequently, possess them. No. He is a being superior to humanity,
drawing his right from himself, and, amongst these rights, he arrogates
to himself that of calculating our profits, of holding the balance
between our various circumstances and conditions. It is very well, say
I; in that case, I will overwhelm him with claims and demands, while I
see a richer man than myself in the country. He will not listen to you,
it may be said to me, for if he listen to you, he will be a Communist,
and he takes good care not to forget that his duty is to secure
properties, not to destroy them.
What disorder, what confusion in facts; but what can you expect when
there is such disorder and confusion in ideas? You may have resisted
Communism vigorously in the abstract; but while at the same time you
humour, and support, and foster it in that part of our legislation which
it has tainted, your labours will be in vain. It is a poison, which,
with your consent and approbation, has glided into all our laws and into
our morals, and now you are indignant that it is followed by its natural
consequences.
Possibly, Sir, you will make me one concession; you will say to me,
perhaps, the system of Protection rests on the principle of Communism.
It is contrary to right, to property, to liberty; it throws the
government out of its proper road, and invests it with arbitrary powers,
which have no rational origin. All this is but too true; but the system
of Protection is useful; without it the country, yielding to foreign
competition, would be ruined.
This would lead us to the examination of Protection in the economical
point of view. Putting aside all consideration of justice, of right, of
equity, of property, of liberty, we should have to resolve the question
into one of pure utility, the money question, so to speak; but this, you
will admit, does not properly fall within my subject. Take care that,
availing yourself of expediency in order to justify your contempt of
the principle of right is as if you said, 'Communism or spoliation,
condemned by justice, can, nevertheless, be admitted as an expedient,'
and you must admit that such an avowal is replete with danger.
Without seeking to solve in this place the economical problem, allow me
to make one assertion. I affirm that I have submitted to arithmetical
calculation the advantages and the inconveniences of Protection,
from the point of view of mere wealth, and putting aside all higher
considerations. I affirm, moreover, that I have arrived at this
result: that all restrictive measures produce one advantage and two
inconveniences, or, if you will, one profit and two losses, each of
these losses equal to the profit, from which results one pure distinct
loss, which circumstance brings with it the encouraging conviction, that
in this, as in many other things, and I dare say in all, expediency and
justice agree.
This is only an assertion, it is true, but it can be supported by proofs
of mathematical accuracy.*
* What M. Bastiat here asserts is unquestionably true. For
it has often been shown, and may readily be shown, that the
importation of foreign commodities, in the common course of
traffic, never takes place except when it is, economically
speaking, a national good, by causing the same amount of
commodities to be obtained at a smaller cost of labour and
capital to the country. To prohibit, therefore, this
importation, or impose duties which prevent it, is to render
the labour and capital of the country less efficient in
production than they would otherwise be; and compel a waste
of the difference between the labour and capital necessary
for the home production of the commodity, and that which is
required for producing the things with which it can be
purchased from abroad. The amount of national loss thus
occasioned is measured by the excess of the price at which
the commodity is produced over that at which it could be
imported. In the case of manufactured goods, the whole
difference between the two prices is absorbed in
indemnifying the producers for waste of labour, or of the
capital which supports that labour. Those who are supposed
to be benefited--namely, the makers of the protected
article, (unless they form an exclusive company, and have a
monopoly against their own countrymen, as well as against
foreigners,) do not obtain higher profits than other people.
All is sheer loss to the country as well as to the consumer.
When the protected article is a product of agriculture--the
waste of labour not being incurred on the whole produce, but
only on what may be called the last instalment of it--the
extra price is only in part an indemnity for waste, the
remainder being a tax paid to the landlords.--J. S. Mill
What causes public opinion to be led astray upon this point is this,
that the profit produced by Protection is palpable--visible, as it were,
to the naked eye, whilst of the two equal losses which it involves, one
is distributed over the mass of society, and the existence of the other
is only made apparent to the investigating and reflective mind.
Without pretending to bring forward any proof of the matter here, I may
be allowed, perhaps, to point out the basis on which it rests.
Two products, A and B, have an original value in France, which I may
denominate 50 and 40 respectively. Let us admit that A is not worth more
than 40 in Belgium. This being supposed, if France is subjected to the
protective system, she will have the enjoyment of A and B in the whole
as the result of her efforts, a quantity equal to 90, for she will, on
the above supposition, be compelled to produce A directly. If she is
free, the result of her efforts, equal to 90, will be equal: 1st, to the
production of B, which she will take to Belgium, in order to obtain
A; 2ndly, to the production of another B for herself; 3rdly, to the
production of C.
It is that portion of disposable labour applied to the production of
C in the second case, that is to say, creating new wealth equal to 10,
without France being deprived either of A or of B, which makes all the
difficulty. In the place of A put iron; in the place of B, wine, silk,
and Parisian articles; in the place of C put some new product not now
existing. You will always find that restriction is injurious to national
prosperity.
Do you wish to leave this dull algebra? So do I. To speak of facts,
therefore, you will not deny that if the prohibitory system has
contrived to do some good to the coal trade, it is only in raising the
price of the coal. You will not, moreover, deny that this excess of
price from 1822 to the present time has only occasioned a greater
expense to all those who use this fuel--in other words, that it
represents a loss. Can it be said that the producers of coal have
received, besides the interest of their capital and the ordinary profits
of trade, in consequence of the protection afforded them, an extra gain
equivalent to that loss? It would be necessary that Protection, without
losing those unjust and Communistic qualities which characterize it,
should at least be _neuter_ in the purely economic point of view. It
would be necessary that it should at least have the merit of resembling
simple robbery, which displaces wealth without destroying it. But
you yourself affirm, at page 236, 'that the mines of Aveyron, Alais,
Saint-Etienne, Creuzot, Anzin, the most celebrated of all, have not
produced a revenue of four per cent, on the capital embarked in them.'
It does not require Protection that capital in France should yield four
per cent. Where, then, in this instance, is the profit to counterbalance
the above-mentioned loss?
This is not all. There is another national loss. Since by the relative
rising of the price of fuel, all the consumers of coal have lost, they
have been obliged to limit their expenses in proportion, and the whole
of national labour has been necessarily discouraged to this extent. It
is this loss which they never take into their calculation, because it
does not strike their senses.
Permit me to make another observation, which I am surprised has not
struck people more. It is that Protection applied to agricultural
produce shows itself in all its odious iniquity with regard to farmers,
and injurious in the end to the landed proprietors themselves.
Let us imagine an island in the South Seas where the soil has become the
private property of a certain number of inhabitants.
Let us imagine upon this appropriated and limited territory an
agricultural population always increasing or having a tendency to
increase.
This last class will not be able to produce anything _directly_ of what
is indispensable to life. They will be compelled to give up their labour
to those who have it in their power to offer in exchange maintenance,
and also the materials for labour, corn, fruit, vegetables, meat, wool,
flax, leather, wood, &c.
The interest of this class evidently is, that the market where these
things are sold should be as extensive as possible. The more it finds
itself surrounded by the greatest quantity of agricultural produce, the
more of this it will receive for any given quantity of its own labour.
Under a free system, a multitude of vessels would be seen seeking food
and materials among the neighbouring islands and continents, in exchange
for manufactured articles. The cultivators of the land will enjoy all
the prosperity to which they have a right to pretend; a just balance
will be maintained between the value of manufacturing labour and that of
agricultural labour.
But, in this situation, the landed proprietors of the island make this
calculation--If we prevent the workmen labouring for the foreigners,
and receiving from them in exchange subsistence and raw materials, they
will be forced to turn to us. As their number continually increases, and
as the competition which exists between them is always active, they will
compete for that share of food and materials which we can dispose of,
after deducting what we require for ourselves, and we cannot fail to
sell our produce at a very high price. In other words, the balance in
the relative value of their labour and of ours will be disturbed. We
shall be able to command a greater share in the result of their labour.
Let us, then, impose restrictions on that commerce which inconveniences
us; and to enforce these restrictions, let us constitute a body of
functionaries, which the workmen shall aid in paying.
I ask you, would not this be the height of oppression, a flagrant
violation of all liberty, of the first and the most sacred principles of
property?
However, observe well, that it would not perhaps be difficult for
the landed proprietors to make this law received as a benefit by the
labourer. They would say to the latter: