We have chiefly considered the derationalising influence of

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BETTING AND GAMBLING

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BETTING & GAMBLING

A National Evil

Edited by

B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE

Author of ‘Poverty’

London

Macmillan and Co., Limited

New York: The Macmillan Company

1905

All rights reserved

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE YORK ANTI-GAMBLING

LEAGUE AT WHOSE SUGGESTION THIS WORK WAS UNDERTAKEN

PREFACE

Until comparatively recent years, betting and gambling were largely

confined in this country to the wealthy few. Now, however, the practice

has spread so widely among all classes of the community that those who

know the facts name gambling and drinking as national evils of almost

equal magnitude.

There is no doubt that the social conscience is as yet only very

partially awakened to the widespread character of the gambling evil

and to its grievous consequences. Like a cancer, the evil thing has

spread its poisonous roots throughout the length and breadth of the

land, carrying with them, where they strike, misery, poverty, weakened

character, and crime.

Nor is the practice any longer spontaneous. It is encouraged and

organised by an army of social parasites in the shape of bookmakers and

their touts; these men or women (for the “profession” is not confined to

men) pursue their calling in every town of Britain—indeed, there are

probably but few villages or large workshops which are free from them.

In many places, indeed, they regularly call for “orders,” the itinerant

packman or agent combining this with his recognised business. Even little

children have been known to bet their slate pencils in the playgrounds

of our State schools, while women and girls in all ranks of society no

longer regard the practice as unwomanly.

And yet, in spite of the acknowledged magnitude of the evil, there are,

with a very few notable exceptions, no organised efforts to check it.

The apparent apathy of the nation to the extraordinary spread of this

mischief in its midst is in sharp contrast to the great efforts organised

to combat intemperance. For this there are probably three main causes:—

1. Ignorance on the part of the general public as to the rapid

growth and the mischief of the practice.

2. Lack of clear thought regarding the ethics of the question.

3. The difficulty of suggesting practical steps to counteract

so insidious an evil.

The purpose of this book is to supply, in concise and readily accessible

form, information which may meet these needs. After a preliminary

chapter devoted to the ethics of Betting and Gambling, facts are stated

concerning the extent of the evil and its effects on national life. The

present position of legislation affecting betting is then dealt with, and

suggestions are made as to needed improvements in the law. A concluding

chapter considers remedial measures outside the sphere of legislation.

In the Appendix additional information is given, which, it is hoped, may

be useful, more particularly to speakers and writers, together with a

Bibliography of books and papers upon the subject. All the articles are

by writers who have given special attention to the topics with which they

deal. Three of them, viz. those by John A. Hobson, B. Seebohm Rowntree,

and “The Deluded Sportsman,” have appeared before. Two, though originally

written for this book, have appeared in periodicals which have a limited

circulation in this country, and the third has appeared in pamphlet form.

B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE.

YORK, _April 1905_.

CONTENTS

PAGE

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING 1

JOHN A. HOBSON, M.A.

THE EXTENT OF GAMBLING 21

JOHN HAWKE, Hon. Sec. National Anti-Gambling League.

STOCK EXCHANGE GAMBLING 45

A. J. WILSON, Editor _Investor’s Review_.

GAMBLING AMONG WOMEN 69

J. M. HOGGE, M.A.

CRIME AND GAMBLING 84

CANON HORSLEY.

THE DELUDED SPORTSMAN 92

A BOOKMAKER.

GAMBLING AND CITIZENSHIP 117

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, Sec. Labour Representation Committee.

EXISTING LEGISLATION 135

JOHN HAWKE.

THE REPRESSION OF GAMBLING 170

B. SEEBOHM ROWNTREE.

APPENDICES—

1. LORDS’ RECOMMENDATIONS, June 1902 191

2. LORD DAVEY’S STREET BETTING BILL, 1903 199

3. SUMMARY OF LORDS’ COMMISSION 203

4. OPINIONS OF EMINENT MEN ON BETTING 213

5. A NOTE ON PEDESTRIANISM 219

6. TIPSTERS AND TIPSTERS’ ADVERTISEMENTS 222

7. BETTING STATISTICS 232

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 236

INDEX 245

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING

By JOHN A. HOBSON

Gambling is the determination of the ownership of property by appeal to

chance. By chance is here implied the resultant of a play of natural

forces that cannot be controlled or calculated by those who appeal to it.

In tossing “heads or tails” for the possession of a coin, neither party

has any knowledge or control of the adjustment of forces which determines

upon which side the coin will fall, or if by practice the tosser acquires

such knowledge or control, he cannot possibly predict or control the

“call” of his opponent, which thus keeps the determination of the issue

within the realm of “Chance.”

Gambling may be described as “pure” or “mixed” according as the

determining power of chance is or is not blended with other powers. Few

so-called games of chance are entirely destitute of skill, even if the

skill consists entirely of speed or accuracy in calculating “chances.”

Where such skill plays a large and a continuous part, the game ceases to

be classed as “gambling,” though chance may exercise a quite considerable

influence in determining the result. In betting on horse-races and in

commercial gambling superior knowledge of some of the determinant causes

may so qualify the chance that, from the standpoint of those who have

such knowledge, the operation ceases to be gambling. If such knowledge

is equally attainable by all those who “speculate,” the game becomes one

of skill; if it consists in genuine “tips” or private knowledge, the

operation is fraudulent. This last fact is generally recognised: all

gamesters denounce betting on “certainties.” Again, both on the turf

and the stock exchange chance may be reduced or even eliminated by an

actual manipulation of the forces so as to yield a result favourable to

the interests of some of those who pose as gamblers. But when the result

supposed to rest on chance is known or controlled by any sort of skill,

fraud, or force, the case is not one of pure gambling; for though it

is a matter of significance that gambling commonly keeps company with

cheating, the latter is not gambling.

Where the skilful draftsmanship of a lottery prospectus allures the dull

or sanguine reader into staking his money, by deceiving him as to the

size of his chance of winning, such trickery, though designed to appeal

to the gambling instinct of investors, is not itself an act or a part of

gambling: it is simply fraud, though not necessarily fraud in a legal

sense.

On the other hand, when the terms of a lottery are clearly understood by

those who stake their money, the mere fact that the managers arrange

the speculation so as to procure for themselves a known and certain

gain, offering prizes admittedly of less value than the aggregate of

the stakes, need not debar us from regarding the proceeding as “pure

gambling” so far as the players are concerned. So with the roulette-table

at Monte Carlo: the players are aware that the chances are favourable

to the bank over a prolonged piece of play, they even know the precise

amount of this bias. But this knowledge does not prevent their play from

ranking as pure gambling, for no skill or knowledge or trickery on their

part can enter in as a determinant of the result.

Thus an honestly managed lottery, or roulette, may fairly serve as a type

of pure gambling which will serve to enable us to test the psychology and

ethics of the proceeding.

Before approaching the distinctively moral aspects of gambling, we

must clearly realise its intellectual reactions. The rational basis

of the acquisition of property is the “natural” relation of effort to

satisfaction. A man who converts an unshaped piece of matter into an

object of human utility may be said to have a “natural” property in

it. And this in a double sense. The expenditure of human energy given

out in this piece of labour requires recuperation: this recuperation

is achieved by “consuming” that which he has made, or its equivalent

obtained by processes of equal exchange. The effort of production

requires the satisfaction of consumption. Thus it is commonly recognised

that labour, or human effort, is the natural basis of the right of

property. Or, regarding the same relation on its psychical side with

reference to motive, we perceive that a property in that which he has

made must be accorded to the maker wherever any painful effort of

production is required, in order to induce his will to sanction the

effort. In a society where social forces co-operate with individual

effort a _full_ property in that which a man is said to make may not

be essential, but that is because no man working in society and for a

market can truly be said to make the whole of anything, much less its

“value” when it is made. But everywhere some proportion of property must

be guaranteed to the individual who is required to exert himself in

productive labour. Any form of theft, fraud, extortion, “sweating,” on

the part of individuals or governments, is liable to interfere with this

physical and psychical adjustment between production and consumption,

output of effort and intake of satisfaction, which forms the natural

or rational basis of individual property. Just in proportion as this

rational character is firmly and clearly stamped upon the processes

of the acquisition of property do we possess security of social order

and progress. When property comes to any one in any other way, its

transfer has an “unreasonable” character. So a society where force or

fraud habitually or frequently displaces this sane process of acquiring

property, where some persons eat bread _sudore vultus alieni_ and others

consequently sweat without eating, is not only economically enfeebled,

but is irrationally constituted. And this unreason in the social organism

corrupts and derationalises the individual members. But even an unjustly

ordered society, where the domination of one class is accompanied by the

subjection of another, where organised parasitism or plunder prevails,

differs from “anarchy” as regards its reactions upon the intelligence

of man. A bad system, the worst of systems, is less derationalising

than no system. So the habitual exploitation of the poor by the rich,

the “have-nots” by the “haves,” though substantially irrational in the

modes of acquisition of property involved, is less demoralising than the

abandonment of the determination of property to pure chance.

Gambling involves the denial of all system in the apportionment of

property: it plunges the mind in a world of anarchy, where things come

upon one and pass from one miraculously. It does not so manifestly sin

against the canons of justice as do other bad modes of transfer,—theft,

fraud, sweating,—for every one is said to have an equal chance; but it

inflicts a graver damage on the intellect. Based as it is on an organised

rejection of all reason as a factor, it removes its devotees into a

positive atmosphere of miracles, and generates an emotional excitement

that inhibits those checks which reason more or less contrives to place

upon emotional extravagances. The essence of gambling consists in an

abandonment of reason, an inhibition of the factors of human control.

In the history of mankind, civilisation of the individual has chiefly

consisted in and been measured by this increased capacity of rational

control—a slow, gradual, imperfect taming of the animal instincts which

made for emotional anarchy of conduct.

This assertion of rational control, implying some sort of plan in life,

restraints on conduct, and trust in orderly processes of phenomena, has

doubtless been most imperfectly established even in the picked members of

the more highly civilised races. But such as it is, it represents order

in society and progress in humanity.

The practice of gambling is thus exhibited as a deliberate reversion

to those passions and that mental attitude which characterise the

savage or pre-human man in his conduct and his outlook. There lurk in

“civilised” man the remnants of survivals of countless ages of pre-human

and of savage heredity, anarchic passions associated with barbarous

superstitions. The order of civilisation claims to have killed or

atrophied the grosser forms of these atavistic tendencies, but many of

them are not dead; social control and education of individual habits

keeps them in subordination or acquiescence, but on temptation they are

ready to awake. Just as war and certain forms of sport can call from the

caverns of heredity brutish traits whose presence was utterly unknown to

their possessors, so the interest of gambling discovers in many natures a

similarly fatal inheritance.

Maeterlinck has recently sought to find a quasi-rational basis for

“luck” in the occasional revival of certain primitive instincts of

self-protection which, seldom needed in the higher progress of humanity,

have died down and rarely assert themselves. Whether such latent powers

of extra-rational warning exist or ever did exist, we need not here

discuss; it is, however, quite evident that the widespread belief in

“luck” among gamblers is a reversion to a form of unreason which carries

no sound instinct of direction with it. It is fair to adduce this belief

in luck as an important testimony to the derationalising influences of

gambling.

It does not seem true that the gambling habit pervades only or chiefly

the least intelligent types of men. Among habitual gamblers on the

stock exchange, on the turf and in the card-room, and wherever skill

tempers chance, high degrees of cunning, memory, and judgment are often

found, while certain qualities of determination and of self-command are

conducive to success. But while many men possessing these qualities are

drawn to games or business pursuits where a strong element of chance is

present, there is no real affinity between any of these personal powers

and pure gambling. It is not, for instance, true that skill, judgment,

or self-command is of the least assistance at the roulette-table or at

rouge-et-noir. The fact that these qualities are so commonly regarded as

serviceable to the player may be cited as a conspicuous evidence of the

derationalising influence of gambling even in the case of those who do

not gamble. For in reality they are only useful in proportion as the game

is not pure gambling.

The curious cunning expended in devising “systems” and the attention to

multifarious incidents of “luck” indicate a genuine inhibition of the

reasoning faculty. Both modes of manipulating chance are vitiated by the

same two fallacies. Belief in the efficacy of a “system” implies that a

series of consecutive coups is a causally connected chain, whereas, in

fact, the result of each coup is entirely unaffected by the coup which

preceded or follows it. The “system” gambler also believes that he is

able to forecast to some extent the drift or current of chances which

makes this causal connection. Similarly with the cruder superstitions,

such as the notion that a virgin player will win his opening bout of

play, or that turning one’s chair or changing one’s seat will break

a spell of bad luck: they also imply that a sequence of separately

determined events is in some unintelligible way a mutually determined

group, and that a tendency running through the series can be altered

by a casual or purposed action which is interjected from outside. The

amazing hold which these superstitious notions obtain over persons of

education and intelligence is a striking testimony to the intellectual

havoc wrought by gambling. How insidious is the illusion about runs of

luck may be shown by the ease with which the minds of most persons, who

are averse to gambling and would deride the notion of a “system,” fall

into the snare when it is set in the following form: Enter a room where

rouge-et-noir is going on and learn that red has turned up twenty times

in succession, when the next card is in the act of being drawn there is

an almost irresistible tendency to expect black, from a first impulsive

judgment which has false reference to the general improbability of red

turning up twenty-one times running. Most persons, including trained

scientists to whom I have put the case, requiring an immediate reply,

have admitted that they would be disposed to bet against red.

A practice so corrupting to the intelligence not only of the habitué but

even of the casual spectator stands condemned as a formidable enemy of

education and of intellectual order.

In thus exposing the irrationality of gambling, both as a mode of

transferring property and as a mental occupation, I have implicitly

exposed its immorality also. Its repudiation of equitable order involves

at once an intellectual and a moral descent to a lower plane of thought

and feeling. Perhaps no other human interest, not based on purely

physical craving, arouses so absorbing a passion: alcoholism itself

scarcely asserts a stronger dominion over its devotees.

So widespread has been the zest for gambling among whole races as widely

different in character and environment as the British, the Zulu, the

Chinese, that we are almost driven to seek some physiological root

for the passion. To give an added weight of interest to chance by

attaching to it a transfer of property seems to imply a love of hazard

as a permanent feature in humanity. Though the transfer of property by

gambling not merely feeds the passion but imports grave moral injuries of

its own, it cannot be said to originate gambling or to be essential to

the play of the interest in chance or hazard. The folly and the social

injury of gambling grow with the proportion of the stakes; but high

stakes, while they concentrate and dramatise the play, do not create the

interest.

Educationalists and other reformers who would exorcise the gambling

habit must look deeper for its origin and early sustenance. The fevered

excitement of the gambler is part of an exaggerated reaction against

certain excesses of orderly routine imposed upon the life in which he

lives. The dull, prolonged monotony of uninteresting drudgery which

constitutes the normal workaday life of large masses of people drives

them to sensational reactions which are crude and violent. The factory

employee, the shop assistant, the office clerk, the most typical members

of modern industrial society, find an oppressive burden of uninteresting

order, of mechanism, in their working day. Their work affords no

considerable scope for spontaneity, self-expression, and the interest,

achievement, and surprise which are ordinary human qualities. It is

easily admitted that an absolutely ordered (however well-ordered) human

life would be vacant of interest and intolerable: in other words, it is a

prime condition of humanity that the unexpected in the form of happening

and achievement should be adequately represented in every life. Art

in its widest sense, as interested effort of production, and play, as

interested but unproductive effort, are essential. But where either the

physical or mental exhaustion of industry, or other external conditions,

prevent the due cultivation or the expression of wholesome art or play

instincts, baser attractions usurp their place. It is impossible, and it

would be undesirable, to deny to man the satisfaction of his instinctive

zest in the unexpected, the hazardous, the disorderly: he needs not only

achievement but accident to sustain his interest in life. The latter

factor may yield largely to the former in highly civilised man, in a

society where varied modes of art offer varied stimuli to self-expression

and achievement: the artist who is a true artist is least likely to be a

gambler. But a margin of disorder, or hazard and unreason, will always

remain a factor in the interest of life: hence an element of unordered

play as distinct from art will always survive.

Even a moral order imposed in the public interest, if too uniform and

rigorous, will arouse, not merely in bad but in good natures, reactions

towards lawlessness. There is much truth in what Charles Lamb wrote of

his interest in the Seventeenth Century Comedy:—

I confess for myself that (with no great delinquencies to

answer for) I am glad for a season to take an airing beyond

the diocese of the strict conscience—not to live always in the

precincts of the law courts—but now and then, for a dream-while

or so, to imagine a world with no meddling restrictions—to get

into recesses where the hunter cannot follow me—I am back to my

cage and my restraint the fresher and more healthy for it.

So it is with all sorts and conditions of men: the incalculable, the

lawless remains an ineradicable factor in life.

Where there is little or no provision of or stimulus to art, the crudest

and most sensational play tends to absorb the entire margin of energy

left after work is done.

In such a state of society every field of activity capable of generating

such elements of hazard is pressed into the service of gambling: sports

and business occupations become popular in proportion as they can by

their structure be made to minister to the craving for hazard; every sort

of competition where a sufficient element of the incalculable exists is

pervaded by gambling.

If the monotony of toil drives large numbers of workers to seek violent

sensational relief in gambling, the ennui of idleness prompts the

leisured classes to the same abuse. A totally or partially parasitic life

(where little or no socially directed labour is imposed), though leaving

a large margin of free energy, makes more for dilettantism than for art,

and depriving play of its healthy interest as a relief from work induces

a “boredom” which fosters gambling among other sensational extravagances.

Moreover in the rich, leisured class the disproportion between earning

and spending loosens the just sense of property more than in any other

class, so that large miraculous transfers of property by betting seem

less discrepant with the ordinary conditions of their life.

This line of diagnosis makes it quite apparent what are the real supports

of gambling, and how the vice inheres in the wider “social problem,”

only to be cured or abated in proportion as sounder general conditions

of social order are obtained. When we regard the actual life of an

ordinary worker in a factory town we can easily understand the attraction

of “betting.” It is hard to refuse sympathy to the factory “hand” or

clerk who occasionally puts his “shilling” on a horse, going through his

weary day’s work with the zest of expectancy and hope afforded by his

speculation. It gives him a topic of conversation in the intervals of his

work, and is for him a sort of “politics” in leisure hours: into his dull

life it introduces an element of romance.

It is, however, impossible to discuss the practical ethics of modern

gambling without regarding that factor of pure gambling, which we

have analysed, in its actual place as part of a vicious amalgam in a

dissipated life.

We have chiefly considered the derationalising influence of the anarchic

element of chance which is the nucleus of the process. But, regarded as

a mode of transfer of property, gambling involves a union of several

anti-social desires. The desire to take unearned gains is, as we have

seen, itself immoral, for such gains of necessity imply an injury to

some other known or unknown persons, nor in the case of gambling is

the damage thus done to the character of a winner mitigated by the

knowledge that those from whom he wins have sought similar unearned gains

at his expense. In many natures the possibility of such facile gain

quickens the latent instinct of avarice, one of the most insidiously

disintegrating influences in human society, inviting as it does complete

self-absorption and an entire loss of sympathy with the material

interests of one’s fellows. The brooding infatuation of the habitual

gambler chills human sympathy more certainly than any other practice,

inducing not indeed enmity or active animosity so much as a callousness

which views the misfortunes of others with placid indifference. It is

just this absorption upon selfish ends in reference to incidents fraught

with emotional strain that is prone at once to break down the whole

fabric of the moral character and to dethrone the reason. For as man is

only moral and rational as a being who stands in orderly relation to

other similar beings in human society, so a practice based on a virtual

denial of this social order is the arch-enemy of human personality:

instead of a man we have a self-absorbed emotionalist. “In the making

of a bet—a man resolves to repress the use of his reason, his will, his

conscience, his affections; only one part of his nature is allowed free

play, and that is his emotions.”[1]

The passion of gambling, once settled in a man, seems to take physical

root in him and to be almost as difficult to expel as drink, opium, or

any other acquired physical vice. In extreme cases, it is often held,

gambling tends to absorb all other interests, even swallowing up its

associate vices. This, however, is not the normal case. Gambling commonly

consorts with drink: gambling-houses are commonly places for the sale

of alcoholic liquors, and wherever the law permits, or can be evaded,

drink-shops are betting haunts. Professional gamblers are doubtless

sober when they ply their craft, for skill and cunning are requisite

in most kinds of “mixed” gambling: a broker “cornering” the market,

like a bookmaker handling a sudden shift in the odds, or a card-sharper

with suspicious dupes, needs to have his wits about him. But it is not

as gamblers but as tricksters that these men need to be sober, and as

they require sobriety in themselves they desire the opposite in their

dupes. Hence, the business of gambling is often done in an atmosphere of

alcohol. This is not, indeed, invariably the case. The temperament of

some people is so sanguine and so prone to reckless play that no physical

stimulant seems necessary. But in Northern European peoples drink is

usually necessary to induce that instability of judgment and disregard of

the future which are conditions of gambling.

The statistics of crime prove beyond all cavil that gambling is the

king’s highway to fraud and theft. This is not merely because it loosens

general morality and in particular saps the rationale of property, but

because cheating is inseparably associated with most actual modes of

gambling. This does not imply that most persons who bet are actually

cheats or thieves; but persons who continue to be cheated or robbed,

half-conscious of the nature of the operations, are fitting themselves

for the other and more profitable part if they are thrown in the way

of acquiring a sufficient quantity of evil skill or opportunity. The

“honour” of a confirmed gambler, even in high life, is known to be a very

hollow commodity, and where there is less to lose in social esteem even

this slender substitute for virtue is absent. What percentage of “men

who bet” would refuse to utilise a secret tip of a “scratched” favourite

or the contents of an illegally disclosed sporting telegram? The barrier

between fraud and smartness does not exist for most of them.

Serious investigation of the gambling process discloses the fact that

pure gambling does not afford any economic basis of livelihood, save in

a few cases where, as at the roulette-table or in a lottery, those who

gamble know and willingly accept the chances against them. And even in

the case of the roulette-table the profits to the bank come largely from

the advantage which a large fund possesses in play against a smaller

fund: in the fluctuations of the game the smaller fund which plays

against the bank is more likely at some point in the game to be absorbed

so as to disable the player from continuing his play. If a man with £1000

were to play “pitch and toss” for sovereigns with a number of men, each

of whom carried £10, he must, if they played long, win all their money.

So, even where skill and fraud are absent, economic force is a large

factor in success.

Since professional gambling in a stockbroker, a croupier, a bookmaker,

or any other species, involves some use of superior knowledge, trickery,

or force, which in its effect on the “chances” amounts to “loading” the

dice, the non-professional gambler necessarily finds himself a loser

on any long series of events. These losses are found in fact to be a

fruitful cause of crime, especially among men employed in businesses

where sums of money belonging to the firm are passing through their

hands. It is not difficult for a man who constantly has in his possession

considerable funds which he has collected for his employer to persuade

himself that a temporary use of these funds, which otherwise lie idle, to

help him over a brief emergency, is not an act of real dishonesty. He is

commonly right in his plea that he had no direct intention to defraud his

employer. He expected to be able to replace the sum before its withdrawal

was discovered. But since not only legally but morally a person must be

presumed to “intend” that which is a natural or reasonable result of his

action, an indirect intention to defraud must be ascribed to him. He

is aware that he is acting wrongly, as well as illegally, in using the

firm’s money for any private purpose of his own. But in understanding and

assessing the quality of guilt involved in such action, two circumstances

extenuating his act, though not the gambling habit which has induced

it, must be taken into account. A poor man who frequently bets must

sooner or later be cleared out and unable, out of his own resources, to

meet his obligations. He is induced to yield to the temptation the more

readily for two reasons. First, there is a genuine probability (not so

large, however, as he thinks) that he can replace the money before any

“harm is done.” So long as he does replace it, no harm appears to him to

have been done: the firm has lost nothing by his action. This narrower

circumstance of extenuation is supported by a broader one. The whole

theory of modern commercial enterprise involves using other people’s

money, getting the advantage of this use for one’s self and paying to the

owner as little as one can. A bank or a finance company is entrusted with

sums of money belonging to outsiders on condition that when required, or

upon agreed notice, they shall be repaid. Any intelligent clerk in such

a firm may be well aware that the profits of the firm are earned by a

doubly speculative use of this money which belongs to other people: it is

employed by the firm in speculative investments which do not essentially

differ from betting on the turf, and the cash in hand or other available

assets are kept at a minimum on the speculative chance that depositors

will not seek to withdraw their money as they are legally entitled to do.

In a firm which thus lives by speculating with other people’s money, is

it surprising that a clerk should pursue what seems to him substantially

the same policy on a smaller scale? It may doubtless be objected that a

vital difference exists in the two cases: the investor who puts his money

into the hands of a speculative company does so knowingly and for some

expected profit; the clerk who speculates with the firm’s money does so

secretly, and no possible gain to the firm balances the chance of loss.

But even to this objection it is possible to reply that the revelation

of modern finance in such cases as the Liberator and the Globe Finance

Companies shows that real knowledge of the use to which money will be

put cannot be imputed to the investor in such companies, and that,

though some gain may possibly accrue to him, such gain is essentially

subsidiary to the projects of the promoters and managers of these

companies.

It is true that these are not normal types of modern business: they are

commonly designated gambling companies, some of them actually criminal

in their methods. But they only differ in degree, not in kind, from a

very large body of modern businesses, whose operations are so highly

speculative, their risks so little understood by the investing public,

and their profits apportioned with so little regard to the body of

shareholders, as fairly to bring them under the same category. In a

word, secret gambling with other people’s money, on the general line of

“heads I win, tails you lose,” is so largely prevalent in modern commerce

as perceptibly to taint the whole commercial atmosphere. Most of these

larger gambling operations are either not illegal or cannot easily be

reached by law, whereas the minor delinquencies of fraudulent clerks and

other employees are more easily detected and punished.

But, living in an atmosphere where secret speculation with other people’s

money is so rife, where deceit or force plays so large a part in

determining profitable coups, it is easy to understand how an employee,

whose conduct in most matters is determined by imitation, falls into lax

ways of regarding other people’s money, and comes in an hour of emergency

to “borrow” the firm’s money. This does not excuse his crime, but it does

throw light upon its natural history.

Publicity and education are, of course, the chief instruments for

converting illegitimate into legitimate speculation, for changing

commercial gambling into commercial foresight. This intelligent movement

towards a restoration of discernible order and rationality in business

processes, by eliminating “chances” and placing the transfer of property

and the earning of industrial gains on a more rational foundation, must,

of course, go _pari passu_ with other movements of social and industrial

reforms which aim simultaneously at the education of individual

personality and the reformation of the economic environment. Every step

which places the attainment of property upon a sane rational basis,

associating it with proportionate personal productive effort, every step

which enables men and women to find orderly interests in work and leisure

by gaining opportunities to express themselves in art or play under

conditions which stimulate new human wants and supply means of satisfying

them, will make for the destruction of gambling.

THE EXTENT OF GAMBLING

By JOHN HAWKE

GROWTH OF BETTING

The most disquieting feature in the consideration of the state of the

country with regard to this habit is its spread among the wage-earning

classes. By them it was little practised when it first became systematic

in connection with horse-racing among people of better means. Groups of

the latter class lost money and fortunes long before the fashion took any

general hold of very considerable numbers of the aristocratic and wealthy

classes. Betting took place principally at the race meetings. There

were grand-stands upon some of the race-courses many years before the

close of the eighteenth century, probably the largest being the one at

Doncaster, erected in 1779 at a cost of £7000. It was not until ten years

later that a regular market for credit betting was established by the

institution of Tattersall’s Subscription Rooms; and, that the original

purpose of the grand-stand was only for viewing the races, is made clear

by the contemporary records. At Ascot Heath, a separate wooden shed had

to be used by those who wished to bet. Even as late as 1833, although

the Epsom stand was the largest in Europe, the betting market was kept

away elsewhere, upon the hill. Six years later, complaints having been

made of the betting market being held in the grand-stand at Doncaster,

to the annoyance of the spectators, especially ladies, arrangements were

decided upon for the future to form an enclosure for betting outside the

stand. Similar precautions had previously been taken at Goodwood. Betting

was transacted at Newmarket at betting posts, where rings were formed on

the heath. Betting was also carried on away from the courses at premises

belonging to Tattersall’s in London (which, however, in 1839 consisted

merely of a small apartment, with only 300 members on the books), and

in the vicinity of the course at the Newmarket Subscription Rooms,

where there were only 57 members, other than those belonging to the

Jockey Club. There were also special rooms hired at Doncaster, York, and

Liverpool for members of either of the above clubs to bet in. A chronicle

informs us, in the reign of William the Fourth, that although the number

of spectators at Newmarket seldom exceeded 500, mostly of the highest

classes, the majority on horseback, the turf was becoming more popular in

1836 and the attendances larger.

It will thus be understood that the general public, for a long time

entirely excluded from the privileged betting circle, could only take

part in the business by the connivance of some of the professional men

having the entrée. In 1849, however, the Newmarket authorities, seeing

the feasibility of largely adding to their funds, arranged that a small

subscription should confer temporary membership of the Newmarket Rooms.

This caused many complaints by the old habitués, and it was found

necessary, in view of the dubious standing of some of the new-comers, to

modify the credit system, and to insist upon daily settlements. The cash

gaming of the race-course indulged in by the great bulk of race-goers

was not betting, but was carried on by means of roulette-tables,

lotteries, sweepstakes, and other adjuncts of the gambling-booth. The

Select Committee of the House of Commons (1844), in reporting against

the miscellaneous race-course gambling, clearly did not anticipate that

the grand-stands and enclosures would take the place of these other

methods, and become sources of great profit as places used for gambling

by betting, and that the abolition of booths would merely result in the

transfer of the gamblers to the enclosures or rings, as may be seen by

the following paragraph from their report:—

Your Committee cannot consider the establishment of

gambling-booths on race-courses as in any way an essential

accompaniment to racing, and they feel that they cannot too

strongly express their opinion that all such practices ought

to be entirely and universally discontinued. If there is in

any place a real demand for races, money enough is sure to

be subscribed for plates and stakes to be run for, and if at

any place sufficient sums for these purposes cannot be raised

without the aid of gambling-booth rents, the races at such

places had much better be left off.

Sixty years have gone by, and race-course proprietors acknowledge that

the loss of the present gambling-ring rents, or entrance fees, would put

a stop to three-fourths of the race meetings in the kingdom.

Legislative enactments followed the Parliamentary Reports, and to a

great extent swept away the miscellaneous gambling, which was only to

make way, unhappily, for the more subtle form of turf betting. For years

before the middle of the nineteenth century, many of the proprietors

of public-houses (or persons in collusion with them), and of specially

hired offices in the great towns, had been in the habit of using their

premises for the purpose of accepting betting money, and, after a time,

relations were established between them and some of the credit-betting

professionals belonging to the clubs and subscription rooms. This was

how betting by those away from the race-course continued, and even

increased in volume, notwithstanding the effect of the Betting House Act

in 1853, which, immediate as it was with regard to these betting offices,

was partially neutralised by the change of location brought about when

the new railways were beginning to convey large numbers at a moderate

expense to the course, and by the laying on of the telegraph offering the

means to others of rapid communication with the betting men at the race

meetings, for gambling purposes, by those unable to make the journey.

The time was one of transition, and legislators appear to have overlooked

the fact that the miscellaneous booth gambling having been previously

suppressed, their enactment putting an end to ready-money betting

establishments, then chiefly in towns, would only result in their virtual

transfer to every race-course and so-called club. There had been a great

deal of irregular and surreptitious cash betting upon the race-course,

but it was not a generally recognised system. It was one that had

gradually grown. The bookmaker with a satchel taking money in advance and

giving tickets, was unknown on our race-courses in the forties. Later on

it was particularly recorded that at the Chester Cup race of 1852, one

large bookmaker took a great many £5 notes, and the practice was then

coming into fashion. It was, however, to laxity in applying the law that

the ready-money, or deposit, system owed its subsequent continuation

and increase in volume, for there is no doubt whatever that the Act of

1853 was considered at that time to apply to the evil in race-course

enclosures as elsewhere. A recognised contemporary authority wrote: “The

fatal facility induced by the open deposit system is nipped in the bud”;

and another, “Cash betting stopped upon the passing of the Act.” The

temptation, however, to race managers to wink at wholesale infraction

of the law was very great. Entrance fees to the enclosures promised to

become their financial backbone, and to enable them to add enormously

to the value of the stakes and cups. And it was found that to permit

ready-money betting was to turn a few score of entrance fees to the

rings into thousands. That the practice was even many years afterwards

considered illegitimate is shown by the Jockey Club notice in the _Racing

Calendar_ of July 23, 1874, and the official notice at Goodwood by the

Duke of Richmond, “No ready-money betting will be allowed upon any part

of the course or park,” in the _Calendar_ of the same date.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT INCREASE

BETTING

It is not necessary to follow in any detail, beyond this period, the

growth of horse-racing, and the practice of betting connected with

it which had now become a national foible. The foregoing sketch was

desirable for the understanding of the subject, owing to the absence of

any other authentic continuous record, and by the fact that the masses

of the nation had not become a gambling people as compared with foreign

populations, either in other ways or in this, until long after the

introduction of the sport. The above review of the past takes us up to

the year mentioned (1874), when the failure of a prosecution, owing to

the interest or prejudice of the Newmarket magistrates, for permitting

ready-money betting in the rings, finally opened the flood-gates of the

system, which now, aided by railway, telegraph, and press, spread over

the country in an ever-increasing volume, and from tens of thousands

of sources in city, town, and village drew its main increment from the

money-making and wage-earning classes. Hardly any portion of the country,

any section of the population, was free from the blight. The bookmakers

multiplied. The wealthy and the idle squandered fortunes on them; the

toilers brought their sovereigns and half-crowns in myriads. A large

portion of the press battened upon the advertisements of prosperous

betting men. Servants of the state in high legal positions, devotees of

the race-course, and others of subordinate station, gave decisions as

to the construction of the law so framed as to put no check upon the

spread of professional betting; and horse-racing became a trade instead

of a sport. The enormous money interests honeycombed it with dishonesty.

Sometimes owners, and more often trainers, jockeys, touts, and betting

men, arranged which horse should win, according to the exigencies of

the betting market; and, not unfrequently, poison played its part when

it was necessary, from the trade point of view, to prevent an animal

from first passing the winning-post. The very atmosphere of the turf

was pestiferous; it corrupted everything of it and connected with it.

The pretence that it was any longer a noble sport was only countenanced

by the fashion of titled people patronising it. The ancient plea as

to its improving the breed of horses became a byword as the number of

yearling races increased and the length of the courses was reduced. The

pregnant sentence in the Report of the old Committee (1844) of the House

of Lords was forgotten: “The Committee would consider the advantages

of horse-racing more than problematical if they were to be unavoidably

purchased by excessive gambling and the vice and misery which it

entails.” The streams of small bets swelled into rivers, and the rivers

filled an ocean swamping the land. The twenty or so bookmakers of the

beginning of the century grew into an army of twenty thousand. Many made

fortunes; nearly all made a living. Those who confined their operations

to the race-courses might be said to do less harm than those who offered

facilities away from the course, only that they usually acted in relation

to these latter as the wholesale dealer does for the retailer. One of

these retail men who was not given to boasting (_Chambers’s Journal_,

1898) admitted that his business had a turnover of £250,000. It must be

remembered that the individuals in the streets are merely the journeymen

of well-to-do bookmakers. During last year, amongst the many thousands of

fines for the offence, evidence was given—and there are scores of similar

cases—that a lad of 16 was one of several servants of a master bookmaker,

who mapped out the district amongst his subordinates.

Betting & Gambling: A National Evil · 第 1 / 15 段