HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ENGLAND
Since I have now given a brief summary of the canon law, which until the
Reformation marked the general principles that guided the laws of all
Europe on the subject of women, I propose next to consider more
particularly the history of women's rights in England; for the
institutions of England, being the basis of our own, will necessarily be
more pertinent to us than those of Continental countries, to which I
shall not devote more than a passing comment here and there. My inquiry
will naturally fall into certain well-defined parts. The status of the
unmarried woman is different from that of her married sister and will,
accordingly, demand separate consideration. The rights of women, again,
are to be viewed both from the legal and the social standpoint. Their
legal rights include those of a private nature, such as the disposal of
property, and public rights, such as suffrage, sitting on a jury, or
holding office. Under social rights are included the right to an
education, to earn a living, and the like. Let us glance first at the
history of the legal rights of single women.
[Sidenote: Single women: Pollock and Maitland i, pp. 482-485.]
From very early times the law has continued to put the single woman of
mature age on practically a par with men so far as private single rights
are concerned. She could hold land, make a will or contract, could sue
and be sued, all of her own initiative; she needed no guardian. She
could herself, if a widow, be guardian of her own children.
[Sidenote: Pollock and Maitland, ii, 260-313. Blackstone, ii, ch. 13.]
In the case of inheritance, however, women have to within extremely
recent times been treated less generously than men. The male sex has
been preferred in an inheritance; males excluded females of equal
degree; or, in the words of Blackstone: "In collateral inheritances the
male stock shall be preferred to the female; that is, kindred derived
from the blood of the male ancestors, however remote, shall be admitted
before those from the blood of the female, however near; unless where
the lands have, in fact, descended from a female. Thus the relations on
the father's side are admitted _in infinitum_ before those on the
mother's side are admitted at all." Blackstone justly remarks that this
harsh enactment of the laws of England was quite unknown to the Roman
law "wherein brethren and sisters were allowed to succeed to equal
portions of the inheritance." As an example, suppose we look for the
heir of John Stiles, deceased. The order of succession would be:
I. The eldest son, Matthew Stiles, or his issue.
II. If his line is extinct, then Gilbert Stiles and the other sons,
respectively, in order of birth, or their issue.
III. In default of these, all the daughters together, Margarite and
Charlotte Stiles, or their issue.
IV. On the failure of the descendants of John Stiles himself, the issue
of Geoffrey and Lucy Stiles, his parents, is called in, viz.: first,
Francis Stiles, the eldest brother of the whole blood, or his issue.
V. Then Oliver Stiles, and the other whole brothers, respectively, in
order of birth, or their issue.
VI. Then the sisters of the whole blood all together, Bridget and Alice
Stiles, or their issue.
And so on. It will be noted that females of equal degree inherited
together; and that a daughter excluded a brother of the dead man. Men
themselves, if younger sons, have suffered what seems to us a grave
injustice in the prevalence of the right of primogeniture, whereby, if
there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only can
inherit. This law might work for the benefit of certain females; thus,
the daughter, granddaughter, or great-granddaughter of an eldest son
will succeed before the younger son.
To public rights, such as sitting on a jury[393] or holding offices of
state, women never were admitted; that is a question that has become
prominent only in the twentieth century and will demand consideration in
its proper place.
[Sidenote: Power of Parents.]
Unlike the Roman law, English law allows parents to disinherit children
completely, if they so desire, without being under any compulsion to
leave them a part of their goods. As to legal power over children, the
mother, as such, is entitled to none, says Blackstone,[394] but only to
reverence and respect. Now, however, by the statute 2 and 3 Vict., c.
54, commonly called _Talfourd's Act_, an order may be made on petition
to the court of chancery giving mothers access to their children and, if
such children are within the age of seven years, for delivery of them to
their mother until they attain that age. But no woman who has been
convicted of adultery is entitled to the benefit of the act. The father
has legal power up to the time when his children come of age; then it
ceases. Until that time, his consent is necessary to a valid marriage;
he may receive the profit of a child's estate, but only as guardian or
trustee, and must render an account when the child attains his majority;
and he may have the benefit of his children's labour while they live
with him.
[Sidenote: Husband and wife. Pollock and Maitland, ii, 399-436.
Blackstone, i, ch 15. Bryce, pp. 818-830.]
We are ready now to observe the status of women in marriage. The
question of their legal rights in this relation offers the most
illuminating insight into their conditions in the various epochs of
history. Matrimony is a state over which the Church has always asserted
special jurisdiction. By the middle of the twelfth century it was law in
England that to it belonged this prerogative. The ecclesiastical court,
for example, pronounced in a given case whether there had been a valid
marriage or not; the temporal court took this decision as one of the
bases for determining a matter of inheritance, whether a woman was
entitled to dower, and the like. The general precepts laid down by canon
law in the case of a wife have already been noted. These rules need now
to be supplemented by an account of the position of women in marriage
under the common law.
Under the older common law the husband was very much lord of all he
surveyed and even more. An old enactment thus describes a husband's
duty[395]: "He shall treat and _govern_ the aforesaid A well and
decently, and shall not inflict nor cause to be inflicted any injury
upon the aforesaid A except in so far as he may lawfully and reasonably
do so in accordance with _the right of a husband to correct and chastise
his wife_." Blackstone, who wrote in 1763, has this to say on the
husband's power to chastise his wife: "The husband also, by the old law,
might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her
misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this
power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same
moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children,
for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer.
But this power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and
the husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife _aliter
quam ad, virum, ex causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris suae, licite
et rationabiliter pertinet_.[396] The civil law gave the husband the
same, or a larger, authority over his wife; allowing him for some
misdemeanours _flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem_ [to give
his wife a severe beating with whips and clubs]; for others, only
_modicam castigationem adhibere_ [to apply moderate correction]. But
with us in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of
correction began to be doubted; and a wife may now have security of the
peace against her husband, or, in return, a husband against his wife.
Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old common
law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege; and the courts of
law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in
case of any gross misbehaviour." Doubtless what Mr. Weller, Sr.,
describes as the "amiable weakness" of wife-beating was not necessarily
confined to the "lower rank." For instance, some of the courtly
gentlemen of the reign of Queen Anne were probably not averse to
exercising their old-time prerogative. Says Sir Richard Steele
(_Spectator_, 479): "I can not deny but there are Perverse Jades that
fall to Men's Lots, with whom it requires more than common Proficiency
in Philosophy to be able to live. When these are joined to men of warm
Spirits, without Temper or Learning, they are frequently corrected with
Stripes; but one of our famous Lawyers is of opinion, That this ought to
be used sparingly." The law was, indeed, even worse than might appear
from the words of Blackstone. The wife who feared unreasonable violence
could, to be sure, bind her husband to keep the peace; but she had no
action against him. A husband who killed his wife was guilty of murder,
but the wife who slew her husband was adjudged guilty of petty treason;
and whereas the man would be merely drawn and hanged, the woman, until
the reign of George III, was drawn and burnt alive.[397]
The right of a husband to restrain a wife's liberty may not be said to
have become completely obsolete until the case of _Reg. v. Jackson in
1891_.[398] Wife-beating is still a flagrantly common offence in
England.
[Sidenote: Wife's property in marriage.]
Turning now to the question of the wife's property in marriage, we shall
be forced to believe that Blackstone was an optimist of unusual
magnitude when he wrote that the female sex was "so great a favourite of
the laws of England." Not to weary the reader by minute details, I
cannot do better than give Messrs. Pollock and Maitland's excellent
summary of the final shape taken by the common law--a glaring piece of
injustice, worthy of careful reading, and in complete accord with
Apostolic injunctions: "I. In the lands of which the wife is tenant in
fee, whether they belonged to her at the date of the marriage or came to
her during the marriage, the husband has an estate which will endure
during the marriage, and this he can alienate without her concurrence.
If a child is born of the marriage, thenceforth the husband as 'tenant
by courtesy' has an estate which will endure for the whole of his life,
and this he can alienate without the wife's concurrence. The husband by
himself has no greater power of alienation than is here stated; he
cannot confer an estate which will endure after the end of the marriage
or (as the case may be) after his own death. The wife has during the
marriage no power to alienate her land without her husband's
concurrence. The only process by which the fee can be alienated is a
_fine_ to which both husband and wife are parties and to which she gives
her assent after a separate examination.
"II. A widow is entitled to enjoy for her life under the name of dower
one third of any land of which the husband was seised in fee at any time
during the marriage. The result of this is that during the marriage the
husband cannot alienate his own land so as to bar his wife's right of
dower, unless this is done with her concurrence, and her concurrence is
ineffectual unless the conveyance is made by _fine_." [This
inconvenience for an unscrupulous husband was evaded in modern
conveyancy by a device of extreme ingenuity finally perfected only in
the eighteenth century. Professor James Bryce remarks (p. 820): "As this
right (i.e., the right of dower) interfered with the husband's power of
freely disposing of his own land, the lawyers at once set about to find
means of evading it, and found these partly in legal processes by which
the wife, her consent being ascertained by the courts, parted with her
right, partly by an ingenious device whereby lands could be conveyed to
a husband without the right of dower attaching to them, partly by giving
the wife a so-called jointure which barred her claim."]
"III. Our law institutes no community, even of movables, between husband
and wife. Whatever movables the wife has at the date of the marriage
become the husband's, and the husband is entitled to take possession of
and thereby to make his own whatever movables she becomes entitled to
during the marriage, and without her concurrence he can sue for all
debts that are due her. On his death, however, she becomes entitled to
all movables and debts that are outstanding, or (as the phrase goes)
have not been 'reduced into possession.' What the husband gets
possession of is simply his; he can freely dispose of it _inter vivos_
or by will. In the main, for this purpose as for other purposes, a 'term
of years' is treated as a chattel, but under an exceptional rule the
husband, though he can alienate his wife's 'chattel real' _inter vivos_,
cannot dispose of it by his will. If he has not alienated it _inter
vivos_, it will be hers if she survives him. If he survives her, he is
entitled to her 'chattels real' and is also entitled to be made the
administrator of her estate. In that capacity he has a right to whatever
movables or debts have not yet been 'reduced into possession' and, when
the debts have been paid, he keeps these goods as his own. If she dies
in his lifetime, she can have no other intestate successor. Without his
consent she can make no will, and any consent that he may have given is
revocable at any time before the will is proved.
"IV. Our common law--but we have seen that this rule is not very
old--assured no share of the husband's personality to the widow. He can,
even by his will, give all of it away from her except her necessary
clothes, and with that exception his creditors can take all of it. A
further exception, of which there is not much to be read, is made of
jewels, trinkets, and ornaments of the person, under the name of
paraphernalia. The husband may sell or give these away in his lifetime,
and even after his death they may be taken for his debts; but he cannot
give them away by will. If the husband dies during the wife's life and
dies intestate she is entitled to a third, or, if there be no living
descendant of the husband, to one half of his personality [but see the
note of Bryce, above]. But this is a case of pure intestate succession;
she only has a share of what is left after payment of her husband's
debts.
"V. During the marriage the husband is in effect liable to the whole
extent of his property for debts incurred or wrongs committed by his
wife before the marriage, also for wrongs committed during the marriage.
The action is against him and her as co-defendants. If the marriage is
dissolved by his death, she is liable, his estate is not. If the
marriage is dissolved by her death, he is liable as her administrator,
but only to the extent of the property which he takes in that
character." [Mr. Ashton, in his very interesting book, p. 31, quotes a
peculiar note from a Parish Register in the reign of Queen Anne to this
effect: "John Bridmore and Anne Sellwood, both of Chiltern all Saints,
were married October 17, 1714. The aforesaid Anne Sellwood was married
in her Smock, without any clothes or headgier on." "This is not
uncommon," remarks Mr. Ashton, "the object being, according to a vulgar
error, to exempt the husband from the payment of any debts his wife may
have contracted in her ante-nuptial condition. This error seems to have
been founded on a misconception of the law, as it is laid down 'the
husband is liable for the wife's debts, because he acquires an absolute
interest in the personal estate of his wife.' An unlearned person from
this might conclude, and not unreasonably, that if his wife had no
estate whatever he could not incur any liability."]
"VI. During the marriage the wife cannot contract on her own behalf. She
can contract as her husband's agent and has a certain power of pledging
his credit in the purchase of necessaries. At the end of the Middle Ages
it is very doubtful how far this power is to be explained by an 'implied
agency.' The tendency of more recent times has been to allow her no
power that cannot be thus explained, except in the exceptional case of
desertion."
A perusal of these laws shows that they are immensely inferior to the
Roman law, which not only gave the wife full control of her property,
but protected her from coercion and bullying on the part of the husband.
The amendment of these injustices has been very recent indeed.
Successive statutes in 1870, 1874, and 1882[399] finally abrogated the
law which gave the husband full ownership of his wife's property by the
mere act of marriage. Beginning with the year 1857, too, enlightenment
in England had progressed to such a remarkable degree that certain acts
were passed forbidding a husband to seize his wife's earnings and
neglect her[400]; and she was actually allowed to keep her own wages
after the desertion of her lord. Before that time he might desert his
wife repeatedly, and return from time to time to take away her earnings
and sell everything she had acquired. An act in 1886 (_49 and 50 Vict.,
c. 52_) gave magistrates the power to order a husband to pay his wife a
weekly sum, not exceeding two pounds, for her support and that of the
children if it appeared to the magistrates that the deserting husband
had the means of maintaining her, but was unwilling to do so. Still,
the husband can at any time terminate his desertion and force his wife
to take him back on penalty of losing all rights to such maintenance.
There was frantic opposition to all of these revolutionary enactments
and many prophets arose crying woe; but the acts finally passed and
England still lives.
[Sidenote: Divorce. Authorities as above; and Howard, ii, 3-117.]
Until the Reformation divorce was regulated by the canon law in
accordance with the principles which I have explained. After the
Reformation the matter at once assumed a different aspect because all
Protestants agreed in denying that marriage is a sacrament. Scotland in
this as in other respects has been more liberal than England; as early
as 1573 desertion as well as adultery had become grounds for divorce.
But in England the force of the canon law continued. In Blackstone's day
there were still, as under the canon law, only two kinds of separation.
Complete dissolution of the marriage tie (_a vinculo matrimonii_) took
place only on a declaration of the Ecclesiastical Court that on account
of some canonical impediment, like consanguinity, the marriage was null
and void from the beginning. Separation "from bed and board" (_a mensa
et thoro_) simply gave the parties permission no longer to live together
and was allowed for adultery or some other grave offences, like
intolerable cruelty or a chronic disease. However, some time before
Blackstone's day it had become the habit to get a dissolution of
marriage _a vinculo matrimonii_ for adultery by Act of Parliament; but
the legal process was so tedious, minute, and expensive that only the
very rich could afford the luxury.[401] In the case of a separation _a
mensa et thoro_ alimony was allowed the wife for her support out of her
husband's estate at the discretion of the ecclesiastical judges.
The initiative in divorce by Act of Parliament was usually taken by the
husband; not until 1801 did a woman have the temerity so to assert her
rights. The fact is, ever since the dawn of history society has, with
its usual double standard of morality for men and women, insisted that
while the husband must never tolerate infidelity on the part of the
wife, the wife should bear with meekness the adulteries of her husband.
Plutarch in his _Conjugal Precepts_ so advises a wife; and this pious
frame of mind has continued down the centuries to the present day.
Devout old Jeremy Taylor in his _Holy Living_--a book which is read by
few, but praised by many--thus counsels the suffering wife[402]: "But
if, after all the fair deportments and innocent chaste compliances, the
husband be morose and ungentle, let the wife discourse thus: 'If, while
I do my duty, my husband neglects me, what will he do if I neglect him?'
And if she thinks to be separated by reason of her husband's unchaste
life, let her consider that the man will be incurably ruined, and her
rivals could wish nothing more than that they might possess him alone."
Dr. Samuel Johnson ably seconded the holy Jeremy's advice by declaring
that there is a boundless difference between the infidelity of the man
and that of the woman. In the husband's case "the man imposes no
bastards upon his wife." Therefore, "wise married women don't trouble
themselves about infidelity in their husbands."[403] Until very recent
times not only men but also women have been unanimous in counselling
abject submission to and humble adoration of the husband. A single
example out of hundreds will serve excellently as a pattern. In 1821 a
"Lady of Distinction" writes to a "Relation Shortly after Her Marriage"
as follows[404]: "The most perfect and implicit faith in the superiority
of a husband's judgment, and the most absolute obedience to his desires,
is not only the conduct that will insure the greatest success, but will
give the most entire satisfaction. It will take from you a thousand
cares, which would have answered to no purpose; it will relieve you from
a weight of thought that would be very painful, and in no way
profitable.... It has its origin in reason, in justice, in nature, and
in the law of God.... I have told you how you may, and how people who
are married do, get a likeness of countenance; and in that I have done
it. You will understand me, that by often looking at your husband's
face, by smiling on the occasions on which he does, by frowning on those
things which make him frown, and by viewing all things in the light in
which you perceive he does, you will acquire that likeness of
countenance which it is an honour to possess, because it is a testimony
of love.... When your temper and your thoughts are formed upon those of
your husband, according to the plan which I have laid down, you will
perceive that you have no will, no pleasure, but what is also his. This
is the character the wife of prudence would be apt to assume; she would
make herself the mirror, to show, unaltered, and without aggravation,
diminution, or distortion, the thoughts, the sentiments, and the
resolutions of her husband. She would have no particular design, no
opinion, no thought, no passion, no approbation, no dislike, but what
should be conformable to his own judgment ... I would have her judgment
seem the reflecting mirror to his determination; and her form the shadow
of his body, conforming itself to his several positions, and following
it in all its movements ... I would not have you silent; nay, when
trifles are the subject, talk as much as any of them; but distinguish
when the discourse turns upon things of importance."
It is not strange, therefore, that no woman protested publicly against
a husband's infidelity until 1801. Up to 1840 there were but three cases
of a woman's taking the initiative in divorce, namely, in 1801, 1831,
and 1840; and in each case the man's adultery was aggravated by other
offences. In two other suits the Lords rejected the petition of the
wife, although the misconduct of the husband was clearly proved. But
redress was still by the elaborate machinery of Act of Parliament and
hence a luxury only for the wealthy until 1857, when a special Court for
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was established.[405] Nevertheless, the
law as it stands to-day is not of a character to excite admiration or to
prove the existence of the proverbial "British Fair Play." A husband can
obtain a divorce upon proof of his wife's infidelity; but the wife can
get it only by proving, in addition to the husband's adultery, either
that it was aggravated by bigamy or incest or that it was accompanied by
cruelty or by two years' desertion. Misconduct by the husband bars him
from obtaining a divorce. The court is empowered to regulate at its
discretion the property rights of divorced people and the custody of the
children.[406] All attempts have failed to make the law recognise that
the misconduct of the husband shall be regarded equally as culpable as
the wife's.
[Sidenote: Rape and the age of legal consent.]
We may pause a moment to glance at the provisions made by the criminal
law for protecting women. The offence that most closely touches women is
rape. The punishment of this in Blackstone's day was death[407]; but in
the next century the death penalty was repealed and transportation for
life substituted.[408] The saddest blot on a presumably Christian
civilisation connected with this matter is the so-called "age of legal
consent." Under the older Common Law this was _ten_ or _twelve;_ in 1885
it was _thirteen_, at which period a girl was supposed to be at an age
to know what she was doing. But in the year 1885 Mr. Stead told the
London public very plainly those hideous truths about crimes against
young girls which everybody knew very well had been going on for
centuries, but which no one ever before had dared to assert. The result
was that Parliament raised the "age of legal consent" to sixteen, where
it now stands.[409] The idea that any girl of this age is sufficiently
mature to know what she is doing by consenting to the lust of scoundrels
is a fine commentary on the acuteness of the legal intellect and the
high moral convictions of legislators.
[Sidenote: Women's rights to an education.]
The rights of women to a higher education is distinctly a movement of
the last half of the nineteenth century. It is true that throughout
history there are many examples of remarkably well-educated women--Lady
Jane Grey, for example, or Queen Elizabeth, or Olympia Morata, in Italy,
she who in the golden period of the Renaissance became a professor at
sixteen and wrote dialogues in Greek after the manner of Plato. But on
looking closely into these instances we shall find first that these
ladies were of noble rank and only thanks to their lofty position had
access to knowledge; and secondly that they stand out as isolated
cases--the great masses of women never dreamed beyond the traditional
Kleider, Küche, Kinder, and Kirche. That an elementary education,
consisting of reading, writing, and simple arithmetic, was offered them
freely by hospital, monastery, and the like schools even as early as
Chaucer--this we know; nevertheless, beyond that they were not supposed
to aspire. So very recently, indeed, have women secured the rights to a
higher education that many thousands to-day can easily recall the
intensely bitter attacks which were directed against colleges like
Wellesley and Bryn Mawr in their inception. Until the middle of the
nineteenth century the whole education--what there was of it--of a girl
was arranged primarily with a view to capture a husband and, once having
him secure, to be his loving slave, to dwell with adoring rapture on his
superior learning, and to be humbly grateful if her liege deigned from
time to time to throw his spouse some scraps of knowledge which might be
safely administered without danger of making her think for herself.
These facts no one can well deny; but a few instances of prevalent
opinion, in addition to those which I have already quoted, will afford
the amusement of concrete examples.
Mrs. Chapone, in the eighteenth century, advised her niece to avoid the
study of classics and science lest she "excite envy in one sex and
jealousy in the other." Lady Mary Wortley Montagu laments thus: "There
is hardly a creature in the world more despicable and more liable to
universal ridicule than a learned woman," and "folly is reckoned so much
our proper sphere, we are sooner pardoned any excesses of that than the
least pretensions to reading and good sense." Pursuant to the prevailing
sentiment on the education of women, the subjects which they studied and
the books which they were allowed to read were carefully regulated. As
to their reading, it was confined to romantic tales whereof the
exceeding insipidity could not awaken any symptom of intelligence. Lyly
dedicated his _Euphues_ to the "Ladies and Gentlewomen of England" and
Sidney's _Arcadia_ owed its vast success to its female readers.
The subjects studied followed the orthodox views. Beginning with the
reign of Queen Anne boarding-schools for girls became very numerous. At
these schools "young Gentlewomen" were "soberly educated" and "taught
all sorts of learning fit for young Gentlewomen." The "learning fit for
young Gentlewomen" comprised "the Needle, Dancing, and the French
tongue; a little Music on the Harpsichord or Spinet, to read, write, and
cast accounts in a small way." Dancing was the all-important study,
since this was the surest route to their Promised Land, matrimony. The
study of French consisted in learning parrot-like a modicum of that
language pronounced according to the fancy of the speaker. As, however,
the young beau probably did not know any more himself, the end justified
the means. Studies like history, when pursued, were taken in
homoeopathic doses from small compendiums; and it was adequate to know
that Charlemagne lived somewhere in Europe about a thousand or so years
ago. Yet even this was rather advanced work and exposed the woman to be
damned by the report that she was educated. Ability to cook was not
despised and pastry schools were not uncommon. Thus in the time of
Queen Anne appears this: "To all Young Ladies: at Edw. Kidder's Pastry
School in little Lincoln's Inn Fields are taught all Sorts of Pastry and
Cookery, Dutch hollow works, and Butter Works," etc.
At last in the first decades of the nineteenth century the civilised
world began slowly to take some thought of women's higher education and
to wake up to the fact that because a certain system has been in vogue
since created man does not necessarily mean that it is the right one; a
very heretical and revolutionary idea, which has always been and still
is ably opposed by that great host of people who have steadily
maintained that when men and women once begin to think for themselves
society must inevitably run to ruin. In 1843 there was established a
certain Governesses' Benevolent Institution. This was in its inception a
society to afford relief to governesses, i.e., women engaged in
tutoring, who might be temporarily in straits, and to raise annuities
for those who were past doing work. Obviously this would suggest the
question of what a competent governess was; and this in turn led to the
demand for a diploma as a warrant of efficiency. That called attention
to the extreme ignorance of the members of the profession; and it was
soon felt that classes of instruction were needed. A sum of money was
accordingly collected in 1846 and given the Institution for that
purpose. Some eminent professors of King's College volunteered to
lecture; and so, on a small scale to be sure, began what is now Queen's
College, the first college for women in England, incorporated by Royal
Charter in 1853. In 1849 Bedford College for women had been founded in
London through the unselfish labours of Mrs. Reid; but it did not
receive its charter until 1869. Within a decade Cheltenham, Girton,
Newnham, and other colleges for women had arisen. Eight of the ten men's
universities of Great Britain now allow examinations and degrees to
women also; Oxford and Cambridge do not.
[Sidenote: Women in the professions.]
Since then women's right to any higher education which they may wish to
embrace has been permanently assured. As early as 1868 Edinburgh opened
its courses in pharmacy to women. In 1895 there were already 264 duly
qualified female physicians in Great Britain. In many schools they are
allowed to study with men, as at the College of Physicians and Surgeons
at Edinburgh; there are four medical schools for women only. We find
women now actively engaged in agriculture, apiculture, poultry-keeping,
horticulture; in library work and indexing; in stenography; in all
trades and professions. The year 1893 witnessed the first appointment of
women as factory inspectors, two being chosen that year in London and in
Glasgow. Nottingham had chosen women as sanitary inspectors in 1892.
Thus in about two decades woman has advanced farther than in the
combined ages which preceded. Before these very modern movements we may
say that the stage was the only profession which had offered them any
opportunity of earning their living in a dignified way. It seems that a
Mrs. Coleman, in 1656, was the first female to act on the stage in
England; before that, all female parts had been taken by boys or young
men. A Mrs. Sanderson played Desdemona in 1660 at the Clare Market
Theatre. In 1661, as we may see from Pepys' _Diary_ (Feb. 12, 1661), an
actress was still a novelty; but within a few decades there were already
many famous ones.
[Sidenote: Woman suffrage in England]
We have seen that now woman has obtained practically all rights on a par
with men. There are still grave injustices, as in divorce; but the
battle is substantially won. One right still remains for her to win, the
right, namely, to vote, not merely on issues such as education--this
privilege she has had for some time--but on all political questions; and
connected with this is the right to hold political office. We may
fittingly close this chapter by a review of the history of the agitation
for woman suffrage.
In the year 1797 Charles Fox remarked: "It has never been suggested in
all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, that it
would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex."
Yet five years before Mary Wollstonecraft had published her _Vindication
of the Rights of Women_. Presently the writings of Harriet Martineau
upon political economy proved that women could really think on politics.
We may say that the general public first began to think seriously on the
matter after the epoch-making Reform Act of 1832. This celebrated
measure admitted £10 householders to the right to vote and carefully
excluded females; yet it marked a new era in the awakening of civic
consciousness: women had taken active part in the attendant campaigns;
and the very fact that "male persons" needed now to be so specifically
designated in the bill, whereas hitherto "persons" and "freeholders" had
been deemed sufficient, attests the recognition of a new factor in
political life.
In 1865 John Stuart Mill was elected to Parliament. That able thinker
had written on _The Subjection of Women_ and was ready to champion their
rights. A petition was prepared under the direction of women like Mrs.
Bodichon and Miss Davies; and in 1867 Mill proposed in Parliament that
the word _man_ be omitted from the People's Bill and _person_
substituted. The amendment was rejected, 196 to 83.
Nevertheless, the agitation was continued. The next year constitutional
lawyers like Mr. Chisholm Anstey decided that women might be legally
entitled to vote; and 5000 of them applied to be registered. In a test
case brought before the Court of Common Pleas the verdict was adverse,
on the ground that it was contrary to usage for women to vote. The
fight went on. Mr. Jacob Bright in 1870 introduced a "Bill to Remove the
Electoral Disabilities of Women" and lost. In 1884 Mr. William Woodall
tried again; he lost also, largely through the efforts of Gladstone; and
the same statesman was instrumental in killing another bill in 1892,
when Mr. A.J. Balfour urged its passage.
At the present day women in England cannot vote on great questions of
universal state policy nor can they hold great offices of state. Yet
their gains have been enormous, as I shall next demonstrate; and in this
connection I shall also glance briefly at their vast strides in the
colonies.
In 1850 Ontario gave all women school suffrage. In 1867 New South Wales
gave them municipal suffrage. In 1869 England granted municipal suffrage
to single women and widows; Victoria gave it to all women, married or
single. In England in 1870 the Education Act, by which school boards
were created, gave women the same rights as men, both as regards
electing and being elected. In 1871 West Australia gave them municipal
suffrage; in 1878 New Zealand gave school suffrage. In 1880 South
Australia gave municipal suffrage. In 1881 widows and single women
obtained municipal suffrage in Scotland and Parliamentary suffrage on
the Isle of Man. Municipal suffrage was given by Ontario and Tasmania in
1884 and by New Zealand and New Brunswick in 1886; by Nova Scotia and
Manitoba in 1887. In 1888 England gave women county suffrage and British
Columbia and the North-West Territory gave them municipal suffrage. In
1889 county suffrage was given the women of Scotland and municipal
suffrage to single women and widows in the Province of Quebec. In 1893
New Zealand gave full suffrage. In 1894 parish and district suffrage was
given in England to women married and single, with power to elect and to
be elected to parish and district councils. In 1895 South Australia gave
full state suffrage to all women. In 1898 the women of Ireland were
given the right to vote for all officers except members of Parliament.
In 1900 West Australia granted full state suffrage to all. In 1902 full
national suffrage was given all the women in federated Australia and
full state suffrage to those of New South Wales. In 1903 Tasmania gave
full state suffrage; in 1905 Queensland did the same; in 1908 Victoria
followed. In 1907 England made women eligible as mayors, aldermen, and
county and town councillors. In London, for example, at the present time
women can vote for the 28 borough councils and 31 boards of guardians of
the London City Council; they can also be themselves elected to these;
be members of the central unemployed body or of the 23 district
committees, and can be co-opted to all other bodies, like the local
pension committees. Women can be aldermen of the Council; and there is
nothing to prevent one from holding even the office of chairman.
At the present moment the cause of woman suffrage in England is being
furthered chiefly by two organizations which differ in methods. The
National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies has adopted the
"constitutional" or peaceful policy; but the National Women's Social and
Political Union is "militant" and coercive.
SOURCES
I. The English Statutes. Published by Authority during the Various
Reigns.
II. Studies in History and Jurisprudence: by James Bryce. Oxford
University Press, 1901. Pages 782-859 on "Marriage and Divorce."
III. History of English Law: by Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland.
2 vols. Cambridge University Press, 1898--second edition.
IV. Commentaries on the Laws of England: by Sir William Blackstone. With
notes selected from the editions of Archbold, Christian, Coleridge,
etc., and additional notes by George Sharswood, of the University of
Pennsylvania. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1860--Childs and Peterson, 602 Arch
Street.
V. A History of Matrimonial Institutions, chiefly in England and the
United States: by George Elliott Howard. 4 vols. The University of
Chicago Press, 1904.
VI. Social England: edited by H.D. Traill. 6 vols. G.P. Putnam's Sons,
1901.
VII. Social Life in the Reign of Queen Anne, taken from original
sources: by John Ashton. London, Chatto and Windus, 1897.
VIII. The Renaissance of Girls' Education in England: by Alice Zimmern.
London, A.D. Innes and Co., 1898.
IX. Progress in Women's Education in the British Empire: edited by the
Countess of Warwick. Being the Report of the Education Section,
Victorian Era Exhibition, 1897. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1898.
X. Current Literature from the Earliest Times to the Present Day,
references to which are noted as they occur.
NOTES:
[393] If a woman sentenced to execution declared she was pregnant, a
jury of twelve matrons could be appointed on a writ _de venire
inspiciendo_ to determine the truth of the matter; for she could not be
executed if the infant was alive in the womb. The same jury determined
the case of a widow who feigned herself with child in order to exclude
the next heir and when she was suspected of trying to palm off a
supposititious birth. But from all other jury duties women have always
been excluded "on account of the weakness of the sex"--_propter defectum
sexus_.
[394] Blackstone, i, ch. 16.
[395] Reg. Brev. Orig., f. 89: quod ipse praefatam A bene et honeste
tractabit et gubernabit, ac damnum vel malum aliquod eidem A de corpore
suo, aliter quam ad virum suum ex causa regiminis et castigationis
uxoris suae licite et rationabiliter pertinet, non faciet nec fieri
procurabit.
[396] "Except in so far as he may lawfully and reasonably do so in order
to correct and chastise his wife."
[397] The learned commentator Christian adds a few more cases where
formerly the criminal law was harshly prejudiced against women. Thus:
"By the Common Law, all women were denied the benefit of clergy; and
till the 3 and 4 _W. and M_., c. 9 [William and Mary] they received
sentence of death and might have been executed for the first offence in
simple larceny, bigamy, manslaughter, etc., however learned they were,
merely because their sex precluded the possibility of their taking holy
orders; though a man who could read was for the same crime subject only
to burning in the hand and a few months' imprisonment."
[398] I Q.B. p. 671--in the Court of Appeal.
[399] _Married Women's Property Act_, 45 and 46 V., c. 75--Aug. 18,
1882.
[400] Note this incident, from the _Westminister Review_, October, 1856:
"A lady whose husband had been unsuccessful in business established
herself as a milliner in Manchester. After some years of toil she
realised sufficient for the family to live upon comfortably, the husband
having done nothing meanwhile. They lived for a time in easy
circumstances after she gave up business and then the husband died,
_bequeathing all his wife's earnings to his own illegitimate children_.
At the age of 62 she was compelled, in order to gain her bread, to
return to business."
[401] For a full account of the elaborate machinery see Chitty's note to
Blackstone, vol. i, p. 441, of Sharswood's edition.
[402] _Holy Living, ch. 3, section I: Rules for Married Persons._
[403] Boswell, vii, 288. Perhaps if the venerable Samuel had had the
statistics of venereal disease given by adulterous husbands to wives and
children he might not have been so sure of his contention.
[404] Quoted by Professor Thomas in the _American Magazine_, July, 1909.
[405] See 20 and 21 V., c. 85--Aug. 28. 1857.
[406] See 7 Edw., c. 12--Aug. 9, 1907--Matrimonial Causes Act, which
also gives the court discretion in alimony.
[407] Blackstone, iv, ch. 15.
[408] 4 _and_ 5 _V., c._ 56, _s._ 3.
[409] The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 _and_ 49 _V. c._ 69,
section 5: "Any person who (1) unlawfully and carnally knows or attempts
to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl being of or above the age
of thirteen years and under the age of sixteen, or (2) unlawfully and
carnally knows or attempts to have carnal knowledge of any female idiot
or imbecile woman or girl under circumstances which do not amount to
rape, but which prove that the offender knew at the time of the
commission of the offence that the woman or girl was an idiot or
imbecile, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof
shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any
term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour." Section 4:
"Any one who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of
thirteen shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be
liable to be kept in penal servitude for life." Any one who merely
attempts it can be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with
or without hard labour.