CHAPTER VI

THE TRANSVAAL OF TO-DAY

We have dealt with the exodus of the trekkers, and with the land

that subsequently became the Transvaal. It behoves us now to discuss

the difference between that primitive pastoral region of the early

century and the busy country that may, for distinction sake, be

styled the Transvaal of to-day.

Modern geographers apply the name of the Transvaal to the tract of

country between the Limpopo River on the north, and the Vaal River

on the south. It is bounded on the east by the Lobombo, and the

Drakenberg Mountains, which run parallel to the Natal coast, and on

the west by British Bechuanaland. On the east lie Portuguese

Territory and British Zululand, on the north Rhodesia, on the west

British Bechuanaland, and on the south the Orange Free State and

Natal. The important rivers are the Limpopo or Crocodile River, so

named in compliment to its reptile inhabitants, and the Vaal, a

tributary of the Orange River. This rises among the Drakenberg

Mountains, and, curving, flows west as a boundary between the Orange

Free State and the Transvaal. The Limpopo rises between Johannesburg

and Pretoria, and sprays out north-east, north-west, east, and

south-east, reaching the sea in the neighbourhood of Delagoa Bay.

After leaving the Transvaal, owing to the presence of a cataract, it

is however unsuitable for purposes of navigation. The district of

the Transvaal varies in height from 2000 to 8000 feet above the

level of the sea. The Hooge Veld, the uplands of the Drakenberg

Mountains, rises from 4000 to 8000 feet above the sea, and between

them and the outer slopes of the Lobombo range is a vast tract of

some 20,000 square miles of arable land, called the Banken Veld. It

furnishes a splendid grazing ground, and corn grows in profusion.

The Bosch Veld or Bush Country comprises the centre of the country,

and runs west into Bechuanaland. This district is largely infested

with the tsetse fly, an insect whose sting means death to almost all

domestic animals. Besides this, it is the home of malaria and other

fevers. The Hooge Veld, which has a drier, colder, and more healthy

climate, is largely used for breeding cattle, and as a grazing

ground for sheep and oxen. It is here that, in later days, the

gold-mining activity proceeds, as almost everywhere there are

believed to be rich auriferous deposits. Its mineral deposits have

been the attraction of the Transvaal, for the coal-fields invited

the attention of some of the first speculators. In fact, the first

railway line of the district ran between Johannesburg and a

colliery.

Besides coal may be found silver, copper, and lead. But the great

attraction, GOLD, has for the last ten years lured all the money

from the pockets of the enterprising. Other metals, such as

cinnabar, iron, and tin are, for the nonce, like Gray's violet,

"born to blush unseen," until some ingenious person discovers in

them a subtle attraction.

To show the financial changes which have come over the country

within the last ten years, Mr. Campbell, late Vice-President of the

Chamber of Mines, Johannesburg, has written a valuable article. In

it he gives us the following agrarian position in the Transvaal of

the present by areas and by values:--

AREAS.

Per cent.

Boers' own land 65

British 35

---

100

But land is valuable not by area merely, but by intrinsic value, and

the Boers have sold much of their best land, and taken British gold

for it, and when we come to the figures in the Government Dues

Office at Pretoria, we have--

VALUE.

Per cent.

Boers' 33

British 67

---

100

The net deductions in the Dues Offices are, that the whole of the

farms and private lands in the Transvaal, under the mere Boer

occupancy, are valued by the outside world at L933,200, whereas

to-day, by the addition of the British buyer and holder, they are

now valued by the world at ten millions sterling! In figures given

above, all land occupied for mining or town sites is excluded.

The current yield of gold is computed at the rate of seventeen and a

half millions sterling per annum. This is the vitalising source of

African trade and African progress. It pays the interest on nearly

all South African Railways, is responsible for a large portion of

the costs of Government in the Cape Colony, Orange States, Natal as

well as Pretoria. And yet the working bees--the white British

community of Johannesburg--who have helped to enrich the hive

containing the whole of South African interests, have been

neglected, if not betrayed, by the Mother Country. They have been

deprived of arms, of liberties,--they have suffered insult and

disdain, and Great Britain, until forced to do so, has moved not a

finger in their defence. The Transvaal, one of the richest districts

of the world, merely wants good and sustained government--a

government that will grant to all respectable white men free and

equal rights. When this shall come to pass, its splendid resources

will be developed. The Indian Ocean trade will be supplied with

steam coal. The country will sustain itself, and will also export

food stuffs, and trade in iron, hide, wool, tin, and quantities of

other things, whose value has hitherto been ignored. All that is

needed is a dignified acceptance of British responsibilities. South

Africa was bought by the paramount Power nearly an hundred years

ago, and has since then been administered--if not entirely wisely

and well--at least administered, by that Power. British sweat has

rained on the country, British muscle has toiled in the country,

British blood has flowed in streams over its face, and British bones

are mixed with the shifting grains of its sand. It now remains for

British sovereignty to wield its sceptre and make its presence felt.

[Illustration: PRETORIA FROM THE EAST.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

ACCUMULATED AGGRAVATIONS

Since it is impossible to enter into all the intricacies of foreign

political relations with the Transvaal, we will return to the

Uitlanders. They became more and more unwelcome as their numbers

increased. Many Acts were passed, each serving to render more

impossible their chances of obtaining the franchise. The fact was

that Mr. Kruger, having brought his State to a condition of

bankruptcy almost identical with that which existed when Sir T.

Shepstone annexed the Transvaal, was struggling to carry on a

divided scheme, that of grabbing with both hands from the Uitlander

financialists, while endeavouring to maintain with close-fisted

obstinacy the exclusiveness, irresponsibility, and bigotry of the

primitive trekker. He knew that if he granted full political rights

to the outsiders he would no longer be master of his own misguided

house. He said as much, and pointed out that were he to do so there

would be no alternative but to haul down his flag. This being the

case, there was no resource but to transform the so-called free

Republic into an absolute oligarchy. Much has been said of the

"Russian despot," but this century can present no more complete

spectacle of despotism than that of Mr. Kruger. The Emperor of

Russia, autocrat as he is, is guided by the traditions of his empire

and the machinations of his ministers, but Mr. Kruger has allowed

himself to be reasoned with and influenced by none, and his word has

been in reality the only form of law or justice on which the

Uitlanders have had to rely. Such system of government as there was

was corrupt. Smuggling flourished under the very eye of the

officials, and the Field Cornets, whose business it was to act as

petty justices, collect taxes, and register arrivals of new-comers,

kept their books in a manner more in accord with their personal

convenience than with accuracy. Hence, when it came to the question

of the naturalisation of the Uitlanders, the books which should have

recorded their registration were either withheld or missing.

Settlers in the Transvaal between the years 1882 and 1890, owing to

this irregularity, were debarred from proving their registration as

the law required. Speaking of this period, Mr. Fitzpatrick, in "The

Transvaal from Within," says:--

"In the country districts justice was not a commodity intended for

the Britisher. Many cases of gross abuse, and several of actual

murder occurred, and in 1885 the case of Mr. Jas. Donaldson, then

residing on a farm in Lydenburg--lately one of the Reform

prisoners--was mentioned in the House of Commons, and became the

subject of a demand by the Imperial Government for reparation and

punishment. He had been ordered by two Boers (one of whom was in the

habit of boasting that he had shot an unarmed Englishman in

Lydenburg since the war, and would shoot others) to abstain from

collecting hut taxes on his own farm; and on refusing had been

attacked by them. After beating them off single-handed, he was later

on again attacked by his former assailants, reinforced by three

others. They bound him with reims (thongs), kicked and beat him with

sjamboks (raw-hide whips) and clubs, stoned him, and left him

unconscious and so disfigured that he was thought to be dead when

found some hours later. On receipt of the Imperial Government's

representations, the men were arrested, tried, and fined. The fines

were stated to have been remitted at once by Government, but in the

civil action which followed Mr. Donaldson received L500 damages. The

incident had a distinctly beneficial effect, and nothing more was

heard of the maltreatment of defenceless men simply because they

were Britishers."

Nevertheless the hostility between the two races was growing apace,

and every ambition of the Uitlanders was promptly nipped in the

bud.

Reforms were at first mildly suggested. Bridges and roads were

required, also a remission of certain taxes, but suggestions, even

agitations, were in vain. In regard to the franchise question--the

crying question of the decade--Mr. Kruger turned an ear more and

more deaf. There are none so deaf as those whose ears are stopped up

with the cotton-wool of their own bigotry. This bigotry it is almost

impossible for enlightened persons to understand. As an instance of

the almost fanatical ignorance and prejudice with which the

Uitlanders had to contend, we may quote the letter of Mr. Kruger

when requested to allow his name to be used as a patron of a ball to

be given in honour of her Majesty's birthday. He replied:--

"SIR,--In reply to your favour of the 12th inst., requesting me to

ask his Honour the State President to consent to his name being

used as a patron of a ball to be given at Johannesburg on the 26th

inst., I have been instructed to inform you that his Honour

considers a ball as Baal's service, for which reason the Lord

ordered Moses to kill all offenders; and as it is therefore

contrary to his Honour's principles, his Honour cannot consent to

the misuse of his name in such connection.--I have, &c.,

"F. ELOFF,

_Private Secretary_."

On another occasion, when the question of locust extermination came

before the first Raad, the worthies to whom the conduct of the State

was confided showed a condition of benighted simplicity that can

scarcely be credited.

"_July 21._--Mr. Roos said locusts were a plague, as in the days of

King Pharaoh, sent by God, and the country would assuredly be loaded

with shame and obloquy if it tried to raise its hand against the

mighty hand of the Almighty.

"Messrs. Declerq and Steenkamp spoke in the same strain, quoting

largely from the Scriptures.

"The Chairman related a true story of a man whose farm was always

spared by the locusts, until one day he caused some to be killed.

His farm was then devastated.

"Mr. Stoop conjured the members not to constitute themselves

terrestrial gods, and oppose the Almighty.

"Mr. Lucas Meyer raised a storm by ridiculing the arguments of the

former speakers, and comparing the locusts to beasts of prey, which

they destroyed.

"Mr. Labuschagne was violent. He said the locusts were different

from beasts of prey. They were a special plague sent by God for

their sinfulness."

[Illustration: SERGEANT and BUGLER, 1st ARGYLE AND SUTHERLAND

HIGHLANDERS.

Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]

Their deliberate unenlightenment, had it not been so tragic for

those who suffered in consequence of it, must have been almost

comical. On one occasion the question of firing at the clouds to

bring down rain was discussed, and declared to be impious.

"_August 5._--A memorial was read from Krugersdorp, praying that the

Raad would pass a law to prohibit the sending up of bombs into the

clouds to bring down rain, as it was a defiance of God, and would

most likely bring down a visitation from the Almighty.

"The Memorial Committee reported that they disapproved of such a

thing, but at the same time they did not consider that they could

make a law on the subject.

"Mr. A. D. Wolmarans said he was astonished at the advice, and he

expected better from the Commission. If one of their children fired

towards the clouds with a revolver they would thrash him. Why should

they permit people to mock at the Almighty in this manner? It was

terrible to contemplate. He hoped that the Raad would take steps to

prevent such things happening.

"The Chairman (who is also a member of the Memorial Commission) said

the Commission thought that such things were only done for a wager.

"Mr. Erasmus said they were not done for a wager, but in real

earnest. People at Johannesburg actually thought that they could

bring down the rain from the clouds by firing cannons at them."

These quotations are not offered in the spirit of ridicule. The

Uitlander question is too serious for joking. They are reproduced to

enable those who have no knowledge of the Boer--his petty tyrannies

and annoying and irritating habits, and the vexatious regulations

from which the Uitlander continually suffered--to form an idea of

the terrible mental gulf which existed between oppressor and

oppressed. As the constant dropping of water will wear away stone,

so the constant fret of Boer treatment wore out the patience of

their victims!

It soon became very difficult for even sons of Uitlanders born in

the country to obtain the franchise. The naturalised subject

resigned his own nationality, and acquired the duties of the citizen

and the liability to be called on for military service, only to find

out that he could not even then enjoy the rights of the citizen. He

felt much as the dog in the fable, which let drop his piece of meat

for the sake of a reflection in the water. New laws and regulations

continually came into force for the ostensible purpose of improving

the state of the Uitlander--laws which in reality were created to

bamboozle him still further. What chicanery failed to accomplish the

remissness of officials successfully brought about, and the

discomfort of the foreign inhabitants was complete. Beside domestic

there were economic grievances. The position in a nutshell is given

by one of the unfortunates:--

"The one thing which we must have--not for its own sake, but for the

security it offers for obtaining and retaining other reforms--_is_

the franchise. No promise of reform, no reform itself will be worth

an hour's purchase unless we have the status of voters to make our

influence felt. But, if you want the chief economic grievances, they

are--the Netherland Railway concession, the dynamite monopoly, the

liquor traffic, and native labour, which, together, constitute an

unwarrantable burden of indirect taxation on the industry of _over

two and a half millions sterling annually_. We petitioned until we

were jeered at; we agitated until we--well--came here (Pretoria

Gaol); and we know that we shall get no remedy until we have the

vote to enforce it. We are not a political but a working community,

and if we were honestly and capably governed, the majority of us

would be content to wait for the franchise for a considerable time

yet in recognition of the peculiar circumstances and of the feelings

of the older inhabitants."

Mrs. Lionel Phillips, as the wife of an Uitlander, has also written

her plaint. She says:--

"To show that the grievances of the Uitlanders are indeed real, let

me call your attention to a few facts. What would women residing in

peaceful England say to the fact that one cannot take a walk out of

sight of one's own house in the suburbs of Johannesburg with safety?

The Kaffirs, who in other parts of South Africa treat a white woman

with almost servile respect, there make it a most unpleasant ordeal

to pass them, and in a lonely part absolutely dangerous.

"Even little girls of the tenderest age are not safe from these

monsters. This is, of course, owing to the utterly inadequate police

protection afforded by the Government, the ridiculously lenient

sentences passed on horrible crimes, and to the adulterated drink

sold by licensed publicans to the Kaffirs on all sides. What would

be said if, when insulted by a cab-driver, it was found that the

nearest policeman was the owner of the cab in question, and refused

to render any assistance or listen to any complaint?

"The educational grievance has been so widely circulated that it is

needless to mention it now; but what is to be expected of a

Government composed of men barely able to write their own names?

"Of course I, as a woman, do not wish to enter into the larger

questions of franchise, monopolies, taxation, &c., but being myself

an Africander, and well able to recognise the many good qualities of

the Boers, you will quite understand that I do not take a

prejudiced view of the situation, and I am in a position better

than that of most people to understand the grave reality of the

Uitlanders' grievances."

MONOPOLIES AND ABUSES

Of the scandals leading out of the Netherlands Railway concession

and the dynamite monopoly it is needless to speak. These monopolies

were little more than schemes having for object the diversion of

money from the pockets of the British into those either of the Boers

or their trusty satellites in the Hollander-German clique. As an

instance of the _modus operandi_, an article relative to the railway

monopoly in the _Johannesburg Mining Journal_ may be quoted:

"RAILWAY MONOPOLY

"This is another carefully designed burden upon the mines and

country. The issued capital and loans of the Netherlands Company

now total about L7,000,000, upon which an average interest of about

5-1/3 per cent.--guaranteed by the State--is paid, equal to

L370,000 per annum. Naturally the bonds are at a high premium. The

company and its liabilities can be taken over by the State at a

year's notice, and the necessary funds for this purpose can be

raised at three per cent. An offer was recently made to the

Government to consolidate this and other liabilities, but the

National Bank, which is another concession, has the monopoly of all

State loan business, and this circumstance effectually disposed of

the proposal. At three per cent. a saving of L160,000 per annum

would be made in this monopoly in interest alone. The value

represented by the custom dues on the Portuguese border we are not

in a position to estimate, but roughly these collections and the

fifteen per cent. of the profits paid to the management and

shareholders must, with other leakages, represent at least another

L100,000 per annum which should be saved the country. As the

revenue of the corporation now exceeds L2,000,000 a year, of which

only half is expended in working costs, the estimate we have taken

does not err upon the side of extravagance. By its neglect of its

duties towards the commercial and mining community enormous losses

are involved. Thus in the coal traffic the rate, which is now to be

somewhat reduced, has been 3d. per ton per mile. According to the

returns of the Chamber of Mines, the coal production of the

Transvaal for 1895 was 1,045,121 tons. This is carried an average

distance of nearly thirty miles, but taking the distance at

twenty-four miles the charges are 6s. per ton. At 1-1/2d. per ton

per mile--three times as much as the Cape railways charge--a saving

upon the coal rates of 3s. per ton would follow, equal to L150,000

per annum. Again, by the 'bagging' system an additional cost of 2s.

3d. per ton is incurred--details of this item have been recently

published in this paper--and if this monopoly were run upon

ordinary business lines, a further saving of L110,000 would be made

by carrying coal in bulk. The interest upon the amount required to

construct the necessary sidings for handling the coal, and the

tram-lines required to transport it to the mines, would be a mere

fraction upon the amount; and as the coal trade in the course of a

short time is likely to see a fifty per cent. increase, the

estimate may be allowed to stand at this figure without deduction.

No data are available to fix the amount of the tax laid upon the

people generally by the vexatious delays and losses following upon

inefficient railway administration, but the monthly meetings of the

local Chamber of Commerce throw some light upon these phases of a

monopolistic management. The savings to be made in dealing with the

coal traffic must not be taken as exhausting all possible reforms:

the particulars given as to this traffic only indicate and suggest

the wide area covered by this monopoly, which hitherto has made but

halting and feeble efforts to keep pace with the requirements of

the public. Dealing as it does with the imports of the whole

country, which now amount in value to L10,000,000, the figures we

have given must serve merely to illustrate its invertebrate methods

of handling traffic, as well as its grasping greed in enforcing the

rates fixed by the terms of its concession. Its forty miles of Rand

steam tram-line and thirty-five miles of railway from the Vaal

River, with some little assistance from the Delagoa line and

customs, brought in a revenue of about L1,250,000 in 1895. Now that

the Natal line is opened the receipts will probably amount to

nearly L3,000,000 per annum, all of which should swell the ordinary

revenue of the country instead of remaining in the hands of

foreigners as a reservoir of wealth for indigent Hollanders to

exploit. The total railway earnings at the Cape and Natal together

over all their lines amounted to L3,916,566 in 1895, and the

capital expenditure on railways by these colonies amounts to

L26,000,000. The greater portion of these receipts come from the

Rand trade, which is compelled to pay an additional L2,500,000

carrying charges to the Netherlands Company, which has L7,000,000

of capital. Thus, railway receipts in South Africa amount now to

L7,000,000 per annum, of which the Rand contributes at least

L5,000,000.

"The revenue of the company is now considerably over L3,000,000 per

annum. The management claim that their expenses amount to but forty

per cent. of revenue, and this is regarded by them as a matter for

general congratulation. The Uitlanders contend that the concern is

grossly mismanaged, and that the low cost of working is a fiction.

It only appears low by contrast with a revenue swollen by

preposterously heavy rates and protected by a monopoly. The tariff

could be reduced by one-half, that is to say, a remission of

taxation to the tune of one and a half million annually could be

effected without depriving the company of a legitimate and indeed

very handsome profit."

[Illustration: Rt. Hon. CECIL JOHN RHODES, P.C.

Photo by Elliott & Fry, London.]

Perhaps the dynamite monopoly was even more aggravating than the

railway one. Mr. Fitzpatrick says it has always been "a very burning

question with the Uitlanders. This concession was granted soon after

the Barberton Fields were discovered, when the prospects of an

industry in the manufacture of explosives were not really very

great. The concessionaire himself has admitted that, had he foreseen

to what proportions this monopoly would eventually grow, he would

not have had the audacity to apply for it. Of course, this is merely

a personal question. The fact which concerned the industry was that

the right was granted to one man to manufacture explosives, and to

sell them at a price nearly 200 per cent. over that at which they

could be imported. It was found, upon investigation after some years

of agitation, that the factory at which this 'manufacture' took

place was in reality merely a depot in which the already

manufactured article was manipulated to a moderate extent, so as to

lend colour to the President's statement that a local industry was

being fostered. An investigation, held by order of the Volksraad,

exposed the imposition. The President himself stated that he found

he had been deceived, and that the terms of the concession had been

broken, and he urged the Raad to cancel it, which the Raad did. The

triumph was considerable for the mining industry, and it was the

more appreciated in that it was the solitary success to which the

Uitlanders could point in their long series of agitations for

reform. But the triumph was not destined to be a lasting one. Within

a few months the monopoly was revived in an infinitely more

obnoxious form. It was now called a Government monopoly, but 'the

agency' was bestowed upon a partner of the gentleman who had

formerly owned the concession, the President himself vigorously

defending this course, and ignoring his own judgment on the case

uttered a few months previously. _Land en Volk_, the Pretoria Dutch

newspaper, exposed the whole of this transaction, including the

system of bribery by which the concessionaires secured their

renewal, and among other things made the charge which it has

continued to repeat ever since, that Mr. J. M. A. Wolmarans, member

of the Executive, received a commission of one shilling per case on

every case sold during the continuance of the agency as a

consideration for his support in the Executive Council, and that he

continues to enjoy this remuneration, which is estimated now to be

not far short of L10,000 a year. Mr. Wolmarans, for reasons of pride

or discretion, has declined to take any notice of the charge,

although frequently pressed to take action in the matter. It is

calculated that the burden imposed upon the Witwatersrandt mines

alone amounts to L600,000 per annum, and is, of course, daily

increasing."

Between the years 1890 and 1895 there were many negotiations over

Swaziland. The South African Republic, ever anxious to extend its

borders, longed to advance eastward to the sea. Negotiations were

started in regard to this arrangement. The Transvaal had recognised

the British occupation of Rhodesia, and the British in return agreed

to allow the Transvaal to make a railway through Amatongaland to

Kosi Bay, and acquire a seaport, if, within three years, it joined

the South African Customs Union.

But Mr. Kruger, luckily for Imperial interests, would not entertain

the idea. He did not want to come into confederation with the Cape.

The Orange Free State, however, joined the Cape system, and the

South African Customs Union was started. The advantages to the Free

State of this arrangement, though unforeseen, were many; the

principal being the privilege of importing, unmolested, arms and

ammunition over the Cape Government railway lines. Finally, in 1895,

the administration of Swaziland was transferred to the South African

Republic on certain conditions. It was not to be incorporated with

the Republic, European settlers were to have full burgher rights,

monopolies were forbidden, English and Dutch languages were to be on

an equal footing, and no duties higher than the maximum tariff rates

imposed by the South African Republic or by the Customs Union were

to be allowed. The territory of Amatongaland was annexed by the

British in 1895, and the Transvaal thus lost its one chance of an

outlet towards the sea.

THE FRANCHISE

The much-vexed question of the Franchise continued to rankle in the

hearts of the Uitlanders. Its ramifications had grown so complicated

that even lawyers in discussing the matter continually found

themselves in error. We may therefore be excused from attempting to

examine its niceties, or rather its--well--the reverse. In 1893 a

petition, signed by upwards of 13,000 aliens in favour of granting

the extension of the Franchise, was received by the Raad with

derision. In 1895 a monster petition was got up by the National

Union, an organisation formed for the purpose of righting the wrongs

of the Uitlanders. During the great Franchise debate in August 1895,

Mr. R. K. Loveday, one of the Loyalists in the war, in the course of

an address dealing with the subject, expressed himself very

definitely and concisely, and in a manner which could not be

refuted. He said--

"The President uses the argument that they should naturalise, and

thus give evidence of their desire to become citizens. I have used

the same argument, but what becomes of such arguments when met with

the objections that the law requires such persons to undergo a

probationary period extending from fourteen to twenty-four years

before they are admitted to full rights of citizenship, and even

after one has undergone that probationary period he can only be

admitted to full rights by the resolution of the First Raad? Law IV.

of 1890, being the Act of the two Volksraads, lays down clearly and

distinctly that those who have been eligible for ten years for the

Second Raad can be admitted to full citizenship. So that, in any

case, the naturalised citizen cannot obtain full rights until he

reaches the age of forty years, he not being eligible for the

Second Raad until he is thirty years. The child born of

non-naturalised parents must therefore wait until he is forty years

of age, although at the age of sixteen he may be called upon to do

military service, and may fall in the defence of the land of his

birth. When such arguments are hurled at me by our own flesh and

blood--our kinsmen from all parts of South Africa--I must confess I

am not surprised that these persons indignantly refuse to accept

citizenship upon such unreasonable terms. The element I have just

referred to--namely, the Africander element--is very considerable,

and numbers thousands, hundreds of whom, at the time this country

was struggling for its independence, accorded it moral and financial

support, and yet these very persons are subjected to a term of

probation extending from fourteen to twenty-four years. It is

useless for me to ask you whether such a policy is just and

reasonable or Republican, for there can be but one answer, and that

is 'No!' Is there one man in this Raad who would accept the

Franchise on the same terms? Let me impress upon you the grave

nature of this question, and the absolute necessity of going to the

burghers without a moment's delay and consulting and advising them.

Let us keep nothing from them regarding the true position, and I am

sure we shall have their hearty co-operation in any reasonable

scheme we may suggest. This is a duty we owe them, for we must not

leave them under the impression that the Uitlanders are satisfied to

remain aliens, as stated by some of the journals. I move amongst

these people, and learn to know their true feelings, and when public

journals tell you that these people are satisfied with their lot

they tell you that which they know to be false. Such journals are

amongst the greatest sources of danger that the country has. We are

informed by certain members that a proposition for the extension of

the Franchise must come from the burghers, but, according to the

Franchise Law, the proposition must come from the Raad, and the

public must consent. The member for Rustenberg says that there are

9338 burghers who have declared that they are opposed to the

extension of the Franchise. Upon reference to the Report he will

find that there are only 1564 opposed to the extension. Members

appear afraid to touch upon the real question at issue, but try to

discredit the memorials by vague statements that some of the

signatures are not genuine, and the former member for Johannesburg,

Mr. J. Meyer, seems just as anxious to discredit the people of

Johannesburg as formerly he was to defend them."

In spite of all that was said and done, however, no progress was

made. The debate was closed on the third day, the request of the

memorialists was refused, and they were referred for satisfaction to

the existing laws.

About this time the Transvaal came very near to war with Great

Britain. As before stated, Mr. Kruger was much bound up with the

affairs of the Netherlands Railway Company and its Hollander-German

promoters. He attempted to divert the stream of Johannesburg traffic

to Delagoa Bay, for the purpose of keeping profit from the pockets

of the British. The freights, however, were evaded by unloading the

goods at the frontier, and taking them across the Vaal in waggons.

It was easy thus to forward goods--between Johannesburg and Viljoens

Drift--direct by the Cape Railway.

But Mr. Kruger was not to be defeated. In October 1895, he closed

the drifts or fords of the Vaal to all waggon loads of goods from

Cape Colony. Unfortunately the President had over-reached himself.

The people of Cape Colony and those of the Free State were

indignant, and the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules Robinson, and the

Cape Premier, Mr. Rhodes, both brought their influence to bear on

the President. He was obdurate. Mr. Chamberlain, the new Colonial

Secretary, came to the rescue. He put his foot down, and a

determined foot it was. He sent an ultimatum to Mr. Kruger

announcing that closure of the drifts after the 15th of November

would be considered an act of war.

The drifts were reopened. But the Netherlands Railway Company still

stuck to their tariffs and their aim of depriving the British

Colonies of the custom dues and railway rates on the traffic of

Johannesburg. Consequently this thorn in the side of the British

Colonists was left to fester.

[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICAN NATIVES--BOUND FOR THE GOLD-FIELDS.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

Day by day the discontent grew, and the cry of "No taxation without

representation" became the Uitlanders' motto. They perceived that

they were deprived of rights, yet expected to serve as milch cows

for the fattening of a State that was arming itself at all points

against them, and they came to the conclusion that some strong

measures must now be taken for their protection. The Chamber of

Mines and the Transvaal National Union had spent some time in

advocating purely constitutional methods, the Chamber of Mines

exploiting the grievances of the Gold Mining industry, while the

National Union struggled for general reforms which should make the

conditions of Uitlander life less intolerable than they were. The

Reformers, whose chairman was Mr. Charles Leonard, a solicitor of

good practice in Johannesburg, were mostly men of the middle and

professional classes. The capitalists, being anxious to keep in with

the Transvaal Government, were somewhat shy of the National

Unionists; while the working men on their side were suspicious of

the motives of the Reformers, and were chary of lending themselves

to any scheme which might conduce to the profit of the millionaires.

The National Union clearly expressed its aims in a manifesto which

ended with the exposition of the Charter which its members hoped to

obtain. It said:

"We want--

1. The establishment of this Republic as a true Republic.

2. A Grondwet, or Constitution, which shall be framed by competent

persons selected by representatives of the whole people, and framed

on lines laid down by them.

3. An equitable Franchise Law and fair representation.

4. Equality of the Dutch and English languages.

5. Responsibility to the Legislature of the heads of the great

departments.

6. Removal of religious disabilities.

7. Independence of the Courts of Justice with adequate and secured

remuneration of the Judges.

8. Liberal and comprehensive Education.

9. Efficient Civil Service, with adequate provision for pay and

pension.

10. Free Trade in South African products."

The Manifesto wound up with the pertinent question, "How shall we

get it?"

The "how" was to have been decided at a public meeting fixed for the

27th of December 1895, and subsequently postponed till January 8th,

1896. But what the National Union proposed the Jameson Raid

disposed. The meeting was destined never to take place!

THE REFORM MOVEMENT

Before 1895 the wealthier members of the community refused to

entertain the suggestion of coercive measures, but after the

Volksraad in session revealed the real policy of the Government,

even they began to perceive that revolutionary action might become

obligatory. Though the capitalists were advised by those who knew to

avoid spending money on hopeless efforts at reform, and to steer

clear, if possible, of the political imbroglio, they eventually

joined hands with the Reformers. How the egg of the Jameson

conspiracy came to be laid no one exactly knew. Certain it was that

those who looked for the hatching of a swan, were confronted with a

very ugly duckling indeed! Arms and ammunition were purchased, and

these, concealed as gold-mining impedimenta, were smuggled into the

country. Messrs. Leonard and Phillips, two prominent Reformers,

consulted Mr. Rhodes as to future affairs, but Mr. Rhodes was in the

awkward position of acting at one and the same time as Managing

Director of the Consolidated Gold Fields in the Transvaal, Prime

Minister of the Colony, and Managing Director of the Chartered

Company, and consequently was a little vague in his propositions.

After some conversation, he decided that he would, at his own

expense, keep Dr. Jameson and his troops on the frontier "as a moral

support."

Later on in September Dr. Jameson visited Johannesburg, and made his

arrangements in person. It was agreed that he should maintain a

force of 1500 mounted men, fully equipped, and that besides, having

with him 1500 spare rifles, and some spare ammunition, there should

be about 5000 rifles, three Maxims, and 1,000,000 rounds of

ammunition smuggled into Johannesburg. The idea was, that the

Uitlanders would prepare their revolt, and that should Dr. Jameson's

services be needed, Johannesburg, with 9000 armed men and a fair

equipment of machine guns and cannon, would be prepared to

co-operate: at that time it seemed no difficult matter to seize the

fort and magazines at Pretoria for the time being. It was in course

of repair, and in charge merely of a hundred men, most of whom could

be relied on to be asleep or off duty after nine o'clock at night.

The plan of seizing the fort, capturing the ammunition, and clearing

it off so as to enforce their views without bloodshed seemed

perfectly feasible, and Dr. Jameson readily agreed to lend himself

to the scheme for giving such "moral support" as was required by the

Uitlander Reformers. Of their part in the affair it is difficult to

speak impartially. It appears on the surface that they induced this

man, for no personal motive either of financial gain or political

power, to lend himself willingly to be the tool of the aggrieved

Uitlanders, who, when the time came, were too vacillating between

their fear of the Republic and the desire for their own individual

good, to support the person whom they had chosen for their champion,

and who so disinterestedly was prepared to risk both life and

position in their service! It was decided, however, that the

Reformers should arrange a revolution, which would have the effect

of forcing the hands of the Transvaal Government. The High

Commissioner, as they imagined, would come on the scene as a final

arbitrator. Dr. Jameson's troops, who had acted so effectively in

the Matabele campaign, were to be kept at Pitsani on the Bechuana

border, in order if necessary to come at a given signal to the

rescue of the Uitlanders. The idea was not without precedent. Sir

Henry Loch, two years before, in dread of a Johannesburg rising, had

considered the advisability of placing troops on the border.

So as to justify his action to the directors of the Chartered

Company and the Imperial authorities, the following undated letter

was sent to Dr. Jameson, Mafeking:--

"DEAR SIR,--The position of matters in this State has become so

critical, that we are assured that at no distant period there will be a

conflict between the Government and the Uitlander population. It is

scarcely necessary for us to recapitulate what is now matter of history;

suffice it to say, that the position of thousands of Englishmen, and

others, is rapidly becoming intolerable. Not satisfied with making the

Uitlander population pay virtually the whole of the revenue of the

country while denying them representation, the policy of the Government

has been steadily to encroach upon the liberty of the subject, and to

undermine the security for property to such an extent as to cause a very

deep-seated sense of discontent and danger. A foreign corporation of

Hollanders is to a considerable extent controlling our destinies, and in

conjunction with the Boer leaders endeavouring to cast them in a mould

which is wholly foreign to the genius of the people. Every public act

betrays the most positive hostility, not only to everything English, but

to the neighbouring States.

"Well, in short, the internal policy of the Government is such as to

have roused into antagonism to it not only practically the whole

body of Uitlanders, but a large number of the Boers; while its

external policy has exasperated the neighbouring States, causing the

possibility of great danger to the peace and independence of this

Republic. Public feeling is in a condition of smouldering

discontent. All the petitions of the people have been refused with a

greater or less degree of contempt; and in the debate on the

Franchise petition, signed by nearly 40,000 people, one member

challenged the Uitlanders to fight for the rights they asked for,

and not a single member spoke against him. Not to go into details,

we may say that the Government has called into existence all the

elements necessary for armed conflict. The one desire of the people

here is for fair play, the maintenance of their independence, and

the preservation of those public liberties without which life is not

worth living. The Government denies these things, and violates the

national sense of Englishmen at every turn.

"What we have to consider is, what will be the condition of things

here in the event of a conflict? Thousands of unarmed men, women,

and children of our race will be at the mercy of well-armed Boers,

while property of enormous value will be in the greatest peril. We

cannot contemplate the future without the gravest apprehensions. All

feel that we are justified in taking any steps to prevent the

shedding of blood, and to ensure the protection of our rights.

"It is under these circumstances that we feel constrained to call

upon you to come to our aid should a disturbance arise here. The

circumstances are so extreme that we cannot but believe that you and

the men under you will not fail to come to the rescue of people who

will be so situated. We guarantee any expense that may reasonably be

incurred by you in helping us, and ask you to believe that nothing

but the sternest necessity has prompted this appeal.

"CHARLES LEONARD.

LIONEL PHILLIPS.

FRANCIS RHODES.

JOHN HAYS HAMMOND.

GEORGE FARRAR."

It was arranged that Dr. Jameson should start from camp on the night

of the outbreak at Johannesburg--either on the 28th of December or

on the 4th of January--according to notice which would subsequently

be given. From this moment, however, doubts began to fill the minds

of the Reformers. They were dissatisfied with the quantity of arms

they had been able to smuggle into the town; there was a want of

cohesion among the different sections, of those interested; they

went so far as to disagree as to what flag they were going to revolt

under. The Reformers were evidently not all of Dr. Jameson's

opinion, that the Union Jack was the one and only flag under which

they could hope for justice--they were, as we know, only comrades in

suffering but not compatriots, and besides this, many declared that

reform and not annexation was what they were anxious to secure.

[Illustration: Dr Leander Starr Jameson.

Photo by Elliott & Fry, London.]

Here we have before us what made the complicated riddle of the Raid.

Since it has defied all the Oedipuses of the century, we will not

endeavour to unravel it. Did the Reformers set all their grievances

aside before the paramount question, "Under which flag, Jameson?" or

did they make use of the flag argument to cover a series of

vacillations which prevented them from acting up to the rules of the

conspiracy they themselves had set on foot? Did Mr. Rhodes engage in

the plot for the sake of financial gain? Did he do so out of

sympathy for the "cause," or did he attempt a magnificent political

_coup_? And lastly--Did that unhappy scapegoat, the gallant Jameson,

launch himself on the wild mistaken escapade to rescue his

fellow-countrymen from oppression, to serve his private ends

financial or political, or from the sheer spirit of adventure which,

in some degree, animates every British heart? Who shall say?

THE CRITICAL MOMENT

It was arranged, as has been mentioned, that the rising at

Johannesburg should take place on the night of the 4th of January.

The arsenal at Pretoria was to be seized, and Dr. Jameson with his

troops was to make his appearance, assist the Reformers in urging

their claims, and, if necessary, save the women and children from

possible violence.

"According to the original plan," says Mrs. Lionel Phillips in her

"South African Recollections," "what with the smuggled rifles, those

in private hands, the spare weapons to be brought by Jameson's men,

and those men (the Reformers) themselves, Johannesburg must have

mustered a little army of not less than 5000 men, to say nothing of

the guns which might possibly be captured in the arsenal. It was

believed that with this force the town could be held against any

attack that might be made by the Transvaal forces, and that, upon a

failure in the first assault, the Boers would have adopted their

well-known tactics of cutting off supplies, with a view to starving

the town into submission. To meet this contingency the town was

provisioned for two months, and it was supposed that the British

Government would never sit still and allow the Uitlanders to be

forced into capitulation in the face of the wrongs which they had

suffered. In November, when Jameson came to Johannesburg, the

supporting force had dwindled to 800. The telegrams apprising the

Reformers of his advance spoke of 700, and in reality he started

with less than 500 men."

But by the time the plot should have neared completion, the

conspirators, as has been shown, had ceased to be of one accord on

the subject. On Christmas Day Mr. Leonard interviewed Mr. Rhodes in

Cape Town, and represented to him the divided state of affairs.

Meanwhile the Reformers in Johannesburg desired to make known to Dr.

Jameson their change of front, and, to prevent him starting on the

expedition, despatched two messengers to Pitsani Camp by different

routes. These messages were received on December the 28th, and with

them other telegraphic ones from Mr. Leonard and Mr. Rhodes

explicitly directing the expedition not to start.

The news that Dr. Jameson had started, in spite of these messages,

came on the Reformers like a thunderclap. They were not ready--they

had not sufficient arms to fight with, and they were not of one

mind. The doing had been easy enough, and they had fancied the

undoing would be as simple. They had laid their gunpowder train

without thinking of the number of firebrands that surrounded it!

Amazement gave way to indignation, and the Reformers were not slow

to hint that Mr. Rhodes or Dr. Jameson had disregarded the messages

in order to further their personal ends. The most charitable decided

that the Doctor's starting was due merely to misunderstanding. Many

rumours of discontent and disturbance were floating about, and it

was believed that some of these might have reached the Doctor's ears

and influenced his actions. Anyway the Reformers were at sea. All

they could do was to arm as many men as possible with a view to

defence--to holding the town against any attack that might be made

by the Transvaal forces, and to decide to take no initiative against

the Boers. No uneasiness was felt regarding Jameson, for it was

believed that he was well supported by not less than 800 men, and

that the Boers would stand a poor chance against a body so well

equipped and trained as his was supposed to be. The position taken

up is explained in a notice of the Reform Committee in the

_Johannesburg Star_:--"Notice is hereby given, that this Committee

adheres to the National Union Manifesto, and reiterates its desire

to maintain the independence of the Republic. The fact that rumours

are in course of circulation to the effect that a force has crossed

the Bechuanaland border, renders it necessary to take active steps

for the defence of Johannesburg and the preservation of order. The

Committee earnestly desires that the inhabitants should refrain from

taking any action which can be considered as an overt act of

hostility against the Government."

The High Commissioner and the Premier of Cape Colony were

communicated with and informed that Dr. Jameson, having started with

an armed force, Johannesburg was in peril which there was no means

to avert. The High Commissioner was further invited to come to

Johannesburg to effect a settlement and prevent civil war.

Arrangements were then made for the arming of some 2000 men. These

preparations and others speedily became known to the Government in

Pretoria. No steps, it appears, had been taken to preserve secrecy,

as the Committee did not hold themselves responsible for Dr.

Jameson's action. The result was the publication of the following

Proclamation by the President:--

"PROCLAMATION BY HIS HONOUR THE STATE PRESIDENT

OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC

"Whereas, it has appeared to the Government of the South African

Republic that there are rumours in circulation to the effect that

earnest endeavours are being made to endanger the public safety of

Johannesburg; and whereas the Government is convinced that, in case

such rumours may contain any truth, such endeavours can only emanate

from a small portion of the inhabitants, and that the greater

portion of the Johannesburg inhabitants are peaceful, and are

prepared to support the Government in its endeavours to maintain law

and order.

"Now, know you that I, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger, State President

of the South African Republic, with the advice and consent of the

Executive Council, according to Article 913 of its minutes, dated the

30th of December 1895, do hereby warn those evil-intentioned persons (as

I do hereby urge all such persons to do) to remain within the pale of

the law, and all such persons not heeding this warning shall do so on

their own responsibility; and I do further make known that life and

property shall be protected against which attempts may be made, and that

every peaceful inhabitant of Johannesburg, of whatsoever nationality he

may be, is called upon to support me herein, and to assist the officials

charged therewith; and further be it known, that the Government is still

prepared to take into consideration all grievances that may be laid

before it in a proper manner, and to submit the same to the people of

the land without delay for treatment."

The High Commissioner also issued a Proclamation calling on Dr.

Jameson to return to British territory at once, and this was

forwarded to him at different points in order that there might be no

mistake and that the invasion might yet be arrested. Meanwhile Mr.

Marais (the editor of the leading Dutch paper) and Mr. Malan (the

son-in-law of Joubert) were proceeding with a commando for the

purpose of fighting for their Government should Dr. Jameson disobey

the Proclamation. They excused themselves under the plea "that if

from unreasonable action of Johannesburg, fighting should take place

between the Government forces and a revolutionary force from

Johannesburg, they were in duty bound to fight, and that among their

ranks would be found many who had been active workers in the ranks

of the Reformers."

It was subsequently decided that a deputation of Reformers should

negotiate with the Government for a peaceful settlement on the

basis of the Manifesto. Their programme was somewhat broad. They

were to approach the Government pacifically and at the same time

insist on their rights and the redress of their grievances--"to avow

the association of Dr. Jameson's forces so far as it had existed,

and to include him in any settlement that might be made."

They also, in answer to a telegram from the British Agent, refused

to repudiate Dr. Jameson, and said, "in order to avert bloodshed on

grounds of Dr. Jameson's action, if Government will allow Dr.

Jameson to come in unmolested, the Committee will guarantee with

their persons if necessary that he will leave again peacefully with

as little delay as possible."

Meanwhile the committee remained in the most horrible doubt and

suspense. No word came from Jameson. That he had started they knew,

and that was the extent of their knowledge. They still trusted that,

on ascertaining that there was no necessity for intervention on

behalf of the Uitlanders, he and his troops would obey the orders of

the High Commissioner, and retire peacefully from the Transvaal.

THE RAID

From all accounts it appears that Dr. Jameson and his party gathered

together at Pitsani early in December. He drilled his troops and

general preparations were made, without sufficient secrecy however,

for the projected invasion. It was unfortunate for the scheme that

these plans were publicly spoken of in society in England at the

same time as they were merely being discussed in whispers in

Johannesburg! On Sunday the 29th of December 1895, Dr. Jameson read

aloud to his troops the letter which has been printed, and which,

simultaneously with his departure, was sent by Dr. Rutherfoord

Harris to the _Times_, to justify the action which in a few hours

would become world famous. This letter the Reformers subsequently

declared was treacherously made use of, as they had not had occasion

to send the appeal therein mentioned. It is evident that at that

time Dr. Jameson believed that his plans were so well arranged that

there would be no bloodshed, that, indeed, he would appear in the

nick of time to afford the "moral support" he had originally engaged

to provide. The troops were to go straight to Johannesburg before

the Boers had time to assemble their forces or to take any measures

to stop him. The Doctor explained that they were marching to the

rescue of the oppressed, and implied that they were going under the

auspices of the British flag. On hearing the latter statement a

considerable number of the troops refused to take part in the

enterprise, and this may account for the fact that while the

Reformers believed Dr. Jameson to be supported by some 800 men or

more, he was in reality accompanied by only 480. Here, in order to

give the crude facts of the Raid as known to the public, we may copy

the report of the affair made by Sir John Willoughby to the War

Office:--

"SIR JOHN WILLOUGHBY'S REPORT TO THE WAR OFFICE

"_Official Report of the Expedition that left the Protectorate at

the urgent request of the leading citizens of Johannesburg, with the

object of standing by them and maintaining law and order whilst they

were demanding justice from the Transvaal authorities. By Sir John

C. Willoughby, Bart., Lieutenant-Colonel commanding Dr. Jameson's

Forces._

"On Saturday, December 28, 1895, Dr. Jameson received a Reuter's

telegram, showing that the situation at Johannesburg had become

acute. At the same time reliable information was received that the

Boers in the Zeerust and Lichtenburg districts were assembling, and

had been summoned to march on Johannesburg.

"Preparations were at once made to act on the terms of the letter

dated December 20, and already published, and also in accordance

with verbal arrangements with the signatories of that letter--viz.,

that should Dr. Jameson hear that the Boers were collecting, and

that the intentions of the Johannesburg people had become generally

known, he was at once to come to the aid of the latter with whatever

force he had available, and without further reference to them, the

object being that such force should reach Johannesburg without any

conflict.

"At 3 P.M. on Sunday afternoon, December 29, everything was in

readiness at Pitsani Camp. The troops were paraded, and Dr. Jameson

read the letter of invitation from Johannesburg.

"He then explained to the force--(_a_) that no hostilities were

intended; (_b_) that we should only fight if forced to do so in self

defence; (_c_) that neither the persons nor property of inhabitants

of the Transvaal were to be molested; (_d_) that our sole object was

to help our fellow-men in their extremity, and to ensure their

obtaining attention to their just demands.

"Dr. Jameson's speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm by

the men, who cheered most heartily.

"The above programme was strictly adhered to until the column was

fired upon on the night of the 31st.

"Many Boers, singly and in small parties, were encountered on the

line of march; to one and all of these the pacific nature of the

expedition was carefully explained.

"The force left Pitsani Camp at 6.30 P.M., December 29, and marched

through the night. At 5.15 A.M., on the morning of the 30th, the

column reached the village of Malmani (thirty-nine miles distant

from Pitsani). Presently, at the same moment, the advanced guard of

the Mafeking Column (under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and

the junction was effected between the two bodies....

"From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross

in daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place,

distant seventy-one miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 P.M.,

December 30.

"I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers,

sent from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed

doing so by three hours only.

"At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from the

Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of

our advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sent

to this, explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as those

used to the force at Pitsani.

"At Doomport (ninety-one miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle'

early on Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook

us, and presented a letter from the High Commissioner, which

contained an order to Dr. Jameson and myself to return at once to

Mafeking and Pitsani.

"A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these

instructions an impossibility. In the first place, there was

absolutely no food for men or horses along the road which we had

recently followed; secondly, three days at least would be necessary

for our horses, jaded with forced marching, to return; on the road

ahead we were sure of finding, at all events, some food for man and

beast. Furthermore, we had by now traversed almost two-thirds of the

total distance; a large force of Boers was known to be intercepting

our retreat, and we were convinced that any retrograde movement

would bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.

"It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little

force, no alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our

friends, who, we were confident, would be awaiting our arrival

there.

"Apart from the above considerations, even had it been possible to

effect a retreat from Doomport, we knew that Johannesburg had

risen, and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully

deserting those coming to meet us.

"Finally, it appeared to us impossible to turn back, in view of the

fact that we had been urgently called in to avert a massacre, which

we had been assured would be imminent in the event of a crisis such

as had now occurred.

"Near Boon's store, on the evening of the 31st, an advanced patrol

fell in with Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp Volunteers. This

officer, in charge of a party of fifteen scouts, had come out to

gain intelligence of our movements. He was detained whilst our

intentions were fully explained to him, and then released at Dr.

Jameson's request.

"At midnight (New Year's Eve), while the advanced scouts were

crossing a rocky, wooded ridge at right angles to and barring the

line of advance, they were fired on by a party of forty Boers, who

had posted themselves in this position. The scouts, reinforced by

the advanced guard, under Inspector Straker, drove off their

assailants after a short skirmish, during which one trooper of the

M.M.P. was wounded.

"At Van Oudtshoorn's, early on the following morning (Jan. 1), Dr.

Jameson received a second letter from the High Commissioner, to

which he replied in writing. At 9.30 A.M. the march was resumed in

the usual day formation. After marching two miles the column got

clear of the hills, and emerged into open country.

"About this time Inspector Drury, in command of the rear guard, sent

word that a force of about one hundred Boers was following him about

one mile in rear. I thereupon reinforced the rear guard, hitherto

consisting of a troop and one Maxim, by an additional half troop and

another Maxim.

"About five miles beyond Van Oudtshoorn's store the column was met

by two cyclists bearing letters from several leaders of the

Johannesburg Reform Committee. These letters expressed the liveliest

approval and delight at our speedy approach, and finally contained a

renewal of their promise to meet the column with a force at

Krugersdorp. The messengers also reported that only 300 armed Boers

were in the town.

"This news was communicated to the troops, who received it with loud

cheers. When about two miles from Hind's store the column was

delayed by extensive wire fencing, which ran for one and a half

miles on either side of the road, and practically constituted a

defile.

"While the column was halted and the wire being cut, the country for

some distance on both sides was carefully scouted.

"By this means it was ascertained that there was a considerable

force of Boers (1) on the left front, (2) in the immediate front

(retreating hastily on Krugersdorp), (3) a third party on the right

flank.

"The force which had been following the column from Van Oudtshoorn's

continued to hover in the rear.

"Lieutenant-Colonel White, in command of the advanced guard, sent

back a request for guns to be pushed forward as a precaution in case

of an attack from the Boers in front. By the time these guns reached

the advanced guard, the Boers were still retreating some two miles

off. A few rounds were then fired in their direction. Had Colonel

White, in the first instance, opened fire with his Maxims on the

Boers, whom he surprised watering their horses close to Hind's

store, considerable loss would have been inflicted, but this was not

our object, for with the exception of the small skirmish on the

previous night, the Boers had not as yet molested the column, whose

sole aim was to reach Johannesburg if possible without fighting.

"At this hour Hind's store was reached. Here the troops rested for

one and a half hours. Unfortunately, hardly any provisions for men

and horses were available. An officer's patrol, consisting of Major

Villiers (Royal Horse Guards), and Lieutenant Grenfell (1st Life

Guards), and six men, moved off for the purpose of reconnoitring the

left flank of the Boer position, while Captain Lindsell, with his

permanent force of advanced scouts, pushed on as usual to

reconnoitre the approach by the main road. At the same time I

forwarded a note to the Commandant of the forces in Krugersdorp to

the effect that, in the event of my friendly force meeting with

opposition on its approach, I should be forced to shell the town,

and that therefore I gave him this warning in order that the women

and children might be moved out of danger.

"To this note, which was despatched by a Boer who had been detained

at Van Oudtshoorn, I received no reply.

"At Hind's store we were informed that the force in our front had

increased during the forenoon to about 800 men, of whom a large

number were entrenched on the hillside.

"Four miles beyond Hind's store the column following the scouts,

which met with no opposition, ascended a steep rise of some 400

feet, and came full in view of the Boer position on the opposite

side of a deep valley, traversed by a broad 'sluit' or muddy

watercourse.

"Standing on the plateau or spur, on which our force was forming up

for action, the view to our front was as follows:--

"Passing through our position to the west ran Hind's

store--Krugersdorp Road traversing the valley and the Boer position

almost at right angles to both lines.

[Illustration: JAMESON'S LAST STAND--THE BATTLE OF DOORNKOP, 2nd

JANUARY 1896.

Painting by R. Caton Woodville.

Reproduced by special arrangement with Henry Graves & Co., London.]

"Immediately to the north of this road, at the point where it

disappeared over the sky-line on the opposite slope, lay the Queen's

Battery House and earthworks, completely commanding the valley on

all sides, and distant 1900 yards from our standpoint.

"Some 1000 yards down the valley to the north stood a farmhouse,

surrounded by a dense plantation, which flanked the valley.

"Half-way up the opposite slope, and adjacent to the road, stood an

iron house which commanded the drift where the road crossed the

above-mentioned watercourse.

"On the south side of the road, and immediately opposite the

last-named house, an extensive rectangular stone wall enclosure with

high trees formed an excellent advanced central defensive position.

Further up the slope, some 500 yards to the south of this enclosure,

stretched a line of rifle-pits, which were again flanked to the

south by 'prospecting' trenches. On the sky-line numbers of Boers

were apparent to our front and right front.

"Before reaching the plateau we had observed small parties of Boers

hurrying towards Krugersdorp, and immediately on reaching the high

ground the rear-guard was attacked by the Boer force which had

followed the column during the whole morning.

"I therefore had no further hesitation in opening fire on the

Krugersdorp position.

"The two 7-pounders and the 12-1/2-pounder opened on the Boer line,

making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and Captain Gosling

at 1900 yards.

"This fire was kept up till 5 P.M. The Boers made practically no

reply, but lay quiet in the trenches and battery.

"Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated,

the first line, consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100

men), under Colonel White, advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this

force; a strong troop with a Maxim formed the right and left support

on either flank.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B.B.P. and one Maxim, had

been previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left.

"The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve and

rear-guard.

"The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of

the watercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy

cross-fire from all points of the defence.

"Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond

the watercourse.

"The left support, under Inspector Dykes, then advanced to prolong

the first line to the left; but, diverging too much to his left,

this officer experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse

and plantation, and was driven back with some loss.

"Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and

come into action.

"About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that

the country to our right was open, and that we could easily move

round in that direction.

"It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intended

holding their position.

"Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of the

Boers--an event which I had been momentarily expecting--I did not

feel justified in pushing a general attack, which would have

certainly entailed heavy losses on my small force.

"I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim to

keep in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateau

to our left, and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B.B.P., one

12-1/2-pounder, and one Maxim, to cover our left flank and continue

firing on the battery and trenches south of the road.

"I then made a general flank movement to the right with the

remaining troops.

"Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advanced

position during the next half-hour, and blew up the Battery House.

"Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first houses of

the Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt to

intercept the movement.

"Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of

the promised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to

push on with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting in

the darkness to slip through any intervening opposition.

"Two guides were obtained, the column followed in the prescribed

night order of march, and we started off along a road leading direct

to Johannesburg.

"At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from

the direction of Krugersdorp, which lay one and a half miles to the

left rear.

"We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of the

long-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg had

Maxims, and that the Staats-Artillerie were not expected to arrive

until the following morning. To leave our supposed friends in the

lurch was out of the question. I determined at once to move to their

support.

"Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road, I advanced

rapidly across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction of

the firing, in the formation shown in the accompanying sketch.

"After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and we

perceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. The

flankers on the right reported another force threatening that flank.

"Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from the

ammunition carts, I ordered a retreat on them.

"It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the

cause thereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force from

Johannesburg.

[Illustration: Plan of JAMIESON'S MARCH]

"Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our

friends at all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could

not fail to carry out their repeated promises, renewed to us by

letter so lately as 11 A.M. this same day. It was now very nearly

dark. In the dusk the Boers could be seen closing in on three sides,

viz., north, east, and south. The road to Johannesburg appeared

completely barred, and the last opportunity of slipping through,

which had presented itself an hour ago when the renewed firing was

heard, was gone not to return.

"Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available.

"But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which we

afterwards heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at the

arrival of large reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column would

have been by this time (7 P.M.), at least four or five miles further

on the road to Johannesburg, with an excellent chance of reaching

that town without further opposition.

"I moved the column to the edge of a wide valley to the right of the

road, and formed the horses in quarter column under cover of the

slope. The carts were formed up in the rear and on both flanks, and

five Maxims were placed along the front so as to sweep the plateau.

"The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear

and flank faces.

"The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on the

side; sentries and Cossack posts were posted on each face.

"Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches

and cuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards.

"At 9 P.M. a heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm of

bullets swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sides

except the south-west.

"The troops were protected by their position on the slope below the

level of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, which

lasted about twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable.

"The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery as

possible, although very tired and hungry and without water.

"We were then left unmolested for two or three hours.

"About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp,

but the firing was not kept up for long.

"Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to get

our range.

"At 3.30 A.M. patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force

as silently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off.

"At 4 A.M. a heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and

the patrols driven in from the north and east sides.

"Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by Lieutenant

Jesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope.

"Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the south

returned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in

that direction.

"The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in force

were occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankment

for a distance of one and a half miles right across the direct road

to Johannesburg.

"I covered the movements of the main body with the B.B.P. and two

Maxims under Colonel Grey along the original left front of the

bivouac, and two troops M.M.P., under Major R. White, on the right

front.

"During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however, the

main body was partially sheltered by the slope.

"Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley

without casualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic

Mine, was subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White

hereupon very judiciously threw out one troop to the left to cover

the further advance of the main body.

"This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by the

disappearance of our volunteer guide of the previous night.

"Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained.

"In the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and the

covering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M.M.P.

covering troops, and rejoined the main body.

"At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but most

gallantly insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of the

action.

"Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in

action until he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop.

"While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavy

fire, and several men and horses were lost here.

"I detailed a rear-guard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R.

White, to cover our rear and left flank, and moved the remainder of

the troops in the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward as

possible.

"In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept up

for ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a stand

was made by various small detachments of the rear and flank guard.

In this manner the Boers were successfully kept at a distance of 500

yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank

of the main body.

"In passing through the various mines and the village of

Randfontein, we met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the

mining population, who professed a desire to help if only they had

arms.

"Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey,

at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the

Speitfontein Mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line

of advance.

"I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with

the rear-guard.

"On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a

ridge which our guide stated was Doornkop.

"The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were

then carried out.

"The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who, I regret to say, was

severely wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared

the ridge in most gallant style, and pushed on beyond it.

"About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which, we have

learnt with grief, has subsequently proved fatal.

"Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P.,

charged and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening

our left flank.

"The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill

was impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the

left.

"This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that

without storming the Boer position there was no road open to

Johannesburg, except by a wide detour of many miles to the right.

"At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High

Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson

informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz.

that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not,

or could not, come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way

through unaided.

"Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we

again pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge

another steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by

hundreds of Boers completely covered from our fire.

"This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must

advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was

no way of getting round this hill.

"Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out,

outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to

keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by

one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in

sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.

"As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render

assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of

Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless

attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt,

moreover, which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and

useless slaughter.

"With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the

Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a

guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the

force.

"To this Commandant Cronje replied by a guarantee of the lives of

all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.

"In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan

subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he

would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not

until our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the

Boers.

[Illustration: JOHANNESBURG FROM THE NORTH.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

"I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to

loss of time from the following causes:--

"1. The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of

Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with

the Johannesburg force.

"2. The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp, or of the guides

to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously

promised by Johannesburg.

"3. The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed

Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.

"I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp

marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under

seventy hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169

miles between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied eighty-six hours, during

seventeen of which the men were engaged with the Boers, and were

practically without food or water, having had their last meal at 8

A.M. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's,

seventeen miles from Krugersdorp."

(The report concludes with a list of officers engaged in the

expedition.)

It will be noted that Sir John Willoughby does not attribute his

failure to the bungling of his employes that is said to have taken

place. The man that was despatched to cut the telegraph wires failed

to do so, with the result that the Boers were provided with the news

of the invasion eight hours before the Reform leaders were aware of

it; while another man, whose business it was to wrench away the

rails between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp, and thus interrupt

communication from Pretoria, was reposing in a clubhouse hopelessly

drunk, while the train he should have intercepted carried ammunition

for use against the invaders.

In order to present a fair picture of the situation, it must be

admitted that many of the statements in this report were

emphatically contradicted by the Reformers, notably the opening

paragraphs, which scarcely tally with the fact that on the 28th (the

day referred to) Dr. Jameson received the letters from the Reformers

telling him not to start.

The following statement of the four Reform leaders, which was read

at their trial, will present the case from their point of view, and

those interested may judge for themselves of a question over which

many differences of opinion exist:--

"For a number of years endeavours have been made to obtain by

constitutional means the redress of the grievances under which the

Uitlander population labours. The new-comer asked for no more than

is conceded to emigrants by all the other Governments in South

Africa, under which every man may, on reasonable conditions, become

a citizen of the State; whilst here alone a policy is pursued by

which the first settlers retain the exclusive right of government.

"Petitions supported by the signatures of some forty thousand men

were ignored, and when it was found that we could not get a fair and

reasonable hearing, that provisions already deemed obnoxious and

unfair were being made more stringent, and that we were being

debarred for ever from obtaining the rights which in other countries

are freely granted, it was realised that we would never get redress

until we should make a demonstration of force to support our claims.

"Certain provision was made regarding arms and ammunition, and a

letter was written to Dr. Jameson, in which he was asked to come to

our aid under certain circumstances.

"On December 26 the Uitlanders' Manifesto was published, and it was

then our intention to make a final appeal for redress at the public

meeting which was to have been held on January 6. In consequence of

matters that came to our knowledge, we sent on December 26 Major

Heany (by train _via_ Kimberley), and Captain Holden across country,

to forbid any movement on Dr. Jameson's part.

"On the afternoon of Monday, December 30, we learnt from Government

sources that Dr. Jameson had crossed the border. We assumed that he

had come in good faith to help us, probably misled by some of the

exaggerated rumours which were then in circulation. We were

convinced, however, that the Government and the burghers would not

in the excitement of the moment believe that we had not invited Dr.

Jameson in, and there was no course open to us but to prepare to

defend ourselves if we were attacked, and at the same time to spare

no effort to effect a peaceful settlement.

"It became necessary to form some organisation for the protection of

the town and the maintenance of order, since, in the excitement

caused by the news of Dr. Jameson's coming, serious disturbances

would be likely to occur, and it was evident that the Government

organisation could not deal with the people without serious risks of

conflict.

"The Reform Committee was formed on Monday night, December 30, and

it was intended to include such men of influence as cared to

associate themselves with the movement. The object with which it was

formed is best shown by its first notice, namely:--

"'Notice is hereby given, that this Committee adheres to the

National Union Manifesto, and reiterates its desire to maintain the

independence of the Republic. The fact that rumours are in course

of circulation to the effect that a force has crossed the

Bechuanaland border renders it necessary to take active steps for

the defence of Johannesburg and preservation of order. The Committee

earnestly desire that the inhabitants should refrain from taking any

action which can be construed as an overt act of hostility against

the Government. By order of the Committee, J. PERCY FITZPATRICK,

_Secretary_.'

"The evidence taken at the preliminary examination will show that

order was maintained by this Committee during a time of intense

excitement, and through the action of the Committee no aggressive

steps whatever were taken against the Government, but on the

contrary, the property of the Government was protected, and its

officials were not interfered with.

"It is our firm belief that had no such Committee been formed, the

intense excitement caused by Dr. Jameson's entry would have brought

about utter chaos in Johannesburg.

"It has been alleged that we armed natives. This is absolutely

untrue, and is disposed of by the fact that during the crisis

upwards of 20,000 white men applied to us for arms and were unable

to get them.

"On Tuesday morning, December 31, we hoisted the flag of the Z. A.

R., and every man bound himself to maintain the independence of the

Republic. On the same day the Government withdrew its police

voluntarily from the town, and we preserved perfect order.

"During the evening of that day, Messrs. Marais and Malan presented

themselves as delegates from the Executive Council. They came (to

use their own words) to 'offer us the olive branch,' and they told

us that if we would send a deputation to Pretoria to meet a

Commission appointed by the Government, we should probably obtain

'practically all that we asked for in the Manifesto.'

"Our deputation met the Government Commission, consisting of

Chief-Justice Kotze, Judge Ameshof, and Mr. Kook, member of the

Executive.