ACQUIREMENT OF LEGAL RIGHT TO PRACTISE MEDICINE AND SURGERY.
_Now Generally Regulated by Statute._—In nearly all of the United
States, as well as in England, France, Germany, and other civilized and
intelligent communities, the legal right to practise the administration
of drugs and medicines, or to perform operations in surgery for the
purpose of curing diseases or injuries, has for many years been the
object of statutory legislation. The necessity and propriety of
regulating by law such practices is generally conceded. It is manifest
to all that a person engaging in the practice of medicine or surgery
as a profession is holding himself out to the world, and especially to
his patients, as one qualified by education and experience to possess
more than ordinary skill and ability to deal with the great problems
of health and life. He professes to the world that he is competent and
qualified to enter into the closest and most confidential relations
with the sick and afflicted, and that he is a fit and proper person to
be permitted freely, and at all hours and all seasons, to enter the
homes, the family circle, and the private chamber of persons suffering
from disease or injury. All this he professes and does upon his own
account, and for his own profit.
=Statutory Regulation of the Right to Practise, Constitutional.=—The
exercise by the States of these statutory powers is upheld as a valid
exercise of the “police power,” to protect the health of the community.
When the constitutionality of such enactments has been questioned,
it has been attacked upon the alleged ground that the statutes under
question unjustly discriminated in favor of one class of citizens and
against another class; and as depriving those already engaged in the
practice of medicine or surgery of “their property without due process
of law.” State _v._ Pennoyer, 18 Atl. Rep., 878; _ex parte_ Spinney,
10 Nev., 323; People _v._ Fulda, 52 Hun. (N. Y.), 65-67; Brown _v._
People, 11 Colo., 109.
_Opinion of United States Supreme Court._—This subject has been
carefully considered by the United States Supreme Court in a recent
case, and the broad extent of the legislative powers of the States to
regulate such matters clearly and fully declared. Dent _v._ West Va.
(129 U. S., 114). The Court say—pp. 121 _et seq._—Mr. Justice Field
delivering the opinion, in which all the other Justices concur: “The
unconstitutionality asserted consists in its [the statutes] alleged
conflict with the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares
that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; the denial to the defendant of the right to
practise his profession, without the certificate required, constituting
the deprivation of his vested right and estate in his profession, which
he had previously acquired.
“It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States
to follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose,
subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons
of like age, sex, and condition. This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions.
Here all vocations are open to every one on like conditions. All may
be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and
great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in them, that is, the
right to continue their prosecution, is often of great value to the
possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. But there is no
arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted
because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the State
for the protection of society. The power of the State to provide for
the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such
regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them
against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of
deception and fraud. As one means to this end it has been the practice
of different States, from time immemorial, to exact in many pursuits
a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may
confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained upon
an examination of the parties by competent persons, or inferred from
a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific
and otherwise, with which such pursuits have to deal. The nature and
extent of the qualifications required must depend primarily upon the
judgment of the State as to their necessity. If they are appropriate
to the calling or profession, and attainable by reasonable study or
application, no objection to their validity can be raised because of
their stringency or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation
to such calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable
study and application, that they can operate to deprive one of his
right to pursue a lawful vocation.
“Few professions require more careful preparation by one who seeks
to enter it than that of medicine. It has to deal with all those
subtle and mysterious influences upon which health and life depend,
and requires not only a knowledge of the properties of vegetable and
mineral substances, but of the human body in all its complicated
parts, and their relation to each other, as well as their influence
upon the mind. The physician must be able to detect readily the
presence of disease, and prescribe appropriate remedies for its
removal. Every one may have occasion to consult him, but comparatively
few can judge of the qualifications of learning and skill which he
possesses. Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his
license, issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect,
that he possesses the requisite qualifications. Due consideration,
therefore, for the protection of society, may well induce the State to
exclude from practice those who have not such a license, or who are
found upon examination not to be fully qualified. The same reasons
which control in imposing conditions, upon compliance with which the
physician is allowed to practise in the first instance, may call for
further conditions as new modes of treating disease are discovered, or
a more thorough acquaintance is obtained of the remedial properties
of vegetable and mineral substances, or a more accurate knowledge
is acquired of the human system and of the agencies by which it is
affected. It would not be deemed a matter for serious discussion that
a knowledge of the new acquisitions of the profession, as it from time
to time advances in its attainments for the relief of the sick and
suffering, should be required for continuance in its practice, but
for the earnestness with which the plaintiff in error insists that,
by being compelled to obtain the certificate required, and prevented
from continuing in his practice without it, he is deprived of his right
and estate in his profession without due process of law. We perceive
nothing in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature
to deprive one of any of his rights. No one has a right to practise
medicine without having the necessary qualifications of learning and
skill; and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by offering
to the community his services as a physician, that he possesses such
learning and skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate or
license from a body designated by the State as competent to judge of
his qualifications. As we have said on more than one occasion, it may
be difficult, if not impossible, to give to the terms ‘due process
of law’ a definition which will embrace every permissible exertion
of power affecting private rights and exclude such as are forbidden.
They come to us from the law of England, from which country our
jurisprudence is to a great extent derived, and their requirement
was there designed to secure the subject against the arbitrary
action of the crown and place him under the protection of the law.
They were deemed to be equivalent to ‘the law of the land.’ In this
country the requirement is intended to have a similar effect against
legislative power, that is, to secure the citizen against any arbitrary
deprivation of his rights, whether relating to his life, his liberty,
or his property. Legislation must necessarily vary with the different
objects upon which it is designed to operate. It is sufficient, for
the purposes of this case, to say that legislation is not open to the
charge of depriving one of his rights without due process of law, if
it be general in its operation upon the subjects to which it relates,
and is enforceable in the usual modes established in the administration
of government with respect to kindred matters: that is, by process or
proceedings adapted to the nature of the case.”
EARLY COMMON-LAW RULE CONCERNING SUITS BY PHYSICIANS.
The common-law rule was that the physician could not sue and recover
for his services, though he might for the medicines he furnished. The
theory of the law followed the etiquette of his profession and forbade
him from making a specific contract for pay for his services, and
obliged him to receive what his patient chose to give him, which was
called his “_honorarium_.”
_The Early Common-Law Rule No Longer in Force._—As time went on this
theory vanished from the law. For many years it has lost its place
among the rules of professional etiquette. In its stead statutory
provisions have been adopted which forbid a recovery for services
performed by persons not legally authorized to practise. The right to
contract with the patient or with those who employ the medical man, and
his remedies to enforce such contracts, will be treated of hereafter.
_Statutory Regulations in New York State._—Most of the States of the
United States have enacted statutory regulations prescribing in one
form or another the necessary qualifications which entitle a physician
or surgeon to practise, and prescribing penalties for practising
without having complied with such statutory requirements. In the State
of New York such matters were regulated for the first time by statute
in 1787. This was followed by a general enactment on the subject of
the organization of county medical societies, and of State medical
societies having boards of censors, to whom was committed the power to
examine applicants for license to practise, and of issuing licenses
(Laws of 1813, p. 94). This law remained in force, with certain
modifications, until 1844, when all acts regulating the practice
of medicine and surgery were repealed. A history of the statutory
regulations in New York State up to the act of 1844 on this subject
will be found in the case of Bailey _v._ Mogg, 4 Denio, 60.[154]
At the time of the passage of the act of 1813, and for many years
afterward, nearly all of the physicians in New York State practised
in accordance with the theories and precepts of what is now called
the regular or allopathic school of medicine. That act provided that
the physicians in the respective counties of the State of New York
should meet in the respective counties and organize county medical
societies. As a consequence of the fact that the physicians of that day
were chiefly of the allopathic school, they necessarily obtained the
control of the county medical societies and State medical societies.
Hence it became difficult, if not impossible, for physicians who
wished to practise upon other theories and tenets than those obtaining
in that school, to obtain licenses to do so. With the growth of the
homœopathic school of medicine and the eclectic school of medicine,
came applications to the legislature asking for those practising under
those schools the same rights and privileges of organizing county and
State societies as had been extended to physicians generally by the
act of 1813; so that in 1857, by Chapter 384, the legislature of New
York State enacted that the homœopathic physicians might meet in their
respective counties and organize county medical societies, with boards
of censors having the same powers and privileges which were granted by
the act of 1813; and by other laws similar privileges were granted to
the so-called eclectic school. After the passage of the act of 1844,
down to about 1874, as hereinbefore stated, there was no limitation
upon the right to practise medicine or surgery in this State.
The inharmonious and injurious effect of such policy of the State
becoming manifest, the legislature, by Chapter 436 of Laws of 1874,
required all persons desiring to practise medicine or surgery to
obtain a certificate as to their qualifications from the censors of
some one of these medical societies. By the Laws of 1880, Chapter 513,
additional and more extensive and particular provisions were made in
reference to this matter, and all the physicians then practising were
required, on or before the time limited in the act, to file with the
county clerks of their respective counties their licenses to practise
granted by the censors of their county medical societies, or a diploma
of some chartered school of medicine; and those persons who desired
to become licensed who were not in practice were likewise required to
obtain similar licenses or certificates and file the same. A diploma
of a chartered school or medical college was given the same effect as a
license issued by the censors.
_Recent Legislation in New York State._—The whole matter, however,
of licensing physicians to practise has, in the State of New York,
been recently regulated by Chapter 468, Laws of 1889, and 499 of 1890,
which have reference to the qualifications of persons becoming medical
students, and Chapter 507 of 1890, which gives to the Regents of the
University of the State of New York power to select boards of examiners
from persons nominated by each of the three State medical societies,
viz., the New York State Medical Society, Homœopathic Medical Society,
and Eclectic Medical Society. These boards prepare questions which are
to be approved by the State Board of Regents; examinations are held
in different parts of the State upon these questions, the examination
papers are certified to that one of these boards of examiners which
the student may elect, and that board in turn certifies whether or
not the examination has been successfully undergone; and upon its
certificate the Board of Regents licenses the student to practise, and
his examination papers are filed in the office of the Board of Regents
and become a matter of record. These provisions have been enlarged and
modified slightly by various statutes since enacted. They are all now
embodied in Chapter 601 of Laws of 1893. They will be found carefully
synopsized below.
_Penal Provisions in New York State._—The New York Penal Code, which
went into effect in 1882, enacted that a person practising medicine or
surgery, or pretending to be a physician or surgeon, without a license
or a diploma from some chartered school, should be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment (Penal Code, Section
356); and the same statute, 357, made it a misdemeanor for a person,
whether licensed or not, to practise medicine or surgery, or do any
other act as a physician or surgeon, while intoxicated, by which the
life of any person is endangered or his health seriously affected.[155]
_Giving “Patented” Medicines No Exception._—At one time an attempt was
made to claim, that under the patent laws of the United States a person
had the right to administer patent medicines without being punishable
for practising without a license, but this doctrine was repudiated by
the courts. Thompson _v._ Staats, 15 Wend., 395; Jordan v. Overseers,
etc., 4 Ohio, 295.
_Courts may Compel Granting of License._—A person who is qualified
and complies with reasonable rules of a licensing body, can compel
such body to license him. This was held to be the law in the case of
The People _ex rel._ Bartlett _v._ The Medical Society of the County
of Erie, which is also an important authority in respect to a vexed
question of medical ethics. It appeared in that case that under the
general laws of New York in regard to the organization of medical
societies, a medical society had refused to receive as a member a
person otherwise qualified, because he had advertised in the public
prints a certain cure, including a mechanical appliance used in
treating throat troubles; it being forbidden by the code of ethics of
the American Medical Association, which the County Medical Society
had adopted as one of its by-laws, that a physician or surgeon should
advertise. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York held that this
constituted no defence to a proceeding instituted by such person to
obtain a mandamus compelling the society to admit him to membership, if
otherwise qualified.[156]
It has also been decided that a medical society had no right to make
a by-law establishing a fixed fee-bill, or tariff of charges, and
providing for the expulsion of a member charging at a different rate
than that prescribed. Such a by-law was declared unreasonable and void
in the case of People _v._ Medical Society of Erie County, 24 Barb.,
570.
The effect of these decisions was, so far as they affect the validity
of by-laws, attempted to be avoided in that State by Chapter 445 of
Laws of 1866, by which it is expressly enacted that the county medical
societies of the State of New York may make such rules and by-laws as
they see fit, “not inconsistent with the laws of said State, and may
enforce them by expulsion or other discipline.” It may be considered
doubtful whether this legislation can accomplish its purpose in the
case of the adoption of a by-law void as against public policy.
=No Particular Schools Recognized by the Courts.=—The general trend of
the decisions in all the States, whenever any questions in reference
to schools of medicine have been before our courts, is to avoid
recognizing any particular system or school. The theory of the New
York courts upon this subject is well expressed by the liberal-minded
and learned Judge Daly in the New York Court of Common Pleas, in the
case of Corsi _v._ Maretzek, 4 E. D. Smith, 1-5. In that case it was
claimed that a certificate of incapacity because of sickness, given
by a “homœopathic” physician to an opera-singer, was not binding. It
was argued that the employment of a “homœopathic” physician under the
contract did not fulfil a provision thereof which required the event of
the singer’s sickness to be certified to by “a doctor,” to be appointed
by the director.
The Court said: “The system pursued by the practitioner is immaterial.
The law has nothing to do with particular systems. Their relative
merit may become the subject of inquiry, when the skill or ability of
a practitioner in any given case is to be passed upon as a matter of
fact. But the law does not, and cannot, supply any positive rules for
the interpretation of medical science. It is not one of those certain
or exact sciences in which truths become established and fixed, but
is essentially progressive in its nature, enlarging with the growth
of human experience, and subject to those changes and revolutions
incident to any branch of human inquiry, the laws of which are not
fully ascertained. The labors of the anatomist, the physiologist, and
the chemist have contributed an immense storehouse of facts; but the
manner in which this knowledge is to be applied in the treatment and
cure of diseases has been, and will probably continue to be, open to
diversity of opinion. No one system of practice has been uniformly
followed, but physicians from the days of Hippocrates have been divided
into opposing sects and schools. The sects of the dogmatists and the
empirics divided the ancient world for centuries, until the rise of
the methodics, who, in their turn, gave way to innumerable sects.
Theories of practice, believed to be infallible in one age, have been
utterly rejected in another. For thirteen centuries Europe yielded
to the authority of Galen. He was implicitly followed—his practice
strictly pursued. Everything that seemed to conflict with his precepts
was rejected; and yet, in the revolutions of medical opinion, the
works of this undoubtedly great man were publicly burned by Paracelsus
and his disciples; and for centuries following, the medical world
was divided between the Galenists and the chemists, until a complete
ascendency over both was obtained by the sect of the Vitalists. This
state of things has been occasioned by the circumstance that medical
practitioners have often been more given to the formation of theories
upon the nature of disease and the mode of its treatment, than to
that careful observation and patient accumulation of facts, by which,
in other sciences, the phenomena of nature have been unravelled. I
am far from undervaluing the great benefits conferred upon mankind
by the study of medicine, and have no wish to minister to any vulgar
prejudice against a useful and learned profession, but it is not to be
overlooked that, as an art, it has been characterized, in a greater
degree, by fluctuations of opinion as to its principles and the mode
of its practice, than, perhaps, any other pursuit. That it has been
distinguished by the constant promulgation and explosion of theories,
that it has alternated between the advancement of new doctrines and
the revival of old ones, and that its professors in every age have
been noted for the tenacity with which they have clung to opinions,
and the unanimity with which they have resisted the introduction of
valuable discoveries. They still continue to disagree in respect to the
treatment of diseases as old as the human race; and at the present day,
when great advances have been made in all departments of knowledge, a
radical and fundamental difference divides the allopathist from the
followers of Hahnemann, to say nothing of those who believe in the
sovereign instrumentality of water.
“In fact, nothing comparatively is known of the philosophy of disease.
Its eradication or cure, where the result of human agency is, in
the great majority of instances, attributable rather to the careful
observation, judgment and experience of the particular practitioner,
than to the application of general or established methods available to
all. The popular axiom, that ‘doctors differ,’ is as true now as it
ever was, and as long as it continues to be so, it is impossible for
the law to recognize any class of practitioners, or the followers of
any particular system or method of treatment, as exclusively entitled
to be regarded as doctors. In adverting to the conflicting views
and differences of opinion, that exist and have ever existed in the
practice of the healing art, it is not to call in question the value
of learned, skilful and experienced physicians, but merely to show
the error of attempting, in the present state of medical science,
to recognize, as matter of law, any one system of practice, or of
declaring that the practitioner who follows a particular system is a
doctor, and that one who pursues a different method is not.” And see
also White _v._ Carroll, 42 N. Y., 161; Ordronaux’ “Jurisprudence of
Medicine,” 27.
This decision was prior to the statute of 1874 and the provisions of
the Penal Code before noted. Since those statutes, it is a misdemeanor
to practise except as permitted by the provisions of those statutes.
IN NEW YORK AND ELSEWHERE PRACTITIONER WITHOUT LICENSE CANNOT SUE AND
RECOVER FOR HIS FEES.
Since the passage of the New York Act of 1844 (Laws of 1844, p. 406),
there has been no precise statutory provision in that State prohibiting
in terms persons who practise physic or surgery without a license,
from suing to obtain a recovery for services performed. But this is of
little consequence, for, as we have already stated, so practising has
been declared to be a misdemeanor by the Penal Code of New York.
It is a well-settled principle that when any act is declared by statute
to be criminal, a contract calling for the performance of such an act
is illegal and void. The early English authorities on this point are
fully collated in Wheeler v. Russell (17 Metc., Mass., 258), and the
later English and American cases may be found in “American and English
Cyclopædia of Law,” title “Contracts,” Vol. III., p. 872 _et seq._; see
also _id._, Vol. XVIII., p. 440. Further consideration of the validity
of contracts for medical and surgical services will be had hereafter.
A full synopsis of the statutes of the different States regulating the
licensing of physicians and surgeons in force at the time this volume
goes to press will be placed in another chapter.
In a suit between a person who has performed medical and surgical
services, and one who employed him, it is said that the person
performing the services is presumed to have been licensed to do
so.[157] If the State sues for a penalty, a different rule is claimed
to prevail.[158]
HOW MAY A DIPLOMA OR LICENSE BE PROVED IN A COURT OF LAW?
It is evident from the foregoing considerations that in any proceedings
to punish for practising without license or legal authority, and in
actions to recover payment for professional services in the States and
countries, where a license or diploma of a regularly chartered school
or college is required by statute to entitle the person to practise, it
may become important to establish—first, the legal authority to grant
the license or diploma; and second, the genuineness of the license or
diploma produced. It frequently happens that the diploma or license has
been obtained in another State or country. Under the New York statutes,
especially the laws of 1880 and 1890, it was made necessary to file a
diploma. When it had been issued by a chartered school of another State
it must be certified to by some lawfully incorporated medical college
in this State, before being received for filing, or regarded by the law
as conferring upon its possessor the right to practise in that State.
As to the chief element of authenticity, namely, the legal
incorporation or authority of the body or institution granting the
diploma, it is clear that the act of incorporation itself would be
the best evidence of the incorporation of the college or school, and
a special act granting the power to license to a board of censors or
other official body or board would have to be produced to show the
right vested in that board or body to grant a license. In Georgia it
has been held (Hunter _v._ Blount, 27 Ga., 76), that to prove a diploma
given to a physician in another State, the existence of the college,
and the fact of its being a chartered institution, must be shown by
producing its act of incorporation.
In Thornton’s case (8 Term Rep., 303; same case, 3 Esp., 4), it was
held that the mere production in court of a diploma under the seal
of one of the universities, is not of itself evidence to show that
the person named in the diploma received the degree which the diploma
specified. In another and later case, however, Simpson _v._ Dunmore
(9 M. & W., 45; same case, 5 Jurist, 1012), it was held that it was
unnecessary for the person producing a license from the Apothecaries’
Company (an incorporated body) to practise as an apothecary, the seal
on which license was proved to be genuine, to give any additional
evidence of his identity with the person named in the license. The
reason for this doctrine is probably to be found in the well-known rule
of evidence, that identity of both christian name and family name, is
sufficient to raise a presumption of fact that the person bearing the
name is the identical person so named in any written instrument.
In Walmsley _v._ Abbott (1 K. & P., 309; same case, 5 D. & R., 62),
proof of the signature of one of the examiners who signed a certificate
of examination was held sufficient to warrant the acceptance of the
certificate in evidence in the first instance. In another case the
proof was that a person previously a stranger to the place went to a
town which was the seat of a university, and was told that a certain
building was the college, and that a certain person whom he saw there
was the librarian, and that this librarian showed him what purported
to be the seal of the university, and also a book which the librarian
stated was the book of acts or records of the university, and the seal
so shown him was compared with the seal of a certain diploma, the
genuineness of which was in question, and a copy was made from the said
book of acts, of an entry stating that the degree of M. D. had been
conferred by the university upon a person bearing the same name as that
in the diploma, and this proof was held a sufficient authentication of
the diploma, and of the act or authority of the university conferring
the degree. Collins case, 1 Addison & Ellis, 695; same case, 3 N. & M.,
703.[159]
_The Rule in Criminal Prosecutions._—We have seen above, that in a
criminal prosecution the burden is on the defendant to produce and
prove his license, but to warrant a conviction for practising without
a license it must be shown that the accused actually _practised_. It
is not enough to show that he is called by persons whom he attends
personally, that is, for whom he prescribes, or to whom he gives
medicine or whom he treats. There must be proof shown that he has done
this on his own account or for his own profit. But proof of a single
act connected with other circumstances, such as tend to show that he
held himself out as a physician, is enough. Burham _v._ State, 116
Ind., 112; Hill _v._ Bodie, 2 Stew. and P. (Ala.), 56; Pedgrift _v._
Schiller, 8 C. B., N. S., 200 (same case, 6 Jurist, N. S., 1341). And
if he simply practises “massage,” he does not fall within the acts
against practising medicine, even though he pretends to accomplish as
much good as could have been accomplished by a regular physician. Smith
_v._ Lane, 24 Hun, N. Y., 632. But see also Leech _v._ Ripon, 12 Cent.
L. J., 479; State _v._ Schultz, 11 Reporter, 701.[160]
_Falsely Pretending to be a Licensed Practitioner Generally a
Misdemeanor._—In some of the States, and in England, it is not
only made a misdemeanor to practise without a license, but falsely
pretending to be a licensed practitioner is made a misdemeanor. Such
is the provision of the Penal Code of New York heretofore cited. In
England such a statute has been somewhat strictly construed in the
case of Carpenter _v._ Hamilton (37 Law Times Rep., 157). In that
case it appeared that a person advertised himself as “John Hamilton,
M.D.,” of the “Metropolitan Medical College of New York.” It further
appeared that he was not registered as required by the law of England.
In a prosecution against him for falsely pretending to be a licensed
physician, the only proof of his practising being as just stated, an
acquittal was sustained by a majority of the court, which held that it
was a question of fact to be determined by a trial court whether or
not what he did was _pretending_ to be a physician authorized to treat
a patient. The Court intimated that the person simply pretended to be
what he really was, namely, a doctor of medicine of the Metropolitan
Medical College of New York.
STATE AND LOCAL BOARDS OF HEALTH—POWERS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL STATUTES.
In addition to the rules and regulations prescribed by the general
statutes, modern sanitary science has developed so broadly throughout
most of the civilized states and countries, that the different
governments have established state boards of health, and in many
instances local boards of health, the latter being limited in their
authority and operation to specific municipal divisions, to which
boards the government has committed the power to pass certain sanitary
rules and regulations, which rules and regulations may have an
important bearing upon and relation to the practice of medicine and
surgery. The jurisdiction and powers of these boards are to be found
in the special statutes creating them, and prescribing their powers
and duties, and cannot be treated of extensively here. They will be
considered further under the special subjects to which they relate.
_Physicians Bound to Report Contagious Cases and Not Liable for
Mistaken Report._—The duty to promptly report[161] to boards of
health every case of contagious or infectious disease is manifest.