MATERIAL OF WAR
As regards the business world the position at this time[1] was a
singularly difficult one. Within a few days of the outbreak of war,
orders from all parts of the globe were forthcoming, on so vast a scale
that the ordinary means of coping with them were wholly inadequate. It
was not possible to walk out of the War Office and buy what was wanted
in the shops. In a very brief period the whole industrial system of
the United Kingdom was congested with orders.
In Lord Kitchener's former experience of military and civil
administration the difficulty had usually been to get the money he
needed, in order to carry out his reforms and undertakings. But here
was a case where he could have all the money he chose to ask for; it
was the commodities themselves which could not be had either for money
or love.
[Sidenote: ORGANISATION OF RESOURCES]
When war broke out the industries of France and Belgium were
paralysed--the former temporarily, the latter permanently. We could
buy nothing in France; France, on the other hand, was buying eagerly in
England. And so was Russia, not herself as yet a great industrial
producer. And so were Belgium, {359} Servia, Italy, Roumania, Greece,
Japan--indeed the whole world, more or less--belligerents and neutrals
alike--except the two Powers with which we were at war. All these
competitors were in the field against the War Office, running up
prices, and making the fortunes of enterprising middlemen, who flocked
to the feast, like vultures from all corners of the sky. The
industrial situation, therefore, needed the sternest regulation, and
needed it at once. For it was essential to secure our own
requirements, and to make certain that our Allies secured theirs, at a
fair price and in advance of all other purchasers.
Moreover, it was obviously necessary to look an immense way ahead,
especially as regards munitions of war; to aid with loans, and
encourage with orders, firms able and willing to make what was
required. It was essential that makers of arms and supplies should be
stimulated to undertake vast increases of their staff and plant.
Before the battle of the Marne was ended it was known, only too well,
that every nation in Europe--with the single exception of Germany--had
grossly underestimated the expenditure of artillery ammunition under
conditions of modern warfare. It was of the most immediate urgency to
concert with our Allies, and with our manufacturers, in order to set
this trouble right. It was as necessary for the Allies to organise
their resources as it was for them to organise their armies. The
second, indeed, was impossible without the first, as Germany well knew,
and in her own case had already practised.
Finally, there was the problem--half industrial, half political--of
labour; its hours, conditions, and remuneration. Without the utmost
vigilance and {360} sympathy, without a constant inspiration of duty,
without political leadership which appealed to the imagination and
heart of the people, there were bound to be endless troubles and
confusion; there were bound to be disputes, quarrels, stoppages, and
strikes.
The prices of certain munitions and materials were almost anything the
makers liked to name. Money was flying about, and everybody was aware
of it. Human nature was sorely tempted. The future was anxious and
uncertain. People dependent for a living on their own exertions, were
beset with a dangerous inclination to hold out their pitchers, in the
hopes of catching some portion of the golden shower while it lasted.
The idea that workmen were, on the average, any greedier than their
masters is only held by persons who have little knowledge of the facts.
Cost of living had risen rapidly; this might have been foreseen from
the beginning, as well as the dangers which it contained.
In such circumstances as these the baser appetites of mankind are
always apt to break loose and gain the upper hand, unless there is a
firm leadership of the nation. That is where the statesman should come
in, exercising a sagacious control upon the whole organisation of
industry; impressing on masters the need for patience and sympathy; on
their men the need for moderation; on all the need for sacrifices.
During the months of February, March, and April 1915 there was a loud
outcry, led by a member of the Government, deploring the lack of
munitions of war, and attributing the deficiency to a want of industry
and energy on the part of a {361} section of the working classes.
Their frequent abstentions were condemned, and drunkenness was alleged
to have been, in many cases, a contributory cause.
[Sidenote: MINISTERIAL INCONSISTENCIES]
Then Mr. Asquith came forward and astonished the world by denying
stoutly that there was, or ever had been, any deficiency in munitions
of war.[2] He assured the country that so long ago as September he had
"appointed a committee ... to survey the situation."[3] He said
nothing about irregularity of work, or about drunkenness as a cause of
it. On the contrary, he produced the impression that the Army was as
well provided as it could be, and that the behaviour of the whole world
of industry had {362} been as impeccable as the foresight and energy of
the Government.
The country found it difficult to reconcile these various statements
one with another. It found it still more difficult to reconcile Mr.
Asquith's assurances with what it had heard, not only from other
Ministers, but from generals in their published communications.
Private letters from the front for months past had told a very
different story from that which was told, in soothing tones, to the
Newcastle audience. These had laid stress upon the heavy price paid in
casualties, and the heavy handicap imposed on military operations,
owing to shortage of artillery ammunition. The appointment of the
Committee alone was wholly credited; the rest of these assurances were
disbelieved.
[Sidenote: COMPLAINTS ABOUT MUNITIONS]
Indeed it was impossible to doubt that there had been miscalculation
and want of foresight in various directions; and it would have been
better to admit it frankly. The blame, however, did not rest upon Lord
Kitchener's shoulders, but upon those of his colleagues. They
understood the industrial conditions of the United Kingdom; he did not
and could not; and they must have been well aware of this fact. It was
not Lord Kitchener's business, nor had he the time, to make himself
familiar with those matters which are so well understood by the Board
of Trade, the Local Government Board, and the Treasury. His business
was to help France, to get recruits as best he could, to train them as
soon as he could, and to send them out to beat the Germans. It was the
business of the Government--expert in British political and industrial
conditions--to put him in the way of getting his recruits, and the
equipment, {363} supplies, and munitions of war which were necessary
for making them effective.[4]
[1] I am specially referring to August-December 1914.
[2] "I saw a statement the other day _that the operations not only of
our Army but of our Allies were being crippled, or at any rate
hampered, by our failure to provide the necessary ammunition_. There
is not a word of truth in that statement. I say there is not a word of
truth in that statement which is the more mischievous because if it
were believed, it is calculated to dishearten our troops, to discourage
our Allies, and to stimulate the hopes and activities of our enemies.
Nor is there any more truth in the suggestion that the Government, of
which I am the head, have only recently become alive to the importance
and the urgency of these matters. On the contrary, in the earliest
days of the war, when some of our would-be instructors were thinking of
quite other things, they were already receiving our anxious attention,
and as far back, I think, as the month of September I appointed a
Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by Lord Kitchener, to survey
the situation from this point of view--a Committee whose labours and
inquiries resulted in a very substantial enlargement both on the field
and of machinery of supply....
"No, the urgency of the situation--and, as I shall show, the urgency is
great--can be explained without any resort to recrimination or to
blame. It is due, in the main, to two very obvious causes. It is due,
first of all, to the unprecedented scale upon which ammunition on both
sides has been, and is being, expended. _It not only goes far beyond
all previous experience, but it is greatly in advance of the forecasts
of the best experts_."--Mr. Asquith at Newcastle, April 20, 1915.
[3] There has certainly been no lack of appointments either of
committees or individuals. So lately as the 7th of April the
newspapers announced a War Office Committee "to secure that the supply
of munitions of war shall be sufficient to meet all requirements."
About a week later came the announcement of a still more august
committee--'The Output Committee'--with Mr. Lloyd-George as Chairman
and Mr. Balfour as a member of it. If war could be won by appointing
committees and creating posts, victory ought long ago to have been
secured.
[4] Since this chapter was printed (May 1915) public opinion has been
somewhat distracted by a sensational wrangle as to whether or not the
right kind of ammunition had been supplied. These are technical
matters upon which the ordinary man is no judge. The main point is
that--certainly until quite recently--enough ammunition was not
supplied; nor anything like enough; and this was due to the failure to
look far enough ahead in the early days of the war; and to organise our
industrial system to meet the inevitable requirements.
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