what continued embodied fell back upon the first column. This latter,
informed, when too late, of the attack made by the French upon the
centre, intended to move to its support; but took a wrong direction to
be capable of making a diversion in its favour. The Austrian cavalry,
which had been left beyond Tellnitz, retired through that village,
which was now evacuated, leaving some Battalions of infantry, with a
few cavalry on the hill fronting it, as a corps of observation, and to
secure the march of M. de Buxhoevden, who was retiring upon Aujest, by
the same route he had advanced. To protect the flank of the Russian
infantry, the Szeckler hussars under Prince Maurice Liechtenstein,
and O'Reilly's light cavalry, with two regiments of Cossacks, under
General Stutterheim, were advanced upon the plain, between the foot
of the mountains and the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz; General
Nostitz, with the hussars of Hesse Homburg, marched with the column.
The French, after their success in the centre, had already brought
forward their reserve, consisting of 20 Battalions, and had extended
along the crest of the heights that were occupied in the morning by the
allies, from Pratzen to the chapel above Aujest, but, _as yet_, they
were not in force, and had no cannon above that village.[16]
If the first column of the allies, reinforced by some Battalions
from the second, and at that time consisting of above 30 Battalions,
had moved in full force upon these heights, and had attacked them;
if, instead of passing through a defile, (the height above which was
occupied by the enemy,) it had made a charge on the flank of the
French, it is possible that a diversion might have been effected
in favour of the centre; and a defeat in Aujest (which was to be
anticipated) would at least have been avoided. In marching upon the
height above Aujest, the left of the allies might, at least, give a
chance in favour of the battle; while the left, being no longer liable
to be put in confusion, would not have lost so many men. Even supposing
it not to have succeeded in maintaining the height, still it had always
a retreat open upon Scharoditz.
As soon as the column arrived in Aujest, the French rushed like a
torrent down upon the village, in which a sharp fire of musketry at
first took place, but which was of short duration, before they gained
possession of the village. It was the division of Vandamme, which had
formed the extreme right, on the heights of Pratzen, and which, in
proportion as the French crowned that height, had gradually moved upon
the chapel, above Aujest. The general of infantry, Buxhoevden, with a
few Battalions, succeeded in passing through the village, and rejoined
the army near Austerlitz; some confusion took place, and 4,000 men were
taken prisoners in or about Aujest: they also lost their artillery.
Many of the fugitives betook themselves to the lake, which was frozen
over, but not sufficiently so to prevent many from perishing in it.
The enemy, who in the mean time had received his artillery, vigorously
plied the fugitives with it, who afterwards passed through Satschan,
and in the evening succeeded in regaining the rear-guard of the army,
on the heights of Neuhof. After the French had occupied Aujest, the
centre and rear of the first column, which was so very strong, fell
back under the orders of Lieut.-general Dochtorow, upon the plain
between Tellnitz and the lake. This infantry was collected, but not
in good order. Lieut.-general Dochtorow succeeded for a moment in
re-establishing order, after which he considered only how to effect
his retreat. This was very difficult in the execution, and could only
be effected across a very narrow dike between the lakes, on which it
was not possible to march more than two men in front. There was also
reason to apprehend that the French passing by Aujest and Satschan,
round the lake, would thus cut off the dike, the only retreat now left
to the Russians, which would have made it impossible to save this last
wreck of the left wing of the allied army. Lieut.-general Kienmayer,
with the hussars of Hesse Hombourg, was sent over in advance, for
the purpose of securing this retreat, and posted himself upon the
heights between Satschan and Ottnitz, in order to observe this point.
Meanwhile, the Austrian cavalry continued to support General Dochtorow,
and for that purpose advanced into the plain, between Aujest and
Sokolnitz. The generals who commanded O'Reilly's light cavalry and the
Szeckler hussars, advanced to the attack of two French regiments of
dragoons, who approached from Sokolnitz, but seeing that the Russian
infantry was supported, the latter marched by their left, upon the
height near Aujest, and posted themselves at the head of the division
of Vandamme. The conclusion of this battle was very remarkable, since
the French troops of the right wing were turning their backs upon
Austerlitz to attack the remains of the left of the allies; to do
which, the French were now quitting the same heights, whence the allies
had marched in the morning, to attack them. When the first column had
advanced, the lake was the point of appuy to the right of the French;
at _this_ moment it was the appuy to their _left_, while the Russians
had their right upon it.
It was now about two o'clock in the afternoon; the action was decided
and finished along the rest of the line, when the division of Vandamme
advanced to complete it. In rear of Tellnitz, between that village and
Menitz, was a hill of considerable elevation, the right of which was
on the lake. To this hill the Russian infantry retired, still under
the protection of the Austrian cavalry, which was every instant mowed
down by discharges of grape-shot. The village of Tellnitz, which has
already been described as surrounded by ditches, presented the means of
defence, which were taken advantage of; and to give time to the rest
of the column to file off, a regiment of Russian infantry, under Major
General Lewis, was posted behind these ditches, where it was attacked,
but defended itself with resolution. From that time, General Dochtorow
continued his retreat. The cavalry occupied the hill that has been
mentioned, in order to save a great part of this column, which was
again in the greatest possible confusion. The French got possession
of Tellnitz (in which a great many Russian stragglers were taken
prisoners), and bringing the light artillery of the guards down to the
edge of the lake, for the purpose of driving the Austrian cavalry from
their post on the hill, they opened a fire on the flank of O'Reilly's
light cavalry, and destroyed a great part of it. Yet nothing could
prevent this brave regiment from continuing to cover the retreat of the
Russians with the greatest intrepidity.
Colonel Degenfeldt posted his light artillery, which commanded that of
the French, with so much judgment as to damp the ardour of their fire.
The Colonel of the Szeckler hussars was desperately wounded in the head
with a grape-shot.
The Russian infantry, fatigued and exhausted, retired very slowly,
and the cavalry had a long time to support their post; at length,
however, this famous dike, the only remaining retreat to the wreck of
the first column of the allies, and which had justly been the subject
of so much uneasiness, was happily passed; still, however, the French
(who occupied the hill, before in possession of the cavalry, as soon
as they quitted it) continued to fire on them, with their artillery,
till they were completely out of reach. Having passed the dike, the two
Austrian Generals, who protected General Dochtorow's retreat, halted
on the heights in front of Neuhoff, and tried to restore order in the
Russian Battalions, which yet formed a corps of at least 8,000 men.
It was then about four o'clock, and already began to grow dark. The
retreat was then continued by Boschowitz; the troops marched the whole
night, under a heavy fall of rain, which completed the destruction
of the roads; the remaining artillery sunk in the sloughs, and were
abandoned. The Austrian cavalry formed the rear guard, without being
pursued by the French, who halted on the dike. The regiment of O'Reilly
brought off its artillery.
The French army took up the position occupied by the allied army the
preceding night; the latter, after the greatest exertion on the part
of the two Emperors to remedy the general confusion on the field of
battle, retired in the evening completely behind Austerlitz, into the
position of Hodiegitz. But the very considerable loss it had sustained
in killed and wounded, and the number of those who were prisoners,
or missing; more especially of the first, second, third, and fourth
columns, made this army, on its arrival in rear of Austerlitz, in a
very feeble state; at least, as far as regards its disposeable force.
The Austrian cavalry, commanded by General Prince Hohenlohe, (who was
sent to replace Prince John de Liechtenstein that same night, on the
latter being charged with a mission to the Emperor Napoleon:) this
cavalry, alone, had some detachments in front of Austerlitz, and
formed the rear guard of the army. Thus closed this ever-memorable day.
Should any errors of detail have crept into the foregoing narrative,
those military men who have been engaged in actual service will know
how to make allowances for them; they will know, from experience,
how difficult it is to procure exact information, as to the minute
particulars of a great battle. Two persons rarely see the same object
in a similar point of view. But, as to the general arrangement, the
plans, and the principal movements, their execution, and their result,
my pen has been strictly guided by the love of truth, an accurate
knowledge of what was done, and the utmost impartiality.
It will not have escaped the observation of the experienced soldier,
that it is principally to the following causes that the loss of
this battle is to be attributed. To the want of correctness in the
information possessed by the allies, as to the enemy's army; to the
bad plan of attack, supposing the enemy to have been entrenched in
a position which he did not occupy; to the movements executed the
day before the attack, and in sight of the enemy, in order to gain
the right flank of the French; to the great interval between the
columns when they quitted the heights of Pratzen; and to their want
of communication with each other. To these causes may be attributed
the first misfortunes of the Austro-Russian army. But, in spite of
these capital errors, it would still have been possible to restore the
fortune of the day, in favour of the allies, if the second and third
columns had thought less of the primary disposition, and attended
more to the enemy, who, by the boldness of his manœuvre, completely
overthrew the basis on which the plan of attack was founded: or, if
the first column (which possessed the means of doing so), instead of
retiring by Aujest, as before mentioned, had marched to the assistance
of the two former, and, together with them (or at least with what
remained of them) had moved upon the heights, of which the French
had as yet but a precarious possession, so long as the left of the
allies was unbroken, and their extreme right, which made only feeble
demonstrations, continued at Posorsitz.
No computation has been made in this work, as to the loss of the two
armies, at the battle of Austerlitz. It is impossible for any one,
though actually bearing a part in the action, to calculate with any
degree of accuracy the number of killed and wounded on each side.
The carnage made on the 2nd December was very great. The few Austrian
troops there yet remained were not collected on one point; but, as
we have seen, conducted themselves every where with constancy and
animation. The sixth Battalions of the regiments of Wurtemberg and
Reuss-Graitz were the only corps that were in confusion at the time
when the fourth column was defeated. The Russians, at the commencement,
fought with intrepidity, and the guards and Hulans distinguished
themselves for their courage. The French infantry manœuvred with
coolness and precision, fought with courage, and executed its bold
movements with admirable concert. After having made some efforts,
without effect, the Russian Battalions began to waver; confusion and,
finally, complete defeat were the consequences of the imprudent conduct
of the second and third columns.
The fourth column of the allies abandoned a _part_ of its artillery.
The first, second, and third columns, lost the _whole_ of theirs, with
the exception of General Kienmayer's corps, which saved its cannon.
The guns were entangled in the sloughs, as before mentioned, and the
Russian horses, which are more calculated for speed than for draft,
could not drag them out of the deep clay, into which they had sunk. The
number of the Russian prisoners may be computed at 15,000 men; while
their killed and wounded must have been very considerable; in addition
to which, as always happens on such occasions, they had a great number
of soldiers missing.
The loss of the French army must also, necessarily, have been very
considerable. The fire, at the commencement of the action, was too
warmly kept up, not to have done great execution; still, however, the
French force was by no means diminished in the same proportion as
that of the allies. The Generals who were killed, wounded, and taken
prisoners are already well known.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 10: _Note by a French officer._--Marshal Bernadotte was never
seen till the day of the battle. _Two_ days before he had rested on his
arms behind Brunn, and the following day he took post in the rear of
the army, near Lattein. The French generals object in this disposition
was, not only to avoid fatiguing this corps as much as possible, but
also, not to pass the defile of Bellowitz; for not intending to risk an
action, unless the enemy committed great errors, he had determined on
retiring another day's march to the rear, if the enemy manœuvred with
skill. It was not his wish to engage a general action with a superior
army, if it were well posted. The victory might have been doubtful, and
above all, too destructive.
It was, therefore, that the divisions repassed the defiles, each day in
proportion as the enemy's plans became apparent, and the faults he was
about to commit became more probable. Besides, if instead of turning
the right of the French army, (which was what the French general rather
wished) the Russians had brought on an affair among the mountains, by
turning the left. The position of the head-quarters, behind Kritchen,
(which was always occupied by the French) was the point, from whence,
by a wheel to the left, it was the most easy to move diagonally in rear
of the Santon, upon the little hills towards the left.
The movement that may have been seen on our left, was nothing else
than the posting the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli to support
the Santon, because it was apprehended the enemy might, in the course
of the day, attempt to get possession of that height, which was the
key to the emperor's projects. He would not allow the enemy to occupy
positions too near to Girshikowitz and Puntowitz, which might have
prevented the army from forming. For the attack, which had been planned
by the emperor, particularly depended on the rapidity with which the
centre should march on the heights of Pratzen.]
[Footnote 11: _Note by a French officer._--This plan was faulty in
every point of view. Supposing the emperor not to have attacked the
heights of Pratzen, merely keeping possession of the Santon, and the
village of Girshikowitz, he would have made an effort in the centre,
when the enemy attacked him, and the left of the enemy, once arrived at
the wood of Turas, was by that divided from his centre.
All this serves to prove, that many men are capable of manœuvring 15 or
20,000 men, but very few know how to derive all the possible advantage
from an army of 80,000.]
[Footnote 12: Many misfortunes of the allies appear to have originated
in attacking with small corps where they had the power of attacking
in force. It is obvious, that if _one_ Battalion is inadequate to the
service on which it is sent, it will not only suffer severely in the
attempt, but that very attempt will apprize the enemy of the intention,
and enable him to reinforce. Whereas, by at once attacking with
numbers, all opposition is borne down, and the defence, from not being
protracted, is generally less destructive to the assailants: wherever
the French make an attack, it is in force; and _therefore_ they usually
succeed; with the additional advantage, that they are enabled _by
those very numbers_ to maintain themselves in what they have acquired.
_Translator._]
[Footnote 13: Either there were two generals of this name in the
Russian army, or there must be some mistake; since, in a former
part of this work, General Stutterheim says, "The corps under Essen
was at Kremsir on the day of the battle, and was of no sort of
use."--_Translator._]
[Footnote 14: _Note by a French Officer._--It is very true, that the
Austrians fought well, as asserted by the Austrian officer; as also
that the regiment of Salzbourg particularly distinguished itself, and
lost a great number of men by the bayonet.]
[Footnote 15: _Note by a French officer._--General Legrand had only one
of his brigades with him; the other, commanded by General Levasseur,
was posted in reserve, in front of the rivulet, and of the village
of Hobesnitz, from whence it marched on the flank and rear of the
enemy, when he attempted to retake the heights of Pratzen; it was this
unforeseen movement which greatly contributed to the defeat of that
column. Levasseur's brigade fought during the remainder of the day, in
conjunction with the divisions of St. Hilaire and Vandamme.]
[Footnote 16: _Note by a French officer._--The first column had no
longer the means of resuming the offensive. The reserve, composed of
20 Battalions of grenadiers, had reached the heights in rear of the
divisions St. Hilaire and Vandamme. (The Emperor, with the cavalry
belonging to the guards, was already descending from the chapel of St.
Anthony.) The rear of the column was exposed to Marshal Davoust and
General Legrand. Marshal Bernadotte, _alone_, had 18 Battalions, not
one half of which had burnt priming, and the remainder had been but
little engaged.
The French would have gained the victory with 25,000 men less than
they had, which is a subject of reflection for military men, and
sufficiently shows the influence which the being well commanded has
over the operations, of war.]
The 3d and 4th of December.
The Austro-Russian army had experienced so many difficulties in
regard to its subsistence, on the line of operations it had followed
previous to these offensive movements, that it was abandoned, during
the retreat, in order to direct its march upon Hungary. The allies
quitted the position of Hodiegitz at 12 o'clock at night, and marched
upon Czeitsch, where they arrived on the morning of the third of
December. The column under General Dochtorow arrived at Niskowitz, on
the road to[17]Hungary, where it found General Kienmayer then forming
the rear-guard of the allies. This Russian column continued its
march, for the purpose of rejoining the army at Czeitsch; but lost a
considerable number of men during the night, who had straggled and lost
themselves in the woods and villages. The Austrian cavalry, which had
protected the retreat of these wrecks of the left wing of the combined
army, and which was a part of the corps under M. de Kienmayer, halted
at Niskowitz. Lieut.-General Prince Bagration was a league in rear
of this Austrian corps, occupying the heights of Urschutz. Between
Niskowitz and Urschutz is a large wood, under cover of which, the
French had it in their power to surround and cut off the corps under
M. de Kienmayer, which was thus too much pushed forward. He therefore
remained in this position no longer than was necessary to give time
to the stragglers of the army, and to some baggage to fall back upon
Urschutz, and to obtain some knowledge of the enemy's movements. As
soon as the French, who had entered Austerlitz in the morning, began
to advance, General Kienmayer fell back upon General Bagration, and
in front of Saruschitz formed the support of that Prince's corps. A
detachment of O'Reilly's light cavalry, and some Cosacks, were sent
to Stanitz, to watch that road. The corps under M. de Merveldt had
received orders to retire from Lunenbourg, in the direction of Goeding,
to observe the country on the left, and principally the two roads of
Auspitz and Nicolsbourg.
On the third of December, the French army advanced in the following
manner: The cavalry, under Prince Murat, which had pushed forward
detachments upon Rausnitz and Wischau (on the evening of the same
day on which the battle was fought) pursued that route, and made
immense booty: it advanced beyond Prosnitz, and then sent out strong
detachments upon Kremsir.
Marshal Lannes at first took the same road, and then moved by his
right, to gain the right of the allies by Butschowitz and Stanitz.
Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, the imperial guards, and the grenadiers
of the reserve, were posted on the route towards Hungary, as soon as
the Emperor Napoleon had received information of the direction taken by
the allied army; they advanced, however, but slowly; probably with a
view to give time to the extreme right of their army to gain ground on
the left of the allies.
Marshal Davoust marched upon the left flank of the Austro-Russian
army, by the route of Nicolsbourg, (in which was the division of
Gudin,) and by that of Auspitz, in which was the remainder of that
corps; these two roads unite within half a league of Goeding.
Prince Bagration had placed some out-posts in the wood of Urschutz.
The French, about two o'clock in the afternoon, began to reconnoitre
it, obtained possession of the wood, and established themselves on the
skirts of it. A trifling affair ensued, which lasted about two hours,
and which terminated by General Bagration maintaining his post, which,
however, he evacuated that evening, retiring towards Czeitsch; General
Kienmayer posted himself in his front, upon the heights of Nasedlowitz,
pushing forward his out-posts in the direction of Urschutz.
The 4th of December the allied army crossed the river March, and
arrived at Hollitsch, much diminished in numbers, and with very few
effectives, compared with the army to which it was opposed. The Emperor
Alexander took up his quarters in the castle of Hollitsch, while the
Emperor of Germany remained at Czeitsch, to be ready for the interview
which was about to take place with the Emperor Napoleon.
An armistice had been agreed on, to take place at day-break on the
4th December. Prince John de Liechtenstein had returned from the
head-quarters of the French the evening before with this intelligence.
But their advanced guard, probably from not having received timely
orders on this subject, advanced to attack the fore-posts of M. de
Kienmayer's corps, which remained upon the heights of Nasedlowitz.
Prince Bagration then retired quite behind Czeitsch. However, this
misunderstanding, and the firing consequent upon it, were soon put a
stop to. A suspension of arms took place, and the space of about a
league and a half was left between the out-posts of the two armies.
That of the French had advanced, and taken up its position in several
lines, between Damborschutz, and Saruschutz, in front of Urschutz.