In those days the landed interest, and the interest of the crown, were

only attended to. Trade at that time was almost at a stop, and had been

ruined by a piratical war. The evil was past a remedy, consistent with

justice. Credit was very low, and daily declining, and demanded an

instant reformation of the coin. Restoring the standard was the most

favourable, both for the landed interest and the exchequer; and so it

was gone into. The nation, and every debtor, was robbed by their

creditors; but they did not perceive it; and what we do not see, seems

to do us no harm. The question, therefore, is very different:

circumstances must constantly be examined, and according to these every

political question must be decided.

I have already observed, how the introduction of milled coin had the

effect of introducing the clipping of that part which had been coined

with the hammer. Guineas, at the revolution, (if I am well informed)

passed for 21 shillings and sixpence. Gold was then to silver, over all

Europe, rather above the proportion of 1 to 15, as appears by the famous

regulation in 1690, called the convention of Leipzick, when the German

coinage was settled; and it appears also by the proportion observed in

France; and in Spain it was still higher, being as 1 to 16. At this rate

we may be certain, that at the revolution the English silver was

standard weight; because the guinea being left to seek its own price

above 20 shillings, the statute value, did not rise above 21 shillings 6

pence, which marks the proportion to have been as 15.6 is to 1. The

guinea, therefore, would not have failed to have risen higher, had the

silver coin been light.

From 1692 to 1695, that is, in _three years time_, (Locke’s Farther

Consid. p. 74.) the progress of clipping went on with such rapidity,

that guineas rose from 21 shillings 6 pence, to 30 shillings; and

according to a very sensible letter which lies before me, signed G. D.

and printed in 1695, intituled, _A Letter from an English merchant at

Amsterdam, to his friend in London_, I find there was at that time no

determinate value at all for the pound sterling: so great was the

difference of the currencies! As a proof, he says, that _100 pounds

sterling in silver, which ought to weigh 32 pounds troy, weighed then

commonly between 14 and 18_. At which rate guineas were very cheap at 30

shillings: they were worth above 40 shillings: and Davenant says, that

five millions then borrowed by the state did not produce the value of

two millions and a half.

[Sidenote: Political circumstances are greatly changed.]

It would be foreign to the present purpose to enter into a particular

disquisition, in order to shew the difference between the political

state of England then, and at present: let it suffice to remark in

general,

I. That there was then no possibility of determining what the current

value of a pound sterling was. It varied every month, and was daily

declining. At present it is nearly of the same standard as it has been

for many years.

II. The money-unit then had nothing to preserve it at any determinate

value. The silver, to which it was affixed, was clipped three times in a

year, while the gold sought its value as a commodity. At present the

gold cannot vary: the guinea is fixed, and must pass for 21 shillings,

let the silver be ever so light; and this gives a determinate value to

the pound sterling.

III. In 1695, the whole disorder had been coming on with rapidity; at

present it has advanced with imperceptible steps: consequently,

IV. At that time the number of permanent contracts which stretched

beyond the æra of the debasement of the standard, were many; at present

they are few.

V. In 1695, a money’d interest was hardly known. The rich had their

money in their chests; now they have it in their pocket-book.

VI. The different between the currency and the legal standard in 1695,

was one half: at present it is one twentieth.

VII. The debts of the nation did not then exceed 12 millions: now they

exceed 140[V].

Footnote V:

In 1766.

VIII. Many sums then had been borrowed on assignments of certain

branches of the excise, the amount of which was uncertain, and

deficiencies (which in such cases are unavoidable) were not made good to

the creditors. At present all is paid in determinate sums of pounds

sterling.

IX. And lastly, the question was not understood. Locke and Lowndes

_felt_, but did not _see_ distinctly, wherein the difference of their

sentiments consisted: and those who only _feel_ never describe with

perspicuity.

It was then generally imagined that a _pound_ could never be more than a

_pound_; but at present people know how to reckon coin by grains, and

see clearly that 1718 is more than 1638.

For these reasons I apprehend, that a scheme, similar to that proposed

by Mr. Lowndes, may now be mentioned without offence; that the people of

Great Britain are just now as good judges of what is for their interest,

as they were in 1695. And if the decision of a former parliament is

alledged in favour of the old standard, I answer, that such arguments

are only good, when people are disposed to pay a greater deference to

the sentiments of their fathers than their own; which I am apt to

believe is not the case at present.

[Sidenote: Reconciliation of the two opinions.]

If these answers are found satisfactory, we may conclude, that in

whatever way the disorder of the British coin is removed, the change

ought to be made in such a manner as neither to benefit or to prejudice

any, but such as have lost or gained by the debasement of the standard.

Lest, however, that these answers should be perplexing only, without

drawing conviction along with them, (which in matters of dispute is

frequently the case) I shall say something farther upon this subject,

with a view to reconcile two opinions, which are perhaps more opposite

in appearance than in reality.

I have already apprized the reader, that I pretend to reason only upon

principles, not upon exact information of facts. Circumstances which are

hid from me, will nevertheless work their full effect, and may render

the best deduced principles delusive, when, without attending to them,

we pretend to draw conclusions.

Now, such circumstances in the present case there must certainly be;

otherwise every body in England would agree, that the standard is at

present actually debased, and that the restitution of it would

effectually be raising it from what it has been for these many years.

Upon this supposition, the consequences we have drawn must be allowed by

every body to be just and natural.

Nothing, I think, is more certain, than that all men would be of the

same opinion upon every proposition, were such propositions well

understood, and did all parties make the application of them to the same

object, and in the same sense.

If this be true, let me try to give a reason how it happens that there

are different sentiments in England upon the method of restoring the

standard.

[Sidenote: The question in dispute is not understood.]

I. First then, the question is not understood; and the principal thing

which obscures people’s ideas concerning it, is their constantly

attending to the denominations of the money of accompt, instead of

attending to the denominations of the coin. These two things are

universally confounded. A pound sterling is always a pound sterling, no

doubt; but the grains of silver which compose one pound sterling are not

the same in number with those which compose every pound sterling. Now,

the moment money is realized in the metals, and that the standard

measure of value is affixed to them, let them be worn or not, it is very

evident that nothing but the grains of the metal in the several pieces

can represent the scale by which the coin becomes a measure of value.

Whenever, therefore, people lose sight of this undoubted truth, and

begin to measure by the denominations of the ideal money of accompt,

without examining whether that value be exactly realized or not, it is

just the same thing as if they were to measure a length upon a plan

without adjusting their compasses to the scale, and upon a bare

supposition that the opening they had, by accident might answer to the

length they were to measure.

[Sidenote: The true characteristic of a change in the standard is

not attended to.]

II. The state, in every country almost, is negligent in instructing the

people of the consequences of every variation in the coin; and likewise

negligent in providing against the inconveniences which result from all

changes in those matters. It is not to be supposed that the common

people can exactly comprehend the consequences of making a pound

sometimes consist of more silver and sometimes of less. When the pieces

are heavy however, they weigh them in their hand, and say _this is good

money_; but when they find that they must give as much in tale of this

good money to pay their debts, as if it had been light, they _feel_ a

regret, but they do not _see_ the injustice of such a regulation.

Farther, when people find that upon a reformation of the coin they are

still obliged to acquit their obligations with the same denominations as

before, is it not very natural for sellers to insist upon having the

former prices for all sorts of commodities. This is the reason why the

universal experience of France (which nation has been more accustomed to

variations in their coin, than England) proves that merchandize does not

immediately rise and fall according to the variations of the coin. But

the operations of foreign trade, which are immediately felt and profited

of by the trading part of the nation, insensibly affect the dealings of

the body of the people, and produce, after a certain time, those

effects, which ought to have followed immediately upon the innovation.

[Sidenote: Principles will not operate their effect without the

assistance of the state.]

Now it is very certain that the principles we have been laying down will

not, in practice, answer, unless the state should lend a hand, both by

instructing their subjects in the nature of the change intended, and by

interposing their authority to see justice done among them.

[Sidenote: When people understand one another, they soon agree.]

Those who oppose the doctrine we have been laying down, go upon the

supposition that the law ought to order all obligations to be acquitted

according to their denomination after the reformation of the standard. I

go upon the supposition that it is just they should be acquitted

according to the intrinsic value. Where then lies the difference between

our sentiments? We are of the same opinion, as to the main question: for

were it true that prices were not to sink 5 _per cent._ after the

reformation, I should be the last man to propose, that debtors ought to

be allowed conversions in paying with the new standard; and I suppose

that those who support the contrary sentiment would be just as little

inclined to oppose a conversion, upon the supposition that ninety five

pounds, after the supposed reformation, were to be equivalent, to all

intents and purposes, to a hundred at present.

[Sidenote: Permanent contracts are confounded with sale in this

dispute.]

III. The clearest and the best reasoners I have met with upon this

subject, are apt upon some occasions to confound the two species of

circulation which we have endeavoured carefully to distinguish; to wit,

the involuntary which takes place in acquitting _contracts already

made_, with the voluntary which takes place in common sales. As an

example of this, and as a means of reconciling opinions, and not with

any intention of entring upon refutations, I shall here extract a

passage from Mr. Harris upon coins, Part II. p. 96. and insert in

Italics what I think will explain the difference between our sentiments.

“You affirm (says he) that if the rate of a guinea be reduced one

shilling, there would be a loss of the one and twentieth part upon all

the guineas in the nation;” (_yes, as often as debtors might be obliged

to give them to their creditors for pounds sterling_) “but that there

would be no loss at all upon guineas, if they were ordered to pass for

twenty one shillings, having in them no more silver than there is at

present in twenty standard shillings.” (_no, certainly; because the

debtor would pay his debt with the same number of guineas which he had

borrowed._) "Strange, very strange indeed, that there should be such

magic in the word shilling, and the number twenty one, as to make the

same thing, only calling it by different names, have such different

effects! It is scarce necessary to take any farther notice of such a

mere jingle of words; but out of tenderness to these young logicians,

but more out of regard to those who may be deceived by them, if any such

there can be, I shall endeavour to shew, that our scheme is more

favourable to them than their own.

“It is self-evident that the nation would not lose one farthing upon all

the gold it exported, by a reduction of the mint price of gold: for this

reduction would not in the least debase the intrinsic quality of the

gold, and every guinea that went into foreign parts, would fetch there

as much afterwards, as it doth at present.”

What I have put in Italics clears up the opinion which the author

endeavours to refute. He seems much surprized to find magic concealed

under the word _shilling_, and _twenty one_, whereas there are no words

more magical in all the jargon of astrology than in these, and in every

term relating to the denominations of money of accompt. Is it not very

magical, that the same quantity of silver at present found in twenty one

light shillings, being coined into twenty standard shillings, should

only acquit a pound sterling of debt, and that were it coined again into

twenty one shillings, it would acquit one pound one shilling of debt?

Nay more, were it coined into a hundred shillings, it would acquit a

debt of five pounds.

The doctrine, therefore, which the author endeavours to combat in this

place, is not so ridiculous as it appeared to him; but he has not, in

this place, attended to the difference between paying what one owes, and

buying merchandize in the course of foreign trade. Let me illustrate

this by an example.

I come to my creditor with a guinea, and I say, I owe you twenty one

shillings; there you have them. No, says my creditor, that piece is but

twenty, by the new regulation; I must have one shilling more. There is

no reasoning here, the denomination of the coin must decide between us,

not the weight, not the intrinsic value of what I had borrowed. But I go

to a shop to buy a hat, the hatter asks twenty shillings; I offer him a

guinea and demand a shilling to be returned; says the hatter, That

guinea is worth but twenty shillings: Very well, say I, if my piece of

gold is worth no more than 20 shillings, your hat was, yesterday, worth

a shilling less than it, and, consequently, to day is worth no more than

19 shillings.

In the last example, magic has no effect, and to such cases Mr. Harris

has only attended in the passage cited; but in the first, the magical

word of a statute, is capable to undo one half of the nation; although

their ruin does not imply the exportation of a shilling out of the

kingdom, or any benefit to foreigners, unless they be creditors to Great

Britain.

[Sidenote: The interest of creditors is always the predominant,

and determines the opinion of a nation.]

IV. The sentiments which the people of England generally form upon this

subject, are directed by those of the higher classes. These are all of

the class of creditors, and very naturally retain sentiments analogous

to their own interest. I am far from insinuating any thing here to the

prejudice of this class; all I mean is, that upon an obscure point,

people lean naturally to that side which favours themselves, especially

when the nation’s interest, and the interest of justice, do not

evidently declare against it.

I call the higher classes of a people creditors; because they live upon

a fortune already made, and draw their income from permanent contracts:

and those are the debtors, who are bound on the opposite side of such

contracts. Besides these two interests, there is another which can never

be at the mercy of any arbitrary regulation as to money: those, to wit,

who live upon their industry, and who enter into no contract but that of

sale: they regulate their prices according to the intrinsic value of the

coin at the time; whereas the others who are engaged in permanent

contracts, must regulate theirs according to the words of their

contract, and the interpretation which the law puts upon those words.

Every man therefore, whose fortune is already made, either in land,

money, or salary, has an interest in seeing the standard raised, and

those who are bound in permanent contracts with them, are those only who

can be hurt by it.

Farther, the higher classes in Great Britain have always the penning of

the law. Is it then surprising, to find the interest of creditors

constantly attended to, in new regulations of the standard? When Princes

arbitrarily debase the standard, they debase it because at such a time

they are virtually in the class of debtors: their expence then exceeds

their income. On the contrary, when wars come to cease, and when their

expences are reduced within the compass of their revenue, they raise the

standard: because they become then of the class of creditors.

This principle is a key to all the mystery of the raising and sinking of

the numerary value of the French coin in former times, before public

credit was established among them.

Now let us apply this reasoning to the present case.

Since in all changes upon the coin we find (of late) the interest of

creditors constantly attended to in Great Britain, is it not very

natural for people to reason upon the supposition that there is no

injustice in raising the standard; and is it not natural to suppose that

government will act upon the same principles in their future regulations

of the standard, as upon the last occasion in 1695? Every one,

therefore, whose fortune is made, finds it his interest to have the

standard brought back to what it was formerly; and he does not perceive

the injury such a regulation would do to his debtors. On the other hand,

the merchants see plainly that if this standard should be restored upon

an imaginary principle of justice, the prices of commodities will not

fall as they ought to do, and as foreign trade requires they should;

they are therefore against raising the standard, because it will be a

prejudice to trade, a clog upon exportation, and therefore a loss to

themselves.

This, I think, very naturally accounts for the difference of opinion

among the people of England, upon a matter of very general concern, and

nothing is so easy as to reconcile all those interests by doing justice

to every one, and injustice to none.

[Sidenote: Application of principles to the change lately made by

the Dutch with respect to their coin.]

As an illustration of this subject, I shall cite a recent example of a

change made in the circulation of Dutch ducats, executed by that wise

nation, seemingly in direct opposition to the principles here laid down,

and exactly consistent with those we are endeavouring to explode.

The States General lately called down all the light ducats, and ordered

them to go by weight, as bullion, without making any allowance to such

as might suffer by it.

This regulation, and a new coinage of ducats, had the immediate effect

of raising the value of that species of current money; consequently, it

may be said, that debtors by that regulation have been proportionally

hurt, by an act of one of the wisest governments in Europe, if our

principles are admitted to be just. But before this conclusion can be

drawn, circumstances must be examined.

Ducats in Holland are the _price_, _not_ the _measure_ of value, having

no fixed legal denomination. The current silver coin is what the state,

and all the mercantile interest attend to: and in proportion as this

current silver coin or bank species is become light, the agio upon that

currency has risen. The agio then, in combination with every currency,

furnishes an invariable measure for value, as well as the bank money of

Amsterdam; and to that every one attends who regards his interest.

The state, therefore, by this arbitrary measure, or sudden revolution on

the ducats, did not hurt any debtor; because debtors never were obliged

to give ducats in payment.

Will any one say that the Dutch silver currency, now that the agio is

high, is of equal value in inland dealings as formerly when it was low:

and must not the same argument hold with respect to the currency of

Great Britain, although no such thing as agio be there known? Or will it

be said, that because the Dutch, who have an invariable measure of value

independent of their coin, make an arbitrary operation upon their

currency, which is only price; that therefore the English, who have no

invariable measure of value independent of their coin, may make a

similar operation upon theirs?

[Sidenote: All decisions in political questions depend upon

circumstances.]

Thus it is that circumstances influence our decisions upon all political

matters; and principles well deduced do not cease to be true, although

they appear contradictory to experience, in cases where every

circumstance is not exactly known. For this reason, I shall be very far

from deciding as to the part proper to be taken by the British

government; I go no farther than to point out plain principles; it is

the business of statesmen to apply them according to circumstances.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAP. XIII.

_In what Sense the Standard may be said to have been debased by Law, and

in what Sense it may be said to have suffered a gradual Debasement by

the Operation of political Causes._

[Sidenote: These proportions appear contradictory.]

In the course of this inquiry, the standard has been represented

sometimes as having been debased by law, above thirty years ago, to 113

grains fine gold, at which it remains at present, and sometimes as

having gradually declined for these many years.

These propositions are true, though they appear inconsistent, or at

least inaccurate; and they must now be set in a clear light.

I have had no opportunity of tracing the progress of the variations as

to the price of the metals in the English market from the beginning of

this century; and to supply the want of exact observation, I have gone

upon the following suppositions: 1. That while the guineas were left to

find their own value (being regulated by the law below their worth, and

not being considered as a lawful money) they naturally would fix

themselves according to the market proportion of the metals. 2. That, at

the time the standard was affixed to the guineas in conjunction with the

silver, and both were made lawful money, the value of the guineas was

exactly inquired into and regulated at their precise value.

[Sidenote: Debased by law when affixed to the gold.]

From these circumstances I conclude, that after this affixing the

standard to both species, the least variation in the proportion of the

metals must have had the effect of _throwing the standard_ (as I may

call it) upon that metal which was the least valuable in the coin: and

since it is certain, that for thirty years backward, at least, gold coin

of equal denomination has been less valuable than silver, payments have

been made, commonly, in gold, under the sanction of law, while the

silver has been melted down or exported; for these reasons, I have

frequently represented the standard as long ago debased by law to the

value of 113 grains fine gold; and I believe I have advanced nothing but

the truth.

[Sidenote: Effects which the changing the proportion of the metals

has upon melting the coin and regulating payments.]

Here we may conclude, that it is impossible for any law to keep the

standard attached both to the gold and the silver coin at once, without

preserving constantly the market proportion of the metals at par, with

the numerary value of the coins. The rise of silver for one week in the

London market is a cause of the silver coin’s being melted; and during

that week, all payments will be made in gold. If the week following,

gold should rise above the proportion fixed in the coin, gold coin would

be melted, and payments would be made in silver.

[Sidenote: Payments made by bankers regulate all others.]

I do not, at present, consider the small circulation either among the

nobility, or among the commons; but I attend to the great circulation

among bankers, who have all the specie in the nation in their hands once

in a year; and I say, that the payments they make must influence those

of all others. Every gentleman pays with the money his banker gives him:

did the bank of England find its interest in paying in silver, would it

not soon become plentiful in circulation, and would not payments begin

to be made in it preferably to gold?

The standard, therefore, has been debased by law by being affixed to the

gold, of which metal the pound sterling has uniformly, for these thirty

years past, been worth 113 grains, in new guineas.

But I have also said, that the standard has been gradually diminishing;

consequently it might be objected, that if a pound sterling was, thirty

years ago, equal to 113 grains of gold, if it has been ever since at

that standard, and if it be to-day 113 grains of gold, it cannot be said

to have been gradually diminishing. The answer is evident, when we

reflect upon our principles.

[Sidenote: The standard gradually debased, by the rising of the

silver.]

The standard affixed to the _gold_ has been diminishing, because these

113 grains of gold have been diminishing in their value with regard to

the _silver_. When the guinea, in 1728, was fixed at 21 shillings, the

pound sterling was fixed thereby at 113 grains fine gold, as has been

said; consequently, if that weight of gold was then worth 1718.7 fine

silver, there was no debasement made by that statute: but in consequence

of that statute, the debasement must take place the moment the silver

rose in its value.

I am not authorized, by any fact, to advance, that at the time the

guineas were brought down from 21 shillings 6 pence to 21 shillings, the

metals in the coin were not put at the exact proportion they then bore

in the English market. The great Sir Isaac Newton was the person

consulted in that matter, and to criticise his decision without plain

evidence, would be rash. All I shall say is, that in France the

proportion then was 1 to 14½, although according to the English statute

it was regulated as 1 to 15.21.

[Sidenote: The proportion of the metals, in 1728, supposed to have

been as 15.21 is to 1.]

Let us therefore suppose, that in 1728, the metals were at the

proportion of 1 to 15.21; and that 113 grains of fine gold were really

worth 1718.7 grains of fine silver.

[Sidenote: By what progression the silver standard has been

debased.]

But the silver having risen, the standard, for this reason, has been

thrown upon the gold, and has constantly remained at 113 grains (that

is, in new guineas;) and as the metals have varied from the proportion

of 1 to 15.21, to that of 1 to 14.5, by the same steps has the value of

the pound sterling, in silver, changed from 1718.7, to 1638.5; which

1638.5 is to 113 as 14.5 is to 1: and were the proportion between gold

and silver to come by slow degrees to the Chinese proportion of 1 to 10,

the pound sterling would still remain at 113 grains of fine gold, as it

has been since the year 1728; but the silver coin would either be melted

down, or so rubbed away, as to make a pound sterling of it weigh no more

than 1130 grains of fine silver, so as to bring it to the proportion of

10 to 1, together with the metals.

Does not this evidently shew the defect of fixing the standard either to

one or to both the species?

As a farther illustration of this matter, which, because of its

importance, cannot, I think, be too often repeated, I shall shew, in a

very few words, how far people are mistaken, when they imagine that by

reducing the guineas to 20 shillings, and re-coining the silver

according to the plan proposed, the standard of the pound sterling will

be brought to that of Elizabeth.

[Sidenote: The standard of Elizabeth for the pound sterling, was

1718.7 grains silver, and 157.6 grains gold, both fine.]

When Elizabeth fixed the standard of the pound sterling at 1718.7 grains

of fine silver, the proportion of the metals, according to the table in

the essay of money and coins above cited, was as 10.905 to 1;

consequently that pound paid in gold was, in 1601, equal to 157.6 grains

fine gold.

[Sidenote: The gold standard of her pound worth, at present,

2285.3 grains fine silver.]

Had, therefore, by accident, the standard been then fixed to the gold,

in place of the silver, and had the silver ever since been considered as

a commodity, the pound sterling at present would be worth 157.6 grains

of fine gold, and consequently worth 2285.3 grains fine silver, at the

proportion of 14.5 to 1; whereas, having been fixed to the silver, it

has been kept at the old standard of 1718.7, and consequently is worth

no more than 118.5 grains of fine gold.

[Sidenote: The variation of the metals has produced three

different standards of Elizabeth.]

Now supposing that in the year 1601, three different payments of a pound

sterling had been made, and locked up in a chest till this day, let us

inquire what would be the value of each at present, were they to be

melted down, and sold as bullion in the English market. The first

payment I shall suppose to have been made in silver, to the value of

1718.7 grains fine silver, which make of standard silver 1858.06 grains;

this sold at the rate of 65 pence an ounce, the present supposed value

of silver, at the rate [Sidenote: One worth £1 0 11⅜ present

currency.] of the gold, when full weight, makes £1 0 11⅜. The second

payment I shall suppose to have been made in gold,[Sidenote:

Another worth £1 7 10⅞] to the value of 157.6 grains fine gold, which

makes of standard gold 171.9 grains, this at the mint price of gold,

that is, £3 17 10½ the ounce, makes of present sterling, £1 7 10⅞.

[Sidenote: And a third worth £1 4 5⅛.]

The third payment I suppose to have been made, one half in gold, one

half in silver, which makes 859.36 grains fine silver, and 78.8 grains

of fine gold, which, at the above conversions,

makes for the silver £0

10 511⁄16

And for the gold £0 13 117⁄16

—————

Together £1 4 5⅛

[Sidenote: The last is the true standard of Elizabeth for the

pound sterling, and worth at present 2002 grains fine silver,

and 138 ditto gold.]

Here we have three different pounds sterling, produced purely by the

variation in the proportion of the metals, although in 1601, they must

have been absolutely the same. Which of the three, therefore, is the

standard of Elizabeth? Is it not evident, that it can be no other than

according to the value of that pound which was paid, half in gold, and

half in silver? And is it not also plain, that this is the exact

arithmetical mean proportional between the gold and the silver? Let the

silver and the gold pounds be added together, they make £2 8 10¼; the

half of which is the value of that pound which was paid half in gold,

and half in silver, to wit, £1 4 5⅛ of the present gold currency,

reckoning standard silver at 65 pence _per_ ounce, and gold at the mint

price. To realize this value exactly in gold and silver, while the

proportion remains as 1 to 14.5, it would be proper to put into the

pound sterling 2001.9 grains troy fine silver, and 138.04 grains of fine

gold. These quantities of the metals would answer exactly to the value

of £1 4 10¼, the mean proportional above mentioned.

Here then is the standard of Elizabeth: if it has any excellence in it

above all others, it might be preferred.

[Sidenote: But may vary at every moment.]

It must however be observed, that it will remain the standard only

whilst the proportion of 1 to 14.5, upon which it has been established,

shall remain unvaried between the metals; and it will vary from where it

might be at present settled, in the same manner as it has varied at all

times from the year 1601, to wit, according to the vicissitudes which

shall happen in the proportion of the metals. But at every period of

time, and in all different varieties of proportion between gold and

silver, no problem is more easily resolved than that of the mean

proportional between the gold and silver, the moment one knows the

proportion of the metals at the time; as shall be demonstrated in a

following chapter.

[Sidenote: Gold rose during the whole 17th century;]

During the whole seventeenth century, gold rose in its value; or to

express this as the French writers do, the _proportion of the metals was

increasing_, from that of 1 to 10.905, to that of 1 to 15; and in Spain

it got up to that of 1 to 16. The standard, therefore being fixed by

Elizabeth to the silver, was then attached to that metal which was the

least sought for; and who knows whether the mercantile interest at that

time, and in the succeeding reigns, did not find it their interest to

keep it attached to the silver, for the same reason they now wish it

attached to the gold?

[Sidenote: and silver has risen since the beginning of this

century.]

Since the beginning of this century the metals have taken a different

turn, and now the _proportion is diminishing_; that is to say, the value

of _silver is rising_; the consequence of which is, that the mercantile

interest would gladly have the standard fixed to the gold; because in

this case, (the proportion of the metals being upon the diminishing

hand) the standard of the pound will gradually diminish, and trading men

will thereby gain, according to the principles above laid down.

From what has been said, the reader may reconcile me with myself, when I

sometimes have spoken of the standard of the pound sterling, as having

been debased by law thirty years ago, to 113 grains of gold; and when,

upon other occasions, I have represented it as having descended by

degrees to where it is at present. Had I involved my reasoning in all

the distinctions which I have now explained, I should have lost my way,

and perplexed my subject, instead of throwing light upon it. I shall

hereafter examine how these circumstances may be attended to in a new

regulation of the mint.

Providing the subject be well understood, men of capacity will be found

to execute this great operation according to justice, in spight of the

most perplexing combinations.

Let me here recapitulate a few positions, which we may now have occasion

to apply.

[Sidenote: Some positions recapitulated.]

I. The standard is debased by being fixed by statute to 113 grains of

fine gold, not by the act of fixing it, but by the rising of the silver

since that time, which the statute could not prevent: and gold being now

the metal the least sought for, is become the standard of the pound

sterling, and regulates its value so, that no silver coin, which is

above the proportion of the gold, can remain in currency.

II. That according as the proportion of the metals shall diminish from

what it is at present, the standard will still fall lower with respect

to silver, but will remain fixed with respect to gold, at 113 grains.

III. That the true value of the pound sterling will always be found in

the mean proportion between 113 grains fine gold, and 1638.5 grains fine

silver.

IV. That if light guineas are allowed to pass current, the standard will

fall below the 113 grains, and the price of gold bullion will rise above

£3 17 10½ in the English market.

V. That upon calling in the light guineas afterwards, a hurt will be

done to all those who have contracted during their currency.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAP. XIV.

_Circumstances to be attended to in a new Regulation of the British

Coin._

I think I have sufficiently laid open all the principles which can

influence a new regulation of the British standard, as far as a change

may influence either the value of the money-unit, or the interests

within the state.

As to the first, it has been said above, that if, by the future

regulation, any change whatsoever shall be made upon the value of the

money-unit, as it stands at present, the adopting any other whatsoever

is a thing purely arbitrary.

[Sidenote: The adopting the standard of Elizabeth has an air of

justice.]

To people who do not understand the nature of such operations, it may

have an air of justice to support the unit at what is commonly believed

to be the standard of Queen Elizabeth, to wit, at 1718.5 grains of fine

silver.

[Sidenote: Advantages of that of Mary I.]

The regulating the standard of both silver and gold to 11⁄12 fine, and

the pound sterling to four ounces standard silver, as it stood during

the reign of Queen Mary I. has also its advantages, as Mr. Harris has

observed. It makes the crown piece to weigh just one ounce, the shilling

four penny weight, and the penny eight grains; consequently, were the

new statute to bear, that the weight of the coin should regulate its

currency upon certain occasions, the having the pieces adjusted to

certain aliquot parts of weight, would make weighing easy, and would

accustom the common people to judge of the value of money by its weight,

and not by the stamp.

In that case, there might be a conveniency in striking the gold coins of

the same weight with the silver; because the proportion of their values

would then constantly be the same with the proportion of the metals. The

gold crowns would be worth at present, 3_l._ 12_s._ 6_d._ the half

crowns 1_l._ 16_s._ 3_d._ the gold shillings 14_s._ and 6_d._ and the

half 7_s._ and 3_d._ This was antiently the practice in the Spanish

mints.

I have, in one place, mentioned the _pound troy_ as the best weight of

all for the pound sterling; and so it would be, were the pound sterling,

by its nature, susceptible of being fixed to any determinate quantity of

the metals. But what I there suggested was only thrown out to shew, that

the choice of any other value than the present is a matter of no

consequence, when all interests within doors are properly taken care of,

and when confusion and perplexity are avoided in making the alteration.

[Sidenote: Conversions necessary in every case.]

The interests within the state can, I think, be nowise perfectly

protected but by permitting conversions of value from the old to the new

standard, whatever it be, and by regulating the footing of such

conversions by act of parliament, according to circumstances. The

intention of this chapter is to point out some circumstances to which it

would be proper to attend; and to propose a scheme of establishing a new

standard, which might perhaps render conversions and regulations less

necessary.

Schemes are here proposed, not to be adopted, but as a means of setting

this important matter in different lights, and thereby, perhaps, of

furnishing hints to some superior genius, who may form a plan liable to

fewer inconveniences than any I can devise.

[Sidenote: Every interest within the state to be examined.]

For this purpose, I shall examine those interests which will chiefly

merit the attention of government, when they form a regulation for the

future acquitting of permanent contracts already entred into. Such as

may be contracted afterwards will naturally follow the new standard.

[Sidenote: Landed interest examined.]

The landed interest is, no doubt, the most considerable in the nation.

Let us therefore examine, in the first place, what regulations it may be

proper to make, in order to do justice to this great class, with respect

to the land-tax on one hand, and with respect to their lessees on the

other.

The valuation of the lands of England was made many years ago, and

reasonably ought to be supported at the real value of the pound sterling

at that time, according to the principles already laid down. The general

valuation, therefore, of the whole kingdom will rise according to this

scheme. This will be considered as an injustice; and no doubt it would

be so, if, for the future, the land tax be imposed as heretofore,

without attending to this circumstance; but as that imposition is

annual, as it is laid on by the landed interest itself, who compose the

parliament, it is to be supposed that this great class will, at least,

take care of their own interest.

Were the valuation of the lands to be stated according to the valuation

of the pound sterling of 1718.7 grains of silver, which is commonly

supposed to be the standard of Elizabeth, there would be no great injury

done: this would raise the valuation only 5 _per cent._ and the land tax

in proportion.

There is no class of inhabitants in all England so much at their ease,

and so free from taxes, as the class of farmers. By living in the

country, and by consuming the fruits of the earth without their

suffering any alienation, they avoid the effect of many excises, which,

by those who live in corporations, are felt upon _many articles_ of

their consumption, as well as on those which are immediately loaded with

these impositions. For this reason it will not, perhaps, appear

unreasonable, if the additional 5 _per cent._ on the land tax were

thrown upon this class, and not upon the landlords.

With respect to leases, it may be observed, that we have gone upon the

supposition that the pound sterling, in the year 1728, was worth 1718.7

grains of fine silver, and 113 grains of fine gold.

There would, I think, be no injustice done the lessees of all the lands

in the kingdom, were their rents to be fixed at the mean proportion of

these values. We have observed how the pound sterling has been gradually

diminishing in its worth from that time, by the gradual rise of the

silver. This mean proportion, therefore, will nearly answer to what the

value of the pound sterling was seventeen years ago; that is to say, in

1743; supposing the rise of the silver to have been uniform: and

seventeen years, I apprehend, is not much above the mean proportion of

the time elapsed of all the leases entred into with the landed interest

of England.

It may be farther alleged in favour of the landlords, that the gradual

debasement of the standard has been more prejudicial to their interest

in letting their lands, than to the farmers in disposing of the fruits

of them. Proprietors cannot so easily raise their rents upon new leases,

as farmers can raise the prices of their grain, according to the

debasement of the value of the currency. We have shewn how the

operations of trade communicate their influence to country markets; but

as the cause of the rise of prices is not rightly understood by country

people, and as it is commonly ascribed rather to accident than to any

thing permanent, it is easy to perceive how such a circumstance must be

prejudicial to the landed interest. These combinations are too

complicated to fall under any calculation, and nothing but the wisdom

and penetration of the legislature is capable of estimating them at

their just value.

The pound sterling, thus regulated at the mean proportion of its worth,

as it stands at present, and as it stood in 1728, may be realized in

1678.6 grains of fine silver, and 115.76 grains fine gold; which is 2.4

_per cent._ above the value of the present currency. No injury,

therefore, would be done to lessees, and no unreasonable gain would

accrue to the landed interest, in appointing conversions of all land

rents at 2½ _per cent._ above the value of the present currency.

Without a thorough knowledge of every circumstance relating to Great

Britain, it is impossible to lay down any plan. It is sufficient, here,

briefly to point out the principles upon which it must be regulated.

[Sidenote: The interest of the public creditors examined.]

The next interest to be considered is that of the nation’s creditors.

The right regulation of their concerns will have a considerable

influence in establishing public credit upon a solid basis, by making it

appear to all the world, that no political operation upon the money of

Great Britain can in any respect either benefit or prejudice the

interest of those who lend their money upon the faith of the nation. The

regulating also the interest of so great a body, will serve as a rule

for all creditors who are in the same circumstances, and will, upon

other accounts, be productive of greater advantages to the nation in

time coming, as we shall presently make appear.

In 1749, a new regulation was made with the public creditors, when the

interest of the whole redeemable national debt was reduced to 3 _per

cent._ This circumstance infinitely facilitates the matter, with respect

to this class, since, by this innovation of all former contracts, the

whole national debt may be considered as contracted at, or posterior to

the 25th of December 1749.

Were the state by any arbitrary operation upon money (which every

reformation must be) to diminish the value of the pound sterling, in

which the parliament at that time, bound the nation to acquit those

capitals and the interest upon them, would not all Europe say, that the

British parliament had defrauded their creditors. If therefore the

operation proposed to be performed should have a contrary tendency, to

wit, to augment the value of the pound sterling, with which the

parliament at that time bound the nation to acquit those capitals and

interests, must not all Europe also agree, that the British parliament

had defrauded the nation?

This convention with the antient creditors of the state, who, in

consequence of the debasement of the standard, might have justly claimed

an indemnification for the loss upon their capitals, lent at a time when

the pound sterling was at the value of the heavy silver, removes all

cause of complaint from that quarter. There was in the year 1749, an

innovation in all their contracts, and they are now to be considered as

creditors only from the 25th of December of that year.

I shall now give a sketch of a regulation which may be made, not only

for the national creditors at present, but in all times to come, which,

by setting money upon a solid footing, may be an advantage both to the

nation, to the creditors, and to credit in general.

Let the value of the pound sterling be inquired into during one year

preceding and one posterior to the transaction of the month of December

1749. The great sums borrowed and paid back by the nation, during that

period, will furnish data sufficient for that calculation. Let this

value of the pound be specified in troy grains of fine silver and fine

gold bullion, without mentioning any denomination of money according to

the exact proportion of the metals at that time. And let this pound be

called the _pound of national credit_.

This first operation being determined, let it be enacted, that the pound

sterling, by which the state is to borrow for the future, and that in

which the creditors are to be paid, shall be the exact mean proportion

between the quantities of gold and silver above specified, according to

the actual proportion of the metals at the time such payments shall be

made; or that the sums shall be borrowed or acquitted, one half in gold

and one half in silver, at the respective requisitions of the creditors

or of the state, when borrowing. All debts contracted posterior to 1749,

may be made liable to conversions.

The consequence of this regulation will be the insensible establishment

of a bank-money, the usefulness of which has been explained. Nothing

would be more difficult to establish by a positive institution than such

an invariable measure, and nothing will be found so easy as to let it

establish itself by its own advantages. This bank-money will be liable

to much fewer inconveniences than that of Amsterdam. There the persons

transacting must be upon the spot, here, the sterling currency may,

every quarter of a year, be adjusted by the exchequer to this invariable

standard, for the benefit of all debtors and creditors, who incline to

profit of the stability of this measure of value.

This scheme is liable to no inconvenience from the variation of the

metals, let them be ever so frequent, or hard to be determined; because

upon every occasion where there is the smallest doubt as to the actual

proportion, the option competent to creditors to be paid half in silver

and half in gold, will remove.

Such a regulation will also have this good effect, that it will give the

nation more just ideas of the nature of money, and consequently of the

influence it ought to have upon prices.

If the value of the pound sterling shall be found to have been by

accident less in December 1749, than it is at present; or if at present

(upon the account of the war, and the exportation of the more weighty

coin) the currency be found below what has commonly been since 1749, in

justice to the creditors, and to prevent all complaints, the nation may

grant them the mean proportion of the value of the pound sterling from

1749 to 1760; or any other which may to parliament appear reasonable.

This regulation must appear equitable in the eyes of all Europe, and the

strongest proof of it will be, that it will not produce the smallest

effect prejudicial to the interest of the foreign creditors. The course

of exchange with regard to them will stand precisely as before.

A Dutch, French, or German creditor, will receive the same value for his

interest in the English stocks as heretofore. This must silence all

clamours at home, being the most convincing proof, that the new

regulation of the coin will have made no alteration upon the real value

of any man’s property, let him be debtor or creditor.

The interest of every other denomination of creditors, whose contracts

are of a fresh date, may be regulated upon the same principles. But

where debts are of an old standing, justice demands, that attention be

had to the value of money at the time of contracting. Nothing but the

stability of the English coin, when compared with that of other nations,

can make such a proposal appear extraordinary. Nothing is better known

in France than this stipulation added to obligations, _argent au cours

de ce jour_, that is to say, that the sum shall be repaid in coin of the

same intrinsic value with what has been lent. Why should such a clause

be thought reasonable for guarding people against arbitrary operations

upon the numerary value of the coin, and not be found just upon every

occasion where the numerary value of it is found to be changed, let the

cause be what it will.

[Sidenote: Interest of trade examined.]

The next interest we shall examine is that of trade, when men have

attained the age of twenty one, they have no more occasion for

guardians. This may be applied to traders: they can parry with their

pen, every inconvenience which may result to other people from the

changes upon money, provided only the laws permit them to do themselves

justice with respect to their engagements. This class demands no more

than a right to convert all reciprocal obligations, into denominations

of coin of the same intrinsic value with those they have contracted in.

The next interest is that of buyers and sellers; that is, of

manufacturers, with regard to consumers, and of servants, with respect

to those who hire their personal service.

[Sidenote: Interest of buyers and sellers examined.]

The interest of this class requires a most particular attention. They

must, literally speaking, be put to school, and taught the first

principles of their trade, which is buying and selling. They must learn

to judge of price by the grains of silver and gold they receive. They

are children of a mercantile mother, however warlike the father’s

disposition may be. If it be the interest of the state that their bodies

be rendred robust and active, it is no less the interest of the state,

that their minds be instructed in the first principle of the trade they

exercise.

For this purpose, tables of conversion from the old standard to the new

must be made, and ordered to be put up in every market, in every shop.

All duties, all excises, must be converted in the same manner.

Uniformity must be made to appear every where. The smallest deviation

from this will be a stumbling block to the multitude.

Not only the interest of the individuals of the class we are at present

considering, demands the nation’s care and attention in this particular;

but the prosperity of trade and the well being of the nation, are also

deeply interested in the execution.

The whole delicacy of the intricate combinations of commerce, depends

upon a just and equable vibration of prices, according as circumstances

demand it. The more therefore the industrious classes are instructed in

the principles which influence prices, the more easily will the machine

move. A workman then learns to sink his price without regret, and can

raise it without avidity. When principles are not understood, prices

cannot gently fall, they must be pulled down; and merchants dare not

suffer them to rise, for fear of abuse, even although the perfection of

an infant manufacture should require it.

[Sidenote: Interest of the bank examined.]

The last interest I shall examine is that of the bank of England, which

naturally must regulate that of every other.

Had this great company followed the example of other banks, and

established a bank-money of an invariable standard, as the measure of

all their debts and credits, they would not have been liable to any

inconvenience upon a variation of the standard.

I am not sufficiently versed in English affairs to be able to sift out

every reason which that company may have had to neglect a thing which

other companies have found of such importance.

An attention to the circumstances of the time of its institution, and to

others relative to the principles of English government with regard to

money, may help us to guess at what other people, who have access to be

informed, may discover with certainty.

The bank of England was projected about the year 1694, at a time when

the current money of the nation was in the greatest disorder, and

government in the greatest distress, both for money and for credit.

Commerce was then at a very low ebb, and the only, or at least the most

profitable trade of any, was jobbing in coin, and carrying backwards and

forwards the precious metals from Holland to England. Merchants profited

also greatly from the effects which the utter disorder of the coin

produced upon the price of merchandize.

At such a juncture the resolution was taken to make a new coinage, and

upon the prospect of this, a company was found, who, for an exclusive

charter to hold a bank for 13 years, willingly lent the government

upwards of a million sterling at 8 _per cent._ (in light money I

suppose) with a prospect of being repaid both interest and capital in

heavy. This was not all: part of the money lent, was to be applied for

the establishment of the bank, and no less than 4000 pounds a year was

allowed to the company, above the full interest, for defraying the

charge of management.

Under such circumstances the introduction of bank-money was very

superfluous, and would have been very impolitic. That invention is

calculated against the raising of the standard; but here the bank

profited of that rise in its quality of creditor for the money lent, and

took care not to commence debtor by circulating their paper, until the

effect of the new regulation took place in 1695. That is after the

general recoinage of all the clipped silver.

From that time till now, the bank of England has been the basis of the

nation’s credit; and with great reason, has been constantly under the

most intimate protection of every minister.

The value of the pound sterling, as we have seen, has been declining

ever since the year 1601, the standard being fixed to silver during all

that century, while the gold was constantly rising. No sooner had the

proportion taken another turn, and silver begun to rise, than the

government of England threw the standard, virtually, upon the gold, by

regulating the value of the guineas at the exact proportion of the

market, whether at the instigation of the bank, or not, I shall not

pretend to determine. By these operations, however, the company has

constantly been a gainer (in its quality of debtor) upon all the paper

in circulation; and therefore has lost nothing by not having established

a bank-money.

The interest of this great company being established upon the principles

we have endeavoured to explain, it is very evident that the government

of England never will take any step in the reformation of the coin,

which in its consequences can prove hurtful to the bank. Such a step

would be contrary both to justice and to common sense. To make a

regulation which, by raising the standard, will prove beneficial to the

public creditors, to the prejudice of the bank (which I may call the

public debtor) would be an operation upon public credit, like that of a

person who is at great pains to support his house by props upon all

sides, and who at the same time blows up the foundation of it with

gun-powder.

We may therefore conclude, that with regard to the bank of England, as

well as every other private banker, the notes which are constantly

payable upon demand, must be made liable to a conversion at the actual

value of the pound sterling at the time of the new regulation.

That the bank will gain by this, is very certain; but the circulation of

their notes is so swift that it would be absurd to allow to the then

possessors of them, that indemnification, which naturally should be

shared by all those through whose hands they have passed, in proportion

to the debasement of the standard during the time of their respective

possession.

Having now shortly examined the several interests within the state,

according to that combination of circumstances, which, with lame

information, I can form to myself, I must again observe that other

circumstances, to which I am a stranger, will nevertheless operate their

effects. These must be carefully examined, and strictly attended to,

before the proper regulation can be established.

My reasoning has proceeded entirely upon the supposition that the

reformation of the standard implies a change upon the intrinsic value of

the unit of money of accompt, and that strict justice is to be done to

every one, so as to render the change neither profitable or hurtful to

any, but such as have been unjustly gainers or losers by the former

disorder in the coin.

[Sidenote: Inconveniences attending all innovations.]

No quality in a statesman is more amiable or more admirable, than

justice and impartiality in every step which can affect the complicated

interests of the people he governs. Such however is the nature of human

society, that the inconveniences resulting from every innovation, do

frequently more than overbalance all the advantages which are obtained

from the closest attention to material and distributive justice upon

such occasions. For this reason, innovations are to be avoided as much

as possible, especially when by their nature they must be sudden.

[Sidenote: Argument for preserving the standard at the present

value.]

Were the pound sterling preserved at its present value, it would, no

doubt, be a plain adulteration of the former standard, and yet I do not

know if it would be a more unpopular measure than another which might

restore it, and at the same time do justice to every interest within the

state; because I apprehend that the greatest hurt done to most people,

with regard to their pecuniary interest, consists in the change. Every

one _feels_ a sudden change, but those only who reflect and who combine,

_perceive_ the consequences of a gradual one.

[Sidenote: That every change must either hurt the bank or the

public creditors.]

Besides these considerations which are in common to all states, the

government of Great Britain has one peculiar to itself. The interest of

the bank, and that of the creditors, are diametrically opposite: every

thing which raises the standard hurts the bank, every thing which can

sink it, hurts the creditors: and upon the right management of the one

and the other, depends the solidity of public credit. For these reasons

I am apt to believe, that, without the most certain prospect of

conducting a restitution of the standard to the general advantage, as

well as approbation of the nation, no minister will ever undertake so

dangerous an operation.

[Sidenote: A more easy method of making a change upon the

standard.]

I shall now propose an expedient which may remove at least some of the

inconveniences which would result from so extensive an undertaking as

that of regulating the respective interests in Great Britain by a

positive law, upon a change in the value of their money of accompt.

Suppose then, that before any change is made in the coin, government

should enter into a transaction with the public creditors, and ascertain

a permanent value for the pound sterling for the future, specified in a

determined proportion of the fine metals in common bullion, without any

regard to money, of accompt, or to any coin whatever.

This preliminary step being taken, let the intended alteration of the

standard be proclaimed a certain time before it is to commence. Let the

nature of the change be clearly explained, and let all such as are

engaged in contracts which are dissolvable at will upon the prestations

stipulated, be acquitted between the parties, or innovated as they shall

think proper, with certification, that posterior to a certain day, the

stipulations formerly entred into, shall be binding according to the

denominations of the money of accompt in the new standard.

As to permanent contracts, which cannot at once be fulfilled and

dissolved, such as leases, the parliament may either prescribe the

methods and terms of conversion; or a liberty may be given to the

parties to annul the contract, upon the debtor’s refusing to perform his

agreement according to the new standard. Contracts, on the other hand,

might remain stable, with respect to creditors who would be satisfied

with payments made on the footing of the old standard. If the rise

intended should not be very considerable, no great injustice can follow

such a regulation.

Annuities are now thoroughly understood, and the value of them is

brought to so nice a calculation, that nothing will be easier than to

regulate these upon the footing of the value paid for them, or of the

subject affected by them. If by the regulation land-rents are made to

rise in denomination, the annuities charged upon them, ought to rise in

proportion; if in intrinsic value, the annuity should remain as it was.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

CHAP. XV.

_Regulations which the Principles of this Inquiry point out as expedient

to be made by a new Statute for regulating_ the British _Coin_.

Let us now examine what regulations it may be proper to make by a new

statute concerning the coin of Great Britain, in order to preserve

always the same exact value of the pound sterling realized in gold and

in silver, in spite of all the incapacities inherent in the metals to

perform the functions of an invariable scale or measure of value.

[Sidenote: 1. Regulation, as to the standard.]

I shall not pretend to determine the precise standard which government

may prefer as the best to be chosen for the value of a pound sterling in

all future times; but let it be what it will, the first point is to

determine the exact number of grains of fine gold and fine silver which

are to compose it, according to the then proportion of the metals in the

London market.

[Sidenote: 2. As to the weight.]

2. To determine the proportion of these metals with the pound troy, and

in regard that the standard of gold and silver is different, let the

mint price of both metals be regulated according to the pound troy fine.

[Sidenote: 3. Mint price.]

3. To fix the mint price within certain limits: that is to say, to leave

to the King and Council, by proclamation, to carry the mint price of

bullion up to the value of the coin, as is the present regulation, or to

sink it to _per cent._ below that price, according as government

shall incline to impose a duty upon coinage.

[Sidenote: 4. Denominations.]

4. To order that silver and gold coin shall be struck of such

denominations as the King shall think fit to appoint; in which the

proportion of the metals above determined, shall be constantly observed

through every denomination of the coin, until necessity shall make a new

general coinage unavoidable.

[Sidenote: 5. Marking the weight on the coin.]

5. To have the number of grains of the fine metal in every piece marked

upon the exergue, or upon the legend of the coin, in place of some

initial letters of titles, which not one person in a thousand can

decypher; and to make the coin of as compact a form as possible,

diminishing the surface of it as much as is consistent with beauty.

[Sidenote: 6. Liberty to stipulate payment in gold or silver.]

6. That it shall be lawful for all contracting parties to stipulate

their payments either in gold or silver coin, or to leave the option of

the species to one of the parties.

[Sidenote: 7. Creditors may demand payment half in gold and half

in silver.]

7. That where no particular stipulation is made, creditors shall have

power to demand payment, half in one species, half in the other; and

when the sum cannot fall equally into gold and silver coins, the

fractions to be paid in silver.

[Sidenote: 8. Regulations as to sale.]

8. That in buying and selling, when no particular species has been

stipulated, and when no act in writing has intervened, the option of the

species shall be competent to the buyer.

[Sidenote: 9. Ditto, as to payments to and from banks, &c.]

9. That all sums paid or received by the King’s receivers, or by

bankers, shall be delivered by weight, if demanded.

[Sidenote: 10. All coin to be of full weight when paid away.]

10. That all money which shall be found under the legal weight, from

whatever cause it may proceed, may be rejected in every payment

whatsoever; or if offered in payment of a debt above a certain sum, may

be taken according to its weight, at the then mint price, in the option

of the creditor.

[Sidenote: 11. Liberty to melt and export coin, but death to clip

or wash.]

11. That no penalty shall be incurred by those who melt down or export

the nation’s coin; but that washing, clipping, or diminishing the weight

of any part of it shall be deemed felony, as much as any other theft, if

the person so degrading the coin shall afterwards make it circulate for

lawful money.

To prevent the inconveniences proceeding from the variation in the

proportion between the metals, it may be provided,

[Sidenote: 12. Rule for changing the mint price of the metals.]

12. That upon every variation of proportion in the market price of the

metals, the price of both shall be changed, according to the following

rule.

Let the price of the pound troy fine gold in the coin be called G.

Let the price of ditto in the silver be called S.

Let the new proportion between the market price of the metals be called

P.

Then state this formula:

G/2P + S/2 = to a pound troy fine silver, in sterling currency.

S/2 × P + G/2 = to a pound troy fine gold, in sterling currency.

This will be a rule for the mint, to keep the price of the metals

constantly at par with the price of the market; and coinage may be

imposed as has been described, by fixing the mint price of them at a

certain rate below the value of the fine metals in the coin.

[Sidenote: 13. When to change the mint price.]

13. As long as the variation of the market price of the metals shall not

carry the price of the rising metal so high as the advanced price of the

coin above the bullion, no alteration need be made on the denomination

of either species.

[Sidenote: 14. Rule for changing the denomination of the coins.]

14. So soon as the variation of the market price of the metals shall

give a value to the rising species, above the difference between the

coin and the bullion; then the King shall alter the denominations of all

the coin, silver and gold, adding to the coins of the rising metal

exactly what is taken from those of the other. An example will make this

plain.

Let us suppose that the coinage has been made according to the

proportion of 14.5 to 1; that 20 shillings, or 4 crown pieces, shall

contain, in fine silver, 14.5 times as many grains as the guinea, or the

gold pound, shall contain grains of fine gold. Let the new proportion of

the metals be supposed to be 14 to 1. In that case, the 20 shillings, or

the 4 crowns, will contain 1⁄29 more value than the guinea. Now since

there is no question of making a new general coinage upon every

variation, in order to adjust the proportion of the metals in the weight

of the coins, that proportion must be adjusted by changing their

respective denominations according to this formula.

Let the 20 shillings, or 4 crowns, in coin, be called S. Let the guinea

be called G. Let the difference between the old proportion and the new,

which is 1⁄29, be called P. Then say,

S - P/2 = a pound sterling, and G + P/2 = a pound sterling.

By this it appears that all the silver coin must be raised in its

denomination 1⁄58, and all the gold coin must be lowered in its

denomination 1⁄58; yet still S + G, will be equal to two pounds

sterling, as before, whether they be considered according to the old, or

according to the new denominations.

But it may be observed, that the imposition of coinage rendering the

value of the coin greater than the value of the bullion, that

circumstance gives a certain latitude in fixing the new denominations of

the coin, so as to avoid minute fractions. For providing the deviation

from the exact proportion shall fall within the advanced price of the

coin, no advantage can be taken by melting down one species preferably

to another; since, in either case, the loss incurred by melting the coin

must be greater than the profit made upon selling the bullion. The mint

price of the metals, however, may be fixed exactly, that is, within the

value of a farthing upon a pound of fine silver or gold. This is easily

reckoned at the mint; although upon every piece in common circulation

the fractions of farthings would be inconvenient.

[Sidenote: 15 How contracts are to be fulfilled, after a change in

the denominations has taken place.]

15. That notwithstanding of the temporary variations made upon the

denomination of the gold and silver coins, all contracts formerly entred

into, and all stipulations in pounds, shillings, and pence, may continue

to be acquitted according to the old denominations of the coins, paying

one half in gold, and one half in silver; unless in the case where a

particular species has been stipulated; in which case, the sums must be

paid according to the new regulation made upon the denomination of that

species, to the end that neither profit or loss may result to any of the

parties.

[Sidenote: 16. The weight of the several coins never to be

changed, except upon a general recoinage of one denomination

at least.]

16. That notwithstanding the alterations on the mint price of the

metals, and in the denomination of the coins, no change shall be made

upon the weight of the particular pieces of the latter, except in the

case of a general recoinage of one denomination at least: that is to

say, the mint must not coin new guineas, crowns, &c. of a different

weight from those already in currency, although by so doing the

fractions might be avoided. This would occasion confusion, and the

remedy would cease to be of any use upon a new change in the proportion

of the metals. But it may be found convenient, for removing the small

fractions in shillings and sixpences, to recoin such denominations all

together, and to put them to their integer numbers, of twelve, and of

six pence, without changing in any respect their proportion of value to

all other denominations of the coin: this will be no great expence, when

the bulk of the silver coin is put into 5 shilling pieces.

[Sidenote: How this will preserve the same value to the pound

sterling at all times, and how fractions in the denominations

of coin may be avoided.]

By this method of changing the denominations of the coin, there never

can result any alteration in the value of the pound sterling: and

although fractions of value may now and then be introduced, in order to

prevent the abuses to which the coin would otherwise be exposed, by the

artifice of those who melt it down, yet still the inconvenience of such

fractions may be avoided in paying, according to the old denominations,

in both species, by equal parts. This will also prove demonstratively

that no change is thereby made in the true value of the national unit of

money.

[Sidenote: 17. Small coins to be current only for twenty years,

and larger coins for forty years or more.]

17. That it be ordered that shillings and sixpences shall only be

current for twenty years, and all other coins, both gold and silver, for

forty years, or more. For ascertaining which term, there may be marked,

upon the exergue of the coin, the last year of their currency, in place

of the date of their fabrication. This term elapsed, or the date

effaced, that they shall have no more currency whatsoever; and when

offered in payment, may be received as bullion at the actual price of

the mint, or refused, at the option of the creditor.

[Sidenote: 18. All foreign coin to pass for bullion only.]

18. That no foreign coin shall have any _legal_ currency, except as

bullion at the mint price.

By these or the like regulations may be prevented, _1mo_, The melting or

exporting of the coin in general. _2do_, The melting or exporting one

species, in order to sell it as bullion, at an advanced price.

[Sidenote: Consequences of these regulations.]_3tio_, The profit in

acquitting obligations preferably in one species to another. _4to_, The

degradation of the standard, by the wearing of the coin, or by a change

in the proportion between the metals. _5to_, The circulation of the coin

below the legal weight. _6to_, The profit that other nations reap by

paying their debts more cheaply to Great Britain than Great Britain can

pay hers to them.

And the great advantage of it is, that it is an uniform plan, and may

serve as a perpetual regulation, compatible with all kinds of

denominations of coins, variations in the proportion of the metals, and

with the imposition of a duty upon coinage; or with the preserving it

free; and farther, that it may in time be adopted by other nations, who

will find the advantage of having their money of accompt preserved

perpetually at the same value, with respect to the denominations of all

foreign money of accompt established on the same principles.

A TABLE OF COINS,

Shewing the Quantity of Fine Metal contained in them.

The number of grains of fine metal in every coin is sought for in the

regulations of the mint of the country where it is coined, and is

expressed in the grains in use in that mint: from that weight it is

converted into those of other countries, according to the following

proportions:

3840 Troy-grains, 4676.35 Paris-grains, 5192.8 Holland-aces or grains,

and 4649.06 Colonia-grains, are supposed to be equal weights; and the

coins in the table are converted according to those proportions.

Table of Coins, reduced to Grains of fine Metal, according to the Troy,

Paris, Colonia, and Holland-weights.

──────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────

│ Gold Coins.

│Troy. │Paris. │Colonia.│Holland.

──────────────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┼────────

English Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Guinea by statute │— │144.46 │143.65 │160.45

2 A Crown by statute │— │— │— │—

3 A Shilling by statute │— │— │— │—

4 A Silver Pound sterling by │ │ │ │

statute 1601 │ │ │ │

5 A Gold Pound sterling by statute│113. │137.61 │136.8 │152.8

1728 │ │ │ │

6 A Silver Pound sterling in │— │— │— │—

currency = 20⁄65 lib. troy │ │ │ │

7 A Silver Pound sterl. at the │113. │137.61 │136.8 │152.8

proportion of gold to silver as │ │ │ │

1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

8 A Gold Pound sterling at the │118.4 │144.18 │143.34 │160.11

same proportion of 1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

9 A Pound sterling at the mean │115.769 │140.98 │140.16 │156.55

proportion in gold and in silver│ │ │ │

10 A Shilling current = 1⁄65 of a │— │— │— │—

pound troy │ │ │ │

11 A Guinea in silver, or 21 │— │— │— │—

shillings standard weight │ │ │ │

12 A Guinea at the proportion of 1│— │— │— │—

to 14½, worth in silver │ │ │ │

13 A Pound troy, or 12 ounces │5760. │7019.2 │6973.5 │7789.2

English weight │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

French Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Louis d’or │113.27 │137.94 │137.13 │153.17

2 A Crown of six livres │— │— │— │—

3 A Crown of three ditto │— │— │— │—

4 A Livre │— │— │— │—

5 A Louis d’or, or 24 livres in │— │— │— │—

silver │ │ │ │

6 A Marc of Paris weight, fine │3783.87 │4608. │4581.1 │5116.9

gold or silver │ │ │ │

7 A Marc of gold coin effective │3398.3 │4138.5 │4114.3 │4593.4

weight, in fine │ │ │ │

8 A Marc of silver coin effective │— │— │— │—

weight, in fine │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

German Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Carolin legal weight │115.45 │140.6 │139.78 │156.12

2 A Ducat of the Empire ditto │52.8 │64.37 │64. │71.48

3 A Florin of Convention │— │— │— │—

4 A Dollar of Convention │— │— │— │—

5 A Dollar of Exchange, the │17.85 │21.74 │21.615 │24.14

Carolin = 9 flor. 42 kreutzers │ │ │ │

6 A Florin current = 1⁄11 of a │10.54 │12.84 │12.77 │14.26

Carolin │ │ │ │

7 A Carolin in Silver at the │— │— │— │—

proportion of 1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

Dutch Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Dutch Ducat │51.76 │63. │62.67 │70.

2 A Florin in silver │— │— │— │—

│ Silver Coins.

──────────────────────────────────┼────────┬────────┬────────┬────────

│Troy. │Paris. │Colonia.│Holland.

──────────────────────────────────┼────────┼────────┼────────┼────────

English Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Guinea by statute │— │— │— │—

2 A Crown by statute │429.68 │523.2 │520.2 │581.

3 A Shilling by statute │85.935 │104.65 │104. │116.2

4 A Silver Pound sterling by │1718.7 │2093. │2080.8 │2324.1

statute 1601 │ │ │ │

5 A Gold Pound sterling by statute│— │— │— │—

1728 │ │ │ │

6 A Silver Pound sterling in │1639.38 │1996.4 │1984.7 │2216.

currency = 20⁄65 lib. troy │ │ │ │

7 A Silver Pound sterl. at the │1638.5 │1995.3 │1983.7 │2215.7

proportion of gold to silver as │ │ │ │

1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

8 A Gold Pound sterling at the │1718.7 │2093. │2080.8 │2324.1

same proportion of 1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

9 A Pound sterling at the mean │1078.6 │2041.2 │2032.2 │2269.9

proportion in gold and in silver│ │ │ │

10 A Shilling current = 1⁄65 of a │81.961 │99.8 │99. │110.82

pound troy │ │ │ │

11 A Guinea in silver, or 21 │1804.6 │2197.6 │2184.8 │2440.3

shillings standard weight │ │ │ │

12 A Guinea at the proportion of 1│1720.4 │2095.1 │2082.8 │2326.4

to 14½, worth in silver │ │ │ │

13 A Pound troy, or 12 ounces │— │— │— │—

English weight │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

French Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Louis d’or │— │— │— │—

2 A Crown of six livres │409.94 │499.22 │496.3 │554.3

3 A Crown of three ditto │204.97 │249.61 │248.15 │277.1

4 A Livre │68.34 │83.23 │82.74 │92.42

5 A Louis d’or, or 24 livres in │1639.7 │1996.9 │1985.2 │2217.4

silver │ │ │ │

6 A Marc of Paris weight, fine │3783.87 │4608. │4581.1 │5116.9

gold or silver │ │ │ │

7 A Marc of gold coin effective │— │— │— │—

weight, in fine │ │ │ │

8 A Marc of silver coin effective │3402.3 │4143.4 │4119.2 │4600.9

weight, in fine │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

German Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Carolin legal weight │— │— │— │—

2 A Ducat of the Empire ditto │— │— │— │—

3 A Florin of Convention │179.73 │218.87 │217.6 │243.

4 A Dollar of Convention │269.59 │328.31 │326.4 │364.5

5 A Dollar of Exchange, the │— │— │— │—

Carolin = 9 flor. 42 kreutzers │ │ │ │

6 A Florin current = 1⁄11 of a │— │— │— │—

Carolin │ │ │ │

7 A Carolin in Silver at the │1674. │2038.6 │2026.8 │2263.8

proportion of 1 to 14½ │ │ │ │

│ │ │ │

Dutch Coins. │ │ │ │

1 A Dutch Ducat │— │— │— │—

2 A Florin in silver │148. │180.3 │179·2 │200.21

[The Binder is desired to place this TABLE at the End of Vol. I.

and not to cut off the Margin, but to fold it.]

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transcriber’s Note

Beginning on p. #362, there is an enumerated outline, summarized as

having four parts (1), (2), (3) and (4). The indicated sections

subsequently appear, inconsistently, as ‘1’ (arguably ‘I’), ‘II’, ‘3tio’

and ‘4to’. These have been retained, adopting ‘I’ for the first section.

A large table, appearing between pages 638 and 639, was, according to a

bracketed note included in the text, to be bound at the end of Volume I.

That wish has been granted. The Table itself has been redesigned to

better display in this medium.

The table of contents mistakenly implies that two sections (‘The

question in dispute is not understood’, and the section following)

appear on p. 606. They appear a page later, on p.607. This has been

corrected.

Spelling, generally, is not ‘corrected’, given the age of the text,

unless there is a clear preponderance of an alternate more standard

spelling. ‘Knowledge’ appears three times as ‘knowlege’, but more than

twenty times with the ‘d’. Verbs ending with -er (‘enter’, ‘render’) are

frequently spelled without the ‘e’ when used in other tenses, as

‘entred’, ‘rendring’, etc.

Diacritical marks in non-English languages are frequently missing, and

have not been added.

On p. 388, a parenthetical remark beginning ‘(by throwing a part of the

wealth...’ is not closed, and it is not obvious where the author

intended it to close. It is left to the reader to close it.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and

are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

The following issues should be noted, along with the resolutions.

P. 569 was mispaginated as p. 561, which has no impact on this version.

ix.12 Men of parts and knowle[d]ge Inserted.

xvii.4 a perfect knowle[d]ge of facts Inserted.

22.24 an entire depend[a/e]nce Replaced.

78.4 seven times that number, or than 201[,]887 Inserted.

137.17 no difference as to agricultu[t/r]e Replaced.

296.20 to enable it to undersel[l] Added.

301.5 after travelling over [eh/the] regions Most likely.

307.7 that the wor[l]d _luxury_ Removed.

331.6 drain off the nation[’]s wealth Inserted.

368.30 as saleable as [houshold] furniture _sic_

506.7 and accounts bal[l]anced on both sides Removed.

518.26 lead me to inqu[i]re Inserted.

592.11 who is possessed of a sal[l]ary Removed.

624.31 Without a thorough knowle[d]ge Inserted.

635.2 or to sink it to _per cent._ below that Missing.

price