from the commander of the Russian parks, several years after the
event, a confirmation of the accuracy of the assertion contained in
the above proclamation.
Napoleon was less favourably received in proportion as he approached
Provence; for there the machinations of his enemies had anticipated his
arrival. He had escaped the ambush of Maubreuil, but he could not avoid
that of Orgon; and this part of his dictated narrative is not the least
curious.
On his arrival at the place of embarkation, he found two vessels in
readiness to receive him; the one French and the other English. Napoleon
went on board the English frigate, observing that, he would never allow
it to be said that a Frenchman had conveyed him away.
Such is a brief account of the great event, the details of which,
dictated by Napoleon himself, will, as I have already mentioned,
hereafter be presented to the public. France was, at the time, inundated
with pamphlets on the subject, so full of falsehood and absurdity that
every honest and sensible man now blushes for having given credit to
them, or having had even the courage to read them.
The following is the treaty of Fontainebleau, to which I have already
alluded. It was carefully suppressed at the time it was drawn up, was
never published in the Moniteur, and remained long unknown. It is to be
found only in official collections, and even there the copies differ one
from another. I presume, therefore, that its insertion here will not be
deemed superfluous. It is intimately connected with the subject of which
I have just been treating, and many of its articles are still the topics
of daily conversation; and it must of course be satisfactory to be
enabled to discuss with a full knowledge of facts.
TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU.
“Article I. His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon renounces for himself, his
successors and descendants, as well as for all the members of his
family, all right of sovereignty and dominion over the French Empire,
and the kingdom of Italy, as well as over every other country.
“II. Their Majesties the Emperor Napoleon and Empress Maria Louisa,
shall retain their titles and rank, to be enjoyed during their lives.
“The mother, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the Emperor, shall
also retain, wherever they may reside, the titles of Princes of the
Emperor’s family.
“III. The Isle of Elba, adopted by his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon as
his place of residence, shall form, during his life, a separate
principality, which shall be possessed by him in full sovereignty and
property.
“There shall be besides granted, in full property to the Emperor
Napoleon, an annual revenue of 2,000,000 francs in rent charge in the
great book of France, of which 1,000,000 shall be in reversion to the
Empress.
“IV. All the Powers promise to employ their good offices in causing to
be respected by the Barbary Powers the flag and territory of the Isle of
Elba; for which purpose, the relations with the Barbary Powers shall be
assimilated to those of France.
“V. The Duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, shall be granted in
full property and sovereignty to her Majesty the Empress Maria Louisa.
They shall pass to the Prince her son, and to his descendants in the
right line. The Prince shall, henceforth, take the title of Prince of
Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla.
“VI. There shall be reserved in the territories renounced by this
treaty, to his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, for himself and his family,
domains, rent charges, in the great book of France, producing an annual
revenue, clear of all deductions and charges, of 2,500,000 francs. These
domains, or rents, shall belong, in full property, to be disposed of as
they think fit, to the Princes and Princesses of the Emperor’s family,
and shall be divided amongst them in such manner that the revenues of
each shall be in the following proportion, viz:
_Francs._
To Madame Mère 300,000
To King Joseph and his Queen 500,000
To King Louis 200,000
To the Queen Hortense and her children 400,000
To King Jerome and his Queen 500,000
To the Princess Eliza 300,000
To the Princess Paulina 300,000
“The Princes and Princesses of the family of the Emperor Napoleon shall
moreover retain all the property, moveable and immoveable, of every kind
whatever, which they may possess by private right; together with the
rents which they hold also, as private individuals, in the great book of
France, or the Monte-Napoleone of Milan.
“VII. The annual pension of the Empress Josephine shall be reduced to
1,000,000 in domains, or inscriptions in the great book of France. She
shall continue to enjoy, in full property, all her private fortune,
moveable and immoveable, with power to dispose of it conformably to the
French Laws.
“VIII. There shall be granted to Prince Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, a
suitable establishment out of France.
“IX. The property which the Emperor Napoleon possesses in France, either
as extraordinary domain, or private domain, will remain attached to the
crown.
“Of the funds vested by the Emperor in the great book of France, in the
French bank, in the _Actions des Forêts_, or in any other manner, and
which his Majesty resigns to the Crown, there shall be reserved a
capital, not exceeding 2,000,000 of francs, to be expended in
gratuities, in favour of the individuals whose names shall be contained
in a list signed by the Emperor Napoleon, and which shall be transmitted
to the French Government.
“X.—All the crown diamonds shall remain in France.
“XI.—His Majesty the Emperor Napoleon shall return to the Treasury, and
to the other public funds, all the sums and effects that may have been
taken therefrom by his orders, with the exception of what has been
appropriated from the civil list.
“XII.—The debts of the household of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon,
such as they may be at the time of the signature of the present treaty,
shall be immediately discharged out of the arrears due by the public
treasury to the civil list, according to a list which shall be signed by
a Commissioner appointed for that purpose.
“XIII.—The obligations of the Monte-Napoleone, of Milan, towards all
creditors, whether Frenchmen or foreigners, shall be punctually
fulfilled, without any change being made in this respect.
“XIV.—There shall be granted all the necessary passports for the free
passage of his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon, the Empress, the Princes
and Princesses, and all the persons of their suites, who wish to
accompany them, or fix their abode in foreign countries, as well as for
the passage of all the equipages, horses, and effects, belonging to
them.
“The Allied Powers will, in consequence, furnish officers and men for
escorts.
“XV.—The French Imperial Guard shall furnish a detachment of from 1200
to 1500 men, of all arms, to serve as an escort to the Emperor to St.
Tropez, the place of his embarkation.
“XVI.—A brig and the necessary transport vessels shall be fitted out to
convey to the place of his destination his Majesty the Emperor Napoleon
and his household. The brig shall belong, in full property, to his
Majesty the Emperor.
“XVII.—The Emperor shall be allowed to take with him, and retain, as his
guard, 400 men, volunteers and officers, as well as sub-officers and
soldiers.
“XVIII.—Every Frenchman who may follow the Emperor Napoleon, or his
family, shall be held to have forfeited his rights as a Frenchman,
should he not return to France within three years; at least, if he be
not included in the exceptions which the French Government reserves to
itself to grant, after the expiration of that period.
“XIX.—The Polish troops of all arms, in the service of France, shall be
at liberty to return home, and shall retain their arms and baggage, as a
testimony of their honourable services. The officers, sub-officers, and
soldiers, shall retain the decorations which have been granted to them,
and the pensions annexed to these decorations.
“XX.—The Allied Powers guarantee the execution of the articles of the
present treaty, and promise to obtain its adoption and guarantee by
France.
“XXI.—The present act shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged
at Paris within ten days, or sooner, if possible.
“Done at Paris, April 11, 1814.
(_Signed_) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza;
Marshal MACDONALD, Duke of Tarento;
Marshal NEY, Duke of Elchingen;[12]
Prince METTERNICH.”
Footnote 12:
It is worthy of remark that Marshal Ney does not here take the title
of Prince of the Moskowa, from delicacy to the Emperor Alexander.
The same articles were signed separately and under the same date, by
Count Nesselrode on behalf of Russia, and Baron Hardenberg, on behalf of
Prussia.
DECLARATION OF ACCESSION IN THE NAME
OF LOUIS XVIII.
“The undersigned, Minister and Secretary of State for the department of
Foreign Affairs, having submitted to the King the inquiry which their
excellencies the plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers have been
ordered by their sovereigns to make, relative to the treaty of the 11th
of April, to which the Provisional Government has acceded; his Majesty
has been pleased to authorize him in his name, to declare that the
clauses of the treaty, in so far as France is concerned, shall be
faithfully executed. The undersigned has consequently the honour to
communicate this declaration to their excellencies.
(_Signed_) “The Prince of BENEVENTO.
“_Paris, May 31, 1814._”
The great European triumvirate dew up the treaty of Fontainebleau,
England acceded to it, a declaration made in the name of the King of
France promised its fulfilment in so far as he was concerned; and yet,
in spite of all these guarantees, it may be said that scarcely any of
the articles were observed. Certainly, it would be difficult to
conceive a more flagrant violation of good faith or a more absolute
compromise of the august signatures, which, it was to be expected,
each party would have been individually interested in preserving
unsullied and sacred. On these manifest violations was grounded the
moral justification of Napoleon’s enterprise in 1815. This opinion was
pretty generally adopted: it was advocated by the most distinguished
members of the English Parliament, those indefatigable supporters of
great principles, and by eminent statesmen of all countries. I may add
to these high authorities an individual opinion, which though somewhat
comically expressed, was not perhaps the less just. An Austrian
gentleman of rank, who was in Paris in 1815, and who was a furious
enemy of Napoleon’s, called on me just at the time when the Emperor’s
advance to the capital began to produce a great sensation. The
Austrian had already determined to set off, and he said to me, with
all possible gravity and sincerity: “Certainly, he hitherto occupied
the throne of France as an usurper: that’s unquestionable! But,” added
he, quibbling with himself diplomatically, “if he should now conquer
France, after all the monarchs of Europe have acknowledged him as a
sovereign, and have entitled him to go to war by not observing the
conditions they entered into, the case would be very different. And,
upon my word! ... for my own part at least ... I think in that case
... there might be some ground for maintaining that he has become
legitimate. At least, I think I should myself be inclined to consider
him so.”
LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO LORD BATHURST, RELATIVE TO THE TREATY
OF FONTAINEBLEAU.
(_Paris, April 15, 1814._)
“... I shall, therefore, on the present occasion, confine myself to an
explanation of what has passed with respect to the future destination
and settlement of Napoleon and his family.
“Your Lordship has been already informed, by Lord Cathcart, of the Act
of Abdication which was signed by Buonaparte, on the 4th instant, and
of the assurance which was given him by the Emperor of Russia, and the
Provisional Government, of a pecuniary provision of six millions of
francs, with a safe asylum in the Island of Elba. The act in question
was deposited in the hands of M. de Caulaincourt, and Marshals Ney and
Macdonald, to be given up upon the due execution of engagements on the
part of the Allies, with respect to the proposed arrangement. These
persons were also authorized to agree to an armistice, and to settle
such a line of demarcation as might be satisfactory to the Allies,
and, in the mean time, prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood.
“On my arrival, I found this arrangement on the point of execution. A
convention had been discussed, and would have, in fact, been signed in
the course of the day by the Russian Minister, had not the approach of
the Allied Ministers been announced. The motives for accelerating the
immediate conclusion of this act, were the inconvenience, if not the
danger of Napoleon’s remaining at Fontainebleau, surrounded by troops,
who still, in a considerable degree, remained faithful to him; the
apprehension of intrigues in the army and in the capital; and the
importance attached, by a considerable portion of the officers, to
some arrangement favourable to their chief, in satisfaction of their
personal honour, before they left him.
“On the night of my arrival, the four Ministers had a conference with
the Prince de Benevento, on the subject of the proposed convention, to
which I stated my objections, desiring, at the same time, to be
understood as not urging them then, at the hazard of the internal
tranquillity of France, nor in impeachment of what was due, in good
faith, to the assurance given, under the exigency of the moment, by
Russia.
“The Prince de Benevento admitted the weight of many of the objections
stated, but declared that he did consider it, on the part of the
Provisional Government, as an object of the first importance, to avoid
any thing that might assume the character of a civil war, even for the
shortest time:—that he also found some such measure necessary, to make
the army pass over in a temper to be made use of. Upon these
declarations, and the Count de Nesselrode’s, that the Emperor, his
master, had found it necessary, in the absence of the Allies, to act
for the best, in their name as well as his own; I withdrew any further
opposition to the principle of the measure, suggesting only some
alterations in the details. I desired, however, to decline, on the
part of my Government, being more than an acceding party to the
treaty, and declared that the Act of Accession on the part of Great
Britain should not go beyond the territorial arrangements proposed in
the Treaty. My objections to our unnecessarily mixing in its forms,
especially in the recognition of Napoleon’s title under present
circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable: and I now
enclose the protocol and note, which will explain the extent to which
I have taken it upon me to give assurances on the part of my Court.
“At my suggestion, the recognition of the imperial titles in the
family were limited to their respective lives, for which there was a
precedent in the case of the King of Poland, when he became Elector of
Saxony.
“To the arrangement in favour of the Empress, I not only felt no
objection, but considered it due to the distinguished sacrifice of
domestic feelings which the Emperor of Austria was making to the cause
of Europe. _I should have wished to substitute another position in
lieu of Elba, for the seat of Napoleon’s retirement_; but none, having
the quality of security on which he insisted, seemed disposable, to
which equal objections did not occur; and I did not feel that I could
encourage the alternative which M. de Caulaincourt assured me
Buonaparte repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England.
“On the same night, the Allied Ministers had a conference with M. de
Caulaincourt, and the Marshals, at which I assisted. The treaty was
gone through, and agreed to with alterations: it has been since signed
and ratified, and Buonaparte will commence his movement towards the
south to-morrow, or the day following.
(_Signed_) “CASTLEREAGH.”
I thought it advisable to transcribe this letter; it throws a complete
light on the treaty of the 11th of April, of the particulars of which
I was ignorant, even when at St. Helena; and it presents two points to
which I particularly wish to call attention. It explains the
observation which fell from the Emperor, when I observed to him that
on an important occasion he seemed to have forgotten the
acknowledgement of his title by the English at Fontainebleau: when he
merely replied that it was done on purpose. Now, I learn from the
letter above quoted, that Lord Castlereagh studiously avoided the
recognition; but this is no impeachment of the scrupulous correctness
of Napoleon’s assertions.
The second point, which impartiality induces me to advert to is that
Lord Castlereagh, in his letter, speaks of the alternative offered by
Napoleon, to retire to England, in default of the cession of the Isle
of Elba. A few pages further on (Nov. 16), it will be found that
Napoleon, on the contrary, reproaches Lord Castlereagh with having
caused it to be insinuated to him that the adoption of England, as a
place of residence, would be the preferable course. These two
statements are certainly quite contradictory; but regard for
impartiality, as I before observed, has induced me to insert them. The
reader is, therefore, free to decide as he may think fit; for, as I
have often heard the Emperor say, one man’s word is as good as
another’s. For my own part, my choice is soon determined: I adopt the
words of Napoleon, in spite of the assertions of Lord Castlereagh. I
still bear in mind the erroneous declarations of Lord Whitworth, which
have been mentioned in the course of this Journal; the scandalous
assertions respecting Napoleon, made by Lord Castlereagh in Parliament
or in public assemblies; the garbled documents, on the authority of
which Murat’s deposition was decreed; and the numerous denials so
confidently expressed by Lord Bathurst in the House of Lords, the
falsehood of which was manifest to every individual at St. Helena, and
occasioned embarrassment even to Sir Hudson Lowe. I shall, therefore,
adhere to the opinion I have formed, until I find good reason to alter
it.
THE SWORD OF FREDERIC THE GREAT.—ON NAPOLEON’S MARRIAGE IT WAS HOPED
THAT THE LION WOULD SLUMBER.—TORMENTING CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNOR.—OUR
LOT ENVIABLE, EVEN AMIDST OUR MISERY.
13th.—This morning, when I was in the Emperor’s apartment, being
unemployed, I took a fancy to examine the large watch of Frederick the
Great, which hangs beside the chimney piece. This led the Emperor to
say, “I have been the possessor of glorious and valuable relics. I had
the sword of Frederick the Great; and the Spaniards presented to me,
at the Tuileries, the sword of Francis I. This was a high compliment,
and it must have cost them some sacrifice. The Turks and Persians have
also sent me arms, which were said to have belonged to Gengiskan,
Tamerlan, Nadir Shah, and I know not whom; but I attached importance
not to the fact, but to the intention.”
I expressed my astonishment that he had not endeavoured to keep
Frederick’s sword. “Why, I had my own,” said he, smiling, and gently
pinching my ear. He was right; I certainly made a very stupid
observation.
Afterwards, alluding to his second marriage, he said, that he had
intended to make choice of a Frenchwoman, and it would have been well
if he had done so. “Such a union would have been eminently national,”
he observed. “France was sufficiently great, and her Monarch
sufficiently powerful, to set aside every consideration of foreign
policy. Besides, among Sovereigns, the ties of blood are always made
to yield to political interests: hence what scandalous violations of
moral feeling are frequently exhibited to the world. Another objection
that may be urged against marriages of this kind is the admission of a
foreign Princess into state secrets, which she may be tempted to
betray; and, if a sovereign places trust in his connexions abroad, he
may find that he has set his foot on an abyss covered with flowers. In
short, it is absurd to suppose that such alliances can guarantee or
ensure any advantage.”
The announcement of the Emperor’s second marriage was a source of joy
to those prudent citizens who looked forward to the future.—A few days
after he had formed his determination, Napoleon said to one of his
Ministers (the Duke Decrès), in a moment of good humoured familiarity,
“Well; it appears that people are very much pleased with my intended
marriage.”—“Yes, Sire.”—“I suppose they expect that the lion will
slumber.”—“To say the truth, Sire, we are somewhat inclined to form
that expectation.”—“Well,” resumed Napoleon, after a few moments’
silence, “it is a mistake: and it is not the fault of the lion either.
Slumber would be as sweet to him as to any other. But do not you see
that while I am, to all appearance, _incessantly attacking_, I am,
nevertheless, always engaged in _self-defence_?”
The correctness of this assertion might have been doubted, while the
terrible conflict lasted; but the joy and indiscretion of the
triumphant party have sufficiently confirmed its truth. Some boasted
of having formed the determination of prosecuting the war until they
had accomplished the destruction of their enemy: others[13] have
unblushingly proclaimed that the plot for Napoleon’s overthrow was
hatched under the mask of alliance and friendship!
Footnote 13:
_Austrian Observer_, 1817 or 1818.
During this and the two succeeding days, my attention was wholly
occupied by a contest which concerned me personally, and which has had
so much influence on my subsequent destiny, that I cannot pass it over
in silence. Ever since my residence at Longwood, I have had, as a
servant, a free mulatto, with whom I was very well satisfied; but Sir
Hudson Lowe suddenly took it into his head to remove him.
Prompted by the determination of tormenting us, by every means his
imagination could suggest, or (as many are inclined to believe,)
following up a perfidiously laid plan, he sent the English officer on
duty to inform me that he had conceived some doubts as to the
propriety of my being attended by a native of the Island; and that he
intended to remove my servant and send me one of his own choosing. My
answer was brief and positive; “The Governor,” said I, “has it in his
power to send away my servant, if he pleases; but he may spare himself
the trouble of sending me one of his choosing. I am daily learning
better and better how to dispense with the comforts of life. I can, if
necessary, wait on myself; this additional privation will be but
slightly felt, amidst the sufferings to which we are subjected.”
This circumstance occasioned the interchange of a vast number of
messages and notes. Sir Hudson Lowe wrote three or four times every
day to the officer on duty directing him to make various
communications to me. He observed that he did not understand my
scruples, and could not conceive why I should object to any servant he
might send me.—One of his selecting was as good as any other—The offer
of making the choice himself was merely a mark of attention, &c.
I was distressed to see the poor officer thus mercilessly sent to and
fro; and I was also heartily tired of the business myself. I therefore
begged that he would spare himself further trouble, by assuring the
Governor that to all his communications my reply must invariably be
the same; namely, that he might send away my servant if he pleased;
but that he must not think of obliging me to receive one of his
choosing; that he might place me in garrison by force, but never with
my own consent. While this correspondence was going forward, my
servant was sent for, interrogated, withdrawn from my service, then
sent back again, and at length finally withdrawn.