and to the Sancta Clara, which was extinguished; but the third time that
the Magdalena frigate, of which Domingo de Ynsaurraga was captain, took
fire, it was impossible to extinguish the flames, as the ship took fire
at the stern and burned furiously; and all that could be done to maintain
a footing on board, was done by the aforesaid captain and the people with
him, until the ship was just burnt down and twelve men were killed by the
enemy’s musquetry, besides as many more burnt. And the aforesaid captain
made his escape by swimming through the midst of the boats and reached
the frigate Sancta Ysabel, which was under the command of Captain Juan
Flores de Rabanal in place of Captain Pedro de Guia, who had charge of a
post on land, and there he lent his assistance in every manner possible.
The battle lasted for an hour, the most obstinately contested that was
ever seen, and the whole port was illumined by the burning frigate in a
manner favourable for the rest, who could thus see to point our artillery
and that of the forts, with which, and with the musquetry and the stones
thrown from the frigate, they did such effect, that the enemy, after
about an hour, during which the combat lasted, as I have said, retreated
with the loss of nine or ten boats and more than four hundred men,
besides many more wounded; while on our side, the only loss was that of
the frigate and forty men killed or burnt, besides a few wounded by the
musquetry. It was a fine sight to see how the frigates fought, and how
capitally they were backed by the artillery of the forts, particularly
that of Sta. Helena, which was in an advantageous position for playing on
the boats.
Friday 24th. Considering that the enemy would assuredly repeat his
attack at night, and endeavour to land his forces, the people on our side
never ceased, from the dawn of day, to prepare for resistance, planting
cannon at some passes on land, as was done, for example, in the whole of
the Tejar, where the governor commanded, with Captain Marco Antonio and
the people forming the company of guards. Captain Guia, who previously
kept guard in the Morrillo, now took his station in the curtain of Sancta
Catalina with fifty arquebusseers; in the curtain of the Friars, close
to the fortress, were two other pieces with thirty soldiers, under the
command of the supercargo, Martin Vomero, and on every side numerous
trenches were dug and defences constructed, every one working spade in
hand, and not a single negro to assist, for the people round about had
sent off all their slaves to the mountain, with their effects and women,
as soon as the enemy appeared.
However, about eight o’clock in the morning, as soon as the land breeze
sprang up, the enemy’s fleet weighed and stood to sea, endeavouring to
get to windward of the port, and continued on this course till evening;
and Don Pedro Tello perceiving that the object was to run at once into
the port, went ashore to explain to the general his apprehension that the
enemy was about to bear down directly on the place: that the two ships
which had been already sunk did not completely close up the entrance to
it, and that it was expedient to sink two frigates in the part that still
remained open, inasmuch as the complete barring of the entrance and the
security of the port were quite as important as the two frigates, for
many reasons, and for the good of His Majesty’s service.
General Sancho Pardo immediately held a council with the governor and
other officers, and they decided that one frigate should be sunk in the
channel, in case that a ship belonging to Pedro Sedeño, which was lying
there laden with merchandise, and another of less size, should prove
insufficient; that these should be sunk immediately, just as they were,
as there was not time to unload them, and that the frigate should be sunk
whenever Don Pedro thought proper.
At four o’clock in the afternoon the enemy came running down with the
breeze towards the port, and Don Pedro Tello, believing that he was
making directly for it, sank the two vessels of Sedeño and Juan Diaz de
Sancta Aña, and also the Texeda frigate, without being able, owing to
the short time allowed, to take out of them all the provisions and guns,
although a part was saved; and thus the entrance of the channel was
completely closed, and about vesper time the enemy came to anchor between
the Rock and Goat island, where he had lain at anchor the night before.
The circumstance that the fleet anchored, and nearer than before to the
port, tended to confirm the suspicion that the enemy meant to attempt
that very night to finish the burning of the frigates, and to land
people. Don Pedro Tello, therefore, with the consent of the governor,
had the three frigates brought back to the interior of the port, and
they were placed in the Tejar with a guard to secure them; but he had no
fears about the landing of a force, seeing the spirit which animated our
people, and that all the posts and landing-places were well entrenched
and strengthened. The removal of the frigates took place at night,
when the enemy could see nothing, and consequently the next morning he
concluded that they had been all sunk. The night passed off quietly,
without any effort on our part to shew that we were well on the watch.
Saturday the 25th, as soon as daylight appeared, the enemy sent seven
or eight boats to reconnoitre the port, and all the shore as far as the
Boqueron. These kept at a distance from land, beyond the reach of our
guns; and about ten o’clock they returned to the fleet, which remained at
anchor in the place above-mentioned.
The same day, about two o’clock in the afternoon, our caravel, which had
gone to look out for the enemy eight days before, came in sight, and as
soon as it was seen by our people, they fired a gun from the Boqueron
to warn it to bear up without approaching the port; and some boats from
the fleet followed it as far as the Playa de Cangrejos (crab ground),
where it ran ashore, and part of the cavalry hastened forward to assist
the crew; and Francisco Gonçalez, who was the pilot and captain of the
caravel, scuttled her, to prevent the enemy’s carrying her off; and so
the boats went away, and returned to the fleet without making a prize.
The same Saturday, at night, the whole fleet made sail without being
seen, and stood out to sea; and when we found in the morning that it
had disappeared, people were sent by land westwards along the coast to
ascertain whether it was seen or had passed that way, as was supposed,
and was going to St. Domingo.
On Monday news arrived from Arracibo, fourteen leagues from this port,
that the fleet had passed by on its course. The same day the general
despatched another messenger to San German, who returned within six days
with the information that the enemy’s fleet was lying in the Butiro de
la Azucar on the other side of San German, and that they had landed five
companies of pikemen and musqueteers, who were collecting supplies of
meat, wood, and water, and made four boats in as many days to carry their
supplies.
The general having received this intelligence, and thinking it likely
that there might be some artifice in the enemy’s movements, who perhaps
might be lying in wait hoping to catch the two frigates, or intending to
return upon Puerto Rico when they should be gone and the place weakened,
in order that he might seize it, and execute his design of fortifying
himself in it, seriously deliberated as to what should be done, and
determined that the frigates should not quit the port till it was known
for certain that the enemy had passed Point de la Aguada; and that
Captain Juan Flores de Rabanal should go seventy or eighty leagues to the
north with a patache to look out, while the bullion was in the meantime
embarking. In eight days he returned, without having seen anything.
The 9th of December intelligence was brought from San German that the
enemy’s fleet had gone away southwards.
On the 11th of the same month there arrived at this place Lope Sanchez,
boatswain of the Magdalena frigate, and four seamen of the same, who had
been taken in the water by the enemy’s boats, the night the frigates
were set on fire. These men had been put on shore in the Butiro de la
Azucar, with a letter of Francis Drake to the governor here, of which the
following is a copy:—
Letter of FRANCIS DRAKE to Colonel PEDRO SUAREZ, Governor of
Puerto Rico.
“Understanding that your lordship is a gentleman of rank and
a soldier, I write this letter to give you to understand that
whenever I have had an opportunity of dealing with the Spanish
nation, I have treated it with much honour and clemency,
liberating the individuals belonging to it, not a few, but
many in number. So, at the time when our people set fire to
the frigates, certain Spaniards were saved from the fury of
the flames, who, as conquered enemies, experienced from us no
ill-treatment, but the usage of honourable war.
“From them it has been learned that the capitana of Don Pedro
Tello took a small vessel of our fleet, having on board
twenty-five Englishmen, or more, treating them well, and as
might be expected in fair war. I myself still cherish my
former sentiments; but having another affair, strong deeds are
done, which never entered my mind. But as there are in this
place soldiers and gentlemen, I have no doubt that my people
will fare well, and will obtain their liberty for the sake of
honourable war: this I hope, and shall do the like myself. I
remain at your lordship’s service in all things, bating the
cause which is to be maintained as that of the flag of her
sacred Majesty the queen of England.
“FRANCIS DRAKE.
“The 23d November 1595, English style.”
From the information given by the aforesaid boatswain and the other
seamen, who had gone with the enemy for eight days, it was ascertained
that the latter had departed thence towards the S. or S.S.W., and that
they were going to St. Domingo and thence to Panama, for they said that
they were going where there was a quantity of gold and silver; and the
same thing might also be inferred from the number of boats they took with
them for an armament.
These men confirmed also the death of John Hawkins, and testified as to
the regret occasioned thereby, as well as to the heavy loss which the
enemy sustained. Thus, as a boat was passing one day from the flag-ship
to one of the other galleons, it was struck, and nearly every man in it
was wounded. They stated that the enemy complained much of the damage
done by the stones thrown from the frigates; and that the loss was so
great, that when Francis Drake held a council the day after the battle,
to determine whether they should renew the attack, there was not one who
agreed with him in favour of that proposition, especially as these men
had told them that our force was much greater than it used to be; and
that Drake was amazed when he learned how few people were on board of the
frigates the night of the fire, and plucked his beard [with vexation] for
not having taken the treasure and the place, not letting himself be seen
those two days; complaining of John Hawkins, who did not allow them to
pursue the three frigates from the island of Guadaloupe, as soon as it
was known that they had taken the vessel and were making for Puerto Rico;
intimating that in that case we should not have had the opportunity of
fortifying the place, as was done in the eight days which they spent in
the delay of preparing boats, and watering.
All this has been so ordered by God, to whom we owe many thanks, since
by His means, besides obtaining such a victory, with so small a force as
that which on our side resisted the efforts of so powerful an armament,
in defence of the place and two millions of treasure, important services
have resulted to his Majesty, and a general gain to private individuals.
In the first place, as far as can be learned, it was the enemy’s
intention to maintain this force, which he might easily do at small cost,
for the pirates of all nations who frequent these seas, would gather
about him, and would aid him in defending the position; and it would then
be necessary to fit out an expedition expressly to retake the place,
since the port has a decided advantage, and from thence much injury may
be easily done to the islands and coasts which are to leeward.
In the second place, this enemy, who up to this time has never met with
any resistance at sea, has here had his head broken; since, as has been
related, one of the two leaders died, with four hundred of his followers,
and a great many were wounded.
Thirdly, we have thus saved two millions worth of gold, silver, and
cochineal, with which the queen might equip and maintain a force to give
us further trouble.
Fourthly, the delaying of the enemy in these islands till the 3rd
December, allowed time for warning those places for the safety of which
fears might be entertained, by means of the despatches which were sent,
as has been stated, to St. Domingo and the Havana, whence others were
forwarded to Carthagena and New Spain, so that we may now hope that all
is safe.
The last, and not the least consideration, is, the spirit which our
people have shewn, and the renown which they have won, proving the
inferiority of the enemy; and, on the other hand, the hold on opinion
which the latter have lost, and in which consists to a great extent the
secret of good or ill-success. And since the beneficial results of this
affair are so many, his Majesty ought to return thanks to those who took
part in it, in order that the lookers-on may be encouraged to serve him
on like occasions.
This affair having passed over as here related, and the general having
received information that the enemy was gone on, and that provisions were
scarce, a quantity of them having been lost on this occasion, and the
poverty of the island being such that the deficiency could not be made
good, and that it was necessary for him to abridge his delay as much as
possible, gave orders to collect the guns with the utmost despatch from
the several posts on land, and to embark the treasure in the frigates;
and with these, one ship, and a patache, in which were embarked part of
the crews and artillery of the two lost frigates, he left Puerto Rico
with good weather on the 20th December 1595.
The Instructions given by F. Drake to the captain of the
Francis, one of the vessels of his fleet, which was taken at
the island of Guadaloupe.
The Instruction and Order to be observed by the whole fleet,
which departs from the port of Plymouth on the 29th August 1595.
1. In the first place, omit not divine worship, and let this
order be observed twice a-day, unless no opportunity offers.
2. Secondly, great care must be taken to keep company and to
come to speak with your admiral twice a-day; and if you cannot
do it more than once, yet let it be done every day; and take
great care to observe every order given you, and to be always
in company, as the weather shall allow.
3. And should it happen that any ship or small vessel, through
stress of weather or other cause that may be, parts company,
they must look for us first of all in the island of Bayona, on
the coast of Galicia, and the fleet will wait till it is time
to proceed and you shall have found us; and thence, if you
should not find us, you shall go to Puerto Sancto, and there
you shall wait for us three days; and should we not be there,
you shall make for the island of Guadaloupe (a small island
near Dominica towards the north-east), where we will stay three
days, and will leave some signal that you may know what course
we shall have taken, which shall be for Puerto Rico; there we
will stay ten days.
4. If in the course of this voyage you meet with any foul
wind or bad weather, you must take in all sail at night till
morning, unless you see that one of your admirals carries sail,
in which case you shall do the same.
5. And if foul wind or bad weather should come on at night,
your admiral will hang out two lanterns, one above the other,
and the height of a man asunder, that you may steer by them.
6. And if we should all shorten sail over night on account of
the weather, and it be necessary to make sail the same night,
you must show, before we make sail, a single lantern with a
light at the bow, and another at the fore-top.
7. You shall keep no light in any of the ships, but only the
light in the binocle, and this with the greatest care that it
be not seen, excepting the admiral’s ship; and to avoid the
danger of fire, you must not bear about any candle or light in
the ship, unless in a lantern; and neither more nor less, you
must take the greatest care with the fire in the galley.
8. No vessel, square or cutter-rigged, should go ahead of the
admiral at night, particularly in rough weather; or get under
the lee of large vessels, in tacking from side to side.
9. And if any vessel of the fleet should lose, through
mischance, a main-mast, or yard, or any of the water vessels,
or anything else of importance, they shall fire one or two
shots, according to the necessity of the case, that the other
vessels may afford them speedy assistance; and take care that
no vessel quit that which is in distress till the required
succour be given.
10. Should any vessel of the fleet lose her course, and fall
in with another of the fleet, the signal shall be to hoist and
lower topsails three times; and the other vessel shall do the
same for recognition.
11. You must not permit any gambling in the ship, with cards or
dice, by reason of the numerous quarrels usually resulting from
that practice.
12. You must take the greatest care to save the provisions,
following your own discretion in this matter till you receive
another order for your guidance.
13. Finally, in order that you may be better able to keep
company, you shall see a light at the admiral’s stern once or
twice.
FRANCIS DRAKE.
FINIS.
RICHARDS, PRINTER, 100, ST. MARTIN’S LANE.