still only in its first stage. Joseph had hastily to evacuate Madrid,
and, in spite of having twelve thousand French troops under his command,
Bessieres could effect nothing. The Spanish armies of Cuesta and Blake
once again took shape; and, like the other French generals, the Marshal
had to fall back on the line of the Ebro. Such was the situation in
October when the Emperor himself appeared on the scene. The situation
changed like magic at the touch of a master hand. The French troops,
strung out in a great semicircle on the Ebro, were quickly concentrated.
Blake and Cuesta were each defeated by an overwhelming combination of
the different French armies. Meanwhile, the Emperor, recognising the
limitations of his faithful friend, superseded him by Soult, but gave
him the command of the Guard and of the reserve cavalry, under his own
immediate supervision, and took him back to France when he gave up the
pursuit of the English.
Napoleon desired to take the Guard with him on the Austrian campaign,
and, as several regiments were still in Spain, others had to be
enrolled to take their places. These regiments were entirely organised
by Bessieres, and formed the nucleus of what was later called the Young
Guard. The Marshal's duty during the Austrian campaign of 1809 was the
same as in Spain: the command of the Guard and of the reserve cavalry.
During the famous Five Days' Fighting he proved again that no troops in
Europe could resist the charges of the heavy cavalry of the Guard, and
that he himself had almost as great a command of the technique of
cavalry tactics as his famous friend and instructor, the King of Naples.
At Aspern and Essling the cavalry of the Guard and the reserve cavalry
covered themselves with glory by their dashing charges. Again and again,
with cries of "Vive l'Empereur," the glittering masses of cuirassiers
attempted to break down the stern handful of indomitable Hungarians who
guarded the Austrian batteries. When the bridges were broken, and the
retreat to the island of Lobau was the only hope for the army,
Bessieres, with the remains of cavalry, so severely punished the enemy
that the retirement was effected in safety. At Wagram, when all seemed
lost, Napoleon called on his old comrade to sacrifice himself with his
cavalry. As the cuirassiers of the Guard trotted past to debouch on
their heroic mission, the Emperor, waving his sword, cried out, "No
sabring. Give point, give point!" The needed time was gained, and the
gallant Marshal was wounded. But at the end of the day, when the
troopers, after their great effort, could no longer face the unbroken
lines of slowly retreating Austrians, Napoleon, chagrined at his
failure, met his cavalry and their commander with reproach: "Was ever
anything seen like this? neither prisoners nor guns! This day will be
attended with no result."
The Emperor's ill-humour was only temporary. When his most trusted
lieutenants were grumbling and longing for peace in which to enjoy the
spoil they had collected in war, when Bernadotte and Fouche were openly
intriguing against him, Napoleon could ill afford to disregard his most
faithful friend. Accordingly, immediately after Wagram he despatched the
newly created Duke of Istria to Belgium to take over the command of the
French troops who were opposing the ill-fated English expedition to the
isle of Walcheren. When the Marshal returned from Belgium to Paris he
found that the Emperor had made all arrangements for the divorce of
Josephine and for his second marriage. Bessieres was placed in a very
awkward position. Prince Eugene was his greatest friend. Josephine had
always been most kind to him and the Duchess, but he could not help them
in any way, and, to make matters worse, the Emperor insisted on coming
and staying with him at his country house at Grignon.
Meanwhile the war in Spain was spoiling many great reputations.
Reinforcements were urgently required, so the Emperor decided to give
his Young Guard their baptism of fire in Spain. Accordingly, at the
commencement of 1811 he despatched them with Bessieres, their commander,
to operate on the northern lines of communication. The ill-success of
the French was palpably due to two causes. There was no
commander-in-chief on the spot--the Emperor was in Paris--and there was
no other Marshal whom all the others would obey. Secondly, there was a
great want of concentration; as Bessieres wrote to Berthier: "All the
world is aware of the vicious system of our operations, everyone sees
that we are too much scattered. We occupy too wide an extent of country:
we exhaust our resources without profit and without necessity: we cling
to dreams. We should concentrate our forces; retain certain points
d'appui for the protection of our magazines and hospitals, and regard
two-thirds of Spain as a vast battlefield, which a single victory may
either secure or wrest from us." Unfortunately the Marshal was human,
like his comrades, and instead of loyally backing up Massena, he came to
an open rupture with him on the question of supplies, and by his
inaction at Fuentes d'Onoro he caused the French to lose that battle.
Though he made good his excuses before Napoleon, and secured the
disgrace of the Prince of Essling, in the opinion of the Duke of
Wellington it was Bessieres's refusal to lend Massena assistance which
was entirely responsible for the French defeat. Moreover, sound as were
his views on the method of conducting war, he had not the personality to
impress them on others or the application to put them into practice, and
his whole time was occupied in attempting to make head against the
guerilla warfare. His methods were rough and barbarous, and reacted
against the French, for he avenged the ill deeds of the guerillas on
their families and women folk, and visited with military execution any
village which failed to meet his onerous requisitions. So the Spaniards
retaliated with revenge, the weapon of the weak, that "wild kind of
justice." The Marshal's blunders were cut short by his recall to Paris
at the beginning of 1812 to reorganise the Guard prior to the Russian
campaign.
The Duke of Istria accompanied the Emperor to the front. His individual
share was restricted by the fact that the King of Naples was with the
army. But during the retreat he led the van and did yeoman service in
restoring order among the disheartened troops.
Early in 1813 he was recalled from Ebling to reorganise the Guard and
the reserve cavalry. The task tried to the utmost the Marshal's great
administrative capacity, for not only was there the question of men and
equipment, but above all he was confronted with the difficulty of
providing remounts. In spite of all his efforts it was impossible to
find anything like enough horses for the cavalry, for the guns had to be
supplied first.
The Marshal's share in the campaign was short. At Luetzen, on the eve of
the first engagement, he was greatly depressed and possessed by a
presentiment of death, which proved only too true, for scarcely had the
battle opened when he was struck by a bullet which inflicted a mortal
wound.
The Duke of Istria has always been among the more unknown of the
Marshals. The reason for this is clear. As commander of the cavalry of
the Guard and organiser of the Young Guard, his greatest work was done
in the office at Paris, disciplining, organising, equipping, and
supervising the instruction of these picked troops. His greatest talents
were those of administration. As a cavalry leader in the field he was
overshadowed by the brilliant and more striking King of Naples. Still,
as a subordinate he possessed some sterling qualities, as is proved by
his actions during the Great Five Days, and by the fierce fight at
Aspern-Essling. As an independent commander he was a failure. Again and
again his moral courage seemed to desert him at the critical moment. In
Spain, at Medina del Rio Seco, at Burgos, and at Fuentes d'Onoro, he
could not brace himself to take the responsibility of throwing his whole
weight into the action. Like many another general, he was sound, but he
was unable to rise to the height of those great commanders who
intuitively know when to stake their all. Consequently, although he
undoubtedly possessed the true military eye, as is shown by the
wonderful way he covered the junction of the French corps along the
Vistula, and by his clearly written despatch on the errors of the war in
Spain, his military reputation always suffered when he had not his great
chief close at hand to stiffen his determination. Napoleon knew full
well his weakness, and the reproaches he hurled at him at Wagram were
not altogether without ground. Still, the Emperor was aware that
Bessieres's advice was always valuable, because of his clearness of
vision and his absolute lack of all bias and prejudice; and while he
made allowances for his lack of moral courage, he always listened to him
attentively. The army believed that it was his frantic appeal, "Sire,
you are seven hundred leagues from Paris," which deterred the Emperor at
Moskowa from throwing the Guard into the action, and thus permitted the
Russians to escape absolute annihilation. As a man the Marshal was loved
and respected by all for his absolute disinterestedness and
straightforwardness. He was adored by his troops, while he possessed the
qualities which enabled him to succeed in the difficult task of
establishing an iron discipline in the Guard. It was due to him that, in
the Imperial Guard, there was none of that lawlessness which made the
Pretorians of Rome a danger to the Empire. When not unnerved by
responsibility the Marshal was tenderhearted to an extreme. At Moscow he
was foremost in saving the wretched inhabitants from the flames; during
the horror of the retreat he dashed back alone to a deserted camp on
hearing the cries of an infant. But when frightened he could be cruelty
itself, as is shown in his terrible decrees against the Spanish
guerillas. Yet even in Spain his justice was appreciated, and in many a
village in Castile, on the news of his death, masses were sung for his
soul. Though he lacked the highest moral courage, his physical bravery
was proven on many a stricken field from Valladolid to Warsaw. At St.
Helena the great Emperor gave his friend a noble epitaph--"He lived like
Bayard, he died like Turenne."
XIX
CLAUDE VICTOR PERRIN, MARSHAL, DUKE OF BELLUNO
Not specially dowered by fortune with talents for war, but possessed of
a resolute character, a high sense of honour, great courage, and that
intrepidity which Napoleon maintained was so absolutely essential for
high command, the Duke of Belluno is a striking instance of how large a
factor is character in the struggle of life which ends in the survival
of the fittest. Born on December 7, 1764, at La Marche, among the
mountains of the Vosges, Victor Perrin enlisted as a private, at the age
of seventeen, in the artillery regiment of Grenoble. The artillery was
the finest arm of the old royal army, for there, and there alone, merit,
not favour, was the key to promotion. Accordingly the future Marshal
served his apprenticeship to arms under officers who knew their service
and loved it. Ten years spent in the ranks under those who maintained
strict discipline and were themselves punctilious in matters of duty,
who exercised careful supervision over their men and materiel, and made
a serious study of their profession, the art of war--these years with
their example were not thrown away on the young soldier. When, in 1791,
the upheaval of the Revolution threatened to subvert the service, Claude
Victor, now a sergeant, in disgust at the licence prevailing among the
troops, applied for his discharge. Seven months of civil life proved
enough for the sturdy ex-sergeant, and in October he enrolled himself
in the volunteers of the Drome, where in nine months he forced himself
by strength of character to the command of his battalion, for, as
Napoleon aptly said, "the times of revolution are the occasions for
those soldiers who have insight and courage." After six months' drill
under the hand of the ex-artilleryman, the volunteers of the Drome were
able to hold their own on the parade ground with the best regiments of
the line. Well might their commander be proud of his battalion. In the
fighting on the Var, Victor's volunteers greatly distinguished
themselves, but it was at Toulon that they first showed their real
worth. It was well for the colonel that he had brought his troops to a
high pitch of morale, for, on starting to attack Mount Faron, General
Dugommier summoned him aside. "We must take the redoubt," he said,
"or----" and he passed his hand in a suggestive way across his throat.
In this attack, alone of all the corps engaged, the men of the Drome
stood their ground when the English made their counter-attack; amid
cries of "Sauve qui peut!" they alone replied steadily to the murderous
fire of the enemy, and as quietly as on parade they covered the rout and
slowly withdrew in good order. Three weeks later came the opportunity of
Victor's life in the assault on the "Little Gibraltar," the seizure of
which position forced the English to evacuate Toulon. The attack was
planned by Bonaparte, and Victor had the good fortune to be chosen as
one of the leaders; he was already the firm friend of the Corsican
captain of artillery, and he now won his boundless admiration by his
reckless bravery and his capacity for making his troops follow him. The
two wounds which he received in the charge which carried the palisades
were a cheap price to pay for the rank and glory which he was later to
gain as a reward for the way in which he flung his shattered column
against the second line of defence. His immediate recompense was the
post of general of brigade in the Army of the Eastern Pyrenees.
From the Spanish campaign Victor returned, in 1795, to Italy with an
enhanced reputation and some knowledge of mountain warfare which was to
stand him in good stead later. When, in 1796, Bonaparte took command of
the Army of Italy, he found Victor still general of brigade, but reputed
one of the bravest men in that army of heroes. The campaign of 1796
brought him still more to the front. Dego, Mondovi, Peschiera, San
Marco, Cerea, and the fights round Mantua proved his courage and
capacity to exact the most from his troops, but it was his manoeuvring
on January 16, 1797, at Saint Georges, outside Mantua, which proved his
real ability, for there, with but two French regiments, he forced the
whole division of General Provera, seven thousand strong, to lay down
its arms. Bonaparte chose the conqueror of Provera to lead the French
army to invade the Papal States. This was Victor's first independent
command, but, owing to the poor condition of the Papal troops, it was no
severe test of his ability; still, it gained for him his step as general
of division, and confirmed his chief's high opinion of him.
During the year following the peace of Campo Formio, General Victor held
several posts in France, but was back again in Italy in 1799, to take
part in the disastrous campaign against the Austrians and Russians.
Detached by General Moreau to aid Macdonald on the Trebbia, he, for the
first time, showed that jealousy which was such a blemish in his
character, and during the retreat he paid so little attention to orders
that he was almost overwhelmed by the enemy. Not from cowardice, but
from his desire to escape Macdonald's control, he abandoned his guns,
and withdrew into the mountains to try to join Moreau; but Macdonald
saved the guns, and sarcastically wrote to his insubordinate lieutenant
that he had secured the guns but found neither friend nor foe.
Victor was serving under Massena when Bonaparte returned from Egypt.
Stern Republican, sprung from the ranks, he hated the idea of a
dictatorship, and did not hide from superiors or inferiors his dislike
of the coup d'etat of the 18th Brumaire. Indeed, so subversive of
discipline became his attitude and his speeches to his soldiers, that
Massena was forced to remove him from his command and report him to the
First Consul. In retirement and disgrace at Monaco, he saw with dismay
the armies of the Allies surging up to the French frontier. Putting
aside all personal animosity, he wrote to his former friend and
commander, with no complaints, or prayers to be reinstated, but giving a
clear exposition of the state of affairs in Italy, and of the means
necessary to restore the prestige of the French arms, and actually
proposing the plan, which the First Consul had already conceived, of
crossing the Alps and falling on the communications of the enemy.
Bonaparte was greatly struck with this letter. Perhaps also he called to
mind his former friendship, in the days when the old ex-artillery
sergeant used to walk round his batteries at Toulon, and doubtless he
remembered his stubborn courage and tenacity in the fights round Mantua;
at any rate, he summoned him to Paris, received him with marks of
affection, and sent him off at once to command a division of the Army of
Reserve. But though he forgave him outwardly, Bonaparte was too shrewd a
judge of men not to see that his old comrade was always dangerous when
not employed. While busy drilling and supervising his troops the general
had no time to think about politics and the theories of government. So,
as First Consul and Emperor, Napoleon saw to it that the ex-artilleryman
had plenty of employment. During the Marengo campaign the general gained
fresh honours. Luckily it was his old friend, Lannes, with whom he had
to co-operate; and Lannes willingly acknowledged his loyal aid at
Montebello, for on the day he received his dukedom he embraced Victor,
saying, "My friend, it is to you I owe my title!" At Marengo he again
had to work with Lannes, and it was due to their admirable co-operation
and stubbornness that the retreat did not become a rout, and that Desaix
had time to return to the field, and allow the First Consul to fight
another battle and turn a defeat into a victory.
But though Napoleon gave him his due share of the glory of Marengo, and
mentioned him first in despatches and presented him with a sword of
honour, he yet remembered his former hostility, and, while constantly
employing him, took care to keep him as much as possible out of France.
So for two years after Marengo General Victor held the post of
commander-in-chief in the Army of Holland. Then in 1802 he was appointed
Captain-General of Louisiana. But fortune here defeated the First
Consul's intentions, and the expedition to America never sailed. Victor
was sent back to his post in Holland, and kept there till February,
1805, when he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary at the Danish
court.
During these years it was clear to everybody that he was in disgrace,
and it was due to the boldness of his friend, Marshal Lannes, that he
was recalled to active service and once again given a chance of
distinguishing himself. In September, 1806, owing to the promotion of
his chief staff officer, Lannes had to find a new chief of the staff for
his corps, and he applied to the Emperor to be allowed to appoint
General Victor. Napoleon hesitated for a moment, then, mindful of the
number of troops under arms, and the necessity of employing really
efficient officers on the staff, he acquiesced in the Marshal's choice,
saying, "He is a really sound man and one in whom I have complete
confidence, and I will give him proof of this when the occasion
arrives." Jena and Pultusk added to the general's distinguished record,
and the Emperor began to treat him once again with favour, and in
January, 1807, entrusted him with the new tenth corps of the Grand Army.
Soon after he had taken over his new command he had the bad luck to be
captured by a patrol of the enemy while driving with a single
aide-de-camp near Stettin. Luckily for him he had by now completely won
back the goodwill of the Emperor. Napoleon at once set about to effect
his exchange, and in a few days he was back again with his corps. At the
beginning of June, when Bernadotte fell ill, the Emperor summoned him to
the front to take command of the first corps, and it was in this
capacity that he was present at the battle of Friedland, and in that
terrible struggle he won his baton. Rewards now came speedily, for after
Tilsit he was entrusted with the government of Prussia, and in 1808
created Duke of Belluno.
From Prussia the Marshal was summoned, in the autumn of 1808, to take
command of the first corps of the Army of Spain, and for the next three
years he saw continuous service in the Peninsula. During the first few
months of his career there fortune smiled upon him. At Espinosa he dealt
General Blake a smashing blow; later he led the van of the army under
Napoleon in the march on Madrid, and forced the enemy's entrenched
position in the pass of the Somosierra by a charge of his Polish
lancers. From Madrid he was despatched to the south to keep the enemy at
some distance from the capital, and at Ulces and Medellin he proved that
the Spanish generals were no match for him and his seasoned troops. But
unfortunately he smirched the fame of these victories by the licence he
permitted his soldiers: at Ulces he allowed the town to be sacked, and
executed sixty-nine of the most prominent of the citizens, including
some monks, while he ordered all prisoners who were unable to march to
be shot. At Medellin the French bayoneted the Spanish wounded. Further,
like many another commander, he did not scruple to make the most of his
successes in his reports, and the Spaniards assert that he eked out his
trophies by taking down the old battle-flags of the knights of Santiago
from the church of Ulces. After Medellin his successes ended. Placed
under the command of Joseph and Jourdan, whom he despised; in great
straits to feed his army in a country which was really a wilderness;
worried by constant contradictory orders, it was in no pleasant mood
that he at last found himself under the personal command of King Joseph
at Talavera. Anxious to maintain his independence and to show off his
military skill, he attempted by himself to surprise the English wing of
the allied army. Consequently he committed King Joseph and Jourdan to an
action which they did not wish to fight, and by refusing to co-operate
with the other corps commanders he brought defeat upon the French army,
for, as Napoleon wrote to Joseph, "As long as you attack good troops,
like the English, in good positions, without reconnoitring them, you
will lead your men to death 'en pure perte.'"
After Talavera Victor's independent career came to an end; he was placed
under the orders of Marshal Soult and sent to besiege Cadiz, before
which place he lay till he was summoned to take part in the Russian
campaign. But before leaving Cadiz he fought one more action against the
British when General Graham seized the opportunity of Soult's absence to
attempt to break up the siege; and he had once again to acknowledge
defeat, when at Barossa the little column of four thousand British
turned at bay and boldly attacked and defeated nine thousand chosen
French infantry under the Marshal himself.
In Russia the Duke of Belluno was saved some of the greatest hardships,
for his corps was on the line of communication, and it was not till the
day before the battle of the Beresina that he actually joined the
retreating army, in time to earn further glory by covering the passage
of the river, though at the cost of more than half his corps. During
1813 he fought at Dresden and at Leipzig, and at the commencement of
1814 was entrusted with the defence of the Vosges; but he soon had to
fall back on the Marne. At Saint Dizier and Brienne he bore himself
bravely, but at Montereau he fell into disgrace; he neglected to hold
the bridge on the Seine, and thus completely spoiled Napoleon's
combination. The Emperor was furious, and deprived him of the command of
his corps and told him to leave the army. But the Marshal refused to go.
"I will shoulder my musket," said he; "Victor has not forgotten his old
occupation. I will take my place in the Guard." At such devotion the
Emperor relented. "Well, Victor," he said, stretching out his hand,
"remain with us. I cannot restore to you your corps, which I have
bestowed on Girard; but I give you two divisions of the Guard." However,
the Marshal did not long occupy his new position, for he was severely
wounded at Craonne and forced to go home.