The battles of Saragossa and Belchite marked the commencement of a fresh

stage in the conquest of Eastern Spain. From this time onwards Aragon

became the base from which was organised the conquest of Catalonia and

Valencia. It was in pursuance of this scheme that Suchet's next task was

the organisation of the civil government of the ancient kingdom of

Aragon. Fortunately for the commander-in-chief the old local patriotism

burnt strong in the hearts of the Aragonese; jealous of the Castilians,

they placed their love of Aragon far above their love of Spain. Suchet,

an ardent student of human nature, was quick to appreciate how to turn

to his use this provincialism. Loud in his praises of their stubborn

resistance to the French arms, he approached the nobles and former civil

servants and prayed them to lend him their help in restoring the former

glories of the ancient kingdom of Aragon. Meanwhile the people of the

towns and villages were propitiated by a stern justice and a new fiscal

system, which, while it drew more from their pockets, was less

aggravating and inquisitorial than the former method, which exacted a

tax on the sale and purchase of every individual article. Meanwhile the

needs of the French army created a market for both agricultural produce

and for manufactured articles, and hence both the urban and rural

populations, while paying heavier taxes, made greater profits than

formerly. Such was the ability with which Aragon was administered that a

province, which even in its most prosperous days had never contributed

more than four million francs to the Spanish treasury, was able to

produce an income of eight million francs for the pay of the troops

alone, without counting the cost of military operations, and at the same

time to maintain its own civil servants, while works of public utility

were commenced in Saragossa and elsewhere.

But it was not only from the point of finance that Suchet proved to the

full the maxim that the art of war is nothing but the art of feeding

your troops: his military operations were no whit less remarkable than

his success as a civil administrator. Immediately after Belchite he

swept all the guerillas out of Aragon, and by a carefully thought out

plan of garrisons gave the country that peace and certainty which is

requisite for commerce and agriculture alike. He then proceeded to wrest

from the enemy the important fortresses of Lerida and Mequinenza, which

command the approaches to Catalonia. Suchet's conquest of Aragon,

Catalonia, and Valencia was marked by a succession of brilliant sieges.

Lerida, Mequinenza, Tortosa, the fort of San Felipe, the Col of

Balanquer, Tarragona, Sagunto, and Valencia all fell before his

conquering arm, for Spain had to be won piece by piece. Each forward

step was marked by a siege, a battle to defeat the relieving force, the

fall of the fortress, and its careful restoration as a base for the next

advance. It was not owing to any weakness or want of precaution on the

part of the enemy that Suchet thus captured all the noted fortresses of

central Spain: in every case the Spaniards fought with grim

determination, and the regular Spanish armies, aided by swarms of

guerillas, made desperate efforts to relieve their beleaguered

countrymen. But the French success was due to the qualities of their

general. With a patience equal to that of Marlborough, with a power of

supervision over detail like that of his great chief, Suchet knew

exactly how to pick his staff and how far to trust his subordinates.

Above all, he had absolute self-control. In the blackest hour he never

gave way, under the most extreme provocation he never lost his temper;

hence his own troops idolised him, while his perfect justice impressed

itself on the enemy. Though the Spanish priests were teaching the

catechism in every village that it was one's duty to love all men except

the French, that it was not only lawful but one's sacred duty to kill

all Frenchmen, though a letter was captured in which a guerilla chief

ordered his subordinates to make every effort to capture Madame Suchet

and to cut her throat, especially because she was pregnant, the

commander-in-chief kept his men in absolute control, and punished with

the greatest severity every outrage committed by his troops.

The battle and siege of Valencia in 1811 were the crowning success of

his career, and brought as their reward the long-coveted Marshal's baton

and the title of Duke of Albufera: to support his title the Emperor

granted him half a million francs, a greater sum than he gave to any

other of his Paladins. The year 1812 saw the Marshal busily engaged in

reorganising the province of Valencia on the lines he had found so

successful in Aragon. But his work there had never time to take root.

The necessities of the Russian campaign had forced Napoleon to recall

from Spain many of his best troops, while the successful advance of

Wellington on Madrid showed how unstable was the French rule. It was the

province of Valencia alone which supplied the money and provisions for

the armies which reconquered the Spanish capital for King Joseph. In

1813 the victorious advance of Wellington and the battle of Vittoria

compelled Suchet to evacuate Valencia. The fall of Pampeluna caused him

to evacuate Aragon. Deprived of all his trustworthy troops, he still, by

his bold counter-attacks, delayed the advance of the English and

Spaniards under Bentinck, but by the time Napoleon abdicated he had been

compelled with his handful of men to fall back on French territory.

Under the Restoration the Marshal was retained in command of the tenth

division, but on Napoleon's return from Elba he once again rejoined his

old leader, whom he had not seen since 1808. The Emperor greeted him

most cordially. "Marshal Suchet," he said, "you have grown greatly in

reputation since last we met. You are welcome; you bring with you glory

and all the glamour that heroes give to their contemporaries on earth."

The Marshal was at once sent off to his old home of Lyons to organise

there out of nothing an army which was to cover the Alps. Men there were

in plenty, but the arsenals were empty; still, the Marshal with ten

thousand troops beat the Piedmontese on June 15th and a few days

afterwards defeated the Austrians. But the occupation of Geneva by the

Allies forced him to evacuate Savoy and fall back on Lyons, where he was

greeted with the news of Waterloo. Under the second Restoration the

Marshal never appeared in public life, and died at the chateau of Saint

Joseph at Marseilles on January 3, 1826.

Talking to O'Meara at St. Helena, Napoleon said, "Of the generals of

France I give the preference to Suchet. Before his time Massena was the

first." At another time he said of him, "It is a pity that mortals

cannot improvise men like him. If I had had two Marshals like Suchet I

should not only have conquered Spain, but have kept it." While making

due allowance for the probability that the Emperor was influenced in

this speech by the fact that Suchet alone relieved the gloom of the

unsuccessful war in Spain, it is yet abundantly clear that the Marshal

was a commander of no mean ability, for though he did not show the

precocity of a Marmont, yet, as Napoleon himself said, "Suchet was a man

whose mind and character increased wonderfully."

As a commander-in-chief, though acting in a small sphere and never

having more than fifty thousand troops under his command, he showed that

he possessed determination, insight, and great powers of organisation.

From the first he saw that the one and only way to wear down the Spanish

resistance was to capture the fortresses. Hence his operations were

twofold--the conduct of sieges and the protection of his convoys from

the guerillas. He justified his reasoning; by 1812 he had captured no

less than seventy-seven thousand officers and men and fourteen hundred

guns and had pacified Aragon, Valencia, and part of Catalonia. Another

great secret of his success lay in the fact that he knew how to profit

by victory; the battle of Belchite followed on that of Maria; no sooner

was Lerida captured than plans were made to take Mequinenza, and before

that fortress was captured the siege train for Tortosa was got ready.

Profiting by the depression of the enemy after the fall of Tortosa, he

despatched columns to capture San Felipe and the Col of Balanquer.

Thanks to his former training as chief of the staff, the Marshal was

able with his own hand to draw up all the smallest regulations for siege

operations, and for the government of Aragon and Valencia. The gift of

drafting clear and concise orders and the intuition with which he chose

his staff and column commanders explain to a great extent the reason why

his operations in Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia were so little

hampered by the constant guerilla warfare which paralysed the other

French commanders in Spain. The indefatigable energy with which he made

himself personally acquainted with every officer under his command, and

his knowledge of, sympathy with, and care for his soldiers, always made

him popular; while the burning enthusiasm which he knew how to infuse

into French, German, and Italian alike so stimulated his troops that he

could demand almost any sacrifice from them. Thus it was that he himself

created the morale which enabled him again and again to conquer against

overwhelming odds.

As a man, moderation and justice lay at the root of his character, and

they account largely for his success as a statesman. He had the

difficult task of administering Aragon and Valencia for the benefit of

the army under his command; yet he was remembered not with hate, but

with affection, by the people of those countries. When any one inquired

what was the character of the French general, the Spaniards would reply,

"He is a just man." The same moderation which caused him to save

Tarragona and Valencia from the fury of his troops taught him to devote

himself to the welfare of his temporary subjects, and caused his

hospital arrangements to receive the gratuitous praise of the Spanish

and English commanders. At Saragossa his name was given to one of the

principal streets, and on his death the inhabitants of the town paid for

masses for his soul, while the King of Spain was only voicing the

feelings of the people when he wrote to the Marshal's widow that

everything he had heard in Spain proved how deservedly the Duke of

Albufera had gained the affections of the people of Valencia and

Aragon.

XII

LAURENT GOUVION ST. CYR, MARSHAL

Laurent Gouvion St. Cyr, the son of a small landowner of Toul, was born

in that town on April 13, 1764. His father, who was a Gouvion, had

married a St. Cyr, but the marriage had turned out an unfortunate one,

and soon after the birth of the young Laurent a separation was agreed

on. Consequently, from an early age, the boy lacked a mother's care. His

father, many of whose relations were in the artillery, desired his son

to enter the army, and with that object in view sent him to the

Artillery College at Toul. But at the age of eighteen the future Marshal

decided to abandon the career of arms for that of art, preferring the

freedom of an artist's life to the dull routine of garrison service.

Taking the bit between his teeth early in 1782, he set off for Rome,

which he made his headquarters for the following two years, with

occasional trips as far as Sicily. The year 1789 found Laurent Gouvion

established in Paris with a great knowledge of art and some considerable

skill in technique. Steeped in classic lore, contemptuous of dull

authority and full of youthful enthusiasm, he hailed with joy the

outbreak of the Revolution. But by the end of 1792 the young painter was

too keen a student of men and matters not to perceive "the danger which

menaced the Republic," and, like all other thinking men, "was lost in

astonishment, not to say at the imprudence, but the folly of the

Convention, which instead of seeking to diminish the number of its

enemies, seemed resolved to augment them by successive insults, not

merely against all kings, but against every existing government." In

spite of this, when Europe threatened France, Laurent Gouvion was one of

the first to enlist in the volunteers. His personality and former

training at once made themselves felt; within a month of enlisting he

was elected captain, in which grade he joined the Army of the Rhine

under General Custine. On reaching the front the volunteer captain soon

found scope for his pencil. In an army thoroughly disorganised a good

draughtsman with an eye for country was no despicable asset. Gouvion was

attached to the topographical department of the staff. He added his

mother's name--St. Cyr--to his surname because of the constant confusion

arising owing to the number of Gouvions employed with the army. After a

year's hard work on the staff, during which he acquired a thorough grasp

of the art of manoeuvring according to the terrain, and a good working

knowledge of the machinery of an army, St. Cyr was promoted on June 5,

1794, general of brigade, and six days later general of division. His

promotion was not unmerited, for it was his complete mastery of mountain

warfare which had contributed more than anything else to the success of

the division of the Army of the Rhine to which he had been attached. The

soldiers had long recognised the fact, and when they heard the guns

booming through the defiles of the Vosges they used to call one to the

other, "There is St. Cyr playing chess." Like Bernadotte, at first he

refused this rapid promotion; he feared it might lead to the scaffold,

for death was then the reward of failure, and besides this, the Gouvions

were classed among the ci-devant nobles. As a commander the new general

speedily proved that, much as he admired liberty in the abstract, he

would have nothing but obedience from his men. Tall of stature, more

like a professor than a soldier, through all his career wearing the

plain blue overcoat, without uniform or epaulettes, which were affected

by the generals of the Army of the Rhine, St. Cyr soon became one of the

best known generals of Republican France. As one of his most bitter

enemies wrote of him, "It was impossible to find a calmer man; the

greatest dangers, disappointments, successes, defeats, were alike unable

to move him. In the presence of every sort of contingency he was like

ice. It may be easily understood, of what advantage such a character,

backed by a taste for study and meditation, was to a general officer."

In the army of the Rhine Desaix and St. Cyr were regarded as the persons

whose examples should be followed. The austerity of their manner of

life, their sincere patriotism and laborious perseverance, left an

indelible mark on all with whom they came in contact. But though they

had much in common they were really very dissimilar, for Desaix was

intoxicated with the love of glory, full of burning enthusiasm,

sympathetic to an extraordinary degree, exceedingly susceptible to the

influence of the moment, while St. Cyr loved duty as the rule of his

life, modelled his action by the strict laws of calculation, was

absolutely impervious to outside influence, and never knew what it was

to doubt his own powers. But with all his great gifts he had many

faults; he was exceedingly jealous, and without knowing it he allowed

his own interests to affect his calculations, consequently very early in

his career his fellow-generals hated to have to work in co-operation

with him, and he got the name of being a "bad bed-fellow." Further,

excellent as he was as a strategist and tactician, the details of

administration bored him. He never held a review, never visited

hospitals, and left the threads of administration in the hands of his

subordinates; consequently, much as his troops trusted him in the field,

they disliked him in quarters, because, while his discipline was most

severe, he did nothing to provide for their needs or amusements.

[Illustration: GOUVION ST. CYR, COUNT

FROM AN ENGRAVING AFTER THE PAINTING BY J. GUERIN]

From 1795 to the peace of Campo Formio St. Cyr shared the fortunes and

vicissitudes of the Army of the Rhine, serving as a subordinate under

Hoche, Jourdan, and Moreau. The battle of Biberach, in 1796, was his

personal triumph. With one single corps he defeated three-fourths of the

whole of the enemy's army and drove it in rout with a loss of five

thousand prisoners. But in spite of this victory and numerous mentions

in despatches, on being introduced to the Director Rewbell, after the

treaty of Campo Formio, he was actually asked, "In which army have you

served?" An explanation was necessary, whereupon the Director, finding

that the general understood and spoke Italian, sent him off at once to

take command of the Army of Rome. On March 26, 1798, he arrived there

and commenced his first independent command. His task was a difficult

one. The officers of the army had risen in revolt against Massena, who

had made no attempt to pay them or their troops, but had spent his time

in amassing a fortune for himself. The new general had orders to arrest

certain officers and restore discipline. It was a task admirably suited

to his talents, and within four days of his arrival the disaffected were

arrested and the mutiny quelled. His next duty, according to the command

of the Directory, was to remove the Pope from Rome; by a queer

coincidence the officer entrusted to escort his Holiness to Tuscany was

a certain Colonel Calvin. So far St. Cyr, much against his wish, had

carried out the orders of the Directory, but his next action was

spontaneous and dictated by his own idea of justice. It was the hour of

spoliation: a committee appointed by the Directory was busy in

transporting to France all the masterpieces of Italian art, and the

newly-appointed Consuls of the Roman Republic were likewise fully

engaged in acts of vandalism. When the general heard that the

magnificent oblation of diamonds belonging to the Doria family had been

purloined from the Church of St. Agnes to grace the necks of the wives

of the bastard Consuls, he at once ordered the ostensoir to be returned

to its owners. The Consuls appealed to the Directory; so after a command

of four short months St. Cyr was recalled, only to be sent at once to

resume his old position as a divisional commander in the Army of the

Rhine.

From there in June, 1799, he was hurriedly despatched to Italy to aid

Moreau, who was attempting to stem the victorious advance of the

Austrians and Russians. He arrived in time to take part in the

hard-fought fight of Novi, and to help to organise a stubborn resistance

on the slopes of the Apennines. Before the battle of Novi he actually

had a glimpse of the redoubtable Suvaroff himself. The Russian general,

who trusted his own eyes more than the reports of his scouts, one day

rode right up to the line of French vedettes clad in his usual fighting

kit, a shirt and pair of breeches, and after a hurried reconnaissance

returned to his camp and gave his celebrated order: "God wishes, the

Emperor orders, Suvaroff commands, that to-morrow the enemy be

conquered." Novi added lustre to St. Cyr's reputation; it was his

strenuous resistance on the right flank and his admirable handling of

the rear guard which prevented the victorious Allies from hurling the

beaten French through the passes into the sea. But Novi was an easy task

compared to what was to follow. The passes of the Apennines had to be

held and Genoa covered with a handful of men dispirited by defeat and

half mutinous from want of necessary food. It was a rabble, not an army;

there was no commissariat, no pay chest, no store of clothing. Meanwhile

Genoa lay smouldering in rebellion at his rear. The task suited the man;

by a series of clever feints and manoeuvres in the valley of the

Bormida, he outwitted the enemy and gradually restored the morale of his

troops, and was able to hurry back to Genoa with three battalions at the

psychological moment when mutiny and rebellion were showing their head.

With absolute calmness he told the civic authorities to prepare

quarters for eight thousand troops, of which the few with him were the

advance guard. The authorities, staggered by his sudden appearance,

never doubted the arrival of this fabulous force, and subsequently St.

Cyr was able to occupy all the strongholds in the town with the handful

of troops he had with him, and then at his leisure to arrest the

ringleaders of the rebellion. Meanwhile, the judicious establishment of

free soup kitchens in the streets alleviated the necessities of the mob.

Scarcely was Genoa pacified when the general was confronted by a much

more serious event. Famine had driven the soldiers to mutiny, and even

the very outposts withdrew from contact with the enemy, and announced

their intention of returning to France. It was only by raising a forced

loan from the Ligurian Government, and delivering a most touching appeal

to their patriotism, that he was able to persuade the mutineers to

return to their duty, telling them that if they left the colours, he

intended, "with the generals, officers, and non-commissioned officers to

hold the positions occupied by the army." Further to encourage them he

began a series of small engagements, which restored their morale and led

up to the battle of Albano, where he inflicted so severe a defeat on the

Austrians that Genoa was for a considerable time relieved from all

danger. The First Consul, on hearing of the victory of Albano, at once

sent St. Cyr a sword of honour, a Damascus blade in a richly engraved

sheath, with the pommel encrusted with diamonds, which had originally

been intended for the Sultan.

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