Austrians in the Low Countries, and owing to the stern discipline of
their lieutenant-colonel, became distinguished as the most reliable of
all the volunteers raised in 1791. Davout adopted the same plan which
proved so effective among the Scotch regiments during the eighteenth
century: keeping in close communication with the local authorities of
the Yonne, and rewarding or punishing his men by posting their names
with their records in the various cantons from which they were drawn.
After fighting bravely under Dumouriez, it fell to the lot of the
battalion to attempt to capture that general, when, after the battle of
Neerwinden, he tried to betray his army to the Austrians. Soon after
this the lieutenant-colonel had to throw up his command when the
Convention decreed that no ci-devant noble could hold a commission; but
Davout's record was so strongly republican that his friend Turreau had
little difficulty in getting him reinstated in his rank, and sent to
command a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Moselle. Except for two
years during which he was at home on parole, after the capture of
Mannheim, the general was on active service in the Rhine valley till the
peace of Campo Formio in 1797. During these years he steadily added to
his reputation as a stern commander and a stubborn fighter, and as such
attracted the attention of Desaix, who introduced him early in 1798 to
Bonaparte. The future Emperor saw at a glance that this small, stout,
bald-headed young man had qualities which few others possessed.
Accordingly he took him with him to Egypt. Like all who met the young
Napoleon, Davout fell entirely beneath his spell. In spite of the fact
that he was not included among the few friends whom Bonaparte selected
to return with him in 1800, his enthusiasm for the First Consul
increased day by day. Returning to France with Desaix, just before the
Marengo campaign, he at once hastened to Paris to congratulate the new
head of the Government. Davout's republicanism had received many shocks.
Like all other honourable men, he had hated and loathed the Terror.
Moreover, he had seen on service how little the preachers of the
equality of man carried out their doctrine in practice. As early as 1794
we find him writing to a friend: "Ought we to be exposed to the tyranny
of any chance revolutionary committee or club?... Why are not all
Frenchmen witnesses of fraternity and of the republican virtues which
reign in our camps; we have no brigands here, but have we not plenty at
home?" Bonaparte knew well that Davout was not only his enthusiastic
personal follower, but also thoroughly approved of the coup d'etat of
the 18th Brumaire, and in his desire for peace and stability at home
would warmly back him up in his scheme of founding a tyranny under the
guise of an Imperial Republic. Accordingly the First Consul published a
most flattering account of him in the official _Moniteur_, and gave him
command of the cavalry of the Army of Italy, under General Brune. In
June, 1801, after the treaty of Lueneville, in pursuance of his plan of
congregating his friends at headquarters, he recalled him to Paris as
inspector-general of cavalry.
It was while thus employed that Davout met his wife, Aimee Leclerc.
Aimee, a sister of that Leclerc who married Pauline Bonaparte, had been
educated at Madame Campan's school in Paris, along with the young
Beauharnais and Bonapartes, and was the bosom friend of Caroline and
Hortense. From many points of view the marriage was extremely
appropriate; for although the Davouts belonged to the old nobility, and
Aimee's father was only a corn merchant of Poitou, he had prospered in
his business, and had been able to give his daughter an excellent
education. The marriage brought Davout into close connection with the
First Consul's family, and was successful from a worldly and a domestic
point of view. The future Marshal was deeply attached to his wife, and
spent every moment with her which he could snatch from his military
duties. When absent on service scarcely a day passed on which he did not
write to her, and his happiness was completely bound up in her welfare
and that of his large family. The year following their marriage the
Davouts bought the beautiful estate of Savigny-sur-Orge for the sum of
seven hundred thousand francs. This was a great strain on their rather
limited resources, and for some years they had to practise strict
economy.
In September, 1803, the general was summoned to Bruges to command a
corps of the Army of the Ocean, which later became the third corps of
the Grand Army. There, in close communication with his great chief, he
began to show those traits which made him respected as the most
relentless and careful administrator of all the Marshals of France. His
energy was indefatigable; everything had to undergo his personal
scrutiny, be it the best means of securing the embarkation of a company
in one of the new barges or the careful inspection of the boots of a
battalion: for Davout, like Wellington, knew that a soldier's marching
powers depended on two things, his feet and his stomach, and every man
in the third corps had to have two pairs of good boots in his valise and
one on his feet. Secrecy also, in his eyes, was of prime importance; he
was quick to give a lesson to all spies, or would-be spies, in Belgium,
and it was with stern exultation in his duty that he wrote to the First
Consul, "Your orders for the trial of the spy (Buelow) will be carried
out, and within a week he will be executed." Day by day, as he gained
experience, the indefatigable soldier drew on him the approbation of
the First Consul, and it was with no sense of favouritism that Napoleon,
when he became Emperor, nominated him among his newly-created Marshals,
although in the eyes of the army at large he had not yet done enough to
justify this choice.
The campaign of 1805 gave the Marshal his first opportunity of handling
large bodies of troops of all arms in the field, and, though it did not
bring him into such conspicuous notice as Murat, Lannes, Soult and Ney,
it justified Napoleon in his selection of him as worthy of the Marshal's
baton. In the operations round Ulm, Davout proved himself an excellent
subordinate, whose corps was ever ready, at full strength, in the field,
and at the hour at which it had been ordered, while the Marshal's stern
checking of marauding was a new feature in French military discipline,
and one which no other Marshal could successfully carry out without
starving his troops. But it was Austerlitz which taught the students of
war the true capabilities of this rising officer. There the Emperor,
relying on his stubborn, methodical character, entrusted him with a duty
which eminently suited his genius: he chose his corps as the screen to
cover the trap which he set for the Russian left, and all day long it
had to fight a stern rear-guard action against overwhelming odds, until
it had tempted the enemy into dissipating his forces, and so weakening
his centre that his left and right were defeated in detail. After
Austerlitz, Davout was entrusted with the pursuit of the left wing of
the Allies. Flushed with victory, the third corps pushed the
disorganised enemy in hopeless rout, and it seemed as if the
annihilation of the Russians was certain. Meanwhile, unknown to the
Marshal, the Emperor had accepted the Czar's demands for an armistice.
Davout first heard of the cessation of hostilities from the enemy, but,
remembering Murat's mistake, he refused to halt his troops. "You want to
deceive me," he said to the flag of truce; "you want to make a fool of
me.... I am going to crush you, and that is the only order I have
received." So the third corps pushed on, and it was only the production
of a despatch in the handwriting of the Czar himself that caused the
victor at last to stay his hand.
[Illustration: LOUIS NICOLAS DAVOUT, PRINCE OF ECKMUeHL
FROM AN ENGRAVING AFTER THE PAINTING BY GAUTHEROT]
Though Davout emerged from the Austrian campaign with the reputation in
the army of having at last earned his Marshal's baton, to the general
public he still appeared as "a little smooth-pated, unpretending man,
who was never tired of waltzing," but the campaign of 1806 made him
nearly the best known of all the Marshals. Auerstaedt was a masterpiece
of minor tactics. Napoleon, thinking that he had before him at Jena the
whole of the Prussian army, summoned to his aid Bernadotte, and thus
left Davout with a force of twenty-three thousand men isolated on his
right wing, with orders to push forward and try to get astride of the
enemy's line of retreat.
It was in pursuance of this order that early in the morning of October
14, 1806, the Marshal, at the head of the advance guard of his corps,
crossed the river Saale at Koesen and proceeded to seize the defile
beyond the bridge through which ran the road to Naumberg. True to his
motto of never leaving to another anything which he could possibly do
himself, he had personally, on the previous evening, carefully
reconnoitred the line of advance, and knew the importance of the village
of Hassenhausen at the further end of the defile. Hardly had his advance
guard seized this position and the heights commanding the road, when
through the fog they saw approaching the masses of the enemy's cavalry;
the fiery Prussian commander, Bluecher, at once hastened to the attack,
and again and again led his horsemen to the charge. Meanwhile Brunswick
counter-ordered the retreat of the infantry and artillery. Soon the
whole of the Prussian army, forty-five thousand strong, was engaged in
the attempt to crush the small French force. But the Marshal was in his
element, carefully husbanding his resources only to hurl them into the
fray at the critical moment; feinting at his enemy's flanks; utilising
every feature of the ground to prolong his resistance; galloping from
square to square, his uniform black from powder, his cocked hat carried
off by a bullet, encouraging his troops with short, sharp words, crying
out, "The great Frederick believed that God gave the victory to the big
battalions, but he lied; it is the obstinate people that win, and that's
you and your general." From six in the morning the battle raged, but
towards mid-day the Prussians, finding that they could make no
impression on the enemy, began to slacken their attack. Davout seized
the psychological moment to order his whole line to advance. Thereon the
King of Prussia commanded his forces to retire, leaving a strong rear
guard under Kalkreuth to prevent the French pursuit. But the French were
in no condition to carry on an active pursuit, for out of twenty-three
thousand men engaged they had lost almost eight thousand killed or
wounded. It is quite true that man for man the French soldier in 1806
was superior in intelligence and patriotism to the Prussian, that the
French staff was infinitely superior to the Prussian staff, and that
there was no comparison between the morale of the two armies; but that
alone does not explain how an army half the size of the enemy, caught as
it was in the act of deploying from a defile, not only was not beaten
absolutely, but actually defeated the superior force. The secret of the
French success at Auerstaedt lay in the character of their general. It
was Davout's careful reconnaissance, his quickness to perceive in
Hassenhausen the key of the position, his careful crowning of the
heights covering the defile, the masterly way in which, while massing
his men in the open to resist Bluecher's fierce charges, he at the same
time contrived so to expand his line as to threaten the flanks of his
vastly superior foe, his indomitable courage in throwing his last
reserve into the firing line, and his audacious counter-attack the
moment he saw the Prussians wavering, which saved his force from what
at the time looked like annihilation, and by sheer downright courage
and self-confidence turned defeat into victory.
Pleased as the Emperor was at his lieutenant's victory, and much as he
admired the way in which his subordinate had copied his own methods,
showing that inflexibility of purpose, absolute disregard of the opinion
of others, and unswerving belief in his own capacity which he knew were
the factors of his own success, it did not suit his policy that a
subordinate should attract the admiration of the army at large.
Accordingly in his bulletins he glossed over the part played by Davout
and belittled his success, but in his private letters he warmly praised
the Marshal's courage and ability. Further, to reward him for lack of
official praise, he gave the third corps the place of honour at the
grand march past held at Berlin, when the inhabitants of the capital of
Frederick the Great saw for the first time, with mingled hatred and
surprise, "the lively, impudent, mean-looking little fellows" who had
thrashed their own magnificent troops. On the following day the Emperor
inspected the third corps, and thanked the officers and men for the
great services they had rendered him, and paid a tribute to "the brave
men I have lost, whom I regret as it were my own children, but who died
on the field of honour." Pleased as the Marshal was with this somewhat
tardy acknowledgment of his achievement, he was in no way inflated with
pride; as General Segur says of him: "Those who knew him best say that
there was a sort of flavour of a bygone age in his inflexibility; stern
towards himself and towards others, and above all in that stoical
simplicity, high above all vanity, with which he ever strode forward,
with shoulders square, and full intent to the accomplishment of his
duty." But though success brought no pride in its train, it brought its
burdens: the jealousy of the other Marshals was barely concealed, and as
Davout wrote to his wife, "I am more than ever in need of the Emperor's
goodwill ... few of my colleagues pardon me the good fortune the third
corps had in beating the King of Prussia."
A winter spent in Poland amid these jealousies and far from his family
was only endurable because of his attachment to the service and person
of the Emperor. Immediately on entering the country which he was to
govern for the next two years, the Marshal summed up the situation at a
glance, and told the Emperor that the nobility would throw cold water on
all schemes unless the French guaranteed them their independence.
With the spring of 1807 came the last phase of the war. At Heilsberg,
Davout fought well, and two days later took his part in the great battle
of Eylau, the most bloody of all Napoleon's battles. Bennigsen, the
Russian commander, had turned at bay on his pursuers. On the morning of
February 8th the French corps came hurrying up from all sides at the
Emperor's commands. It was not, however, till mid-day that the third
corps arrived on the scene of the action. Heavy snow blizzards obscured
the scene, but the struggle raged fiercely on all sides, the Russians
fighting like bulls, as the French said. The Emperor, on Davout's
arrival, placed his corps on the right and ordered him to advance, but
the enemy's cavalry and artillery effectually barred his way. All day
long the contest lasted, men fighting hand to hand in a confused melee.
All day long Davout, with obstinate courage, clung to the village which
he seized in the morning, whence he threatened the Russian line of
retreat. When night came he still held his position; at last the
Emperor, fearing a renewal of the fight on the next day, gave orders at
eight o'clock for the third corps to fall back on Eylau. But the
Marshal, hearing of the commencement of the Russian retreat, disobeyed
the Emperor, and thus, by his bold front, in conjunction with Soult, he
was mainly instrumental in causing the enemy to leave the field. If
Davout had been less obstinate, the French would have had to fight
another battle on the following day, but thanks to him they were spared
this fate, and the twenty-five thousand dead and wounded Frenchmen had
not spent their blood in vain. The third corps escaped the horrors of
Friedland, as it had been detached to intercept the enemy's line of
retreat in the direction of Koenigsberg, and Tilsit saw the end of
Davout's second campaign against the Russians.
But peace did not bring the opportunity of returning to his beloved
France and the joys of home life; the Emperor in peace, as in war, could
not spare the great administrative capacity, the stern discipline, and
the rigid probity of the Marshal. "It is quite fair that I should give
him enormous presents," said the Emperor, "for he takes no perquisites."
So Davout found himself established nominally as commander of the army
of occupation, and really as special adviser to the Government of the
newly constituted Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It was a situation that
required infinite tact, patience, and a stern will. The Poles longed for
a restored kingdom of Poland. The Emperor could not grant this without
offending his new friend the Czar, who, with the Emperor of Austria,
looked with suspicion on the experiment of creating a Grand Duchy. So on
one side the Marshal had to try to inspire confidence in the Poles by
pretending that the Grand Duchy was merely a temporary experiment in the
larger policy of restoring the kingdom, while on the other hand he had
to assure the Austrians and Russians that nothing was further from the
Emperor's thoughts than creating a power at Warsaw dangerous to them.
Meanwhile there was plenty of occupation in getting provisions for his
troops in a land always poor and but lately devastated by war, and in
attempting to maintain order in a country full of adventurers where
police were unknown. It was useless to attempt to get assistance from
the Government, for there was no organisation, no division of duties
among the different ministers, and nobody knew what his own particular
business was. The situation was well summed up in a caricature which
showed the ministers nicely dressed in their various uniforms but
without heads. It was well for the new Government that they had at their
side such a stern, disinterested adviser as Davout, ready to take the
initiative and accept the responsibility of any act which he thought
good for the community. Under his supervision the ministers' spheres of
action were duly arranged: the state was saved from bankruptcy by
importing bullion from Prussia and deporting the adventurers who were
filling their own coffers by draining the money from the country. The
monks who preached against the Government and fanned popular discontent
were three times given twenty-four hours' notice to put their houses in
order, and then quietly escorted across the frontier. A strong Polish
force was raised, armed and equipped by Prince Poniatowski under the
Marshal's supervision. As a reward for his labours the Emperor granted
Davout three hundred thousand francs to buy a town house in Paris, and
followed this up, in May, 1808, by creating him Duke of Auerstaedt. But
what pleased the Marshal more than all was that the Emperor allowed the
Duchess to join him at Warsaw. This was a politic move, for the Emperor,
knowing well the secret intention of Austria, could not afford to
withdraw the warden of the marches from his outpost at Warsaw; but by
sending the Duchess of Auerstaedt to Poland he kept his faithful
lieutenant content. However, the Duchess's visit to Poland was not a
long one. By September, 1808, it became certain that Austria was making
immense efforts to recover her possessions, and accordingly Napoleon
very wisely began to concentrate his troops in Central Europe, and the
Duke of Auerstaedt's corps was recalled to Silesia in October, and was
incorporated with the French troops in Prussia under the designation of
the Army of the Rhine.
During the winter the Marshal was fully occupied in forcing Prussia to
drain to the last dregs her cup of humiliation: extorting from her the
immense ransom Napoleon had laid on her, and crushing her attempts at
regeneration by hounding out of the country the patriotic Stein and his
band of fellow-workers. From his cantonments round Berlin Davout was
summoned in 1809 to take part in another struggle with Austria. The
campaign opened disastrously for the French. The Archduke Charles
commenced operations earlier than Napoleon had calculated, and
accordingly the Grand Army found itself under the feeble command of the
chief of the staff. Berthier, in blind obedience to the Emperor, who had
misread the situation, was compelled to neglect the first principles of
war and to attempt to block all possible lines of advance instead of
concentrating in a strategic position. In consequence of this, the Duke
of Auerstaedt, in spite of his official protests, found himself at
Ratisbon, isolated from the rest of the army, with no support within
forty miles. From this dangerous position he was saved by the arrival of
the Emperor at headquarters, who, recognising his own mistakes,
immediately ordered a concentration on Abensberg. The retreat, or rather
the flank march, in the face of eighty thousand Austrians under the
Archduke Charles, was successfully carried out, thanks to the stubborn
fighting of the troops and the lucky intervention of a tremendous
thunderstorm, which forced the enemy to give up their attack at the
critical moment when the French were crossing a difficult defile. Two
days later the Emperor once again tested Davout's stubborn qualities,
entrusting him with the duty of containing the main Austrian force while
he disposed of the rest of the enemy. The result was the three days'
fighting at Eckmuehl; during the first two, Davout, unaided, held his own
till on the third the Emperor arrived with supports and gave the
Austrians the coup-de-grace, but rewarded the Marshal for his tenacity
by bestowing on him the title of Prince of Eckmuehl.