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NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS

[Illustration: MARSHAL NEY COVERING THE RETREAT

FROM THE PAINTING BY YVON AT VERSAILLES]

NAPOLEON'S

MARSHALS

R. P. DUNN-PATTISON, M.A.

LATE LIEUTENANT ARGYLL AND SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS, AND

SOMETIME LECTURER AT MAGDALEN COLLEGE, OXFORD

WITH TWENTY ILLUSTRATIONS

METHUEN & CO.

36 ESSEX STREET W.C.

LONDON

First Published in 1909

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION ix

SYNOPSIS OF THE MARSHALS xviii

I. LOUIS ALEXANDRE BERTHIER, MARSHAL, PRINCE OF

WAGRAM, SOVEREIGN PRINCE OF NEUCHATEL AND

VALANGIN 1

II. JOACHIM MURAT, MARSHAL, KING OF NAPLES 23

III. ANDRE MASSENA, MARSHAL, DUKE OF RIVOLI, PRINCE

OF ESSLING 49

IV. JEAN BAPTISTE JULES BERNADOTTE, MARSHAL, PRINCE

OF PONTE CORVO, KING OF SWEDEN 72

V. JEAN DE DIEU NICOLAS SOULT, MARSHAL, DUKE OF

DALMATIA 93

VI. JEAN LANNES, MARSHAL, DUKE OF MONTEBELLO 117

VII. MICHEL NEY, MARSHAL, DUKE OF ELCHINGEN, PRINCE

OF MOSKOWA 141

VIII. LOUIS NICOLAS DAVOUT, MARSHAL, DUKE OF AUERSTAeDT,

PRINCE OF ECKMUeHL 162

IX. JACQUES ETIENNE JOSEPH ALEXANDRE MACDONALD,

MARSHAL, DUKE OF TARENTUM 183

X. AUGUSTE FREDERIC LOUIS VIESSE DE MARMONT,

MARSHAL, DUKE OF RAGUSA 200

XI. LOUIS GABRIEL SUCHET, MARSHAL, DUKE OF ALBUFERA 219

XII. LAURENT GOUVION ST. CYR, MARSHAL 231

XIII. BON ADRIEN JEANNOT DE MONCEY, MARSHAL, DUKE

OF CONEGLIANO 245

XIV. JEAN BAPTISTE JOURDAN, MARSHAL 251

XV. CHARLES PIERRE FRANCOIS AUGEREAU, MARSHAL, DUKE

OF CASTIGLIONE 259

XVI. GUILLAUME MARIE ANNE BRUNE, MARSHAL 268

XVII. ADOLPHE EDOUARD CASIMIR JOSEPH MORTIER, MARSHAL,

DUKE OF TREVISO 278

XVIII. JEAN BAPTISTE BESSIERES, MARSHAL, DUKE OF ISTRIA 286

XIX. CLAUDE VICTOR PERRIN, MARSHAL, DUKE OF BELLUNO 296

XX. EMMANUEL DE GROUCHY, MARSHAL 305

XXI. FRANCOIS CHRISTOPHE KELLERMANN, MARSHAL, DUKE

OF VALMY 316

XXII. FRANCOIS JOSEPH LEFEBVRE, MARSHAL, DUKE OF

DANTZIG 322

XXIII. NICOLAS CHARLES OUDINOT, MARSHAL, DUKE OF

REGGIO 333

XXIV. DOMINIQUE CATHERINE DE PERIGNON, MARSHAL 344

XXV. JEAN MATHIEU PHILIBERT SERURIER, MARSHAL 349

XXVI. PRINCE JOSEPH PONIATOWSKI, MARSHAL 354

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

MARSHAL NEY COVERING THE RETREAT _Frontispiece_

(From the painting by Yvon at Versailles. Photo Neurdein)

FACING PAGE

ALEXANDRE BERTHIER, PRINCE OF WAGRAM 4

(From an engraving after the painting by Pajou _fils_)

JOACHIM MURAT, AFTERWARDS KING OF NAPLES 24

(From the painting by Gerard at Versailles. Photo Neurdein)

ANDRE MASSENA, PRINCE OF ESSLING 51

JEAN BAPTISTE BERNADOTTE, KING OF SWEDEN 74

(From an engraving after the painting by Hilaire le Dru)

JEAN DE DIEU SOULT, DUKE OF DALMATIA 96

(From a lithograph by Delpech after the painting by Rouillard)

JEAN LANNES, DUKE OF MONTEBELLO 120

(From an engraving by Amedee Maulet)

MICHEL NEY, PRINCE OF MOSKOWA 142

(From an engraving after the painting by F. Gerard)

LOUIS NICOLAS DAVOUT, PRINCE OF ECKMUeHL 167

(From an engraving after the painting by Gautherot)

JACQUES ETIENNE MACDONALD, DUKE OF TARENTUM 184

(From a lithograph by Delpech)

AUGUSTE DE MARMONT, DUKE OF RAGUSA 202

(From an engraving after the painting by Muneret)

LOUIS GABRIEL SUCHET, DUKE OF ALBUFERA 220

(From an engraving by Pollet)

GOUVION ST. CYR, COUNT 233

(From an engraving after the painting by J. Guerin)

JEAN BAPTISTE JOURDAN 252

(After a drawing by Ambroise Tardieu)

CHARLES PIERRE AUGEREAU, DUKE OF CASTIGLIONE 260

(From an engraving by Ruotte)

BRUNE 268

(From an engraving after the painting by F. J. Harriet)

ADOLPHE EDOUARD MORTIER, DUKE OF TREVISO 280

(From an engraving after the painting by Lariviere)

EMMANUEL DE GROUCHY, MARQUIS 306

(From an engraving after the painting by Rouillard)

FRANCOIS CHRISTOPHE KELLERMANN, DUKE OF VALMY 318

(From an engraving after the painting by Ansiaux)

NICOLAS CHARLES OUDINOT, DUKE OF REGGIO 332

(From an engraving after the painting by Robert le Fevre)

INTRODUCTION

It is a melancholy but instructive fact to remember that, in the opinion

of him whom nature had adorned with the greatest intellect that the

world has yet seen, selfishness and self-interest lie at the root of all

human action. "For," as Napoleon said, "in ambition is to be found the

chief motive force of humanity, and a man puts forth his best powers in

proportion to his hopes of advancement." It was on this cynical

hypothesis therefore, with a complete disregard of those higher

aspirations of self-sacrifice and self-control which raise man above the

mere brute, that the Corsican adventurer waded through seas of blood to

the throne of France, and then attempted, by the destruction of a

million human beings, to bind on his brow the imperial crown of Western

Europe. In spite of loud-sounding phrases and constitutional

sleight-of-hand, none knew better than Napoleon that by the sword alone

he had won his empire and by the sword alone he could keep it. Keen

student of history, it was not in vain that again and again he had read

and re-read the works of Caesar, and pondered on the achievements of

Charlemagne and the career of Cromwell. The problem he had to solve was,

how to conceal from his lieutenants that his dynasty rested purely on

their swords, to bind their honours so closely to his own fortune that

they should ever be loyal; so to distribute his favours that his

servants should never become so great as to threaten his own position.

It was with this object in view that at the time he seized for himself

the imperial crown he re-established the old role of Marshal of France,

frankly confessing to Roederer that his reason for showering rewards on

his lieutenants was to assure to himself his own dignity, since they

could not object to it when they found themselves the recipients of such

lofty titles. But, with the cunning of the serpent, while he gave with

one hand he took away with the other. He fixed the number of Marshals at

sixteen on the active list and added four others for those too old for

active service. Hence he had it in his power to reward twenty hungry

aspirants, while he robbed the individuals of their glory, since each

Marshal shared his dignity with nineteen others. Plainly also he told

them that, lofty though their rank might appear to others, to him they

were still mere servants, created by him and dependent for their

position on him alone. "Recollect," he said, "that you are soldiers only

when with the army. The title of Marshal is merely a civil distinction

which gives you the honourable rank at my court which is your due, but

it carries with it no authority. On the battlefield you are generals, at

court you are nobles, belonging to the State by the civil position I

created for you when I bestowed your titles on you." It was on May 19,

1804, that the _Gazette_ appeared with the first creation of Marshals.

There were fourteen on the active list and four honorary Marshals in the

Senate. Two batons were withheld as a reward for future service. The

original fourteen were Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Massena,

Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Ney, Davout and

Bessieres; while on the retired list were Kellermann, Lefebvre,

Perignon, and Serurier. The list caused much surprise and

dissatisfaction. On the one hand there were those like Massena who

received their congratulations with a grunt and "Yes, one of fourteen."

On the other hand were those like Macdonald, Marmont, Victor, and many

another, who thought they ought to have been included. An examination of

the names soon explains how the choice was made. Except Jourdan, who was

too great a soldier to be passed over, all those who could not forget

their Republican principles were excluded. Massena received his baton as

the greatest soldier of France. Berthier, Murat, and Lannes had won

theirs by their talents, as much as by their personal devotion. Soult,

Ney, Davout, and Mortier were Napoleon's choice from among the coming

men, who in the camps of the Army of the Ocean were fast justifying

their selection. Bessieres was included because he would never win it at

any later date, but his doglike devotion made him a priceless

subordinate. Augereau and Bernadotte received their batons to keep them

quiet. The names of Moncey, Brune, Kellermann, Perignon, and Serurier

were intimately connected with glorious feats of the republican armies,

and so, though only fortunate mediocrities, they were included in the

first creation, while Lefebvre, the republican of republicans, now under

the glamour of Napoleon's power, was placed on the list as a

stalking-horse of the extreme members of his party. At the time of the

first creation, of the great soldiers of the Republic, Moreau was

branded as a traitor; Hoche, Marceau, Kleber, Desaix, and Pichegru were

dead; Carnot, the organiser of victory, was a voluntary exile; while

staunch blades like Leclerc, Richepanse, Lecourbe, Macdonald, Victor,

St. Cyr, and Suchet were all more or less in disgrace. By the end of the

Empire, death and the necessity of rewarding merit added to the list of

Marshals until in all twenty-six batons were granted by the Emperor. In

1808 Victor was restored to favour and received his baton. After Wagram,

Macdonald, Oudinot, and Marmont received the prize, while the Spanish

War brought it to Suchet, and the Russian campaign to St. Cyr. In 1813

the Polish prince, Poniatowski, was sent his truncheon on the field of

Leipzig, while last of all, in 1815, Grouchy was promoted to one of the

vacancies caused by the refusal of many of the Marshals to cast off

their allegiance to the Bourbons.

It was a popular saying in the Napoleonic army that every private

soldier carried in his knapsack a Marshal's baton, and the early history

of many of these Marshals bears out this saying. But while the

Revolution carried away all the barriers and opened the highest ranks to

talent, be it never so humble in its origin, the history of the Marshals

proves that heaven-born soldiers are scarce, and that the art of war,

save in the case of one out of a million, can only be acquired by years

of patient work in a subordinate position. Of the generals of the

revolutionary armies only four, Moreau, Mortier, Suchet, and Brune, had

no previous military training, and of these four, Moreau and Suchet

alone had claim to greatness. The rough unlettered generals of the early

years of the war soon proved that they could never rise above the

science of the drill-sergeant. Once discipline and organisation were

restored there was no room for a general like the gallant Macard, who,

when about to charge, used to call out, "Look here, I am going to dress

like a beast," and thereon divest himself of everything save his leather

breeches and boots, and then, like some great hairy baboon, with strange

oaths and yells lead his horsemen against the enemy. A higher type was

required than this Macard, who could not understand that because an

officer could sketch mountains he could not necessarily measure a man

for a pair of boots.

Of the twenty-six Marshals, nine had held commissions ranging from

lieutenant-general to lieutenant in the old royal army, one was a Polish

Prince, an ex-Austrian officer, while one had passed the artillery

college but had refused to accept a commission; eleven had commenced

life as privates in the old service, and of these, nine had risen to the

rank of sergeant; and four had had no previous military training. It

must also be remembered that the standard of the non-commissioned rank

in the royal army just before the Revolution was extremely high. The

reforms of St. Germain and the popularity of the American War had

enticed into the ranks a high class of recruits, with the result that

the authorities were able to impose tests, and no private could rise to

the rank of corporal, or from corporal to sergeant, without passing an

examination. Further, since the officers of the ancient regime left the

entire organisation, discipline, and control in the hands of the

non-commissioned officers, and seldom, if ever, visited their companies

either in barracks or on the parade ground, the non-commissioned

officers, in everything save actual title, were really extremely

well-trained officers. It was this class which really saved France when

the old officers emigrated and the incapable politicians in Paris did

their best to ruin the army. Hence it was that, without prejudice to the

service, a sergeant might one day be found quietly obeying the orders of

his company officer, and the next day with the rank of lieutenant-colonel

commanding his battalion.

The art of war can only be truly learned in the field, and the officers

of the French army had such an experience as had never fallen to the lot

of any other nation since the days of the Thirty Years' War. With

continuous fighting winter and summer, on every frontier, military

knowledge was easily gained by those who had the ability to acquire it,

and the young generals of brigade, with but three years' service in

commissioned rank, had gone through experiences which seldom fall to the

lot of officers with thirty years' service. The cycle of war seemed

unending. From the day on which, in 1792, France hurled her declaration

of war on Austria, till the surrender of Paris, in 1814, with the

exception of the year of peace gained at Amiens, war was continuous. It

began with a light-hearted invasion of France by Austria and Prussia in

September, 1792, which ended in the cannonade of Valmy, when Dumouriez

and Kellermann, with the remnant of the old royal army, showed such a

bold front that the Allies, who had never expected to fight, lost heart

and ran home. The Austro-Prussian invasion sealed the King's

death-warrant, and France, in the hands of republican enthusiasts, went

forth with a rabble of old soldiers and volunteers to preach the

doctrine of the Equality of Man and the Brotherhood of Nations. But the

sovereigns of Europe determined to fight for their crowns, and the

licence of the French soldiers and the selfishness of these prophets of

the new doctrine of Equality soon disgusted the people of the Rhine

valley; so the revolutionary mob armies were driven into France, and for

two years she was busy on every frontier striving to drive the enemy

from her soil. It was during these years that the new French army arose.

The volunteers were brigaded with the old regular battalions, the ranks

were kept full by calling out all fit to bear arms, and the incompetent

and unfortunate were weeded out by the guillotine. By 1795 France had

freed her own soil and had forged a weapon whereby she could retaliate

on the Powers who had attempted to annex her territory in the hour of

her degradation. The Rhine now became her eastern frontier. But

Austria, whose Archduke was Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, would not

give up the provinces seized from her; so from 1795 to 1797, on the

headwaters of the Danube and in Italy, the representative of the Feudal

Ages fought the new democracy. It was the appearance of the great

military talent of Bonaparte which decided the day. On the Danube the

Austrians had found that under the excellent leading of the Archduke

Charles they were fit to defeat the best French troops under capable

generals like Jourdan and Moreau. But the military genius of Bonaparte

overbore all resistance, and when peace came, practically all Italy had

been added to the dominion of France. Unfortunately for the peace of

Europe, the rulers of France had tasted blood. They found in the

captured provinces a means of making war without feeling the effects,

for the rich pillage of Italy paid the war expenses. But, grateful as

the Directors were to Bonaparte for thus opening to them a means of

enriching themselves at the expense of Europe, they rightly saw in him a

menace to their own power, and gladly allowed him to depart on the

mission to Egypt. From Egypt Bonaparte returned, seized the reins of

government, and saved France from the imbecility of her rulers, and, by

the battle of Marengo, assured to her all she had lost in his absence.

Unfortunately for France the restless ambition of her new ruler was not

satisfied with re-establishing the Empire of the West and reviving the

glories of Charlemagne, but hankered after a vast oversea dominion, to

include America and India. Hence it was that he found in Great Britain

an implacable enemy ever stirring up against him European coalitions. To

cover his failure to wrest the dominion of the sea from its mistress,

Napoleon turned his wrath on Austria, and soon she lay cowed at his feet

after the catastrophe at Ulm and the battle of Austerlitz. Austria's

fall was due to the lethargy and hesitation of the courts of Berlin and

St. Petersburg. But once Austria was disposed of, Prussia and Russia met

their punishment for having given her secret or open aid. The storm fell

first on Prussia. At one fell swoop on the field of Jena, the famed

military monarchy of the great Frederick fell in pieces like a potter's

vessel. From Prussia the invincible French legions penetrated into

Poland, and after Eylau and Friedland the forces of Prussia and Russia

could no longer face the enemy in the field. The Czar, dazzled by

Napoleon's greatness, threw over his ally Prussia and at Tilsit made

friends with the great conqueror. In June, 1807, it seemed as if Europe

lay at Napoleon's feet, but already in Portugal the seeds of his ruin

had been sown. The Portuguese monarch, the ally of Great Britain, fled

at the mere approach of a single Marshal of the Emperor. The apparent

lethargy of the inhabitants of the Iberian Peninsula and the

unpopularity of the Spanish Bourbons tempted Napoleon to establish his

brother on the throne of Spain. It was a fatal error, for though the

Spanish people might despise their King, they were intensely proud of

their nationality. For the first time in his experience the Corsican had

to meet the forces of a nation and not of a government. The chance

defeat of a French army at Baylen was the signal for a general rising

throughout the Peninsula, and not only throughout the Peninsula, but for

the commencement of a national movement against the French in Austria

and Germany. England gladly seized the opportunity of injuring her enemy

and sent aid to the people of Spain. Austria tried another fall with her

conqueror, but was defeated at Wagram. Wagram ought to have taught the

Emperor that his troops were no longer invincible as of old, but, blind

to this lesson, he still attempted to lord it over Europe and treated

with contumely his only friend, the Czar. Consequently, in 1812, while

still engaged in attempting to conquer Spain, he found himself forced to

fight Russia. The result was appalling; out of half a million troops who

entered Russia, a bare seventy thousand returned. Prussia and Austria at

once made a bid to recover their independence. Napoleon, blinded by

rage, refused to listen to reason, and in October, 1813, was defeated by

the Allies at Leipzig. Even then he might have saved his throne, but he

still refused to listen to the Allies, who in 1814 invaded France, and,

after a campaign in which the Emperor showed an almost superhuman

ability, at last by sheer weight of numbers they captured Paris. Thereon

the French troops refused to fight any longer for the Emperor. Such is a

brief outline of what is called the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars,

the finest school the world has yet seen for an apprenticeship in the

trade of arms.

SYNOPSIS OF THE MARSHALS

----------------+---------+---------+-------------------+----------------+

Berthier, |Nov. 20, |May 19, |Prince of Neuchatel|Accident, |62

Alexandre | | | Mar. 15, 1806; | |

| | | Dec. 31, 1809 | |

| | | | |

Murat, Joachim |Mar. 25, | " |Prince, |Shot at Pizzo, |48

| 1767 | | Feb. 1, 1805; | Oct. 13, 1815 |

| | | Mar. 15, 1806; | |

| | | Aug. 1, 1808 | |

| | | | |

| | | | |

Jean Baptiste | 1762 | | | Nov. 1833 |

| | | | |

Massena, Andre |May 6, | " |Duke of Rivoli, |Natural cause, |61

| | | Jan. 31, 1810 | |

| | | | |

Augereau, |Oct. 21, | " |Duke of |Natural cause, |59

| | | | |

Bernadotte, |Jan. 26, | " |Prince of |Natural cause, |81

Jean Baptiste | 1763 | | Ponte Corvo, | Mar. 8, 1844 |

| | | Aug. 21, 1810; | |

| | | | |

Soult, Jean de |Mar. 29, | " |Duke of Dalmatia, |Natural cause, |82

Dieu Nicolas | 1769 | | June 29, 1808 | Nov. 26, 1851 |

| | | | |

Brune, Guillaume|May 13, | " |Count, Mar. 1, 1808|Murdered |52

| | | | Aug. 2, 1815 |

| | | | |

| | | | May 31, 1809 |

| | | | |

Mortier, Adolphe|Feb. 13, | " |Duke of Treviso, |Killed by |67

| | | | |

Ney, Michel |Jan. 10, | " |Duke of Elchingen, |Shot at Paris, |46

| 1769 | | May 5, 1808; | Dec. 7, 1815 |

| | | Mar. 25, 1813 | |

| | | | |

Davout, |May 10, | " |Duke of Auerstaedt, |Natural cause, |53

| | | Nov. 28, 1809 | |

Bessieres, |Aug. 6, | " |Duke of Istria, |Killed |45

Jean Baptiste | 1768 | | May 28, 1809 |at Luetzen, |

| | | | May 1, 1813 |

| | | | |

Kellermann, |May 28, | " |Count, |Natural cause, |85

Francois | 1735 | | Mar. 1, 1808; | Sept. 13, 1820|

| | | May 2, 1808 | |

| | | | |

Lefebvre, |Oct. 15, | " |Count, |Natural cause, |65

Francois | 1755 | | Mar. 1, 1808; | Sept. 14, 1820|

| | | | |

Perignon, |May 31, | " |Count, |Natural cause, |64

Dominique | 1754 | | Sept. 6, 1811 | Dec. 25, 1818 |

| | | | |

Serurier, |Dec. 8, | " |Count, |Natural cause, |77

Jean Mathieu | 1742 | | Mar. 1, 1808 | Dec. 21, 1819 |

| | | | |

Victor Claude | 1764 | 1807 | Sept. 10, 1808 | Mar. 1, 1841 |

| | | | |

Jacques | 1765 | 1809 | Dec. 9, 1809 | Sept. 7, 1840 |

| | | | |

| | | | |

Louis Gabriel | 1770 | 1811 | June 24, 1808; | Jan. 3, 1826 |

| | | Jan. 3, 1813 | |

| | | | |

Laurent | 1764 | 1812 | | Mar. 17, 1830 |

| | | | |

Poniatowski, |May 7, |Oct. 17, | -- |Drowned |51

Joseph, Prince| 1762 | 1813 | |in Elster, |

| | | | Oct. 19, 1813 |

| | | | |

Emmanuel de | 1766 | 1815 | Jan. 28, 1809 | May 29, 1847 |

| | | | |

----------------+---------+---------+-------------------+----------------+--

NAPOLEON'S MARSHALS

LOUIS ALEXANDRE BERTHIER, MARSHAL, PRINCE OF WAGRAM, SOVEREIGN PRINCE OF

NEUCHATEL AND VALANGIN

To be content ever to play an inferior part, to see all honour and

renown fall to the share of another, yet loyally to efface self and work

for the glory of a friend, denotes a sterling character and an

inflexibility of purpose with which few can claim to be endowed. Nobody

doubts that, if it had not been for Napoleon, Berthier, good business

man as he was, could never have risen to the fame he attained; still it

is often forgotten that without this admirable servant it is more than

doubtful if the great Emperor could have achieved all his most splendid

success. Berthier, controlled by a master mind, was an instrument beyond

price. Versed in the management of an army almost from his cradle, he

had the gift of drafting orders so clear, so lucid, that no one could

possibly mistake their meaning. His memory was prodigious, and his

physical endurance such that he appeared never to require rest. But

above all he alone seemed to be able to divine the thoughts of his great

master before they were spoken, and this wonderful intuition taught him

how, from a few disjointed utterances, to unravel Napoleon's most daring

conceptions and work out the details in ordered perfection. Napoleon

called his faithful Achates a gosling whom he had transformed into an

eagle, but history proclaims that long before the name of Bonaparte was

known beyond the gate of the military academy at Brienne, Berthier had

established a record as a staff officer of the highest promise; while,

before the young Corsican first met him in Italy, the future

major-general of the Grand Army had evolved that perfect system of

organisation which enabled the conqueror of Italy to control every

movement and vibration in the army, to be informed of events as soon as

they happened, and to be absolutely sure of the despatch and performance

of his orders.

Alexandre Berthier had seen twenty-three years' service in the old royal

army before the Revolution broke out in 1789. Born on November 20, 1753,

at the age of thirteen he received his commission in the engineers owing

to his father's services in preparing a map of royal hunting forests.

But the boy soon forsook his father's old regiment, for he knew well

that the highest commands in the army seldom if ever fell to the

scientific corps. When in 1780 the French Government decided to send out

an expeditionary corps to assist the revolted colonies in their struggle

with Great Britain, Berthier, after serving in the infantry and cavalry,

was employed as a staff captain with the army of Normandy. Eager to see

active service, he at once applied to be attached to the expedition, and

offered, if there was no room for an extra captain, to resign his rank

and serve as sub-lieutenant. Thanks to powerful family influence and to

his record of service his desire was gratified, and in January, 1781, he

found himself with the French troops in America employed on the staff of

General Count de Rochambeau. Returning from America in 1783 with a

well-earned reputation for bravery and ability, Captain Berthier was one

of the officers sent to Prussia under the Marquis de Custine to study

the military organisation of the great Frederick. Continuously employed

on the staff, he had the advantage of serving as brigade major at the

great camp of instruction held at Saint Omer in 1788, and in that year

received as a reward for his services the cross of Saint Louis. The year

1789 saw him gazetted lieutenant-colonel, and chief of the staff to

Baron de Besenval, commanding the troops round Paris.

When, after the capture of the Bastille, Lafayette undertook the work of

organising the National Guard, he at once bethought him of his old

comrade of American days, and appointed Berthier assistant

quartermaster-general. Berthier found the post well suited to him;

inspired by the liberal ideas which he had gained in America, he threw

himself heart and soul into the work. Soon his talent as an organiser

became widely recognised; many prominent officers applied to have him

attached to their command, and, after holding several staff

appointments, he was entrusted in 1791 with the organisation and

instruction of the thirty battalions of volunteers cantonned between the

Somme and Meuse. When war broke out in 1792 he was despatched as

major-general and chief of the staff to his old friend Rochambeau, and

when the Count resigned his command Berthier was specially retained by

Rochambeau's successor, Luckner. But the Revolution, while giving him

his chance, nearly brought about his fall. His intimate connection with

the nobles of the old royal army, his courage in protecting the King's

aunts, and his family connections caused him to become "suspect." It was

in vain that the leaders at the front complained of the absolute

disorder in their forces, of the necessity of more trained staff

officers and of their desire for the services of the brilliant soldier

who had gained his experience in war time in America and in peace time

in Prussia. In vain Custine wrote to the Minister of War, "In the name

of the Republic send Berthier to me to help me in my difficulties," in

vain the Commissioners with the army reported that "Berthier has gained

the esteem and confidence of all good patriots." Vain also was the

valour and ability he showed in the campaign against the Royalists in

La Vendee. Bouchotte, the incapable, the friend of the brutish,

blockheaded Hebert, the insulter of the Queen, the destroyer of the

army, decreed that his loyalty to the Republic was not sincere, and by a

stroke of the pen dismissed him; thus during the whole of the year 1793

the French army was deprived of the service of an officer who, owing to

his powers of organisation, was worth fifty thousand of the butcher

generals.

In 1795, with the fall of the Jacobins, Berthier was restored to his

rank and sent as chief of the staff to Kellermann, commanding the Army

of the Alps, and before the end of the year the staff work of

Kellermann's army became the pattern for all the armies of the Republic.

When in March, 1796, Bonaparte was appointed commander of the Army of

Italy, he at once requisitioned Berthier as the chief of the staff, and

from that day till April, 1814, Berthier seldom if ever left the future

Emperor's side, serving him with a patience and cheerfulness which

neither ill-will nor neglect seemed to disturb. Though over forty-two

years of age and sixteen years older than his new chief, the chief of

the staff was still in the prime of his manhood. Short, thick-set and

athletic, his frame proclaimed his immense physical strength, while his

strong alert face under a mass of thick curly hair foretold at a glance

his mental capacity.

A keen sportsman, in peace he spent all his leisure in the chase. Hard

exercise and feats of physical endurance were his delight. Fatigue he

never knew, and on one occasion he was said to have spent thirteen days

and nights in the saddle. To strangers and officials he was silent and

stern, but his aloofness of manner hid a warm heart and a natural

sincerity, and many a poor officer or returned emigre received secret

help from his purse. Though naturally of a strong character, his

affection and respect for his great commander became the dominating note

in his career; in fact, it might almost be said that, in later years,

his personality became merged to such an extent in that of Napoleon that

he was unable to see the actions of the Emperor in their proper

perspective. From their first meeting Bonaparte correctly guessed the

impression he had made on his new staff officer, and aimed at increasing

his influence over him. Meanwhile he was delighted with him, he wrote to

the Directory, "Berthier has talents, activity, courage, character--all

in his favour." Berthier on his side was well satisfied; as he said to a

friend who asked him how he could serve a man with such a temper,

"Remember that one day it will be a fine thing to be second to

Bonaparte." So the two worked admirably together.

[Illustration: ALEXANDRE BERTHIER, PRINCE OF WAGRAM

FROM AN ENGRAVING AFTER THE PAINTING BY PAJOU FILS]

Bonaparte kept in his own hands the movement of troops, the direction of

skirmishes and battles, commissariat, discipline, and all communications

from the Government. Berthier had a free hand in the organisation and

maintenance of the general staff, the headquarter staff, and the

transmission of orders, subject to inspection by Bonaparte; he also had

to throw into written form all verbal orders, and he alone was

responsible for their promulgation and execution. It was his ability to

work out in detail and to reduce into clear, lucid orders the slightest

hint of his commander which, as Napoleon said later, "was the great

merit of Berthier, and was of inestimable importance to me. No other

could possibly have replaced him." Thanks to Berthier's admirable

system, Bonaparte was kept in touch with every part of his command. One

of the first principles laid down in the staff regulations was, "That it

was vital to the good of the service that the correspondence of the army

should be exceedingly swift and regular, that nothing should be

neglected which might contribute to this end." To ensure regularity of

communication, divisional commanders and officers detached in command of

small columns were ordered to report at least twice a day to

headquarters. With each division, in addition to the divisional staff,

there were officers detached from the headquarters staff. All important

despatches had to be sent in duplicate; in times of great danger

commanding officers had to send as many as eight different orderly

officers each with a copy of despatches.

But it was not only as an organiser and transmitter of orders that

Berthier proved his usefulness to his chief. At Lodi he showed his

personal courage and bravery among the band of heroes who forced the

bridge, and Bonaparte paid him a fine tribute when he wrote in his

despatches, "If I were bound to mention all the soldiers who

distinguished themselves on that wonderful day, I should be obliged to

mention all the carabiniers and grenadiers of the advance guard, and

nearly all the officers of the staff; but I must not forget the

courageous Berthier, who on that day played the part of gunner, trooper,

and grenadier." At Rivoli, in addition to his staff duties, Berthier

commanded the centre of the army, and fought with a stubbornness beyond

all praise. By the end of the campaign of 1796 he had proved that he was

as great a chief of the staff as Bonaparte was a great commander.

Doubtless it is true that before the commencement of a campaign an army

possesses in itself the causes of its future victory or defeat, and the

Army of Italy, with its masses of enthusiastic veterans and the

directing genius of Bonaparte, was bound to defeat the Austrians with

their listless men and incompetent old generals; but, without the zeal,

activity, and devotion which Berthier transfused through the whole of

the general staff, success could not have been so sudden or so complete.

After Leoben the conqueror of Italy employed his trusty friend on

numerous diplomatic missions in connection with the annexation of Corfu

and the government of the Cisalpine republic. Meanwhile he was in close

communication with him in regard to the proposed descent on England and

the possible expedition to the East. To Berthier, if to any one,

Bonaparte entrusted his secret designs, for he knew that he could do so

in safety. Accordingly, in 1798, finding an invasion of England

impossible at the moment, he persuaded the Directory to send Berthier to

Italy as commander-in-chief, his object being to place him in a position

to gather funds for the Egyptian expedition. From Italy Berthier sent

his former commander the most minute description of everything of

importance, but he found the task difficult and uncongenial, and prayed

him "to recall me promptly. I much prefer being your aide-de-camp to

being commander-in-chief here." Still he carried out his orders and

marched on Rome, to place the eight million francs' worth of diamonds

wrung from the Pope to the credit of the army. From Rome he returned

with coffers well filled for the Egyptian expedition, but leaving behind

him an army half-mutinous for want of pay; his blind devotion to

Bonaparte hid this incongruity from his eyes.

As in Italy in 1795 so in Egypt, Berthier was Bonaparte's right-hand

man, methodical, indefatigable, and trustworthy. But even his iron frame

could scarcely withstand the strain of three years' continuous active

service, the incessant office work day and night, and the trials of an

unaccustomed climate. After the battle of the Pyramids he fell sick, and

before the Syrian expedition, applied to return to France. Unkind

friends hinted that he longed for his mistress, Madame Visconti, but

Bonaparte, knowing that it was not this but sheer overstrain which had

caused his breakdown in health, gave him the desired leave and made all

arrangements for his journey home. However, at the moment of departure

Berthier's love for his chief overcame his longing for rest, and, in

spite of ill-health, he withdrew his resignation and set out with the

army for Syria. As ever, he found plenty of work, for even in the face

of the ill-success of the expedition, Bonaparte determined to administer

Egypt as if the French occupation was to be for ever permanent; and

Berthier, in addition to his ordinary work, was ordered to edit a

carefully executed map from the complete survey which was being made of

the country.

It was to Berthier that Bonaparte first divulged his intention of

leaving Egypt and returning to France, and his determination to upset

the Directory. Liberal by nature, but essentially a man of method and a

disciplinarian, the chief of the staff was quite in accord with his

commander's ideas on the regeneration of France, and loyally supported

him during the _coup d'etat_ of the 18th Brumaire. Thereafter the First

Consul appointed his friend Minister of War, a position that gave full

scope to his talents. All the administrative services had at once to be

reorganised, the frontier fortresses garrisoned and placed in a state of

defence, and the army covering the frontiers supplied with food, pay,

equipment, and reinforcements, while the formation of the secret Army of

Reserve was a task which alone would have occupied all the attention of

an ordinary man; in fact, the safety of France hung on this army.

Consequently, since, by the constitution, the First Consul was unable

himself to take command in the field, in April, 1800, he transferred

Berthier from the War Office to the head of this most important force.

It is not generally known that the idea of the passage of the Alps by

the St. Bernard Pass actually originated with Berthier, and had first

been projected by him as early as 1795. So it was at the execution of

what was really his own idea that for two months Berthier slaved. At

times even his stout heart quailed, as when he wrote to the First

Consul, "It is my duty to complain of the position of this army on which

you have justly spent so much interest, and which is paralysed because

it can only rely on its bayonets, on account of the lack of ammunition

and means to transport the artillery." Incessant work and toil were at

last rewarded; but when the Army of the Reserve debouched on the

Austrian lines of communication, the First Consul appeared in person,

and, though nominally in command, Berthier once again resumed his

position of chief of the staff. Without a murmur he allowed Bonaparte to

reap all the glory of Marengo, for he knew that without the First

Consul, however excellent his own dispositions were, they would have

been lacking in the driving power which alone teaches men how to seize

on victory. After Marengo, Berthier was despatched as Ambassador

Extraordinary to Madrid, "to exhort Spain by every possible means to

declare war on Portugal, the ally of England." The result of this

mission was eminently successful; a special treaty was drawn up and

Spain sold Louisiana to France. By October the ambassador was once again

back in Paris at his old post of Minister of War--a post which he held

continuously during peace and war till August, 1807. The position was no

light one, for even during the short years of peace it involved the

supervision of the expedition to San Domingo, the defence of Italy, the

reorganisation of the army, and the re-armament of the artillery, in

addition to the ordinary routine of official work. Moreover, the

foundations of the Consulate being based on the army, it was essential

that the army should be efficient and content, and consequently the

French soldier of that day was not, as in other countries, neglected in

peace time. The officers in command of the troops were constantly

reminded by the War Minister that "the French soldier is a citizen

placed under military law"--not an outcast or serf, whose well-being and

comfort concern no one.

On the establishment of the Empire Berthier, like many another, received

the reward for his faithfulness to Napoleon. Honours were showered upon

him. The first to receive the Marshal's baton, he was in succession

created senator by right as a dignitary of the Empire, grand officer of

the palace and grand huntsman to the crown, while at the coronation he

carried the imperial globe. But though the Emperor thus honoured, and

treated him as his most trustworthy confidant, the cares of state to

some extent withdrew Napoleon from close intimacy with his old

companion. At the same time the Marshal was insensibly separated from

his former comrades-in-arms by his high rank and employment, which,

while it tended to make him more the servant than the friend of the

Emperor, also caused him to be regarded as a superior to be obeyed by

those who were formerly his equals. At all times a strict

disciplinarian, and one who never passed over a breach of orders, the

Marshal, as voicing the commands of the Emperor, gradually began to

assume a stern attitude to all subordinates, and spared neither princes

or marshals, when he considered that the good of the service required

that they should be reprimanded and shown their duty. So strong was the

sense of subordination in the army and the desire to stand well with

Napoleon, that even the fiery Murat paid attention to orders and

reprimands signed by Berthier in the name of the Emperor.

Meanwhile the work of the War Minister increased day by day. The

organisation and supervision of the Army of the Ocean added considerably

to his work, which was much interfered with by visits of inspection in

company with the Emperor, or far-distant expeditions to the frontiers

and to Italy for the coronation at Milan.

On August 3rd, 1805, the Emperor created the Marshal major-general and

chief of the staff to the Army of the Ocean, and himself assumed command

of the Army and held a grand review of one hundred thousand men.

Everybody thought that the moment for the invasion of England had

arrived. Berthier, and perhaps Talleyrand, alone knew that Austria, not

England, was the immediate quarry, and all through August the

major-general was busy working out the routes for the concentration of

the various corps in the valley of the Danube; whilst at the same time

as War Minister he was responsible for the supervision of all the troops

left in France and in garrison in Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Hanover.

Consequently he had to divide his staff into two sections, one of which

he took with him into the field, the other remaining in Paris under an

assistant who was capable of managing the ordinary routine, but who had

to forward all difficult problems to the War Minister in the field. Even

during the drive to the frontier there was no abatement of the strain;

during the journey the Emperor would give orders which had to be

expanded and written out in the short stoppages for food and rest. By

day the major-general travelled in the Emperor's carriage; at night he

always slept under the same roof with him, to be ready at any moment, in

full uniform, to receive his commands and expand and dictate them to his

clerks. Everyone knew when the major-general was worried, for he had a

habit of biting his nails when making a decision or trying to solve a

problem, but otherwise he never showed any sign of feeling, and whether

tired or troubled by the Emperor's occasional outbursts of temper, he

went on with his work with the methodical precision of an automaton. To

belong to the general staff when Berthier was major-general was no bed

of roses, no place for gilded youth, for with Napoleon commanding and

Berthier directing, if there was often fighting there was plenty of

writing; if there was galloping on horseback by day, to make up for it

by night there were hours of steady copying of orders and no chance of

laying down the pen until all business was finished. Thanks to this

excellent staff work, Napoleon's ambitious plans were faithfully

accomplished, the Austrians were completely taken in by the

demonstration in the Black Forest, the French columns stepped astride of

their communications on the Danube, and Mack was forced to surrender at

Ulm. But Ulm was only the commencement of the campaign, and even after

Austerlitz Napoleon pursued the enemy with grim resolution. This was one

of the secrets of his success, for, as Berthier wrote to Soult, "The

Emperor's opinion is that in war nothing is really achieved as long as

there remains something to achieve; a victory is not complete as long as

greater success can still be gained."

After the treaty of Pressburg, on December 27, 1805, Napoleon quitted

the army and returned to Paris, leaving the major-general in command of

the Grand Army with orders to evacuate the conquered territory when the

terms of the treaty had been carried out by the Austrians; but the

Emperor retained the real control, and every day a courier had to be

despatched to Paris with a detailed account of every event, and every

day a courier arrived from Paris bearing fresh orders and instructions.

For Napoleon refused to allow the slightest deviation from his orders:

"Keep strictly to the orders I give you," he wrote; "execute punctually

your instructions. I alone know what I want done." Meanwhile the

major-general was still War Minister and had to supervise all the more

important business of the War Office; while he also found time to edit

an official history of the campaign of 1805, and to superintend the

execution of a map of most of the Austrian possessions. The work was

immense, but Berthier never flagged, and the Emperor showed his

appreciation of his zeal when on March 30th, 1806, he conferred on him

the principality of Neuchatel with the title of Prince and Duke, to hold

in full possession and suzerainty for himself, his heirs and successors,

with one stipulation, that he should marry. He added that the Prince's

passion for Madame Visconti had lasted too long, that it was not

becoming to a dignitary of the Empire, and that he was now fifty years

old and ought to think of providing an heir to his honours. The Prince

Marshal never had time to visit personally his principality, but he sent

one of his intimate friends, General Dutaillis, to provide for the

welfare of his new subjects, and to the best of his ability he saw that

they were well governed, while a battalion of picked troops from

Neuchatel was added to the Imperial Guard. But, orders or no orders,

the Prince could never break himself free from the trammels of his

mistress, and Napoleon gave him but little leisure in which to find a

congenial partner, so that it was not till after Tilsit, in the brief

pause before the Peninsular War, that Berthier at last took a wife. His

chosen Princess was Elizabeth, the daughter of William, Duke of Bavaria,

brother of the King. She was married with all due solemnity in March,

1808, and though the exigencies of war gave her but little opportunity

of seeing much of her husband, affection existed between them, as also

between Berthier and his father-in-law, the Duke of Bavaria. All cause

of difficulty was smoothed over by the fact that in time the Princess

herself conceived an affection for Madame Visconti.