THE civil list is indeed properly the whole of the king's revenue in

his own distinct capacity; the rest being rather the revenue of the

public, or it's creditors, though collected, and distributed again, in

the name and by the officers of the crown: it now standing in the same

place, as the hereditary income did formerly; and, as that has

gradually diminished, the parliamentary appointments have encreased.

The whole revenue of queen Elizabeth did not amount to more than

600000_l._ a year[g]: that of king Charles I was[h] 800000_l._ and the

revenue voted for king Charles II was[i] 1200000_l._ though it never

in fact amounted to quite so much[k]. But it must be observed, that

under these sums were included all manner of public expenses, among

which lord Clarendon in his speech to the parliament computed that the

charge of the navy and land forces amounted annually to 800000_l._

which was ten times more than before the former troubles[l]. The same

revenue, subject to the same charges, was settled on on [Transcriber's

Note: duplicate word] king James II[m]: but by the encrease of trade,

and more frugal management, it amounted on an average to a million and

half _per annum_, (besides other additional customs, granted by

parliament[n], which produced an annual revenue of 400000_l._) out of

which his fleet and army were maintained at the yearly expense of[o]

1100000_l._ After the revolution, when the parliament took into it's

own hands the annual support of the forces, both maritime and

military, a civil list revenue was settled on the new king and queen,

amounting, with the hereditary duties, to 700000_l._ _per annum_[p];

and the same was continued to queen Anne and king George I[q]. That of

king George II, we have seen, was nominally augmented to[r] 800000_l._

and in fact was considerably more. But that of his present majesty is

expressly limited to that sum; and, by reason of the charges upon it,

amounts at present to little more than 700000_l._ And upon the whole

it is doubtless much better for the crown, and also for the people, to

have the revenue settled upon the modern footing rather than the

antient. For the crown; because it is more certain, and collected with

greater ease: for the people; because they are now delivered from the

feodal hardships, and other odious branches of the prerogative. And

though complaints have sometimes been made of the encrease of the

civil list, yet if we consider the sums that have been formerly

granted, the limited extent under which it is now established, the

revenues and prerogatives given up in lieu of it by the crown, and

(above all) the diminution of the value of money compared with what it

was worth in the last century, we must acknowlege these complaints to

be void of any rational foundation; and that it is impossible to

support that dignity, which a king of Great Britain should maintain,

with an income in any degree less than what is now established by

parliament.

[Footnote g: Lord Clar. continuation. 163.]

[Footnote h: Com. Journ. 4 Sept. 1660.]

[Footnote i: _Ibid._]

[Footnote k: _Ibid._ 4 Jun. 1663. Lord Clar. _ibid._]

[Footnote l: _Ibid._ 165.]

[Footnote m: Stat. 1 Jac. II. c. 1.]

[Footnote n: Stat. 1 Jac. II. c. 3 & 4.]

[Footnote o: Com. Journ. 1 Mar. 20 Mar. 1688.]

[Footnote p: _Ibid._ 14 Mar. 1701.]

[Footnote q: _Ibid._ 17 Mar. 1701. 11 Aug. 1714.]

[Footnote r: Stat. 1 Geo. II. c. 1.]

THIS finishes our enquiries into the fiscal prerogatives of the king;

or his revenue, both ordinary and extraordinary. We have therefore now

chalked out all the principal outlines of this vast title of the law,

the supreme executive magistrate, or the king's majesty, considered in

his several capacities and points of view. But, before we intirely

dismiss this subject, it may not be improper to take a short

comparative review of the power of the executive magistrate, or

prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it stands

at present. And we cannot but observe, that most of the laws for

ascertaining, limiting, and restraining this prerogative have been

made within the compass of little more than a century past; from the

petition of right in 3 Car. I. to the present time. So that the powers

of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and

diminished since the reign of king James the first: particularly, by

the abolition of the star chamber and high commission courts in the

reign of Charles the first, and by the disclaiming of martial law, and

the power of levying taxes on the subject, by the same prince: by the

disuse of forest laws for a century past: and by the many excellent

provisions enacted under Charles the second; especially, the abolition

of military tenures, purveyance, and preemption; the _habeas corpus_

act; and the act to prevent the discontinuance of parliaments for

above three years: and, since the revolution, by the strong and

emphatical words in which our liberties are asserted in the bill of

rights, and act of settlement; by the act for triennial, since turned

into septennial, elections; by the exclusion of certain officers from

the house of commons; by rendering the seats of the judges permanent,

and their salaries independent; and by restraining the king's pardon

from operating on parliamentary impeachments. Besides all this, if we

consider how the crown is impoverished and stripped of all it's

antient revenues, so that it greatly depends on the liberality of

parliament for it's necessary support and maintenance, we may perhaps

be led to think, that the ballance is enclined pretty strongly to the

popular scale, and that the executive magistrate has neither

independence nor power enough left, to form that check upon the lords

and commons, which the founders of our constitution intended.

BUT, on the other hand, it is to be considered, that every prince, in

the first parliament after his accession, has by long usage a truly

royal addition to his hereditary revenue settled upon him for his

life; and has never any occasion to apply to parliament for supplies,

but upon some public necessity of the whole realm. This restores to

him that constitutional independence, which at his first accession

seems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to

power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least

sufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no

danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The

instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they

formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and

invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account.

In short, our national debt and taxes (besides the inconveniences

before-mentioned) have also in their natural consequences thrown such

a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot

think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled

for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative; and

by an unaccountable want of foresight established this system in their

stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue,

being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a

multitude of new officers, created by and removeable at the royal

pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every

corner of the nation. Witness the commissioners, and the multitude of

dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the

commissioners of excise, and their numerous subalterns, in every

inland district; the postmasters, and their servants, planted in every

town, and upon every public road; the commissioners of the stamps, and

their distributors, which are full as scattered and full as numerous;

the officers of the salt duty, which, though a species of excise and

conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the

ordinary managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses and

windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and

the commissioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately

or immediately appointed by the crown, and removeable at pleasure

without any reason assigned: these, it requires but little penetration

to see, must give that power, on which they depend for subsistence, an

influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent

opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in

loans, subscriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-transactions,

which will greatly encrease this influence; and that over those

persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently

the most desirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the

unforeseen, consequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to

support them establishing our present perpetual taxes: the whole of

which is entirely new since the restoration in 1660; and by far the

greatest part since the revolution in 1688. And the same may be said

with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which

the army has created. All which put together gives the executive power

so persuasive an energy with respect to the persons themselves, and so

prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply

make amends for the loss of external prerogative.

BUT, though this profusion of offices should have no effect on

individuals, there is still another newly acquired branch of power;

and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined

army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the

crown; raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the

crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and

that by the power of parliament: but during that year they must, by

the nature of our constitution, if raised at all, be at the absolute

disposal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how

great a trust is thereby reposed in the prince by his people. A trust,

that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome

prerogatives.

ADD to all this, that, besides the civil list, the immense revenue of

seven millions sterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of

the publick, or carried to the sinking fund, is first deposited in the

royal exchequer, and thence issued out to the respective offices of

payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it

is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well

considered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high

importance.

UPON the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have

become of the _nominal_, the _real_ power of the crown has not been

too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is

indeed given up; but much is also acquired. The stern commands of

prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence; the slavish

and exploded doctrine of non-resistance has given way to a military

establishment by law; and to the disuse of parliaments has succeeded a

parliamentary trust of an immense perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by

the free operation of the sinking fund, our national debts shall be

lessened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal

introduction of a well planned and national militia, will suffer our

formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in consequence

of all) our taxes shall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power

of the crown will slowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it slowly and

imperceptibly rose. But, till that shall happen, it will be our

especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the

crown, and yet guard against corrupt and servile influence from those

who are intrusted with it's authority; to be loyal, yet free;

obedient, and yet independent: and, above every thing, to hope that we

may long, very long, continue to be governed by a sovereign, who, in

all those public acts that have personally proceeded from himself,

hath manifested the highest veneration for the free constitution of

Britain; hath already in more than one instance remarkably

strengthened it's outworks; and will therefore never harbour a

thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental

to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

IN a former chapter of these commentaries[a] we distinguished

magistrates into two kinds; supreme, or those in whom the sovereign

power of the state resides; and subordinate, or those who act in an

inferior secondary sphere. We have hitherto considered the former kind

only, namely, the supreme legislative power or parliament, and the

supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed to

enquire into the rights and duties of the principal subordinate

magistrates.

[Footnote a: ch. 2. pag. 142.]

AND herein we are not to investigate the powers and duties of his

majesty's great officers of state, the lord treasurer, lord

chamberlain, the principal secretaries, or the like; because I do not

know that they are in that capacity in any considerable degree the

objects of our laws, or have any very important share of magistracy

conferred upon them: except that the secretaries of state are allowed

the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial[b].

Neither shall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord

chancellor, or the other judges of the superior courts of justice;

because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these

commentaries. Nor shall I enter into any minute disquisitions, with

regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and aldermen, or other

magistrates of particular corporations; because these are mere private

and strictly municipal rights, depending entirely upon the domestic

constitution of their respective franchises. But the magistrates and

officers, whose rights and duties it will be proper in this chapter to

consider, are such as are generally in use and have a jurisdiction and

authority dispersedly throughout the kingdom: which are, principally,

sheriffs; coroners; justices of the peace; constables; surveyors of

highways; and overseers of the poor. In treating of all which I shall

enquire into, first, their antiquity and original; next, the manner in

which they are appointed and may be removed; and, lastly, their rights

and duties. And first of sheriffs.

[Footnote b: 1 Leon. 70. 2 Leon. 175. Comb. 343. 5 Mod. 84. Salk.

347.]

I. THE sheriff is an officer of very great antiquity in this kingdom,

his name being derived from two Saxon words, shire reeve, the bailiff

or officer of the shire. He is called in Latin _vice-comes_, as being

the deputy of the earl or _comes_; to whom the custody of the shire is

said to have been committed at the first division of this kingdom into

counties. But the earls in process of time, by reason of their high

employments and attendance on the king's person, not being able to

transact the business of the county, were delivered of that burden[c];

reserving to themselves the honour, but the labour was laid on the

sheriff. So that now the sheriff does all the king's business in the

county; and though he be still called _vice-comes_, yet he is entirely

independent of, and not subject to the earl; the king by his letters

patent committing _custodiam comitatus_ to the sheriff, and him alone.

[Footnote c: Dalton of sheriffs, c. 1.]

SHERIFFS were formerly chosen by the inhabitants of the several

counties. In confirmation of which it was ordained by statute 28 Edw.

I. c. 8. that the people should have election of sheriffs in every

shire, where the shrievalty is not of inheritance. For antiently in

some counties, particularly on the borders, the sheriffs were

hereditary; as I apprehend they are in Scotland, and in the county of

Westmorland, to this day: and the city of London has also the

inheritance of the shrievalty of Middlesex vested in their body by

charter[d]. The reason of these popular elections is assigned in the

same statute, c. 13. "that the commons might chuse such as would not

be a burthen to them." And herein appears plainly a strong trace of

the democratical part of our constitution; in which form of government

it is an indispensable requisite, that the people should chuse their

own magistrates[e]. This election was in all probability not

absolutely vested in the commons, but required the royal approbation.

For in the Gothic constitution, the judges of their county courts

(which office is executed by our sheriff) were elected by the people,

but confirmed by the king: and the form of their election was thus

managed; the people, or _incolae territorii_, chose _twelve_ electors,

and they nominated _three_ persons, _ex quibus rex unum

confirmabat_[f]. But, with us in England, these popular elections,

growing tumultuous, were put an end to by the statute 9 Edw. II. st.

2. which enacted, that the sheriffs should from thenceforth be

assigned by the lord chancellor, treasurer, and the judges; as being

persons in whom the same trust might with confidence be reposed. By

statutes 14 Edw. III. c. 7. and 23 Hen. VI. c. 8. the chancellor,

treasurer, _chief_ justices, and _chief_ baron, are to make this

election; and that on the morrow of All Souls in the exchequer. But

the custom now is (and has been at least ever since the time of

Fortescue[g], who was chief justice and chancellor to Henry the sixth)

that _all_ the judges, and certain other great officers, meet in the

exchequer chamber on the morrow of All Souls yearly, (which day is now

altered to the morrow of St. Martin by the act for abbreviating

Michaelmas term) and then and there nominate three persons to the

king, who afterwards appoints one of them to be sheriff. This custom,

of the _twelve_ judges nominating _three_ persons, seems borrowed from

the Gothic constitution beforementioned; with this difference, that

among the Goths the twelve nominors were first elected by the people

themselves. And this usage of ours at it's first introduction, I am

apt to believe, was founded upon some statute, though not now to be

found among our printed laws: first, because it is materially

different from the directions of all the statutes beforementioned;

which it is hard to conceive that the judges would have countenanced

by their concurrence, or that Fortescue would have inserted in his

book, unless by the authority of some statute: and also, because a

statute is expressly referred to in the record, which sir Edward Coke

tells us[h] he transcribed from the council book of 3 Mar. 34 Hen. VI.

and which is in substance as follows. The king had of his own

authority appointed a man sheriff of Lincolnshire, which office he

refused to take upon him: whereupon the opinions of the judges were

taken, what should be done in this behalf. And the two chief justices,

sir John Fortescue and sir John Prisot, delivered the unanimous

opinion of them all; "that the king did an error when he made a person

sheriff, that was not chosen and presented to him according to the

_statute_; that the person refusing was liable to no fine for

disobedience, as if he had been one of the _three_ persons chosen

according to the tenor of the _statute_; that they would advise the

king to have recourse to the _three_ persons that were chosen

according to the _statute_, or that some other thrifty man be

intreated to occupy the office for this year; and that, the next year,

to eschew such inconveniences, the order of the _statute_ in this

behalf made be observed." But, notwithstanding this unanimous

resolution of all the judges of England, thus entered in the council

book, some of our writers[i] have affirmed, that the king, by his

prerogative, may name whom he pleases to be sheriff, whether chosen by

the judges or no. This is grounded on a very particular case in the

fifth year of queen Elizabeth, when, by reason of the plague, there

was no Michaelmas term kept at Westminster; so that the judges could

not meet there _in crastino Animarum_ to nominate the sheriffs:

whereupon the queen named them herself, without such previous

assembly, appointing for the most part one of the two remaining in the

last year's list[k]. And this case, thus circumstanced, is the only

precedent in our books for the making these extraordinary sheriffs. It

is true, the reporter adds, that it was held that the queen by her

prerogative might make a sheriff without the election of the judges,

_non obstante aliquo statuto in contrarium_: but the doctrine of _non

obstante_'s, which sets the prerogative above the laws, was

effectually demolished by the bill of rights at the revolution, and

abdicated Westminster-hall when king James abdicated the kingdom. So

that sheriffs cannot now be legally appointed, otherwise than

according to the known and established law.

[Footnote d: 3 Rep. 72.]

[Footnote e: Montesq. Sp. L. b. 2. c. 2.]

[Footnote f: Stiernhook _de jure Goth._ _l._ 1. _c._ 3.]

[Footnote g: _de L.L._ _c._ 24.]

[Footnote h: 2 Inst. 559.]

[Footnote i: Jenkins. 229.]

[Footnote k: Dyer 225.]

SHERIFFS, by virtue of several old statutes, are to continue in their

office no longer than one year; and yet it hath been said[l] that a

sheriff may be appointed _durante bene placito_, or during the king's

pleasure; and so is the form of the royal writ[m]. Therefore, till a

new sheriff be named, his office cannot be determined, unless by his

own death, or the demise of the king; in which last case it was usual

for the successor to send a new writ to the old sheriff[n]: but now by

statute 1 Ann. st. 1. c. 8. all officers appointed by the preceding

king may hold their offices for six months after the king's demise,

unless sooner displaced by the successor. We may farther observe, that

by statute 1 Ric. II. c. 11. no man, that has served the office of

sheriff for one year, can be compelled to serve the same again within

three years after.

[Footnote l: 4 Rep. 32.]

[Footnote m: Dalt. of sheriffs. 8.]

[Footnote n: Dalt. 7.]

WE shall find it is of the utmost importance to have the sheriff

appointed according to law, when we consider his power and duty. These

are either as a judge, as the keeper of the king's peace, as a

ministerial officer of the superior courts of justice, or as the

king's bailiff.

IN his judicial capacity he is to hear and determine all causes of

forty shillings value and under, in his county court, of which more in

it's proper place: and he has also judicial power in divers other

civil cases[o]. He is likewise to decide the elections of knights of

the shire, (subject to the control of the house of commons) of

coroners, and of verderors; to judge of the qualification of voters,

and to return such as he shall determine to be duly elected.

[Footnote o: Dalt. c. 4.]

AS the keeper of the king's peace, both by common law and special

commission, he is the first man in the county, and superior in rank to

any nobleman therein, during his office[p]. He may apprehend, and

commit to prison, all persons who break the peace, or attempt to break

it: and may bind any one in a recognizance to keep the king's peace.

He may, and is bound _ex officio_ to, pursue and take all traitors,

murderers, felons, and other misdoers, and commit them to gaol for

safe custody. He is also to defend his county against any of the

king's enemies when they come into the land: and for this purpose, as

well as for keeping the peace and pursuing felons, he may command all

the people of his county to attend him; which is called the _posse

comitatus_, or power of the county[q]: which summons every person

above fifteen years old, and under the degree of a peer, is bound to

attend upon warning[r], under pain of fine and imprisonment[s]. But

though the sheriff is thus the principal conservator of the peace in

his county, yet, by the express directions of the great charter[t],

he, together with the constable, coroner, and certain other officers

of the king, are forbidden to hold any pleas of the crown, or, in

other words, to try any criminal offence. For it would be highly

unbecoming, that the executioners of justice should be also the

judges; should impose, as well as levy, fines and amercements; should

one day condemn a man to death, and personally execute him the next.

Neither may he act as an ordinary justice of the peace during the time

of his office[u]: for this would be equally inconsistent; he being in

many respects the servant of the justices.

[Footnote p: 1 Roll. Rep. 237.]

[Footnote q: Dalt. c. 95.]

[Footnote r: Lamb. Eiren. 315.]

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