UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR
Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince—Austria’s Motive in Making
War—Servia Accepts Austria’s Demand—The Ironies of History—What Austria
Has to Gain—How the War Became Continental—An Editorial Opinion—Is the
Kaiser Responsible?—Germany’s Stake in the War—Why Russia Entered the
Field—France’s Hatred of Germany—Great Britain and Italy—The Triple
Alliance and Triple Entente
What brought on the mighty war which so suddenly sprang forth? What
evident, what subtle, what deep-hidden causes led to this sudden
demolition of the temple of peace? What pride of power, what lust of
ambition, what desire of imperial dominion cast the armed hosts of the
nations into the field of conflict, on which multitudes of innocent
victims were to be sacrificed to the insatiate hunger for blood of the
modern Moloch?
Here are questions which few are capable of answering. Ostensible
answers may be given, surface causes, reasons of immediate potency. But
no one will be willing to accept these as the true moving causes. For a
continent to spring in a week’s time from complete peace into almost
universal war, with all the great and several of the small Powers
involved, is not to be explained by an apothegm or embraced within the
limits of a paragraph. If not all, certainly several of these nations
had enmities to be unchained, ambitions to be gratified, long-hidden
purposes to be put in action. They seemed to have been awaiting an
opportunity, and it came when the anger of the Servians at the seizure
of Bosnia by Austria culminated in a mad act of assassination
ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN CROWN PRINCE
The immediate cause, so far as apparent to us, of the war in question
was the murder, on June 29, 1914, of the Austrian Crown Prince Francis
Ferdinand and his wife, while on a visit to Sarajevo, the capital of
Bosnia, the assassin being a Servian student, supposed to have come for
that purpose from Belgrade, the Servian capital. The inspiring cause of
this dastardly act was the feeling of hostility towards Austria which
was widely entertained in Servia. Bosnia was a part of the ancient
kingdom of Servia. The bulk of its people are of Slavic origin and
speak the Servian language. Servia was eager to regain it, as a
possible outlet for a border on the Mediterranean Sea. When, therefore,
in 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under
her military control since 1878, the indignation in Servia was great.
While it had died down in a measure in the subsequent years, the
feeling of injury survived in many hearts, and there is little reason
to doubt that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was a result of
this pervading sentiment.
In fact, the Austrian government was satisfied that the murder plot was
hatched in Belgrade and held that Servian officials were in some way
concerned in it. The Servian press gave some warrant for this, being
openly boastful and defiant in its comments. When the Austrian
consul-general at Belgrade dropped dead in the consulate the papers
showed their satisfaction and hinted that he had been poisoned. This
attitude of the press evidently was one of the reasons for the
stringent demand made by Austria on July 23d, requiring apology and
change of attitude from Servia and asking for a reply by the hour of 6
P.M. on the 25th. The demands were in part as follows:
1. An apology by the Servian government in its official journal for all
Pan-Servian propaganda and for the participation of Servian army
officers in it, and warning all Servians in the future to desist from
anti-Austrian demonstrations.
2. That orders to this effect should be issued to the Servian army.
3. That Servia should dissolve all societies capable of conducting
intrigues against Austria.
4. That Servia should curb the activities of the Servian press in
regard to Austria.
5. That Austrian officials should be permitted to conduct an inquiry in
Servia independent of the Servian government into the Sarajevo plot.
An answer to these demands was sent out at ten minutes before 6 o’clock
on the 25th, in which Servia accepted all demands except the last,
which it did not deem “in accordance with international law and good
neighborly relations.” It asked that this demand should be submitted to
The Hague Tribunal. The Austrian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von
Gieslingen, refused to accept this reply and at once left the capital
with the entire staff of the legation. The die was cast, as Austria
probably intended that it should be.
AUSTRIA’S MOTIVE IN MAKING WAR
It had, in fact, become evident early in July that the military party
in Austria was seeking to manufacture a popular demand for war, based
on the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife. Such was
the indication of the tone of the Vienna newspapers, which appeared
desirous of working up a sentiment hostile to Servia. It may be doubted
if the aged emperor was a party to this. Probably his assent was a
forced one, due to the insistence of the war party and the public
sentiment developed by it. That the murder of the Archduke was the real
cause of the action of Austria can scarcely be accepted in view of
Servia’s acceptance of Austria’s rigid demands. The actual cause was
undoubtedly a deeper one, that of Austria’s long-cherished purpose of
gaining a foothold on the Aegean Sea, for which the possession of
Servia was necessary as a preliminary step. A plausible motive was
needed, any pretext that would serve as a satisfactory excuse to Europe
for hostile action and that could at the same time be utilized in
developing Austrian indignation against the Servians. Such a motive
came in the act of assassination and immediate use was made of it. The
Austrian war party contended that the deed was planned at Belgrade,
that it had been fomented by Servian officials, and that these had
supplied the murderer with explosives and aided in their transfer into
Bosnia.
What evidence Austria possessed leading to this opinion we do not know.
While it is not likely that there was any actual evidence, the case was
one that called for investigation, and Austria was plainly within its
rights in demanding such an inquiry and due punishment of every one
found to be connected with the tragic deed. But Austria went farther
than this. It was willing to accept nothing less than a complete and
humiliating submission on the part of Servia. And the impression was
widely entertained, whether with or without cause, that in this Austria
was not acting alone but that it had the full support of Germany. That
country also may be supposed to have had its ends to gain. What these
were we shall consider later.
SERVIA ACCEPTS AUSTRIA’S DEMANDS
Imperious as had been the demand of Austria, one which would never have
been submitted to a Power of equal strength, Servia accepted it,
expressing itself as willing to comply with all the conditions imposed
except that relating to the participation of Austrian officials in the
inquiry, an explanation being asked on this point. If this reply should
be deemed inadequate, Servia stood ready to submit the question at
issue to The Hague Peace Tribunal and to the Powers which had signed
the declaration of 1909 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The subsequent action of Austria was significant. The Austrian Minister
at Belgrade, as before stated, rejected it as unsatisfactory and
immediately left the Servian capital. He acted, in short, with a
precipitancy that indicated that he was acting under instructions. This
was made very evident by what immediately followed. When news came on
July 28th that war had been declared and active hostilities commenced,
it was accompanied by the statement that Austria would not now be
satisfied even with a full acceptance of her demands.
That the intention of this imperious demand and what quickly followed
was to force a war, no one can doubt. Servia’s nearly complete assent
to the conditions imposed was declared to be not only unsatisfactory,
but also “dishonorable,” a word doubtless deliberately used. Evidently
no door was to be left open for retrogressive consideration.
THE IRONIES OF HISTORY
It is one of the ironies of history that a people who once played a
leading part in saving the Austrian capital from capture should come to
be threatened by the armies of that capital. This takes us back to the
era when Servia, a powerful empire of those days, fell under the
dominion of the conquering Turks, whose armies further overran Hungary
and besieged Vienna. Had this city been captured, all central Europe
would have lain open to the barbarities of the Turks. In its defense
the Servians played a leading part, so great a one that we are told by
a Hungarian historian, “It was the Serb Bacich who saved Vienna.” But
in 1914 Servia was brought to the need of saving itself from Vienna.
WHAT AUSTRIA HAD TO GAIN
If it be asked what Austria had to gain by this act; what was her aim
in forcing war upon a far weaker state; the answer is at hand. The
Balkan States, of which Servia is a prominent member, lie in a direct
line between Europe and the Orient. A great power occupying the whole
of the Balkan peninsula would possess political advantages far beyond
those enjoyed by Austria-Hungary. It would be in a position giving it
great influence over, if not strategic control of, the Suez Canal, the
commerce of the Mediterranean, and a considerable all-rail route
between Central Europe and the far East. Salonika, on the AEgean Sea,
now in Greek territory, is one of the finest harbors on the
Mediterranean Sea. A railway through Servia now connects this port with
Austria and Germany. In addition to this railway it is not unlikely
that a canal may in the near future connect the Danube with the harbor
of Salonika. If this project should be carried out, the commerce of the
Danube and its tributary streams and canals, even that of central and
western Germany, would be able to reach the Mediterranean without
passing through the perilous Iron Gates of the Danube or being
subjected to the delays and dangers incident to the long passage
through the Black Sea and the Grecian Archipelago.
We can see in all this a powerful motive for Austria to seek to gain
possession of Servia, as a step towards possible future control of the
whole Balkan peninsula. The commercial and manufacturing interests of
Austria-Hungary were growing, and mastership of such a route to the
Mediterranean would mean immense advantage to this ambitious empire.
Possession of northern Italy once gave her the advantage of an
important outlet to the Mediterranean. This, through events that will
be spoken of in later chapters, was lost to her. She apparently then
sought to reach it by a more direct and open road, that leading through
Salonika.
Such seem the reasons most likely to have been active in the Austrian
assault upon Servia. The murder of an Austrian archduke by an
insignificant assassin gave no sufficient warrant for the act. The
whole movement of events indicates that Austria was not seeking
retribution for a crime but seizing upon a pretext for a predetermined
purpose and couching her demands upon Servia in terms which no
self-respecting nation could accept without protest. Servia was to be
put in a position from which she could not escape and every door of
retreat against the arbitrament of war was closed against her.
But in this retrospect we are dealing with Austria and Servia alone.
What brought Germany, what brought France, what brought practically the
whole of Europe into the struggle? What caused it to grow with
startling suddenness from a minor into a major conflict, from a contest
between a bulldog and a terrier into a battle between lions? What were
the unseen and unnoted conditions that, within little more than a
week’s time, induced all the leading nations of Europe to cast down the
gage of battle and spring full-armed into the arena, bent upon a
struggle which threatened to surpass any that the world had ever seen?
Certainly no trifling causes were here involved. Only great and
far-reaching causes could have brought about such a catastrophe. All
Europe appeared to be sitting, unknowingly or knowingly, upon a powder
barrel which only needed some inconsequent hand to apply the match. It
seems incredible that the mere pulling of a trigger by a Servian
student and the slaughter of an archduke in the Bosnian capital could
in a month’s time have plunged all Europe into war. From small causes
great events may rise. Certainly that with which we are here dealing
strikingly illustrates this homely apothegm.
HOW THE WAR BECAME CONTINENTAL
We cannot hope to point out the varied causes which were at work in
this vast event. Very possibly the leading ones are unknown to us. Yet
some of the important ones are evident and may be made evident, and to
these we must restrict ourselves.
Allusion has already been made to the general belief that the Emperor
of Germany was deeply concerned in it, and that Austria would not have
acted as it did without assurance of support, in fact without direct
instigation, from some strong allied Power, and this Power is adjudged
alike by public and private opinion to have been Germany, acting in the
person of its ambitious war lord, the dominating Kaiser.
It may be stated that all the Powers concerned have sought to disclaim
responsibility. Thus Servia called the world to witness that her answer
to Austria was the limit of submission and conciliation. Austria,
through her ambassador to the United States, solemnly declared that her
assault upon Servia was a measure of “self-defense.” Russia explained
her action as “benevolent intervention,” and expressed “a humble hope
in omnipotent providence” that her hosts would be triumphant. Germany
charged France with perfidious attack upon the unarmed border of the
fatherland, and proclaimed a holy war for “the security of her
territory.” France and England, Belgium and Italy deplored the conflict
and protested that they were innocent of offense. So far as all this is
concerned the facts are generally held to point to Germany as the chief
instigator of the war.
Russia, indeed, had made threatening movements toward Austria as a
warning to her to desist from her threatened invasion of Servia. Great
Britain proposed mediation. Germany made no movement in the direction
of preventing the war, but directed its attention to Russia, warning it
to stop mobilization within twenty-four hours, and immediately
afterward beginning a similar movement of mobilization in its own
territory. On August 1st Germany declared war against Russia, the first
step towards making the contest a continental one. On the 2d, when
France began mobilization, German forces moved against Russia and
France simultaneously and invaded the neutral states of Luxembourg and
Belgium. It was her persistence in the latter movement that brought
Great Britain into the contest, as this country was pledged to support
Belgian neutrality. On August 4th, Great Britain sent an ultimatum to
Germany to withdraw from the neutral territory which her troops had
entered and demanded an answer by midnight. Germany declined to answer
satisfactorily and at 11 o’clock war was declared by Great Britain.
AN EDITORIAL OPINION
As regards the significance of these movements, in which Germany hurled
declarations of war in rapid succession to east and west, and forced
the issue of a continental war upon nations which had taken no decisive
step, it may suffice to quote an editorial summing up of the situation
as regards Germany, from the Philadelphia North American of August 7th:
“From these facts there is no escape. Leaving aside all questions of
justice or political expediency, the aggressor throughout has been
Germany. Austria’s fury over the assassination of the heir to the
throne was natural. But Servia tendered full reparation.
So keen and conservative an authority as Rear Admiral Mahan declares
that ‘the aggressive insolence’ of Austria’s ultimatum ‘and Sevia’s
concession of all demands except those too humiliating for national
self-respect’ show that behind Austria’s assault was the instigation of
Berlin. He adds:
“Knowing how the matter would be viewed in Russia, it is incredible
that Austria would have ventured on the ultimatum unless assured
beforehand of the consent of Germany. The inference is irresistible
that it was the pretext for a war already determined upon as soon as
plausible occasion offered.’
“Circumstantial evidence, at least, places responsibility for the
flinging of the first firebrand upon the government of the Kaiser. Now,
who added fuel to the flames, until the great conflagration was under
way?
“The next move was the Czar’s. ‘Fraternal sentiments of the Russian
people for the Slavs in Servia,’ he says, led him to order partial
mobilization, following Austria’s invasion of Servia. Instantly Germany
protested, and within forty-eight hours sent an ultimatum demanding
that Russia cease her preparations. On the following day Germany began
mobilizing, and twenty-four hours later declared war on Russia.
Mobilization in France, necessitated by these events, was anticipated
by Germany, which simultaneously flung forces into Russia, France,
Luxembourg and Belgium.
“It was Germany’s historic policy of “blood and iron” that fired
Austria to attempt the crushing of Servia. It was Germany that hurled
an ultimatum, swiftly followed by an army, at Russia. It was Germany
that struck first at the French frontier. It was Germany that trampled
upon solemn treaty engagements by invading the neutral states of
Luxembourg and Belgium. And it was Germany that, in answer to England’s
demand that the neutrality of Belgium be protected, declared war
against Great Britain.
“Regardless, therefore, of questions of right and wrong, it is
undeniable that in each succeeding crisis Germany has taken the
aggressive. In so doing she has been inspired by a supreme confidence
in her military might. But she has less reason to be proud of her
diplomacy. The splendid audacity of her moves cannot obscure the fact
that in making the case upon which she will be judged she has been
outmaneuvered by the deliberation of Russia, the forbearance of France
and the patience of Great Britain. She has assumed the role of
international autocrat, while giving her foes the advantage of
prosecuting a patriotic war of defense.
“Particularly is this true touching the violation of neutral territory.
For nearly half a century the duchy of Luxembourg has been considered a
‘perpetually neutral state,’ under solemn guarantee of Austria, Great
Britain, Germany and Russia. Since 1830, when Belgium seceded from the
Netherlands, it, too, has been held ‘an independent and perpetually
neutral state,’ that status being solemnly declared in a convention
signed hy Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Yet the
first war move of Germany was to overrun these countries, seize their
railroads, bombard their cities and lay waste their territories.
“For forty years Germany has been the exemplar of a progressive
civilization. In spite of her adherence to inflated militarism, she has
put the whole world in her debt by her inspiring industrial and
scientific achievements. Her people have taught mankind lessons of
incalculable value, and her sons have enriched far distant lands with
their genius. Not the least of the catastrophes inflicted by this
inhuman war is that an unbridled autocracy has brought against the
great German empire an indictment for arrogant assault upon the peace
of nations and the security of human institutions.”
IS THE KAISER RESPONSIBLE?
How much reliance is to be placed on the foregoing newspaper opinion,
and on the prevailing sentiment holding Kaiser Wilhelm responsible for
flinging the war bomb that disrupted the ranks of peace, no one can
say. Every one naturally looked for the fomenter of this frightful
international conflict and was disposed to place the blame on the basis
of rumor and personal feeling. On the other hand each nation concerned
has vigorously disclaimed responsibility for the cataclysm.
Austria—very meekly—claimed that Servia precipitated the conflict.
Germany blamed it upon Russia and France, the former from Slavic race
sentiment, the latter from enmity that had existed since the loss of
Alsace and Lorraine in 1870. They, on the contrary, laid all the blame
upon Germany. In the case of England alone we have a clear vista. The
obligation of the island kingdom to maintain the neutral position of
Belgium and the utter disregard of this neutrality by Germany forced
her to take part and throw her armies into the field for the
preservation of her international obligations.
Many opinions were extant, many views advanced. One of these, from
Robert C. Long, a war correspondent of note, laid the total
responsibility upon Austria, which, he said, plunged Europe into war in
disregard of the Kaiser, who vigorously sought to prevent the outbreak,
even threatening his ally in his efforts to preserve peace. In his
view, “All the blood-guiltiness in this war will rest upon two Powers,
Austria and Russia. It rests on Austria for her undue harshness to
Servia and on Russia for its dishonesty in secretly mobilizing its
entire army at a time when it was imploring the Kaiser to intervene for
peace, and when the Kaiser was working for peace with every prospect of
success.”
We have quoted one editorial opinion holding Germany wholly
responsible. Here is another, from the New York TIMES, which, with a
fair degree of justice, distributes the responsibility among all the
warring nations of Europe:
“Germany is not responsible; Russia is not responsible, or Austria, or
France, or England. The pillars of civilization are undermined and
human aspirations bludgeoned down by no Power, but by all Powers; by no
autocrats, but by all autocrats; not because this one or that has erred
or dared or dreamed or swaggered, but because all, in a mad stampede
for armament, trade and territory, have sowed swords and guns,
nourished harvests of death-dealing crops, made ready the way.
“For what reason other than war have billions in bonds and taxes been
clamped on the backs of all Europe? None sought to evade war; each
sought to be prepared to triumph when it came. At most some
chancelleries whispered for delay, postponement; they knew the clash to
be inevitable; if not today, tomorrow. Avoid war! What else have they
lived for, what else prepared for, what else have they inculcated in
the mind of youth than the sureness of the conflict and the great glory
of offering themselves to this Moloch in sacrifice?
“No Power involved can cover up the stain. It is indelible, the sin of
all Europe. It could have been prevented by common agreement. There was
no wish to prevent it. Munition manufacturers were not alone in urging
the race to destruction, physical and financial. The leaders were for
it. It was policy. A boiling pot will boil, a nurtured seed will grow.
There was no escape from the avowed goal. A slow drift to the
inevitable, a thunderbolt forged, the awful push toward the vortex!
What men and nations want they get.”
GERMANY’S STAKE IN THE WAR
What had Germany to gain in the war in the instigation of which she is
charged with being so deeply involved? Territorial aggrandizement may
have been one of her purposes. Belgium and Holland lay between her and
the open Atlantic, and the possession of these countries, with their
splendid ports, would pay her well for a reasonable degree of risk and
cost. The invasion of Belgium as her first move in the war game may
have had an ulterior purpose in the acquisition of that country, one
likely to be as distasteful to France as the taking over of
Alsace-Lorraine. Perhaps the neutral position taken by Holland, with
her seeming inclination in favor of Germany, may have had more than
racial relations behind it. Considerations of ultimate safety from
annexation may have had its share in this attitude of neutrality.
The general impression has been that Germany went to war with the
purpose of establishing beyond question her political and military
supremacy on the European continent. Military despotism in Germany was
the decisive factor in making inevitable the general war. The Emperor
of Germany stood as the incarnation and exponent of the Prussian policy
of military autocracy. He had ruled all German States in unwavering
obedience to the militarist maxim: “In times of peace prepare for war.”
He had used to the full his autocratic power in building up the German
Empire and in making it not only a marvel of industrial efficiency, but
also a stupendous military machine. In this effort he had burdened the
people of Germany with an ever-increasing war budget. The limit in this
direction was reached with the war budget of the year 1912 when the
revenues of the princes and of all citizens of wealth were specially
taxed. No new sources of revenue remained. A crisis had come.
That crisis, as sometimes claimed, was not any menace from Britain or
any fear of the British power. It was rather the very real and very
rapidly rising menace of the new great Slav power on Germany’s border,
including, as it did, the Russian Empire and the entire line of Slav
countries that encircled Germanic Austria from the Adriatic to Bohemia.
These Slav peoples are separated from the governing Teutonic race in
the Austrian Empire by the gulfs of blood, language, and religion. And
in Europe the Slav population very largely outnumbers the Teuton
population and is growing much more rapidly.
Recent events, especially in the Balkan wars, had made it plain, not to
the German Emperor alone, but to all the world, that the growth into an
organized power of more than two hundred millions of Slav peoples along
nearly three thousand miles of international frontier was a menace to
the preservation of Teuton supremacy in Europe. That Teuton supremacy
was based on the sword. The German Emperor’s appeal was to “My sword.”
But when the new sword of the united Slav power was allowed to be
unsheathed, German supremacy was threatened on its own ground and by
the weapon of its own choosing.
However all this be, and it must be admitted that it is to a degree
speculative, there were in 1914 conditions existing that appeared to
render the time a suitable one for the seemingly inevitable continental
war. Revelations pointing to defects in the French army, deficiencies
of equipment and weaknesses in artillery, had been made in the French
Parliament. The debate that occurred was fully dwelt upon in the German
papers. And on July 16th the organ of Berlin radicalism, the VOSSICHE
ZEITUNG, published a leading article to show that Russia was not
prepared for war, and never had been. As for France, it said: “A Gallic
cock with a lame wing is not the ideal set up by the Russians. And when
the Russian eagle boasts of being in the best of health who is to
believe him? Why should the French place greater confidence in the
inveterate Russian disorganization than in their own defective
organization?”
As regards the Kaiser’s own estimate of his preparedness for war, and
the views of national polity he entertained, we shall let him speak for
himself in the following extracts from former utterances:
“We will be everywhere victorious even if we are surrounded by enemies
on all sides and even if we have to fight superior numbers, for our
most powerful ally is God above, who, since the time of the Great
Elector and Great King, has always been on our side.”—At Berlin, March
29, 1901.
“I vowed never to strike for world mastery. The world empire that I
then dreamed of was to create for the German empire on all sides the
most absolute confidence as a quiet, honest and peaceable neighbor. I
have vowed that if ever the time came when history should speak of a
German world power or a Hohenzollern world power this should not be
based on conquest, but come through a mutual striving of nations after
a common purpose.
“After much has been done internally in a military way, the next thing
must be the arming ourselves at sea. Every German battleship is a new
guarantee for the peace of the world. We are the salt of the earth, but
must prove worthy of being so. Therefore, our youth must learn to deny
what is not good for them.
“With all my heart I hope that golden peace will continue to be present
with us.”—At Bremen, March 22, 1905.
“My final and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea. May
God grant that war may not come, but should the cloud descend, I am
firmly convinced that the army will acquit itself as it did so nobly
thirty-five years ago.”—At Berlin, February 25, 1906.
In the early days of the reign of William II war was prominent in his
utterances. He was the War Lord in full feather, and the world at that
time looked with dread upon this new and somewhat blatant apostle of
militarism. Yet year after year passed until the toll of almost three
decades was achieved, without his drawing the sword, and the world
began to regard him as an apostle of peace, a wise and capable ruler
who could gain his ends without the shedding of blood. What are we to
believe now? Had he been wearing a mask for all these years, biding his
time, hiding from view a deeply cherished purpose? Or did he really
believe that a mission awaited him, that regeneration of the world
through the sanguinary path of the battle-field was his duty, and that
by the aid of a successful war he could inaugurate a safer and sounder
era of peace?
We throw out these ideas as suggestions only. What the Kaiser purposed,
what deep-laid schemes of international policy he entertained, will,
perhaps, never be known. But if he was really responsible for the great
war, as he was so widely accused of being, the responsibility he
assumed was an awful one. If he was not responsible, as he declared and
as some who claim to have been behind the scenes maintain, the world
will be ready to absolve him when his innocence has been made evident.
WHY RUSSIA ENTERED THE FIELD
In this survey of the causes of the great war under consideration the
position of Russia comes next. That country was the first to follow
Austria and begin the threatening work of mobilization. Germany’s first
open participation consisted in a warming to Russia that this work must
cease. Only when her warning was disregarded did Germany begin
mobilization and declare war. All this was the work of a very few days,
but in this era of active military preparedness it needs only days,
only hours in some instances, to change from a state of peace into a
state of war and hurl great armed hosts against the borders of hostile
nations.
The general impression was that it was the Slavic race sentiment that
inspired Russia’s quick action. Servia, a country of Slavs, brothers in
race to a large section of the people of Russia, was threatened with
national annihilation and her great kinsman sprang to her rescue,
determined that she should not be absorbed by her land-hungry neighbor.
This seemed to many a sufficient cause for Russia’s action. Not many
years before, when Austria annexed her wards, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
both Slavic countries, Russia protested against the act. She would
doubtless have done more than protest but for her financial and
military weakness arising from the then recent Russo-Japanese War. In
1914 she was much stronger in both these elements of national power and
lost not a day in preparing to march to Servia’s aid.
But was this the whole, or indeed the chief, moving impulse in Russia’s
action? Was she so eager an advocate of Pan-Slavism as such a fact
would indicate? Had she not some other purpose in view, some fish of
her own to fry, some object of moment to obtain? Many thought so. They
were not willing to credit the Russian bear with an act of pure
international benevolence. Wars of pure charity are rarely among the
virtuous acts of nations. As it had been suggested that Germany saw in
the war a possible opportunity to gain a frontier on the Atlantic, so
it was hinted that Russia had in mind a similar frontier on the
Mediterranean. Time and again she had sought to wring Constantinople
from the hands of the Turks. In 1877 she was on the point of achieving
this purpose when she was halted and turned back by the Congress of
Berlin and the bellicose attitude of the nations that stood behind it.
Here was another and seemingly a much better opportunity. The Balkan
War had almost accomplished the conquest of the great Turkish capital
and left Turkey in a state of serious weakness. If Europe should be
thrown into the throes of a general war, in which every nation would
have its own interests to care for, Russia’s opportunity to seize upon
the prize for which she had so long sought was an excellent one, there
being no one in a position to say her nay. To Russia the possession of
Constantinople was like the possession of a new world, and this may
well have been her secret motive in springing without hesitation into
the war. Her long-sought prize hung temptingly within reach of her
hand, the European counterpart of the “Monroe Doctrine” could not now
be evoked to stay her grasp, and it seems highly probable that in this
may have lain the chief cause of Russia’s participation in the war.
FRANCE’S HATRED OF GERMANY
The Republic of France was less hasty than Russia and Germany in
issuing a declaration of war. Yet there, too, the order of mobilization
was quickly issued and French troops were on the march toward the
German border before Germany had taken a similar step. France had not
forgotten her humiliation in 1870. So far was she from forgetting it
that she cherished a vivid recollection of what she had lost and an
equally vivid enmity towards Germany in consequence. Enmity is hardly
the word. Hatred better fits the feeling entertained. And this was kept
vitally alive by the fact that Alsace and Lorraine, two of her former
provinces, still possessing a considerable French population, were now
held as part of the dominions of her enemy. The sore rankled and hope
of retribution lay deep in the heart of the French. Here seemed an
opportunity to achieve this long-cherished purpose, and we may
reasonably believe that the possibility of regaining this lost
territory made France eager to take part in the coming war. She had
been despoiled by Germany, a valued portion of her territory had been
wrested from her grasp, a promising chance of regaining it lay before
her. She had the men; she had the arms; she had a military organization
vastly superior to that of 1870; she had the memory of her former
triumphs over the now allied nations of Austria and Germany; she had
her obligations to aid Russia as a further inducement. The causes of
her taking part in the war are patent, especially in view of the fact
that in a very brief interval after her declaration her troops had
crossed the border and were marching gaily into Alsace, winning battles
and occupying towns as they advanced.
GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY
We have suggested that in the case alike of Austria, Russia, Germany
and France the hope of gaining valuable acquisitions of territory was
entertained. In the case of France, enmity to Germany was an added
motive, the territory she sought being land of which she had been
formerly despoiled. These purposes of changing the map of Europe did
not apply to or influence Great Britain. That country had no territory
to gain and no great military organization to exercise. She possessed
the most powerful navy of any country in the world, but she was moved
by no desire of showing her strength upon the sea. There was no reason,
so far as any special advantage to herself was concerned, for her
taking part in the war, and her first step was a generous effort to
mediate between the Powers in arms.
Only when Belgium—a small nation that was in a sense under the
guardianship of Great Britain, so far as its nationality and neutrality
were concerned—was invaded by Germany without warning, did Britain feel
it incumbent upon her to come to its aid. This may not have been
entirely an act of benevolence. There was a probability that Germany,
once in control of Belgium, could not readily let go. She might add it
to her empire, a fact likely to seriously affect British sea-power.
However this be, Great Britain lost no time after the invasion in
becoming a party to the continental war, sending her fleet abroad and
enlisting troops for service in the aid of her allies, France and
Belgium.
Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance, the other members of which were
Germany and Austria, was the only one of the great Powers that held
aloof. She had absolutely nothing to gain by taking part in the war,
while her late large expenses in the conquest of Tripoli had seriously
depleted her war chest. As regards her alliance with Germany and
Austria, it put her under no obligation to come to their aid in an
offensive war. Her obligation was restricted to aid in case they were
attacked, and she justly held that no such condition existed. As a
result, Germany and Austria found themselves at war with the three
powerful members of the Triple Entente, while Italy, the third member
of the Triple Alliance, declined to draw the sword.
The defection of Italy was a serious loss to the power of the allies,
so much so that Emperor William threatened her with war if she failed
to fulfil her assumed obligations. This threat Italy quietly ignored.
She gave indications, in fact, that her sympathies were with the
opposite party. Thus Germany and Austria found themselves pitted
against three great Powers and a possible fourth, with the addition of
the two small nations of Servia and Belgium. And the latter were not to
be despised as of negligible importance. Servia quickly showed an
ability to check the forward movements of Austria, while Belgium,
without aid, long held a powerful German army at bay, defending the
city and fortresses of Liege with a boldness and success that called
forth the admiring acclamations of the world.
THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE
This review of causes and motives may be supplemented by a brief
statement of what is meant by the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,
terms which come into common prominence in discussing European
politics. They indicate the division of Europe, so far as its greater
Powers are concerned, into two fully or partially allied bodies, the
former consisting of Germany, Austria and Italy, the latter of Great
Britain, France and Russia. These organizations are of comparatively
recent date. The Alliance began in 1879 in a compact between Germany
and Austria, a Dual Alliance, which was converted into a Triple one in
1883, Italy then, through the influence of Bismarck, joining the
alliance. In this compact Austria and Germany pledged themselves to
mutual assistance if attacked by Russia; Italy and Germany to the same
if attacked by France.
The Triple Entente—or Understanding—arose from a Dual Alliance between
France and Russia, formed in 1887, an informal understanding between
Britain and France in 1904 and a similar understanding between Britain
and Russia in 1907. Its purpose, as formed by Edward VII, was to
balance the Triple Alliance and thus convert Europe into two great
military camps. When organized there seemed little probability of its
being called into activity for many years.