POLITICAL SITUATION
Amir’s policy in killing off leading men of country to ensure
his son’s reign—Dwindling revenue—Why Amir could not meet
Lord Curzon in India—Russian encroachment on frontier—Russian
influence in Kabul—Afghanistan a menace to Russian approach
towards India—Afghan rule cheapest means of keeping unruly
tribes in order—Policy to keep the Afghans well armed—Sympathy
with English justice and government—Influence of British Agent
on the people—Why railways are not wanted in Afghanistan—Reason
rich mines are left unworked—Seaboard wanted by Amir on
Beloochistan coast—Internal policy of Amir Abdur Rahman.
From the beginning of his reign, it was the policy of Amir Abdur Rahman
to get rid in one way or another of those men who had much influence in
the country, and could, by attaching to themselves a following, become a
menace to his interests. It was not politic to do this openly, nor to get
rid of many at one time, but gradually all who were likely to cause him
trouble were disposed of. The last influential man left in the country
was Ghulam Hyder, the commander-in-chief, and during the latter part of
the Amir’s reign he was often invited to Kabul, but always evaded the
invitation on one pretext or another. He at last died at his post near
the Indian frontier, and invidious remarks were made when the native
doctor, who had been his hakeem, and attended him in his last sickness,
was sent for to Kabul, where the Amir raised him to the rank of colonel,
and gave him money and presents, and generally made much of him.
One of the Amir’s methods of getting rid of those men who caused him any
anxiety was described to me by one who said he had been appointed to do
the work on several occasions. This man was not a Mussulman, and it was
one evening, after drinking a good deal of my whisky, that he related his
experiences, otherwise I doubt if he would have had the courage to say
anything about the matter. Instead of mentioning the man’s name I will
call him Y. Y. said the Amir sent for him late one night, and asked if
he knew a certain man. This man was of high rank, and on saying that he
knew him, Y. was told to go to the Captain of the Guard, and get twelve
soldiers, as was written in the order now given him, after which he was
to go to the man’s house and, on the pretext that the Amir wanted him
privately on some urgent business, take him to a certain part of the
old city which is in ruins, and when he got the man there he was to act
according to instructions which were written on another paper the Amir
gave him. Y. accordingly went to the man’s house, taking the twelve
soldiers with him, and leaving them outside, went to the inner gate
and waited, as is the etiquette of the country, while the door-keeper
told the master of the house that Y. wished to see him on some urgent
business. Receiving permission, he followed the servant up to the room
where the man was sitting, together with several friends and relations,
drinking tea. When the man saw Y., he called out and asked him to come
and sit by him, and drink tea with them. Y. did as he was asked, and
then whispered in the man’s ear that the Amir Sahib wanted him on some
very important matter, and it was best that the Amir should not be kept
waiting. The man said he would go into the harem and tell his family he
was going out, and would not be back till late, but Y. told him not to
delay even to do that, as the Amir was very urgent on his going at once,
and soon they were outside together. When they got outside the gate the
soldiers surrounded them, and the man wanted to know why these men came
round them, but Y. told him that the Amir had sent a guard in his honour
for the hour was late, so they went on, the soldiers walking on both
sides, until they came to the bridge which spans the river, and here
they turned to cross it, for the old part of the city to which Y. had
been ordered to take the man lay in that direction. The man, however,
got suspicious, and asked why they were going away from the palace,
instead of towards it, and he seemed inclined to break away; but the
soldiers gathered round closer, and Y. made an excuse that the Amir had
ordered them to go that way, as he did not wish others to see them going
towards the palace, and that they were to re-cross the river lower down,
and reach their destination that way. The man said no more, and they
went on, but when the road led them still further away from the palace
he refused to go further; but on Y. telling him that it was the Amir’s
orders, and perhaps seeing that it was useless to resist doing as he was
told, he went on with them. When they at last arrived at a place in the
ruins where there was an old disused well, the soldiers were signalled
to seize the man, who, realizing what was intended, struggled fiercely,
but was eventually overpowered, and held down on the ground. The officer
of the men then came up and asked what was to be done further, so taking
the paper given him by the Amir, Y. lighted a match, and after reading it
told the officer that the man’s head was to be severed from the body. The
officer then walked back to his men, taking out his sword as he went, and
while the man was held down, cut through the throat, and at last finished
the job, but the man’s violent struggles rendered it difficult to do what
was ordered, until a gash had been made in the throat, and loss of blood
weakened him. The head and body were then cast into an old well, and
earth thrown on top to hide all traces, and they returned to the palace,
and on arrival there Y. went to the Amir and reported that he had done as
was ordered; the Amir said, “It is good,” and told him he had leave to go
home.
Y. said that night, after going to bed, every time he shut his eyes he
could see the man’s head as it was when it was at last severed from the
body, and that it was several nights before he could sleep without
starting up again thinking he saw the same thing. A few weeks after this
had happened, the dead man’s son went to the Amir, and said that Y. had
called for his father late one night, intimating that the Amir Sahib
wanted him, and the two of them had gone out together, and since then his
father had not been seen. The Amir told him it was true, but to keep his
mind at rest, for his father had been sent a long journey on a special
mission and, God willing, he would come back. The relatives of men got
rid of in this way, however, soon guessed the fate of those missing, and
for their own sakes kept quiet lest they too should be taken away and
never return.
The Amir’s object in getting rid of men who might cause disturbance was
not only to prevent trouble during his own reign, but also to prepare
the way for the peaceful accession of his son to the throne, and his
thoroughness in carrying out all he did has made it very unlikely that
if Ayoob Khan or Yakoob Khan returned to their country they could get
together a following of sufficient numbers to cause any serious trouble.
It was to prevent disturbances after his death that the Amir kept all his
sons in Kabul, and put them in charge of various official departments,
instead of making them governors of different provinces as former
Amirs had done, for that was the cause of the fighting among the sons
for supremacy and rule when the father died, because each son as the
governor of a province had money and an army to help him in a struggle
for the throne, and as each brother wanted it a good deal of fighting
always ensued, and caused much bloodshed and misery in the country from
time to time.
The history of Afghanistan shows how brother fought brother, and sons
their father, one killing or blinding the other in a fierce desire to
rule supreme, and the foresight of the Amir prevented a repetition of
these horrors on his death. When that occurred there was no one but
Sirdar Habibullah who had any chance as a candidate for the throne, and
having been the head Sirdar for many years, and having also represented
his father, who was seldom in good health, on many official occasions,
he was looked upon by the leading men of the country as the one to
succeed to the throne, and consequently received their support. This,
together with his immediate occupation of the fortified palace of Arak,
whereby he gained control of the treasury and the stores of modern arms
and ammunition as soon as his father was dead, made him master of the
situation, and there was no one likely to give him trouble except the
Queen-Sultana, the mother of his half-brother, Mahomed Omar Khan, who was
then about twelve years of age, and she was at once shut out of Arak,
where she usually occupied the harem-serai built for the use of the
Amir’s chief wife, and had to live in her private palace, Gulistan serai,
which is situated on the Deh Afghanan side of the city. Here she was
kept nominally in great honour as the chief wife of the late Amir, but
practically a prisoner, for all her chief and confidential servants were
taken from her and others in the Amir’s pay sent in place of them, and
no one was allowed to go and see her, while all entrances to her palace,
excepting the principal gate, were bricked up. The Amir and Sirdar
Nasrullah Khan were particularly urgent in their orders to Mrs. Daly,
the lady doctor in Kabul, that she should not visit the Queen-Sultana or
hold communication with her, and they apparently feared that she might be
induced to take or send a letter from the queen to the Indian Government,
asking for aid in placing her own son on the throne; and, though the
Indian Government might not take any notice of her letter, yet such
action might prejudice the new Amir in their eyes. Also those officials
and army officers who were possessed of any influence, and were inclined
to side with the Queen-Sultana, were bought over by the new Amir, and
were raised to higher rank.
The army, however, was seething with discontent, and a rising was feared
and indeed imminent; but a promise, which was afterwards ratified, of an
increase of pay all round kept them from any open act of insubordination,
although there was a good deal of muttering for a long time, and the
soldiers freely expressed their opinions and said they wanted any other
government but that of the reigning family. The want of reliance in the
Government among the people was shown by open acts of robbery with
violence in different parts of the country, the like of which had been
unknown for many years, and it expressed the indifference of the people
to the constituted authority. This want of reliance in, or objection to,
the existing Government was further shown by the attacks on the Europeans
resident in the country, one of whom was shot from behind and killed by
the officer of his escort for a slight so trivial as to induce a doubt
as to whether the man acted entirely on his own initiative, or had been
prompted by those who hoped thereby to cause complications with other
powers prejudicial to their own Government.
At the time I left Kabul, the revenue of the country was barely
sufficient to pay for the army, and it has been for many years gradually
dwindling in amount, and the Amir was in great need of money. Also
no arrangement had been come to with the Indian Government regarding
the continuance of the subsidy which was paid the former Amir, and
the present ruler, for fear of refusal, dared not ask for it prior to
arrangements being made for the continuance with himself of the terms of
alliance made with his father. Lord Curzon was insistent in his requests
for the Amir to visit him in Peshawar, in order to settle all matters
in a personal interview; but with the people in a state of unrest, and
so many matters of importance to the internal government of the country
requiring immediate settlement and action, the danger of leaving Kabul
at that time was too great for the Amir to risk. The Russian Government
offered to present him with many field-guns, rifles, and ammunition, but
the offer was declined, for the Russians are feared and distrusted, and
their encroachment on Afghan territory is greatly resented. Some of the
officials, however, appeared to be in favour of Russian help, for they
said that if the English Government did not help the country there were
others who would, and there were those who endeavoured to persuade the
Amir into accepting Russian help.
About this time an Afghan general came in from the Russian frontier, and
it was generally said that he brought with him two Russians, dressed like
Afghan slave boys, of high family. Nothing was definitely known of this;
but at the time it was said that these Russians were in Kabul, the Amir
went to stop a week or two at his summer palace at Hindeki, some six
miles south of the city, taking with him none but a few trusted officials
and friends, and it was peremptorily ordered that while there he was to
be left undisturbed, and no one but those who were sent for were to go
to him. This general afterwards changed a large amount of Russian money
in the city, and from that time Russian notes could be bought in the
bazar, and as it was the first time since his accession to the throne
that the Amir had stayed at Hindeki, or any other place except in the
Arak stronghold, and as nothing definite was publicly known of what
transpired, or indeed anything at all of what the Amir did while he was
at Hindeki, it was all very unusual, for all that the Amir does, except
when in his harem, is commonly known and discussed, and a good deal is
known of what he does there.
It will be seen that the Amir’s position for some time after his
succession was a difficult one, and there are still many elements of
danger to be overcome. He has neither the experience nor self-reliance of
his father, and what he may do in a critical time, or how he would emerge
from the test of danger and adversity, cannot be forecast; but as the
ingredients which go towards the making of anarchy and rebellion are not
wanting in the country, time will probably give the answer.
Afghanistan is frequently described as a buffer state between India
and Russia, but it is a buffer which the rolling forward of either
power would readily crush. The bulk of the people are in a discontented
condition, for with high taxation driving them from their lands to seek
work as coolies, food yearly growing dearer, and epidemics common, it
is likely enough that they would welcome any change as a change for
the better, and until the Amir has a grasp on the people equal to that
of his father, an invading power would not have an altogether combined
Afghanistan to contend against, in spite of the Amir’s widely distributed
pamphlets on Jihad.
The Amir, and those with him, rely a good deal on Jihad (religious
war), which is to be preached by the mullahs in case an invading army
crosses the frontier, and pamphlets on the subject have been printed and
distributed all over the country. But as matters now stand, the people,
although extremely fanatical, can hardly be relied on to fight very
vigorously, or for any length of time. The army is supplied with modern
field-guns, rifles, and ammunition, but, although of a modern pattern,
they are few in number, and are not equal to those of other countries
in range and accuracy. The army is also wholly untrained as compared
with the troops of the two great powers on either side of them, and its
officers have no more knowledge of modern warfare than the rank-and-file.
It is only in the natural difficulties offered by the mountainous
description of country to the effective movement of troops and transport
of heavy guns that the Amir could hope to offer any serious opposition
to an invading army, and it is unlikely that after the first stand made
against the invader they would risk further battle. They would be more
likely to resort to the guerilla methods common to them, cutting up small
detachments and harassing the rear and lines of communication; but the
larger the invading army, the less effective would these methods be.
As a means of keeping unruly tribes in order, the Afghans are best left
to govern themselves. Their methods of quelling rebellion and disorder
are more ruthless, and therefore more effective and lasting, for the
description of people dealt with than are the humane methods of other
people. Amir Abdur Rahman, after killing off the bulk of a nation (men,
women, and children) for rebelling against his authority, has had the
remainder transported to a distant part of the country, where, rid of
former associations and by intermarriage with other people, they have
lost their old traditions, and settled down quietly to the new order of
things. Should the English (or other power) occupy the country, the cost
of an army of occupation, which would be necessary to keep the people
in order, would probably equal that of the Indian army, until a new
generation had grown up, more adaptable and willing to accept the altered
condition of affairs.
If it was intended that the Afghans should be used as a means of checking
Russian aggression, it would no doubt be better that they were well
supplied with the best modern arms; but on the other hand, there is
always the chance of such arms being used against the English, for the
Afghans look upon all who are not of their own country and religion as
enemies, and it is unlikely that any existing treaty would be considered
or have the effect of making them hesitate to take advantage of an
occasion which gave them an opportunity for extending their country,
or of benefiting themselves otherwise. When the border tribes rose and
necessitated the Tirah campaign, the late Amir had some thousands of
transport animals collected near Kabul, at the back of the mountains,
and though a rising on his frontier no doubt necessitated precautionary
measures in case his own interests were menaced, yet, had the British
been driven beyond the Indus as was expected, and which was reported
in the bazars as accomplished shortly after the rising started, the
temptation to retake the Peshawar district would perhaps have been a
powerful one, for that district is always claimed as part of the Afghan
territory which was stolen from them by the British.
Generally the sympathies of the people lie towards the justice and
equality of the British rule, and this is due mostly to the stories
related of the freedom of life in India by the people who have lived
there; but the authorities deal severely with those who show a liking
for the English, and as they fear to let any information of their doings
reach the British Government, a spy truly or falsely convicted of
reporting to the English is an offender, who is summarily and finally
dealt with.
The British agent in Kabul, and those with him, are little better than
prisoners, for they see no one, and cannot themselves mix with the
people, and have to confine their peregrinations to the boundaries of
Kabul. All who are found visiting the British agent are imprisoned, and
many hundreds have been killed merely on suspicion of giving him reports
of the doings of the Government; and an Afghan spy, ostensibly doing
a trade as a tea-seller, is stationed on the road opposite the gate of
the agent’s house (the house lies a little back from the road) for the
purpose of noting those who go there, and if any man passes even within a
few yards of the gate, he is reported to the Kotwal; but the fear of the
people of being seen anywhere near the house is now such that all give it
a wide berth in passing by, and no man who values his life would dare to
be seen talking to any of the agent’s men whom he met in the bazar.
All this would seem to point to a good deal happening which is
detrimental to the interests of the British Government which the Afghan
ruler fears may come to their knowledge, but from what I saw and heard in
the country, it is only occasionally that anything happens which would
interest the Indian Government, and then only mildly. It may be, however,
to prevent news of these occasional happenings leaking out that the
Afghan rulers consider it necessary to make the people afraid of giving
news of any sort to the enemies of their country; for so they look upon
all those who are not of themselves.
They certainly have occasion to fear their prison system becoming known
publicly, for cruelty of all sorts is common in the way of torture.
Imagine a prison where the limbs which have been hacked off men are left
lying about, together with the dismembered bodies of those dead, of the
suffering inflicted on them, until the whole place reeks of decomposing
flesh, and then consider the frame of mind of hundreds who are
imprisoned without trial, unknowing of what their own punishment is to
be, who daily live in the midst of these horrors. If the truth about the
Kabul prisons were generally known, other countries would probably unite
in insisting on such barbarity being stopped.
The common people, who have their own way of looking at everything,
attribute the large numbers of men killed in prison without any generally
known reason for their execution to the British Government, and say
that as the British were unable to conquer them by fighting, they now
pay the Amir large sums of money monthly (the subsidy) to kill them in
other ways. The people also say of the Bala Hisar (high fort) in Kabul,
which Lord Roberts rased to the ground in 1880 after the massacre of
Cavagnari and his men, and which still remains in ruins, that the Amir
has been ordered by the British Government not to rebuild it, as one of
the conditions of his occupying the throne. The opinion of these people,
however fallacious, is still the opinion of those who comprise the bulk
of the population, and although they are ignorant and uninformed their
opinion ought not to be altogether neglected.
Amir Abdur Rahman, on one of the occasions when he favoured me with
remarks on political affairs, told me he had received a letter from
one of his spies in Russia, and he would read it to me. His object in
doing so, of course, was not that he wished me to keep the information
to myself, but I was leaving for India the following day, and it was a
matter the Amir could not very well make the occasion of a letter to the
Indian Government. The spy wrote that he had it from a Russian official
in high authority that his Government intended, so long as Amir Abdur
Rahman lived, to leave Afghanistan untouched, but that after his death
they would seize it; and when the Amir had read this to me he remarked
that if it was true that such was their intention, although he would be
dead when they endeavoured to take his country, it was, nevertheless, a
matter of importance to him, for he had for many years been striving to
unite and raise his country to such position that it could hold its own
among the nations and remain always an independent kingdom, and if at the
time of his death his object might not be altogether accomplished, still,
what he had done would form a foundation on which it was his greatest
desire that his sons and their descendants would build the wall which was
to keep the country intact and prevent foreign aggression.
On all occasions when Amir Abdur Rahman spoke to me on such matters he
showed that he had the good of his country at heart, and at times he even
shed tears when he reflected on his failure to imbue the whole of his
people with his ambitions, and that all his efforts, even punishing and
killing to the extent he had done, failed to induce them to forego those
habits which prevented the union and strength he prayed for.
On the occasion mentioned above, the Amir threw some light on his
aversion to having railways in Afghanistan. He said he had powerful
neighbours on both sides of him. Each power was anxious to extend their
railways into his country, and, failing that, they were always trying to
persuade him to construct them himself for the benefit and improvement
of his people. But supposing he did as they wanted and laid railways
over his country, then they would point out that unless his system
communicated with theirs they would be of little advantage to him, and he
himself could see that too. And then if he joined up his railways with
one power, the other power would claim a like concession and he would
have to give it to risk friction and war, and yet England as his ally
would expect to be the only one so favoured. Therefore, he said, it is
better that the country should go without railways, however much it loses
in its trade and development by so doing.
Amir Abdur Rahman never favoured me with any remarks which would throw
a light on his apparently culpable neglect in working the rich mines of
his country. Instead, he often mentioned the benefit to his country which
the working of these mines would occasion, and soon after my appointment
he gave me written orders to build the necessary works for smelting the
copper ores which have been found in the neighbourhood of Kabul. When the
work was about half completed, however, he sent instructions to me to
postpone work on it until further orders, and thereafter let the matter
rest in abeyance, so that the work still remains uncompleted. He avoided
any mention to me of his reason for stopping a work on which he had been
so keen to begin, and it can only be supposed that he was fearful of
adding an incentive to interference with his country on the part of his
neighbours by showing the riches it contained.
Amir Habibullah, who follows his father’s policy in all things, has
done nothing towards developing the resources of the country beyond
ascertaining the position and value of its various mineral deposits. Amir
Habibullah is, however, desirous of obtaining a strip of country from
the west of Afghanistan to the coast on the Beloochistan side, in order
to obtain a seaboard which would enable him to deal direct with other
countries and obviate the necessity of going through the territories of
his neighbours—permission for which depends always on their goodwill.
With such a seaboard they would be independent, could develop the
country, and sell the produce of their mines and other exports direct,
and with the proceeds of such trade could import whatever war material
or other goods they required, and strengthen themselves without the
knowledge of or interference from their neighbours.
The Afghan rulers have spies and others in India as well as in European
countries who give them information on all subjects which affect
Afghanistan either directly or indirectly, and the Amir and his intimates
take the utmost interest in the doings of those who rule the destinies
of other nations, and they watch all that goes on between the different
powers. But, excepting these few in authority, the people are shut
off from news of the outer world, for there are no newspapers in the
country, and the newspapers of other countries they are unable to read;
and as their Government objects to foreigners entering the country and
allows none such to do so except on business, and then only by special
permission from the Amir, and as very few of their own people are allowed
to travel on business across the border, the bulk of the Afghans are
ignorant of everything except that which happens within their own limited
sphere.
The Afghan rulers also in their conduct of the internal affairs of the
country make a point of keeping it secluded and out of touch with the
other countries around them, and British officers who have crossed the
border either knowingly or otherwise, have been made prisoners and
kept so until the Amir’s orders were received. The intercourse of the
people with other nations would no doubt tend to civilize them, and by
broadening their views do away with much of their present fanatical
prejudice against all other people, which is due principally to the
secluded life they are forced to lead, practically cut off from the rest
of the world. It is this thought which directs the policy of seclusion of
their rulers, for they make a practice of working upon the ignorance and
religious superstition of the people to influence them in any required
direction.