bands still here and there upheld the national banner. The bold
Drappes and the brave comrade in arms of Vercingetorix Lucterius,
after the breaking up of the army united on the Loire, gathered
together the most resolute men, and with these threw themselves
into the strong mountain-town of Uxellodunum on the Lot,(50)
which amidst severe and fatal conflicts they succeeded in sufficiently
provisioning. In spite of the loss of their leaders, of whom
Drappes had been taken prisoner, and Lucterius had been cut off
from the town, the garrison resisted to the uttermost; it was not
till Caesar appeared in person, and under his orders the spring
from which the besieged derived their water was diverted by means
of subterranean drains, that the fortress, the last stronghold
of the Celtic nation, fell. To distinguish the last champions
of the cause of freedom, Caesar ordered that the whole garrison should
have their hands cut off and should then be dismissed, each one
to his home. Caesar, who felt it all-important to put an end at least
to open resistance throughout Gaul, allowed king Commius, who still
held out in the region of Arras and maintained desultory warfare
with the Roman troops there down to the winter of 703-704, to make
his peace, and even acquiesced when the irritated and justly
distrustful man haughtily refused to appear in person in the Roman
camp. It is very probable that Caesar in a similar way allowed
himself to be satisfied with a merely nominal submission, perhaps
even with a de facto armistice, in the less accessible districts
of the north-west and north-east of Gaul.(51)
Gaul Subdued
Thus was Gaul--or, in other words, the land west of the Rhine
and north of the Pyrenees--rendered subject after only eight years
of conflict (696-703) to the Romans. Hardly a year after the full
pacification of the land, at the beginning of 705, the Roman troops
had to be withdrawn over the Alps in consequence of the civil war,
which had now at length broken out in Italy, and there remained
nothing but at the most some weak divisions of recruits in Gaul.
Nevertheless the Celts did not again rise against the foreign yoke;
and, while in all the old provinces of the empire there was
fighting against Caesar, the newly-acquired country alone remained
continuously obedient to its conqueror. Even the Germans
did not during those decisive years repeat their attempts to conquer
new settlements on the left bank of the Rhine. As little did
there occur in Gaul any national insurrection or German invasion
during the crises that followed, although these offered the most
favourable opportunities. If disturbances broke out anywhere,
such as the rising of the Bellovaci against the Romans in 708,
these movements were so isolated and so unconnected with
the complications in Italy, that they were suppressed without material
difficulty by the Roman governors. Certainly this state of peace
was most probably, just as was the peace of Spain for centuries,
purchased by provisionally allowing the regions that were most
remote and most strongly pervaded by national feeling--Brittany,
the districts on the Scheldt, the region of the Pyrenees--
to withdraw themselves de facto in a more or less definite manner
from the Roman allegiance. Nevertheless the building of Caesar--
however scanty the time which he found for it amidst other
and at the moment still more urgent labours, however unfinished
and but provisionally rounded off he may have left it--in substance
stood the test of this fiery trial, as respected both the repelling
of the Germans and the subjugation of the Celts.
Organization
Roman Taxation
As to administration in chief, the territories newly acquired
by the governor of Narbonese Gaul remained for the time being united
with the province of Narbo; it was not till Caesar gave up
this office (710) that two new governorships--Gaul proper
and Belgica--were formed out of the territory which he conquered.
That the individual cantons lost their political independence,
was implied in the very nature of conquest. They became throughout
tributary to the Roman community. Their system of tribute however was,
of course, not that by means of which the nobles and financial
aristocracy turned Asia to profitable account; but, as was
the case in Spain, a tribute fixed once for all was imposed on each
individual community, and the levying of it was left to itself.
In this way forty million sesterces (400,000 pounds) flowed annually
from Gaul into the chests of the Roman government; which, no doubt,
undertook in return the cost of defending the frontier of the
Rhine. Moreover, the masses of gold accumulated in the temples
of the gods and the treasuries of the grandees found their way,
as a matter of course, to Rome; when Caesar offered his Gallic gold
throughout the Roman empire and brought such masses of it at once
into the money market that gold as compared with silver fell about
25 per cent, we may guess what sums Gaul lost through the war.
Indulgences towards Existing Arrangements
The former cantonal constitutions with their hereditary kings,
or their presiding feudal-oligarchies, continued in the main
to subsist after the conquest, and even the system of clientship,
which made certain cantons dependent on others more powerful,
was not abolished, although no doubt with the loss of political
independence its edge was taken off. The sole object of Caesar
was, while making use of the existing dynastic, feudalist,
and hegemonic divisions, to arrange matters in the interest of Rome,
and to bring everywhere into power the men favourably disposed
to the foreign rule. Caesar spared no pains to form a Roman party
in Gaul; extensive rewards in money and specially in confiscated
estates were bestowed on his adherents, and places in the common
council and the first offices of state in their cantons
were procured for them by Caesar's influence. Those cantons
in which a sufficiently strong and trustworthy Roman party existed,
such as those of the Remi, the Lingones, the Haedui, were favoured
by the bestowal of a freer communal constitution--the right
of alliance, as it was called--and by preferences in the regulation
of the matter of hegemony. The national worship and its priests
seem to have been spared by Caesar from the outset as far as possible;
no trace is found in his case of measures such as were adopted
in later times by the Roman rulers against the Druidical system,
and with this is probably connected the fact that his Gallic wars,
so far as we see, do not at all bear the character of religious
warfare after the fashion which formed so prominent a feature
of the Britannic wars subsequently.
Introduction of the Romanizing of the Country
While Caesar thus showed to the conquered nation every allowable
consideration and spared their national, political, and religious
institutions as far as was at all compatible with their subjection
to Rome, he did so, not as renouncing the fundamental idea of his
conquest, the Romanization of Gaul, but with a view to realize it
in the most indulgent way. He did not content himself with letting
the same circumstances, which had already in great part Romanized
the south province, produce their effect likewise in the north;
but, like a genuine statesman, he sought to stimulate the natural
course of development and, moreover, to shorten as far as possible
the always painful period of transition. To say nothing
of the admission of a number of Celts of rank into Roman citizenship
and even of several perhaps into the Roman senate, it was probably
Caesar who introduced, although with certain restrictions,
the Latin instead of the native tongue as the official language
within the several cantons in Gaul, and who introduced the Roman
instead of the national monetary system on the footing of reserving
the coinage of gold and of denarii to the Roman authorities, while
the smaller money was to be coined by the several cantons, but only
for circulation within the cantonal bounds, and this too in accordance
with the Roman standard. We may smile at the Latin jargon,
which the dwellers by the Loire and the Seine henceforth employed
in accordance with orders;(52) but these barbarisms were pregnant
with a greater future than the correct Latin of the capital.
Perhaps too, if the cantonal constitution in Gaul afterwards appears
more closely approximated to the Italian urban constitution,
and the chief places of the canton as well as the common councils
attain a more marked prominence in it than was probably the case
in the original Celtic organization, the change may be referred
to Caesar. No one probably felt more than the political heir
of Gaius Gracchus and of Marius, how desirable in a military
as well as in a political point of view it would have been to establish
a series of Transalpine colonies as bases of support for the new rule
and starting-points of the new civilization. If nevertheless
he confined himself to the settlement of his Celtic or German horsemen
in Noviodunum(53) and to that of the Boii in the canton
of the Haedui (54)--which latter settlement already rendered quite
the services of a Roman colony in the war with Vercingetorix(55)--
the reason was merely that his farther plans did not permit him
to put the plough instead of the sword into the hands of his legions.
What he did in later years for the old Roman province
in this respect, will be explained in its own place; it is probable
that the want of time alone prevented him from extending
the same system to the regions which he had recently subdued.
The Catastrophe of the Celtic Nation
Traits Common to the Celts and Irish
All was over with the Celtic nation. Its political dissolution
had been completed by Caesar; its national dissolution was begun
and in course of regular progress. This was no accidental destruction,
such as destiny sometimes prepares even for peoples capable
of development, but a self-incurred and in some measure historically
necessary catastrophe. The very course of the last war proves this,
whether we view it as a whole or in detail. When the establishment
of the foreign rule was in contemplation, only single districts--
mostly, moreover, German or half-German--offered energetic
resistance. When the foreign rule was actually established,
the attempts to shake it off were either undertaken altogether
without judgment, or they were to an undue extent the work
of certain prominent nobles, and were therefore immediately
and entirely brought to an end with the death or capture of an
Indutiomarus, Camulogenus, Vercingetorix, or Correus. The sieges
and guerilla warfare, in which elsewhere the whole moral depth
of national struggles displays itself, were throughout this Celtic
struggle of a peculiarly pitiable character. Every page of Celtic
history confirms the severe saying of one of the few Romans who had
the judgment not to despise the so-called barbarians--that the Celts
boldly challenge danger while future, but lose their courage
before its presence. In the mighty vortex of the world's history,
which inexorably crushes all peoples that are not as hard
and as flexible as steel, such a nation could not permanently maintain
itself; with reason the Celts of the continent suffered the same
fate at the hands of the Romans, as their kinsmen in Ireland suffer
down to our own day at the hands of the Saxons--the fate
of becoming merged as a leaven of future development in a politically
superior nationality. On the eve of parting from this remarkable
nation we may be allowed to call attention to the fact,
that in the accounts of the ancients as to the Celts on the Loire
and Seine we find almost every one of the characteristic traits
which we are accustomed to recognize as marking the Irish.
Every feature reappears: the laziness in the culture of the fields;
the delight in tippling and brawling; the ostentation--we may recall
that sword of Caesar hung up in the sacred grove of the Arverni
after the victory of Gergovia, which its alleged former owner viewed
with a smile at the consecrated spot and ordered the sacred property
to be carefully spared; the language full of comparisons and hyperboles,
of allusions and quaint turns; the droll humour--an excellent
example of which was the rule, that if any one interrupted a person
speaking in public, a substantial and very visible hole should be
cut, as a measure of police, in the coat of the disturber
of the peace; the hearty delight in singing and reciting the deeds
of past ages, and the most decided gifts of rhetoric and poetry;
the curiosity--no trader was allowed to pass, before he had told
in the open street what he knew, or did not know, in the shape of news--
and the extravagant credulity which acted on such accounts,
for which reason in the better regulated cantons travellers
were prohibited on pain of severe punishment from communicating
unauthenticated reports to others than the public magistrates;
the childlike piety, which sees in the priest a father and asks
for his counsel in all things; the unsurpassed fervour of national
feeling, and the closeness with which those who are fellow-countrymen
cling together almost like one family in opposition to strangers;
the inclination to rise in revolt under the first chance-leader
that presents himself and to form bands, but at the same time
the utter incapacity to preserve a self-reliant courage equally remote
from presumption and from pusillanimity, to perceive the right time
for waiting and for striking a blow, to attain or even barely
to tolerate any organization, any sort of fixed military or political
discipline. It is, and remains, at all times and all places
the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid, inquisitive,
credulous, amiable, clever, but--in a political point of view--
thoroughly useless nation; and therefore its fate has been always
and everywhere the same.
The Beginnings of Romanic Development
But the fact that this great people was ruined by the Transalpine wars
of Caesar, was not the most important result of that grand enterprise;
far more momentous than the negative was the positive result.
It hardly admits of a doubt that, if the rule of the senate
had prolonged its semblance of life for some generations
longer, the migration of peoples, as it is called, would have
occurred four hundred years sooner than it did, and would have
occurred at a time when the Italian civilization had not become
naturalized either in Gaul, or on the Danube, or in Africa and
Spain. Inasmuch as the great general and statesman of Rome
with sure glance perceived in the German tribes the rival antagonists
of the Romano-Greek world; inasmuch as with firm hand he established
the new system of aggressive defence down even to its details,
and taught men to protect the frontiers of the empire by rivers
or artificial ramparts, to colonize the nearest barbarian tribes along
the frontier with the view of warding off the more remote,
and to recruit the Roman army by enlistment from the enemy's country;
he gained for the Hellenico-Italian culture the interval necessary
to civilize the west just as it had already civilized the east.
Ordinary men see the fruits of their action; the seed sown by men
of genius germinates slowly. Centuries elapsed before men understood
that Alexander had not merely erected an ephemeral kingdom
in the east, but had carried Hellenism to Asia; centuries again
elapsed before men understood that Caesar had not merely conquered
a new province for the Romans, but had laid the foundation
for the Romanizing of the regions of the west. It was only a late
posterity that perceived the meaning of those expeditions
to England and Germany, so inconsiderate in a military point of view,
and so barren of immediate result. An immense circle of peoples,
whose existence and condition hitherto were known barely through
the reports--mingling some truth with much fiction--of the mariner
and the trader, was disclosed by this means to the Greek and Roman
world. "Daily," it is said in a Roman writing of May 698,
"the letters and messages from Gaul are announcing names of peoples,
cantons, and regions hitherto unknown to us." This enlargement
of the historical horizon by the expeditions of Caesar beyond
the Alps was as significant an event in the world's history
as the exploring of America by European bands. To the narrow circle
of the Mediterranean states were added the peoples of central
and northern Europe, the dwellers on the Baltic and North seas;
to the old world was added a new one, which thenceforth was influenced
by the old and influenced it in turn. What the Gothic Theodoric
afterwards succeeded in, came very near to being already carried
out by Ariovistus. Had it so happened, our civilization would have
hardly stood in any more intimate relation to the Romano-Greek than
to the Indian and Assyrian culture. That there is a bridge connecting
the past glory of Hellas and Rome with the prouder fabric of modern
history; that Western Europe is Romanic, and Germanic Europe
classic; that the names of Themistocles and Scipio have to us
a very different sound from those of Asoka and Salmanassar;
that Homer and Sophocles are not merely like the Vedas and Kalidasa
attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our own
garden--all this is the work of Caesar; and, while the creation
of his great predecessor in the east has been almost wholly reduced
to ruin by the tempests of the Middle Ages, the structure of Caesar
has outlasted those thousands of years which have changed religion
and polity for the human race and even shifted for it the centre
of civilization itself, and it stands erect for what we may
designate as eternity.
The Countries on the Danube
To complete the sketch of the relations of Rome to the peoples
of the north at this period, it remains that we cast a glance
at the countries which stretch to the north of the Italian and Greek
peninsulas, from the sources of the Rhine to the Black Sea.
It is true that the torch of history does not illumine the mighty stir
and turmoil of peoples which probably prevailed at that time there,
and the solitary gleams of light that fall on this region are,
like a faint glimmer amidst deep darkness, more fitted to bewilder
than to enlighten. But it is the duty of the historian to indicate
also the gaps in the record of the history of nations; he may not
deem it beneath him to mention, by the side of Caesar's magnificent
system of defence, the paltry arrangements by which the generals
of the senate professed to protect on this side
the frontier of the empire.
Alpine Peoples
North-eastern Italy was still as before(56) left exposed
to the attacks of the Alpine tribes. The strong Roman army
encamped at Aquileia in 695, and the triumph of the governor
of Cisalpine Gaul Lucius Afranius, lead us to infer, that about
this time an expedition to the Alps took place, and it may have been
in consequence of this that we find the Romans soon afterwards
in closer connection with a king of the Noricans. But that even
subsequently Italy was not at all secure on this side, is shown
by the sudden assault of the Alpine barbarians on the flourishing town
of Tergeste in 702, when the Transalpine insurrection had compelled
Caesar to divest upper Italy wholly of troops.
Illyria
The turbulent peoples also, who had possession of the district
along the Illyrian coast, gave their Roman masters constant
employment. The Dalmatians, even at an earlier period the most
considerable people of this region, enlarged their power so much
by admitting their neighbours into their union, that the number
of their townships rose from twenty to eighty. When they refused
to give up once more the town of Promona (not far from the river
Kerka), which they had wrested from the Liburnians, Caesar
after the battle of Pharsalia gave orders to march against them;
but the Romans were in the first instance worsted, and in consequence
of this Dalmatia became for some time a rendezvous of the party
hostile to Caesar, and the inhabitants in concert with the Pompeians
and with the pirates offered an energetic resistance
to the generals of Caesar both by land and by water.
Macedonia
Lastly Macedonia along with Epirus and Hellas lay in greater
desolation and decay than almost any other part of the Roman
empire. Dyrrhachium, Thessalonica, and Byzantium had still some
trade and commerce; Athens attracted travellers and students
by its name and its philosophical school; but on the whole there lay
over the formerly populous little towns of Hellas, and her seaports
once swarming with men, the calm of the grave. But if the Greeks
stirred not, the inhabitants of the hardly accessible Macedonian
mountains on the other hand continued after the old fashion their
predatory raids and feuds; for instance about 697-698 Agraeans
and Dolopians overran the Aetolian towns, and in 700 the Pirustae
dwelling in the valleys of the Drin overran southern Illyria.
The neighbouring peoples did likewise. The Dardani on the northern
frontier as well as the Thracians in the east had no doubt been
humbled by the Romans in the eight years' conflicts from 676
to 683; the most powerful of the Thracian princes, Cotys, the ruler
of the old Odrysian kingdom, was thenceforth numbered among the client
kings of Rome. Nevertheless the pacified land had still as before
to suffer invasions from the north and east. The governor Gaius
Antonius was severely handled both by the Dardani and by the tribes
settled in the modern Dobrudscha, who, with the help of the dreaded
Bastarnae brought up from the left bank of the Danube, inflicted
on him an important defeat (692-693) at Istropolis (Istere, not far
from Kustendji). Gaius Octavius fought with better fortune
against the Bessi and Thracians (694). Marcus Piso again (697-698)
as general-in-chief wretchedly mismanaged matters; which was
no wonder, seeing that for money he gave friends and foes whatever
they wished. The Thracian Dentheletae (on the Strymon) under his
governorship plundered Macedonia far and wide, and even stationed
their posts on the great Roman military road leading from Dyrrhachium
to Thessalonica; the people in Thessalonica made up their minds
to stand a siege from them, while the strong Roman army in the province
seemed to be present only as an onlooker when the inhabitants
of the mountains and neighbouring peoples levied contributions
from the peaceful subjects of Rome.
The New Dacian Kingdom
Such attacks could not indeed endanger the power of Rome, and a fresh
disgrace had long ago ceased to occasion concern. But just about
this period a people began to acquire political consolidation
beyond the Danube in the wide Dacian steppes--a people which seemed
destined to play a different part in history from that of the Bessi
and the Dentheletae. Among the Getae or Dacians in primeval times
there had been associated with the king of the people a holy man
called Zalmoxis, who, after having explored the ways and wonders
of the gods in distant travel in foreign lands, and having thoroughly
studied in particular the wisdom of the Egyptian priests
and of the Greek Pythagoreans, had returned to his native country
to endhis life as a pious hermit in a cavern of the "holy mountain."
He remained accessible only to the king and his servants, and gave
forth to the king and through him to the people his oracles
with reference to every important undertaking. He was regarded
by his countrymen at first as priest of the supreme god and ultimately
as himself a god, just as it is said of Moses and Aaron that the Lord
had made Aaron the prophet and Moses the god of the prophet.
This had become a permanent institution; there was regularly associated
with the king of the Getae such a god, from whose mouth everything
which the king ordered proceeded or appeared to proceed.
This peculiar constitution, in which the theocratic idea had become
subservient to the apparently absolute power of the king, probably
gave to the kings of the Getae some such position with respect
to their subjects as the caliphs had with respect to the Arabs;
and one result of it was the marvellous religious-political reform
of the nation, which was carried out about this time by the king
of the Getae, Burebistas, and the god Dekaeneos. The people,
which had morally and politically fallen into utter decay through
unexampled drunkenness, was as it were metamorphosed by the new
gospel of temperance and valour; with his bands under the influence,
so to speak, of puritanic discipline and enthusiasm king Burebistas
founded within a few years a mighty kingdom, which extended along
both banks of the Danube and reached southward far into Thrace,
Illyria, and Noricum. No direct contact with the Romans had yet
taken place, and no one could tell what might come out of
this singular state, which reminds us of the early times of Islam;
but this much it needed no prophetic gift to foretell, that proconsuls
like Antonius and Piso were not called to contend with gods.
CHAPTER VIII
The Joint Rule of Pompeius and Caesar
Pompeius and Caesar in Juxtaposition
Among the democratic chiefs, who from the time of the consulate
of Caesar were recognized officially, so to speak, as the joint
rulers of the commonwealth, as the governing "triumvirs," Pompeius
according to public opinion occupied decidedly the first place.
It was he who was called by the Optimates the "private dictator";
it was before him that Cicero prostrated himself in vain;
against him were directed the sharpest sarcasms in the wall-placards
of Bibulus, and the most envenomed arrows of the talk in the saloons
of the opposition. This was only to be expected. According to
the facts before the public Pompeius was indisputably the first general
of his time; Caesar was a dexterous party-leader and party-orator,
of undeniable talents, but as notoriously of unwarlike and indeed
of effeminate temperament. Such opinions had been long current;
it could not be expected of the rabble of quality that it should
trouble itself about the real state of things and abandon
once established platitudes because of obscure feats of heroism
on the Tagus. Caesar evidently played in the league the mere part
of the adjutant who executed for his chief the work which Flavius,
Afranius, and other less capable instruments had attempted
and not performed. Even his governorship seemed not to alter
this state of things. Afranius had but recently occupied
a very similar position, without thereby acquiring any special
importance; several provinces at once had been of late years
repeatedly placed under one governor, and often far more
than four legions had been united in one hand; as matters
were again quiet beyond the Alps and prince Ariovistus
was recognized by the Romans as a friend and neighbour,
there was no prospect of conducting a war of any moment there.
It was natural to compare the position which Pompeius had obtained
by the Gabinio-Manilian law with that which Caesar had obtained
by the Vatinian; but the comparison did not turn out to Caesar's
advantage. Pompeius ruled over nearly the whole Roman empire;
Caesar over two provinces. Pompeius had the soldiers
and the treasures of the state almost absolutely at his disposal;
Caesar had only the sums assigned to him and an army of 24,000 men.
It was left to Pompeius himself to fix the point of time
for his retirement; Caesar's command was secured to him
for a long period no doubt, but yet only for a limited term.
Pompeius, in fine, had been entrusted with the most important
undertakings by sea and land; Caesar was sent to the north,
to watch over the capital from upper Italy and to take care
that Pompeius should rule it undisturbed.
Pompeius and the Capital
Anarchy
But when Pompeius was appointed by the coalition to be ruler
of the capital, he undertook a task far exceeding his powers.
Pompeius understood nothing further of ruling than may be summed up
in the word of command. The waves of agitation in the capital
were swelled at once by past and by future revolutions; the problem
of ruling this city--which in every respect might be compared
to the Paris of the nineteenth century--without an armed force
was infinitely difficult, and for that stiff and stately
pattern-soldier altogether insoluble. Very soon matters reached
such a pitch that friends and foes, both equally inconvenient to him,
could, so far as he was concerned, do what they pleased;
after Caesar's departure from Rome the coalition ruled doubtless
still the destinies of the world, but not the streets of the capital.
The senate too, to whom there still belonged a sort of nominal
government, allowed things in the capital to follow their
natural course; partly because the section of this body controlled
by the coalition lacked the instructions of the regents, partly because
the angry opposition kept aloof out of indifference or pessimism,
but chiefly because the whole aristocratic corporation began
to feel at any rate, if not to comprehend, its utter impotence.
For the moment therefore there was nowhere at Rome any power
of resistance in any sort of government, nowhere a real authority.
Men were living in an interregnum between the ruin of the aristocratic,
and the rise of the military, rule; and, if the Roman commonwealth
has presented all the different political functions and organizations
more purely and normally than any other in ancient or modern times,
it has also exhibited political disorganization-anarchy--
with an unenviable clearness. It is a strange coincidence
that in the same years, in which Caesar was creating beyond the Alps
a workto last for ever, there was enacted in Rome one of the most
extravagant political farces that was ever produced upon the stage
of the world's history. The new regent of the commonwealth
did not rule, but shut himself up in his house and sulked in silence.
The former half-deposed government likewise did not rule, but sighed,
sometimes in private amidst the confidential circles of the villas,
sometimes in chorus in the senate-house. The portion of the burgesses
which had still at heart freedom and order was disgusted
with the reign of confusion, but utterly without leaders
and counsel it maintained a passive attitude-not merely avoiding
all political activity, but keeping aloof, as far as possible,
from the political Sodom itself.
The Anarchists
On the other hand the rabble of every sort never had better days,
never found a merrier arena. The number of little great men
was legion. Demagogism became quite a trade, which accordingly
did not lack its professional insignia--the threadbare mantle,
the shaggy beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice;
and not seldom it was a trade with golden soil. For the standing
declamations the tried gargles of the theatrical staff
were an article in much request;(1) Greeks and Jews, freedmen
and slaves, were the most regular attenders and the loudest criers
in the public assemblies; frequently, even when it came to a vote,
only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses constitutionally
entitled to do so. "Next time," it is said in a letter of this period,
"we may expect our lackeys to outvote the emancipation-tax."
The real powers of the day were the compact and armed bands,
the battalions of anarchy raised by adventurers of rank
out of gladiatorial slaves and blackguards. Their possessors
had from the outset been mostly numbered among the popular party;
but since the departure of Caesar, who alone understood how to impress
the democracy, and alone knew how to manage it, all discipline
had departed from them and every partisan practised politics
at his own hand. Even now, no doubt, these men fought with most pleasure
under the banner of freedom; but, strictly speaking, they were neither
of democratic nor of anti-democratic views; they inscribed on the--
in itself indispensable--banner, as it happened, now the name
of the people, anon that of the senate or that of a party-chief;
Clodius for instance fought or professed to fight in succession
for the ruling democracy, for the senate, and for Crassus. The leaders
of these bands kept to their colours only so far as they inexorably
persecuted their personal enemies--as in the case of Clodius
against Cicero and Milo against Clodius--while their partisan
position served them merely as a handle in these personal feuds.
We might as well seek to set a charivari to music as to write the history
of this political witches' revel; nor is it of any moment
to enumerate all the deeds of murder, besiegings of houses,
acts of incendiarism and other scenes of violence within a great capital,
and to reckon up how often the gamut was traversed from hissing
and shouting to spitting on and trampling down opponents,
and thence to throwing stones and drawing swords.
Clodius
The principal performer in this theatre of political rascality
was that Publius Clodius, of whose services, as already mentioned,(2)
the regents availed themselves against Cato and Cicero.
Left to himself, this influential, talented, energetic and--
in his trade--really exemplary partisan pursued during his tribunate,
of the people (696) an ultra-democratic policy, gave the citizens
corn gratis, restricted the right of the censors to stigmatize
immoral burgesses, prohibited the magistrates from obstructing
the course of the comitial machinery by religious formalities,
set asidethe limitswhich had shortly before (690), for the purpose
of checking the system of bands, been imposed on the right
of association of the lower classes, and reestablished the "street-clubs"
(-collegia compitalicia-) at that time abolished, which were nothing
else than a formal organization--subdivided according to the streets,
and with an almost military arrangement--of the whole free
or slave proletariate of the capital. If in addition the further law,
which Clodius had likewise already projected and purposed to introduce
when praetor in 702, should give to freedmen and to slaves living
in de facto possession of freedom the same political rights
with the freeborn, the author of all these brave improvements
of the constitution might declare his work complete, and as
a second Numa of freedom and equality might invite the sweet rabble
of the capital to see him celebrate high mass in honour of the arrival
of the democratic millennium in the temple of Liberty which he had
erected on the site of one of his burnings at the Palatine.
Of course these exertions in behalf of freedom did not exclude
a traffic in decrees of the burgesses; like Caesar himself, Caesar's ape
kept governorships and other posts great and small on sale
for the benefit of his fellow-citizens, and sold the sovereign rights
of the state for the benefit of subject kings and cities.
Quarrel of Pompeius with Clodius
At all these things Pompeius looked on without stirring.
If he did not perceive how seriously he thus compromised himself,
his opponent perceived it. Clodius had the hardihood to engage
in a dispute with the regent of Rome on a question of little moment,
as to the sending back of a captive Armenian prince; and the variance
soon became a formal feud, in which the utter helplessness
of Pompeius was displayed. The head of the state knew not how to meet
the partisan otherwise than with his own weapons, only wielded
with far less dexterity. If he had been tricked by Clodius respecting
the Armenian prince, he offended him in turn by releasing Cicero,
who was preeminently obnoxious to Clodius, from the exile
into which Clodius had sent him; and he attained his object
so thoroughly, that he converted his opponent into an implacable foe.
If Clodius made the streets insecure with his bands, the victorious
general likewise set slaves and pugilists to work; in the frays
which ensued the general naturally was worsted by the demagogue
and defeated in the street, and Gaius Cato was kept almost constantly
under siege in his garden by Clodius and his comrades. It is not
the least remarkable feature in this remarkable spectacle,
that the regent and the rogue amidst their quarrel vied in courting
the favour of the fallen government; Pompeius, partly to please
the senate, permitted Cicero's recall, Clodius on the other hand
declared the Julian laws null and void, and called on Marcus Bibulus
publicly to testify to their having been unconstitutionally passed.
Naturally no positive result could issue from this imbroglio
of dark passions; its most distinctive character was just
its utterly ludicrous want of object. Even a man of Caesar's genius
had to learn by experience that democratic agitation was completely
worn out, and that even the way to the throne no longer lay
through demagogism. It was nothing more than a historical makeshift,
if now, in the interregnum between republic and monarchy,
some whimsical fellow dressed himself out with the prophet's mantle
and staff which Caesar had himself laid aside, and the great ideals
of Gaius Gracchus came once more upon the stage distorted into a parody;
the so-called party from which this democratic agitation
proceeded was so little such in reality, that afterwards it had
not even a part falling to it in the decisive struggle. It cannot
even be asserted that by means of this anarchical state of things
the desire after a strong government based on military power
had been vividly kindled in the minds of those who were indifferent
to politics. Even apart from the fact that such neutral burgesses
were chiefly to be sought outside of Rome, and thus were not
directly affected by the rioting in the capital, those minds
which could be at all influenced by such motives had been already
by their former experiences, and especially by the Catilinarian
conspiracy, thoroughly converted to the principle of authority;
but those that were really alarmed were affected far more emphatically
by a dread of the gigantic crisis inseparable from an overthrow
of the constitution, than by dread of the mere continuance of the--
at bottom withal very superficial--anarchy in the capital.
The only result of it which historically deserves notice
was the painful position in which Pompeius was placed by the attacks
of the Clodians, and which had a material share in determining
his farther steps.
Pompeius in Relation to the Gallic Victories of Caesar
Little as Pompeius liked and understood taking the initiative,
he was yet on this occasion compelled by the change of his position
towards both Clodius and Caesar to depart from his previous inaction.
The irksome and disgraceful situation to which Clodius
had reduced him, could not but at length arouse even his sluggish
nature to hatred and anger. But far more important was the change
which took place in his relation to Caesar. While, of the two
confederate regents, Pompeius had utterly failed in the functions
which he had undertaken, Caesar had the skill to turn his official
position to an account which left all calculations and all fears
far behind. Without much inquiry as to permission, Caesar
had doubled his army by levies in his southern province inhabited
in great measure by Roman burgesses; had with this army crossed
the Alps instead of keeping watch over Rome from Northern Italy;
had crushed in the bud a new Cimbrian invasion, and within two years
(696, 697) had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and the Channel.
In presence of such facts even the aristocratic tactics of ignoring
and disparaging were baffled. He who had often been scoffed
at as effeminate was now the idol of the army, the celebrated victory-
crowned hero, whose fresh laurels outshone the faded laurels
of Pompeius, and to whom even the senate as early as 697 accorded
the demonstrations of honour usual after successful campaigns
in richer measure than had ever fallen to the share of Pompeius.
Pompeius stood towards his former adjutant precisely
as after the Gabinio-Manilian laws the latter had stood towards him.
Caesar was now the hero of the day and the master of the most powerful
Roman army; Pompeius was an ex-general who had once been famous.
It is true that no collision had yet occurred between father-in-law
and son-in-law, and the relation was externally undisturbed;
but every political alliance is inwardly broken up, when the relative
proportions of the power of the parties are materially altered.
While the quarrel with Clodius was merely annoying, the change
in the position of Caesar involved a very serious danger for Pompeius;
just as Caesar and his confederates had formerly sought a military
support against him, he found himself now compelled to seek a military
support against Caesar, and, laying aside his haughty privacy,
to come forward as a candidate for some extraordinary magistracy,
which would enable him to hold his place by the side of the governor
of the two Gauls with equal and, if possible, with superior power.
His tactics, like his position, were exactly those of Caesar
during the Mithradatic war. To balance the military power
of a superior but still remote adversary by the obtaining
of a similar command, Pompeius required in the first instance
the official machinery of government. A year and a half ago
this had been absolutely at his disposal. The regents then ruled
the state both by the comitia, which absolutely obeyed them
as the masters of the street, and by the senate, which was
energetically overawed by Caesar; as representative of the coalition
in Rome and as its acknowledged head, Pompeius would have doubtless
obtained from the senate and from the burgesses any decree
which he wished, even if it were against Caesar's interest.
But by the awkward quarrel with Clodius, Pompeius had lost the command
of the streets, and could not expect to carry a proposal in his favour
in the popular assembly. Things were not quite so unfavourable for him
in the senate; but even there it was doubtful whether Pompeius
after that long and fatal inaction still held the reins of the majority
firmly enough in hand to procure such a decree as he needed.
The Republican Opposition among the Public
The position of the senate also, or rather of the nobility
generally, had meanwhile undergone a change. From the very fact
of its complete abasement it drew fresh energy. In the coalition
of 694 various things had come to light, which were by no means
as yet ripe for it. The banishment of Cato and Cicero--
which public opinion, however much the regents kept themselves
in the background and even professed to lament it, referred
with unerring tact to its real authors--and the marriage-relationship
formed between Caesar and Pompeius suggested to men's minds
with disagreeable clearness monarchical decrees of banishment
and family alliances. The larger public too, which stood
more aloof from political events, observed the foundations
of the future monarchy coming more and more distinctly into view.
From the moment when the public perceived that Caesar's object
was not a modification of the republican constitution,
but that the question at stake was the existence or non-existence
of the republic, many of the best men, who had hitherto reckoned
themselves of the popular party and honoured in Caesar its head,
must infallibly have passed over to the opposite side. It was
no longer in the saloons and the country houses of the governing
nobilityalone that men talked of the "three dynasts," of the "three-
headed monster." The dense crowds of people listened to the consular
orations of Caesar without a sound of acclamation or approval;
not a hand stirred to applaud when the democratic consul entered
the theatre. But they hissed when one of the tools of the regents
showed himself in public, and even staid men applauded when an actor
utteredan anti-monarchic sentence or an allusion against Pompeius.
Nay, when Cicero was to be banished, a great number of burgesses--
it is said twenty thousand--mostly of the middle classes, put on mourning
after the example of the senate. "Nothing is now more popular,"
it is said in a letter of this period, "than hatred
of the popular party."
Attempts of the Regents to Check It
The regents dropped hints, that through such opposition the equites
might easily lose their new special places in the theatre,
and the commons their bread-corn; people were therefore somewhat
more guarded perhaps in the expression of their displeasure,
but the feeling remained the same. The lever of material interests
was applied with better success. Caesar's gold flowed in streams.
Men of seeming riches whose finances were in disorder, influential
ladies who were in pecuniary embarrassment, insolvent young nobles,
merchants and bankers in difficulties, either went in person
to Gaul with the view of drawing from the fountain-head, or applied
to Caesar's agents in the capital; and rarely was any man
outwardly respectable--Caesar avoided dealings with vagabonds
who were utterly lost--rejected in either quarter. To this fell
to be added the enormous buildings which Caesar caused to be executed
on his account in the capital--and by which a countless number of men
of all ranks from the consular down to the common porter found
opportunity of profiting--as well as the immense sums expended
for public amusements. Pompeius did the same on a more limited scale;
to him the capital was indebted for the first theatre of stone,
and he celebrated its dedication with a magnificence never seen before.
Of course such distributions reconciled a number of men
who were inclined towards opposition, more especially in the capital,
to the new order of things up to a certain extent; but the marrow
of the opposition was not to be reached by this system of corruption.
Every day more and more clearly showed how deeply the existing
constitution had struck root among the people, and how little,
in particular, the circles more aloof from direct party-agitation,
especially the country towns, were inclined towards monarchy
or even simply ready to let it take its course.
Increasing Importance of the Senate
If Rome had had a representative constitution, the discontent
of the burgesses would have found its natural expression
in the elections, and have increased by so expressing itself;
under the existing circumstances nothing was left for those
true to the constitution but to place themselves under the senate,
which, degraded as it was, still appeared the representative
and champion of the legitimate republic. Thus it happened
that the senate, now when it had been overthrown, suddenly found
at its disposal an army far more considerable and far more
earnestly faithful, than when in its power and splendour
it overthrew the Gracchi and under the protection of Sulla's
sword restored the state. The aristocracy felt this; it began
to bestir itself afresh. Just at this time Marcus Cicero,
after having bound himself to join the obsequious party
in the senate and not only to offer no opposition, but to work
with all his might for the regents, had obtained from them
permission to return. Although Pompeius in this matter only made
an incidental concession to the oligarchy, and intended first
of all to play a trick on Clodius, and secondly to acquire
in the fluent consular a tool rendered pliant by sufficient blows,
the opportunity afforded by the return of Cicero was embraced
for republican demonstrations, just as his banishment had been
a demonstration against the senate. With all possible solemnity,
protected moreover against the Clodians by the band of Titus Annius
Milo, the two consuls, following out a resolution of the senate,
submitted a proposal to the burgesses to permit the return
of the consular Cicero, and the senate called on all burgesses
true to the constitution not to be absent from the vote.
An unusual number of worthy men, especially from the country towns,
actually assembled in Rome on the day of voting (4 Aug. 697).
The journey of the consular from Brundisium to the capital
gave occasion to a series of similar, but not less brilliant
manifestations of public feeling. The new alliance between the senate
and the burgesses faithful to the constitution was on this occasion
as it were publicly proclaimed, and a sort of review of the latter
was held, the singularly favourable result of which contributed
not a little to revive the sunken courage of the aristocracy.
Helplessness of Pompeius
The helplessness of Pompeius in presence of these daring
demonstrations, as well as the undignified and almost ridiculous
position into which he had fallen with reference to Clodius, deprived
him and the coalition of their credit; and the section of the senate
which adhered to the regents, demoralized by the singular inaptitude
of Pompeius and helplessly left to itself, could not prevent
the republican-aristocratic party from regaining completely
the ascendency in the corporation. The game of this party
really at that time (697) was still by no means desperate
for a courageous and dexterous player. It had now--what it had
not possessed for a century past--a firm support in the people;
if it trusted the people and itself, it might attain its object
in the shortest and most honourable way. Why not attack the regents
openly and avowedly? Why should not a resolute and eminent man
at the head of the senate cancel the extraordinary powers
as unconstitutional, and summon all the republicans of Italy to arms
against the tyrants and their following? It was possible perhaps
in this way once more to restore the rule of the senate. Certainly
the republicans would thus play a bold game; but perhaps in this case,
as often, the most courageous resolution might have been
at the same time the most prudent. Only, it is true, the indolent
aristocracy of this period was scarcely capable of so simple
and bold a resolution. There was however another way perhaps
more sure, at any rate better adapted to the character and nature
of these constitutionalists; they might labour to set the two regents
at variance and through this variance to attain ultimately
to the helm themselves. The relations between the two men ruling
the state had become altered and relaxed, now that Caesar had acquired
a standing of preponderant power by the side of Pompeius
and had compelled the latter to canvass for a new position of command;
it was probable that, if he obtained it, there would arise in one way
or other a rupture and struggle between them. If Pompeius remained
unsupported in this, his defeat was scarcely doubtful,
and the constitutional party would in that event find themselves
after the close of the conflict under the rule of one master
instead of two. But if the nobility employed against Caesar
the same means by which the latter had won his previous victories,
and entered into alliance with the weaker competitor, victory
would probably, with a general like Pompeius, and with an army
such as that of the constitutionalists, fall to the coalition;
and to settle matters with Pompeius after the victory could not--
judging from the proofs of political incapacity which he had
already given-appear a specially difficult task.
Attempts of Pompeius to Obtain a Command through the Senate
Administration of the Supplies of Corn
Things had taken such a turn as naturally to suggest an understanding
between Pompeius and the republican party. Whether such
an approximation was to take place, and what shape the mutual
relations of the two regents and of the aristocracy, which had become
utterly enigmatical, were next to assume, fell necessarily
to be decided, when in the autumn of 697 Pompeius came to the senate
with the proposal to entrust him with extraordinary official power.
He based his proposal once more on that by which he had
eleven years before laid the foundations of his power,
the price of bread in the capital, which had just then--as previously
to the Gabinian law--reached an oppressive height. Whether
it had been forced up by special machinations, such as Clodius imputed
sometimes to Pompeius, sometimes to Cicero, and these in their turn
charged on Clodius, cannot be determined; the continuance of piracy,
the emptiness of the public chest, and the negligent and disorderly
supervision of the supplies of corn by the government were already
quite sufficient of themselves, even without political forestalling,
to produce scarcities of bread in a great city dependent
almost solely on transmarine supplies. The plan of Pompeius
was to get the senate to commit to him the superintendence
of the matters relating to corn throughout the whole Roman empire,
and, with a view to this ultimate object, to entrust him
on the one hand with the unlimited disposal of the Roman state-
treasure, and on the other hand with an army and fleet, as well as
a command which not only stretched over the whole Roman empire,
but was superior in each province to that of the governor--in short
he designed to institute an improved edition of the Gabinian law,
to which the conduct of the Egyptian war just then pending(3)
would therefore quite as naturally have been annexed as the conduct
of the Mithradatic war to the razzia against the pirates.
However much the opposition to the new dynasts had gained ground
in recent years, the majority of the senate was still, when this matter
came to be discussed in Sept. 697, under the constraint of the terror
excited by Caesar. It obsequiously accepted the project in principle,
and that on the proposition of Marcus Cicero, who was expected to give,
and gave, in this case the first proof of the pliableness
learned by him in exile. But in the settlement of the details
very material portions were abated from the original plan,
which the tribune of the people Gaius Messius submitted.
Pompeius obtained neither free control over the treasury,
nor legions and ships of his own, nor even an authority superior
to that of the governors; but they contented themselves
with granting to him, for the purpose of his organizing
due supplies for the capital, considerable sums, fifteen adjutants,
and in allaffairs elating to the supply of grain full proconsular
power throughout the Roman dominions for the next five years,
and with having this decree confirmed by the burgesses.
There were many different reasons which led to this alteration,
almost equivalent to a rejection, of the original plan: a regard
to Caesar, with reference to whom the most timid could not but have
the greatest scruples in investing his colleague not merely with equal
but with superior authority in Gaul itself; the concealed opposition
of Pompeius' hereditary enemy and reluctant ally Crassus,
to whom Pompeius himself attributed or professed to attribute primarily
the failure of his plan; the antipathy of the republican opposition
in the senate to any decree which really or nominally enlarged
the authority of the regents; lastly and mainly, the incapacity
of Pompeius himself, who even after having been compelled to act
could not prevail on himself to acknowledge his own action, but chose
always to bring forward his real design as it were in incognito
by means of his friends, while he himself in his well-known modesty
declared his willingness to be content with even less. No wonder
that they took him at his word, and gave him the less.
Egyptian Expedition
Pompeius was nevertheless glad to have found at any rate
a serious employment, and above all a fitting pretext for leaving
the capital. He succeeded, moreover, in providing it with ampler
and cheaper supplies, although not without the provinces severely
feeling the reflex effect. But he had missed his real object;
the proconsular title, which he had a right to bear in all the provinces,
remained an empty name, so long as he had not troops of his own
at his disposal. Accordingly he soon afterwards got a second
proposition made to the senate, that it should confer on him
the charge of conducting back the expelled king of Egypt, if necessary
by force of arms, to his home. But the more that his urgent need
of the senate became evident, the senators received his wishes
with a less pliant and less respectful spirit. It was immediately
discovered in the Sibylline oracles that it was impious to send
a Roman army to Egypt; whereupon the pious senate almost
unanimously resolved to abstain from armed intervention. Pompeius
was already so humbled, that he would have accepted the mission
even without an army; but in his incorrigible dissimulation he left
this also to be declared merely by his friends, and spoke and voted
for the despatch of another senator. Of course the senate rejected
a proposal which wantonly risked a life so precious to his country;
and the ultimate issue of the endless discussions was the resolution
not to interfere in Egypt at all (Jan. 698).
Attempt at an Aristocratic Restoration
Attack on Caesar's Laws
These repeated repulses which Pompeius met with in the senate and,
what was worse, had to acquiesce in without retaliation,
were naturally regarded--come from what side they would--by the public
at large as so many victories of the republicans and defeats
of the regents generally; the tide of republican opposition
was accordingly always on the increase. Already the elections for 698
had gone but partially according to the minds of the dynasts; Caesar's
candidates for the praetorship, Publius Vatinius and Gaius Alfius,
had failed, while two decided adherents of the fallen government,
Gnaeus Lentulus Marcellinus and Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus,
had been elected, the former as consul, the latter as praetor.
But for 699 there even appeared as candidate for the consulship
Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, whose election it was difficult to prevent
owing to his influence in the capital and his colossal wealth, and who,
it was sufficiently well known, would not be content with a concealed
opposition. The comitia thus rebelled; and the senate chimed in.
It solemnly deliberated over an opinion, which Etruscan soothsayers
of acknowledged wisdom had furnished respecting certain signs
and wonders at its special request. The celestial revelation announced
that through the dissension of the upper classes the whole power
over the army and treasure threatened to pass to one ruler,
and the state to incur loss of freedom--it seemed that the gods
pointed primarily at the proposal of Gaius Messius. The republicans
soon descended from heaven to earth. The law as to the domain of Capua
and the other laws issued by Caesar as consul had been constantly
described by them as null and void, and an opinion had been expressed
in the senate as early as Dec. 697 that it was necessary to cancel
them on account of their informalities. On the 6th April 698
the consular Cicero proposed in a full senate to put the consideration
of the Campanian land distribution in the order of the day
for the 15th May. It was the formal declaration of war;
and it was the more significant, that it came from the mouth
of one of those men who only show their colours when they think
that they can do so with safety. Evidently the aristocracy held
that the moment had come for beginning the struggle not with Pompeius
against Caesar, but against the -tyrannis- generally. What would
further follow might easily be seen. Domitius made no secret
that he intended as consul to propose to the burgesses
the immediate recall of Caesar from Gaul. An aristocratic restoration
was at work; and with the attack on the colony of Capua the nobility
threw down the gauntlet to the regents.
Conference of the Regents at Luca
Caesar, although receiving from day to day detailed accounts
of the events in the capital and, whenever military considerations
allowed, watching their progress from as near a point of his
southern province as possible, had not hitherto, visibly at least
interfered in them. But now war had been declared against him
as well as his colleague, in fact against him especially;
he was compelled to act, and he acted quickly. He happened
to be in the very neighbourhood; the aristocracy had not even
found it advisable to delay the rupture, till he should have again
crossed the Alps. In the beginning of April 698 Crassus
left the capital, to concert the necessary measures with his
more powerful colleague; he found Caesar in Ravenna. Thence
both proceeded to Luca, and there they were joined by Pompeius,
who had departed from Rome soon after Crassus (11 April),
ostensibly for the purpose of procuring supplies of grain
from Sardinia and Africa. The most noted adherents of the regents,
such as Metellus Nepos the proconsul of Hither Spain, Appius Claudius
the propraetor of Sardinia, and many others, followed them;
a hundred and twenty lictors, and upwards of two hundred senators
were counted at this conference, where already the new monarchical
senate was represented in contradistinction to the republican.
In every respect the decisive voice lay with Caesar. He used it
to re-establish and consolidate the existing joint rule
on a new basis of more equal distribution of power of most importance
in a military point of view, next to that of the two Gauls,
were assigned to his two colleagues--that of the two Spains
to Pompeius, that of Syria to Crassus; and these offices
were to be secured to them by decree of the people for five years
(700-704), and to be suitably provided for in a military
and financial point of view. On the other hand Caesar stipulated
for the prolongation of his command, which expired with the year 700,
to the close of 705, as well as for the prerogative of increasing
his legions to ten and of charging the pay for the troops
arbitrarily levied by him on the state-chest. Pompeius and Crassus
were moreover promised a second consulship for the next year (699)
before they departed for their governorships, while Caesar kept it
open to himself to administer the supreme magistracy a second time
after the termination of his governorship in 706, when the ten years'
interval legally requisite between two consulships should have
in his case elapsed. The military support, which Pompeius
and Crassus required for regulating the affairs of the capital
all the more that the legions of Caesar originally destined
for this purpose could not now be withdrawn from Transalpine Gaul,
was to be found in new legions, which they were to raise for the Spanish
and Syrian armies and were not to despatch from Italy to their several
destinations until it should seem to themselves convenient
to do so. The main questions were thus settled; subordinate matters,
such as the settlement of the tactics to be followed against
the opposition in the capital, the regulation of the candidatures
for the ensuing years, and the like, did not long detain them.
The great master of mediation composed the personal differences
which stood in the way of an agreement with his wonted ease,
and compelled the most refractory elements to act in concert.
An understanding befitting colleagues was reestablished,
externally at least, between Pompeius and Crassus. Even Publius Clodius
was induced to keep himself and his pack quiet, and to give
no farther annoyance to Pompeius--not the least marvellous feat
of the mighty magician.
Designs of Caesar in This Arrangement
That this whole settlement of the pending questions proceeded,
not from a compromise among independent and rival regents meeting
on equal terms, but solely from the good will of Caesar, is evident
from the circumstances. Pompeius appeared at Luca in the painful
position of a powerless refugee, who comes to ask aid from his opponent.
Whether Caesar chose to dismiss him and to declare the coalition
dissolved, or to receive him and to let the league continue
just as it stood--Pompeius was in either view politically
annihilated. If he did not in this case break with Caesar, he became
the powerless client of his confederate. If on the other hand
he did break with Caesar and, which was not very probable,
effected even now a coalition with the aristocracy, this alliance
between opponents, concluded under pressure of necessity
and at the last moment, was so little formidable that it was hardly
for the sake of averting it that Caesar agreed to those concessions.
A serious rivalry on the part of Crassus with Caesar was utterly
impossible. It is difficult to say what motives induced Caesar
to surrender without necessity his superior position,
and now voluntarily to concede--what he had refused to his rival
even on the conclusion of the league of 694, and what the latter
had since, with the evident design of being armed against Caesar,
vainly striven in different ways to attain without, nay against,
Caesar's will--the second consulate and military power. Certainly
it was not Pompeius alone that was placed at the head of an army,
but also his old enemy and Caesar's ally throughout many years, Crassus;
and undoubtedly Crassus obtained his respectable military position
merely as a counterpoise to the new power of Pompeius. Nevertheless
Caesar was a great loser, when his rival exchanged his former
powerlessness for an important command. It is possible
that Caesar did not yet feel himself sufficiently master of his soldiers
to lead them with confidence to a warfare against the formal
authorities of the land, and was therefore anxious not to be forced
to civil war now by being recalled from Gaul; but whether civil war
should come or not, depended at the moment far more on the aristocracy
of the capital than on Pompeius, and this would have been
at most a reason for Caesar not breaking openly with Pompeius,
so that the opposition might not be emboldened by this breach,
but not a reason for conceding to him what he did concede.
Purely personal motives may have contributed to the result;
it may be that Caesar recollected how he had once stood in a position
of similar powerlessness in presence of Pompeius, and had been saved
from destruction only by his--pusillanimous, it is true, rather than
magnanimous--retirement; it is probable that Caesar hesitated
to breakthe heart of his beloved daughter who was sincerely attached
to her husband--in his soul there was room for much besides the statesman.
But the decisive reason was doubtless the consideration of Gaul.
Caesar--differing from his biographers--regarded the subjugation
of Gaul not as an incidental enterprise useful to him
for the gaining of the crown, but as one on which depended
the external security and the internal reorganization, in a word
the future, of his country. That he might be enabled to complete
this conquest undisturbed and might not be obliged to take in hand
just at once the extrication of Italian affairs, he unhesitatingly
gave up his superiority over his rivals and granted to Pompeius
sufficient power to settle matters with the senate and its adherents.
This was a grave political blunder, if Caesar had no other object
than to become as quickly as possible king of Rome; but the ambition
of that rare man was not confined to the vulgar aim of a crown.
He had the boldness to prosecute side by side, and to complete,
two labours equally vast--the arranging of the internal affairs
of Italy, and the acquisition and securing of a new and fresh soil
for Italian civilization. These tasks of course interfered
with each other; his Gallic conquests hindered much more than helped
him on his way to the throne. It was fraught to him with bitter fruit
that, instead of settling the Italian revolution in 698,
he postponed it to 706. But as a statesman as well as a general
Caesar was a peculiarly daring player, who, confiding in himself
and despising his opponents, gave them always great
and sometimes extravagant odds.
The Aristocracy Submits
It was now therefore the turn of the aristocracy to make good
their high gage, and to wage war as boldly as they had boldly
declared it. But there is no more pitiable spectacle
than when cowardly men have the misfortune to take a bold resolution.
They had simply exercised no foresight at all. It seemed to have
occurred to nobody that Caesar would possibly stand on his defence,
or that Pompeius and Crassus would combine with him afresh
and more closely than ever. This seems incredible; but it becomes
intelligible, when we glance at the persons who then led
the constitutional opposition in the senate. Cato was still absent;(4)
the most influential man in the senate at this time was Marcus Bibulus,
the hero of passive resistance, the most obstinate and most stupid
of all consulars. They had taken up arms only to lay them down,
so soon as the adversary merely put his hand to the sheath;
the bare news of the conferences in Luca sufficed to suppress
all thought of a serious opposition and to bring the mass
of the timid--that is, the immense majority of the senate--
back to their duty as subjects, which in an unhappy hour
they had abandoned. There was no further talk of the appointed
discussion to try the validity of the Julian laws; the legions raised
by Caesar on his own behalf were charged by decree of the senate
on the public chest; the attempts on occasion of regulating
the next consular provinces to take away both Gauls or one of them
by decree from Caesar were rejected by the majority (end of May 698).
Thus the corporation did public penance. In secret the individual lords,
one after another, thoroughly frightened at their own temerity,
came to make their peace and vow unconditional obedience--
none more quickly than Marcus Cicero, who repented too late
of his perfidy, and in respect of the most recent period of his life
clothed himself with titles of honour which were altogether
more appropriate than flattering.(5) Of course the regents agreed
to be pacified; they refused nobody pardon, for there was nobody
who was worth the trouble of making him an exception. That we may
see how suddenly the tone in aristocratic circles changed
after the resolutions of Luca became known, it is worth while
to compare the pamphlets given forth by Cicero shortly before
with the palinode which he caused to be issued to evince publicly
his repentance and his good intentions.(6)
Settlement of the New Monarchical Rule
The regents could thus arrange Italian affairs at their pleasure
and more thoroughly than before. Italy and the capital
obtained practically a garrison although not assembled in arms,
and one of the regents as commandant. Of the troops levied for Syria
and Spain by Crassus and Pompeius, those destined for the east no doubt
took their departure; but Pompeius caused the two Spanish provinces
to be administered by his lieutenants with the garrison hitherto
stationed there, while he dismissed the officers and soldiers
of the legions which were newly raised--nominally for despatch
to Spain--on furlough, and remained himself with them in Italy.
Doubtless the tacit resistance of public opinion increased,
the more clearly and generally men perceived that the regents
were working to put an end to the old constitution and with as much
gentleness as possible to accommodate the existing condition
of the government and administration to the forms of the monarchy;
but they submitted, because they were obliged to submit.
First of all all the more important affairs, and particularly
all that related to military matters and external relations,
were disposed of without consulting the senate upon them,
sometimes by decree of the people, sometimes by the mere good
pleasure of the rulers. The arrangements agreed on at Luca respecting
the military command of Gaul were submitted directly to the burgesses
by Crassus and Pompeius, those relating to Spain and Syria by the tribune
of the people Gaius Trebonius, and in other instances the more important
governorships were frequently filled up by decree of the people.
That the regents did not need the consent of the authorities
to increase their troops at pleasure, Caesar had already sufficiently
shown: as little did they hesitate mutually to borrow troops;
Caesar for instance received such collegiate support from Pompeius
for the Gallic, and Crassus from Caesar for the Parthian, war.
The Transpadanes, who possessed according to the existing constitution
only Latin rights, were treated by Caesar during his administration
practically as full burgesses of Rome.(7) While formerly
the organization of newly-acquired territories had been managed
by a senatorial commission, Caesar organized his extensive Gallic
conquests altogether according to his own judgment, and founded,
for instance, without having received any farther full powers
burgess-colonies, particularly Novum-Comum (Como) with five thousand
colonists. Piso conducted the Thracian, Gabinius the Egyptian,
Crassus the Parthian war, without consulting the senate,
and without even reporting, as was usual, to that body;
in like manner triumphs and other marks of honour were accorded
and carried out, without the senate being asked about them.
Obviously this did not arise from a mere neglect of forms, which would
be the less intelligible, seeing that in the great majority of cases
no opposition from the senate was to be expected. On the contrary,
it was a well-calculated design to dislodge the senate from the domain
of military arrangements and of higher politics, and to restrict
its share of administration to financial questions and internal
affairs; and even opponents plainly discerned this and protested,
so far as they could, against this conduct of the regents by means
of senatorial decrees and criminal actions. While the regents
thus in the main set aside the senate, they still made some use
of the less dangerous popular assemblies--care was taken that in these
the lords of the street should put no farther difficulty in the way
of the lords of the state; in many cases however they dispensed
even with this empty shadow, and employed without disguise
autocratic forms.
The Senate under the Monarchy
Cicero and the Majority
The humbled senate had to submit to its position
whether it would or not. The leader of the compliant majority
continued to be Marcus Cicero. He was useful on account
of his lawyer's talent of finding reasons, or at any rate words,
for everything; and there was a genuine Caesarian irony
in employing the man, by means of whom mainly the aristocracy
had conducted their demonstrations against the regents,
as the mouthpiece of servility. Accordingly they pardoned him
for his brief desire to kick against the pricks, not however
without having previously assured themselves of his submissiveness
in every way. His brother had been obliged to take the position
of an officer in the Gallic army to answer in some measure
as a hostage for him; Pompeius had compelled Cicero himself
to accept a lieutenant-generalship under him, which furnished
a handle for politely banishing him at any moment. Clodius
had doubtless been instructed to leave him meanwhile at peace,
but Caesar as little threw off Clodius on account of Cicero
as he threw off Cicero on account of Clodius; and the great saviour
of his country and the no less great hero of liberty entered
into an antechamber-rivalry in the headquarters of Samarobriva,
for the befitting illustration of which there lacked, unfortunately,
a Roman Aristophanes. But not only was the same rod kept in suspense
over Cicero's head, which had once already descended on him
so severely; golden fetters were also laid upon him. Amidst
the serious embarrassment of his finances the loans of Caesar
free of interest, and the joint overseership of those buildings
which occasioned the circulation of enormous sums in the capital,
were in a high degree welcome to him; and many an immortal oration
for the senate was nipped in the bud by the thought of Caesar's agent,
who might present a bill to him after the close of the sitting.
Consequently he vowed "in future to ask no more after right and honour,
but to strive for the favour of the regents," and "to be as flexible
as an ear-lap." They used him accordingly as--what he was good for--
an advocate; in which capacity it was on various occasions
his lot to be obliged to defend his very bitterest foes
at a higher bidding, and that especially in the senate,
where he almost regularly served as the organ of the dynasts
and submitted the proposals "to which others probably consented,
but not he himself"; indeed, as recognized leader of the majority
of the compliant, he obtained even a certain political importance.
They dealt with the other members of the governing corporation
accessible to fear, flattery, or gold in the same way as they had dealt
with Cicero, and succeeded in keeping it on the whole in subjection.
Cato and the Minority
Certainly there remained a section of their opponents, who at least
kept to their colours and were neither to be terrified nor to be won.
The regents had become convinced that exceptional measures,
such as those against Cato and Cicero, did their cause
more harm than good, and that it was a lesser evil to tolerate
an inconvenient republican opposition than to convert their opponents
into martyrs for the republic Therefore they allowed Cato to return
(end of 698) and thenceforward in the senate and in the Forum,
often at the peril of his life, to offer a continued opposition
to the regents, which was doubtless worthy of honour, but unhappily
was at the same time ridiculous. They allowed him on occasion
of the proposals of Trebonius to push matters once more
to a hand-to-hand conflict in the Forum, and to submit to the senate
a proposal that the proconsul Caesar should be given over
to the Usipetes and Tencteri on account of his perfidious conduct
toward those barbarians.(8) They were patient when Marcus Favonius,
Cato's Sancho, after the senate had adopted the resolution
to charge the legions of Caesar on the state-chest, sprang to the door
of the senate-house and proclaimed to the streets the danger
of the country; when the same person in his scurrilous fashion
called the white bandage, which Pompeius wore round his weak leg,
a displaced diadem; when the consular Lentulus Marcellinus,
on being applauded, called out to the assembly to make diligent use
of this privilege of expressing their opinion now while they were
still allowed to do so; when the tribune of the people
Gaius Ateius Capito consigned Crassus on his departure for Syria,
with all the formalities of the theology of the day, publicly
to the evil spirits. These were, on the whole, vain demonstrations
of an irritated minority; yet the little party from which they issued
was so far of importance, that it on the one hand fostered and gave
the watchword to the republican opposition fermenting in secret,
and on the other hand now and then dragged the majority of the senate,
which ithal cherished at bottom quite the same sentiments with reference
to the regents, into an isolated decree directed against them.
For even the majority felt the need of giving vent, at least
sometimes and in subordinate matters to their suppressed indignation,
and especially--after the manner of those who are servile
with reluctance--of exhibiting their resentment towards the great foes
in rage against the small. Wherever it was possible, a gentle blow
was administered to the instruments of the regents; thus Gabinius
was refused the thanksgiving-festival that he asked (698);
thus Piso was recalled from his province; thus mourning was put on
by the senate, when the tribune of the people Gaius Cato hindered
the elections for 699 as long as the consul Marcellinus belonging
to the constitutional party was in office. Even Cicero, however humbly
he always bowed before the regents, issued an equally envenomed
and insipid pamphlet against Caesar's father-in-law. But both these
feeble signs of opposition by the majority of the senate
and the ineffectual resistance of the minority show only
the more clearly, that the government had now passed from the senate
to the regents as it formerly passed from the burgesses to the senate;
and that the senate was already not much more than a monarchical
council of state employed also to absorb the anti-monarchical
elements. "No man," the adherents of the fallen government complained,
"is of the slightest account except the three; the regents
are all-powerful, and they take care that no one shall remain
in doubt about it; the whole senate is virtually transformed
and obeys the dictators; our generation will not live to see
a change of things." They were living in fact no longer
under the republic, but under monarchy.
Continued Oppositon at the Elections
But if the guidance of the state was at the absolute disposal
of the regents, there remained still a political domain separated
in some measure from the government proper, which it was more easy
to defend and more difficult to conquer; the field of the ordinary
elections of magistrates, and that of the jury-courts. That the latter
do not fall directly under politics, but everywhere, and above all
in Rome, come partly under the control of the spirit dominating
state-affairs, is of itself clear. The elections of magistrates
certainly belonged by right to the government proper of the state;
but, as at this period the state was administered substantially
by extraordinary magistrates or by men wholly without title,
and even the supreme ordinary magistrates, if they belonged
to the anti-monarchical party, were not able in any tangible way
to influence the state-machinery, the ordinary magistrates sank
more and more into mere puppets--as, in fact, even those of them
who were most disposed to opposition described themselves frankly
and with entire justice as powerless ciphers--and their elections
therefore sank into mere demonstrations. Thus, after the opposition
had already been wholly dislodged from the proper field of battle,
hostilities might nevertheless be continued in the field of elections
and of processes. The regents spared no pains to remain victors
also in this field. As to the elections, they had already
at Luca settled between themselves the lists of candidates
for the next years, and they left no means untried to carry
the candidates agreed upon there. They expended their gold primarily
for the purpose of influencing the elections. A great number
of soldiers were dismissed annually on furlough from the armies
of Caesar and Pompeius to take part in the voting at Rome.
Caesar was wont himself to guide, and watch over, the election movements
from as near a point as possible of Upper Italy. Yet the object
was but very imperfectly attained. For 699 no doubt Pompeius
and Crassus were elected consuls, agreeably to the convention of Luca,
and Lucius Domitius, the only candidate of the opposition who persevered
was set aside; but this had been effected only by open violence,
on which occasion Cato was wounded and other extremely scandalous
incidents occurred. In the next consular elections for 700,
in spite of all the exertions of the regents, Domitius was
actually elected, and Cato likewise now prevailed in the candidature
for the praetorship, in which to the scandal of the whole burgesses
Caesar's client Vatinius had during the previous year beaten him
off the field. At the elections for 701 the opposition succeeded
in so indisputably convicting the candidates of the regents,
along with others, of the most shameful electioneering intrigues
that the regents, on whom the scandal recoiled, could not do otherwise
than abandon them. These repeated and severe defeats of the dynasts
on the battle-field of the elections may be traceable in part
to the unmanageableness of the rusty machinery, to the incalculable
accidents of the polling, to the opposition at heart of the middle
classes, to the various private considerations that interfere
in such cases and often strangely clash with those of party;
but the main cause lies elsewhere. The elections were at this time
essentially in the power of the different clubs into which the aristocracy
had grouped themselves; the system of bribery was organized by them
on the most extensive scale and with the utmost method.
The same aristocracy therefore, which was represented in the senate,
ruled also the elections; but while in the senate it yielded
with a grudge, it worked and voted here--in secret and secure
from all reckoning--absolutely against the regents. That the influence
of the nobility in this field was by no means broken by the strict
penal law against the electioneering intrigues of the clubs,
which Crassus when consul in 699 caused to be confirmed by the burgesses,
is self-evident, and is shown by the elections of the succeeding years.
And in the Courts
The jury-courts occasioned equally great difficulty to the regents.
As they were then composed, while the senatorial nobility was here
also influential, the decisive voice lay chiefly with the middle class.
The fixing of a high-rated census for jurymen by a law proposed
by Pompeius in 699 is a remarkable proof that the opposition
to the regents had its chief seat in the middle class properly
so called, and that the great capitalists showed themselves here,
as everywhere, more compliant than the latter. Nevertheless
the republican party was not yet deprived of all hold in the courts,
and it was never weary of directing political impeachments,
not indeed against the regents themselves, but against
their prominent instruments. This warfare of prosecutions
was waged the more keenly, that according to usage the duty of accusation
belonged to the senatorial youth, and, as may readily be conceived,
there was more of republican passion, fresh talent, and bold delight
in attack to be found among these youths than among the older members
of their order. Certainly the courts were not free; if the regents
were in earnest, the courts ventured as little as the senate
to refuse obedience. None of their antagonists were prosecuted
by the opposition with such hatred--so furious that it almost
passed into a proverb--as Vatinius, by far the most audacious
and unscrupulous of the closer adherents of Caesar; but his master
gave the command, and he was acquitted in all the processes
raised against him. But impeachments by men who knew how to wield
the sword of dialectics and the lash of sarcasm as did
Gaius Licinius Calvus and Gaius Asinius Pollio, did not miss
their mark even when they failed; nor were isolated successes wanting.
They were mostly, no doubt, obtained over subordinate individuals,
but even one of the most high-placed and most hated adherents
of the dynasts, the consular Gabinius, was overthrown in this way.
Certainly in his case the implacable hatred of the aristocracy,
which as little forgave him for the law regarding the conducting
of the war with the pirates as for his disparaging treatment
of the senate during his Syrian governorship, was combined
with the rage of the great capitalists, against whom he had when governor
of Syria ventured to defend the interests of the provincials,
and even with the resentment of Crassus, with whom he had stood
on ceremony in handing over to him the province. His only protection
against all these foes was Pompeius, and the latter had every reason
to defend his ablest, boldest, and most faithful adjutant at any price;
but here, as everywhere, he knew not how to use his power
and to defend his clients, as Caesar defended his; in the end
of 700 the jurymen found Gabinius guilty of extortions
and sent him into banishment.
On the whole, therefore, in the sphere of the popular elections
and of the jury-courts it was the regents that fared worst.
The factors which ruled in these were less tangible, and therefore
more difficult to be terrified or corrupted than the direct organs
of government and administration. The holders of power encountered
here, especially in the popular elections, the tough energy
of a close oligarchy--grouped in coteries--which is by no means
finally disposed of when its rule is overthrown, and which is
the more difficult to vanquish the more covert its action.
They encountered here too, especially in the jury-courts,
the repugnance of the middle classes towards the new monarchical rule,
which with all the perplexities springing out of it they were
as little able to remove. They suffered in both quarters a series
of defeats. The election-victories of the opposition had,
it is true, merely the value of demonstrations, since the regents
possessed and employed the means of practically annulling any magistrate
whom they disliked; but the criminal trials in which the opposition
carried condemnations deprived them, in a way keenly felt,
of useful auxiliaries. As things stood, the regents could neither
set aside nor adequately control the popular elections
and the jury-courts, and the opposition, however much it felt itself
straitened even here, maintained to a certain extent the field of battle.
Literature of the Opposition
It proved, however, yet a more difficult task to encounter
the opposition in a field, to which it turned with the greater zeal
the more it was dislodged from direct political action. This was
literature. Even the judicial opposition was at the same time
a literary one, and indeed pre-eminently so, for the orations
were regularly published and served as political pamphlets.
The arrows of poetry hit their mark still more rapidly and sharply.
The lively youth of the high aristocracy, and still more energetically
perhaps the cultivated middle class in the Italian country towns,
waged the war of pamphlets and epigrams with zeal and success.
There fought side by side on this field the genteel senator's son
Gaius Licinius Calvus (672-706) who was as much feared
in the character of an orator and pamphleteer as of a versatile poet,
and the municipals of Cremona and Verona Marcus Furius Bibaculus
(652-691) and Quintus Valerius Catullus (667-c. 700) whose elegant
and pungent epigrams flew swiftly like arrows through Italy
and were sure to hit their mark. An oppositional tone prevails
throughout the literature of these years. It is full of indignant
sarcasm against the "great Caesar," "the unique general,"
against the affectionate father-in-law and son-in-law,
who ruin the whole globe in order to give their dissolute favourites
opportunity to parade the spoils of the long-haired Celts
through the streets of Rome, to furnish royal banquets with the booty
of the farthest isles of the west, and as rivals showering gold
to supplant honest youths at home in the favour of their mistresses.
There is in the poems of Catullus(9) and the other fragments
of the literature of this period something of that fervour of personal
and political hatred, of that republican agony overflowing
in riotous humour or in stern despair, which are more prominently
and powerfully apparent in Aristophanes and Demosthenes.
The most sagacious of the three rulers at least saw well
that it was as impossible to despise this opposition as to suppress
it by word of command. So far as he could, Caesar tried
rather personally to gain over the more notable authors.
Cicero himself had to thank his literary reputation in good part
for the respectful treatment which he especially experienced
from Caesar; but the governor of Gaul did not disdain to conclude
a special peace even with Catullus himself through the intervention
of his father who had become personally known to him in Verona;
and the young poet, who had just heaped upon the powerful general
the bitterest and most personal sarcasms, was treated by him
with the most flattering distinction. In fact Caesar was gifted enough
to follow his literary opponents on their own domain and to publish--
as an indirect way of repelling manifold attacks--a detailed report
on the Gallic wars, which set forth before the public, with happily
assumed naivete, the necessity and constitutional propriety
of his military operations. But it is freedom alone that is absolutely
and exclusively poetical and creative; it and it alone is able
even in its most wretched caricature, even with its latest breath,
to inspire fresh enthusiasm. All the sound elements of literature
were and remained anti-monarchical; and, if Caesar himself
could venture on this domain without proving a failure, the reason
was merely that even now he still cherished at heart the magnificent
dream of a free commonwealth, although he was unable to transfer it
either to his adversaries or to his adherents. Practical politics
was not more absolutely controlled by the regents than literature
by the republicans.(10)
New Exceptional Measures Resolved on
It became necessary to take serious steps against this opposition,
which was powerless indeed, but was always becoming more troublesome
and audacious. The condemnation of Gabinius, apparently,
turned the scale (end of 700). The regents agreed to introduce
a dictatorship, though only a temporary one, and by means of this
to carry new coercive measures especially respecting the elections
and the jury-courts. Pompeius, as the regent on whom primarily devolved
the government of Rome and Italy, was charged with the execution
of this resolve; which accordingly bore the impress of the awkwardness
in resolution and action that characterized him, and of his singular
incapacity of speaking out frankly, even where he would and could
command. Already at the close of 700 the demand for a dictatorship
was brought forward in the senate in the form of hints,
and that not by Pompeius himself. There served as its ostensible ground
the continuance of the system of clubs and bands in the capital,
which by acts of bribery and violence certainly exercised
the most pernicious pressure on the elections as well as
on the jury-courts and kept it in a perpetual state of disturbance;
we must allow that this rendered it easy for the regents to justify
their exceptional measures. But, as may well be conceived,
even the servile majority shrank from granting what the future dictator
himself seemed to shrink from openly asking. When the unparalleled
agitation regarding the elections for the consulship of 701
led to the most scandalous scenes, so that the elections
were postponed a full year beyond the fixed time and only took place
after a seven months' interregnum in July 701, Pompeius found
in this state of things the desired occasion for indicating
now distinctly to the senate that the dictatorship was the only means
of cutting, if not of loosing the knot; but the decisive
word of command was not even yet spoken. Perhaps it would have
still remained for long unuttered, had not the most audacious
partisan of the republican opposition Titus Annius Milo
stepped into the field at the consular elections for 702
as a candidate in opposition to the candidates of the regents,
Quintus Metellus Scipio and Publius Plautius Hypsaeus, both men
closely connected with Pompeius personally and thoroughly devoted to him.
Milo
Killing of Clodius
Milo, endowed with physical courage, with a certain talent for intrigue
and for contracting debt, and above all with an ample amount
of native assurance which had been carefully cultivated,
had made himself a name among the political adventurers
of the time, and was the greatest bully in his trade next to Clodius,
and naturally therefore through rivalry at the most deadly feud
with the latter. As this Achilles of the streets had been acquired
by the regents and with their permission was again playing the ultra-
democrat, the Hector of the streets became as a matter of course
an aristocrat! And the republican opposition, which now would have
concluded an alliance with Catilina in person, had he presented
himself to them, readily acknowledged Milo as their legitimate
champion in all riots. In fact the few successes, which they
carried off in this field of battle, were the work of Milo
and of his well-trained band of gladiators. So Cato and his friends
in return supported the candidature of Milo for the consulship;
even Cicero could not avoid recommending one who had been his enemy's
enemy and his own protector during many years; and as Milo himself
spared neither money nor violence to carry his election,
it seemed secured. For the regents it would have been not only
a new and keenly-felt defeat, but also a real danger; for it was
to be foreseen that the bold partisan would not allow himself
as consul to be reduced to insignificance so easily as Domitius
and other men of the respectable opposition. It happened that Achilles
and Hector accidentally encountered each other not far from the capital
on the Appian Way, and a fray arose between their respective bands,
in which Clodius himself received a sword-cut on the shoulder
and was compelled to take refuge in a neighbouring house.
This had occurred without orders from Milo; but, as the matter
had gone so far and as the storm had now to be encountered at any rate,
the whole crime seemed to Milo more desirable and even less dangerous
than the half; he ordered his men to drag Clodius forth
from his lurking place and to put him to death (13 Jan. 702).
Anarchy in Rome
The street leaders of the regents' party--the tribunes of the people
Titus Munatius Plancus, Quintus Pompeius Rufus, and Gaius
Sallustius Crispus--saw in this occurrence a fitting opportunity
to thwart in the interest of their masters the candidature of Milo
and carry the dictatorship of Pompeius. The dregs of the populace,
especially the freedmen and slaves, had lost in Clodius
their patron and future deliverer;(11) the requisite excitement
was thus easily aroused. After the bloody corpse had been exposed
for show at the orators' platform in the Forum and the speeches
appropriate to the occasion had been made, the riot broke forth.
The seat of the perfidious aristocracy was destined as a funeral pile
for the great liberator; the mob carried the body to the senate-house,
and set the building on fire. Thereafter the multitude proceeded
to the front of Milo's house and kept it under siege, till his band
drove off the assailants by discharges of arrows. They passed
on to the house of Pompeius and of his consular candidates,
of whom the former was saluted as dictator and the latter as consuls,
and thence to the house of the interrex Marcus Lepidus, on whom
devolved the conduct of the consular elections. When the latter,
as in duty bound, refused to make arrangements for the elections
immediately, as the clamorous multitude demanded, he was kept
during five days under siege in his dwelling house.
Dictatorship of Pompeius
But the instigators of these scandalous scenes had overacted
their part. Certainly their lord and master was resolved to employ
this favourable episode in order not merely to set aside Milo,
but also to seize the dictatorship; he wished, however, to receive it
not from a mob of bludgeon-men, but from the senate. Pompeius brought
up troops to put down the anarchy which prevailed in the capital,
and which had in reality become intolerable to everybody;
at the same time he now enjoined what he had hitherto requested,
and the senate complied. It was merely an empty subterfuge,
that on the proposal of Cato and Bibulus the proconsul Pompeius,
retaining his former offices, was nominated as "consul without
colleague" instead of dictator on the 25th of the intercalary
month(12) (702)--a subterfuge, which admitted an appellation labouring
under a double incongruity(13) for the mere purpose of avoiding
one which expressed the simple fact, and which vividly reminds us
of the sagacious resolution of the waning patriciate to concede
to the plebeians not the consulship, but only the consular power.(14)
Changes of in the Arrangement of Magistracies and the Jury-System
Thus in legal possession of full power, Pompeius set to work
and proceeded with energy against the republican party which was
powerful in the clubs and the jury-courts. The existing enactments
as to elections were repeated and enforced by a special law;
and by another against electioneering intrigues, which obtained
retrospective force for all offences of this sort committed
since 684, the penalties hitherto imposed were augmented.
Still more important was the enactment, that the governorships,
which were by far the more important and especially by far
the more lucrative half of official life, should be conferred
on the consuls and praetors not immediately on their retirement
from the consulate or praetorship, but only after the expiry
of other five years; an arrangement which of course could only
come into effect after four years, and therefore made the filling up
of the governorships for the next few years substantially dependent
on decrees of senate which were to be issued for the regulation
of this interval, and thus practically on the person or section
ruling the senate at the moment. The jury-commissions were left
in existence, but limits were put to the right of counter-plea,
and--what was perhaps still more important--the liberty of speech
in the courts was done away; for both the number of the advocates
and the time of speaking apportioned to each were restricted
by fixing a maximum, and the bad habit which had prevailed of adducing,
in addition to the witnesses as to facts, witnesses to character
or -laudatores-, as they were called, in favour of the accused
was prohibited. The obsequious senate further decreed on the suggestion
of Pompeius that the country had been placed in peril by the quarrel
on the Appian Way; accordingly a special commission was appointed
by an exceptional law for all crimes connected with it,
the members of which were directly nominated by Pompeius.
An attempt was also made to give once more a serious importance
to the office of the censors, and by that agency to purge
the deeply disordered burgess-body of the worst rabble.
All these measures were adopted under the pressure of the sword.
In consequence of the declaration of the senate that the country
was in danger, Pompeius called the men capable of service
throughout Italy to arms and made them swear allegiance
for all contingencies; an adequate and trustworthy corps
was temporarily stationed at the Capitol; at every stirring
of opposition Pompeius threatened armed intervention, and during
the proceedings at the trial respecting the murder of Clodius
stationed contrary to all precedent, a guard over the place
of trial itself.
Humiliation of the Republicans
The scheme for the revival of the censorship failed, because
among the servile majority of the senate no one possessed
sufficient moral courage and authority even to become a candidate
for such an office. On the other hand Milo was condemned
by the jurymen (8 April 702) and Cato's candidature for the consulship
of 703was frustrated. The opposition of speeches and pamphlets
received through the new judicial ordinance a blow from which
it never recovered; the dreaded forensic eloquence was thereby
driven from the field of politics, and thenceforth felt
the restraints of monarchy. Opposition of course had not disappeared
either from the minds of the great majority of the nation
or even wholly from public life--to effect that end the popular elections,
the jury-courts, and literature must have been not merely restricted,
but annihilated. Indeed, in these very transactions themselves,
Pompeius by his unskilfulness and perversity helped the republicans
to gain even under his dictatorship several triumphs which
he severely felt. The special measures, which the rulers took
to strengthen their power, were of course officially characterized
as enactments made in the interest of public tranquillity and order,
and every burgess, who did not desire anarchy, was described
as substantially concurring in them. But Pompeius pushed
this transparent fiction so far, that instead of putting
safe instruments into the special commission for the investigation
of the last tumult, he chose the most respectable men of all parties,
including even Cato, and applied his influence over the court essentially
to maintain order, and to render it impossible for his adherents
as well as for his opponents to indulge in the scenes of disturbance
customary in the courts of this period. This neutrality of the regent
was discernible in the judgments of the special court. The jurymen
did not venture to acquit Milo himself; but most of the subordinate
persons accused belonging to the party of the republican opposition
were acquitted, while condemnation inexorably befell those
who in the last riot had taken part for Clodius, or in other words
for the regents, including not a few of Caesar's and of Pompeius' own
most intimate friends--even Hypsaeus his candidate for the consulship,
and the tribunes of the people Plancus and Rufus, who had directed
the -emeute- in his interest. That Pompeius did not prevent
their condemnation for the sake of appearing impartial, was one specimen
of his folly; and a second was, that he withal in matters
quite indifferent violated his own laws to favour his friends--
appearing for example as a witness to character in the trial of Plancus,
and in fact protecting from condemnation several accused persons
specially connected with him, such as Metellus Scipio. As usual,
he wished here also to accomplish opposite things; in attempting
to satisfy the duties at once of the impartial regent
and of the party-chief, he fulfilled neither the one nor the other,
and was regarded by public opinion with justice as a despotic regent,
and by his adherents with equal justice as a leader who either
could not or would not protect his followers.
But, although the republicans were still stirring and were even refreshed
by an isolated success here and there, chiefly through the blunders
of Pompeius, the object which the regents had proposed
to themselves in that dictatorship was on the whole attained,
the reins were drawn tighter, the republican party was humbled,
and the new monarchy was strengthened. The public began
to reconcile themselves to the latter. When Pompeius not long after
recovered from a serious illness, his restoration was celebrated
throughout Italy with the accompanying demonstrations of joy
which are usual on such occasions in monarchies. The regents
showed themselves satisfied; as early as the 1st of August 702
Pompeius resigned his dictatorship, and shared the consulship
with his client Metellus Scipio.
CHAPTER IX
Death of Crassus--Rupture between the Joint Rulers
Crassus Goes to Syria
Marcus Crassus had for years been reckoned among the heads
of the "three-headed monster," without any proper title
to be so included. He served as a makeweight to trim the balance
between the real regents Pompeius and Caesar, or, to speak
more accurately, his weight fell into the scale of Caesar
against Pompeius. This part is not a too reputable one;
but Crassus was never hindered by any keen sense of honour
from pursuing his own advantage. He was a merchant and was open
to be dealt with. What was offered to him was not much;
but, when more was not to be got, he accepted it, and sought
to forget the ambition that fretted him, and his chagrin
at occupying a position so near to power and yet so powerless,
amidst his always accumulating piles of gold. But the conference
at Luca changed the state of matters also for him; with the view
of still retaining the preponderance as compared with Pompeius
after concessions so extensive, Caesar gave to his old confederate
Crassus an opportunity of attaining in Syria through the Parthian war
the same position to which Caesar had attained by the Celtic war
in Gaul. It was difficult to say whether these new prospects
proved more attractive to the ardent thirst for gold which had now become
at the age of sixty a second nature and grew only the more intense
with every newly-won million, or to the ambition which had been
long repressed with difficulty in the old man's breast
and now glowed in it with restless fire. He arrived in Syria as early
as the beginning of 700; he had not even waited for the expiry
of his consulship to depart. Full of impatient ardour he seemed desirous
to redeem every minute with the view of making up for what he had lost,
of gathering in the treasures of the east in addition to those
of the west, of achieving the power and glory of a general
as rapidly as Caesar, and with as little trouble as Pompeius.
Expedition against Parthia Resolved on
He found the Parthian war already commenced. The faithless conduct
of Pompeius towards the Parthians has been already mentioned;(1)
he had not respected the stipulated frontier of the Euphrates
and had wrested several provinces from the Parthian empire
for the benefit of Armenia, which was now a client state of Rome.
King Phraates had submitted to this treatment; but after he had been
murdered by his two sons Mithradates and Orodes, the new king
Mithradates immediately declared war on the king of Armenia, Artavasdes,
son of the recently deceased Tigranes (about 698).(2) This was
at the same time a declaration of war against Rome; therefore
as soon as the revolt of the Jews was suppressed, Gabinius,
the able and spirited governor of Syria, led the legions
over the Euphrates. Meanwhile, however, a revolution had occurred
in the Parthian empire; the grandees of the kingdom, with the young,
bold, and talented grand vizier at their head, had overthrown
king Mithradates and placed his brother Orodes on the throne.
Mithradates therefore made common cause with the Romans
and resorted to the camp of Gabinius. Everything promised
the best results to the enterprise of the Roman governor,
when he unexpectedly received orders to conduct the king of Egypt
back by force of arms to Alexandria.(3) He was obliged to obey;
but, in the expectation of soon coming back, he induced the dethroned
Parthian prince who solicited aid from him to commence the war
in the meanwhile at his own hand. Mithradates did so; and Seleucia
and Babylon declared for him; but the vizier captured Seleucia
by assault, having been in person the first to mount the battlements,
and in Babylon Mithradates himself was forced by famine to surrender,
whereupon he was by his brother's orders put to death.
His death was a palpable loss to the Romans; but it by no means
put an end to the ferment in the Parthian empire, and the Armenian war
continued. Gabinius, after ending the Egyptian campaign,
was just on the eve of turning to account the still favourable
opportunity and resuming the interrupted Parthian war, when Crassus
arrived in Syria and along with the command took up also the plans
of his predecessor. Full of high-flown hopes he estimated
the difficulties of the march as slight, and the power of resistance
in the armies of the enemy as yet slighter; he not only spoke
confidently of the subjugation of the Parthians, but was already
in imagination the conqueror of the kingdoms of Bactria and India.
Plan of the Campaign
The new Alexander, however, was in no haste. Before he carried
into effect these great plans, he found leisure for very tedious
and very lucrative collateral transactions. The temples of Derceto
at Hierapolis Bambyce and of Jehovah at Jerusalem and other rich shrines
of the Syrian province, were by order of Crassus despoiled
of their treasures; and contingents or, still better, sums of money
instead were levied from all the subjects. The military operations
of the first summer were limited to an extensive reconnaissance
in Mesopotamia; the Euphrates was crossed, the Parthian satrap
was defeated at Ichnae (on the Belik to the north of Rakkah),
and the neighbouring towns, including the considerable one of Nicephorium
(Rakkah), were occupied, after which the Romans having left garrisons
behind in them returned to Syria. They had hitherto been in doubt
whether it was more advisable to march to Parthia by the circuitous route
of Armenia or by the direct route through the Mesopotamian desert.
The first route, leading through mountainous regions under the control
of trustworthy allies, commended itself by its greater safety;
king Artavasdes came in person to the Roman headquarters
to advocate this plan of the campaign. But that reconnaissance
decided in favour of the march through Mesopotamia. The numerous
and flourishing Greek and half-Greek towns in the regions
along the Euphrates and Tigris, above all the great city
of Seleucia, were altogether averse to the Parthian rule;
all the Greek townships with which the Romans came into contact had now,
like the citizens of Carrhae at an earlier time,(4) practically shown
how ready they were to shake off the intolerable foreign yoke
and to receive the Romans as deliverers, almost as countrymen.
The Arab prince Abgarus, who commanded the desert of Edessa and Carrhae
and thereby the usual route from the Euphrates to the Tigris,
had arrived in the camp of the Romans to assure them in person
of his devotedness. The Parthians had appeared to be wholly unprepared.
The Euphrates Crossed
Accordingly (701) the Euphrates was crossed (near Biradjik).
To reach the Tigris from this point they had the choice
of two routes; either the army might move downward along the Euphrates
to the latitude of Seleucia where the Euphrates and Tigris
are only a few miles distant from each other; or they might
immediately after crossing take the shortest line to the Tigris
right across the great Mesopotamian desert. The former route
led directly to the Parthian capital Ctesiphon, which lay opposite
Seleucia on the other bank of the Tigris; several weighty voices
were raised in favour of this route in the Roman council of war;
in particular the quaestor Gaius Cassius pointed to the difficulties
of the march in the desert, and to the suspicious reports arriving
from the Roman garrisons on the left bank of the Euphrates
as to the Parthian warlike preparations. But in opposition to this
the Arab prince Abgarus announced that the Parthians were employed
in evacuating their western provinces. They had already packed up
their treasures and put themselves in motion to flee to the Hyrcanians
and Scythians; only through a forced march by the shortest route
was it at all possible still to reach them; but by such a march
the Romans would probably succeed in overtaking and cutting up at least
the rear-guard of the great army under Sillaces and the vizier,
and obtaining enormous spoil. These reports of the friendly Bedouins
decided the direction of the march; the Roman army, consisting
of seven legions, 4000 cavalry, and 4000 slingers and archers,
turned off from the Euphrates and away into the inhospitable plains
of northern Mesopotamia.
The March in the Desert
Far and wide not an enemy showed himself; only hunger and thirst,
and the endless sandy desert, seemed to keep watch at the gates
of the east. At length, after many days of toilsome marching, not far
from the first river which the Roman army had to cross,
the Balissus (Belik), the first horsemen of the enemy were descried.
Abgarus with his Arabs was sent out to reconnoitre; the Parthian
squadrons retired up to and over the river and vanished
in the distance, pursued by Abgarus and his followers. With impatience
the Romans waited for his return and for more exact information.
The general hoped here at length to come upon the constantly
retreating foe; his young and brave son Publius, who had fought
with the greatest distinction in Gaul under Caesar,(5) and had been sent
by the latter at the head of a Celtic squadron of horse to take part
in the Parthian war, was inflamed with a vehement desire
for the fight. When no tidings came, they resolved to advance
at a venture; the signal for starting was given, the Balissus
was crossed, the army after a brief insufficient rest at noon
was led on without delay at a rapid pace. Then suddenly the kettledrums
of the Parthians sounded all around; on every side their silken
gold-embroidered banners were seen waving, and their iron helmets
and coats of mail glittering in the blaze of the hot noonday sun;
and by the side of the vizier stood prince Abgarus with his Bedouins.
Roman and Parthian Systems of Warfare