They went to work accordingly. The corn and colonial laws encountered,

as was to be expected, the keenest opposition from the government.

They proved in the senate by striking figures, that the former must

make the public treasury bankrupt; Saturninus did not trouble himself

about that. They brought tribunician intercession to bear against

both laws; Saturninus ordered the voting to go on. They informed

the magistrates presiding at the voting that a peal of thunder had

been heard, a portent by which according to ancient belief the gods

enjoined the dismissal of the public assembly; Saturninus remarked

to the messengers that the senate would do well to keep quiet, otherwise

the thunder might very easily be followed by hail. Lastly the urban

quaestor, Quintus Caepio, the son, it may be presumed, of the general

condemned three years before,(8) and like his father a vehement

antagonist of the popular party, with a band of devoted partisans

dispersed the comitia by violence. But the tough soldiers of Marius,

who had flocked in crowds to Rome to vote on this occasion, quickly

rallied and dispersed the city bands, and on the voting ground thus

reconquered the vote on the Appuleian laws was successfully brought to

an end. The scandal was grievous; but when it came to the question

whether the senate would comply with the clause of the law that

within five days after its passing every senator should on pain of

forfeiting his senatorial seat take an oath faithfully to observe it,

all the senators took the oath with the single exception of Quintus

Metellus, who preferred to go into exile. Marius and Saturninus

were not displeased to see the best general and the ablest man among

the opposing party removed from the state by voluntary banishment.

The Fall of the Revolutionary Party

Their object seemed to be attained; but even now to those who saw

more clearly the enterprise could not but appear a failure. The cause

of the failure lay mainly in the awkward alliance between a politically

incapable general and a street-demagogue, capable but recklessly

violent, and filled with passion rather than with the aims of a

statesman. They had agreed excellently, so long as the question related

only to plans. But when the plans came to be executed, it was very soon

apparent that the celebrated general was in politics utterly incapable;

that his ambition was that of the farmer who would cope with and,

if possible, surpass the aristocrats in titles, and not that of the

statesman who desires to govern because he feels within him the power

to do so; that every enterprise, which was based on his personal standing

as a politician, must necessarily even under the most favourable

circumstances be ruined by himself.

Opposition of the Whole Aristocracy

He knew neither the art of gaining his antagonists, nor that of keeping

his own party in subjection. The opposition against him and his

comrades was even of itself sufficiently considerable; for not only did

the government party belong to it in a body, but also a great part of

the burgesses, who guarded with jealous eyes their exclusive privileges

against the Italians; and by the course which things took the whole

class of the wealthy was also driven over to the government. Saturninus

and Glaucia were from the first masters and servants of the proletariate

and therefore not at all on a good footing with the moneyed aristocracy,

which had no objection now and then to keep the senate in check by means

of the rabble, but had no liking for street-riots and violent outrages.

As early as the first tribunate of Saturninus his armed bands had their

skirmishes with the equites; the vehement opposition which his election

as tribune for 654 encountered shows clearly how small was the party

favourable to him. It should have been the endeavour of Marius to avail

himself of the dangerous help of such associates only in moderation,

and to convince all and sundry that they were destined not to rule, but

to serve him as the ruler. As he did precisely the contrary, and the

matter came to look quite as if the object was to place the government

in the hands not of an intelligent and vigorous master, but of the mere

-canaille-, the men of material interests, terrified to death at the

prospect of such confusion, again attached themselves closely to the

senate in presence of this common danger. While Gaius Gracchus, clearly

perceiving that no government could be overthrown by means of the

proletariate alone, had especially sought to gain over to his side

the propertied classes, those who desired to continue his work began by

producing a reconciliation between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie.

Variance between Marius and the Demogogues

But the ruin of the enterprise was brought about, still more rapidly

than by this reconciliation of enemies, through the dissension which

the more than ambiguous behaviour of Marius necessarily produced among

its promoters. While the decisive proposals were brought forward by

his associates and carried after a struggle by his soldiers, Marius

maintained an attitude wholly passive, just as if the political leader

was not bound quite as much as the military, when the brunt of battle

came, to present himself everywhere and foremost in person. Nor was

this all; he was terrified at, and fled from the presence of, the

spirits which he had himself evoked. When his associates resorted to

expedients which an honourable man could not approve, but without which

in fact the object of their efforts could not be attained, he attempted,

in the fashion usual with men whose ideas of political morality are

confused, to wash his hands of participation in those crimes and at the

same time to profit by their results. There is a story that the general

once conducted secret negotiations in two different rooms of his house,

with Saturninus and his partisans in the one, and with the deputies of

the oligarchy in the other, talking with the former of striking a blow

against the senate, and with the latter of interfering against the

revolt, and that under a pretext which was in keeping with the anxiety

of the situation he went to and fro between the two conferences--a story

as certainly invented, and as certainly appropriate, as any incident in

Aristophanes. The ambiguous attitude of Marius became notorious in the

question of the oath. At first he seemed as though he would himself

refuse the oath required by the Appuleian laws on account of the

informalities that had occurred at their passing, and then swore it with

the reservation, "so far as the laws were really valid"; a reservation

which annulled the oath itself, and which of course all the senators

likewise adopted in swearing, so that by this mode of taking the oath

the validity of the laws was not secured, but on the contrary was for

the first time really called in question.

The consequences of this behaviour--stupid beyond parallel--on the part

of the celebrated general soon developed themselves. Saturninus and

Glaucia had not undertaken the revolution and procured for Marius

the supremacy of the state, in order that they might be disowned and

sacrificed by him; if Glaucia, the favourite jester of the people, had

hitherto lavished on Marius the gayest flowers of his jovial eloquence,

the garlands which he now wove for him were by no means redolent of

roses and violets. A total rupture took place, by which both parties

were lost; for Marius had not a footing sufficiently firm singly to

maintain the colonial law which he had himself called in question and

to possess himself of the position which it assigned to him, nor were

Saturninus and Glaucia in a condition to continue on their own account

the work which Marius had begun.

Saturninus Isolated

Saturninus Assailed and Overpowered

But the two demagogues were so compromised that they could not recede;

they had no alternative save to resign their offices in the usual way

and thereby to deliver themselves with their hands bound to their

exasperated opponents, or now to grasp the sceptre for themselves,

although they felt that they could not bear its weight. They resolved

on the latter course; Saturninus would come forward once more as a

candidate for the tribunate of the people for 655, Glaucia, although

praetor and not eligible for the consulship till two years had elapsed,

would become a candidate for the latter. In fact the tribunician

elections were decided entirely to their mind, and the attempt of

Marius to prevent the spurious Tiberius Gracchus from soliciting the

tribuneship served only to show the celebrated man what was now the

worth of his popularity; the multitude broke the doors of the prison in

which Gracchus was confined, bore him in triumph through the streets,

and elected him by a great majority as their tribune. Saturninus and

Glaucia sought to control the more important consular election by the

expedient for the removal of inconvenient competitors which had been

tried in the previous year; the counter-candidate of the government

party, Gaius Memmius--the same who eleven years before had led the

opposition against them(9)--was suddenly assailed by a band of ruffians

and beaten to death. But the government party had only waited for a

striking event of this sort in order to employ force. The senate

required the consul Gaius Marius to interfere, and the latter in reality

professed his readiness now to draw for the conservative party the

sword, which he had obtained from the democracy and had promised to

wield on its behalf. The young men were hastily called out, equipped

with arms from the public buildings, and drawn up in military array; the

senate itself appeared under arms in the Forum, with its venerable chief

Marcus Scaurus at its head. The opposite party were doubtless superior

in a street-riot, but were not prepared for such an attack; they had now

to defend themselves as they could. They broke open the doors of the

prisons, and called the slaves to liberty and to arms; they proclaimed--

so it was said at any rate--Saturninus as king or general; on the day

when the new tribunes of the people had to enter on their office, the

10th of December 654, a battle occurred in the great market-place--the

first which, since Rome existed, had ever been fought within the walls

of the capital. The issue was not for a moment doubtful. The Populares

were beaten and driven up to the Capitol, where the supply of water was

cut off from them and they were thus compelled to surrender. Marius,

who held the chief command, would gladly have saved the lives of his

former allies who were now his prisoners; Saturninus proclaimed to the

multitude that all which he had proposed had been done in concert with

the consul: even a worse man than Marius was could not but shudder at

the inglorious part which he played on this day. But he had long ceased

to be master of affairs. Without orders the youth of rank climbed

the roof of the senate-house in the Forum where the prisoners were

temporarily confined, stripped off the tiles, and with these stoned

their victims. Thus Saturninus perished with most of the more notable

prisoners. Glaucia was found in a lurking-place and likewise put

to death. Without sentence or trial there died on this day four

magistrates of the Roman people--a praetor, a quaestor, and two

tribunes of the people--and a number of other well-known men, some of

whom belonged to good families. In spite of the grave faults by which

the chiefs had invited on themselves this bloody retribution, we may

nevertheless lament them: they fell like advanced posts, which are left

unsupported by the main army and are forced to perish without aim in

a conflict of despair.

Ascendency of the Government

Marius Politically Annihilated

Never had the government party achieved a more complete victory, never

had the opposition suffered a more severe defeat, than on this 10th of

December. It was the least part of the success that they had got rid

of some troublesome brawlers, whose places might be supplied any day by

associates of a like stamp; it was of greater moment that the only man,

who was then in a position to become dangerous to the government, had

publicly and completely effected his own annihilation; and most

important of all that the two elements of the opposition, the capitalist

order and the proletariate, emerged from the strife wholly at variance.

It is true that this was not the work of the government; the fabric

which had been put together by the adroit hands of Gaius Gracchus

had been broken up, partly by the force of circumstances, partly

and especially by the coarse and boorish management of his incapable

successor; but in the result it mattered not whether calculation or good

fortune helped the government to its victory. A more pitiful position

can hardly be conceived than that occupied by the hero of Aquae and

Vercellae after such a disaster--all the more pitiful, because people

could not but compare it with the lustre which only a few months before

surrounded the same man. No one either on the aristocratic or the

democratic side any longer thought of the victorious general on occasion

of filling up the magistracies; the hero of six consulships could not

even venture to become a candidate in 656 for the censorship. He went

away to the east, ostensibly for the purpose of fulfilling a vow there,

but in reality that he might not be a witness of the triumphant return

of his mortal foe Quintus Metellus; he was allowed to go. He returned

and opened his house; his halls stood empty. He always hoped that

conflicts and battles would occur and that the people would once

more need his experienced arm; he thought to provide himself with an

opportunity for war in the east, where the Romans might certainly have

found sufficient occasion for energetic interference. But this also

miscarried, like every other of his wishes; profound peace continued

to prevail. Yet the longing after honours once aroused within him,

the oftener it was disappointed, ate the more deeply into his heart.

Superstitious as he was, he cherished in his bosom an old oracular

saying which had promised him seven consulships, and in gloomy

meditation brooded over the means by which this utterance was to

obtain its fulfilment and he his revenge, while he appeared to all,

himself alone excepted, insignificant and innocuous.

The Equestrian Party

Still more important in its consequences than the setting aside of the

dangerous man was the deep exasperation against the Populares, as they

were called, which the insurrection of Saturninus left behind in the

party of material interests. With the most remorseless severity the

equestrian tribunals condemned every one who professed oppositional

views; Sextus Titius, for instance, was condemned not so much on

account of his agrarian law as because he had in his house a statue of

Saturninus; Gaius Appuleius Decianus was condemned, because he had as

tribune of the people characterized the proceedings against Saturninus

as illegal. Even for earlier injuries inflicted by the Populares on

the aristocracy satisfaction was now demanded, not without prospect of

success, before the equestrian tribunals. Because Gaius Norbanus had

eight years previously in concert with Saturninus driven the consular

Quintus Caepio into exile(10) he was now (659) on the ground of his own

law accused of high treason, and the jurymen hesitated long--not whether

the accused was guilty or innocent, but whether his ally Saturninus

or his enemy Caepio was to be regarded as the most deserving of their

hate--till at last they decided for acquittal. Even if people were not

more favourably disposed towards the government in itself than before,

yet, after having found themselves, although but for a moment, on the

verge of a real mob-rule, all men who had anything to lose viewed the

existing government in a different light; it was notoriously wretched

and pernicious for the state, but the anxious dread of the still more

wretched and still more pernicious government of the proletariate had

conferred on it a relative value. The current now set so much in that

direction that the multitude tore in pieces a tribune of the people

who had ventured to postpone the return of Quintus Metellus, and the

democrats began to seek their safety in league with murderers and

poisoners--ridding themselves, for example, of the hated Metellus

by poison--or even in league with the public enemy, several of them

already taking refuge at the court of king Mithradates who was secretly

preparing for war against Rome. External relations also assumed an

aspect favourable for the government. The Roman arms were employed but

little in the period from the Cimbrian to the Social war, but everywhere

with honour. The only serious conflict was in Spain, where, during

the recent years so trying for Rome (649 seq.), the Lusitanians and

Celtiberians had risen with unwonted vehemence against the Romans.

In the years 656-661 the consul Titus Didius in the northern and the consul

Publius Crassus in the southern province not only re-established with

valour and good fortune the ascendency of the Roman arms, but also razed

the refractory towns and, where it seemed necessary, transplanted the

population of the strong mountain-towns to the plains. We shall show in

the sequel that about the same time the Roman government again directed

its attention to the east which had been for a generation neglected,

and displayed greater energy than had for long been heard of in Cyrene,

Syria, and Asia Minor. Never since the commencement of the revolution

had the government of the restoration been so firmly established, or so

popular. Consular laws were substituted for tribunician; restrictions

on liberty replaced measures of progress. The cancelling of the laws of

Saturninus was a matter of course; the transmarine colonies of Marius

disappeared down to a single petty settlement on the barbarous island

of Corsica. When the tribune of the people Sextus Titius--a caricatured

Alcibiades, who was greater in dancing and ball-playing than in

politics, and whose most prominent talent consisted in breaking the

images of the gods in the streets at night--re-introduced and carried

the Appuleian agrarian law in 655, the senate was able to annul the new

law on a religious pretext without any one even attempting to defend it;

the author of it was punished, as we have already mentioned, by the

equites in their tribunals. Next year (656) a law brought in by the

two consuls made the usual four-and-twenty days' interval between the

introduction and the passing of a project of law obligatory, and forbade

the combination of several enactments different in their nature in one

proposal; by which means the unreasonable extension of the initiative

in legislation was at least somewhat restricted, and the government was

prevented from being openly taken by surprise with new laws. It became

daily more evident that the Gracchan constitution, which had survived

the fall of its author, was now, since the multitude and the moneyed

aristocracy no longer went together, tottering to its foundations.

As that constitution had been based on division in the ranks of

the aristocracy, so it seemed that dissensions in the ranks of the

opposition could not but bring about its fall. Now, if ever, the

time had come for completing the unfinished work of restoration of 633,

for making the Gracchan constitution share the fate of the tyrant,

and for replacing the governing oligarchy in the sole possession

of political power.

Collision between the Senate and Equites in the Administration of

the Provinces

Everything depended on recovering the nomination of the jurymen.

The administration of the provinces--the chief foundation of the

senatorial government--had become dependent on the jury courts, more

particularly on the commission regarding exactions, to such a degree

that the governor of a province seemed to administer it no longer for

the senate, but for the order of capitalists and merchants. Ready as

the moneyed aristocracy always was to meet the views of the government

when measures against the democrats were in question, it sternly

resented every attempt to restrict it in this its well-acquired right

of unlimited sway in the provinces. Several such attempts were now

made; the governing aristocracy began again to come to itself, and

its very best men reckoned themselves bound, at least for their

own part, to oppose the dreadful maladministration in the provinces.

The most resolute in this respect was Quintus Mucius Scaevola, like

his father Publius -pontifex maximus- and in 659 consul, the foremost

jurist and one of the most excellent men of his time. As praetorian

governor (about 656) of Asia, the richest and worst-abused of all the

provinces, he--in concert with his older friend, distinguished as an

officer, jurist, and historian, the consular Publius Rutilius Rufus--

set a severe and deterring example. Without making any distinction

between Italians and provincials, noble and ignoble, he took up every

complaint, and not only compelled the Roman merchants and state-lessees

to give full pecuniary compensation for proven injuries, but, when some

of their most important and most unscrupulous agents were found guilty

of crimes deserving death, deaf to all offers of bribery he ordered them

to be duly crucified. The senate approved his conduct, and even made it

an instruction afterwards to the governors of Asia that they should take

as their model the principles of Scaevola's administration; but the

equites, although they did not venture to meddle with that highly

aristocratic and influential statesman himself, brought to trial his

associates and ultimately (about 662) even the most considerable of

them, his legate Publius Rufus, who was defended only by his merits

and recognized integrity, not by family connection. The charge that

such a man had allowed himself to perpetrate exactions in Asia, almost

broke down under its own absurdity and under the infamy of the accuser,

one Apicius; yet the welcome opportunity of humbling the consular was

not allowed to pass, and, when the latter, disdaining false rhetoric,

mourning robes, and tears, defended himself briefly, simply, and to

the point, and proudly refused the homage which the sovereign capitalists

desired, he was actually condemned, and his moderate property was

confiscated to satisfy fictitious claims for compensation. The condemned

resorted to the province which he was alleged to have plundered, and

there, welcomed by all the communities with honorary deputations, and

praised and beloved during his lifetime, he spent in literary leisure

his remaining days. And this disgraceful condemnation, while perhaps

the worst, was by no means the only case of the sort. The senatorial

party was exasperated, not so much perhaps by such abuse of justice in

the case of men of stainless walk but of new nobility, as by the fact

that the purest nobility no longer sufficed to cover possible stains

on its honour. Scarcely was Rufus out of the country, when the most

respected of all aristocrats, for twenty years the chief of the senate,

Marcus Scaurus at seventy years of age was brought to trial for exactions;

a sacrilege according to aristocratic notions, even if he were guilty.

The office of accuser began to be exercised professionally by worthless

fellows, and neither irreproachable character, nor rank, nor age longer

furnished protection from the most wicked and most dangerous attacks.

The commission regarding exactions was converted from a shield of the

provincials into their worst scourge; the most notorious robber escaped

with impunity, if he only indulged his fellow-robbers and did not refuse

to allow part of the sums exacted to reach the jury; but any attempt

to respond to the equitable demands of the provincials for right and

justice sufficed for condemnation. It seemed as if the intention was to

bring the Roman government into the same dependence on the controlling

court, as that in which the college of judges at Carthage had formerly

held the council there. The prescient expression of Gaius Gracchus was

finding fearful fulfilment, that with the dagger of his law as to the

jurymen the world of quality would lacerate itself.

Livius Drusus

An attack on the equestrian courts was inevitable. Every one in the

government party who was still alive to the fact that governing implies

not merely rights but also duties, every one in fact who still felt any

nobler or prouder ambition within him, could not but rise in revolt

against this oppressive and disgraceful political control, which

precluded any possibility of upright administration. The scandalous

condemnation of Rutilius Rufus seemed a summons to begin the attack at

once, and Marcus Livius Drusus, who was tribune of the people in 663,

regarded that summons as specially addressed to himself. Son of the man

of the same name, who thirty years before had primarily caused the

overthrow of Gaius Gracchus(11) and had afterwards made himself a name

as an officer by the subjugation of the Scordisci,(12) Drusus was, like

his father, of strictly conservative views, and had already given

practical proof that such were his sentiments in the insurrection of

Saturninus. He belonged to the circle of the highest nobility, and was

the possessor of a colossal fortune; in disposition too he was a genuine

aristocrat--a man emphatically proud, who scorned to bedeck himself with

the insignia of his offices, but declared on his death-bed that there

would not soon arise a citizen like to him; a man with whom the

beautiful saying, that nobility implies obligation, was and continued

to be the rule of his life. With all the vehement earnestness of his

temperament he had turned away from the frivolity and venality that

marked the nobles of the common stamp; trustworthy and strict in morals,

he was respected rather than properly beloved on the part of the common

people, to whom his door and his purse were always open, and

notwithstanding his youth, he was through the personal dignity of his

character a man of weight in the senate as in the Forum. Nor did he

stand alone. Marcus Scaurus had the courage on occasion of his defence

in the trial for extortion publicly to summon Drusus to undertake a

reform of the judicial arrangements; he and the famous orator, Lucius

Crassus, were in the senate the most zealous champions of his proposals,

and were perhaps associated with him in originating them. But the mass

of the governing aristocracy was by no means of the same mind with

Drusus, Scaurus, and Crassus. There were not wanting in the senate

decided adherents of the capitalist party, among whom in particular a

conspicuous place belonged to the consul of the day, Lucius Marcius

Philippus, who maintained the cause of the equestrian order as he had

formerly maintained that of the democracy(13) with zeal and prudence,

and to the daring and reckless Quintus Caepio, who was induced to this

opposition primarily by his personal hostility to Drusus and Scaurus.

More dangerous, however, than these decided opponents was the cowardly

and corrupt mass of the aristocracy, who no doubt would have preferred

to plunder the provinces alone, but in the end had not much objection to

share the spoil with the equites, and, instead of taking in hand the

grave and perilous struggle against the haughty capitalists, reckoned

it far more equitable and easy to purchase impunity at their hands by

fair words and by an occasional prostration or even by a round sum.

The result alone could show how far success would attend the attempt to

carry along with the movement this body, without which it was impossible

to attain the desired end.

Attempt at Reform on the Part of the Moderate Party

Drusus drew up a proposal to withdraw the functions of jurymen from

the burgesses of equestrian rating and to restore them to the senate,

which at the same time was to be put in a position to meet its increased

obligations by the admission of 300 new members; a special criminal

commission was to be appointed for pronouncing judgment in the case

of those jurymen who had been or should be guilty of accepting bribes.

By this means the immediate object was gained; the capitalists were

deprived of their political exclusive rights, and were rendered

responsible for the perpetration of injustice. But the proposals

and designs of Drusus were by no means limited to this; his projects

were not measures adapted merely for the occasion, but a comprehensive

and thoroughly-considered plan of reform. He proposed, moreover,

to increase the largesses of grain and to cover the increased expense

by the permanent issue of a proportional number of copper plated,

alongside of the silver, -denarii-; and then to set apart all the

still undistributed arable land of Italy--thus including in particular

the Campanian domains--and the best part of Sicily for the settlement

of burgess-colonists. Lastly, he entered into the most distinct

obligations towards the Italian allies to procure for them the Roman

franchise. Thus the very same supports of power and the very same ideas

of reform, on which the constitution of Gaius Gracchus had rested,

presented themselves now on the side of the aristocracy--a singular,

and yet easily intelligible coincidence. It was only to be expected

that, as the -tyrannis- had rested for its support against the oligarchy,

so the latter should rest for its support against the moneyed aristocracy,

on the paid and in some degree organized proletariate; while the

government had formerly accepted the feeding of the proletariate at

the expense of the state as an inevitable evil, Drusus now thought of

employing it, at least for the moment, against the moneyed aristocracy.

It was only to be expected that the better part of the aristocracy, just

as it formerly consented to the agrarian law of Tiberius Gracchus, would

now readily consent to all those measures of reform, which, without

touching the question of a supreme head, only aimed at the cure of the

old evils of the state. In the question of emigration and colonization,

it is true, they could not go so far as the democracy, since the power

of the oligarchy mainly rested on their free control over the provinces

and was endangered by any permanent military command; the ideas of

equalizing Italy and the provinces and of making conquests beyond the

Alps were not compatible with conservative principles. But the senate

might very well sacrifice the Latin and even the Campanian domains

as well as Sicily in order to raise the Italian farmer class, and

yet retain the government as before; to which fell to be added the

consideration, that they could not more effectually obviate future

agitations than by providing that all the land at all disposable should

be brought to distribution by the aristocracy itself, and that according

to Drusus' own expression, nothing should be left for future demagogues

to distribute but "the street-dirt and the daylight." In like manner it

was for the government--whether that might be a monarch, or a close

number of ruling families--very much a matter of indifference whether

the half or the whole of Italy possessed the Roman franchise; and hence

the reforming men on both sides probably could not but coincide in the

idea of averting the danger of a recurrence of the insurrection of

Fregellae on a larger scale by a judicious and reasonable extension of

the franchise, and of seeking allies, moreover, for their plans in the

numerous and influential Italians. Sharply as in the question of the

headship of the state the views and designs of the two great political

parties differed, the best men of both camps had many points of contact

in their means of operation and in their reforming tendencies; and, as

Scipio Aemilianus may be named alike among the adversaries of Tiberius

Gracchus and among the promoters of his reforming efforts, so Drusus

was the successor and disciple no less than the antagonist of Gaius.

The two high-born and high-minded youthful reformers had a greater

resemblance than was apparent at the first glance; and, personally also,

the two were not unworthy to meet, as respects the substance of their

patriotic endeavours, in purer and higher views above the obscuring

mists of prejudiced partisanship.

Discussions on the Livian Laws

The question at stake was the passing of the laws drawn up by Drusus.

Of these the proposer, just like Gaius Gracchus, kept in reserve for

the moment the hazardous project of conferring the Roman franchise on

the Italian allies, and brought forward at first only the laws as to

the jurymen, the assignation of land, and the distribution of grain.

The capitalist party offered the most vehement resistance, and, in

consequence of the irresolution of the greater part of the aristocracy

and the vacillation of the comitia, would beyond question have carried

the rejection of the law as to jurymen, if it had been put to the vote

by itself. Drusus accordingly embraced all his proposals in one law;

and, as thus all the burgesses interested in the distributions of grain

and land were compelled to vote also for the law as to jurymen, he

succeeded in carrying the law with their help and that of the Italians,

who stood firmly by Drusus with the exception of the large landowners,

particularly those in Umbria and Etruria, whose domanial possessions

were threatened. It was not carried, however, until Drusus had caused

the consul Philippus, who would not desist from opposition, to be

arrested and carried off to prison by a bailiff. The people celebrated

the tribune as their benefactor, and received him in the theatre by

rising up and applauding; but the voting had not so much decided the

struggle as transferred it to another ground, for the opposite party

justly characterized the proposal of Drusus as contrary to the law

of 656(14) and therefore as null.

CHAPTER VII

The Revolt of the Italian Subjects, and the Sulpician Revolution

Romans and Italians

From the time when the defeat of Pyrrhus had put an end to the last

war which the Italians had waged for their independence--or, in other

words, for nearly two hundred years--the Roman primacy had now

subsisted in Italy, without having been once shaken in its

foundations even under circumstances of the utmost peril. Vainly

had the heroic family of the Barcides, vainly had the successors

of Alexander the Great and of the Achaemenids, endeavoured to rouse

the Italian nation to contend with the too powerful capital; it had

obsequiously appeared in the fields of battle on the Guadalquivir

and on the Mejerdah, at the pass of Tempe and at Mount Sipylus, and

with the best blood of its youth had helped its masters to achieve

the subjugation of three continents. Its own position meanwhile had

changed, but had deteriorated rather than improved. In a material

point of view, doubtless, it had in general not much ground to

complain. Though the small and intermediate landholders throughout

Italy suffered in consequence of the injudicious Roman legislation

as to corn, the larger landlords and still more the mercantile and

capitalist class were flourishing, for the Italians enjoyed, as

respected the turning of the provinces to financial account,

substantially the same protection and the same privileges as

Roman burgesses, and thus shared to a great extent in the material

advantages of the political ascendency of the Romans. In general,

the economic and social condition of Italy was not primarily dependent

on political distinctions; there were allied districts, such as Umbria

and Etruria, in which the class of free farmers had mostly disappeared,

while in others, such as the valleys of the Abruzzi, the same

class had still maintained a tolerable footing or remained almost

unaffected--just as a similar diversity could be pointed out in the

different Roman burgess-districts. On the other hand the political

inferiority of Italy was daily displayed more harshly and more

abruptly. No formal open breach of right indeed occurred, at

least in the principal questions. The communal freedom, which

under the name of sovereignty was accorded by treaty to the Italian

communities, was on the whole respected by the Roman government;

the attack, which the Roman reform party at the commencement of the

agrarian agitation made on the Roman domains guaranteed to the

communities of better position, had not only been earnestly opposed

by the strictly conservative as well as by the middle party in Rome,

but had been very soon abandoned by the Roman opposition itself.

Disabilities and Wrongs of the Subjects

But the rights, which belonged and could not but belong to Rome as

the leading community--the supreme conduct of war-affairs, and the

superintendence of the whole administration--were exercised in a way

which was almost as bad as if the allies had been directly declared

to be subjects devoid of rights. The numerous modifications of the

fearfully severe martial law of Rome, which were introduced there in

the course of the seventh century, seem to have remained on the whole

limited to the Roman burgess-soldiers: this is certain as to the most

important, the abolition of executions by martial law,(1) and we may

easily conceive the impression which was produced when, as happened

in the Jugurthine war, Latin officers of repute were beheaded by

sentence of the Roman council of war, while the lowest burgess-soldier

had in the like case the right of presenting an appeal to the civil

tribunals of Rome. The proportions in which the burgesses and

Italian allies were to be drawn for military service had, as was fair,

remained undefined by treaty; but, while in earlier times the two had

furnished on an average equal numbers of soldiers,(2) now, although the

proportions of the population had changed probably in favour of the

burgesses rather than to their disadvantage, the demands on the allies

were by degrees increased disproportionately,(3) so that on the one

hand they had the chief burden of the heavier and more costly service

imposed on them, and on the other hand there were two allies now

regularly levied for one burgess. In like manner with this military

supremacy the civil superintendence, which (including the supreme

administrative jurisdiction which could hardly be separated from it)

the Roman government had always and rightly reserved to itself over

the dependent Italian communities, was extended in such a way that

the Italians were hardly less than the provincials abandoned without

protection to the caprice of any one of the numberless Roman

magistrates. In Teanum Sidicinum, one of the most considerable

of the allied towns, a consul had ordered the chief magistrate of

the town to be scourged with rods at the stake in the marketplace,

because, on the consul's wife expressing a desire to bathe in the

men's bath, the municipal officers had not driven forth the bathers

quickly enough, and the bath appeared to her not to be clean.

Similar scenes had taken place in Ferentinum, likewise a town

holding the best position in law, and even in the old and important

Latin colony of Cales. In the Latin colony of Venusia a free peasant

had been seized by a young Roman diplomatist not holding office but

passing through the town, on account of a jest which he had allowed

himself to make on the Roman's litter, had been thrown down, and

whipped to death with the straps of the litter. These occurrences are

incidentally mentioned about the time of the Fregellan insurrection;

it admits of no doubt that similar outrages frequently occurred, and

of as little that no real satisfaction for such misdeeds could anywhere

be obtained, whereas the right of appeal--not lightly violated with

impunity--protected in some measure at least the life and limbs of the

Roman burgess. In consequence of this treatment of the Italians on the

part of the Roman government, the variance, which the wisdom of their

ancestors had carefully fostered between the Latin and the other

Italian communities, could not fail, if not to disappear, at any

rate to undergo abatement.(4) The curb-fortresses of Rome and the

districts kept to their allegiance by these fortresses lived now under

the like oppression; the Latin could remind the Picentine that they

were both in like manner "subject to the fasces"; the overseers and

the slaves of former days were now united by a common hatred towards

the common despot.

While the present state of the Italian allies was thus transformed from

a tolerable relation of dependence into the most oppressive bondage,

they were at the same time deprived of every prospect of obtaining

better rights. With the subjugation of Italy the Roman burgess-body

had closed its ranks; the bestowal of the franchise on whole

communities was totally given up, its bestowal on individuals was

greatly restricted.(5) They now advanced a step farther: on occasion

of the agitation which contemplated the extension of the Roman franchise

to all Italy in the years 628, 632, the right of migration to Rome was

itself attacked, and all the non-burgesses resident in Rome were

directly ejected by decree of the people and of the senate from the

capital(6)--a measure as odious on account of its illiberality, as

dangerous from the various private interests which it injuriously

affected. In short, while the Italian allies had formerly stood to

the Romans partly in the relation of brothers under tutelage, protected

rather than ruled and not destined to perpetual minority, partly in

that of slaves tolerably treated and not utterly deprived of the hope

of manumission, they were now all of them subject nearly in equal

degree, and with equal hopelessness, to the rods and axes of their

Roman masters, and might at the utmost presume like privileged

slaves to transmit the kicks received from their masters onward

to the poor provincials.

The Rupture

Fregellan War

Difficulty of a General Insurrection

It belongs to the nature of such differences that, restrained by the

sense of national unity and by the remembrance of dangers surmounted

in common, they make their appearance at first gently and as it were

modestly, till the breach gradually widens and the relation between

the rulers, whose might is their sole right, and the ruled, whose

obedience reaches no farther than their fears, manifests at length

undisguisedly the character of force. Down to the revolt and razing

of Fregellae in 629, which as it were officially attested the altered

character of the Roman rule, the ferment among the Italians did not

properly wear a revolutionary character. The longing after equal

rights had gradually risen from a silent wish to a loud request,

only to be the more decidedly rejected, the more distinctly it was

put forward. It was very soon apparent that a voluntary concession

was not to be hoped for, and the wish to extort what was refused

would not be wanting; but the position of Rome at that time hardly

permitted them to entertain any idea of realizing that wish. Although

the numerical proportions of the burgesses and non-burgesses in Italy

cannot be properly ascertained, it may be regarded as certain that

the number of the burgesses was not very much less than that of the

Italian allies; for nearly 400,000 burgesses capable of bearing arms

there were at least 500,000, probably 600,000 allies.(7) So long

as with such proportions the burgesses were united and there was no

outward enemy worthy of mention, the Italian allies, split up into

an endless number of isolated urban and cantonal communities, and

connected with Rome by a thousand relations public and private,

could never attain to common action; and with moderate prudence the

government could not fail to control their troublesome and indignant

subjects partly by the compact mass of the burgesses, partly by the very

considerable resources which the provinces afforded, partly by setting

one community against another.

The Italian and the Roman Parties

Accordingly the Italians kept themselves quiet, till the revolution

began to shake Rome; but, as soon as this had broken out, they too

mingled in the movements and agitations of the Roman parties, with a

view to obtain equality of rights by means of the one or the other.

They had made common cause first with the popular and then with the

senatorial party, and gained equally little by either. They had been

driven to the conviction that, while the best men of both parties

acknowledged the justice and equity of their claims, these best men,

aristocrats as well as Populares, had equally little power to

procure ahearing for those claims with the mass of their party.

They had also observed that the most gifted, most energetic, and most

celebrated statesmen of Rome had found themselves, at the very moment

when they came forward as advocates of the Italians, deserted by their

own adherents and had been accordingly overthrown. In all the

vicissitudes of the thirty years of revolution and restoration

governments enough had been installed and deposed, but, however

the programme might vary, a short-sighted and narrow-minded spirit

sat always at the helm.

The Italians and the Oligarchy

The Licinio-Mucian Law

Above all, the recent occurrences had clearly shown how vain was the

expectation of the Italians that their claims would be attended to

by Rome. So long as the demands of the Italians were mixed up with

those of the revolutionary party and had in the hands of the latter

been thwarted by the folly of the masses, they might still resign

themselves to the belief that the oligarchy had been hostile merely

to the proposers, not to the proposal itself, and that there was still

a possibility that the mere intelligent senate would accept a measure

which was compatible with the nature of the oligarchy and salutary

for the state. But the recent years, in which the senate once more

ruled almost absolutely, had shed only too disagreeable a light on

the designs of the Roman oligarchy also. Instead of the expected

modifications, there was issued in 659 a consular law which most

strictly prohibited the non-burgesses from laying claim to the

franchise and threatened transgressors with trial and punishment--a

law which threw back a large number of most respectable persons who

were deeply interested in the question of equalization from the ranks

of Romans into those of Italians, and which in point of indisputable

legality and of political folly stands completely on a parallel with

that famous act which laid the foundation for the separation of North

America from the mother-country; in fact it became, just like that

act, the proximate cause of the civil war. It was only so much

the worse, that the authors of this law by no means belonged to

the obstinate and incorrigible Optimates; they were no other than

the sagacious and universally honoured Quintus Scaevola, destined,

like George Grenville, by nature to be a jurist and by fate to be

a statesman--who by his equally honourable and pernicious rectitude

inflamed more than any one else first the war between senate and

equites, and then that between Romans and Italians--and the orator

Lucius Crassus, the friend and ally of Drusus and altogether one of

the most moderate and judicious of the Optimates.

The Italians and Drusus

Amidst the vehement ferment, which this law and the numerous processes

arising out of it called forth throughout Italy, the star of hope once

more appeared to arise for the Italians in the person of Marcus

Drusus. That which had been deemed almost impossible--that a

conservative should take up the reforming ideas of the Gracchi,

and should become the champion of equal rights for the Italians--had

nevertheless occurred; a man of the high aristocracy had resolved to

emancipate the Italians from the Sicilian Straits to the Alps and

the government at one and the same time, and to apply all his earnest

zeal, all his trusty devotedness to these generous plans of reform.

Whether he actually, as was reported, placed himself at the head of

a secret league, whose threads ramified through Italy and whose

members bound themselves by an oath(8) to stand by each other

for Drusus and for the common cause, cannot be ascertained; but,

even if he did not lend himself to acts so dangerous and in fact

unwarrantable for a Roman magistrate, yet it is certain that he did

not keep to mere general promises, and that dangerous connections were

formed in his name, although perhaps without his consent and against

his will. With joy the Italians heard that Drusus had carried his

first proposals with the consent of the great majority of the senate;

with still greater joy all the communities of Italy celebrated not long

afterwards the recovery of the tribune, who had been suddenly attacked

by severe illness. But as the further designs of Drusus became

unveiled, a change took place; he could not venture to bring in

his chief law; he had to postpone, he had to delay, he had soon

to retire. It was reported that the majority of the senate were

vacillating and threatened to fall away from their leader; in rapid

succession the tidings ran through the communities of Italy, that the

law which had passed was annulled, that the capitalists ruled more

absolutely than ever, that the tribune had been struck by the hand

of an assassin, that he was dead (autumn of 663).

Preparations for General Revolt against Rome

The last hope that the Italians might obtain admission to Roman

citizenship by agreement was buried with Marcus Drusus. A measure,

which that conservative and energetic man had not been able under the

most favourable circumstances to induce his own party to adopt, was

not to be gained at all by amicable means. The Italians had no

course left save to submit patiently or to repeat once more, and

if possible with their united strength, the attempt which had been

crushed in the bud five-and-thirty years before by the destruction

of Fregellae--so as by force of arms either to destroy Rome and

succeed to her heritage, or at least to compel her to grant equality

of rights. The latter resolution was no doubt a resolution of

despair; as matters stood, the revolt of the isolated urban communities

against the Roman government might well appear still more hopeless

than the revolt of the American colonies against the British empire;

to all appearance the Roman government might with moderate attention

and energy of action prepare for this second insurrection the fate

of its predecessor. But was it less a resolution of despair, to sit

still and allow things to take their course? When they recollected

how the Romans had been in the habit of behaving in Italy without

provocation, what could they expect now that the most considerable

men in every Italian town had or were alleged to have had--the

consequences on either supposition being pretty much the same--an

understanding with Drusus, which was immediately directed against the

party now victorious and might well be characterized as treason? All

those who had taken part in this secret league, all in fact who

might be merely suspected of participation, had no choice left

save to begin the war or to bend their neck beneath the axe

of the executioner.

Moreover, the present moment presented comparatively favourable

prospects for a general insurrection throughout Italy. We are not

exactly informed how far the Romans had carried out the dissolution

of the larger Italian confederacies;(9) but it is not improbable that

the Marsians, the Paelignians, and perhaps even the Samnites and

Lucanians still were associated in their old communal leagues, though

these had lost their political significance and were in some cases

probably reduced to mere fellowship of festivals and sacrifices.

The insurrection, if it should now begin, would still find a rallying

point in these unions; but who could say how soon the Romans would

for that very reason proceed to abolish these also? The secret

league, moreover, which was alleged to be headed by Drusus, had lost

in him its actual or expected chief, but it continued to exist and

afforded an important nucleus for the political organization of the

insurrection; while its military organization might be based on the

fact that each allied town possessed its own armament and experienced

soldiers. In Rome on the other hand no serious preparations had

been made. It was reported, indeed, that restless movements were

occurring in Italy, and that the communities of the allies maintained

a remarkable intercourse with each other; but instead of calling the

citizens in all haste to arms, the governing corporation contented

itself with exhorting the magistrates in the customary fashion to

watchfulness and with sending out spies to learn farther particulars.

The capital was so totally undefended, that a resolute Marsian officer

Quintus Pompaedius Silo, one of the most intimate friends of Drusus,

is said to have formed the design of stealing into the city at the

head of a band of trusty associates carrying swords under their

clothes, and of seizing it by a coup de main. Preparations were

accordingly made for a revolt; treaties were concluded, and arming

went on silently but actively, till at last, as usual, the insurrection

broke out through an accident somewhat earlier than the leading

men had intended.

Outbreak of the Insurrection in Asculum

Marsians and Sabellians

Central and Southern Italy

The Roman praetor with proconsular powers, Gaius Servilius, informed

by his spies that the town of Asculum (Ascoli) in the Abruzzi was

sending hostages to the neighbouring communities, proceeded thither

with his legate Fonteius and a small escort, and addressed to the

multitude, which was just then assembled in the theatre for the

celebration of the great games, a vehement and menacing harangue.

The sight of the axes known only too well, the proclamation of

threats that were only too seriously meant, threw the spark into

the fuel of bitter hatred that had been accumulating for centuries;

the Roman magistrates were torn to pieces by the multitude in the

theatre itself, and immediately, as if it were their intention by a

fearful outrage to break down every bridge of reconciliation, the

gates were closed by command of the magistracy, all the Romans

residing in Asculum were put to death, and their property was

plundered. The revolt ran through the peninsula like the flame

through the steppe. The brave and numerous people of the Marsians

took the lead, in connection with the small but hardy confederacies

in the Abruzzi--the Paeligni, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini.

The brave and sagacious Quintus Silo, already mentioned, was here

the soul of the movement. The Marsians were the first formally to

declare against the Romans, whence the war retained afterwards the

name of the Marsian war. The example thus given was followed by

the Samnite communities, and generally by the mass of the communities

from the Liris and the Abruzzi down to Calabria and Apulia; so that

all Central and Southern Italy was soon in arms against Rome.

Italians Friendly to Rome

The Etruscans and Umbrians on the other hand held by Rome, as they

had already taken part with the equites against Drusus.(10) It is

a significant fact, that in these regions the landed and moneyed

aristocracy had from ancient times preponderated and the middle class

had totally disappeared, whereas among and near the Abruzzi the

farmer-class had preserved its purity and vigour better than anywhere

else in Italy: it was from the farmers accordingly and the middle

class in general that the revolt substantially proceeded, whereas the

municipal aristocracy still went hand in hand with the government of

the capital. This also readily explains the fact, that there were in

the insurgent districts isolated communities, and in the insurgent

communities minorities, adhering to the Roman alliance; the Vestinian

town Pinna, for instance, sustained a severe siege for Rome, and a

corps of loyalists that was formed in the Hirpinian country under

Minatius Magius of Aeclanum supported the Roman operations in Campania.

Lastly, there adhered to Rome the allied communities of best legal

position--in Campania Nola and Nuceria and the Greek maritime towns

Neapolis and Rhegium, and in like manner at least most of the Latin

colonies, such as Alba and Aesernia--just as in the Hannibalic war

the Latin and Greek towns on the whole had taken part with, and the

Sabellian towns against, Rome. The forefathers of the city had

based their dominion over Italy on an aristocratic classification,

and with skilful adjustment of the degrees of dependence had kept in

subjection the less privileged communities by means of those with

better rights, and the burgesses within each community by means of

the municipal aristocracy. It was only now, under the incomparably

wretched government of the oligarchy, that the solidity and strength

with which the statesmen of the fourth and fifth centuries had joined

together the stones of their structure were thoroughly put to the test;

the building, though shaken in various ways, still held out against

this storm. When we say, however, that the towns of better position

did not at the first shock abandon Rome, we by no means affirm that

they would now, as in the Hannibalic war, hold out for a length of

time and after severe defeats, without wavering in their allegiance

to Rome; that fiery trial had not yet been endured.

Impression As to the Insurrection in Rome

Rejection of the Proposals for an Accomodation

Commission of High Treason

The first blood was thus shed, and Italy was divided into two great

military camps. It is true, as we have seen, that the insurrection

was still very far from being a general rising of the Italian allies;

but it had already acquired an extent exceeding perhaps the hopes of

the leaders themselves, and the insurgents might without arrogance

think of offering to the Roman government a fair accommodation. They

sent envoys to Rome, and bound themselves to lay down their arms in

return for admission to citizenship; it was in vain. The public

spirit, which had been so long wanting in Rome, seemed suddenly to

have returned, when the question was one of obstructing with stubborn

narrow-mindedness a demand of the subjects just in itself and now

supported by a considerable force. The immediate effect of the

Italian insurrection was, just as was the case after the defeats

which the policy of the government had suffered in Africa and Gaul,(11)

the commencement of a warfare of prosecutions, by means of which

the aristocracy of judges took vengeance on those men of the government

whom they, rightly or wrongly, looked upon as the primary cause

of this mischief. On the proposal of the tribune Quintus Varius,

in spite of the resistance of the Optimates and in spite of tribunician

interference, a special commission of high treason--formed, of course,

from the equestrian order which contended for the proposal with

open violence--was appointed for the investigation of the conspiracy

instigated by Drusus and widely ramified in Italy as well as in Rome,

out of which the insurrection had originated, and which now, when

the half of Italy was under arms, appeared to the whole of the indignant

and alarmed burgesses as undoubted treason. The sentences of this

commission largely thinned the ranks of the senatorial party favourable

to mediation: among other men of note Drusus' intimate friend, the young

and talented Gaius Cotta, was sent into banishment, and with difficulty

the grey-haired Marcus Scaurus escaped the same fate. Suspicion went

so far against the senators favourable to the reforms of Drusus, that

soon afterwards the consul Lupus reported from the camp to the senate

regarding the communications that were constantly maintained between

the Optimates in his camp and the enemy; a suspicion which, it is true,

was soon shown to be unfounded by the arrestof Marsian spies. So far

king Mithradates might not without reason assert, that the mutual

enmities of the factions were more destructive to the Roman state

than the Social War itself.

Energetic Decrees

In the first instance, however, the outbreak of the insurrection,

and the terrorism which the commission of high treason exercised,

produced at least a semblance of unity and vigour. Party feuds were

silent; able officers of all shades--democrats like Gaius Marius,

aristocrats like Lucius Sulla, friends of Drusus like Publius

Sulpicius Rafus--placed themselves at the disposal of the government.

The largesses of corn were, apparently about this time, materially

abridged by decree of the people with a view to husband the financial

resources of the state for the war; which was the more necessary, as,

owing to the threatening attitude of king Mithradates, the province of

Asia might at any moment fall into the hand of the enemy and thus one

of the chief sources of the Roman revenue be dried up. The courts,

with the exception of the commission of high treason, in accordance

with a decree of the senate temporarily suspended their action; all

business stood still, and nothing was attended to but the levying of

soldiers and the manufacture of arms.

Political Organizatin of the Insurrection

Opposition--Rome

While the leading state thus collected its energies in the prospect

of the severe war impending, the insurgents had to solve the more

difficult task of acquiring political organization during the

struggle. In the territory of the Paeligni situated in the centre

of the Marsian, Samnite, Marrucinian, and Vestinian cantons and

consequently in the heart of the insurgent districts, in the beautiful

plain on the river Pescara, the town of Corfinium was selected as the

Opposition-Rome or city of Italia, whose citizenship was conferred on

the burgesses of all the insurgent communities; there a Forum and a

senate-house were staked off on a suitable scale. A senate of five

hundred members was charged with the settlement of the constitution

and the superintendence of the war. In accordance with its directions

the burgesses selected from the men of senatorial rank two consuls and

twelve praetors, who, just like the two consuls and six praetors of

Rome, were invested with the supreme authority in war and peace.

The Latin language, which was even then the prevailing language among

the Marsians and Picentes, continued in official use, but the Samnite

language which predominated in Southern Italy was placed side by

side with it on a footing of equality; and the two were made use of

alternately on the silver pieces which the new Italian state began to

coin in its own name after Roman models and after the Roman standard,

thus appropriating likewise the monopoly of coinage which Rome had

exercised for two centuries. It is evident from these arrangements--

and was, indeed a matter of course-that the Italians now no longer

thought of wresting equality of rights from the Romans, but purposed

to annihilate or subdue them and to form a new state. But it is also

obvious that their constitution was nothing but a pure copy of that

of Rome or, in other words, was the ancient polity handed down by

tradition among the Italian nations from time immemorial:--the

organization of a city instead of the constitution of a state, with

primary assemblies as unwieldy and useless as the Roman comitia, with

a governing corporation which contained within it the same elements

of oligarchy as the Roman senate, with an executive administered in

like manner by a plurality of coordinate supreme magistrates. This

imitation descended to the minutest details; for instance, the title

of consul or praetor held by the magistrate in chief command was

after a victory exchanged by the general of the Italians also for

the title of Imperator. Nothing in fact was changed but the name;

on the coins of the insurgents the same image of the gods appears, the

inscription only being changed from Roma to Italia. This Rome of the

insurgents was distinguished--not to its advantage--from the original

Rome merely by the circumstance, that, while the latter had at any

rate an urban development, and its unnatural position intermediate

between a city and a state had formed itself at least in a natural

way, the new Italia was nothing at all but a place of congress

for the insurgents, and it was by a pure fiction of law that the

inhabitants of the peninsula were stamped as burgesses of this new

capital. But it is significant that in this case, where the sudden

amalgamation of a number of isolated cantons into a new political unity

might have so naturally suggested the idea of a representative

constitution in the modern sense, no trace of any such idea occurs;

in fact the very opposite course was followed,(12) and the communal

organization was simply reproduced in a far more absurd manner than

before. Nowhere perhaps is it so clearly apparent as in this

instance, that in the view of antiquity a free constitution was

inseparable from the appearance of the sovereign people in person in

the primary assemblies, or from a city; and that the great fundamental

idea of the modern republican-constitutional state, viz. the expression

of the sovereignty of the people by a representative assembly--an idea

without which a free state would be a chaos--is wholly modern. Even

the Italian polity, although in its somewhat representative senates

and in the diminished importance of the comitia it approximated to a

free state, never was able in the case either of Rome or of Italia

to cross the boundary-line.

Warlike Preparations

Thus began, a few months after the death of Drusus, in the winter of

663-4, the struggle--as one of the coins of the insurgents represents

it--of the Sabellian ox against the Roman she-wolf. Both sides made

zealous preparations: in Italia great stores of arms, provisions, and

money were accumulated; in Rome the requisite supplies were drawn from

the provinces and particularly from Sicily, and the long-neglected walls

were put in a state of defence against any contingency. The forces

were in some measure equally balanced. The Romans filled up the

blanks in their Italian contingents partly by increased levies from

the burgesses and from the inhabitants--already almost wholly Romanized--

of the Celtic districts on the south of the Alps, of whom 10,000

served in the Campanian army alone,(13) partly by the contingents

of the Numidians and other transmarine nations; and with the aid

of the free cities in Greece and Asia Minor they collected a war

fleet.(14) On both sides, without reckoning garrisons, as many as

100,000 soldiers were brought into the field,(15) and in the ability

of their men, in military tactics and armament, the Italians were

nowise inferior to the Romans.

Subdivision of the Armies on Either Side

The conduct of the war was very difficult both for the insurgents and

for the Romans, because the territory in revolt was very extensive and

a great number of fortresses adhering to Rome were scattered up and

down in it: so that on the one hand the insurgents found themselves

compelled to combine a siege-warfare, which broke up their forces

and consumed their time, with the protection of an extended frontier;

and on the other hand the Romans could not well do otherwise than

combat the insurrection, which had no proper centre, simultaneously

in all the insurgent districts. In a military point of view the

insurgent country fell into two divisions; in the northern, which

reached from Picenum and the Abruzzi to the northern border of

Campania and embraced the districts speaking Latin, the chief command

was held on the Italian side by the Marsian Quintus Silo, on the Roman

side by Publius Rutilius Lupus, both as consuls; in the southern,

which included Campania, Samnium, and generally the regions speaking

Sabellian, the Samnite Gaius Papius Mutilus commanded as consul of the

insurgents, and Lucius Julius Caesar as the Roman consul. With each

of the two commanders-in-chief there were associated on the Italian

side six, on the Roman side five, lieutenant-commanders, each of whom

conducted the attack or defence in a definite district, while the

consular armies were destined to act more freely and to strike the

decisive blow. The most esteemed Roman officers, such as Gaius

Marius, Quintus Catulus, and the two consulars of experience in the

Spanish war, Titus Didius and Publius Crassus, placed themselves at

the disposal of the consuls for these posts; and though the Italians

had not names so celebrated to oppose to them, yet the result

showed that their leaders were in a military point of view nowise

inferior to the Romans.

The offensive in this thoroughly desultory war was on the whole on the

side of the Romans, but was nowhere decisively assumed even on their

part. It is surprising that the Romans did not collect their troops

for the purpose of attacking the insurgents with a superior force,

and that the insurgents made no attempt to advance into Latium and to

throw themselves on the hostile capital. We are how ever too little

acquainted with their respective circumstances to judge whether or

how they could have acted otherwise, or to what extent the remissness

of the Roman government on the one hand and the looseness of the

connection among the federate communities on the other contributed

to this want of unity in the conduct of the war. It is easy to see

that with such a system there would doubtless be victories and defeats,

but the final settlement might be very long delayed; and it is no less

plain that a clear and vivid picture of such a war--which resolved

itself into a series of engagements on the part of individual corps

operating at the same time, sometimes separately, sometimes in

combination--cannot be prepared out of the remarkably fragmentary

accounts which have come down to us.

Commencement of the War

The Fortresses

Caesar in Campania and Samnium

Aesernia Taken by the Insurgents

As also Nola

Campania for the Most Part Lost to the Romans

The first assault, as a matter of course, fell on the fortresses

adhering to Rome in the insurgent districts, which in all haste

closed their gates and carried in their moveable property from the

country. Silo threw himself on the fortress designed to hold in

check the Marsians, the strong Alba, Mutilus on the Latin town of

Aesernia established in the heart of Samnium: in both cases they

encountered the most resolute resistance. Similar conflicts probably

raged in the north around Firmum, Atria, Pinna, in the south around

Luceria, Beneventum, Nola, Paestum, before and while the Roman armies

gathered on the borders of the insurgent country. After the southern

army under Caesar had assembled in the spring of 664 in Campania which

for the most part held by Rome, and had provided Capua--with its

domain so important for the Roman finances--as well as the more

important allied cities with garrisons, it attempted to assume the

offensive and to come to the aid of the smaller divisions sent on

before it to Samnium and Lucania under Marcus Marcellus and Publius

Crassus. But Caesar was repulsed by the Samnites and Marsians under

Publius Vettius Scato with severe loss, and the important town of

Venafrum thereupon passed over to the insurgents, into whose hands

it delivered its Roman garrison. By the defection of this town,

which lay on the military road from Campania to Samnium, Aesernia was

isolated, and that fortress already vigorously assailed found itself now

exclusively dependent on the courage and perseverance of its defenders

and their commandant Marcellus. It is true that an incursion, which

Sulla happily carried out with the same artful audacity as formerly

his expedition to Bocchus, relieved the hard-pressed Aesernians for a

moment; nevertheless they were after an obstinate resistance compelled

by the extremity of famine to capitulate towards the end of the year.

In Lucania too Publius Crassus was defeated by Marcus Lamponius, and

compelled to shut himself up in Grumentum, which fell after a long

and obstinate siege. With these exceptions, they had been obliged

to leave Apulia and the southern districts totally to themselves.

The insurrection spread; when Mutilus advanced into Campania at the

head of the Samnite army, the citizens of Nola surrendered to him

their city and delivered up the Roman garrison, whose commander was

executed by the orders of Mutilus, while the men were distributed

through the victorious army. With the single exception of Nuceria,

which adhered firmly to Rome, all Campania as far as Vesuvius was lost

to the Romans; Salernum, Stabiae, Pompeii, Herculaneum declared for

the insurgents; Mutilus was able to advance into the region to the

north of Vesuvius, and to besiege Acerrae with his Samnito-Lucanian

army. The Numidians, who were in great numbers in Caesar's army,

began to pass over in troops to Mutilus or rather to Oxyntas, the son

of Jugurtha, who on the surrender of Venusia had fallen into the hands

of the Samnites and now appeared among their ranks in regal purple;

so that Caesar found himself compelled to send home the whole

African corps. Mutilus ventured even to attack the Roman camp;

but he was repulsed, and the Samnites, who while retreating were

assailed in the rear by the Roman cavalry, left nearly 6000 dead on

the field of battle. It was the first notable success which the Romans

gained in this war; the army proclaimed the general -imperator-, and

the sunken courage of the capital began to revive. It is true that

not long afterwards the victorious army was attacked in crossing a

river by Marius Egnatius, and so emphatically defeated that it had

to retreat as far as Teanum and to be reorganized there; but the

exertions of the active consul succeeded in restoring his army to

a serviceable condition even before the arrival of winter, and he

reoccupied his old position under the walls of Acerrae, which the

Samnite main army under Mutilus continued to besiege.

Combats with the Marsians

Defeat and Death of Lupus

At the same time operations had also begun in Central Italy, where

the revolt of the Abruzzi and the region of the Fucine lake threatened

the capital in dangerous proximity. An independent corps under Gnaeus

Pompeius Strabo was sent into Picenum in order that, resting for

support on Firmum and Falerio, it might threaten Asculum; but the

main body of the Roman northern army took its position under the

consul Lupus on the borders of the Latin and Marsian territories,

where the Valerian and Salarian highways brought the enemy nearest to

the capital; the rivulet Tolenus (Turano), which crosses the Valerian

road between Tibur and Alba and falls into the Velino at Rieti,

separated the two armies. The consul Lupus impatiently pressed for

a decision, and did not listen to the disagreeable advice of Marius

that he should exercise his men--unaccustomed to service--in the first

instance in petty warfare. At the very outset the division of Gaius

Perpenna, 10,000 strong, was totally defeated. The commander-in-

chief deposed the defeated general from his command and united the

remnant of the corps with that which was under the orders of Marius,

but did not allow himself to be deterred from assuming the offensive

and crossing the Tolenus in two divisions, led partly by himself,

partly by Marius, on two bridges constructed not far from each other.

Publius Scato with the Marsians confronted them; he had pitched his

camp at the spot where Marius crossed the brook, but, before the

passage took place, he had withdrawn thence, leaving behind the mere

posts that guarded the camp, and had taken a position in ambush

farther up the river. There he attacked the other Roman corps under

Lupus unexpectedly during the crossing, and partly cut it down, partly

drove it into the river (11th June 664). The consul in person and

8000 of his troops fell. It could scarcely be called a compensation

that Marius, becoming at length aware of Scato's departure, had crossed

the river and not without loss to the enemy occupied their camp.

Yet this passage of the river, and a victory at the same time obtained

over the Paelignians by the general Servius Sulpicius, compelled the

Marsians to draw their line of defence somewhat back, and Marius, who

by decree of the senate succeeded Lupus as commander-in-chief, at least

prevented the enemy from gaining further successes. But, when Quintus

Caepio was soon afterwards associated in the command with equal powers,

not so much on account of a conflict which he had successfully

sustained, as because he had recommended himself to the equites then

leading the politics of Rome by his vehement opposition to Drusus,

he allowed himself to be lured into an ambush by Silo on the pretext

that the latter wished to betray to him his army, and was cut to

pieces with a great part of his force by the Marsians and Vestinians.

Marius, after Caepio's fall once more sole commander-in-chief, through

his tenacious resistance prevented his antagonist from profiting by

the advantages which he had gained, and gradually penetrated far into

the Marsian territory. He long refused battle; when he at length

gave it, he vanquished his impetuous opponent, who left on the battle--

field among other dead Herius Asinius the chieftain of the Marrucini.

In a second engagement the army of Marius and the corps of Sulla

which belonged to the army of the south co-operated to inflict on

the Marsians a still more considerable defeat, which cost them 6000 men;

but the glory of this day remained with the younger officer, for, while

Marius had given and gained the battle, Sulla had intercepted the retreat

of the fugitives and destroyed them.

Picenian War

While the conflict was proceeding thus warmly and with varying success

at the Fucine lake, the Picenian corps under Strabo had also fought

with alternations of fortune. The insurgent chiefs, Gaius Iudacilius

from Asculum, Publius Vettius Scato, and Titus Lafrenius, had

assailed it with their united forces, defeated it, and compelled it

to throw itself into Firmum, where Lafrenius kept Strabo besieged,

while Iudacilius moved into Apulia and induced Canusium, Venusia, and

the other towns still adhering to Rome in that quarter to join the

insurgents. But on the Roman side Servius Sulpicius by his victory

over the Paeligni cleared the way for his advancing into Picenum and

rendering aid to Strabo; Lafrenius was attacked by Strabo in front

and taken in rear by Sulpicius, and his camp was set on fire; he

himself fell, the remnant of his troops fled in disorder and threw

themselves into Asculum. So completely had the state of affairs

changed in Picenum, that the Italians now found themselves confined

to Asculum as the Romans were previously to Firmum, and the war was

thus once more converted into a siege.

Umbro-Etruscan Conflicts

Lastly, there was added in the course of the year to the two difficult

and straggling wars in southern and central Italy a third in the

north. The state of matters apparently so dangerous for Rome after

the first months of the war had induced a great portion of the

Umbrian, and isolated Etruscan, communities to declare for the

insurrection; so that it became necessary to despatch against the

Umbrians Aulus Plotius, and against the Etruscans Lucius Porcius Cato.

Here however the Romans encountered a far less energetic resistance

than in the Marsian and Samnite countries, and maintained a most

decided superiority in the field.

Disadvantageous Aggregate Result of the First Year of the War

Thus the severe first year of the war came to an end, leaving behind

it, both in a military and political point of view, sorrowful

memories and dubious prospects. In a military point of view both

armies of the Romans, the Marsian as well as the Campanian, had been

weakened and discouraged by severe defeats; the northern army had

been compelled especially to attend to the protection of the capital,

the southern army at Neapolis had been seriously threatened in its

communications, as the insurgents could without much difficulty break

forth from the Marsian or Samnite territory and establish themselves

between Rome and Naples; for which reason it was found necessary to

draw at least a chain of posts from Cumae to Rome. In a political

point of view, the insurrection had gained ground on all sides during

this first year of the war; the secession of Nola, the rapid

capitulation of the strong and large Latin colony of Venusia, and

the Umbro-Etruscan revolt were suspicious signs that the Roman symmachy

was tottering to its very base and was not in a position to hold out

against this last trial. They had already made the utmost demands on

the burgesses; they had already, with a view to form that chain of

posts along the Latino-Campanian coast, incorporated nearly 6000

freedmen in the burgess-militia; they had already required the

severest sacrifices from the allies that still remained faithful;

it was not possible to draw the string of the bow any tighter

without hazarding everything.

Despondency of the Romans

The temper of the burgesses was singularly depressed. After the

battle on the Tolenus, when the dead bodies of the consul and the

numerous citizens of note who had fallen with him were brought back

from the neighbouring battlefield to the capital and were buried there;

when the magistrates in token of public mourning laid aside their

purple and insignia; when the government issued orders to the

inhabitants of the capital to arm en masse; not a few had resigned

themselves to despair and given up all as lost. It is true that the

worst despondency had somewhat abated after the victories achieved by

Caesar at Acerrae and by Strabo in Picenum: on the news of the former

the wardress in the capital had been once more exchanged for the dress

of the citizen, on the news of the second the signs of public mourning

had been laid aside; but it was not doubtful that on the whole the

Romans had been worsted in this passage of arms: and above all the

senate and the burgesses had lost the spirit, which had formerly

borne them to victory through all the crises of the Hannibalic war.

They still doubtless began war with the same defiant arrogance as then,

but they knew not how to end it as they had then done; rigid obstinacy,

tenacious persistence had given place to a remiss and cowardly

disposition. Already after the first year of war their outward and

inward policy became suddenly changed, and betook itself to compromise.

There is no doubt that in this they did the wisest thing which could

be done; not however because, compelled by the immediate force of

arms, they could not avoid acquiescing in disadvantageous conditions,

but because the subject-matter of dispute--the perpetuation of the

political precedence of the Romans over the other Italians--was

injurious rather than beneficial to the commonwealth itself.

It sometimes happens in public life that one error compensates another;

in this case cowardice in some measure remedied the mischief which

obstinacy had incurred.

Revolution in Political Processes

The year 664 had begun with a most abrupt rejection of the

compromise offered by the insurgents and with the opening of a war

of prosecutions, in which the most passionate defenders of patriotic

selfishness, the capitalists, took vengeance on all those who were

suspected of having counselled moderation and seasonable concession.

On the other hand the tribune Marcus Plautius Silvanus, who entered

on his office on the 10th of December of the same year, carried a

law which took the commission of high treason out of the hands

of the capitalist jurymen, and entrusted it to other jurymen who

were nominated by the free choice of the tribes without class--

qualification; the effect of which was, that this commission was

converted from a scourge of the moderate party into a scourge of the

ultras, and sent into exile among others its own author, Quintus

Varius, who was blamed by the public voice for the worst democratic

outrages--the poisoning of Quintus Metellus and the murder of Drusus.

Bestowal of the Franchise on the Italians Who Remained Faithful--

or Submitted

Of greater importance than this singularly candid political

recantation, was the change in the course of their policy toward

the Italians. Exactly three hundred years had passed since Rome had

last been obliged to submit to the dictation of peace; Rome was now

worsted once more, and the peace which she desired could only be got

by yielding in part at least to the terms of her antagonists. With

the communities, doubtless, which had already risen in arms to subdue

and to destroy Rome, the feud had become too bitter for the Romans to

prevail on themselves to make the required concessions; and, had they

done so, these terms would now perhaps have been rejected by the other

side. But, if the original demands were conceded under certain

limitations to the communities that had hitherto remained faithful,

such a course would on the one hand preserve the semblance of voluntary

concession, while on the other hand it would prevent the otherwise

inevitable consolidation of the confederacy and thereby pave the way

for its subjugation. Accordingly the gates of Roman citizenship, which

had so long remained closed against entreaty, now suddenly opened when

the sword knocked at them; yet even now not fully and wholly, but in

a manner reluctant and annoying even for those admitted. A law carried

by the consul Lucius Caesar(16) conferred the Roman franchise on the

burgesses of all those communities of Italian allies which had not up

to that time openly declared against Rome; a second, emanating from

the tribunes of the people Marcus Plautius Silvanus and Gaius Papirius

Carbo, laid down for every man who had citizenship and domicile in

Italy a term of two months, within which he was to be allowed to acquire

the Roman franchise by presenting himself before a Roman magistrate.

But these new burgesses were to be restricted as to the right of

voting in a way similar to the freedmen, inasmuch as they could only

be enrolled in eight, as the freedmen only in four, of the thirty-five

tribes; whether the restriction was personal or, as it would seem,

hereditary, cannot be determined with certainty.

Bestowal of Latin Rights on the Italian Celts

This measure related primarily to Italy proper, which at that time

extended northward little beyond Ancona and Florence. In Cisalpine

Gaul, which was in the eye of the law a foreign country, but in

administration and colonization had long passed as part of Italy,

all the Latin colonies were treated like the Italian communities.

Otherwise on the south side of the Po the greatest portion of the

soil was, after the dissolution of the old Celtic tribal communities,

not organized according to the municipal system, but remained withal in

the ownership of Roman burgesses mostly dwelling together in market-

villages (-fora-). The not numerous allied townships to the south of

the Po, particularly Ravenna, as well as the whole country between the

Po and the Alps was, in consequence of a law brought in by the consul

Strabo in 665, organized after the Italian urban constitution, so that

the communities not adapted for this, more especially the townships in

the Alpine valleys, were assigned to particular towns as dependent and

tributary villages. These new town-communities, however, were not

presented with the Roman franchise, but, by means of the legal fiction

that they were Latin colonies, were invested with those rights which

had hitherto belonged to the Latin towns of inferior legal position.

Thus Italy at that time ended practically at the Po, while the

Transpadane country was treated as an outlying dependency. Here

to the north of the Po, with the exception of Cremona, Eporedia

and Aquileia, there were no burgess or Latin colonies, and even

the native tribes here had been by no means dislodged as they were

to the south of the Po. The abolition of the Celtic cantonal, and

the introduction of the Italian urban, constitution paved the way

for the Romanizing of the rich and important territory; this was the

first step in the long and momentous transformation of the Gallic stock--

which once stood contrasted with Italy, and the assaults of which

Italy had rallied to repel--into comrades of their Italian masters.

Considerable as these concessions were, if we compare them with the

rigid exclusiveness which the Roman burgess-body had retained for

more than a hundred and fifty years, they were far from involving a

capitulation with the actual insurgents; they were on the contrary

intended partly to retain the communities that were wavering and

threatening to revolt, partly to draw over as many deserters as

possible from the ranks of the enemy. To what extent these laws and

especially the most important of them--that of Caesar--were applied,

cannot be accurately stated, as we are only able to specify in general

terms the extent of the insurrection at the time when the law was

issued. The main matter at any rate was that the communities hitherto

Latin--not only the survivors of the old Latin confederacy, such as

Tibur and Praeneste, but more especially the Latin colonies, with the

exception of the few that passed over to the insurgents--were thereby

admitted to Roman citizenship. Besides, the law was applied to the

allied cities that remained faithful in Etruria and especially in

Southern Italy, such as Nuceria and Neapolis. It was natural that

individual communities, hitherto specially privileged, should hesitate

as to the acceptance of the franchise; that Neapolis, for example,

should scruple to give up its former treaty with Rome--which

guaranteed to its citizens exemption from land-service and their

Greek constitution, and perhaps domanial advantages besides--for

the restricted rights of new burgesses. It was probably in virtue of

conventions concluded on account of these scruples that this city, as

well as Rhegium and perhaps other Greek communities in Italy, even

after their admission to Roman citizenship retained unchanged their

former communal constitution and Greek as their official language.

At all events, as a consequence of these laws, the circle of Roman

burgesses was extraordinarily enlarged by the merging into it of

numerous and important urban communities scattered from the Sicilian

Straits to the Po; and, further, the country between the Po and the

Alps was, by the bestowal of the best rights of allies, as it were

invested with the legal expectancy of full citizenship.

Second Year of the War

Etruria and Umbria Tranquillized

On the strength of these concessions to the wavering communities, the

Romans resumed with fresh courage the conflict against the insurgent

districts. They had pulled down as much of the existing political

institutions as seemed necessary to arrest the extension of the

conflagration; the insurrection thenceforth at least spread no

farther. In Etruria and Umbria especially, where it was just

beginning, it was subdued with singular rapidity, still more, probably,

by means of the Julian law than through the success of the Roman arms.

In the former Latin colonies, and in the thickly-peopled region of the

Po, there were opened up copious and now trustworthy sources of aid:

with these, and with the resources of the burgesses themselves, they

could proceed to subdue the now isolated conflagration. The two former

commanders-in-chief returned to Rome, Caesar as censor elect, Marius

because his conduct of the war was blamed as vacillating and slow, and

the man of sixty-six was declared to be in his dotage. This objection

was very probably groundless; Marius showed at least his bodily

vigour by appearing daily in the circus at Rome, and even as

commander-in-chief he seems to have displayed on the whole his old

ability in the last campaign; but he had not achieved the brilliant

successes by which alone after his political bankruptcy he could have

rehabilitated himself in public opinion, and so the celebrated champion

was to his bitter vexation now, even as an officer, unceremoniously laid

aside as useless. The place of Marius in the Marsian army was taken

by the consul of this year, Lucius Porcius Cato, who had fought with

distinction in Etruria, and that of Caesar in the Campanian army by

his lieutenant, Lucius Sulla, to whom were due some of the most

material successes of the previous campaign; Gnaeus Strabo retained--

now as consul--the command which he had held so successfully in

the Picenian territory.

War in Picenum

Asculum Besieged

And Conquered

Subjugation of the Sabellians and Marsians

Thus began the second campaign in 665. The insurgents opened it,

even before winter was over, by the bold attempt--recalling the grand

passages of the Samnite wars--to send a Marsian army of 15,000 men to

Etruria with a view to aid the insurrection brewing in Northern Italy.

But Strabo, through whose district it had to pass, intercepted

and totally defeated it; only a few got back to their far distant

home. When at length the season allowed the Roman armies to assume

the offensive, Cato entered the Marsian territory and advanced,

successfully encountering the enemy there; but he fell in the region

of the Fucine lake during an attack on the enemy's camp, so that the

exclusive superintendence of the operations in Central Italy devolved

on Strabo. The latter employed himself partly in continuing the

siege of Asculum, partly in the subjugation of the Marsian, Sabellian,

and Apulian districts. To relieve his hard-pressed native town,

Iudacilius appeared before Asculum with the Picentine levy and

attacked the besieging army, while at the same time the garrison

sallied forth and threw itself on the Roman lines. It is said that

75,000 Romans fought on this day against 60,000 Italians. Victory

remained with the Romans, but Iudacilius succeeded in throwing himself

with a part of the relieving army into the town. The siege resumed

its course; it was protracted(17) by the strength of the place and the

desperate defence of the inhabitants, who fought with a recollection of

the terrible declaration of war within its walls. When Iudacilius

at length after a brave defence of several months saw the day of

capitulation approach, he ordered the chiefs of that section of

the citizens which was favourable to Rome to be put to death under

torture, and then died by his own hand. So the gates were opened,

and Roman executions were substituted for Italian; all officers and

all the respectable citizens were executed, the rest were driven forth

to beggary, and all their property was confiscated on account of

the state. During the siege and after the fall of Asculum numerous

Roman corps marched through the adjacent rebel districts, and induced

one after another to submit. The Marrucini yielded, after Servius

Sulpicius had defeated them decidedly at Teate (Chieti). The praetor

Gaius Cosconius penetrated into Apulia, took Salapia and Cannae, and

besieged Canusium. A Samnite corps under Marius Egnatius came to the

help of the unwarlike region and actually drove back the Romans, but

the Roman general succeeded in defeating it at the passage of the

Aufidus; Egnatius fell, and the rest of the army had to seek shelter

behind the walls of Canusium. The Romans again advanced as far

as Venusia and Rubi, and became masters of all Apulia. Along the

Fucine lake also and at the Majella mountains--the chief seats of

the insurrection--the Romans re-established their mastery; the Marsians

succumbed to Strabo's lieutenants, Quintus Metellus Pius and Gaius

Cinna, the Vestinians and Paelignians in the following year (666) to

Strabo himself; Italia the capital of the insurgents became once more

the modest Paelignian country-town of Corfinium; the remnant of the

Italian senate fled to the Samnite territory.

Subjugation of Campania As Far As Nola

Sulla in Samnium

The Roman southern army, which was now under the command of Lucius

Sulla, had at the same time assumed the offensive and had penetrated

into southern Campania which was occupied by the enemy. Stabiae was

taken and destroyed by Sulla in person (30 April 665) and Herculaneum

by Titus Didius, who however fell himself (11 June) apparently at the

assault on that city. Pompeii resisted longer. The Samnite general

Lucius Cluentius came up to bring relief to the town, but he was

repulsed by Sulla; and when, reinforced by bands of Celts, he

renewed his attempt, he was, chiefly owing to the wavering of these

untrustworthy associates, so totally defeated that his camp was taken

and he himself was cut down with the greater part of his troops on

their flight towards Nola. The grateful Roman army conferred on its

general the grass-wreath--the homely badge with which the usage of

the camp decorated the soldier who had by his capacity saved a division

of his comrades. Without pausing to undertake the siege of Nola and

of the other Campanian towns still occupied by the Samnites, Sulla

at once advanced into the interior, which was the head-quarters of

the insurrection. The speedy capture and fearful punishment of

Aeclanum spread terror throughout the Hirpinian country; it submitted

even before the arrival of the Lucanian contingent which had set itself

in motion to render help, and Sulla was able to advance unhindered as

far as the territory of the Samnite confederacy. The pass, where the

Samnite militia under Mutilus awaited him, was turned, the Samnite army

was attacked in rear, and defeated; the camp was lost, the general

escaped wounded to Aesernia. Sulla advanced to Bovianum, the capital of

the Samnite country, and compelled it to surrender by a second victory

achieved beneath its walls. The advanced season alone put an end

to the campaign there.

The Insurrection on the Whole Overpowered

The position of affairs had undergone a most complete change.

Powerful, victorious, aggressive as was the insurrection when it

began the campaign of 665, it emerged from it deeply humbled, everywhere

beaten, and utterly hopeless. All northern Italy was pacified.

In central Italy both coasts were wholly in the Roman power, and the

Abruzzi almost entirely; Apulia as far as Venusia, and Campania as far

as Nola, were in the hands of the Romans; and by the occupation of the

Hirpinian territory the communication was broken off between the only

two regions still persevering in open resistance, the Samnite and the

Lucano-Bruttian. The field of the insurrection resembled the scene

of an immense conflagration dying out; everywhere the eye fell on

ashes and ruins and smouldering brands; here and there the flame

still blazed up among the ruins, but the fire was everywhere mastered,

and there was no further threatening of danger. It is to be

regretted that we no longer sufficiently discern in the superficial

accounts handed down to us the causes of this sudden revolution.

While undoubtedly the dexterous leadership of Strabo and still more

of Sulla, and especially the more energetic concentration of the

Roman forces, and their more rapid offensive contributed materially

to that result, political causes may have been at work along with the

military in producing the singularly rapid fall of the power of the

insurgents; the law of Silvanus and Carbo may have fulfilled its design

in carrying defection and treason to the common cause into the ranks

of the enemy; and misfortune, as has so frequently happened, may

have fallen as an apple of discord among the loosely-connected

insurgent communities.

Perseverance of the Samnites

We see only--and this fact points to an internal breaking up of Italia,

that must certainly have been attended by violent convulsions--that

the Samnites, perhaps under the leadership of the Marsian Quintus Silo

who had been from the first the soul of the insurrection and after the

capitulation of the Marsians had gone as a fugitive to the neighbouring

people, now assumed another organization purely confined to their

own land, and, after "Italia" was vanquished, undertook to continue

the struggle as "Safini" or Samnites.(18) The strong Aesernia was

converted from the fortress that had curbed, into the last retreat

that sheltered, Samnite freedom; an army assembled consisting, it was

said, of 30,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was strengthened by the

manumission and incorporation of 20,000 slaves; five generals were

placed at its head, among whom Silo was the first and Mutilus next to

him. With astonishment men saw the Samnite wars beginning anew after

a pause of two hundred years, and the resolute nation of farmers making

a fresh attempt, just as in the fifth century, after the Italian

confederation was shattered, to force Rome with their own hand to

recognize their country's independence. But this resolution of the

bravest despair made not much change in the main result; although the

mountain-war in Samnium and Lucania might still require some time and

some sacrifices, the insurrection was nevertheless already

substantially at an end.

Outbreak of the Mithradatic War

In the meanwhile, certainly, there had occurred a fresh complication,

for the Asiatic difficulties had rendered it imperatively necessary

to declare war against Mithradates king of Pontus, and for next year

(666) to destine the one consul and a consular army to Asia Minor.

Had this war broken out a year earlier, the contemporary revolt of

the half of Italy and of the most important of the provinces would have

formed an immense peril to the Roman state. Now that the marvellous

good fortune of Rome had once more been evinced in the rapid collapse

of the Italian insurrection, this Asiatic war just beginning was,

notwithstanding its being mixed up with the expiring Italian

struggle, not of a really dangerous character; and the less so,

because Mithradates in his arrogance refused the invitation of the

Italians that he should afford them direct assistance. Still it

was in a high degree inconvenient. The times had gone by, when

they without hesitation carried on simultaneously an Italian and

a transmarine war, the state-chest was already after two years of

warfare utterly exhausted, and the formation of a new army in addition

to that already in the field seemed scarcely practicable. But they

resorted to such expedients as they could. The sale of the sites

that had from ancient times(19) remained unoccupied on and near the

citadel to persons desirous of building, which yielded 9000 pounds of

gold (360,000 pounds), furnished the requisite pecuniary means. No new

army was formed, but that which was under Sulla in Campania was destined

to embark for Asia, as soon as the state of things in southern Italy

should allow its departure; which might be expected, from the progress

of the army operating in the north under Strabo, to happen soon.

Third Campaign

Capture of Venusia

Fall of Silo

So the third campaign in 666 began amidst favourable prospects for

Rome. Strabo put down the last resistance which was still offered

in the Abruzzi. In Apulia the successor of Cosconius, Quintus Metellus

Pius, son of the conqueror of Numidia and not unlike his father in

his strongly conservative views as well as in military endowments,

put an end to the resistance by the capture of Venusia, at which 3000

armed men were taken prisoners. In Samnium Silo no doubt succeeded

in retaking Bovianum; but in a battle, in which he engaged the Roman

general Mamercus Aemilius, the Romans conquered, and--what was more

important than the victory itself--Silo was among the 6000 dead whom

the Samnites left on the field. In Campania the smaller townships,

which the Samnites still occupied, were wrested from them by Sulla,

and Nola was invested. The Roman general Aulus Gabinius penetrated

also into Lucania and gained no small advantages; but, after he had

fallen in an attack on the enemy's camp, Lamponius the insurgent

leader and his followers once more held almost undisturbed command

over the wide and desolate Lucano-Bruttian country. He even made an

attempt to seize Rhegium, which was frustrated, however, by the Sicilian

governor Gaius Norbanus. Notwithstanding isolated mischances the Romans

were constantly drawing nearer to the attainment of their end; the fall

of Nola, the submission of Samnium, the possibility of rendering

considerable forces available for Asia appeared no longer distant,

when the turn taken by affairs in the capital unexpectedly gave fresh

life to the well-nigh extinguished insurrection.

Ferment in Rome

The Bestowal of the Franchise and Its Limitations

Secondary Effect of the Political Prosecutions

Marius

Rome was in a fearful ferment. The attack of Drusus upon the

equestrian courts and his sudden downfall brought about by the

equestrian party, followed by the two-edged Varian warfare of

prosecutions, had sown the bitterest discord between the aristocracy

and the bourgeoisie as well as between the moderates and the ultras.

Events had completely justified the party of concession; what it had

proposed voluntarily to bestow, men had been more than half compelled

to concede; but the mode in which the concession was made bore, just

like the earlier refusal, the stamp of obstinate and shortsighted

envy. Instead of granting equality of rights to all Italian

communities, they had only expressed the inferiority in another form.

They had received a great number of Italian communities into Roman

citizenship, but had attached to what they thus conferred an offensive

stigma, by placing the new burgesses alongside of the old on nearly

the same footing as the freedmen occupied alongside of the freeborn.

They had irritated rather than pacified the communities between the

Po and the Alps by the concession of Latin rights. Lastly, they had

withheld the franchise from a considerable, and that not the worst,

portion of the Italians--the whole of the insurgent communities

which had again submitted; and not only so, but, instead of legally

re-establishing the former treaties annulled by the insurrection, they

had at most renewed them as a matter of favour and subject to revocation

at pleasure.(20) The disability as regarded the right of voting

gave the deeper offence, that it was--as the comitia were then

constituted--politically absurd, and the hypocritical care of the

government for the unstained purity of the electors appeared to every

unprejudiced person ridiculous; but all these restrictions were

dangerous, inasmuch as they invited every demagogue to carry his

ulterior objects by taking up the more or less just demands of the

new burgesses and of the Italians excluded from the franchise. While

accordingly the more clear-seeing of the aristocracy could not but find

these partial and grudging concessions as inadequate as did the new

burgesses and the excluded themselves, they further painfully felt

the absence from their ranks of the numerous and excellent men whom

the Varian commission of high treason had exiled, and whom it was the

more difficult to recall because they had been condemned by the verdict

not of the people but of the jury-courts; for, while there was little

hesitation as to cancelling a decree of the people even of a judicial

character by means of a second, the cancelling of a verdict of

jurymen bythe people appeared to the betterportion of the aristocracy

as a very dangerous precedent. Thus neither the ultras nor the

moderates were content with the issue of the Italian crisis. But still

deeper indignation swelled the heart of the old man, who had gone

forth to the Italian war with freshened hopes and had come back from

it reluctantly, with the consciousness of having rendered new services

and of having received in return new and most severe mortifications,

with the bitter feeling of being no longer dreaded but despised by

his enemies, with that gnawing spirit of vengeance in his heart,

which feeds on its own poison. It was true of him also, as of the

new burgesses and the excluded; incapable and awkward as he had shown

himself to be, his popular name was still a formidable weapon in

the hand of a demagogue.

Decay of Military Discipline

With these elements of political convulsion was combined the rapidly

spreading decay of decorous soldierly habits and of military

discipline. The seeds, which were sown by the enrolment of the

proletariate in the army, developed themselves with alarming rapidity

during the demoralizing insurrectionary war, which compelled Rome

to admit to the service every man capable of bearing arms without

distinction, and which above all carried political partizanship

directly into the headquarters and into the soldiers' tent.

The effects soon appeared in the slackening of all the bonds of

the military hierarchy. During the siege of Pompeii the commander

of the Sullan besieging corps, the consular Aulus Postumius Albinus,

was put to death with stones and bludgeons by his soldiers, who believed

themselves betrayed by their general to the enemy; and Sulla the

commander-in-chief contented himself with exhorting the troops to efface

the memory of that occurrence by their brave conduct in presence of

the enemy. The authors of that deed were the marines, from of old

the least respectable of the troops. A division of legionaries raised

chiefly from the city populace soon followed the example thus given.

Instigated by Gaius Titius, one of the heroes of the market-place, it

laid hands on the consul Cato. By an accident he escaped death on

this occasion; Titius was arrested, but was not punished. When Cato

soon afterwards actually perished in a combat, his own officers, and

particularly the younger Gaius Marius, were--whether justly or unjustly,

cannot be ascertained--designated as the authors of his death.

Economic Crisis

Murder of Asellio

To the political and military crisis thus beginning fell to be added

the economic crisis--perhaps still more terrible--which set in upon the

Roman capitalists in consequence of the Social war and the Asiatic

troubles. The debtors, unable even to raise the interest due and yet

inexorably pressed by their creditors, had on the one hand entreated

from the proper judicial authority, the urban praetor Asellio, a

respite to enable them to dispose of their possessions, and on the

other hand had searched out once more the old obsolete laws as to

usury(21) and, according to the rule established in olden times,

had sued their creditors for fourfold the amount of the interest

paid to them contrary to the law. Asellio lent himself to bend the

actually existing law into conformity with the letter, and put into

shape in the usual way the desired actions for interest; whereupon

the offended creditors assembled in the Forum under the leadership of

the tribune of the people Lucius Cassius, and attacked and killed the

praetor in front of the temple of Concord, just as in his priestly

robes he was presenting a sacrifice--an outrage which was not even

made a subject of investigation (665). On the other hand it was

said in the circles of the debtors, that the suffering multitude could

not be relieved otherwise than by "new account-books," that is, by

legally cancelling the claims of all creditors against all debtors.

Matters stood again exactly as they had stood during the strife

of the orders; once more the capitalists in league with the

prejudiced aristocracy made war against, and prosecuted, the oppressed

multitude and the middle party which advised a modification of the

rigour of the law; once more Rome stood on the verge of that abyss

into which the despairing debtor drags his creditor along with him.

Only, since that time the simple civil and moral organization of a

great agricultural city had been succeeded by the social antagonisms

of a capital of many nations, and by that demoralization in which

the prince and the beggar meet; now all incongruities had come to be

on a broader, more abrupt, and fearfully grander scale. When the

Social war brought all the political and social elements fermenting

among the citizens into collision with each other, it laid the

foundation for a new resolution. An accident led to its outbreak.

The Sulpician Laws

Sulpicius Rufus

It was the tribune of the people Publius Sulpicius Rufus who in 666

proposed to the burgesses to declare that every senator, who owed more

than 2000 -denarii- (82 pounds), should forfeit his seat in the senate;

to grant to the burgesses condemned by non-free jury courts liberty

to return home; to distribute the new burgesses among all the tribes,

and likewise to allow the right of voting in all tribes to the

freedmen. They were proposals which from the mouth of such a man

were at least somewhat surprising. Publius Sulpicius Rufus (born in

630) owed his political importance not so much to his noble birth, his

important connections, and his hereditary wealth, as to his remarkable

oratorical talent, in which none of his contemporaries equalled him.

His powerful voice, his lively gestures sometimes bordering on

theatrical display, the luxuriant copiousness of his flow of words

arrested, even if they did not convince, his hearers. As a partisan

he was from the outset on the side of the senate, and his first public

appearance (659) had been the impeachment of Norbanus who was mortally

hated by the government party.(22) Among the conservatives he belonged

to the section of Crassus and Drusus. We do not know what primarily

gave occasion to his soliciting the tribuneship of the people for 666,

and on its account renouncing his patrician nobility; but he seems

to have been by no means rendered a revolutionist through the

fact that he, like the whole middle party, had been persecuted as

revolutionary by the conservatives, and to have by no means intended

an overthrow of the constitution in the sense of Gaius Gracchus.

It would rather seem that, as the only man of note belonging to

the party of Crassus and Drusus who had come forth uninjured from

the storm of the Varian prosecutions, he felt himself called on

to complete the work of Drusus and finally to set aside the still

subsisting disabilities of the new burgesses--for which purpose he

needed the tribunate. Several acts of his even during his tribuneship

are mentioned, which betray the very opposite of demagogic designs.

For instance, he prevented by his veto one of his colleagues from

cancelling through a decree of the people the sentences of jurymen

issued under the Varian law; and when the late aedile Gaius Caesar,

passing over the praetorship, unconstitutionally became a candidate

for the consulship for 667, with the design, it was alleged, of getting

the charge of the Asiatic war afterwards entrusted to him, Sulpicius

opposed him more resolutely and sharply than any one else. Entirely

in the spirit of Drusus, he thus demanded from himself as from

others primarily and especially the maintenance of the constitution.

But in fact he was as little able as was Drusus to reconcile things

that were incompatible, and to carry out in strict form of law the

change of the constitution which he had in view--a change judicious

in itself, but never to be obtained from the great majority of the

old burgesses by amicable means. His breach with the powerful

family of the Julii--among whom in particular the consular Lucius

Caesar, the brother of Gaius, was very influential in the senate--

and withthesectionof the aristocracy adhering to it, beyond doubt

materially cooperated and carried the irascible man through personal

exasperation beyond his original design.

Tendency of These Laws

Yet the proposals brought in by him were of such a nature as

to be by no means out of keeping with the personal character and

the previous party-position of their author. The equalization of

the new burgesses with the old was simply a partial resumption of

the proposals drawn up by Drusus in favour of the Italians; and,

like these, only carried out the requirements of a sound policy.

The recall of those condemned by the Varian jurymen no doubt sacrificed

the principle of the inviolability of such a sentence, in defence of

which Sulpicius himself had just practically interposed; but it mainly

benefited in the first instance the members of the proposer's own

party, the moderate conservatives, and it may be very well conceived

that so impetuous a man might when first coming forward decidedly

combat such a measure and then, indignant at the resistance which

he encountered, propose it himself. The measure against the

insolvency of senators was doubtless called forth by the exposure

of the economic condition of the ruling families--so deeply embarrassed

notwithstanding all their outward splendour--on occasion of the last

financial crisis. It was painful doubtless, but yet of itself

conducive to the rightly understood interest of the aristocracy,

if, as could not but be the effect of the Sulpician proposal, all

individuals should withdraw from the senate who were unable speedily

to meet their liabilities, and if the coterie-system, which found its

main support in the insolvency of many senators and their consequent

dependence on their wealthy colleagues, should be checked by the

removal of the notoriously venal pack of the senators. At the same

time, of course, we do not mean to deny that such a purification

of the senate-house so abruptly and invidiously exposing the senate,

as Rufus proposed, would certainly never have been proposed without

his personal quarrels with the ruling coterie-heads. Lastly, the

regulationin favour of the freedmen had undoubtedly for its primary

object to make its proposer master of the street; but in itself it

was neither unwarranted nor incompatible with the aristocratic

constitution. Since the freedmen had begun to be drawn upon for

military service, their demand for the right of voting was so far

justified, as the right of voting and the obligation of service had

always gone hand in hand. Moreover, looking to the nullity of the

comitia, it was politically of very little moment whether one sewer

more emptied itself into that slough. The difficulty which the

oligarchy felt in governing with the comitia was lessened rather than

increased by the unlimited admission of the freedmen, who were to a

very great extent personally and financially dependent on the ruling

families and, if rightly used, might quite furnish the government with

a means of controlling the elections more thoroughly than before.

This measure certainly, like every other political favour shown to

the proletariate, ran counter to the tendencies of the aristocracy

friendly to reform; but it was for Rufus hardly anything else

than what the corn-law had been for Drusus--a means of drawing

the proletariate over to his side and of breaking down with its aid

the opposition against the truly beneficial reforms which he meditated.

It was easy to foresee that this opposition would not be slight; that

the narrow-minded aristocracy and the narrow-minded bourgeoisie would

display the same stupid jealousy after the subduing of the insurrection

as they had displayed before its outbreak; that the great majority

of all parties would secretly or even openly characterize the partial

concessions made at the moment of the most formidable danger as

unseasonable compliances, and would passionately resist every attempt

to extend them. The example of Drusus had shown what came of

undertakingto carry conservative reforms solely in reliance on the

majority of the senate; it was a course quite intelligible, that his

friend who shared his views should attempt to carry out kindred designs

in opposition to that majority and under the forms of demagogism.

Rufus accordingly gave himself no trouble to gain the senate over to

his views by the bait of the jury courts. He found a better support

in the freedmen and above all in the armed retinue--consisting,

according to the report of his opponents, of 3000 hired men and an

"opposition-senate" of 600 young men from the better class--with

which he appeared in the streets and in the Forum.

Resistance of the Government

Riots

Position of Sulla

His proposals accordingly met with the most decided resistance from

the majority of the senate, which first, to gain time, induced the

consuls Lucius Cornelius Sulla and Quintus Pompeius Rufus, both declared

opponents of demagogism, to enjoin extraordinary religious observances,

during which the popular assemblies were suspended. Sulpicius

replied by a violent tumult, in which among other victims the young

Quintus Pompeius, son of the one and son-in-law of the other consul,

met his death and the lives of both consuls themselves were seriously

threatened--Sulla is said even to have escaped only by Marius

opening to him his house. They were obliged to yield; Sulla agreed

to countermand the announced solemnities, and the Sulpician proposals

now passed without further difficulty. But this was far from

determining their fate. Though the aristocracy in the capital might

own its defeat, there was now--for the first time since the commencement

of the revolution--yet another power in Italy which could not be

overlooked, viz. the two strong and victorious armies of the proconsul

Strabo and the consul Sulla. The political position of Strabo might

be ambiguous, but Sulla, although he had given way to open violence

for the moment, was on the best terms with the majority of the senate;

and not only so, but he had, immediately after countermanding

the solemnities, departed for Campania to join his army. To terrify

the unarmed consul by bludgeon-men or the defenceless capital by

the swords of the legions, amounted to the same thing in the end:

Sulpicius assumed that his opponent, now when he could, would

requite violence with violence and return to the capital at the head

of his legions to overthrow the conservative demagogue and his laws

along with him. Perhaps he was mistaken. Sulla was just as eager

for the war against Mithradates as he was probably averse to the

political exhalations of the capital; considering his original spirit

of indifference and his unrivalled political nonchalance, there is

great probability that he by no means intended the coup d'etat which

Sulpicius expected, and that, if he had been let alone, he would have

embarked without delay with his troops for Asia so soon as he had

captured Nola, with the siege of which he was still occupied.

Marius Nominated Commander-in-Chief in Sulla's Stead

But, be this as it might, Sulpicius, with a view to parry the presumed

blow, conceived the scheme of taking the supreme command from Sulla;

and for this purpose joined with Marius, whose name was still

sufficiently popular to make a proposal to transfer to him the chief

command in the Asiatic war appear plausible to the multitude, and

whose military position and ability might prove a support in the

event of a rupture with Sulla. Sulpicius probably did not overlook

the danger involved in placing that old man--not less incapable than

vengeful and ambitious--at the head of the Campanian army, and as little

the scandalous irregularity of entrusting an extraordinary supreme

command by decree of the people to a private man; but the very tried

incapacity of Marius as a statesman gave a sort of guarantee that he

would not be able seriously to endanger the constitution, and above

all the personal position of Sulpicius, if he formed a correct

estimate of Sulla's designs, was one of so imminent peril that such

considerations could hardly be longer heeded. That the worn-out

hero himself readily met the wishes of any one who would employ him

as a -condottiere-, was a matter of course; his heart had now for

many years longed for the command in an Asiatic war, and not less

perhaps for an opportunity of once settling accounts thoroughly with

the majority of the senate. Accordingly on the proposal of Sulpicius

Gaius Marius was by decree of the people invested with extraordinary

supreme, or as it was called proconsular, power, and obtained the

command of the Campanian army and the superintendence of the war

against Mithradates; and two tribunes of the people were despatched

to the camp at Nola, to take over the army from Sulla.

Sulla's Recall

The History of Rome (Volumes 1-5) · 第 35 / 54 章