At last the obstinate resistance came to an end. Sparta retained its

independence and was neither compelled to receive back the emigrants

nor to join the Achaean league; even the existing monarchical

constitution, and Nabis himself, were left intact. On the other hand

Nabis had to cede his foreign possessions, Argos, Messene, the Cretan

cities, and the whole coast besides; to bind himself neither to

conclude foreign alliances, nor to wage war, nor to keep any other

vessels than two open boats; and lastly to disgorge all his plunder,

to give to the Romans hostages, and to pay to them a war-contribution.

The towns on the Laconian coast were given to the Spartan emigrants,

and this new community, who named themselves the "free Laconians" in

contrast to the monarchically governed Spartans, were directed to

enter the Achaean league. The emigrants did not receive back their

property, as the district assigned to them was regarded as a

compensation for it; it was stipulated, on the other hand, that

their wives and children should not be detained in Sparta against

their will. The Achaeans, although by this arrangement they gained

the accession of the free Laconians as well as Argos, were yet far

from content; they had expected that the dreaded and hated Nabis would

be superseded, that the emigrants would be brought back, and that

the Achaean symmachy would be extended to the whole Peloponnesus.

Unprejudiced persons, however, will not fail to see that Flamininus

managed these difficult affairs as fairly and justly as it was

possible to manage them where two political parties, both chargeable

with unfairness and injustice stood opposed to each other. With the

old and deep hostility subsisting between the Spartans and Achaeans,

the incorporation of Sparta into the Achaean league would have been

equivalent to subjecting Sparta to the Achaeans, a course no less

contrary to equity than to prudence. The restitution of the

emigrants, and the complete restoration of a government that had been

set aside for twenty years, would only have substituted one reign of

terror for another; the expedient adopted by Flamininus was the right

one, just because it failed to satisfy either of the extreme parties.

At length thorough provision appeared to be made that the Spartan

system of robbery by sea and land should cease, and that the

government there, such as it was, should prove troublesome only

to its own subjects. It is possible that Flamininus, who knew

Nabis and could not but be aware how desirable it was that he should

personally be superseded, omitted to take such a step from the mere

desire to have done with the matter and not to mar the clear

impression of his successes by complications that might be prolonged

beyond all calculation; it is possible, moreover, that he sought

to preserve Sparta as a counterpoise to the power of the Achaean

confederacy in the Peloponnesus. But the former objection relates to

a point of secondary importance; and as to the latter view, it is far

from probable that the Romans condescended to fear the Achaeans.

Final Regulation of Greece

Peace was thus established, externally at least, among the petty Greek

states. But the internal condition of the several communities also

furnished employment to the Roman arbiter. The Boeotians openly

displayed their Macedonian tendencies, even after the expulsion of the

Macedonians from Greece; after Flamininus had at their request allowed

their countrymen who were in the service of Philip to return home,

Brachyllas, the most decided partisan of Macedonia, was elected to the

presidency of the Boeotian confederacy, and Flamininus was otherwise

irritated in every way. He bore it with unparalleled patience; but

the Boeotians friendly to Rome, who knew what awaited them after the

departure of the Romans, determined to put Brachyllas to death, and

Flamininus, whose permission they deemed it necessary to ask, at least

did not forbid them. Brachyllas was accordingly killed; upon which

the Boeotians were not only content with prosecuting the murderers,

but lay in wait for the Roman soldiers passing singly or in small

parties through their territories, and killed about 500 of them.

This was too much to be endured; Flamininus imposed on them a fine

of a talent for every soldier; and when they did not pay it, he

collected the nearest troops and besieged Coronea (558). Now they

betook themselves to entreaty; Flamininus in reality desisted on the

intercession of the Achaeans and Athenians, exacting but a very

moderate fine from those who were guilty; and although the Macedonian

party remained continuously at the helm in the petty province, the

Romans met their puerile opposition simply with the forbearance of

superior power. In the rest of Greece Flamininus contented himself

with exerting his influence, so far as he could do so without

violence, over the internal affairs especially of the newly-freed

communities; with placing the council and the courts in the hands of

the more wealthy and bringing the anti-Macedonian party to the helm;

and with attaching as much as possible the civic commonwealths to the

Roman interest, by adding everything, which in each community should

have fallen by martial law to the Romans, to the common property of

the city concerned. The work was finished in the spring of 560;

Flamininus once more assembled the deputies of all the Greek

communities at Corinth, exhorted them to a rational and moderate use

of the freedom conferred on them, and requested as the only return for

the kindness of the Romans, that they would within thirty days send to

him the Italian captives who had been sold into Greece during the

Hannibalic war. Then he evacuated the last fortresses in which Roman

garrisons were still stationed, Demetrias, Chalcis along with the

smaller forts dependent upon it in Euboea, and Acrocorinthus--thus

practically giving the lie to the assertion of the Aetolians that

Rome had inherited from Philip the "fetters" of Greece--and departed

homeward with all the Roman troops and the liberated captives.

Results

It is only contemptible disingenuousness or weakly sentimentality,

which can fail to perceive that the Romans were entirely in earnest

with the liberation of Greece; and the reason why the plan so nobly

projected resulted in so sorry a structure, is to be sought only in

the complete moral and political disorganization of the Hellenic

nation. It was no small matter, that a mighty nation should have

suddenly with its powerful arm brought the land, which it had been

accustomed to regard as its primitive home and as the shrine of

its intellectual and higher interests, into the possession of

full freedom, and should have conferred on every community in it

deliverance from foreign taxation and foreign garrisons and the

unlimited right of self-government; it is mere paltriness that sees

in this nothing save political calculation. Political calculation

made the liberation of Greece a possibility for the Romans; it was

converted into a reality by the Hellenic sympathies that were at that

time indescribably powerful in Rome, and above all in Flamininus

himself. If the Romans are liable to any reproach, it is that all

of them, and in particular Flamininus who overcame the well-founded

scruples of the senate, were hindered by the magic charm of the

Hellenic name from perceiving in all its extent the wretched character

of the Greek states of that period, and so allowed yet further freedom

for the doings of communities which, owing to the impotent antipathies

that prevailed alike in their internal and their mutual relations,

knew neither how to act nor how to keep quiet. As things stood, it

was really necessary at once to put an end to such a freedom, equally

pitiful and pernicious, by means of a superior power permanently

present on the spot; the feeble policy of sentiment, with all its

apparent humanity, was far more cruel than the sternest occupation

would have been. In Boeotia for instance Rome had, if not to

instigate, at least to permit, a political murder, because the Romans

had resolved to withdraw their troops from Greece and, consequently,

could not prevent the Greeks friendly to Rome from seeking their

remedy in the usual manner of the country. But Rome herself also

suffered from the effects of this indecision. The war with Antiochus

would not have arisen but for the political blunder of liberating

Greece, and it would not have been dangerous but tor the military

blunder of withdrawing the garrisons from the principal fortresses on

the European frontier. History has a Nemesis for every sin--for an

impotent craving after freedom, as well as for an injudicious

generosity.

Notes for Chapter VIII

1. III. III. Acquisition of Territory in Illyria

2. III. VI. Stagnation of the War in Italy

3. There are still extant gold staters, with the head of Flamininus

and the inscription "-T. Quincti(us)-," struck in Greece under the

government of the liberator of the Hellenes. The use of the Latin

language is a significant compliment.

4. III. III. Acquisition of Territory in Illyria

CHAPTER IX

The War with Antiochus of Asia

Antiochus the Great

In the kingdom of Asia the diadem of the Seleucidae had been worn since

531 by king Antiochus the Third, the great-great-grandson of the founder

of the dynasty. He had, like Philip, begun to reign at nineteen years

of age, and had displayed sufficient energy and enterprise, especially

in his first campaigns in the east, to warrant his being without too

ludicrous impropriety addressed in courtly style as "the Great." He

had succeeded--more, however, through the negligence of his opponents

and of the Egyptian Philopator in particular, than through any ability

of his own--in restoring in some degree the integrity of the monarchy,

and in reuniting with his crown first the eastern satrapies of Media

and Parthyene, and then the separate state which Achaeus had founded

on this side of the Taurus in Asia Minor. A first attempt to wrest

from the Egyptians the coast of Syria, the loss of which he sorely

felt, had, in the year of the battle of the Trasimene lake, met with a

bloody repulse from Philopator at Raphia; and Antiochus had taken good

care not to resume the contest with Egypt, so long as a man--even

though he were but an indolent one--occupied the Egyptian throne.

But, after Philopator's death (549), the right moment for crushing

Egypt appeared to have arrived; with that view Antiochus entered into

concert with Philip, and had thrown himself upon Coele-Syria, while

Philip attacked the cities of Asia Minor. When the Romans interposed

in that quarter, it seemed for a moment as if Antiochus would make

common cause with Philip against them--the course suggested by the

position of affairs, as well as by the treaty of alliance. But, not

far-seeing enough to repel at once with all his energy any

interference whatever by the Romans in the affairs of the east,

Antiochus thought that his best course was to take advantage of the

subjugation of Philip by the Romans (which might easily be foreseen),

in order to secure the kingdom of Egypt, which he had previously been

willing to share with Philip, for himself alone. Notwithstanding the

close relations of Rome with the court of Alexandria and her royal

ward, the senate by no means intended to be in reality, what it was in

name, his "protector;" firmly resolved to give itself no concern

about Asiatic affairs except in case of extreme necessity, and to

limit the sphere of the Roman power by the Pillars of Hercules and the

Hellespont, it allowed the great-king to take his course. He himself

was not probably in earnest with the conquest of Egypt proper--which

was more easily talked of than achieved--but he contemplated the

subjugation of the foreign possessions of Egypt one after another, and

at once attacked those in Cilicia as well as in Syria and Palestine.

The great victory, which he gained in 556 over the Egyptian general

Scopas at Mount Panium near the sources of the Jordan, not only gave

him complete possession of that region as far as the frontier of Egypt

proper, but so alarmed the Egyptian guardians of the young king that,

to prevent Antiochus from invading Egypt, they submitted to a peace

and sealed it by the betrothal of their ward to Cleopatra the daughter

of Antiochus. When he had thus achieved his first object, he

proceeded in the following year, that of the battle of Cynoscephalae,

with a strong fleet of 100 decked and 100 open vessels to Asia Minor,

to take possession of the districts that formerly belonged to Egypt on

the south and west coasts of Asia Minor--probably the Egyptian

government had ceded these districts, which were -de facto- in the

hands of Philip, to Antiochus under the peace, and had renounced all

their foreign possessions in his favour--and to recover the Greeks of

Asia Minor generally for his empire. At the same time a strong Syrian

land-army assembled in Sardes.

Difficulties with Rome

This enterprise had an indirect bearing on the Romans who from the

first had laid it down as a condition for Philip that he should

withdraw his garrisons from Asia Minor and should leave to the

Rhodians and Pergamenes their territory and to the free cities their

former constitution unimpaired, and who had now to look on while

Antiochus took possession of them in Philip's place. Attalus and the

Rhodians found themselves now directly threatened by Antiochus with

precisely the same danger as had driven them a few years before into

the war with Philip; and they naturally sought to involve the Romans

in this war as well as in that which had just terminated. Already in

555-6 Attalus had requested from the Romans military aid against

Antiochus, who had occupied his territory while the troops of Attalus

were employed in the Roman war. The more energetic Rhodians even

declared to king Antiochus, when in the spring of 557 his fleet

appeared off the coast of Asia Minor, that they would regard its

passing beyond the Chelidonian islands (off the Lycian coast) as a

declaration of war; and, when Antiochus did not regard the threat,

they, emboldened by the accounts that had just arrived of the battle

at Cynoscephalae, had immediately begun the war and had actually

protected from the king the most important of the Carian cities,

Caunus, Halicarnassus, and Myndus, and the island of Samos. Most of

the half-free cities had submitted to Antiochus, but some of them,

more especially the important cities of Smyrna, Alexandria Troas, and

Lampsacus, had, on learning the discomfiture of Philip, likewise taken

courage to resist the Syrian; and their urgent entreaties were

combined with those of the Rhodians.

It admits of no doubt, that Antiochus, so far as he was at all capable

of forming a resolution and adhering to it, had already made up his

mind not only to attach to his empire the Egyptian possessions in

Asia, but also to make conquests on his own behalf in Europe and, if

not to seek on that account a war with Rome, at any rate to risk it

The Romans had thus every reason to comply with that request of their

allies, and to interfere directly in Asia; but they showed little

inclination to do so. They not only delayed as long as the Macedonian

war lasted, and gave to Attalus nothing but the protection of

diplomatic intercession, which, we may add, proved in the first

instance effective; but even after the victory, while they doubtless

spoke as though the cities which had been in the hands of Ptolemy and

Philip ought not to be taken possession of by Antiochus, and while the

freedom of the Asiatic cities, Myrina, Abydus, Lampsacus,(1) and Cius,

figured in Roman documents, they took not the smallest step to give

effect to it, and allowed king Antiochus to employ the favourable

opportunity presented by the withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons to

introduce his own. In fact, they even went so far as to submit to his

landing in Europe in the spring of 558 and invading the Thracian

Chersonese, where he occupied Sestus and Madytus and spent a

considerable time in the chastisement of the Thracian barbarians and

the restoration of the destroyed Lysimachia, which he had selected as

his chief place of arms and as the capital of the newly-instituted

satrapy of Thrace. Flamininus indeed, who was entrusted with the

conduct of these affairs, sent to the king at Lysimachia envoys, who

talked of the integrity of the Egyptian territory and of the freedom

of all the Hellenes; but nothing came out of it. The king talked in

turn of his undoubted legal title to the ancient kingdom of Lysimachus

conquered by his ancestor Seleucus, explained that he was employed not

in making territorial acquisitions but only in preserving the

integrity of his hereditary dominions, and declined the intervention

of the Romans in his disputes with the cities subject to him in Asia

Minor. With justice he could add that peace had already been

concluded with Egypt, and that the Romans were thus far deprived of

any formal pretext for interfering.(2) The sudden return of the king

to Asia occasioned by a false report of the death of the young king of

Egypt, and the projects which it suggested of a landing in Cyprus or

even at Alexandria, led to the breaking off of the conferences without

coming to any conclusion, still less producing any result. In the

following year, 559, Antiochus returned to Lysimachia with his fleet

and army reinforced, and employed himself in organizing the new

satrapy which he destined for his son Seleucus. Hannibal, who had

been obliged to flee from Carthage, came to him at Ephesus; and the

singularly honourable reception accorded to the exile was virtually a

declaration of war against Rome. Nevertheless Flamininus in the

spring of 560 withdrew all the Roman garrisons from Greece. This was

under the existing circumstances at least a mischievous error, if not

a criminal acting in opposition to his own better knowledge; for we

cannot dismiss the idea that Flamininus, in order to carry home with

him the undiminished glory of having wholly terminated the war and

liberated Hellas, contented himself with superficially covering up for

the moment the smouldering embers of revolt and war. The Roman

statesman might perhaps be right, when he pronounced any attempt to

bring Greece directly under the dominion of the Romans, and any

intervention of the Romans in Asiatic affairs, to be a political

blunder; but the opposition fermenting in Greece, the feeble arrogance

of the Asiatic king, the residence, at the Syrian head-quarters, of

the bitter enemy of the Romans who had already raised the west in arms

against Rome--all these were clear signs of the approach of a fresh

rising in arms on the part of the Hellenic east, which could not but

have for its aim at least to transfer Greece from the clientship of

Rome to that of the states opposed to Rome, and, if this object should

be attained, would immediately extend the circle of its operations.

It is plain that Rome could not allow this to take place. When

Flamininus, ignoring all these sure indications of war, withdrew the

garrisons from Greece, and yet at the same time made demands on the

king of Asia which he had no intention of employing his army to

support, he overdid his part in words as much as he fell short in

action, and forgot his duty as a general and as a citizen in the

indulgence of his personal vanity--a vanity, which wished to confer,

and imagined that it had conferred, peace on Rome and freedom

on the Greeks of both continents.

Preparations of Antiochus for War with Rome

Antiochus employed the unexpected respite in strengthening his

position at home and his relations with his neighbours before

beginning the war, on which for his part he was resolved, and became

all the more so, the more the enemy appeared to procrastinate. He now

(561) gave his daughter Cleopatra, previously betrothed, in marriage

to the young king of Egypt. That he at the same time promised to

restore the provinces wrested from his son-in-law, was afterwards

affirmed on the part of Egypt, but probably without warrant; at any

rate the land remained actually attached to the Syrian kingdom.(3)

He offered to restore to Eumenes, who had in 557 succeeded his father

Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, the towns taken from him, and to

give him also one of his daughters in marriage, if he would abandon

the Roman alliance. In like manner he bestowed a daughter on

Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gained the Galatians by presents,

while he reduced by arms the Pisidians who were constantly in revolt,

and other small tribes. Extensive privileges were granted to the

Byzantines; respecting the cities in Asia Minor, the king declared

that he would permit the independence of the old free cities such as

Rhodes and Cyzicus, and would be content in the case of the others

with a mere formal recognition of his sovereignty; he even gave them

to understand that he was ready to submit to the arbitration of the

Rhodians. In European Greece he could safely count on the Aetolians,

and he hoped to induce Philip again to take up arms. In fact, a plan

of Hannibal obtained the royal approval, according to which he was to

receive from Antiochus a fleet of 100 sail and a land army of 10,000

infantry and 1000 cavalry, and was to employ them in kindling first

a third Punic war in Carthage, and then a second Hannibalic war in

Italy; Tyrian emissaries proceeded to Carthage to pave the way for a

rising in arms there(4) Finally, good results were anticipated from

the Spanish insurrection, which, at the time when Hannibal left

Carthage, was at its height.(5)

Aetolian Intrigues against Rome

While the storm was thus gathering from far and wide against Rome, it

was on this, as on all occasions, the Hellenes implicated in the

enterprise, who were of the least moment, and yet took action of the

greatest importance and with the utmost impatience. The exasperated

and arrogant Aetolians began by degrees to persuade themselves that

Philip had been vanquished by them and not by the Romans, and could

not even wait till Antiochus should advance into Greece. Their policy

is characteristically expressed in the reply, which their -strategus-

gave soon afterwards to Flamininus, when he requested a copy of the

declaration of war against Rome: that he would deliver it to him in

person, when the Aetolian army should encamp on the Tiber. The

Aetolians acted as the agents of the Syrian king in Greece and

deceived both parties, by representing to the king that all the

Hellenes were waiting with open arms to receive him as their true

deliverer, and by telling those in Greece who were disposed to listen

to them that the landing of the king was nearer than it was in

reality. Thus they actually succeeded in inducing the simple

obstinacy of Nabis to break loose and to rekindle in Greece the flame

of war two years after Flamininus's departure, in the spring of 562;

but in doing so they missed their aim. Nabis attacked Gythium, one of

the towns of the free Laconians that by the last treaty had been

annexed to the Achaean league, and took it; but the experienced

-strategus- of the Achaeans, Philopoemen, defeated him at the

Barbosthenian mountains, and the tyrant brought back barely a fourth

part of his army to his capital, in which Philopoemen shut him up. As

such a commencement was no sufficient inducement for Antiochus to come

to Europe, the Aetolians resolved to possess themselves of Sparta,

Chalcis, and Demetrias, and by gaining these important towns to

prevail upon the king to embark. In the first place they thought to

become masters of Sparta, by arranging that the Aetolian Alexamenus

should march with 1000 men into the town under pretext of bringing a

contingent in terms of the alliance, and should embrace the

opportunity of making away with Nabis and of occupying the town. This

was done, and Nabis was killed at a review of the troops; but, when

the Aetolians dispersed to plunder the town, the Lacedaemonians found

time to rally and slew them to the last man. The city was then

induced by Philopoemen to join the Achaean league. After this

laudable project of the Aetolians had thus not only deservedly failed,

but had had precisely the opposite effect of uniting almost the whole

Peloponnesus in the hands of the other party, it fared little better

with them at Chalcis, for the Roman party there called in the citizens

of Eretria and Carystus in Euboea, who were favourable to Rome, to

render seasonable aid against the Aetolians and the Chalcidian exiles.

On the other hand the occupation of Demetrias was successful, for the

Magnetes to whom the city had been assigned were, not without reason,

apprehensive that it had been promised by the Romans to Philip as a

prize in return for his aid against Antiochus; several squadrons of

Aetolian horse moreover managed to steal into the town under the

pretext of forming an escort for Eurylochus, the recalled head of the

opposition to Rome. Thus the Magnetes passed over, partly of their

own accord, partly by compulsion, to the side of the Aetolians, and

the latter did not fail to make use of the fact at the court of the

Seleucid.

Rupture between Antiochus and the Romans

Antiochus took his resolution. A rupture with Rome, in spite of

endeavours to postpone it by the diplomatic palliative of embassies,

could no longer be avoided. As early as the spring of 561 Flamininus,

who continued to have the decisive voice in the senate as to eastern

affairs, had expressed the Roman ultimatum to the envoys of the king,

Menippus and Hegesianax; viz. that he should either evacuate Europe

and dispose of Asia at his pleasure, or retain Thrace and submit to

the Roman protectorate over Smyrna, Lampsacus, and Alexandria Troas.

These demands had been again discussed at Ephesus, the chief place of

arms and fixed quarters of the king in Asia Minor, in the spring of

562, between Antiochus and the envoys of the senate, Publius Sulpicius

and Publius Villius; and they had separated with the conviction on

both sides thata peaceful settlement was no longer possible.

Thenceforth war was resolved on in Rome. In that very summer of 562

a Roman fleet of 30 sail, with 3000 soldiers on board, under Aulus

Atilius Serranus, appeared off Gythium, where their arrival

accelerated the conclusion of the treaty between the Achaeans

and Spartans; the eastern coasts of Sicily and Italy were strongly

garrisoned, so as to be secure against any attempts at a landing; a

land army was expected in Greece in the autumn. Since the spring of

562 Flamininus, by direction of the senate, had journeyed through

Greece to thwart the intrigues of the opposite party, and to

counteract as far as possible the evil effects of the ill-timed

evacuation of the country. The Aetolians had already gone so far as

formally to declare war in their diet against Rome. But Flamininus

succeeded In saving Chalcis for the Romans by throwing into it a

garrison of 500 Achaeans and 500 Pergamenes. He made an attempt also

to recover Demetrias; and the Magnetes wavered. Though some towns in

Asia Minor, which Antiochus had proposed to subdue before beginning

the great war, still held out, he could now no longer delay his

landing, unless he was willing to let the Romans recover all the

advantages which they had surrendered two years before by withdrawing

their garrisons from Greece. He collected the vessels and troops

which were at hand--he had but 40 decked vessels and 10,000 infantry,

along with 500 horse and 6 elephants--and started from the Thracian

Chersonese for Greece, where he landed in the autumn of 562 at

Pteleum on the Pagasaean gulf, and immediately occupied the adjoining

Demetrias. Nearly about the same time a Roman army of some 25,000 men

under the praetor Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia. The war was

thus begun on both sides.

Attitude of the Minor Powers

Carthage and Hannibal

Everything depended on the extent to which that comprehensively-

planned coalition against Rome, of which Antiochus came forward as the

head, might be realized. As to the plan, first of all, of stirring

up enemies to the Romans in Carthage and Italy, it was the fate of

Hannibal at the court of Ephesus, as through his whole career, to have

projected his noble and high-spirited plans for the behoof of people

pedantic and mean. Nothing was done towards their execution, except

that some Carthaginian patriots were compromised; no choice was left

to the Carthaginians but to show unconditional submission to Rome.

The camarilla would have nothing to do with Hannibal--such a man was

too inconveniently great for court cabals; and, after having tried all

sorts of absurd expedients, such as accusing the general, with whose

name the Romans frightened their children, of concert with the Roman

envoys, they succeeded in persuading Antiochus the Great, who like all

insignificant monarchs plumed himself greatly on his independence and

was influenced by nothing so easily as by the fear of being ruled,

into the wise belief that he ought not to allow himself to be thrown

into the shade by so celebrated a man. Accordingly it was in solemn

council resolved that the Phoenician should be employed in future

only for subordinate enterprises and for giving advice--with the

reservation, of course, that the advice should never be followed.

Hannibal revenged himself on the rabble, by accepting every commission

and brilliantly executing all.

States of Asia Minor

In Asia Cappadocia adhered to the great-king; Prusias of Bithynia on

the other hand took, as always, the side of the stronger. King

Eumenes remained faithful to the old policy of his house, which was

now at length to yield to him its true fruit. He had not only

persistently refused |the offers of Antiochus, but had constantly

urged the Romans to a war, from which he expected the aggrandizement

of his kingdom. The Rhodians and Byzantines likewise joined their

old allies. Egypt too took the side of Rome and offered support in

supplies and men; which, however, the Romans did not accept.

Macedonia

In Europe the result mainly depended on the position which Philip of

Macedonia would take up. It would have been perhaps the right policy

for him, notwithstanding all the injuries or shortcomings of the past,

to unite with Antiochus. But Philip was ordinarily influenced not by

such considerations, but by his likings and dislikings; and his hatred

was naturally directed much more against the faithless ally, who had

left him to contend alone with the common enemy, had sought merely to

seize his own share in the spoil, and had become a burdensome

neighbour to him in Thrace, than against the conqueror, who had

treated him respectfully and honourably. Antiochus had, moreover,

given deep offence to the hot temper of Philip by the setting up of

absurd pretenders to the Macedonian crown, and by the ostentatious

burial of the Macedonian bones bleaching at Cynoscephalae. Philip

therefore placed his whole force with cordial zeal at the disposal

of the Romans.

The Lesser Greek States

The second power of Greece, the Achaean league, adhered no less

decidedly than the first to the alliance with Rome. Of the smaller

powers, the Thessalians and the Athenians held by Rome; among the

latter an Achaean garrison introduced by Flamininus into the citadel

brought the patriotic party, which was pretty strong, to reason. The

Epirots exerted themselves to keep on good terms, if possible, with

both parties. Thus, in addition to the Aetolians and the Magnetes who

were joined by a portion of the neighbouring Perrhaebians, Antiochus

was supported only by Amynander, the weak king of the Athamanes, who

allowed himself to be dazzled by foolish designs on the Macedonian

crown; by the Boeotians, among whom the party opposed to Rome was

still at the helm; and in the Peloponnesus by the Eleans and

Messenians, who were in the habit of taking part with the Aetolians

against the Achaeans. This was indeed a hopeful beginning; and the

title of commander-in-chief with absolute power, which the Aetolians

decreed to the great-king, seemed insult added to injury. There had

been, just as usual, deception on both sides. Instead of the

countless hordes of Asia, the king brought up a force scarcely half as

strong as an ordinary consular army; and instead of the open arms with

which all the Hellenes were to welcome their deliverer from the Roman

yoke, one or two bands of klephts and some dissolute civic communities

offered to the king brotherhood in arms.

Antiochus in Greece

For the moment, indeed, Antiochus had anticipated the Romans in Greece

proper. Chalcis was garrisoned by the Greek allies of the Romans, and

refused the first summons but the fortress surrendered when Antiochus

advanced with all his force; and a Roman division, which arrived too

late to occupy it, was annihilated by Antiochus at Deliurn. Euboea

was thus lost to the Romans. Antiochus still made even in winter

an attempt, in concert with the Aetolians and Athamanes, to gain

Thessaly; Thermopylae was occupied, Pherae and other towns were taken,

but Appius Claudius came up with 2000 men from Apollonia, relieved

Larisa, and took up his position there. Antiochus, tired of the

winter campaign, preferred to return to his pleasant quarters at

Chalcis, where the time was spent merrily, and the king even, in spite

of his fifty years and his warlike schemes, wedded a fair Chalcidian.

So the winter of 562-3 passed, without Antiochus doing much more than

sending letters hither and thither through Greece: he waged the war

--a Roman officer remarked--by means of pen and ink.

Landing of the Romans

In the beginning of spring 563 the Roman staff arrived at Apollonia.

The commander-in-chief was Manius Acilius Glabrio, a man of humble

origin, but an able general feared both by his soldiers and by the

enemy; the admiral was Gaius Livius; and among the military tribunes

were Marcus Porcius Cato, the conqueror of Spain, and Lucius Valerius

Flaccus, who after the old Roman wont did not disdain, although they

had been consuls, to re-enter the army as simple war-tribunes. They

brought with them reinforcements in ships and men, including Numidian

cavalry and Libyan elephants sent by Massinissa, and the permission

of the senate to accept auxiliary troops to the number of 5000 from

the extra-Italian allies, so that the whole number of the Roman forces

was raised to about 40,000 men. The king, who in the beginning of

spring had gone to the Aetolians and had thence made an aimless

expedition to Acarnania, on the news of Glabrio's landing returned to

his head-quarters to begin the campaign in earnest. But incom

prehensibly, through his own negligence and that of his lieutenants in

Asia, reinforcements had wholly failed to reach him, so that he had

nothing but the weak army--now further decimated by sickness and

desertion in its dissolute winter-quarters--with which he had landed

at Pteleum in the autumn of the previous year. The Aetolians too, who

had professed to send such enormous numbers into the field, now, when

their support was of moment, brought to their commander-in-chief no

more than 4000 men. The Roman troops had already begun operations in

Thessaly, where the vanguard in concert with the Macedonian army drove

the garrisons of Antiochus out of the Thessalian towns and occupied

the territory of the Athamanes. The consul with the main army

followed; the whole force of the Romans assembled at Larisa.

Battle at Thermopylae

Greece Occupied by the Romans

Resistance of the Aetolians

Instead of returning with all speed to Asia and evacuating the field

before an enemy in every respect superior, Antiochus resolved to

entrench himself at Thermopylae, which he had occupied, and there to

await the arrival of the great army from Asia. He himself took up a

position in the chief pass, and commanded the Aetolians to occupy the

mountain-path, by which Xerxes had formerly succeeded in turning the

Spartans. But only half of the Aetolian contingent was pleased to

comply with this order of the commander-in-chief; the other 2000 men

threw themselves into the neighbouring town of Heraclea, where they

took no other part in the battle than that of attempting during its

progress to surprise and plunder the Roman camp. Even the Aetolians

posted on the heights discharged their duty of watching with

remissness and reluctance; their post on the Callidromus allowed

itself to be surprised by Cato, and the Asiatic phalanx, which the

consul had meanwhile assailed in front, dispersed, when the Romans

hastening down the mountain fell upon its flank. As Antiochus had

made no provision for any case and had not thought of retreat, the

army was destroyed partly on the field of battle, partly during its

flight; with difficulty a small band reached Demetrias, and the king

himself escaped to Chalcis with 500 men. He embarked in haste for

Ephesus; Europe was lost to him all but his possessions in Thrace, and

even the fortresses could be no longer defended Chalcis surrendered to

the Romans, and Demetrias to Philip, who received permission--as a

compensation for the conquest of the town of Lamia in Achaia

Phthiotis, which he was on the point of accomplishing and had then

abandoned by orders of the consul--to make himself master of all the

communities that had gone over to Antiochus in Thessaly proper, and

even of the territories bordering on Aetolia, the districts of Dolopia

and Aperantia. All the Greeks that had pronounced in favour of

Antiochus hastened to make their peace; the Epirots humbly besought

pardon for their ambiguous conduct, the Boeotians surrendered at

discretion, the Eleans and Messenians, the latter after some struggle,

submitted to the Achaeans. The prediction of Hannibal to the king was

fulfilled, that no dependence at all could be placed upon the Greeks,

who would submit to any conqueror. Even the Aetolians, when their

corps shut up in Heraclea had been compelled after obstinate

resistance to capitulate, attempted to make their peace with the

sorely provoked Romans; but the stringent demands of the Roman consul,

and a consignment of money seasonably arriving from Antiochus,

emboldened them once more to break off the negotiations and to sustain

for two whole months a siege in Naupactus. The town was already

reduced to extremities, and its capture or capitulation could not have

been long delayed, when Flamininus, constantly striving to save every

Hellenic community from the worst consequences of its own folly and

from the severity of his ruder colleagues, interposed and arranged in

the first instance an armistice on tolerable terms. This terminated,

at least for the moment, armed resistance in Greece.

Maritime War, and Preparations for Crossing to Asia

Polyxenidas and Pausistratus

Engagement off Aspendus

Battle of Myonnesus

A more serious war was impending in Asia--a war which appeared of a

very hazardous character on account not so much of the enemy as of the

great distance and the insecurity of the communications with home,

while yet, owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of Antiochus, the

struggle could not well be terminated otherwise than by an attack on

the enemy in his own country. The first object was to secure the sea.

The Roman fleet, which during the campaign in Greece was charged with

the task of interrupting the communication between Greece and Asia

Minor, and which had been successful about the time of the battle at

Thermopylae in seizing a strong Asiatic transport fleet near Andros,

was thenceforth employed in making preparations for the crossing of

the Romans to Asia next year and first of all in driving the enemy's

fleet out of the Aegean Sea. It lay in the harbour of Cyssus on the

southern shore of the tongue of land that projects from Ionia towards

Chios; thither in search of it the Roman fleet proceeded, consisting

of 75 Roman, 24 Pergamene, and 6 Carthaginian, decked vessels under

the command of Gaius Livius. The Syrian admiral, Polyxenidas, a

Rhodian emigrant, had only 70 decked vessels to oppose to it; but, as

the Roman fleet still expected the ships of Rhodes, and as Polyxenidas

relied on the superior seaworthiness of his vessels, those of Tyre and

Sidon in particular, he immediately accepted battle. At the outset

the Asiatics succeeded in sinking one of the Carthaginian vessels;

but, when they came to grapple, Roman valour prevailed, and it was

owing solely to the swiftness of their rowing and sailing that the

enemy lost no more than 23 ships. During the pursuit the Roman fleet

was joined by 25 ships from Rhodes, and the superiority of the Romans

in those waters was now doubly assured. The enemy's fleet thenceforth

kept the shelter of the harbour of Ephesus, and, as it could not be

induced to risk a second battle, the fleet of the Romans and allies

broke up for the winter; the Roman ships of war proceeded to the

harbour of Cane in the neighbourhood of Pergamus. Both parties were

busy during the winter in preparing for the next campaign. The Romans

sought to gain over the Greeks of Asia Minor; Smyrna, which had

perseveringly resisted all the attempts of the king to get possession

of the city, received the Romans with open arms, and the Roman party

gained the ascendency in Samos, Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Phocaea,

Cyme, and elsewhere. Antiochus was resolved, if possible, to prevent

the Romans from crossing to Asia, and with that view he made zealous

naval preparations--employing Polyxenidas to fit out and augment the

fleet stationed at Ephesus, and Hannibal to equip a new fleet in

Lycia, Syria, and Phoenicia; while he further collected in Asia Minor

a powerful land army from all regions of his extensive empire. Early

next year (564) the Roman fleet resumed its operations. Gaius Livius

left the Rhodian fleet--which had appeared in good time this year,

numbering 36 sail--to observe that of the enemy in the offing of

Ephesus, and went with the greater portion of the Roman and Pergamene

vessels to the Hellespont in accordance with his instructions, to

pave the way for the passage of the land army by the capture of the

fortresses there. Sestus was already occupied and Abydus reduced to

extremities, when the news of the defeat of the Rhodian fleet recalled

him. The Rhodian admiral Pausistratus, lulled into security by the

representations of his countryman that he wished to desert from

Antiochus, had allowed himself to be surprised in the harbour of

Samos; he himself fell, and all his vessels were destroyed except five

Rhodian and two Coan ships; Samos, Phocaea, and Cyme on hearing the

news went over to Seleucus, who held the chief command by land in

those provinces for his father.

But when the Roman fleet arrived partly from Cane, partly from the

Hellespont, and was after some time joined by twenty new ships of the

Rhodians at Samos, Polyxenidas was once more compelled to shut himself

up in the harbour of Ephesus. As he declined the offered naval

battle, and as, owing to the small numbers of the Roman force, an

attack by land was not to be thought of, nothing remained for the

Roman fleet but to take up its position in like manner at Samos. A

division meanwhile proceeded to Patara on the Lycian coast, partly to

relieve the Rhodians from the very troublesome attacks that were

directed against them from that quarter, partly and chiefly to prevent

the hostile fleet, which Hannibal was expected to bring up, from

entering the Aegean Sea. When the squadron sent against Patara

achieved nothing, the new admiral Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who had

arrived with 20 war-vessels from Rome and had relieved Gaius Livius at

Samos, was so indignant that he proceeded thither with the whole

fleet; his officers with difficulty succeeded, while they were on

their voyage, in making him understand that the primary object was not

the conquest of Patara but the command of the Aegean Sea, and in

inducing him to return to Samos. On the mainland of Asia Minor

Seleucus had in the meanwhile begun the siege of Pergamus, while

Antiochus with his chief army ravaged the Pergamene territory and the

possessions of the Mytilenaeans on the mainland; they hoped to crush

the hated Attalids, before Roman aid appeared. The Roman fleet went

to Elaea and the port of Adramytium to help their ally; but, as the

admiral wanted troops, he accomplished nothing. Pergamus seemed lost;

but the laxity and negligence with which the siege was conducted

allowed Eumenes to throw into the city Achaean auxiliaries under

Diophanes, whose bold and successful sallies compelled the Gallic

mercenaries, whom Antiochus had entrusted with the siege, to raise it.

In the southern waters too the projects of Antiochus were frustrated.

The fleet equipped and led by Hannibal, after having been long

detained by the constant westerly winds, attempted at length to reach

the Aegean; but at the mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in

Pamphylia, it encountered a Rhodian squadron under Eudamus; and in the

battle, which ensued between the two fleets, the excellence of the

Rhodian ships and naval officers carried the victory over Hannibal's

tactics and his numerical superiority. It was the first naval battle,

and the last battle against Rome, fought by the great Carthaginian.

The victorious Rhodian fleet then took its station at Patara, and

there prevented the intended junction of the two Asiatic fleets. In

the Aegean Sea the Romano-Rhodian fleet at Samos, after being weakened

by detaching the Pergamene ships to the Hellespont to support the land

army which had arrived there, was in its turn attacked by that of

Polyxenidas, who now numbered nine sail more than his opponents. On

December 23 of the uncorrected calendar, according to the corrected

calendar about the end of August, in 564, a battle took place at the

promontory of Myonnesus between Teos and Colophon; the Romans broke

through the line of the enemy, and totally surrounded the left wing,

so that they took or sank 42 ships. An inscription in Saturnian verse

over the temple of the Lares Permarini, which was built in the Campus

Martius in memory of this victory, for many centuries thereafter

proclaimed to the Romans how the fleet of the Asiatics had been

defeated before the eyes of king Antiochus and of all his land army,

and how the Romans thus "settled the mighty strife and subdued the

kings." Thenceforth the enemy's ships no longer ventured to show

themselves on the open sea, and made no further attempt to obstruct

the crossing of the Roman land army.

Expedition to Asia

The conqueror of Zama had been selected at Rome to conduct the war on

the Asiatic continent; he practically exercised the supreme command

for the nominal commander-in-chief, his brother Lucius Scipio, whose

intellect was insignificant, and who had no military capacity. The

reserve hitherto stationed in Lower Italy was destined for Greece, the

army of Glabrio for Asia: when it became known who was to command it,

5000 veterans from the Hannibalic war voluntarily enrolled, to fight

once more under their beloved leader. In the Roman July, but

according to the true time in March, the Scipios arrived at the army

to commence the Asiatic campaign; but they were disagreeably surprised

to find themselves instead involved, in the first instance, in an

endless struggle with the desperate Aetolians. The senate, finding

that Flamininus pushed his boundless consideration for the Hellenes

too far, had left the Aetolians to choose between paying an utterly

exorbitant war contribution and unconditional surrender, and thus had

driven them anew to arms; none could tell when this warfare among

mountains and strongholds would come to an end. Scipio got rid

of the inconvenient obstacle by concerting a six-months' armistice,

and then entered on his march to Asia. As the one fleet of the enemy

was only blockaded in the Aegean Sea, and the other, which was coming

up from the south, might daily arrive there in spite of the squadron

charged to intercept it, it seemed advisable to take the land route

through Macedonia and Thrace and to cross the Hellespont. In that

direction no real obstacles were to be anticipated; for Philip of

Macedonia might be entirely depended on, Prusias king of Bithynia was

in alliance with the Romans, and the Roman fleet could easily

establish itself in the straits. The long and weary march along the

coast of Macedonia and Thrace was accomplished without material loss;

Philip made provision on the one hand for supplying their wants, on

the other for their friendly reception by the Thracian barbarians.

They had lost so much time however, partly with the Aetolians, partly

on the march, that the army only reached the Thracian Chersonese about

the time of the battle of Myonnesus. But the marvellous good fortune

of Scipio now in Asia, as formerly in Spain and Africa, cleared his

path of all difficulties.

Passage of the Hellespont by the Romans

On the news of the battle at Myonnesus Antiochus so completely lost

his judgment, that in Europe he caused the strongly-garrisoned and

well-provisioned fortress of Lysimachia to be evacuated by the

garrison and by the inhabitants who were faithfully devoted to the

restorer of their city, and withal even forgot to withdraw in like

manner the garrisons or to destroy the rich magazines at Aenus and

Maronea; and on the Asiatic coast he opposed not the slightest

resistance to the landing of the Romans, but on the contrary, while

it was taking place, spent his time at Sardes in upbraiding destiny.

It is scarcely doubtful that, had he but provided for the defence of

Lysimachia down to the no longer distant close of the summer, and

moved forward his great army to the Hellespont, Scipio would have

been compelled to take up winter quarters on the European shore,

in a position far from being, in a military or political point

of view, secure.

While the Romans, after disembarking on the Asiatic shore, paused for

some days to refresh themselves and to await their leader who was

detained behind by religious duties, ambassadors from the great-king

arrived in their camp to negotiate for peace. Antiochus offered half

the expenses of the war, and the cession of his European possessions

as well as of all the Greek cities in Asia Minor that had gone over to

Rome; but Scipio demanded the whole costs of the war and the surrender

of all Asia Minor. The former terms, he declared, might have been

accepted, had the army still been before Lysimachia, or even on the

European side of the Hellespont; but they did not suffice now, when

the steed felt the bit and knew its rider. The attempts of the great-

king to purchase peace from his antagonist after the Oriental manner

by sums of money--he offered the half of his year's revenues!--failed

as they deserved; the proud burgess, in return for the gratuitous

restoration of his son who had fallen a captive, rewarded the great-

king with the friendly advice to make peace on any terms. This was

not in reality necessary: had the king possessed the resolution to

prolong the war and to draw the enemy after him by retreating into the

interior, a favourable issue was still by no means impossible. But

Antiochus, irritated by the presumably intentional arrogance of his

antagonist, and too indolent for any persevering and consistent

warfare, hastened with the utmost eagerness to expose his unwieldy,

but unequal, and undisciplined mass of an army to the shock of the

Roman legions.

Battle of Magnesia

In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia at the foot of Mount

Sipylus not far from Smyrna, the Roman troops fell in with the enemy

late in the autumn of 564. The force of Antiochus numbered close on

80,000 men, of whom 12,000 were cavalry; the Romans--who had along

with them about 5000 Achaeans, Pergamenes, and Macedonian volunteers

--had not nearly half that number, but they were so sure of victory,

that they did not even wait for the recovery of their general who had

remained behind sick at Elaea; Gnaeus Domitius took the command in his

stead. Antiochus, in order to be able even to place his immense mass

of troops, formed two divisions. In the first were placed the mass of

the light troops, the peltasts, bowmen, slingers, the mounted archers

of Mysians, Dahae, and Elymaeans, the Arabs on their dromedaries, and

the scythe-chariots. In the second division the heavy cavalry (the

Cataphractae, a sort of cuirassiers) were stationed on the flanks;

next to these, in the intermediate division, the Gallic and

Cappadocian infantry; and in the very centre the phalanx armed after

the Macedonian fashion, 16,000 strong, the flower of the army, which,

however, had not room in the narrow space and had to be drawn up in

double files 32 deep. In the space between the two divisions were

placed 54 elephants, distributed between the bands of the phalanx and

of the heavy cavalry. The Romans stationed but a few squadrons on the

left wing, where the river gave protection; the mass of the cavalry

and all the light armed were placed on the right, which was led by

Eumenes; the legions stood in the centre. Eumenes began the battle by

despatching his archers and slingers against the scythe-chariots with

orders to shoot at the teams; in a short time not only were these

thrown into disorder, but the camel-riders stationed next to them were

also carried away, and even in the second division the left wing of

heavy cavalry placed behind fell into confusion. Eumenes now threw

himself with all the Roman cavalry, numbering 3000 horse, on the

mercenary infantry, which was placed in the second division between

the phalanx and the left wing of heavy cavalry, and, when these gave

way, the cuirassiers who had already fallen into disorder also fled.

The phalanx, which had just allowed the light troops to pass through

and was preparing to advance against the Roman legions, was hampered

by the attack of the cavalry in flank, and compelled to stand still

and to form front on both sides--a movement which the depth of its

disposition favoured. Had the heavy Asiatic cavalry been at hand, the

battle might have been restored; but the left wing was shattered, and

the right, led by Antiochus in person, had driven before it the little

division of Roman cavalry opposed to it, and had reached the Roman

camp, which was with great difficulty defended from its attack. In

this way the cavalry were at the decisive moment absent from the scene

of action. The Romans were careful not to assail the phalanx with

their legions, but sent against it the archers and slingers, not one

of whose missiles failed to take effect on the densely-crowded mass.

The phalanx nevertheless retired slowly and in good order, till the

elephants stationed in the interstices became frightened and broke the

ranks. Then the whole army dispersed in tumultuous flight; an attempt

to hold the camp failed, and only increased the number of the dead and

the prisoners. The estimate of the loss of Antiochus at 50,000 men

is, considering the infinite confusion, not incredible; the legions of

the Romans had never been engaged, and the victory, which gave them a

third continent, cost them 24 horsemen and 300 foot soldiers. Asia

Minor submitted; including even Ephesus, whence the admiral had

hastily to withdraw his fleet, and Sardes the residence of the court.

Conclusion of Peace

Expedition against the Celts of Asia Minor

Regulation of the Affairs of Asia Minor

The king sued for peace and consented to the terms proposed by the

Romans, which, as usual, were just the same as those offered before

the battle and consequently included the cession of Asia Minor. Till

they were ratified, the army remained in Asia Minor at the expense of

the king; which came to cost him not less than 3000 talents (730,000

pounds). Antiochus himself in his careless fashion soon consoled

himself for the loss of half his kingdom; it was in keeping with his

character, that he declared himself grateful to the Romans for saving

him the trouble of governing too large an empire. But with the day of

Magnesia Asia was erased from the list of great states; and never

perhaps did a great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so

ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidae under this Antiochus

the Great. He himself was soon afterwards (567) slain by the

indignant inhabitants of Elymais at the head of the Persian gulf, on

occasion of pillaging the temple of Bel, with the treasures of which

he had sought to replenish his empty coffers.

The Roman government, after having achieved the victory, had to

arrange the affairs of Asia Minor and of Greece. If the Roman rule

was here to be erected on a firm foundation, it was by no means enough

that Antiochus should have renounced the supremacy in the west of Asia

Minor. The circumstances of the political situation there have been

set forth above.(6) The Greek free cities on the Ionian and Aeolian

coast, as well as the kingdom of Pergamus of a substantially similar

nature, were certainly the natural pillars of the new Roman supreme

power, which here too came forward essentially as protector of the

Hellenes kindred in race. But the dynasts in the interior of Asia

Minor and on the north coast of the Black Sea had hardly yielded for

long any serious obedience to the kings of Asia, and the treaty with

Antiochus alone gave to the Romans no power over the interior. It was

indispensable to draw a certain line within which the Roman influence

was henceforth to exercise control. Here the element of chief

importance was the relation of the Asiatic Hellenes to the Celts who

had been for a century settled there. These had formally apportioned

among them the regions of Asia Minor, and each one of the three

cantons raised its fixed tribute from the territory laid under

contribution. Doubtless the burgesses of Pergamus, under the vigorous

guidance of their presidents who had thereby become hereditary

princes, had rid themselves of the unworthy yoke; and the fair

afterbloom of Hellenic art, which had recently emerged afresh from the

soil, had grown out of these last Hellenic wars sustained by a

national public spirit. But it was a vigorous counterblow, not a

decisive success; again and again the Pergamenes had to defend with

arms their urban peace against the raids of the wild hordes from the

eastern mountains, and the great majority of the other Greek cities

probably remained in their old state of dependence.(7)

If the protectorate of Rome over the Hellenes was to be in Asia more

than a name, an end had to be put to this tributary obligation of

their new clients; and, as the Roman policy at this time declined,

much more even in Asia than on the Graeco-Macedonian peninsula, the

possession of the country on its own behalf and the permanent

occupation therewith connected, there was no course in fact left but

to carry the arms of Rome up to the limit which was to be staked off

for the domain of Rome's power, and effectively to inaugurate the new

supremacy among the inhabitants of Asia Minor generally, and above all

in the Celtic cantons.

This was done by the new Roman commander-in-chief, Gnaeus Manlius

Volso, who relieved Lucius Scipio in Asia Minor. He was subjected

to severe reproach on this score; the men in the senate who were

averse to the new turn of policy failed to see either the aim, or

the pretext, for such a war. There is no warrant for the former

objection, as directed against this movement in particular; it

was on the contrary, after the Roman state had once interfered

in Hellenic affairs as it had done, a necessary consequence of this

policy. Whether it was the right course for Rome to undertake the

protectorate over the Hellenes collectively, may certainly be called

in question; but regarded from the point of view which Flamininus

and the majority led by him had now taken up, the overthrow of the

Galatians was in fact a duty of prudence as well as of honour. Better

founded was the objection that there was not at the time a proper

ground of war against them; for they had not been, strictly speaking,

in alliance with Antiochus, but had only according to their wont

allowed him to levy hired troops in their country. But on the other

side there fell the decisive consideration, that the sending of a

Roman military force to Asia could only be demanded of the Roman

burgesses under circumstances altogether extraordinary, and, if once

such an expedition was necessary, everything told in favour of

carrying it out at once and with the victorious army that was now

stationed in Asia. So, doubtless under the influence of Flamininus

and of those who shared his views in the senate, the campaign into

the interior of Asia Minor was undertaken in the spring of 565. The

consul started from Ephesus, levied contributions from the towns and

princes on the upper Maeander and in Pamphylia without measure, and

then turned northwards against the Celts. Their western canton, the

Tolistoagii, had retired with their belongings to Mount Olympus, and

the middle canton, the Tectosages, to Mount Magaba, in the hope that

they would be able there to defend themselves till the winter should

compel the strangers to withdraw. But the missiles of the Roman

slingers and archers--which so often turned the scale against the

Celts unacquainted with such weapons, almost as in more recent times

firearms have turned the scale against savage tribes--forced the

heights, and the Celts succumbed in a battle, such as had often its

parallels before and after on the Po and on the Seine, but here

appears as singular as the whole phenomenon of this northern race

emerging amidst the Greek and Phrygian nations. The number of the

slain was at both places enormous, and still greater that of the

captives. The survivors escaped over the Halys to the third Celtic

canton of the Trocmi, which the consul did not attack. That river was

the limit at which the leaders of Roman policy at that time had

resolved to halt. Phrygia, Bithynia, and Paphlagonia were to

become dependent on Rome; the regions lying farther to the east

were left to themselves.

The affairs of Asia Minor were regulated partly by the peace with

Antiochus (565), partly by the ordinances of a Roman commission

presided over by the consul Volso. Antiochus had to furnish hostages,

one of whom was his younger son of the same name, and to pay a war-

contribution--proportional in amount to the treasures of Asia--of

15,000 Euboic talents (3,600,000 pounds), a fifth of which was to be

paid at once, and the remainder in twelve yearly instalments. He was

called, moreover, to cede all the lands which he possessed in Europe

and, in Asia Minor, all his possessions and claims of right to the

north of the range of the Taurus and to the west of the mouth of the

Cestrus between Aspendus and Perga in Pamphylia, so that he retained

nothing in Asia Minor but eastern Pamphylia and Cilicia. His

protectorate over its kingdoms and principalities of course ceased.

Asia, or, as the kingdom of the Seleucids was thenceforth usually and

more appropriately named, Syria, lost the right of waging aggressive

wars against the western states, and in the event of a defensive war,

of acquiring territory from them on the conclusion of peace; lost,

moreover, the right of navigating the sea to the west of the mouth of

the Calycadnus in Cilicia with vessels of war, except for the

conveyance of envoys, hostages, or tribute; was further prevented from

keeping more than ten decked vessels in all, except in the case of a

defensive war, from taming war-elephants, and lastly from the levying

of mercenaries in the western states, or receiving political refugees

and deserters from them at court. The war vessels which he possessed

beyond the prescribed number, the elephants, and the political

refugees who had sought shelter with him, he delivered up. By way of

compensation the great-king received the title of a friend of the

Roman commonwealth. The state of Syria was thus by land and sea

completely and for ever dislodged from the west; it is a significant

indication of the feeble and loose organization of the kingdom of the

Seleucidae, that it alone, of all the great states conquered by Rome

never after the first conquest desired a second appeal to the decision

of arms.

Armenia

The two Armenias, hitherto at least nominally Asiatic satrapies,

became transformed, if not exactly in pursuance with the Roman treaty

of peace, yet under its influence into independent kingdoms; and their

holders, Artaxias and Zariadris, became founders of new dynasties.

Cappadocia

Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, whose land lay beyond the boundary

laid down by the Romans for their protectorate, escaped with a money-

fine of 600 talents (146,000 pounds); which was afterwards, on the

intercession of his son-in-law Eumenes, abated to half that sum.

Bithynia

Prusias, king of Bithynia, retained his territory as it stood, and so

did the Celts; but they were obliged to promise that they would no

longer send armed bands beyond their bounds, and the disgraceful

payments of tribute by the cities of Asia Minor came to an end. The

Asiatic Greeks did not fail to repay the benefit--which was certainly

felt as a general and permanent one--with golden chaplets and

transcendental panegyrics.

The Free Greek Cities

In the western portion of Asia Minor the regulation of the territorial

arrangements was not without difficulty, especially as the dynastic

policy of Eumenes there came into collision with that of the Greek

Hansa. At last an understanding was arrived at to the following

effect. All the Greek cities, which were free and had joined the

Romans on the day of the battle of Magnesia, had their liberties

confirmed, and all of them, excepting those previously tributary to

Eumenes, were relieved from the payment of tribute to the different

dynasts for the future. In this way the towns of Dardanus and Ilium,

whose ancient affinity with the Romans was traced to the times of

Aeneas, became free, along with Cyme, Smyrna, Clazomenae, Erythrae,

Chios, Colophon, Miletus, and other names of old renown. Phocaea

also, which in spite of its capitulation had been plundered by

the soldiers of the Roman fleet--although it did not fall under

the category designated in the treaty--received back by way of

compensation its territory and its freedom. Most of the cities of

the Graeco-Asiatic Hansa acquired additions of territory and other

advantages. Rhodes of course received most consideration; it obtained

Lycia exclusive of Telmissus, and the greater part of Caria south of

the Maeander; besides, Antiochus guaranteed the property and the

claims of the Rhodians within his kingdom, as well as the exemption

from customs-dues which they had hitherto enjoyed.

Extension of the Kingdom of Pergamus

All the rest, forming by far the largest share of the spoil, fell to

the Attalids, whose ancient fidelity to Rome, as well as the hardships

endured by Eumenes in the war and his personal merit in connection

with the issue of the decisive battle, were rewarded by Rome as no

king ever rewarded his ally. Eumenes received, in Europe, the

Chersonese with Lysimachia; in Asia--in addition to Mysia which he

already possessed--the provinces of Phrygia on the Hellespont, Lydia

with Ephesus and Sardes, the northern district of Caria as far as the

Maeander with Tralles and Magnesia, Great Phrygia and Lycaonia along

with a portion of Cilicia, the district of Milyas between Phrygia and

Lycia, and, as a port on the southern sea, the Lycian town Telmissus.

There was a dispute afterwards between Eumenes and Antiochus regarding

Pamphylia, as to how far it lay on this side of or beyond the

prescribed boundary, and accordingly belonged to the former or to the

latter. He further acquired the protectorate over, and the right of

receiving tribute from, those Greek cities which did not receive

absolute freedom; but it was stipulated in this case that the cities

should retain their charters, and that the tribute should not be

heightened. Moreover, Antiochus had to bind himself to pay to Eumenes

the 350 talents (85,000 pounds) which he owed to his father Attalus,

and likewise to pay a compensation of 127 talents (31,000 pounds) for

arrears in the supplies of corn. Lastly, Eumenes obtained the royal

forests and the elephants delivered up by Antiochus, but not the ships

of war, which were burnt: the Romans tolerated no naval power by the

side of their own. By these means the kingdom of the Attalids became

in the east of Europe and Asia what Numidia was in Africa, a powerful

state with an absolute constitution dependent on Rome, destined and

able to keep in check both Macedonia and Syria without needing, except

in extraordinary cases, Roman support. With this creation dictated by

policy the Romans had as far as possible combined the liberation of

the Asiatic Greeks, which was dictated by republican and national

sympathy and by vanity. About the affairs of the more remote east

beyond the Taurus and Halys they were firmly resolved to give

themselves no concern. This is clearly shown by the terms of the

peace with Antiochus, and still more decidedly by the peremptory

refusal of the senate to guarantee to the town of Soli in Cilicia the

freedom which the Rhodians requested for it. With equal fidelity they

adhered to the fixed principle of acquiring no direct transmarine

possessions. After the Roman fleet had made an expedition to Crete

and had accomplished the release of the Romans sold thither into

slavery, the fleet and land army left Asia towards the end of the

summer of 566; on which occasion the land army, which again marched

through Thrace, in consequence of the negligence of the general

suffered greatly on the route from the attacks of the barbarians.

The Romans brought nothing home from the east but honour and gold,

both of which were already at this period usually conjoined in the

practical shape assumed by the address of thanks--the golden chaplet.

Settlement of Greece

Conflicts and Peace with the Aetolians

European Greece also had been agitated by this Asiatic war, and needed

reorganization. The Aetolians, who had not yet learned to reconcile

themselves to their insignificance, had, after the armistice concluded

with Scipio in the spring of 564, rendered intercourse between Greece

and Italy difficult and unsafe by means of their Cephallenian

corsairs; and not only so, but even perhaps while the armistice yet

lasted, they, deceived by false reports as to the state of things in

Asia, had the folly to place Amynander once more on his Athamanian

throne, and to carry on a desultory warfare with Philip in the

districts occupied by him on the borders of Aetolia and Thessaly, in

the course of which Philip suffered several discomfitures. After

this, as a matter of course, Rome replied to their request for peace

by the landing of the consul Marcus Fulvius Nobilior. He arrived

among the legions in the spring of 565, and after fifteen days' siege

gained possession of Ambracia by a capitulation honourable for the

garrison; while simultaneously the Macedonians, Illyrians, Epirots,

Acarnanians, and Achaeans fell upon the Aetolians. There was no such

thing as resistance in the strict sense; after repeated entreaties of

the Aetolians for peace the Romans at length desisted from the war,

and granted conditions which must be termed reasonable when viewed

with reference to such pitiful and malicious opponents. The Aetolians

lost all cities and territories which were in the hands of their

adversaries, more especially Ambracia which afterwards became free and

independent in consequence of an intrigue concocted in Rome against

Marcus Fulvius, and Oenia which was given to the Acarnanians: they

likewise ceded Cephallenia. They lost the right of making peace and

war, and were in that respect dependent on the foreign relations of

Rome. Lastly, they paid a large sum of money. Cephallenia opposed

this treaty on its own account, and only submitted when Marcus Fulvius

landed on the island. In fact, the inhabitants of Same, who feared

that they would be dispossessed from their well-situated town by a

Roman colony, revolted after their first submission and sustained a

four months' siege; the town, however, was finally taken and the whole

inhabitants were sold into slavery.

Macedonia

In this case also Rome adhered to the principle of confining herself

to Italy and the Italian islands. She took no portion of the spoil

for herself, except the two islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus,

which formed a desirable supplement to the possession of Corcyra and

other naval stations in the Adriatic. The rest of the territorial

gain went to the allies of Rome. But the two most important of these,

Philip and the Achaeans, were by no means content with the share of

the spoil granted to them. Philip felt himself aggrieved, and not

without reason. He might safely say that the chief difficulties

in the last war--difficulties which arose not from the character

of the enemy, but from the distance and the uncertainty of the

communications--had been overcome mainly by his loyal aid. The senate

recognized this by remitting his arrears of tribute and sending back

his hostages; but he did not receive those additions to his territory

which he expected. He got the territory of the Magnetes, with

Demetrias which he had taken from the Aetolians; besides, there

practically remained in his hands the districts of Dolopia and

Athamania and a part of Thessaly, from which also the Aetolians had

been expelled by him. In Thrace the interior remained under

Macedonian protection, but nothing was fixed as to the coast towns

and the islands of Thasos and Lemnos which were -de facto- in Philip's

hands, while the Chersonese was even expressly given to Eumenes; and

it was not difficult to see that Eumenes received possessions in

Europe, simply that he might in case of need keep not only Asia but

Macedonia in check. The exasperation of the proud and in many

respects chivalrous king was natural; it was not chicane, however,

but an unavoidable political necessity that induced the Romans to take

this course. Macedonia suffered for having once been a power of the

first rank, and for having waged war on equal terms with Rome; there

was much better reason in her case than in that of Carthage for

guarding against the revival of her old powerful position.

The Achaeans

It was otherwise with the Achaeans. They had, in the course of the

war with Antiochus, gratified their long-cherished wish to bring the

whole Peloponnesus into their confederacy; for first Sparta, and then,

after the expulsion of the Asiatics from Greece, Elis and Messene had

more or less reluctantly joined it. The Romans had allowed this to

take place, and had even tolerated the intentional disregard of Rome

which marked their proceedings. When Messene declared that she wished

to submit to the Romans but not to enter the confederacy, and the

latter thereupon employed force, Flamininus had not failed to remind

the Achaeans that such separate arrangements as to the disposal of a

part of the spoil were in themselves unjust, and were, in the relation

in which the Achaeans stood to the Romans, more than unseemly; and yet

in his very impolitic complaisance towards the Hellenes he had

substantially done what the Achaeans willed. But the matter did not

end there. The Achaeans, tormented by their dwarfish thirst for

aggrandizement, would not relax their hold on the town of Pleuron in

Aetolia which they had occupied during the war, but on the contrary

made it an involuntary member of their confederacy; they bought

Zacynthus from Amynander the lieutenant of the last possessor, and

would gladly have acquired Aegina also. It was with reluctance that

they gave up the former island to Rome, and they heard with great

displeasure the good advice of Flamininus that they should content

themselves with their Peloponnesus.

The Achaean Patriots

The Achaeans believed it their duty to display the independence of

their state all the more, the less they really had; they talked of the

rights of war, and of the faithful aid of the Achaeans in the wars of

the Romans; they asked the Roman envoys at the Achaean diet why Rome

should concern herself about Messene when Achaia put no questions as

to Capua; and the spirited patriot, who had thus spoken, was applauded

and was sure of votes at the elections. All this would have been very

right and very dignified, had it not been much more ridiculous. There

was a profound justice and a still more profound melancholy in the

fact, that Rome, however earnestly she endeavoured to establish the

freedom and to earn the thanks of the Hellenes, yet gave them nothing

but anarchy and reaped nothing but ingratitude. Undoubtedly very

generous sentiments lay at the bottom of the Hellenic antipathies to

the protecting power, and the personal bravery of some of the men who

took the lead in the movement was unquestionable; but this Achaean

patriotism remained not the less a folly and a genuine historical

caricature. With all that ambition and all that national

susceptibility the whole nation was, from the highest to the lowest,

pervaded by the most thorough sense of impotence. Every one was

constantly listening to learn the sentiments of Rome, the liberal

man no less than the servile; they thanked heaven, when the dreaded

decree was not issued; they were sulky, when the senate gave them to

understand that they would do well to yield voluntarily in order that

they might not need to be compelled; they did what they were obliged

to do, if possible, in a way offensive to the Romans, "to save forms";

they reported, explained, postponed, evaded, and, when all this would

no longer avail, yielded with a patriotic sigh. Their proceedings

might have claimed indulgence at any rate, if not approval, had their

leaders been resolved to fight, and had they preferred the destruction

of the nation to its bondage; but neither Philopoemen nor Lycortas

thought of any such political suicide--they wished, if possible,

to be free, but they wished above all to live. Besides all this, the

dreaded intervention of Rome in the internal affairs of Greece was not

the arbitrary act of the Romans, but was always invoked by the Greeks

themselves, who, like boys, brought down on their own heads the rod

which they feared. The reproach repeated -ad nauseam- by the erudite

rabble in Hellenic and post-Hellenic times--that the Romans had been

at pains to stir up internal discord in Greece--is one of the most

foolish absurdities which philologues dealing in politics have ever

invented. It was not the Romans that carried strife to Greece--which

in truth would have been "carrying owls to Athens"--but the Greeks

that carried their dissensions to Rome.

Quarrels between Achaeans and Spartans

The Achaeans in particular, who, in their eagerness to round their

territory, wholly failed to see how much it would have been for their

own good that Flamininus had not incorporated the towns of Aetolian

sympathies with their league, acquired in Lacedaemon and Messene a

very hydra of intestine strife. Members of these communities were

incessantly at Rome, entreating and beseeching to be released from the

odious connection; and amongst them, characteristically enough, were

even those who were indebted to the Achaeans for their return to their

native land. The Achaean league was incessantly occupied in the work

of reformation and restoration at Sparta and Messene; the wildest

refugees from these quarters determined the measures of the diet.

Four years after the nominal admission of Sparta to the confederacy

matters came even to open war and to an insanely thorough restoration,

in which all the slaves on whom Nabis had conferred citizenship were

once more sold into slavery, and a colonnade was built from the

proceeds in the Achaean city of Megalopolis; the old state of property

in Sparta was re-established, the of Lycurgus were superseded by

Achaean laws, and the walls were pulled down (566). At last the Roman

senate was summoned by all parties to arbitrate on all these doings

--an annoying task, which was the righteous punishment of the

sentimental policy that the senate had pursued. Far from mixing

itself up too much in these affairs, the senate not only bore the

sarcasms of Achaean candour with exemplary composure, but even

manifested a culpable indifference while the worst outrages were

committed. There was cordial rejoicing in Achaia when, after that

restoration, the news arrived from Rome that the senate had found

fault with it, but had not annulled it. Nothing was done for the

Lacedaemonians by Rome, except that the senate, shocked at the

judicial murder of from sixty to eighty Spartans committed by the

Achaeans, deprived the diet of criminal jurisdiction over the

Spartans--truly a heinous interference with the internal affairs of

an independent state! The Roman statesmen gave themselves as little

concern as possible about this tempest in a nut-shell, as is best

shown by the many complaints regarding the superficial, contradictory,

and obscure decisions of the senate; in fact, how could its decisions

be expected to be clear, when there were four parties from Sparta

simultaneously speaking against each other at its bar? Add to this

the personal impression, which most of these Peloponnesian statesmen

produced in Rome; even Flamininus shook his head, when one of them

showed him on the one day how to perform some dance, and on the next

entertained him with affairs of state. Matters went so far, that the

senate at last lost patience and informed the Peloponnesians that it

would no longer listen to them, and that they might do what they chose

(572). This was natural enough, but it was not right; situated as

the Romans were, they were under a moral and political obligation

earnestly and steadfastly to rectify this melancholy state of things.

Callicrates the Achaean, who went to the senate in 575 to enlighten

it as to the state of matters in the Peloponnesus and to demand a

consistent and calm intervention, may have had somewhat less worth as

a man than his countryman Philopoemen who was the main founder of that

patriotic policy; but he was in the right.

Death of Hannibal

Thus the protectorate of the Roman community now embraced all the

states from the eastern to the western end of the Mediterranean.

There nowhere existed a state that the Romans would have deemed it

worth while to fear. But there still lived a man to whom Rome

accorded this rare honour--the homeless Carthaginian, who had

raised in arms against Rome first all the west and then all the east,

and whose schemes perhaps had been only frustrated by infamous

aristocratic policy in the former case, and by stupid court policy in

the latter. Antiochus had been obliged to bind himself in the treaty

of peace to deliver up Hannibal; but the latter had escaped, first to

Crete, then to Bithynia,(8) and now lived at the court of Prusias king

of Bithynia, employed in aiding the latter in his wars with Eumenes,

and victorious as ever by sea and by land. It is affirmed that he was

desirous of stirring up Prusias also to make war on Rome; a folly,

which, as it is told, sounds very far from credible. It is more

certain that, while the Roman senate deemed it beneath its dignity to

have the old man hunted out in his last asylum--for the tradition

which inculpates the senate appears to deserve no credit--Flamininus,

whose restless vanity sought after new opportunities for great

achievements, undertook on his own part to deliver Rome from Hannibal

as he had delivered the Greeks from their chains, and, if not to

wield--which was not diplomatic--at any rate to whet and to point,

the dagger against the greatest man of his time. Prusias, the most

pitiful among the pitiful princes of Asia, was delighted to grant the

little favour which the Roman envoy in ambiguous terms requested; and,

when Hannibal saw his house beset by assassins, he took poison. He

had long been prepared to do so, adds a Roman, for he knew the Romans

and the word of kings. The year of his death is uncertain; probably

he died in the latter half of the year 571, at the age of sixty-seven.

When he was born, Rome was contending with doubtful success for the

possession of Sicily; he had lived long enough to see the West wholly

subdued, and to fight his own last battle with the Romans against the

vessels of his native city which had itself become Roman; and he was

constrained at last to remain a mere spectator, while Rome overpowered

the East as the tempest overpowers the ship that has no one at the

helm, and to feel that he alone was the pilot that could have

weathered the storm. There was left to him no further hope to be

disappointed, when he died; but he had honestly, through fifty years

of struggle, kept the oath which he had sworn when a boy.

Death of Scipio

About the same time, probably in the same year, died also the man whom

the Romans were wont to call his conqueror, Publius Scipio. On him

fortune had lavished all the successes which she denied to his

antagonist--successes which did belong to him, and successes which did

not. He had added to the empire Spain, Africa, and Asia; and Rome,

which he had found merely the first community of Italy, was at his

death mistress of the civilized world. He himself had so many titles

of victory, that some of them were made over to his brother and his

cousin.(9) And yet he too spent his last years in bitter vexation,

and died when little more than fifty years of age in voluntary

banishment, leaving orders to his relatives not to bury his remains

in the city for which he had lived and in which his ancestors reposed.

It is not exactly known what drove him from the city. The charges of

corruption and embezzlement, which were directed against him and still

more against his brother Lucius, were beyond doubt empty calumnies,

which do not sufficiently explain such bitterness of feeling; although

it is characteristic of the man, that instead of simply vindicating

himself by means of his account-books, he tore them in pieces in

presence of the people and of his accusers, and summoned the Romans

to accompany him to the temple of Jupiter and to celebrate the

anniversary of his victory at Zama. The people left the accuser on

the spot, and followed Scipio to the Capitol; but this was the last

glorious day of the illustrious man. His proud spirit, his belief

that he was different from, and better than, other men, his very

decided family-policy, which in the person of his brother Lucius

especially brought forward a clumsy man of straw as a hero, gave

offence to many, and not without reason. While genuine pride protects

the heart, arrogance lays it open to every blow and every sarcasm, and

corrodes even an originally noble-minded spirit. It is throughout,

moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of such natures as that of

Scipio--strange mixtures of genuine gold and glittering tinsel--that

they need the good fortune and the brilliance of youth in order

to exercise their charm, and, when this charm begins to fade, it is

the charmer himself that is most painfully conscious of the change.

Notes for Chapter IX

1. According to a recently discovered decree of the town of Lampsacus

(-Mitth, des arch. Inst, in Athen-, vi. 95) the Lampsacenes after the

defeat of Philip sent envoys to the Roman senate with the request that

the town might be embraced in the treaty concluded between Rome and

(Philip) the king (--opos sumperilephthomen [en tais sunthekais] tais

genomenais Pomaiois pros ton [basilea]--), which the senate, at least

according to the view of the petitioners, granted to them and referred

them, as regarded other matters, to Flamininus and the ten envoys.

From the latter they then obtain in Corinth a guarantee of their

constitution and "letters to the kings." Flamininus also gives to them

similar letters; of their contents we learn nothing more particular,

than that in the decree the embassy is described as successful. But

if the senate and Flamininus had formally and positively guaranteed

the autonomy and democracy of the Lampsacenes, the decree would hardly

dwell so much at length on the courteous answers, which the Roman

commanders, who had been appealed to on the way for their intercession

with the senate, gave to the envoys.

Other remarkable points in this document are the "brotherhood" of the

Lampsacenes and the Romans, certainly going back to the Trojan legend,

and the mediation, invoked by the former with success, of the allies

and friends of Rome, the Massiliots, who were connected with the

Lampsacenes through their common mother-city Phocaea.

2. The definite testimony of Hieronymus, who places the betrothal of

the Syrian princess Cleopatra with Ptolemy Epiphanes in 556, taken in

connection with the hints in Liv. xxxiii. 40 and Appian. Syr. 3, and

with the actual accomplishment of the marriage in 561, puts it beyond

a doubt that the interference of the Romans in the affairs of Egypt

was in this case formally uncalled for.

3. For this we have the testimony of Polybius (xxviii. i), which the

sequel of the history of Judaea completely confirms; Eusebius (p. 117,

-Mai-) is mistaken in making Philometor ruler of Syria. We certainly

find that about 567 farmers of the Syrian taxes made their payments at

Alexandria (Joseph, xii. 4, 7); but this doubtless took place without

detriment to the rights of sovereignty, simply because the dowry of

Cleopatra constituted a charge on those revenues; and from this very

circumstance presumably arose the subsequent dispute.

4. II. VII. Submission of Lower Italy

5. III. VII. The Romans Maintain a Standing Army in Spain

6. III. VIII. The Celts of Asia Minor ff.

7. From the decree of Lampsacus mentioned at III. IX. Difficulties

with Rome, it appears pretty certain that the Lampsacenes requested

from the Massiliots not merely intercession at Rome, but also

intercession with the Tolistoagii (so the Celts, elsewhere named

Tolistobogi, are designated in this document and in the Pergamene

inscription, C. J. Gr. 3536,--the oldest monuments which mention

them). Accordingly the Lampsacenes were probably still about the

time of the wax with Philip tributary to this canton (comp. Liv.

xxxviii. 16).

8. The story that he went to Armenia and at the request of king

Artaxias built the town of Artaxata on the Araxes (Strabo, xi. p. 528;

Plutarch, Luc. 31), is certainly a fiction; but it is a striking

circumstance that Hannibal should have become mixed up, almost like

Alexander, with Oriental fables.

9. Africanus, Asiagenus, Hispallus.

CHAPTER X

The Third Macedonian War

Dissatisfactions of Philip with Rome

Philip of Macedonia was greatly annoyed by the treatment which he

met with from the Romans after the peace with Antiochus; and the

subsequent course of events was not fitted to appease his wrath.

His neighbours in Greece and Thrace, mostly communities that had once

trembled at the Macedonian name not less than now they trembled at

the Roman, made it their business, as was natural, to retaliate on the

fallen great power for all the injuries which since the times of

Philip the Second they had received at the hands of Macedonia. The

empty arrogance and venal anti-Macedonian patriotism of the Hellenes

of this period found vent at the diets of the different confederacies

and in ceaseless complaints addressed to the Roman senate. Philip had

been allowed by the Romans to retain what he had taken from the

Aetolians; but in Thessaly the confederacy of the Magnetes alone

had formally joined the Aetolians, while those towns which Philip

had wrested from the Aetolians in other two of the Thessalian

confederacies--the Thessalian in its narrower sense, and the

Perrhaebian--were demanded back by their leagues on the ground that

Philip had only liberated these towns, not conquered them. The

Athamahes too believed that they might crave their freedom; and

Eumenes demanded the maritime cities which Antiochus had possessed

in Thrace proper, especially Aenus and Maronea, although in the peace

with Antiochus the Thracian Chersonese alone had been expressly

promised to him. All these complaints and numerous minor ones from

all the neighbours of Philip as to his supporting king Prusias against

Eumenes, as to competition in trade, as to the violation of contracts

and the seizing of cattle, were poured forth at Rome. The king of

Macedonia had to submit to be accused by the sovereign rabble before

the Roman senate, and to accept justice or injustice as the senate

chose; he was compelled to witness judgment constantly going against

him; he had with deep chagrin to withdraw his garrisons from the

Thracian coast and from the Thessalian and Perrhaebian towns, and

courteously to receive the Roman commissioners, who came to see

whether everything required had been carried out in accordance with

instructions. The Romans were not so indignant against Philip as they

had been against Carthage; in fact, they were in many respects even

favourably disposed to the Macedonian ruler; there was not in his case

so reckless a violation of forms as in that of Libya; but the

situation of Macedonia was at bottom substantially the same as that of

Carthage. Philip, however, was by no means the man to submit to this

infliction with Phoenician patience. Passionate as he was, he had

after his defeat been more indignant with the faithless ally than with

the honourable antagonist; and, long accustomed to pursue a policy not

Macedonian but personal, he had seen in the war with Antiochus simply

an excellent opportunity of instantaneously revenging himself on the

ally who had disgracefully deserted and betrayed him. This object he

had attained; but the Romans, who saw very clearly that the Macedonian

was influenced not by friendship for Rome, but by enmity to Antiochus,

and who moreover were by no means in the habit of regulating their

policy by such feelings of liking and disliking, had carefully

abstained from bestowing any material advantages on Philip, and had

preferred to confer their favours on the Attalids. From their first

elevation the Attalids had been at vehement feud with Macedonia, and

were politically and personally the objects of Philip's bitterest

hatred; of all the eastern powers they had contributed most to maim

Macedonia and Syria, and to extend the protectorate of Rome in the

east; and in the last war, when Philip had voluntarily and loyally

embraced the side of Rome, they had been obliged to take the same side

for the sake of their very existence. The Romans had made use of

these Attalids for the purpose of reconstructing in all essential

points the kingdom of Lysimachus--the destruction of which had been

the most important achievement of the Macedonian rulers after

Alexander--and of placing alongside of Macedonia a state, which was

its equal in point of power and was at the same time a client of Rome.

In the special circumstances a wise sovereign, devoted to the

interests of his people, would perhaps have resolved not to resume the

unequal struggle with Rome; but Philip, in whose character the sense

of honour was the most powerful of all noble, and the thirst for

revenge the most potent of all ignoble, motives, was deaf to the voice

of timidity or of resignation, and nourished in the depths of his

heart a determination once more to try the hazard of the game. When

he received the report of fresh invectives, such as were wont to be

launched against Macedonia at the Thessalian diets, he replied with

the line of Theocritus, that his last sun had not yet set.(1)

The Latter Years of Philip

Philip displayed in the preparation and the concealment of his designs

a calmness, earnestness, and persistency which, had he shown them in

better times, would perhaps have given a different turn to the

destinies of the world. In particular the submissiveness towards

Rome, by which he purchased the time indispensable for his objects,

formed a severe trial for the fierce and haughty man; nevertheless he

courageously endured it, although his subjects and the innocent

occasions of the quarrel, such as the unfortunate Maronea, paid

severely for the suppression of his resentment. It seemed as if war

could not but break out as early as 571; but by Philip's instructions,

his younger son, Demetrius, effected a reconciliation between his

father and Rome, where he had lived some years as a hostage and was a

great favourite. The senate, and particularly Flamininus who managed

Greek affairs, sought to form in Macedonia a Roman party that would be

able to paralyze the exertions of Philip, which of course were not

unknown to the Romans; and had selected as its head, and perhaps as

the future king of Macedonia, the younger prince who was passionately

attached to Rome. With this purpose in view they gave it clearly to

be understood that the senate forgave the father for the sake of the

son; the natural effect of which was, that dissensions arose in the

royal household itself, and that the king's elder son, Perseus, who,

although the offspring of an unequal marriage, was destined by his

father for the succession, sought to ruin his brother as his future

rival. It does not appear that Demetrius was a party to the Roman

intrigues; it was only when he was falsely suspected that he was

forced to become guilty, and even then he intended, apparently,

nothing more than flight to Rome. But Perseus took care that his

father should be duly informed of this design; an intercepted letter

from Flamininus to Demetrius did the rest, and induced the father to

give orders that his son should be put to death. Philip learned, when

it was too late, the intrigues which Perseus had concocted; and death

overtook him, as he was meditating the punishment of the fratricide

and his exclusion from the throne. He died in 575 at Demetrias, in

his fifty-ninth year. He left behind him a shattered kingdom and a

distracted household, and with a broken heart confessed to himself

that all his toils and all his crimes had been in vain.

King Perseus

His son Perseus then entered on the government, without encountering

opposition either in Macedonia or in the Roman senate. He was a man

of stately aspect, expert in all bodily exercises, reared in the camp

and accustomed to command, imperious like his father and unscrupulous

in the choice of his means. Wine and women, which too often led

Philip to forget the duties of government, had no charm for Perseus;

he was as steady and persevering as his father had been fickle and

impulsive. Philip, a king while still a boy, and attended by good

fortune during the first twenty years of his reign, had been spoiled

and ruined by destiny; Perseus ascended the throne in his thirty-first

year, and, as he had while yet a boy borne a part in the unhappy war

with Rome and had grown up under the pressure of humiliation and under

the idea that a revival of the state was at hand, so he inherited

along with the kingdom of his father his troubles, resentments, and

hopes. In fact he entered with the utmost determination on the

continuance of his father's work, and prepared more zealously than

ever for war against Rome; he was stimulated, moreover, by the

reflection, that he was by no means indebted to the goodwill of the

Romans for his wearing the diadem of Macedonia. The proud Macedonian

nation looked with pride upon the prince whom they had been accustomed

to see marching and fighting at the head of their youth; his

countrymen, and many Hellenes of every variety of lineage, conceived

that in him they had found the right general for the impending war of

liberation. But he was not what he seemed. He wanted Philip's

geniality and Philip's elasticity--those truly royal qualities, which

success obscured and tarnished, but which under the purifying power of

adversity recovered their lustre. Philip was self-indulgent, and

allowed things to take their course; but, when there was occasion, he

found within himself the vigour necessary for rapid and earnest

action. Perseus devised comprehensive and subtle plans, and

prosecuted them with unwearied perseverance; but, when the moment

arrived for action and his plans and preparations confronted him in

living reality, he was frightened at his own work. As is the wont of

narrow minds, the means became to him the end; he heaped up treasures

on treasures for war with the Romans, and, when the Romans were in the

land, he was unable to part with his golden pieces. It is a

significant indication of character that after defeat the father first

hastened to destroy the papers in his cabinet that might compromise

him, whereas the son took his treasure-chests and embarked. In

ordinary times he might have made an average king, as good as or

better than many another; but he was not adapted for the conduct of

an enterprise, which was from the first a hopeless one unless some

extraordinary man should become the soul of the movement.

Resources of Macedonia

The power of Macedonia was far from inconsiderable. The devotion of

the land to the house of the Antigonids was unimpaired; in this one

respect the national feeling was not paralyzed by the dissensions

of political parties. A monarchical constitution has the great

advantage, that every change of sovereign supersedes old resentments

and quarrels and introduces a new era of other men and fresh hopes.

The king had judiciously availed himself of this, and had begun his

reign with a general amnesty, with the recall of fugitive bankrupts,

and with the remission of arrears of taxes. The hateful severity of

the father thus not only yielded benefit, but conciliated affection,

to the son. Twenty-six years of peace had partly of themselves filled

up the blanks in the Macedonian population, partly given opportunity

to the government to take serious steps towards rectifying this which

was really the weak point of the land. Philip urged the Macedonians

to marry and raise up children; he occupied the coast towns, whose

inhabitants he carried into the interior, with Thracian colonists of

trusty valour and fidelity. He formed a barrier on the north to check

once for all the desolating incursions of the Dardani, by converting

the space intervening between the Macedonian frontier and the

barbarian territory into a desert, and by founding new towns in the

northern provinces. In short he took step by step the same course in

Macedonia, as Augustus afterwards took when he laid afresh the

foundations of the Roman empire. The army was numerous--30,000 men

without reckoning contingents and hired troops--and the younger men

were well exercised in the constant border warfare with the Thracian

barbarians. It is strange that Philip did not try, like Hannibal, to

organize his army after the Roman fashion; but we can understand it

when we recollect the value which the Macedonians set upon their

phalanx, often conquered, but still withal believed to be invincible.

Through the new sources of revenue which Philip had created in mines,

customs, and tenths, and through the flourishing state of agriculture

and commerce, he had succeeded in replenishing his treasury,

granaries, and arsenals. When the war began, there was in the

Macedonian treasury money enough to pay the existing army and 10,000

hired troops for ten years, and there were in the public magazines

stores of grain for as long a period (18,000,000 medimni or 27,000,000

bushels), and arms for an army of three times the strength of the

existing one. In fact, Macedonia had become a very different state

from what it was when surprised by the outbreak of the second war with

Rome. The power of the kingdom was in all respects at least doubled:

with a power in every point of view far inferior Hannibal had been

able to shake Rome to its foundations.

Attempted Coalition against Rome

Its external relations were not in so favourable a position. The

nature of the case required that Macedonia should now take up the

plans of Hannibal and Antiochus, and should try to place herself at

the head of a coalition of all oppressed states against the supremacy

of Rome; and certainly threads of intrigue ramified in all directions

from the court of Pydna. But their success was slight. It was indeed

asserted that the allegiance of the Italians was wavering; but neither

friend nor foe could fail to see that an immediate resumption of the

Samnite wars was not at all probable. The nocturnal conferences

likewise between Macedonian deputies and the Carthaginian senate,

which Massinissa denounced at Rome, could occasion no alarm to serious

and sagacious men, even if they were not, as is very possible, an

utter fiction. The Macedonian court sought to attach the kings of

Syria and Bithynia to its interests by intermarriages; but nothing

further came of it, except that the immortal simplicity of the

diplomacy which seeks to gain political ends by matrimonial means once

more exposed itself to derision. Eumenes, whom it would have been

ridiculous to attempt to gain, the agents of Perseus would have gladly

put out of the way: he was to have been murdered at Delphi on his way

homeward from Rome, where he had been active against Macedonia; but

the pretty project miscarried.

Bastarnae

Genthius

Of greater moment were the efforts made to stir up the northern

barbarians and the Hellenes to rebellion against Rome. Philip had

conceived the project of crushing the old enemies of Macedonia,

the Dardani in what is now Servia, by means of another still more

barbarous horde of Germanic descent brought from the left bank of the

Danube, the Bastarnae, and of then marching in person with these and

with the whole avalanche of peoples thus set in motion by the land-

route to Italy and invading Lombardy, the Alpine passes leading to

which he had already sent spies to reconnoitre--a grand project,

worthy of Hannibal, and doubtless immediately suggested by Hannibal's

passage of the Alps. It is more than probable that this gave occasion

to the founding of the Roman fortress of Aquileia,(2) which was formed

towards the end of the reign of Philip (573), and did not harmonize

with the system followed elsewhere by the Romans in the establishment

of fortresses in Italy. The plan, however, was thwarted by the

desperate resistance of the Dardani and of the adjoining tribes

concerned; the Bastarnae were obliged to retreat, and the whole horde

were drowned in returning home by the giving way of the ice on the

Danube. The king now sought at least to extend his clientship among

the chieftains of the Illyrian land, the modern Dalmatia and northern

Albania. One of these who faithfully adhered to Rome, Arthetaurus,

perished, not without the cognizance of Perseus, by the hand of an

assassin. The most considerable of the whole, Genthius the son and

heir of Pleuratus, was, like his father, nominally in alliance with

Rome; but the ambassadors of Issa, a Greek town on one of the

Dalmatian islands, informed the senate, that Perseus had a secret

understanding with the young, weak, and drunken prince, and that

the envoys of Genthius served as spies for Perseus in Rome.

Cotys

In the regions on the east of Macedonia towards the lower Danube the

most powerful of the Thracian chieftains, the brave and sagacious

Cotys, prince of the Odrysians and ruler of all eastern Thrace from

the Macedonian frontier on the Hebrus (Maritza) down to the fringe of

coast covered with Greek towns, was in the closest alliance with

Perseus. Of the other minor chiefs who in that quarter took part

with Rome, one, Abrupolis prince of the Sagaei, was, in consequence

of a predatory expedition directed against Amphipolis on the Strymon,

defeated by Perseus and driven out of the country. From these regions

Philip had drawn numerous colonists, and mercenaries were to be had

there at any time and in any number.

Greek National Party

Among the unhappy nation of the Hellenes Philip and Perseus had, long

before declaring war against Rome carried on a lively double system of

proselytizing, attempting to gain over to the side of Macedonia on the

one hand the national, and on the other--if we may be permitted the

expression--the communistic, party. As a matter of course, the whole

national party among the Asiatic as well as the European Greeks was

now at heart Macedonian; not on account of isolated unrighteous acts

on the part of the Roman deliverers, but because the restoration of

Hellenic nationality by a foreign power involved a contradiction in

terms, and now, when it was in truth too late, every one perceived

that the most detestable form of Macedonian rule was less fraught with

evil for Greece than a free constitution springing from the noblest

intentions of honourable foreigners. That the most able and upright

men throughout Greece should be opposed to Rome was to be expected;

the venal aristocracy alone was favourable to the Romans, and here

and there an isolated man of worth, who, unlike the great majority,

was under no delusion as to the circumstances and the future of the

nation. This was most painfully felt by Eumenes of Pergamus, the main

upholder of that extraneous freedom among the Greeks. In vain he

treated the cities subject to him with every sort of consideration;

in vain he sued for the favour of the communities and diets by fair-

sounding words and still better-sounding gold; he had to learn that

his presents were declined, and that all the statues that had formerly

been erected to him were broken in pieces and the honorary tablets

were melted down, in accordance with a decree of the diet,

simultaneously throughout the Peloponnesus (584). The name of Perseus

was on all lips; even the states that formerly were most decidedly

anti-Macedonian, such as the Achaeans, deliberated as to the

cancelling of the laws directed against Macedonia; Byzantium,

although situated within the kingdom of Pergamus, sought and obtained

protection and a garrison against the Thracians not from Eumenes, but

from Perseus, and in like manner Lampsacus on the Hellespont joined

the Macedonian: the powerful and prudent Rhodians escorted the Syrian

bride of king Perseus from Antioch with their whole magnificent war-

fleet--for the Syrian war-vessels were not allowed to appear in the

Aegean--and returned home highly honoured and furnished with rich

presents, more especially with wood for shipbuilding; commissioners

from the Asiatic cities, and consequently subjects of Eumenes, held

secret conferences with Macedonian deputies in Samothrace. That

sending of the Rhodian war-fleet had at least the aspect of a

demonstration; and such, certainly, was the object of king Perseus,

when he exhibited himself and all his army before the eyes of the

Hellenes under pretext of performing a religious ceremony at Delphi.

That the king should appeal to the support of this national

partisanship in the impending war, was only natural. But it was wrong

in him to take advantage of the fearful economic disorganization of

Greece for the purpose of attaching to Macedonia all those who desired

a revolution in matters of property and of debt. It is difficult to

form any adequate idea of the unparalleled extent to which the

commonwealths as well as individuals in European Greece--excepting the

Peloponnesus, which was in a somewhat better position in this respect

--were involved in debt. Instances occurred of one city attacking and

pillaging another merely to get money--the Athenians, for example,

thus attacked Oropus--and among the Aetolians, Perrhaebians, and

Thessalians formal battles took place between those that had property

and those that had none. Under such circumstances the worst outrages

were perpetrated as a matter of course; among the Aetolians, for

instance, a general amnesty was proclaimed and a new public peace was

made up solely for the purpose of entrapping and putting to death a

number of emigrants. The Romans attempted to mediate; but their

envoys returned without success, and announced that both parties were

equally bad and that their animosities were not to be restrained. In

this case there was, in fact, no longer other help than the officer

and the executioner; sentimental Hellenism began to be as repulsive as

from the first it had been ridiculous. Yet king Perseus sought to

gain the support of this party, if it deserve to be called such--of

people who had nothing, and least of all an honourable name, to lose

--and not only issued edicts in favour of Macedonian bankrupts, but

also caused placards to be put up at Larisa, Delphi, and Delos, which

summoned all Greeks that were exiled on account of political or other

offences or on account of their debts to come to Macedonia and to

look for full restitution of their former honours and estates. As may

easily be supposed, they came; the social revolution smouldering

throughout northern Greece now broke out into open flame, and the

national-social party there sent to Perseus for help. If Hellenic

nationality was to be saved only by such means, the question might

well be asked, with all respect for Sophocles and Phidias, whether

the object was worth the cost.

Rupture with Perseus

The senate saw that it had delayed too long already, and that it was

time to put an end to such proceedings. The expulsion of the Thracian

chieftain Abrupolis who was in alliance with the Romans, and the

alliances of Macedonia with the Byzantines, Aetolians, and part of the

Boeotian cities, were equally violations of the peace of 557, and

sufficed for the official war-manifesto: the real ground of war was

that Macedonia was seeking to convert her formal sovereignty into a

real one, and to supplant Rome in the protectorate of the Hellenes.

As early as 581 the Roman envoys at the Achaean diet stated pretty

plainly, that an alliance with Perseus was equivalent to casting off

the alliance of Rome. In 582 king Eumenes came in person to Rome with

a long list of grievances and laid open to the senate the whole

situation of affairs; upon which the senate unexpectedly in a secret

sitting resolved on an immediate declaration of war, and furnished the

landing-places in Epirus with garrisons. For the sake of form an

embassy was sent to Macedonia, but its message was of such a nature

that Perseus, perceiving that he could not recede, replied that he

was ready to conclude with Rome a new alliance on really equal terms,

but that he looked upon the treaty of 557 as cancelled; and he bade

the envoys leave the kingdom within three days. Thus war was

practically declared.

This was in the autumn of 582. Perseus, had he wished, might have

occupied all Greece and brought the Macedonian party everywhere to the

helm, and he might perhaps have crushed the Roman division of 5000 men

stationed under Gnaeus Sicinius at Apollonia and have disputed the

landing of the Romans. But the king, who already began to tremble at

the serious aspect of affairs, entered into discussions with his

guest-friend the consular Quintus Marcius Philippus, as to the

frivolousness of the Roman declaration of war, and allowed himself to

be thereby induced to postpone the attack and once more to make an

effort for peace with Rome: to which the senate, as might have been

expected, only replied by the dismissal of all Macedonians from Italy

and the embarkation of the legions. Senators of the older school no

doubt censured the "new wisdom" of their colleague, and his un-Roman

artifice; but the object was gained and the winter passed away without

any movement on the part of Perseus. The Romati diplomatists made all

the more zealous use of the interval to deprive Perseus of any support

in Greece. They were sure of the Achaeans. Even the patriotic party

among them--who had neither agreed with those social movements, nor

had soared higher than the longing after a prudent neutrality--had no

idea of throwing themselves into the arms of Perseus; and, besides,

the opposition party there had now been brought by Roman influence to

the helm, and attached itself absolutely to Rome. The Aetolian league

had doubtless asked aid from Perseus in its internal troubles; but

the new strategus, Lyciscus, chosen under the eyes of the Roman

ambassadors, was more of a Roman partisan than the Romans themselves.

Among the Thessalians also the Roman party retained the ascendency.

Even the Boeotians, old partisans as they were of Macedonia, and sunk

in the utmost financial disorder, had not in their collective capacity

declared openly for Perseus; nevertheless at least three of their

cities, Thisbae, Haliartus and Coronea, had of their own accord

entered into engagements with him. When on the complaint of the Roman

envoy the government of the Boeotian confederacy communicated to him

the position of things, he declared that it would best appear which

cities adhered to Rome, and which did not, if they would severally

pronounce their decision in his presence; and thereupon the Boeotian

confederacy fell at once to pieces. It is not true that the great

structure of Epaminondas was destroyed by the Romans; it actually

collapsed before they touched it, and thus indeed became the prelude

to the dissolution of the other still more firmly consolidated leagues

of Greek cities.(3) With the forces of the Boeotian towns friendly

to Rome the Roman envoy Publius Lentulus laid siege to Haliartus,

even before the Roman fleet appeared in the Aegean.

Preparations for War

Chalcis was occupied with Achaean, and the province of Orestis with

Epirot, forces: the fortresses of the Dassaretae and Illyrians on the

west frontier of Macedonia were occupied by the troops of Gnaeus

Sicinius; and as soon as the navigation was resumed, Larisa received a

garrison of 2000 men. Perseus during all this remained inactive and

had not a foot's breadth of land beyond his own territory, when in the

spring, or according to the official calendar in June, of 583, the

Roman legions landed on the west coast. It is doubtful whether

Perseus would have found allies of any mark, even had he shown as much

energy as he displayed remissness; but, as circumstances stood, he

remained of course completely isolated, and those prolonged attempts

at proselytism led, for the time at least, to no result. Carthage,

Genthius of Illyria, Rhodes and the free cities of Asia Minor, and

even Byzantium hitherto so very friendly with Perseus, offered to the

Romans vessels of war; which these, however, declined. Eumenes put

his land army and his ships on a war footing. Ariarathes king of

Cappadocia sent hostages, unsolicited, to Rome. The brother-in-law of

Perseus, Prusias II. king of Bithynia, remained neutral. No one

stirred in all Greece. Antiochus IV. king of Syria, designated

in court style "the god, the brilliant bringer of victory," to

distinguish him from his father the "Great," bestirred himself, but

only to wrest the Syrian coast during this war from the entirely

impotent Egypt.

Beginning of the War

But, though Perseus stood almost alone, he was no contemptible

antagonist. His army numbered 43,000 men; of these 21,000 were

phalangites, and 4000 Macedonian and Thracian cavalry; the rest were

chiefly mercenaries. The whole force of the Romans in Greece amounted

to between 30,000 and 40,000 Italian troops, besides more than 10,000

men belonging to Numidian, Ligurian, Greek, Cretan, and especially

Pergamene contingents. To these was added the fleet, which numbered

only 40 decked vessels, as there was no fleet of the enemy to oppose

it--Perseus, who had been prohibited from building ships of war by the

treaty with Rome, was only now erecting docks at Thessalonica--but it

had on board 10,000 troops, as it was destined chiefly to co-operate

in sieges. The fleet was commanded by Gaius Lucretius, the land army

by the consul Publius Licinius Crassus.

The Romans Invade Thessaly

The consul left a strong division in Illyria to harass Macedonia

from the west, while with the main force he started, as usual, from

Apollonia for Thessaly. Perseus did not think of disturbing their

arduous march, but contented himself with advancing into Perrhaebia

and occupying the nearest fortresses. He awaited the enemy at Ossa,

and not far from Larisa the first conflict took place between the

cavalry and light troops on both sides. The Romans were decidedly

beaten. Cotys with the Thracian horse had defeated and broken the

Italian, and Perseus with his Macedonian horse the Greek, cavalry; the

Romans had 2000 foot and 200 horsemen killed, and 600 horsemen made

prisoners, and had to deem themselves fortunate in being allowed to

cross the Peneius without hindrance. Perseus employed the victory to

ask peace on the same terms which Philip had obtained: he was ready

even to pay the same sum. The Romans refused his request: they never

concluded peace after a defeat, and in this case the conclusion

of peace would certainly have involved as a consequence the loss

of Greece.

Their Lax and Unsuccessful Management of the War