CHAPTER IV.

THE CHAMBER OF 1815.

1815-1816.

FALL OF M. DE TALLEYRAND AND FOUCHE.--FORMATION OF THE DUKE DE

RICHELIEU'S CABINET.--MY CONNECTION AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE WITH M. DE MARBOIS, KEEPER OF THE GREAT

SEAL.--MEETING AND ASPECT OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES.--INTENTIONS

AND ATTITUDE OF THE OLD ROYALIST FACTION.--FORMATION AND

COMPOSITION OF A NEW ROYALIST PARTY.--STRUGGLE OF CLASSES UNDER

THE CLOAK OF PARTIES.--PROVISIONAL LAWS.--BILL OF AMNESTY.--THE

CENTRE BECOMES THE GOVERNMENT PARTY, AND THE RIGHT THE

OPPOSITION.--QUESTIONS UPON THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE STATE

AND THE CHURCH.--STATE OF THE GOVERNMENT BEYOND THE

CHAMBERS.--INSUFFICIENCY OF ITS RESISTANCE TO THE SPIRIT OF

REACTION.--THE DUKE OF FELTRI AND GENERAL BERNARD.--TRIAL OF

MARSHAL NEY.--CONTROVERSY BETWEEN M. DE VITROLLES AND ME.--CLOSING

OF THE SESSION.--MORTIFICATIONS IN THE CABINET.--M. LAINE MINISTER

OF THE INTERIOR.--I LEAVE THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND ENTER THE

STATE COUNCIL AS MASTER OF REQUESTS.--THE CABINET ENTERS INTO

CONTESTS WITH THE RIGHT-HAND PARTY.--M. DECAZES.--POSITION OF

MESSRS. ROYER-COLLARD AND DE SERRE.--OPPOSITION OF M. DE

CHATEAUBRIAND.--THE COUNTRY RISES AGAINST THE CHAMBER OF

DEPUTIES.--EFFORTS OF M. DECAZES TO BRING ABOUT A DISSOLUTION.--THE

KING DETERMINES ON IT.--DECREE OF THE 5TH OF SEPTEMBER, 1816.

Three months had scarcely elapsed and neither Fouche nor

M. de Talleyrand were any longer in the Ministry. They had fallen, not

under the pressure of any new or unforeseen event, but by the evils

connected with their personal situation, and their inaptitude for the

parts they had undertaken to play. M. de Talleyrand had effected a

miracle at Vienna; by the treaty of alliance concluded on the 3rd

January, 1815, between France, England, and Austria, he had put an end

to the coalition formed against us in 1813, and separated Europe into

two parties, to the advantage of France. But the event of the 20th of

March had destroyed his work; the European coalition was again formed

against the Emperor and against France, who had made herself, or had

permitted herself to be made, the instrument of Napoleon. There was no

longer a chance of breaking up this formidable alliance. The same

feeling of uneasiness and mistrust of our faith, the same desire for a

firm and lasting union, animated the sovereigns and the nations. They

had speedily arranged at Vienna the questions which had threatened to

divide them. In this fortified hostility against France the Emperor

Alexander participated, with extreme irritation towards the House of

Bourbon and M. de Talleyrand, who had sought to deprive him of his

allies. The second Restoration was no longer like the first, the

personal glory and work of M. de Talleyrand; the honour was chiefly due

to England and the Duke of Wellington. Instigated by self-love and

policy, the Emperor Alexander arrived at Paris on the 10th of July,

1815, stern and angrily disposed towards the King and his advisers.

France and the King stood, nevertheless, in serious need of the goodwill

of the Russian Emperor, encompassed as they were by the rancorous and

eager ambition of Germany. Her diplomatists drew up the geographical

chart of our territory, leaving out the provinces of which they desired

to deprive us. Her generals undermined, to blow into the air, the

monuments which recalled their defeats in the midst of their victories.

Louis XVIII. resisted with much dignity these acts of foreign barbarism;

he threatened to place his chair of state upon the bridge of Jena, and

said publicly to the Duke of Wellington, "Do you think, my Lord, that

your Government would consent to receive me if I were again to solicit a

refuge?" Wellington restrained to the utmost of his power the violence

of Bluecher, and remonstrated with him by arguments equally urgent and

politic; but neither the dignity of the King, nor the amicable

intervention of England were sufficient to curb the overweening

pretensions of Germany. The Emperor Alexander alone could keep them

within bounds. M. de Talleyrand sought to conciliate him by personal

concessions. In forming his cabinet, he named the Duke de Richelieu, who

was still absent, Minister of the Royal Household, while the Ministry of

the Interior was held in reserve for Pozzo di Borgo, who would willingly

have left the official service of Russia to take part in the Government

of France. M. de Talleyrand placed much faith in the power of

temptations; but, in this instance, they were of no avail. The

Duke de Richelieu, probably in concert with the King himself, refused;

Pozzo di Borgo did not obtain, or dared not to solicit, the permission

of his master to become, once more, a Frenchman. I saw him frequently,

and that mind, at once quick and decisive, bold and restless, felt

keenly its doubtful situation, and with difficulty concealed its

perplexities. The Emperor Alexander maintained his cold reserve, leaving

M. de Talleyrand powerless and embarrassed in this arena of negotiation,

ordinarily the theatre of his success.

The weakness of Fouche was different, and sprang from other causes. It

was not that the foreign sovereigns and their ministers regarded him

more favourably than they did M. de Talleyrand, for his admission into

the King's cabinet had greatly scandalized monarchical Europe; the Duke

of Wellington alone persisted in still upholding him; but none amongst

the foreigners either attacked him or appeared anxious for his downfall.

It was from within that the storm was raised against him. With a

strangely frivolous presumption, he had determined to deliver up the

Revolution to the King, and the King to the Revolution, relying upon his

dexterity and boldness to assist him in passing and repassing from camp

to camp, and in governing one by the other, while alternately betraying

both. The elections which took place at this period throughout France,

signally falsified his hopes. In vain did he profusely employ agents,

and circular addresses; neither obtained for him the slightest

influence; the decided Royalists prevailed in nearly every quarter,

almost without a struggle. It is our misfortune and our weakness, that

in every great crisis the vanquished become as the dead. The Chamber of

1815 as yet appeared only in the distance, and already the Duke of

Otranto trembled as though thunderstruck by the side of the tottering

M. de Talleyrand. In this opposite and unequal peril, but critical for

both, the conduct of these two men was very different. M. de Talleyrand

proclaimed himself the patron of constitutional monarchy, boldly and

greatly organized as in England. Modifications conformable to the views

of the Liberal party were in some instances immediately acceded to, and

in others promised by the Charter. Young men were permitted to enter

the Chamber of Deputies. Fourteen Articles relative to the constitution

of this Chamber were submitted for the inspection of the next

Legislative Assembly. The Peerage was made hereditary. The censorship,

to which works under twenty printed sheets had been subjected, was

abolished. A grand Privy Council, on important occasions, united the

principal men of every party. It was neither the urgent necessity of the

moment, nor prevailing public opinion, that imposed on restored royalty

these important reforms: they were enacted by the Cabinet from a desire

of encouraging free institutions, and of giving satisfaction to the

party,--I ought rather to say to the small section of enlightened and

impatient spirits.

The real intentions and measures of Fouche were of a more personal

nature. Violently menaced by the reaction in favour of royalty, he at

first endeavoured to appease by feeding it. He consented to make himself

the instrument of proscription against the very men who, but a short

time before, were his agents, his confederates, his accomplices, his

colleagues, and his friends. At the same time that he published

memorials and circulars showing the necessity of clemency and

forgetfulness of the past, he placed before the Royal Council a list of

one hundred and ten names, to be excluded from all amnesty; and when

strict inquiry had reduced this number to eighteen, subject to

courts-martial, and to thirty-eight provisionally banished, he

countersigned without hesitation the decree which condemned them. A few

days afterwards, and upon his request, another edict revoked all the

privileges hitherto accorded to the daily papers, imposed upon them the

necessity of a new license, and subjected them to the censorship of a

commission, in which several of the principal royalist writers, amongst

others Messieurs Auger and Fievee, refused to sit under his patronage.

As little did the justice or national utility of his acts affect the

Duke of Otranto in 1815, as in 1793; he was always ready to become, no

matter at what cost, the agent of expediency. But when he saw that his

severe measures did not protect himself, and perceived the rapidly

approaching danger, he changed his tactics; the minister of the

monarchical reaction became again the factious revolutionist. He caused

to be secretly published and circulated, "Reports to the King," and the

"Notes to the Foreign Ministers," less calculated to enlighten the

authorities he addressed, than to prepare for himself arms and allies

against the Government and the party, from which he saw that he was

about to be excluded. He was of the number of those who try to make

themselves feared, by striving to injure when they are no longer

permitted to serve.

Neither the liberal reforms of M. de Talleyrand, nor the revolutionary

menaces of the Duke of Otranto, warded off the danger which pressed on

them. Notwithstanding their extraordinary abilities and long experience,

both mistook the new aspect of the times, either not seeing, or not

wishing to see, how little they were in unison with the contests which

the Hundred Days had revived. The election of a Chamber decidedly

Royalist, surprised them as an unexpected phenomenon; they both fell at

its approach, and within a few days of each other; left, nevertheless,

after their common downfall, in opposite positions. M. de Talleyrand

retained credit; the King and his new Cabinet loaded him with gifts and

royal favours; his colleagues during his short administration, Messieurs

de Jaucourt, Pasquier, Louis and Gouvion St. Cyr, received signal marks

of royal esteem, and retired from the scene of action as if destined to

return. Having accepted the trifling and distant embassy to Dresden,

Fouche hastened to depart, and left Paris under a disguise which he only

changed when he reached the frontier, fearful of being seen in his

native land, which he was fated never again to behold.

The Cabinet of the Duke de Richelieu entered upon office warmly welcomed

by the King, and even by the party which had gained the ascendency

through the present elections. It was indeed a new and thoroughly

royalist Ministry. Its head, recently arrived in France, honoured by all

Europe, and beloved by the Emperor Alexander, was to King Louis XVIII.

what the king himself was to France, the pledge of a more advantageous

peace. Two of his colleagues, Messieurs Decazes and Dubouchage, had

taken no part in public affairs previous to the Restoration. The four

others, Messieurs Barbe-Marbois, de Vaublanc, Coretto, and the Duke of

Feltri, had recently given proofs of strong attachment to the regal

cause. Their union inspired hope without suspicion, in the public mind,

as well as in that of the triumphant party. I was intimately acquainted

with M. de Marbois; I had frequently met him at the houses of

Madame de Rumford and Madame Suard. He belonged to that old France

which, in a spirit of generous liberality, had adopted and upheld, with

enlightened moderation, the principles most cherished by the France of

the day. I held under him, in the capacity of a confidential friend, the

post of Secretary-General to the Ministry of Justice, to which

M. Pasquier, then keeper of the great seal, had nominated me under the

Cabinet of M. de Talleyrand. Hardly was the new minister installed in

office, when the Chamber of Deputies assembled, and in its turn

established itself. It was almost exclusively Royalist. With

considerable difficulty, a few men, members of other parties, had

obtained entrance into its ranks. They found themselves in a state of

perpetual discomfort, isolated and ill at ease, as though they were

strangers of suspicious character; and when they endeavoured to declare

themselves and explain their sentiments, they were roughly driven back

into impotent silence. On the 23rd of October, 1815, in the debate on

the Bill presented by M. Decazes for the temporary suspension of

personal liberty, M. d'Argenson spoke of the reports which had been

spread abroad respecting the massacre of Protestants in the south. A

violent tumult arose in contradiction of his statements; he explained

himself with great reserve. "I name no facts," replied he, "I bring

forward no charges; I merely say that vague and contradictory rumours

have reached me; ... the very vagueness of these rumours calls for a report

from the minister, on the state of the kingdom." M. d'Argenson was not

only defeated in his object, and interrupted in his speech, but he was

expressly called to order for having alluded to facts unfortunately too

certain, but which the Government wished to smother up by silencing all

debate on the question.

For the first time in five-and-twenty years, the Royalists saw

themselves in the ascendant. Thoroughly believing that they had obtained

a legitimate triumph, they indulged unreservedly in the enjoyment of

power, with a mixture of aristocratic arrogance and new-born zeal, as

men do when little accustomed to victory, and doubtful of the strength

they are so eager to display.

Very opposite causes plunged the Chamber of 1815 into the extreme

reaction which has stamped its historical character. In the first place,

and above all others, may be named, the good and evil passions of the

Royalists, their moral convictions and personal resentments, their love

of order and thirst for vengeance, their pride in the past and their

apprehensions for the future, their determination to re-establish honour

and respect for holy observances, their old attachments, their sworn

pledges, and the gratification of lording it over their conquerors. To

the violence of passion was joined a prudent calculation of advantage.

To strengthen their party, and to advance individual fortunes, it was

essential for the new rulers of France to possess themselves everywhere

of place and power; therein lay the field to be worked, and the

territory to be occupied, in order to reap the entire fruits of victory.

Finally must be added, the empire of ideas, more influential than is

commonly supposed, and often exercising more power over men, without

their being conscious of it, than prejudice or interest. After so many

years of extraordinary events and disputes, the Royalists had, on all

political and social questions, systematic views to realize, historical

reminiscences to act upon, requirements of the mind to satisfy. They

hastened to apply their hands to the work, believing the day at last

arrived when they could, once more, assume in their own land, morally as

well as physically, in thought and deed, the superiority which had so

long been wrested from them.

As it happens in every great crisis of human associations, these

opposing principles in the reaction of 1815, had each its special and

exclusively effective representative in the ranks of the Royalists. The

party had their fighting champion, their political advocate, and their

philosopher. M. de la Bourdonnaye led their passions, M. de Villele

their interests, and M. de Bonald their ideas; three men well suited to

their parts, for they excelled respectively, the first in fiery attack,

the second in prudent and patient manoeuvring, and the third in

specious, subtle, and elevated exposition; and all three, although

unconnected by any previous intimacy, applied their varied talents with

unflinching perseverance to the common cause.

And what, after all, was the cause? What was, in reality, the end which

the leaders of the party, apparently on the very verge of success,

proposed to themselves? Had they been inclined to speak sincerely, they

would have found it very difficult to answer the question. It has been

said and believed by many, and probably a great portion of the Royalists

imagined, in 1815, that their object was to abolish the Charter, and

restore the old system: a commonplace supposition of puerile credulity;

the battle-cry of the enemies, whether able or blind, of the

Restoration. In the height of its most sanguine hopes, the Chamber of

1815 had formed no idea so extreme or audacious. Replaced as conquerors

upon the field, not by themselves, but by the errors of their

adversaries and the course of European events, the old Royalist party

expected that the reverses of the Revolution and the Empire would bring

them enormous advantages, and restitution; but they were yet undecided

as to the use they should make of victory in the government of France,

when they found themselves in the undisturbed possession of power. Their

views were as unsettled and confused as their passions were violent;

above all things, they coveted victory, for the haughty pleasure of

triumph itself, for the definitive establishment of the Restoration, and

for their own predominance, by holding power at the centre of

government, and throughout the departments by administration.

But in those social shocks there are deeper questions involved than the

actors are aware of. The Hundred Days inflicted on France a much heavier

evil than the waste of blood and treasure it had cost her; they lit up

again the old quarrel which the Empire had stifled and the Charter was

intended to extinguish,--the quarrel between old and new France, between

the emigrants and the revolutionists. It was not alone between two

political parties, but between two rival classes, that the struggle

recommenced in 1815, as it originally exploded in 1789.

An unfavourable position for founding a Government, and, above all, a

free Government. A certain degree of excitement and emulation invariably

exists between the people and the political parties, which constitutes

the very life of the social body, and encourages its energetic and

wholesome development. But if this agitation is not confined to

questions of legislature and the conduct of public affairs,--if it

attacks society in its very basis,--if, instead of emulation between

parties, there arises hostility amongst classes, the movement ceases to

be healthy, and changes to a destroying malady, which leads on to the

most lamentable disorders, and may end in the dissolution of the State.

The undue ascendency of one class over another, whether of the

aristocracy or the people, becomes tyranny. The bitter and continued

struggle of either to obtain the upper hand, is in fact revolution,

imminently impending or absolutely declared. The world has witnessed, in

two great examples, the diametrically opposite results to which this

formidable fact may lead. The contest between the Patricians and

Plebeians held Rome for ages between the cruel alternations of despotism

and anarchy, which had no variety but war. As long as either party

retained public virtue, the republic found grandeur, if not social

peace, in their quarrel; but when Patricians and Plebeians became

corrupted by dissension, without agreeing on any fixed principle of

liberty, Rome could only escape from ruin by falling under the despotism

and lingering decline of the Empire. England presents to modern Europe a

different spectacle. In England also, the opposing parties of nobles and

democrats long contended for the supremacy; but, by a happy combination

of fortune and wisdom, they came to a mutual compromise, and united in

the common exercise of power: and England has found, in this amicable

understanding between the different classes, in this communion of their

rights and mutual influence, internal peace with greatness, and

stability with freedom.

I looked forward to an analogous result for my own country, from the

form of government established by the Charter. I have been accused of

desiring to model France upon the example of England. In 1815, my

thoughts were not turned towards England; at that time I had not

seriously studied her institutions or her history. I was entirely

occupied with France, her destinies, her civilization, her laws, her

literature, and her great men. I lived in the heart of a society

exclusively French, more deeply impregnated with French tastes and

sentiments than any other. I was immediately associated with that

reconciliation, blending, and intercourse of different classes, and even

of parties, which seemed to me the natural condition of our new and

liberal system. People of every origin, rank, and calling, I may almost

say of every variety of opinion,--great noblemen, magistrates,

advocates, ecclesiastics, men of letters, fashion, or business, members

of the old aristocracy, of the Constituent Assembly, of the Convention,

of the Empire,--lived in easy and hospitable intercourse, adopting

without hesitation their altered positions and views, and all apparently

disposed to act together in goodwill for the advantage of their country.

A strange contradiction in our habits and manners! When social

relations, applicable to mental or worldly pleasures, are alone

involved, there are no longer distinctions of classes, or contests;

differences of situation and opinion cease to exist; we have no thought

but to enjoy and contribute in common our mutual possessions,

pretensions, and recommendations. But let political questions and the

positive interests of life once more spring up,--let us be called upon,

not merely to assemble for enjoyment or recreation, but to assume each

his part in the rights, the affairs, the honours, the advantages, and

the burdens of the social system,--on the instant, all dissensions

re-appear; all pretences, prejudices, susceptibilities, and oppositions

revive; and that society which had seemed so single and united, resumes

all its former divisions and differences.

This melancholy incoherence between the apparent and actual state of

French society revealed itself suddenly in 1815. The reaction provoked

by the Hundred Days destroyed in the twinkling of an eye the work of

social reconciliation carried on in France for sixteen years, and caused

the abrupt explosion of all the passions, good or evil, of the social

system, against all the works, beneficial or mischievous, of the

Revolution.

Attacked also by another difficulty, the party which prevailed at the

opening of the session, in the Chamber of 1815, fell into another

mistake. The aristocratic classes in France, although generously

devoted, in public dangers, to the king and the country, knew not how to

make common cause either with the crown or the people; they have

alternately blamed and opposed, royal power and public liberty.

Isolating themselves in the privileges which satisfied their vanity

without giving them real influence in the State, they had not assumed,

for three centuries, either with the monarch, or at the head of the

nation, the position which seemed naturally to belong to them. After all

they had lost, and in spite of all they ought to have learned at the

Revolution, they found themselves in 1815, when power reverted to their

hands, in the same undefined and shifting position. In its relations

with the great powers of the State, in public discussion, in the

exercise of its peculiar rights, the Chamber of 1815 had the merit of

carrying into vigorous practice the constitutional system, which, in

1814, had scarcely emerged from its torpor under the Empire; but in its

new work it lost sight of equity, moderation, and the favourable moment.

It wished at the same time to control France and the King. It was

independent and haughty, often revolutionary in its conduct towards the

monarch, and equally violent and contra-revolutionary as regarded the

people. This was to attempt too much; it ought to have chosen between

the two, and to have declared itself either monarchical or popular. The

Chamber of 1815 was neither the one nor the other. It appeared to be

deeply imbued with the spirit of the old system, envenomed by the ideas

or examples of the spirit of the revolution; but the spirit of

government, even more essential under constitutional than under absolute

power, was wanting altogether.

Thus, an opposition was seen to spring up quickly within its own

bosom,--an opposition which became at once popular and monarchical, for

it equally defended against the ruling party, the crown they had so

rashly insulted, and the country they had profoundly disturbed. After

some sharp contests, sustained with acrimonious determination on both

sides, this opposition, strong in the royal support as in public

sympathy, frequently obtained a majority, and became the party of the

Government.

I had no seat at that time in the Chamber of Deputies. It has often been

said that I took a more important share in the Government of the day

than could be attributed to me with truth. I have never complained of

this, nor shall I complain now. I accept the responsibility, not only of

my own actions, but of those of the friends I selected and supported.

The monarchical and constitutional party formed in 1815, became on the

instant my own. I shall acknowledge frankly what experience has taught

me of their mistakes, while I feel proud of having been enrolled in

their ranks.

This party was formed abruptly and spontaneously, without premeditated

object, without previous or personal concert, under the simple necessity

of the moment, to meet a pressing evil, and not to establish any

particular system, or any specific combination of ideas, resolutions, or

designs. Its sole policy was at first confined to the support of the

Restoration against the reaction: a thankless undertaking, even when

most salutary; for it is useless to contend with a headlong

counter-current. While you are supporting the power whose flag serves as

a cloak to reaction, it is impossible to arrest the entire mischief you

desire to check; and you seem to adopt that which you have been unable

to subdue. This is one of the inevitable misconstructions which honest

men, who act conscientiously, in stormy days, must be prepared to

encounter.

Neither in its composition nor plans had the new Royalist party any

special or decided character. Amongst its rising leaders, as in its more

undistinguished ranks, there were men of every origin and position,

collected from all points of the social and political horizon.

M. de Serre was an emigrant, and had been a lieutenant in the army of

Conde; MM. Pasquier, Beugnot, Simeon, Barante and St. Aulaire, had

possessed influence under Napoleon; MM. Royer-Collard and Camille Jordan

were opposed to the Imperial system. The same judgment, the same opinion

upon the events of the day and the chances of the morrow, upon the

rights and legitimate interests of the throne and country, suddenly

united these men, hitherto unknown to each other. They combined, as the

inhabitants of the same quarter run from all sides and, without

acquaintance and never having met before, work in concert to extinguish

a great fire.

A fact, however, disclosed itself, which characterized already the new

royalist party in the impending struggle. Equally disturbed by the

pretensions of the old aristocrats, the monarchy and the citizens formed

a close league for mutual support. Louis XVIII. and young France resumed

together the policy of their fathers. It is fruitless for a people to

deny or forget the past; they cannot either annihilate or abstract

themselves from it; situations and emergencies will soon arise to force

them back into the road on which they have travelled for ages.

Selected as President by the Chamber itself, and also by the King,

M. Laine, while preserving, with a dignity at the same time natural and

slightly studied, the impartiality which his situation required,

inclined nevertheless towards the opinions of the moderate minority, and

supported them by his moral influence, sometimes even by his words. The

ascendency of his character, the gravity of his manners, and, at

certain moments, the passionate overflowing of his soul, invested him

with an authority which his abilities and knowledge would scarcely have

sufficed to command.

The Session had not been many days open, and already, from conversation,

from the selection of the officials, from the projects of interior

movement which were announced, the Deputies began to know and arrange

themselves, but still with doubt and confusion; as, in a battalion

unexpectedly called together, the soldiers assemble in disorder, looking

for their arms and colours. The Government propositions soon brought the

different parties to broad daylight, and placed them in contest. The

Session commenced, as might be expected, with measures arising from

incidental circumstances. Of the four bills evidently bearing this

character, two--the suspension of personal liberty, and the

establishment of prevotal courts--were proposed as exceptional and

purely temporary; the others--for the suppression of seditious acts, and

for a general amnesty--were intended to be definitive and permanent.

Measures of expediency, and exceptional laws, have been so often and so

peremptorily condemned in France, that their very name and aspect

suffice to render them suspicious and hateful,--a natural impression,

after so much and such bitter experience! They supply notwithstanding,

and particularly under a constitutional government, the least dangerous

as well as the most efficacious method of meeting temporary and urgent

necessities. It is better to suspend openly, and for a given time, a

particular privilege, than to pervert, by encroachment and subtlety,

the fixed laws, so as to adapt them to the emergency of the hour. The

experience of history, in such cases, confirms the suggestions of

reason. In countries where political liberty is finally established, as

in England, it is precisely after it has obtained a signal triumph, that

the temporary suspension of one or more of its special securities has,

under pressing circumstances, been adopted as a Government measure. In

ruder and less intelligent times, under the dominion of momentary

danger, and as an immediate defence, those rigorous and artful statutes

were enacted in perpetuity, in which all tyrannies have found arms ready

made, without the odium of forging them, and from which a more advanced

civilization, at a later period, has found it so difficult to escape.

It is necessary, I admit, to enable these exceptional laws to accomplish

their end without too much danger, that, beyond the scope of their

operation and during their continuance, the country should retain enough

general liberty, and the authorities sufficient real responsibility, to

confine these measures within their due limits, and to control their

exercise. But, in spite of the blindness and rage of the beaten parties,

we have only to read the debates in the Chambers of 1815, and the

publications of the time, to be convinced that at that epoch liberty was

far from having entirely perished; and the history of the ministers who

were then in power unanswerably demonstrates that they sustained the

weight of a most effective responsibility.

Of the two temporary bills introduced into the Chamber in 1815, that

respecting the prevotal courts met with the least opposition. Two very

superior men, MM. Royer-Collard and Cuvier, had consented to become its

official advocates, in the character of Royal Commissioners; and during

the discussion, M. Cuvier took the lead. The debate was a very short

one; two hundred and ninety members voted for the bill, ten only

rejected it. The division may create surprise. The bill, in principle,

comprised the heaviest possible infringement on common right, and the

most formidable in practical application, by the suppression, in these

courts, of the greater part of the privileges accorded in the ordinary

modes of jurisdiction. A clause in the bill went almost to deprive the

King of his prerogative of pardon, by ordering the immediate execution

of the condemned criminals, unless the prevotal court itself assumed the

functions of grace by recommending them to royal clemency. One of

the most enthusiastic Royalists of the right-hand party,

M. Hyde de Neuville, objected energetically, but without effect, to a

clause so harsh and anti-monarchical. The two most intractable of

passions, anger and fear, prevailed in the Chamber; it had its own

cause, as well as that of the King, to defend and avenge, and persuaded

itself that it could neither strike too soon nor too strongly when both

were attacked.

On this occasion, as well as on others, the memory of M. Cuvier has been

unjustly treated. He has been accused of pusillanimity and servile

ambition. The charge indicates little knowledge of human nature, and

insults a man of genius on very slight grounds. I lived much with

M. Cuvier. Firmness in mind and action was not his most prominent

quality; but he was neither servile, nor governed by fear in opposition

to his conscience. He loved order, partly for his own personal security,

but much more for the cause of justice, civilization, the advantage of

society, and the progress of intellect. In his complaisance for power,

he was more governed by sincere inclination than egotism. He was one of

those who had not learned from experience to place much confidence in

liberty, and whom the remembrance of revolutionary anarchy had rendered

easily accessible to honest and disinterested apprehensions. In times of

social disturbance, men of sense and probity often prefer drifting

towards the shore, to running the risk of being crushed, with many dear

objects, on the rocks upon which the current may carry them.

In the debate on the bill which suspended for a year the securities for

personal liberty, M. Royer-Collard, while supporting the Government,

marked the independence of his character, and the mistrustful foresight

of the moralist with regard to the power which the politician most

desired to establish. He demanded that the arbitrary right of

imprisonment should be entrusted only to a small number of functionaries

of high rank, and that the most exalted of all, the Ministers, should in

every case be considered distinctly responsible. But these amendments,

which would have prevented many abuses without interfering with the

necessary power, were rejected. Inexperience and precipitation were

almost universal at the moment. The Cabinet and its most influential

partisans in the Chambers had scarcely any knowledge of each other;

neither had yet learned to conceive plans in combination, to settle the

limits or bearing of their measures, or to enter on a combat with

preconcerted arrangements.

A combined action and continued understanding, however, between the

Government and the moderate Royalists, became every day more

indispensable; for the divergence of several new parties which began to

be formed, and the extent of their disagreements, manifested themselves

with increasing strength from hour to hour. In proposing the act

intended to repress sedition, M. de Marbois, a gentle and liberal

nature, inclined to mild government, and little acquainted with the

violent passions that fermented around him, had merely looked upon these

acts as ordinary offences, and had sent the criminals before the

tribunals of correctional police, to be punished by imprisonment only.

Better informed as to the intentions of a portion of the Chamber, the

committee appointed to examine the bill, of which M. Pasquier was the

chairman, endeavoured to restrain the dissentients, while satisfying

them to a certain extent. Amongst seditious acts, the committee drew a

line between crimes and offences, assigning crimes to the Court of

Assizes, to be punished by transportation, and prescribing for simple

offences fine and imprisonment. This was still too little for the

ultra-members of the party. They demanded the penalty of death, hard

labour, and confiscation of property. These additions were refused, and

the Chamber, by a large majority, passed the bill as amended by the

committee. Undoubtedly there were members of the right-hand party who

would not have dared to contest the propositions of MM. Piet and

de Salaberry, but who rejoiced to see them thrown out, and voted for the

bill. How many errors would men escape, and how many evils would they

avoid, if they had the courage to act as they think right, and to do

openly what they desire!

All these debates were but preludes to the great battle ready to

commence, on the most important of the incidental questions before the

Chamber. It is with regret that I use the word _question_. The amnesty

was no longer one. On returning to France, the King, by his proclamation

from Cambray, had promised it; and, with kings, to promise is to

perform. What sovereign could refuse the pardon, of which he has given a

glimpse to the condemned criminal? The royal word is not less pledged to

a nation than to an individual. But in declaring, on the 28th of June,

1815, that he would only except from pardon "the authors and instigators

of the plot which had overturned the throne," the King had also

announced "that the two Chambers would point them out to the punishment

of the laws;" and when, a month later, the Cabinet had, upon the report

of the Duke of Otranto, arrested the individuals excepted in the two

lists, the decree of the 24th of July again declared that "the Chambers

should decide upon those amongst them who should be expatriated or

brought to trial." The Chambers were therefore inevitably compromised.

The amnesty had been declared, and yet it still remained a question, a

bill was still considered necessary.

Four members of the Chamber of Deputies hastened to take the

initiative in this debate, three of them with extreme violence,

M. de la Bourdonnaye being the most vehement of the three. He had

energy, enthusiasm, independence, political tact as a partisan, and a

frank and impassioned roughness, which occasionally soared to eloquence.

His project, it was said, would have brought eleven hundred persons

under trial. Whatever might be the correctness of this calculation, the

three propositions were tainted with two capital errors: they assumed,

in fact, that the catastrophe of the 20th of March had been the result

of a widely-spread conspiracy, the authors of which ought to be punished

as they would have been in ordinary times, and by the regular course of

law, if they had miscarried; they assigned to the Chambers the right of

indicating, by general categories, and without limit as to number, the

conspirators to be thus dealt with, although the King, by his decree of

the 24th of July preceding, had merely conferred on them the power of

deciding, amongst the thirty-eight individuals specially excepted by

name, which should be banished and which should be brought to trial.

There was thus, in these projects, at the same time, an act of

accusation under the name of amnesty, and an invasion of the powers

already exercised, as well as of the limits already imposed, by the

royal authority.

The King's Government by no means mistook the bearing of such

resolutions, and maintained its rights, its acts, and promises with

suitable dignity. It hastened to check at once the attempt of the

Chamber. The bill introduced by the Duke de Richelieu on the 8th of

December, was a real act of amnesty, with no other exceptions than the

fifty-six persons named in the two lists of the decree of the 24th of

July, and belonging to the family of the Emperor Napoleon. A single

additional clause, the fatal consequences of which were assuredly not

foreseen, had been introduced into the preamble: the fifth article

excepted from the amnesty all persons against whom prosecutions had been

ordered or sentences passed before the promulgation of the law,--a

lamentable reservation, equally contrary to the principle of the measure

and the object of its framers. The character and essential value of an

amnesty consist in assigning a term to trials and punishments, in

arresting judicial action in the name of political interest, and in

re-establishing confidence in the public mind, with security in the

existing state of things, at once producing a cessation of sanguinary

scenes and dangers. The King's Government had already, by the first list

of exceptions in the decree of the 24th of July, imposed on itself a

heavy burden. Eighteen generals had been sent before councils of war.

Eighteen grand political prosecutions, after the publication of the

amnesty, would have been much even for the strongest and

best-established government to bear. The Duke de Richelieu's Cabinet, by

the fifth article of the bill, imposed on itself, in addition, the

prospective charge of an indefinite number of political prosecutions,

which might rise up in an indefinite time; and no one could possibly

foresee in what part of the kingdom, or under what circumstances. The

evil of this short-sightedness continued, with repeated instances

rapidly succeeding each other, for more than two years. It was the

prolonged application of this article which destroyed the value and

almost the credit of the amnesty, and compromised the royal Government

in that reaction of 1815 which has left such lamentable reminiscences.

A member of the right-hand party, who was soon destined to become its

leader, and who until then had taken no share in the debate,

M. de Villele, alone foresaw the danger of the fifth article, and

hesitated not to oppose it. "This article," said he, "seems to me too

vague and expansive; exceptions to amnesty, after such a rebellion as

that which has taken place in our country, deliver over inevitably to

the rigour of the laws all the excepted individuals. Now rigorous

justice demands that, in such cases, none should be excepted but the

most guilty and the most dangerous. Having no pledge or certain proof

that the individuals attainted by the fifth article have deserved this

express exception, I vote that the article be struck out." Unfortunately

for the Government, this vote of the leader of the opposition passed

without effect.

Independently of the question itself, this discussion produced an

important result: it settled the division of the Chamber into two great

parties, the right-hand side and the centre; the one the opponent, and

the other the ally of the Cabinet. The differences of opinion which

manifested themselves on this occasion were too keen, and were

maintained on both sides with too much animosity, not to become the

basis of a permanent classification. The right-hand party persisted in

requiring several categories of exceptions to the amnesty, confiscations

under the name of indemnity for injuries done to the State, and the

banishment of the regicides who had been implicated during the Hundred

Days. The centre, and the Cabinet in union, firmly resisted these

propositions. M. Royer-Collard and M. de Serre, amongst others,

exhibited in the course of this debate as much political intelligence

as moral rectitude and impassioned eloquence. "It is not always the

number of executions that saves empires," said M. Royer-Collard; "the

art of governing men is more difficult, and glory is acquired at a

loftier price. If we are prudent and skilful, we shall find that we have

punished enough; never, if we are not so." M. de Serre applied himself

chiefly to oppose the confiscations demanded under the title of

indemnities. "The revolutionists have acted thus," said he; "they would

do the same again if they could recover power. It is precisely for this

reason that you ought not to imitate their detestable example; and by a

distorted interpretation of an expression which is not open and sincere,

by an artifice scarcely worthy of the theatre.... Gentlemen, our

treasury may be low, but let it be pure." The categories and the

indemnities were definitively rejected. At the last moment, and in the

midst of almost universal silence, the banishment of the regicides was

alone inscribed upon the act. Under the advice of his ministers, the

King felt that he could not, in obedience to the will of Louis XVI.,

refuse his sanction to the amnesty, and leave this formidable question

in suspense. There are Divine judgments which human authority ought not

to forestall; neither is it called upon to reject them when they are

declared by the course of events.

To the differences on the questions of expediency, every day were added

the disagreements on the questions of principle. The Government itself

excited but few. A bill on elections, introduced by the Minister of the

Interior, M. de Vaublanc, was the only one which assumed this

character. The debate was long and animated. The leading men on the

opposite sides of the Chamber, MM. de Villele, de la Bourdonnaye,

de Bonald, Royer-Collard, Pasquier, de Serre, Beugnot, and Laine,

entered into it anxiously. But the ministerial plan was badly conceived,

based upon incompatible foundations, and giving to the elections more of

an administrative than of a political character. The principal orators

of the Centre rejected it, as well as a counter-project proposed by the

committee, in which the right-hand party prevailed, and which the

Cabinet also disapproved. The last proposal was ultimately carried, but

with important amendments, and vehemently opposed to the last. The

Chamber of Deputies passed it by a weak majority, and in the Chamber of

Peers it was thrown out. Although the different parties had clearly

indicated their impressions and desires on the electoral system, the

details were as yet obscure and unsettled. The question remained in

abeyance. From the Chamber itself emanated the other propositions which

involved matters of principle; they sprang from the right-hand party,

and all tended to the same point--the position of the Church in the

State. M. de Castelbajac proposed that the bishops and ministers should

be authorized to receive and hold in perpetuity, without requiring the

sanction of Government, all donations of property, real or personal, for

the maintenance of public worship or ecclesiastical establishments.

M. de Blangy demanded that the condition of the clergy should be

materially improved, and that the married priests should no longer enjoy

the pensions which had been given to them in their clerical character.

M. de Bonald called for the abolition of the law of divorce.

M. Lacheze-Murel insisted that the custody of the civil records should

be given back to the ministers of religion. M. Murard de St. Romain

attacked the University, and argued that public education should be

confided to the clergy. The zeal of the new legislators was, above all

other considerations, directed towards the re-establishment of religion

and the Church, as the true basis of social power.

At the outset, the uneasiness and opposition excited by these proposals

were less animated than we can at present imagine. More immediate

dangers occupied the adversaries of Government and the public mind. A

general sentiment in favour of religion as a necessary principle of

order and morality, prevailed throughout the country; a sentiment

revived even by the crisis of the Hundred Days, the moral wounds which

that crisis had revealed, and the social dangers it had partially

disclosed. The Catholic Church had not yet become the mark of the

reaction which a little later was raised against it. The clergy took no

direct part in these debates. The University had been, under the Empire,

an object of suspicion and hostility on the part of the Liberals. The

movement in favour of religious influences scarcely astonished those

whom it displeased. But in the very bosom of the Chamber whence this

movement emanated, there were enlightened understandings, who at once

perceived its full range, and I foresaw the angry dissensions which

sooner or later would be stirred up in the new social system by some of

these propositions, so utterly opposed to its most fundamental and

cherished principles. They applied themselves, with resolute good

sense, to extract from the measures introduced, a selection conformable

to the true interests of society and the Church. The law of divorce was

abolished. The position of the parish priests, of the assistant

ministers, and of several ecclesiastical establishments received

important amelioration. The scandal of married clergymen still receiving

official pensions ceased. But the proposal of assigning to the clergy

the care of the civil records, and the control of public instruction,

fell to the ground. The University, well defended and directed by

M. Royer-Collard, remained intact. And with regard to the privilege

demanded for the clergy, of receiving every kind of donation without the

interference of the civil authorities, the Chamber of Peers, on a

report, as judicious as it was elegantly composed, by the

Abbe de Montesquiou, reduced it to these conditions,--that none but

religious establishments recognized by law should exercise this right,

and that in every individual instance the authority of the King should

be indispensable. The Chamber of Deputies adopted the measure thus

amended, and from this movement, which threatened to disturb so

completely the relations of the Church and State, nothing eventuated to

infringe seriously either on the old maxims or the modern principles of

French society.

The Cabinet co-operated loyally in these debates and wise resolutions,

but with less decision and ascendency than that evinced by the moderate

Royalists in the Chambers. It brought into the question neither the

depth of thought, nor the power of eloquence, which give a Government

the control over legislative assemblies, and raise it, even in spite of

its deficiencies, in public estimation. The Duke de Richelieu was

universally respected. Amongst his colleagues, all men of high character

and loyalty, there were several who were endowed with rare knowledge,

ability, and courage. But the Cabinet wanted unity and brilliant

reputation; important conditions under any system, but pre-eminently so

under a free government.

Outside the Chambers, the Ministry had to sustain a still more weighty

load than the pressure from within, and one which they were not better

able to encounter. France had become a prey, not to the most tyrannical

or the most sanguinary, but to the most vexatious and irritating of all

the passing influences which the vicissitudes of frequent revolutions

impose upon a nation. A party long vanquished, trampled on, and finally

included in a general amnesty, the party of the old Royalty, suddenly

imagined that they had become masters, and gave themselves up

passionately to the enjoyment of a new power which they looked upon as

an ancient right. God forbid that I should revive the sad remembrances

of this reaction! I only desire to explain its true character. It was,

in civil society, in internal administration, in local affairs, and

nearly throughout the entire land of France, a species of foreign

invasion, violent in certain places, offensive everywhere, and which

occasioned more evil to be dreaded than it actually inflicted; for these

unexpected victors threatened and insulted even where they refrained

from striking. They seemed inclined to indemnify themselves by arrogant

temerity, for their impotence to recover all that they had lost; and to

satisfy their own consciences in the midst of their revenge, they tried

to persuade themselves that they were far from inflicting on their

enemies the full measure of what they had themselves suffered.

Strangers to the passions of this party, impressed with the mischief

they inflicted on the Royal cause, and personally wounded by the

embarrassments they occasioned to the Government, the Duke de Richelieu

and the majority of his colleagues contended with honest sincerity

against them. Even by the side of the most justly condemned proceedings

during the reaction of 1815, and which remained entirely unpunished, we

find traces of the efforts of the existing authorities either to check

them, prevent their return, or at least to repel the sad responsibility

of permitting them. When the outrages against the Protestants broke out

in the departments of the south, and more than six weeks before

M. d'Argenson spoke of them in the Chamber of Deputies, a royal

proclamation, countersigned by M. Pasquier, vehemently denounced them,

and called upon the magistrates for their suppression. After the

scandalous acquittal, by the Court of Assize at Nismes, of the assassin

of General Lagarde, who had protected the free worship of the

Protestants, M. Pasquier demanded and obtained, from the Court of

Appeal, the annulment of this sentence, in the name of the law, and as a

last protestation of discarded justice. In spite of every possible

intervention of delay and impediment, the proceedings commenced at

Toulouse, and ended in a decree of the prevotal court at Pau, which

inflicted five years' imprisonment on two of the murderers of General

Ramel. Those of Marshal Brune had never been seriously pursued; but

M. de Serre, being appointed Chancellor, compelled justice to resume its

course; and the Court of Assize at Riom condemned to death, in default

of appearance, the assassins they were unable to apprehend. Tardy and

insufficient amends, which reveal the weakness of authority, as well as

the resistance with which it was opposed! Even the ministers most

subservient to the extreme royalist party endeavoured to check while

supporting them, and took care to contribute less assistance than they

had promised. At the very time when the Government divided the old army

into classes, to get rid of all the suspected officers, the Minister of

War, the Duke of Feltri, summoned to the direction of the staff of his

department General de Meulan, my brother-in-law, a brave soldier, who

had entered the service as a private in 1797, and had won his promotion

on the field of battle by dint of wounds. M. de Meulan was a royalist,

but extremely attached to the army and his comrades, and deeply grieved

by the severities with which they were oppressed. I witnessed his

constant efforts to obtain justice for them, and to secure the

continuance in the ranks, or re-admission, of all those whom he believed

to be disposed to serve the King with honest loyalty. The undertaking

was difficult. In 1816, one of our most able and distinguished officers

of engineers, General Bernard, had been placed on half-pay, and lived in

exile at Dole. The United States of America offered him the command of

that branch of service in the Republic, with considerable advantages. He

accepted the proposal, and asked the permission of his minister. The

Duke of Feltri summoned him to his presence, and tried to induce him to

abandon this design, by offering to appoint him to any situation in

France which he considered suitable. "You promise me," said Bernard,

"what you are unable to perform; place me as you intend, and in a

fortnight I shall be so denounced that you will have no power to support

me, and so harassed that I should voluntarily resign. While the

Government has no more strength than at present, it can neither employ

nor protect me. In my corner, I am at the mercy of a sub-prefect and

police magistrate, who can arrest and imprison me; who sends for me

every day, and compels me to wait in his ante-chamber to be ill received

at last. Suffer me to go to America. The United States are the natural

allies of France. I have decided, and, unless imprisoned, I shall

certainly take my departure." His passport was then given to him. The

Duke de Berry complained to General Haxo of the course adopted by

General Bernard. "After the manner in which he has been treated,"

replied Haxo, "I am only surprised that he has not gone before; it is by

no means certain that I shall not some day follow his example."

Nothing can explain, better than this simple fact, the situation of the

King's ministers at that time, and the sincerity as well as the timidity

of their wishes to be prudent and just.

A great act, resolutely conceived and accomplished, on a great occasion,

was necessary to raise the executive authority from the reputation as

well as the actual mischief of this weakness, and to emancipate it from

the party under which it succumbed while resisting. Today, so long

removed as we are from that time, the more I reflect on it in the calm

freedom of my judgment, the more I am convinced that the trial of

Marshal Ney afforded a most propitious opportunity for such an act as

that to which I now allude. There were undoubtedly weighty reasons for

leaving justice to its unfettered course. Society and the royal power

both required that respect for, and a salutary dread of, the law should

repossess men's minds. It was important that generations formed during

the vicissitudes of the Revolution and the triumphs of the Empire,

should learn, by startling examples, that all does not depend on the

strength and success of the moment; that there are certain inviolable

duties; that we cannot safely sport with the fate of governments and the

peace of nations; and that, in this momentous game, the most powerful

and the most eminent risk their honour and their lives. In a political

and moral sense these considerations were of the greatest importance.

But another prominent truth, equally moral and political, ought to have

weighed heavily in the balance against an extreme decision. The Emperor

Napoleon had reigned long and brilliantly, acknowledged and admired by

France and Europe, and supported by the devotion of millions of men,--by

the people as well as by the army. Ideas of right and duty, sentiments

of respect and fidelity, were confused and antagonistic in many minds.

There were two actual and natural governments in presence of each other;

and many, without perversity, might have hesitated which to choose. The

King, Louis XVIII. and his advisers might in their turn, without

weakness, have taken into consideration this moral confusion, of which

Marshal Ney presented the most illustrious example. The greater his

offence against the King, with the more safety could they place clemency

by the side of justice, and display, over his condemned head, that

greatness of mind and heart which has also its full influence in

establishing power and commanding fidelity. The very violence of the

reaction in favour of royalty, the bitterness of party passions, their

thirst for punishment and vengeance, would have imparted to this act a

still greater brilliancy of credit and effect; for boldness and liberty

would have sprung from it as natural consequences. I heard at that

time a lady of fashion, usually rational and amiable, call

Mademoiselle de Lavalette "a little wretch," for aiding her mother in

the escape of her father. When such extravagancies of feeling and

language are indulged in the hearing of kings and their advisers, they

should be received as warnings to resist, and not to submit.

Marshal Ney, pardoned and banished after condemnation, by royal letters

deliberately promulgated, would have given to kingly power the aspect of

a rampart raising itself above all, whether friends or enemies, to stay

the tide of blood; it would have been, in fact, the reaction of 1815

subdued and extinguished, as well as that of the Hundred Days.

I do not pretend to have thought and said then, all that I say and think

at present. I was sorrowful and perplexed. The King's ministers were in

a similar predicament. They believed that they neither could nor ought

to recommend clemency. In this momentous contingency, power knew not how

to be great, sometimes the only method of becoming strong. Controlled

but not overthrown, and irritated while defeated, by these alternations

of concession and resistance, the Right-hand party, now become decidedly

the Opposition, sought, while complaining and hesitating, some channel

of escape from their position at once powerful and impotent,--some

breach through which they might give the assault to the Government,

enter the citadel, and establish themselves firmly there. A man of mind

and courage, ambitious, restless, clever, and discontented, as well on

his own account as for the sake of his party, ventured an attack

extremely daring in reality, but circumspect in form, and purely

theoretical in appearance. M. de Vitrolles, in a short pamphlet entitled

'Of the Ministry under a Representative Government,' said:--"France in

every quarter expresses the necessity, profoundly acknowledged, of

sterner action in the Government. I have examined the causes of this

universal feeling, and the reasons which could explain why the different

Administrations that have succeeded each other within the last eighteen

months have not given the King's Cabinet the character of strength and

unity which the Ministers themselves feel to be so essential. I believe

that I have found them in the incoherence which existed between the

nature of the adopted government and the ministerial organization, which

it had not been considered necessary to modify, while at the same time

we received a new division of power, and that power assumed an entirely

new character of action." Appealing at every sentence to the practice

and example of England, M. de Vitrolles argued that the Ministry, which

he called _an institution_, should have perfect unity in itself, a

predominant majority in the Chambers, and an actual responsibility in

the conduct of affairs, which would ensure for it, with the Crown, the

requisite influence and dignity. On these three conditions alone could

the Government be effective. A strange reminiscence to refer to at the

present day! By the most confidential intimate of the Count d'Artois,

and to establish the old royalist party in power, parliamentary

legislation was for the first time recommended and demanded for France,

as a necessary consequence of representative government.

I undertook to repulse this attack by unmasking it.[11] I explained, in

reply, the essential principles of representative government, their true

meaning, their real application, and the conditions under which they

could be usefully developed, in the state in which France had been

plunged by our revolutions and dissensions. Above all, I endeavoured to

expose the bitterness of party spirit which lay behind this polished and

erudite tilting-match between political rhetoricians, and the underhand

blows which, in the insufficiency of their public weapons, they secretly

aimed at each other. I believe my ideas were sound enough to satisfy

intelligent minds who looked below the surface and onwards to the

future; but they had no immediate and practical efficacy. When the great

interests of nations and the contending passions of men are at stake,

the most ingenious speculative arguments are a mere war of display,

which has no influence on the course of events. As soon as the budget

was voted, and on the very day of its announcement, the session was

closed, and the Chambers of 1815 retired, having strenuously exercised,

both in defence and attack, the free privileges conferred on France by

the Charter; but divided into two Royalist parties: the one wavering and

uneasy, although in the possession of power; the other full of

expectation, and looking forward, with the opening of the next session,

to a more decisive success, and both in a state of mutual irritation.

Notwithstanding their doubts and weaknesses, the advantage remained with

the Cabinet and its adherents. For the first time since France had been

a prey to the Revolution, the struggles of liberty assisted the

advocates of a moderate policy, and essentially checked, if not

completely subdued, their opponents. The waves of reaction murmured, but

rose no more. The Cabinet, strongly supported in the Chambers, possessed

the confidence of the King, who entertained a high esteem for the Duke

de Richelieu, and a friendly disposition, becoming daily more warm,

towards his young Minister of Police, M. Decazes. Eight days after the

closing of the session, the Cabinet gained an important accession to its

internal strength, and an eloquent interpreter of its public policy.

M. Laine replaced M. de Vaublanc as Minister of the Interior. As a slight

compensation to the right-hand party, M. de Marbois, who had rendered

himself very objectionable to them, was dismissed from the Ministry of

Justice, and the Chancellor, M. Dambray, resumed the seals.

M. de Marbois was one of those upright and well-informed men, but at the

same time neither quick-sighted nor commanding, who assist power by

opinion rather than force. He had opposed the reaction with more

integrity than energy, and served the King with dignity, without

acquiring personal influence. In October 1815, at a moment of the most

violent agitation, the King expressed much anxiety for the introduction

of the bill respecting the prevotal courts. It was settled in council

that the Chancellor and the Minister of War should prepare it together.

A few days after, the King asked for it rather impatiently. "Sire,"

answered M. de Marbois, "I am ashamed to tell your Majesty that it is

ready." He resigned office honourably, although with some regret. At the

same time I left the post of Secretary-General to the Ministry of

Justice. While there, M. de Marbois had treated me with confidence

inspired by sympathy. Finding it disagreeable to remain under

M. Dambray, to whom my Protestant extraction and opinions were equally

unsuited, I re-assumed the place of Master of Requests in the State

Council.

The Chambers had scarcely adjourned, when the conspiracy of Grenoble,

planned by Didier, and that called the plot of the patriots, at Paris,

in 1816, came, one upon the other, to put the moderation of the Cabinet

to the proof. The details forwarded by the magistrates of the department

of the Isere were full of exaggeration and declamatory excitement. The

mode of repression ordered by the Government was precipitately rigorous.

Grenoble had been the cradle of the Hundred Days. It was thought

expedient to strike Bonapartism heavily, in the very place where it had

first exploded. A natural opportunity presented itself here of dealing

firmly with the abettors of treason, while in another quarter strong

resistance was opposed to the advocates of reaction. Moderation

sometimes becomes impatient of its name, and yields to the temptation of

forgetting it for the moment.

The Government nevertheless continued to be moderate, and the public

were not deceived as to the course adopted. Although M. Decazes, from

the nature of his department, was the minister on whom measures of

inquiry and suppression devolved, he was at the same time looked upon,

and truly, as the protector of the oppressed, and of all who were

suspected without cause. By natural disposition and magisterial habit,

he loved justice in his heart. A stranger to all party antipathies,

penetrating, fearless, indefatigably active, and as prompt in

benevolence as in duty, he exercised the power which the special laws

conferred on him with measure and discretion; enforcing them as much

against the spirit of reaction and persecution as against detected

conspiracy, and continually occupied himself in preventing or repairing

the abuses in which the inferior authorities indulged. Thus he advanced

equally in the good opinion of the country and the favour of the King.

People and parties have an infallible instinct by which they recognize,

under the most complicated circumstances, those who attack and those who

defend them, their friends and their enemies. The ultra-royalists soon

began to look upon M. Decazes as their chief adversary, and the

moderates to regard him as their most valuable ally.

At the same time, and during the silence of the tribune, the chief

representatives of moderate policy in the Chambers eagerly sought

opportunities of bringing their views before the public, of proclaiming

their principles, and of rallying, round the King and the constitutional

government, the still hesitating support of the nation at large. It

affords me much gratification to recall here the words, perhaps

forgotten, of three justly celebrated men, all personal friends of my

own; they demonstrate (as I think, with some brilliancy) the spirit of

the monarchical party attached to the state of society which the times

had engendered in France, and the opinions and sentiments they were

anxious to disseminate.

On the 6th of July, 1816, M. de Serre, in establishing, as first

President, the Royal Court at Colmar, spoke as follows:--"Liberty, that

pretext of all seditious ambition,--liberty, which is nothing more than

the reign of law, has ever been the first privilege buried with the laws

under the ruins of the throne. Religion itself is in danger when the

throne and laws are attacked; for everything on earth is derived from

heaven, and there is perfect harmony between all divine and human

institutions. If the latter are overturned, the former cannot be

respected. Let all our efforts, then, be exerted to combine, purify, and

strengthen that monarchical and Christian spirit which inspires the

sentiment of every sacrifice to duty! Let our first care be to obtain

universal respect for the Charter which the King has granted to us.

Undoubtedly our laws, our Charter, may be improved; and we neither

require to interdict regret for the past nor hope for the future. But

let us commence by submitting heartily and without reserve to the laws

as they exist; let us place this first check on the impatient

restlessness to which we have been surrendered for twenty-five years;

let us teach ourselves this primary conviction, that we know how to

adopt and to be satisfied with a defined system. The rest may be left to

time."

Six weeks later, on the 19th of August, M. Royer-Collard, when presiding

over the distribution of prizes at the general meeting of the

University, addressed these words to the young students:--"Today, when

the reign of falsehood has ceased, and the legitimacy of power, which is

truth in government, permits a more unshackled play to all salutary and

generous doctrines, public instruction beholds its destinies elevated

and expanded. Religion demands from it pure hearts and disciplined

minds; the State looks for habits profoundly monarchical; science,

philosophy, and literature expect new brilliancy and distinction. These

will be the benefits bestowed by a prince to whom his people already owe

so much gratitude and love. He, who has made public liberty flourish

under the shadow of his hereditary throne, will know well how to base,

on the tutelary principles of empires, a system of teaching worthy of

the enlightened knowledge of the age, and such as France demands from

him, that she may not descend from the glorious rank she occupies

amongst nations."

At the expiration of eight days more, in an assembly exclusively

literary, a man who had never held public office, but for half or more

than half a century a sincere and steady friend to liberty, M. Suard,

perpetual secretary of the French Academy, in giving an account to that

body of the examination in which he had decreed the prize to

M. Villemain for his 'Panegyric on Montesquieu,' expressed himself in

these terms:--"The instability of governments generally proceeds from

indecision as to the principles which ought to regulate the exercise of

power. A prince enlightened by the intelligence of the age, by

experience, and a superior understanding, bestows on royal authority a

support which no other can replace, in that Charter which protects the

rights of the monarch, while it guarantees to the nation all those that

constitute true and legitimate liberty. Let us rally under this signal

of alliance between the people and their king. Their union is the only

certain pledge for the happiness of both. Let the Charter be for us what

the holy ark that contained the tables of the law was for the Hebrews of

old. If the shade of the great publicist who has shed light on the

principles of constitutional monarchies could be present at the triumph

which we now award him, he would confirm with his sanction the

sentiments I venture to express."

An assembly so unanimous in opinion and intention, composed of such men,

representing so many important sections of society, and voluntarily

grouped round the King and his ministers, constituted in themselves a

great political fact. A certain index was supplied, that, in the opinion

of the moderate party, enlightened minds were not wanting to comprehend

the conditions of the new system, or serious dispositions for its

support. As yet, however, they only formed the scattered elements and

seeds of a great conservative party under a free government. Time was

necessary for this party to unite, to consolidate its natural strength,

and to render itself acceptable to the country. Would time be given for

this difficult undertaking? The question was doubtful. A formidable

crisis approached; the Chamber of 1815 was on the point of re-opening,

and undoubtedly still more ardent and aggressive than during the

preceding session. The party which prevailed there had not only to

retrieve their checks, and pursue their designs, but they had also

recent insults to avenge. During the recess they had been the objects of

animated attack. The Government everywhere opposed their influence; the

public loudly manifested towards them mistrust and antipathy; they were

alternately charged with fanaticism and hypocrisy, with incapacity and

vindictive obstinacy. Popular-anger and ridicule assailed them with

unrestrained license. From notes collected at the time, I quote

literally a few specimens of the sarcastic hostility with which they

were pursued:--

"April 10th, 1816.--Before adjourning, the Chamber of Deputies has

organized itself into a chapel. Treasurer and secretary, M. Laborie.

Contractor for burials, M. de La Bourdonnaye. Grave-digger,

M. Duplessis-Grenedan. Superintendent, M. de Bouville, and in his

capacity of vice-president--rattlesnake. Dispenser of holy water

(promise-maker), M. de Vitrolles. General of the Capuchins,

M. de Villele; and he deserves the post for his voice. Grand almoner,

M. de Marcellus, who gives a portion of his own estate to the poor.

Bellringers, M. Hyde de Neuville," etc. etc.

"May, 1816.--Here is the Charter which a majority of the Chamber

proposes to confer upon us.--_Article._ The fundamental principles of

the constitution may be changed as often as we wish; nevertheless,

seeing that stability is desirable, they shall not be changed more than

three times a year.--_Art._ Every law emanates from the King; this is

the first evidence of the right of petition accorded to all

frenchmen.--_Art._ The laws shall be executed according to the pleasure

of the Deputies, each in their respective departments.--_Art._ Every

representative shall have the nomination to all posts within his

district."

"July 1816.--They say the King is slightly indisposed. He will be very

ill indeed if he is obliged to keep his _Chamber_ for five years."

Such were the public expressions respecting this assembly, one of the

most honourable members of which, M. de Kergorlay, said, a few months

before, "The Chamber had not yet whispered when the former Ministry

already fell; let it speak, and the present Government will scarcely

last eight days."

The Ministry, however, had held its ground, and still continued to do

so; but it was evidently impossible that it could stand firm against the

Chamber, once more assembled with redoubled animosity. They well knew

that the Opposition was determined to renew the most violent attacks

upon the existing authorities. M. de Chateaubriand printed his 'Monarchy

according to the Charter;' and although this able pamphlet was not yet

published, everybody knew the superior skill with which the author could

so eloquently blend falsehood with truth, how brilliantly he could

compound sentiments and ideas, and with what power he could entangle the

blinded and unsettled public in this dazzling chaos. Neither the

Ministry nor the Opposition attempted to deceive themselves as to the

nature and consequences of the struggle about to commence. The question

of persons was merely the symbol and cloak of the great social and

political topics in dispute between the two parties. The point to be

decided was, whether power should pass over to the _Right-hand_ party,

such as it had exhibited itself during the session lately terminated;

that is, whether the theories of M. de Bonald and the passions of

M. de La Bourdonnaye, feebly qualified by the prudence and influence, as

yet unripened, of M. de Villele, should become the rule of the King's

policy.

I am not now, neither was I in 1815, amongst those who considered the

_Right-hand_ party unfit to govern France. On the contrary, I had

already, although less profoundly and clearly than at present, adopted

the opinion, that a concurrence of all the enlightened and independent

classes, whether old or new, was absolutely necessary to rescue our

country from the impending alternations of anarchy or despotism, and

that without their union we could never long preserve order and liberty

together. Perhaps too I might include this natural tendency amongst the

reasons, not absolutely defined, which led me to desire the Restoration.

Hereditary monarchy, become constitutional, presented itself to my mind

both as a principle of stability, and as a natural and worthy means of

reconciliation and conversion amongst the classes and parties who had

been so long and continually at war. But in 1816, so soon after the

revolutionary shock of the Hundred Days, and before the

counter-revolutionary reaction of 1815 had subsided, the accession of

the _Right-hand_ party to power, would have been very different from the

victory of men capable of governing without social disturbance, although

under an unpopular system. It would have been the Revolution and the

Counter-revolution once more in active contest, under an attack of

raging fever; and thus the Throne and the Charter, the internal peace

and security of France as well as her liberties, would be endangered by

this struggle, before the eyes of Europe encamped within our territory

and in arms around the combatants.

Under these menacing circumstances, M. Decazes had the rare merit of

finding and applying a remedy to the gigantic evil. He was the first,

and for some time the only one amongst the Ministers, who looked upon

the dissolution of the Chamber of 1815 as equally necessary and

possible. Undoubtedly personal interest had a share in his bold

perspicuity; but I know him well enough to feel convinced, that his

devotion to the country and the King powerfully contributed to his

enlightened decision; and his conduct at this crisis displayed at least

as much patriotism as ambition.

He had a double labour of persuasion to accomplish; first to win over

his two principal colleagues, the Duke de Richelieu and M. Laine, and

afterwards the King himself. Both sincerely attached to a moderate

policy, the Duke and M. Laine were undecided, timid under great

responsibility, and more disposed to wait the progress of difficulties

and dangers, than to surmount by confronting them. Amongst the Duke's

immediate circle were many ultra-royalists, who exercised no influence

over him, and whom he even treated rudely when they displayed their

violence; but he was unwilling to declare open war against them.

M. Laine, scrupulous in his resolves and fearful for their consequences,

was sensitive on the point of vanity, and disinclined to any measure not

originating with himself.[12] The King's irresolution was perfectly

natural. How could he dissolve the first Chamber, avowedly royalist,

which had been assembled for twenty-five years,--a Chamber he had

himself declared incomparable, and which contained so many of his oldest

and most faithful friends? What dangers to himself and his dynasty might

spring up on the day of such a decree! and even now, what discontent and

anger already existed in his family and amongst his devoted adherents,

and consequently what embarrassment and vexation thereby recoiled upon

himself.

But Louis XVIII. had a cold heart and an unfettered mind. The rage and

ill-temper of his relatives affected him little, when he had once firmly

resolved not to be influenced by them. It was his pride and pleasure to

fancy himself a more enlightened politician than all the rest of his

race, and to act in perfect independence of thought and will. On more

than one occasion, the Chamber, if not in direct words, at least in act

and manner, had treated him with disrespect almost amounting to

contempt, after the fashion of a revolutionary assembly. It became

necessary for him to show to all, that he would not endure the display

of such feelings and principles either from his friends or enemies. He

regarded the Charter as his own work, and the foundation of his glory.

The right-hand party frequently insulted and sometimes threatened a

direct attack upon the Charter. The defence lay with the King. This gave

him an opportunity of re-establishing it in its original integrity.

During the administration of M. de Talleyrand he had, reluctantly and

against his own conviction, modified several articles, and submitted

fourteen others to the revision of the legislative authorities. To cut

short this revision, and to return to the pure Charter, was to restore

it a second time to France, and thus to establish, for the country and

himself, a new pledge of security and peace.

During more than two months, M. Decazes handled all these points with

much ability and address; determined, but not impatient, persevering,

yet not obstinate, changing his topic according to the tempers he

encountered, and day by day bringing before these wavering minds the

facts and arguments best adapted to convince them. Without taking his

principal friends unconnected with the Cabinet into the full and daily

confidence of his labours, he induced them, under a promise of secrecy,

to assist him by reasons and reflections which he might bring under the

eyes of the King, while they gave variety to his own views. Several

amongst them transmitted notes to him with this object; I contributed

one also, particularly bearing on the hopes which those numerous middle

classes placed in the King, who desired no more than to enjoy the

productive repose they derived from him, and whom he alone could secure

from the dangerous uncertainty to which the Chamber had reduced them.

Different in origin and style, but all actuated by the same spirit and

tending to the same end, these argumentative essays became gradually

more and more efficacious. Having at last decided, the Duke de Richelieu

and M. Laine concurred with M. Decazes to bring over the King, who had

already formed his resolution, but chose to appear undecided, it being

his pleasure to have no real confidant but his favourite. The three

ministers who were known to be friends of the right-hand party,

M. Dambray, the Duke of Feltri, and M. Dubouchage, were not consulted;

and it was said that they remained in total ignorance of the whole

affair to the last moment. I have reason to believe that, either from

respect to the King, or from reluctance to enter into contest with the

favourite, they soon reconciled themselves to a result which they plainly

foresaw.

Be this as it may, on Wednesday, the 14th of August, the King held a

cabinet council; the sitting was over, and the Duke of Feltri had

already risen to take his departure. The King desired him to resume his

place again. "Gentlemen," said he, "there is yet a question of immediate

urgency,--the course to be taken with respect to the Chamber of

Deputies. Three months ago I had determined to re-assemble it. Even a

month since, I retained the same intention; but all that I have seen,

and all that comes under my daily observation, proves so clearly the

spirit of faction by which that Chamber is governed, the dangers which

it threatens to France and to myself have become so apparent, that I

have entirely changed my opinion. From this moment, then, you may

consider the Chamber as dissolved. Start from that point, gentlemen,

prepare to execute the measure, and in the meantime preserve the most

inviolable secrecy on the subject. My decision is absolute." When Louis

XVIII. had formed a serious resolution and intended to be obeyed, he had

a tone of dignity and command which cut short all remonstrance. During

three weeks, although the question deeply occupied all minds, and in

spite of some returns of hesitation on the part of the King himself, the

secret of the resolution adopted was so profoundly kept, that the Court

believed the Chamber would re-assemble. It was only on the 5th of

September, after the King had retired to bed, that _Monsieur_ received

information through the Duke de Richelieu, from his Majesty, that the

decree for the dissolution was signed, and would be published in the

'Moniteur' on the following morning.

The surprise and anger of _Monsieur_ were unbounded; he would have

hastened at once to the King; the Duke de Richelieu withheld him, by

saying that the King was already asleep, and had given peremptory orders

that he should not be disturbed. The Princes, his sons, accustomed to

extreme reserve in the King's presence, appeared to approve rather than

condemn. "The King has acted wisely," said the Duke de Berry; "I warned

those gentlemen of the Chamber that they had indulged in too much

license." The Court was thrown into consternation, on hearing of a

stroke so totally unexpected. The party against whom it was aimed,

attempted some stir in the first instance. M. de Chateaubriand added an

angry _Postscript_ to his 'Monarchy according to the Charter,' and

evinced symptoms of resistance, more indignant than rational, to the

measures decreed, in consequence of some infraction of the regulations

of the press, to retard the publication of his work.[13] But the party,

having reflected a little, prudently stifled their anger, and began

immediately to contrive means for re-engaging in the contest. The

public, or, I ought rather to say, the entire land, loudly proclaimed

its satisfaction. For honest, peaceably disposed people, the measure was

a signal of deliverance; for political agitators, a proclamation of

hope. None were ignorant that M. Decazes had been its first and most

effectual advocate. He was surrounded with congratulations, and promises

that all men of sense and substance would rally round him; he replied

with modest satisfaction, "This country must be very sick indeed for me

to be of so much importance."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 11: In a publication entitled 'Of Representative Government,

and the Actual Condition of France,' published in 1816.]

[Footnote 12: I insert amongst the "Historic Documents" a note which he

transmitted to the King, in the course of the month of August, on the

question of the dissolution of the Chamber; and in which the

fluctuations and fantasies of his mind, more ingenious than judicious,

are revealed. (Historic Documents, No. VII.)]

[Footnote 13: I have added to the "Historic Documents" the letters

exchanged on this occasion between M. de Chateaubriand, M. Decazes, and

the Chancellor Dambray, which characterize strongly the event and the

individuals. (Historic Documents, No. VIII.)]