CHAPTER VII.

FURTHER OBSERVATIONS ON THE DEFENSE NEUROPSYCHOSES.

Under the caption of “Defense Neuropsychoses” I have comprised hysteria,

obsessions, as well as certain cases of acute hallucinatory

confusion.[47] All these affections evince one common aspect in the fact

that their symptoms originated through the psychic mechanism of

(unconscious) defense, that is, through the attempt to repress an

unbearable idea which appeared in painful contrast to the ego of the

patient. I was also able to explain and exemplify by cases reported in

the preceding chapters in what sense this psychic process of “defense”

or “repression” is to be understood. I have also discussed the laborious

but perfectly reliable method of psychoanalysis of which I make use in

my examinations, and which at the same time serves as a therapy.

My experiences during the last two years have strengthened my

predilection for making the defense the essential point in the psychic

mechanism of the mentioned neuroses, and on the other hand have

permitted me to give a clinical foundation to the psychological theory.

To my surprise I have discovered some simple but sharply circumscribed

solutions for the problem of the neuroses which I shall provisionally

briefly report in the following pages. It would be inconsistent with

this manner of reporting to add to the assertions the required proofs,

but I hope to be able to fulfill this obligation in a comprehensive

discussion.

I. THE “SPECIFIC” ETIOLOGY OF HYSTERIA.

That the symptoms of hysteria become comprehensible only through a

reduction to “traumatically” effective experiences, and that these

psychic traumas refer to the sexual life has already been asserted by

Breuer and me in former publications. What I have to add today as a

uniform result of thirteen analyzed cases of hysteria concerns, on the

one hand, the nature of these sexual traumas, and on the other, the

period of life in which they occurred. An experience occurring at any

period of life, touching in any way the sexual life, and then becoming

pathogenic through the liberation and suppression of a painful affect is

not sufficient for the causation of hysteria. It must on the contrary

belong to the sexual traumas of early childhood (the period of life

before puberty), and its content must consist in a real irritation of

the genitals (coitus-like processes).

This specific determination of hysteria—sexual passivity in pre-sexual

periods—I have found fulfilled in all analyzed cases of hysteria (among

which were two men). To what extent the determination of the accidental

etiological moment diminishes the requirement of the hereditary

predisposition needs only be intimated. We can, moreover, understand the

disproportionately greater frequency of hysteria in the female sex, as

even in childhood this sex is more subject to sexual assaults.

The objection most frequently advanced against this result may be to the

purport, that sexual assaults on little children occur too frequently to

give an etiological value to its verification, or that such experiences

must remain ineffectual just because they concern a sexually undeveloped

being; and that one must moreover be careful not to obtrude upon the

patient through the examination such alleged reminiscences or believe in

the romances which they themselves fabricate. To the latter objections I

hold out the request that no one should really judge with great

certainty this obscure realm unless he has made use of the only method

which can clear it up (the method of psychoanalysis for bringing to

consciousness the hitherto unconscious[48]). The essential point in the

first doubts is settled by the observation that it really is not the

experiences themselves that act traumatically, but their revival as

reminiscences after the individual has entered into sexual maturity.

My thirteen cases of hysteria were throughout of the graver kind, they

were all of long duration, and some had undergone a lengthy and

unsuccessful asylum treatment. Every one of the infantile traumas which

the analysis revealed for these severe cases had to be designated as

marked sexual injuries; some of them were indeed abominable. Among the

persons who were guilty of such serious abuse we have in the first place

nurses, governesses, and other servants to whom children are left much

too carelessly, then in regrettable frequency come the teachers; but in

seven of the thirteen cases we dealt with innocent childish offenders,

mostly brothers who for years entertained sexual relations with their

younger sisters. The course of events always resembled some of the cases

which could with certainty be tracked, namely, that the boy had been

abused by a person of the feminine sex, thus awakening in him

prematurely the libido, and that after a few years he repeated in sexual

aggression on his sister the same procedures to which he himself was

subjected.

I must exclude active masturbation from the list of sexual injuries of

early childhood as being pathogenic for hysteria. That it is so very

frequently found associated with hysteria is due to the fact that

masturbation in itself is more frequently the result of abuse or

seduction than one supposes. It not seldom happens that both members of

a childish pair later in life become afflicted by defense neuroses, the

brother by obsessions and the sister by hysteria, which naturally gives

the appearance of a familial neurotic predisposition. This

pseudo-heredity is now and then solved in a surprising manner. I have

had under observation a brother, sister, and a somewhat older cousin.

The analysis which I have undertaken with the brother showed me that he

suffered from reproaches for being the cause of his sister’s malady; he

himself was corrupted by his cousin, concerning whom it was known in the

family that he fell a victim to his nurse.

I can not definitely state up to what age sexual damage occurs in the

etiology of hysteria, but I doubt whether sexual passivity can cause

repression after the eighth and tenth year unless qualified for it by

previous experiences. The lower limit reaches as far as memory in

general, that is, to the delicate age of one and one half or two years!

(two cases). In a number of my cases the sexual trauma (or the number of

traumas) occurred during the third and fourth year of life. I myself

would not lend credence to this peculiar discovery if it were not for

the fact that the later development of the neurosis furnished it with

full trustworthiness. In every case there are a number of morbid

symptoms, habits and phobias which are only explainable by returning to

those youthful experiences, and the logical structure of the neurotic

manifestation makes it impossible to reject the faithfully retained

memories of childhood. Except through psychoanalysis it is of no avail

to ask a hysterical patient about these infantile traumas; their remains

can only be found in the morbid symptoms and not in conscious memory.

All the experiences and excitements which prepare the way for, or

occasion the outburst of, hysteria in the period of life after puberty

evidently act through the fact that they awaken the memory remnants of

those infantile traumas which do not become conscious but lead to the

liberation of affect and repression. It is quite in harmony with this

rôle of the later traumas not to be subject to the strict limitation of

the infantile traumas, but that both in intensity and quality they can

vary from an actual sexual assault to a mere approximation of the

sexual, such as perceiving the sexual acts of others, or receiving

information concerning sexual processes.[49]

In my first communication on the defense neuropsychoses I failed to

explain how the exertion of a hitherto healthy individual to forget such

traumatic happenings would result in the real intentional repression,

and thus open the door for the defense neurosis. It can not depend on

the nature of the experience, as other persons remain unaffected despite

the same motives. Hysteria cannot therefore be fully explained by the

effect of the trauma, and we are forced to admit that the capacity for

hysteria already existed before the trauma.

This indefinite hysterical predisposition can now wholly or partially be

substituted by the posthumous effect of the infantile sexual trauma. The

“repression” of the memory of a painful sexual experience of maturer

years can take place only in persons in whom this experience can bring

into activity the memory remnants of an infantile trauma.[50]

The prerequisite of obsessions is also a sexual infantile experience,

but of a different nature than that of hysteria. The etiology of both

defense neuropsychoses now shows the following relation to the etiology

of both simple neuroses, neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. As I have

shown above, both the latter neuroses are the direct results of the

sexual noxas alone, while both defense neuroses are the direct results

of sexual noxas which acted before the appearance of sexual maturity,

that is, they are the results of the psychic memory remnants of these

noxas. The actual causes producing neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis

simultaneously play the rôle of inciting causes of the defense neuroses,

and on the other hand, the specific causes of the defense neuroses, the

infantile traumas, may simultaneously prepare the soil for the later

developing neurasthenia. Finally it not seldom happens that the

existence of a neurasthenia or anxiety neurosis is only preserved by

continued recollection of an infantile trauma rather than by actual

sexual injuries.

II. THE ESSENCE AND MECHANISM OF COMPULSION NEUROSIS.

Sexual experiences of early childhood have the same significance in the

etiology of the compulsion neurosis as in hysteria, still we no longer

deal here with sexual passivity but with pleasurably accomplished

aggressions, and with pleasurably experienced participation in sexual

acts, that is, we deal here with sexual activity. It is due to this

difference in the etiological relations that the masculine sex seems to

be preferred in the compulsion neurosis.

In all my cases of compulsion neurosis I have found besides a subsoil of

hysterical symptoms which could be traced to a pleasurable action of

sexual passivity from a precedent scene. I presume that this coincidence

is a lawful one, and that premature sexual aggression always presupposes

an experience of seduction. But I am unable to present as yet a complete

description of the etiology of the compulsion neurosis. I only believe

that the final determination as to whether a hysteria or compulsion

neurosis should originate on the basis of infantile traumas depends on

the temporal relation of the development of the libido.

The essence of the compulsion neurosis may be expressed in the following

simple formula: Obsessions are always transformed _reproaches_ returning

from consciousness which always refer to a pleasurably accomplished

sexual action of childhood. In order to elucidate this sentence it will

be necessary to describe the typical course of compulsion neurosis.

In a first period—period of childish immorality—the events containing

the seeds of the later neurosis take place. In the earliest childhood

there appear at first the experiences of sexual seduction which later

makes the repression possible, and this is followed by the actions of

sexual aggressions against the other sex which later manifest themselves

as actions of reproach.

This period is brought to an end by the appearance of the—often self

ripened—sexual “maturity.” A reproach then attaches itself to the memory

of that pleasurable action, and the connection with the initial

experience of passivity makes it possible—often only after conscious and

recollected effort—to repress it and replace it by a primary symptom of

defense. The third period, that of apparent healthiness but really of

successful defense, begins with the symptoms of scrupulousness, shame

and diffidence.

The next period, the disease is characterized by the return of the

repressed reminiscences, hence, by the failure of the defense; but it

remains undecided whether the awakening of the same is more frequently

accidental and spontaneous, or whether it appears in consequence of

actual sexual disturbances, that is, as additional influences of the

same. But the revived reminiscences and the reproaches formed from them

never enter into consciousness unchanged, but what becomes conscious as

an obsession and obsessive affect and substitutes the pathogenic memory

in the conscious life, are compromise formations between the repressed

and the repressing ideas.

In order to describe clearly and probably convincingly the processes of

repression, the return of the repression, and the formation of the

pathological ideas of compromise, we would have to decide upon very

definite hypotheses concerning the substratum of the psychic occurrence

and consciousness. As long as we wish to avoid it we will have to rest

content with the following rather figuratively understood observations.

Depending on whether the memory content of the reproachful action alone

forces an entrance into consciousness or whether it takes with it the

accompanying reproachful affect, we have two forms of compulsion

neurosis. The first represents the typical obsessions, the content of

which attracts the patient’s attention; only an indefinite displeasure

is perceived as an affect, whereas, for the content of the obsession the

only suitable affect would be one of reproach. The content of the

obsession is doubly distorted when compared to the content of the

infantile compulsive act. First, something actual replaces the past

experience, and second, the sexual is substituted by an analogous

non-sexual experience. These two changes are the results of the constant

tendency to repression still in force which we will attribute to the

“ego.” The influence of the revived pathogenic memory is shown by the

fact that the content of the obsession is still partially identical with

the repressed, or can be traced to it by a correct stream of thought.

If, with the help of the psychoanalytic method, we reconstruct the

origin of one individual obsession we find that one actual impression

instigated two diverse streams of thought, and that the one which passed

over the repressed memory, though incapable of consciousness and

correction, proves to be just as correctly formed logically as the

other. If the results of the two psychic operations disagree, the

contradiction between the two may never be brought to logical

adjustment, but as a compromise between the resistance and the

pathological result of thought an apparently absurd obsession enters

into consciousness beside the normal result of the thought. If both

streams of thought yield the same result, they reinforce each other so

that the normally gained result of thought now behaves psychically like

an obsession. Wherever neurotic compulsion manifests itself psychically

it originates from repression. The obsessions have, as it were, a

psychical course of compulsion which is due, not to their own validity,

but to the source from which they originate, or to the source which

furnishes a part of their validity.

A second form of compulsion neurosis results if the repressed reproach

and not the repressed content of memory forces a replacement in the

conscious psychic life. Through a psychic admixture, the affect of the

reproach can change itself into any other affect of displeasure, and if

this occurs there is nothing to hinder the substituting affect from

becoming conscious. Thus, the reproach (of having performed in childhood

some sexual actions) may be easily transformed into shame (if some one

else becomes aware of it), into hypochondriacal anxiety (because of the

physical harmful consequences of those reproachful acts), into social

anxiety (fearing punishment from others), into religious anxiety, into

delusions of observation (fear of betraying those actions to others),

into fear of temptations (justified distrust in one’s own moral ability

of resistance), etc. Besides, the memory content of the reproachful

action may also be represented in consciousness, or it may be altogether

concealed, which makes the diagnosis very difficult. Many cases which on

superficial examination are taken as ordinary (neurasthenic)

hypochondria often belong to this group of compulsive affects; the very

frequently so called “periodic neurasthenia” or “periodic melancholia”

especially seem to be explained by compulsive affects or obsessions, a

recognition not unimportant therapeutically.

Beside these compromise symptoms which signify the return of the

repression and hence a failure of the originally achieved defense, the

compulsion neurosis forms a series of other symptoms of a totally

different origin. The ego really tries to defend itself against those

descendants of the initial repressed reminiscence, and in this conflict

of defense it produces symptoms which may be comprehended as “secondary

defense.” These are throughout “protective measures” which have

performed good service in the struggle carried on against the obsessions

and the obsessing affects. If these helps in the conflict of the defense

really succeed in repressing anew the symptoms of return obtruding

themselves on the ego, the compulsion then transmits itself on the

protective measures themselves and produces a third form of the

“compulsion neurosis,” the compulsive action. These are never primary,

they never contain anything else but a defense, never an aggression.

Psychic analysis shows that despite their peculiarity they can always be

fully explained by reduction to the compulsive reminiscence which they

oppose.[51]

The secondary defense of the obsessions can be brought about by a

forcible deviation to other thoughts of possibly contrary content;

hence, in case of success there is a compulsive reasoning, regularly

concerning abstract and transcendental subjects, because the repressed

ideas always occupied themselves with the sensuous. Or the patient tries

to become master of every compulsive idea through logical labor and by

appealing to his conscious memory; this leads to compulsive thinking and

examination and to doubting mania. The priority of the perception before

the memory in these examinations at first induce and then force the

patient to collect and preserve all objects with which he comes in

contact. The secondary defense against the compulsive affects results in

a greater number of defensive measures which are capable of being

transformed into compulsive actions. These can be grouped according to

their tendency. We may have measures of penitence (irksome ceremonial

and observation of numbers), of prevention (diverse phobias,

superstition, pedantry, aggravation of the primary symptom of

scrupulousness), measures of fear of betrayal (collecting papers and

shyness), and measures of becoming unconscious (dipsomania). Among these

compulsive acts and impulses the phobias play the greatest part as

limitations of the patient’s existence.

There are cases in which we can observe how the compulsion becomes

transferred from the idea or affect to the measure, and other cases in

which the compulsion oscillates between the returning symptoms of

secondary defense. But there are also cases in which no obsessions are

really formed, but the repressed reminiscence immediately becomes

replaced by the apparent primary defensive measure. Here that stage is

attained at a bound which otherwise ends the course of the compulsion

neurosis only after the conflict of the defense. Grave cases of this

affection end either with a fixation of ceremonial actions, general

doubting mania, or in an existence of eccentricity conditioned by

phobias.

That the obsessions and everything derived from them are not believed is

probably due to the fact that the defense symptom of scrupulousness was

formed during the first repression and gained compulsive validity. The

certainty of having lived morally throughout the whole period of the

successful defense makes it impossible to give credence to the reproach

which the obsession really involves. Only transitorily during the

appearance of a new obsession, and now and then in melancholic

exhaustive states of the ego do the morbid symptoms of the return also

enforce the belief. The “compulsion” of the psychic formations here

described has in general nothing to do with the recognition through

belief, and is not to be mistaken for that moment which is designated as

“strength” or “intensity” of an idea. Its main characteristic lies in

its inexplicableness through psychic activities of conscious ability,

and this character undergoes no change whether the idea to which the

compulsion is attached is stronger or weaker, more or less intensively

“elucidated,” “supplied with energy,” etc.

The reason for the unassailableness of the obsession or its derivative

is due only to its connection with the repressed memory of early

childhood, for as soon as we succeed in making it conscious, for which

the psychotherapeutic methods already seem quite sufficient, the

compulsion, too, becomes detached.

III. ANALYSIS OF A CASE OF CHRONIC PARANOIA.

For some length of time I entertained the idea that paranoia also—or the

group of cases belonging to paranoia—is a defense psychosis, that is,

like hysteria and obsessions it originates from the repression of

painful reminiscences, and that the form of its symptoms is determined

by the content of the repression. A special way or mechanism of

repression must be peculiar to paranoia perhaps just as in hysteria

which brings about the repression by way of conversion into bodily

innervation, and perhaps like obsessions in which a substitution is

accomplished (displacement along certain associative categories). I

observed many cases which seemed to favor this interpretation, but I had

not found any which demonstrated it until a few months ago when, through

the kindness of Dr. J. Breuer, I subjected to psychoanalysis, with

therapeutic aims, an intelligent woman of 32, whom no one will be able

to refuse to designate as a chronic paranoiac. I report here some

explanations gained in this work, because I have no prospects of

studying paranoia except in very isolated examples, and because I think

it possible that these observations may instigate a psychiatrist for

whom conditions are more favorable, to give due justice to the moment of

defense in the present animated discussion on the nature and psychic

mechanism of paranoia. It is of course far from my thoughts to wish to

show from the following single observation anything but that this case

is a defense psychosis, and that in the group of “paranoia” there may be

still others of a similar nature.

Mrs. P. thirty-two years old, married three years. She is the mother of

a two-year-old child, and does not descend from nervous parents; but her

sister and brother whom I know, are also neurotic. It was doubtful

whether she was not transitorily depressed and mistaken in her judgment

in the middle of her twentieth year. During the last years she was

healthy and capacitated until she evinced the first symptoms of the

present illness, six months after the birth of her child. She became

secluded and suspicious, showing a disinclination towards social

relations with the relatives of her husband, and complained that the

neighbors in the little town now behaved towards her in a rather

impolite and regardless manner. Gradually these complaints grew in

intensity, she thought that there was something against her, though she

had no notion what it could be. But there was no doubt that all the

relatives and friends denied her respect, and did everything to

aggravate her. She was trying very hard to find out whence this came but

could not discover anything. Some time later she complained that she was

watched, that her thoughts were guessed, and that everything that

happened in her house was known. One afternoon she suddenly conceived

the thought that she was watched during the evening while undressing.

Since then she applied while undressing the most complicated

precautionary measures. She slipped into her bed in the darkness and

undressed only under cover. As she avoided all social relations, and

took but little nourishment, and was very depressed, she was sent in the

summer of 1895 to a hydrotherapeutic institute. There new symptoms

appeared and reinforced those already existing. As early as the spring,

while she was alone with the servant girl, she suddenly perceived a

sensation in her lap, and thought that the servant girl then had an

unseemly thought. This sensation became more frequent in the summer, it

was almost continuous, and she felt her genitals “as if one feels a

heavy hand.” She then began to see pictures which frightened her; they

were hallucinations of female nakedness, especially an exposed woman’s

lap with hair; occasionally she also saw male genitals. The picture of

the hairy lap and the organic sensation in the lap usually came

conjointly. The pictures became very aggravating, as she regularly

perceived them when she was in the company of a woman, and the thought

accompanying them was that she sees the woman in an indecent exposure,

and that in the same moment the woman sees the same picture of her (!)

Simultaneously with these visual hallucinations, which, after their

first appearance in the asylum, disappeared again for many months, she

began to be troubled with voices which she did not recognize and could

not explain. When she was in the street she heard, “This is Mrs. P.—Here

she goes.—Where does she go?”. Every one of her movements and actions

were commented upon. Occasionally she heard threats and reproaches. All

these symptoms became worse when she was in society, or even in the

street; she therefore hesitated about going out; she also stated that

she experienced nausea for food, and as a result she became reduced in

vitality.

I obtained this from her when she came under my care in the winter of

1895. I present this case in detail in order to make the impression that

we really deal here with a very frequent form of chronic paranoia, which

diagnosis will agree with the details of the symptoms and their behavior

to be mentioned later. At that time she either concealed from me the

delusions for the interpretation of the hallucinations or they really

had not as yet occurred. Her intelligence was undiminished. It was

reported to me as peculiar that she had a number of rendezvous with her

brother who lived in the neighborhood, in order to confide something to

him, but this she never told him. She never spoke about her

hallucinations, and towards the end she did not say much about the

aggravations and persecutions from which she suffered. What I have to

report about this patient concerns the etiology of the case and the

mechanism of the hallucinations. I discovered the etiology by applying

Breuer’s method exactly as in hysteria, for the investigation and

removal of the hallucinations. I started with the presupposition that

just as in the two other defense neuroses known to me this paranoia must

contain unconscious thoughts and repressed reminiscences which have to

be brought to consciousness, in the same manner as in the others, by

overcoming a certain resistance. The patient immediately corroborated

this expectation by behaving during the analysis exactly like a

hysteric, and under attention to the pressure of my hand she reproduced

thoughts which she could not remember having had, which she at first

could not understand, and which contradicted her expectations. The

occurrence of important unconscious ideas was therefore also

demonstrated in a case of paranoia, and I could hope to reconduct the

compulsion of paranoia to repression. It was only peculiar that the

assertions which originated in the unconscious were usually heard

inwardly or hallucinated by her as her voices.

Concerning the origin of the visual hallucinations, or at least the

vivid pictures, I discovered the following: The picture of the female

lap occurred almost always together with the organic sensation in the

lap. The latter, however, was more constant and often occurred without

the picture.

The first pictures of feminine laps appeared in the hydrotherapeutic

institute a few hours after she had actually seen a number of women

naked in the bath house. They were therefore only simple reproductions

of a real impression. It may be assumed that these impressions repeated

themselves because something of great interest was connected with them.

She stated that she was at that time ashamed of these women, and that

since she recalled it she is ashamed of having been seen naked. Having

been obliged to look upon this shame as something compulsive, I

concluded that according to the mechanism of defense an experience must

have here been repressed in which she was not ashamed, and I requested

her to allow those reminiscences to emerge which belonged to the theme

of shame. She promptly reproduced a series of scenes from her

seventeenth to her eighth year, during which while bathing before her

mother, her sister, and her physician she was ashamed of her nakedness.

This series, however, reached back to a scene in her sixth year when she

undressed in the children’s room before going to sleep without feeling

ashamed of her brother who was present. On questioning her it was found

that there were a number of such scenes, and that for years the brothers

and sisters were in the habit of showing themselves naked to one another

before retiring. I now understood the significance of the sudden thought

of being watched on going to sleep. It was an unchanged fragment of the

old reproachful reminiscence, and she was now trying to make up in shame

what she lost as a child.

The supposition that we dealt here with an amour of childhood so

frequent in the etiology of hysteria was strengthened by the further

progress of the analysis which also showed simultaneous solutions for

individual frequently recurring details in the picture of paranoia. The

beginning of her depression commenced at the time of a disagreement

between her husband and her brother on account of which the latter no

longer visited her. She was always much attached to this brother and

missed him very much at this time. Besides this she spoke about a moment

in the history of her disease during which for the first time

“everything became clear,” that is, during which she became convinced

that her assumption about being generally despised and intentionally

annoyed was true. She gained this assurance during a visit of her

sister-in-law, who in the course of conversation dropped the words, “If

such a thing should happen to me I would not mind it.” Mrs. P. at first

took this utterance unsuspectingly, but when her visitor left her it

seemed to her that these words contained a reproach meaning that she was

in the habit of taking serious matters lightly, and since that hour she

was sure that she was a victim of common slander. On asking her why she

felt justified in referring those words to herself she answered that the

tone in which her sister-in-law spoke convinced her of it—to be sure

subsequently—This is really a characteristic detail of paranoia. I now

urged her to recall her sister-in-law’s conversation before the accusing

utterance, and it was found that she related that in her father’s home

there were all sorts of difficulties with the brothers, and added the

wise remark, “In every family many things happen which one would rather

keep under cover, and that if such a thing should happen to her she

would take it lightly.” Mrs. P. had to acknowledge that her depression

was connected with the sentences before the last utterance. As she

repressed both sentences which could recall her relations with her

brother, and retained only the last meaningless one, she was forced to

connect with it the feeling of being reproached by her sister-in-law;

but, inasmuch as the contents of this sentence offered absolutely no

basis for such assumption she disregarded it and laid stress on the tone

with which the words were pronounced. It is probably a typical

illustration for the fact that the misinterpretations of paranoia depend

on repression.

In a most surprising manner it also explains her peculiar behavior in

making appointments with her brother and then refusing to tell him

anything. Her explanation was that she thought that if she only looked

at him he must understand her suffering, as he knew the cause of it. As

this brother was really the only person who could know anything about

the etiology of her disease it followed that she acted from a motive

which, though she did not consciously understand, seemed perfectly

justified as soon as a new sense was put on it from the unconscious.

I then succeeded in causing her to reproduce different scenes the

culminating points of which were the sexual relations with her brother

at least from her sixth to her tenth year. During this work of

reproduction the organic sensation in the lap “joined in the

discussion,” precisely as regularly observed in the analysis of memory

remnants of hysterical patients. The picture of a naked female lap (but

now reduced to childish proportions and without hair) immediately

appeared or stayed away in accordance with the occurrence of the scene

in question in full light or in darkness. The disgust for eating, too,

was explained by a repulsive detail of these actions. After we had gone

through this series, the hallucinatory sensations and pictures

disappeared without having thus far returned.[52]

I have thus learned that these hallucinations were nothing other than

fragments from the content of the repressed experiences of childhood,

that is, symptoms of the return of the repressed material.

I now turned to the analysis of the voices. Here it must before all be

explained why such indifferent remarks as, “Here goes Mrs. P.—She now

looks for apartments, etc.” could be so painfully perceived, and how

these harmless sentences managed to become distinguished by

hallucinatory enforcement. To begin with, it was clear that these

“voices” could not be hallucinatory reproduced reminiscences like the

pictures and sensations, but rather thoughts which “became loud.”

She heard the voices for the first time under the following

circumstances. With great tension she read the pretty story, “The

Heiterethei” by O. Ludwig, and noticed that while reading she was

preoccupied with incoming thoughts. Immediately after she took a walk on

the highway and suddenly while passing a peasant’s cottage the voices

told her, “That is how the house of the Heiterethei looked! Here is the

well, and here is the bush! How happy she was in all her poverty!” The

voices then repeated whole paragraphs of what she had just read, but it

remained incomprehensible why house, bush, and well of the Heiterethei,

and just such indifferent and most irrelevant passages of the romance

should have obtruded themselves upon her attention with pathological

strength. The analysis showed that while reading she at the same time

entertained extraneous thoughts, and that she was excited by totally

different passages of the book. Against this material analogy between

the couple of the romance and herself and her husband, the reminiscence

of intimate things of her married life and family secrets, against all

these there arose a repressive resistance because they were connected

with her sexual shyness by very simple and demonstrable streams of

thought, and finally resulted in the awakening of old experiences of

childhood. In consequence of the censorship exercised by the repression

the harmless and idyllic passages connected with the objectionable ones

by contrast and vicinity, became reinforced in consciousness, enabling

them to become audible. For example, the first repressed thought

referred to the slander to which the secluded heroine was subjected by

her neighbors. She readily found in this an analogy to herself. She,

too, lived in a small place, had no intercourse with anybody and

considered herself despised by her neighbors. The suspicion against the

neighbors was founded on the fact that in the beginning of her married

life she was obliged to content herself with a small apartment. The wall

of the bedroom, near which stood the nuptial bed of the young couple,

adjoined the neighbors’ room. With the beginning of her marriage there

awakened in her a great sexual shyness. This was apparently due to an

unconscious awakening of some reminiscences of childhood of having

played husband and wife. She was very careful lest the neighbors might

hear through the adjacent wall either words or noises and this shyness

changed into suspicion against the neighbors.

The voices therefore owed their origin to the repression of thoughts

which in the last analysis really signified reproaches on the occasion

of an experience analogous to the infantile trauma; they were

accordingly symptoms of the return of the repression, but at the same

time they were results of a comparison between the resistance of the ego

and the force of the returning repression which in this case produce a

distortion beyond recognition. On other occasions when analyzing voices

in Mrs. P. the distortion was less marked, still the words heard always

showed a character of diplomatic uncertainty. The annoying allusion was

generally deeply hidden, the connection of the individual sentences was

masked by a strange expression, unusual forms of speech, etc.,

characteristics generally common to the auditory hallucinations of

paranoiacs, and in which I noticed the remnant of the compromise

distortion. The expression, “There goes Mrs. P., she is looking for

apartments in the street,” signified, for example, the threat that she

will never recover, for I promised her that after the treatment she

would be able to return to the little city where her husband was

employed. She rented temporary quarters in Vienna for a few months.

On some occasions Mrs. P. also perceived more distinct threats, for

example, concerning the relatives of her husband, the restrained

expression of which still continued to contrast with the grief which

such voices caused her. Considering all that we otherwise know of

paranoiacs I am inclined to assume a gradual relaxation of that

resistance which weakens the reproaches so that finally the defense

fails completely and the original reproach, the insulting word, which

one wanted to save himself returns in unchanged form. I do not, however,

know whether this is a constant course, whether the censor of the

expressions of reproach can not from the beginning stay away, or persist

to the end.

It is left for me to utilize the explanations gained in this case of

paranoia for the comparison of paranoia with compulsion neurosis. Here,

as there, the repression was shown to be the nucleus of the psychic

mechanism, and in both cases the repression is a sexual experience of

childhood. The origin of every compulsion in this paranoia is in the

repression, and the symptoms of paranoia allow a similar classification

as the one found justified in compulsion neurosis. Some symptoms also

originate from the primary defense among which are all delusions of

distrust, suspicion and persecution by others. In the compulsion

neurosis the initial reproach became repressed through the formation of

the primary symptom of defense, self-distrust, moreover, the reproach

was recognized as justified, and for the purpose of adjustment the

validity acquired by the scrupulousness during the normal interval now

guards against giving credence to the returning reproach in the form of

an obsession. By the formation of the defense symptom of distrust in

others, the reproach in paranoia is repressed in a way which may be

designated as projection; the reproach is also deprived of recognition,

and as a retaliation there is no protection against the returning

reproaches contained in the delusions.

The other symptoms in my case of paranoia are therefore to be designated

as symptoms of the return of the repression, and as in the compulsion

neurosis they show the traces of the compromise which alone permits an

entrance into consciousness. Such are the delusions of being observed

while undressing, the visual hallucinations, the perceptual

hallucinations and the hearing of voices. The memory content existing in

the delusion mentioned is almost unchanged and appears only uncertain

through utterance. The return of the repression into visual pictures

comes nearer to the character of hysteria than to the character of

compulsion neurosis; still, hysteria is wont to repeat its memory

symbols without modification, whereas the paranoiac memory hallucination

undergoes a distortion similar to those in compulsion neurosis. An

analogous modern picture takes the place of the one repressed (instead

of a child’s lap it was the lap of a woman upon which the hairs were

particularly distinct because they were absent in the original

impression). Quite peculiar to paranoia but no further elucidated in

this comparison is the fact that the repressed reproaches return as loud

thoughts, this must yield to a double distortion: (1) a censor, which

either leads to a replacement through other associated thoughts or to a

concealment by indefinite expressions, and (2) the reference to the

modern which is merely analogous to the old.

The third group of symptoms found in compulsion neurosis, the symptoms

of the secondary defense, cannot exist as such in paranoia, for no

defense asserts itself against the returning symptoms which really find

credence. As a substitute for this we find in paranoia another source of

symptom formation; the delusions (symptoms of return) reaching

consciousness through the compromise demand a great deal of the thinking

work of the ego until they can be unconditionally accepted. As they

themselves are not to be influenced the ego must adapt itself to them,

and hence the combining delusional formation, the delusion of

interpretation which results in the transformation of the ego,

corresponds here to the symptoms of secondary defense of compulsion

neurosis. In this respect my case was imperfect as it did not at that

time show any attempt at interpretation, this only appeared later. I do

not doubt, however that if psychoanalysis were also applied to that

stage of paranoia, another important result would be established. It

would probably be found that even the so called weakness of memory in

paranoiacs is purposeful, that is, it depends on the repression and

serves its purpose. Subsequently even those nonpathogenic memories which

stand in opposition to the transformation of the ego become repressed

and replaced; this the symptoms of return imperatively demand.

Selected papers on hysteria and other psychoneuroses · 第 7 / 10 章