THE IMPERIAL ALLIANCE
1521-1523
The failure of Wolsey's plans was due to the diplomacy of Gattinara and
to the obstinacy of Charles V., who showed at the end of the
negotiations at Calais an unexpected readiness to appreciate his
obligations towards his dominions as a whole, by refusing to abandon
Fontarabia lest thereby he should irritate his Spanish subjects. It was
this capacity for large consideration that gave Charles V. his power in
the future; his motives were hard to discover, but they always rested on
a view of his entire obligations, and were dictated by reasons known
only to himself. Even Wolsey did not understand the Emperor's motives,
which seemed to him entirely foolish. He allowed himself to take up a
haughty position, which deeply offended Charles, who exclaimed angrily,
"This cardinal will do everything his own way, and treats me as though I
were a prisoner." Charles treasured up his resentment, of which Wolsey
was entirely unconscious, and was determined not to allow so masterful a
spirit to become more powerful.
He soon had an opportunity of acting on this determination, as the
unexpected death of Pope Leo X. on 1st December naturally awakened hopes
in Wolsey's breast. It was impossible that the foremost statesman in
Europe should not have had the legitimate aspiration of reaching the
highest office to which he could attain. But though Wolsey was ready
when the opportunity came to press his own claims with vigour, it cannot
be said with fairness that his previous policy had been in any way
directed to that end, or that he had swerved in the least from his own
path to further his chances for the papal office. Indeed he had no
reason for so doing, as Leo was only forty-six years old when he died,
and his death was entirely unforeseen. Moreover, we know that when the
Spanish envoys offered Wolsey the Emperor's help towards the Papacy in
1520, Wolsey refused the offer; since then Charles at Bruges had
repeated the offer without being asked. Now that a vacancy had arisen,
it was natural for Wolsey to attach some weight to this promise, and
Henry expressed himself warmly in favour of Wolsey's election, and urged
his imperial ally to work by all means for that end. He sent to Rome his
favourite secretary Pace to further it by pressing representations to
the cardinals.
It does not seem that Wolsey was very sanguine in his expectations of
being elected. Leo X. had died at a moment of great importance for
Charles V.; in fact his death had been brought about by the imprudence
which he showed in manifesting his delight at the success of the
imperial arms against Milan, and his prospect of the overthrow of
France. It was necessary for Charles that a Pope should be elected who
would hold to Leo's policy, and would continue the alliance with
England. The man who held in his hand the threads of Leo X.'s numerous
intrigues was his cousin, Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, and Wolsey
admitted the advantages to be gained by his election. Wolsey at once
declared that he submitted his candidature to the decision of Henry
VIII. and the Emperor; if they thought that he was the best person to
promote their interests he would not shrink from the labour; but he
agreed that if his candidature were not likely to be acceptable to the
cardinals, the two monarchs should unite in favour of Cardinal Medici.
Charles's ambassador wrote him that it would be well to act carefully,
as Wolsey was watching to see how much faith he could put in the
Emperor's protestations of goodwill.
So Charles was prepared, and acted with ambiguous caution. He put off
communicating with Henry as long as he could; he regretted that he was
in the Netherlands instead of Germany, whence he could have made his
influence felt in Rome; he secretly ordered his ambassador in Rome to
press for the election of Cardinal Medici, but gave him no definite
instructions about any one else; finally he wrote a warm letter in
favour of Wolsey, which he either never sent at all, or sent too late to
be of any use, but which served as an enclosure to satisfy Henry VIII.
Wolsey was not deceived by this, and knew how papal elections might be
influenced. He told the Spanish ambassador that, if his master were in
earnest, he should order his troops to advance against Rome, and should
command the cardinals to elect his nominee; he offered to provide
100,000 ducats to cover the expenses of such action. When it came to the
point Wolsey was a very practical politician, and was under no illusions
about the fair pretences of free choice which surrounded a papal
election. He treated it as a matter to be settled by pressure from
outside, according to the will of the strongest. There is something
revoltingly cynical in this proposal. No doubt many men thought like
Wolsey, but no one else would have had the boldness to speak out.
Wolsey's outspokenness was of no avail at the time, but it bore fruits
afterwards. He taught Henry VIII. to conceive the possibility of a short
way of dealing with refractory popes. He confirmed his willing pupil in
the belief that all things may be achieved by the resolute will of one
who rises above prejudice and faces the world as it is. When he fell he
must have recognised that it was himself who trained the arm which smote
him.
In spite of Wolsey's advice Charles did not allow Spanish influence to
be unduly felt in the proceedings of the conclave. Rarely had the
cardinals been more undecided, and when they went into the conclave on
27th December, it was said that every one of them was a candidate for
the Papacy. The first point was to exclude Cardinal Medici, and it could
be plausibly urged that it was dangerous to elect two successive popes
from the same family. Medici's opponents succeeded in making his
election impossible, but could not agree upon a candidate of their own;
while Medici tried to bring about the election of some one who would be
favourable to the Emperor. At last in weariness the cardinals turned
their thoughts to some one who was not present. Wolsey was proposed, and
received seven votes; but Medici was waiting his time, and put forward
Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht, who had been Charles's tutor, and was then
governing Spain in his master's name. Both parties agreed on him,
chiefly because he was personally unknown to any of the cardinals, had
given no offence, was well advanced in years, and was reckoned to be of
a quiet disposition, so that every one had hopes of guiding his
counsels. It was clear that the imperialists were strongest in the
conclave, and of all the imperialist candidates Adrian was the least
offensive to the French. One thing is quite clear, that Charles V. had
not the least intention of helping Wolsey.
Wolsey probably knew this well enough, and was not disappointed. He bore
the Emperor no ill-will for his lukewarmness; indeed he had no ground
for expecting anything else. Wolsey's aim was not the same as that of
Charles, and Charles had had sufficient opportunity to discover the
difference between them. Probably Wolsey saw that the alliance between
England and the Emperor would not be of long duration, as there was no
real identity of interests. Henry VIII. was dazzled for a moment with
the prospect of asserting the English claims on France; he was glad to
find himself at one with his queen, who was overjoyed at the prospect of
a family alliance with her own beloved land of Spain. The English nobles
rejoiced at an opportunity to display their prowess, and hoped in time
of war to recover the influence and position of which they had been
deprived by an upstart priest. The sentiment of hostility to France was
still strong amongst the English people, and the allurements of a
spirited foreign policy were many. But as a matter of fact England was
ill prepared for war; and though the people might throw up their caps at
first, they would not long consent to pay for a war which brought them
no profits. And the profits were not likely to be great, for Charles had
no wish to see England's importance increased. He desired only English
help to achieve his own purposes, and was no more trustworthy as an ally
than had been his grandfather Ferdinand.
However, war had been agreed upon, and all that Wolsey could do was to
try and put off its declaration until he had secured sufficient
assurance that English money was not to be spent to no purpose. Charles
V., who was in sore straits for money, asked for a loan from England, to
which Wolsey answered that England could not declare war till the loan
was repaid. He insisted that no declaration of war should be made till
the Emperor had fulfilled his promise to pay a visit to England, a
promise which Charles's want of money rendered him unable for some time
to keep.
But however much Wolsey might try to put off the declaration of war, it
was inevitable. Francis could not be expected, for all Wolsey's fine
promises, to continue his payments for Tournai to so doubtful an ally as
Henry, nor could he resist from crippling England as far as he could.
The Duke of Albany went back to Scotland; and in the beginning of May
Francis ordered the seizure of goods lying at Bordeaux for shipment to
England. This led to retaliation on the part of England, and war was
declared against France on 28th May 1522.
This coincided with the visit of Charles V. to London, where he was
magnificently entertained for a month, while the treaty of alliance was
being finally brought into shape by Wolsey and Gattinara. Wolsey
contented himself with providing that the alliance did not go further
than had been agreed at Bruges, and that England's interests were
secured by an undertaking from Charles that he would pay the loss which
Henry VIII. sustained by the withdrawal of the French instalments for
Tournai. When the treaty was signed it was Wolsey who, as papal legate,
submitted both princes to ecclesiastical censures in case of a breach of
its provisions. Moreover, Charles granted Wolsey a pension of 9000
crowns in compensation for his loss from Tournai, and renewed his empty
promise of raising him to the Papacy.
It was one thing to declare war and another to carry it on with good
effect. England, in spite of all the delays which Wolsey had contrived
to interpose, was still unprepared. It was late in the autumn before
forces could be put in the field, and the troops of Charles V. were too
few for a joint undertaking of any importance. The allies contented
themselves with invading Picardy, where they committed useless
atrocities, burning houses, devastating the country, and working all the
mischief that they could. They did not advance into the centre of
France, and no army met them in the field; in the middle of October they
retired ingloriously. It is hard to discover the purpose of such an
expedition. The damage done was not enough to weaken France materially,
and such a display of barbarity was ill suited to win the French people
to favour Henry VIII.'s claim to be their rightful lord. If Francis I.
had been unpopular before, he was now raised to the position of a
national leader whose help was necessary for the protection of his
subjects.
The futile result of this expedition caused mutual recriminations
between the new allies. The imperialists complained that the English had
come too late; the English answered that they had not been properly
supported. There were no signs of mutual confidence; and the two
ministers, Wolsey and Gattinara, were avowed enemies, and did not
conceal their hostility. The alliance with the Emperor did not show
signs of prospering from the beginning.
The proceedings of the Earl of Surrey and the direction of the campaign
were not Wolsey's concern. He was employed nearer home, in keeping a
watchful eye on Scotland, which threatened to be a hindrance to Henry
VIII.'s great undertakings abroad. The return of the Duke of Albany in
December 1521 was a direct threat of war. Albany was nominally regent,
but had found his office troublesome, and had preferred to spend the
last five years in the gaieties of the French Court rather than among
the rugged nobles of Scotland. They were years when France was at peace
with England and had little interest in Scottish affairs; so Queen
Margaret might quarrel with her husband at leisure, while the Scottish
lords distributed themselves between the two parties as suited them
best. But when war between France and England was approaching, the Duke
of Albany was sent back by Francis I. to his post as agent for France in
Scottish affairs. Queen Margaret welcomed him with joy, hoping that he
would further her plan of gaining a divorce from the Earl of Angus.
Before this union of forces the English party in Scotland was powerless.
It was in vain that Henry VIII. tried by menaces to influence either his
sister or the Scottish lords. As soon as the English forces sailed for
France Albany prepared to invade England.
It was lucky for Henry VIII. that he was well served on the Borders by
Lord Dacre of Naworth, who managed to show the Scots the measure of
Albany's incapacity. Dacre began negotiations with Albany, to save time;
and when, in September, the Scottish forces passed the Border, Albany
was willing to make a truce. As a matter of fact, England was totally
unprepared to repel an invasion, and Albany might have dictated his own
terms. But Dacre, in Carlisle, which he could not defend, maintained his
courage, and showed no signs of fear. He managed to blind Albany to the
real state of affairs, and kept him from approaching to the crumbling
walls of Carlisle. He advanced to the Debatable Land to meet him, and
"with a high voice" demanded the reason of his coming; and the parley
thus begun ended in the conclusion of a month's truce. Wolsey was
overjoyed at this result, but yet found it necessary to intercede with
the king for Dacre's pardon, as he had no authority to make terms with
the enemy; and Dacre was not only forgiven, but thanked. This futile end
to an expedition for which 80,000 soldiers had been raised ruined
Albany's influence, and he again retired to France at the end of October.
Wolsey at once saw the risk which England had run. A successful invasion
on the part of the Scots would have been a severe blow to England's
military reputation; and Wolsey determined to be secure on the Scottish
side for the future. The Earl of Surrey, on his return from his
expedition in France, was put in charge of the defences of the Border,
and everything was done to humour Queen Margaret, and convince her that
she had more to gain from the favour of her brother than from the help
of the Duke of Albany. Moreover, Wolsey, already convinced of the
uselessness of the war against France, was still ready to gain from it
all that he could, and strove to use the threat of danger from Scotland
as a means of withdrawing from war and gaining a signal triumph. Francis
I., unable to defend himself, tried to separate his enemies, and turned
to Charles V. with offers of a truce. When this was refused, he repeated
his proposals to England, and Wolsey saw his opportunity. He represented
to Charles that so long as England was menaced by Scotland she could
send little effective help abroad; if Scotland were crushed she would be
free again. He suggested that the Emperor had little to win by military
enterprises undertaken with such slight preparation as the last
campaign; would he not make truce for a year, not comprehending the
realm of Scotland?
The suggestion was almost too palpable. Gattinara answered that Henry
wished to use his forces for his private advantage, and neglected the
common interest of the alliance. Again bitter complaints were made of
Wolsey's lukewarmness. Again the two allies jealously watched each other
lest either should gain an advantage by making a separate alliance with
France. And while they were thus engaged the common enemy of Christendom
was advancing, and Rhodes fell before the Turkish arms. It was in vain
that Adrian VI. lamented and wept; in vain he implored for succours.
Fair promises alone were given him. Europe was too much intent on the
duel between Francis and Charles to think seriously of anything else.
The entreaties of the Pope were only regarded by all parties as a good
means of enabling them to throw a decent veil over any measure which
their own interests might prompt. They might declare that it was taken
for the sake of the holy war; they might claim that they had acted from
a desire to fulfil the Pope's behest.
So things stood in the beginning of 1523, when an unexpected event
revived the military spirit of Henry VIII., and brought the two
half-hearted allies once more closely together, by the prospect which it
afforded of striking a deadly blow at France. The chief of the nobles of
France, the sole survivor of the great feudatories, the Constable of
Bourbon, was most unwisely affronted by Francis I., at a time when he
needed to rally all his subjects round him. Not only was Bourbon
affronted, but also a lawsuit was instituted against him, which
threatened to deprive him of the greater part of his possessions.
Bourbon, who could bring into the field 6000 men, did not find his
patriotism strong enough to endure this wrong. He opened up secret
negotiations with Charles, who disclosed the matter to Henry. Henry's
ambition was at once fired. He saw Francis I., hopelessly weakened by a
defection of the chief nobles, incapable of withstanding an attack upon
the interior of his land, so that the English troops might conquer the
old provinces which England still claimed, and victory might place upon
his head the crown of France.
Wolsey was not misled by this fantastic prospect, but as a campaign was
imminent, took all the precautions he could that it should be as little
costly as possible to England, and that Charles should bear his full
share of the expense. He demanded, moreover, that Bourbon should
acknowledge Henry VIII. as the rightful King of France--a demand which
was by no means acceptable to Charles. He sent an envoy of his own to
confer with Bourbon, but his envoy was delayed on the way, so that the
agreement was framed in the imperial interests alone, and the demands of
Henry were little heeded. The agreement was that Bourbon should receive
the hand of one of the Emperor's sisters, and should receive a subsidy
of 200,000 crowns to be paid equally by Henry and Charles; the question
of the recognition of Henry as rightful King of France was to be left to
the decision of the Emperor.
The plan of the campaign was quickly settled. Charles, with 20,000 men,
was to advance into Guienne; Henry, with 15,000 English, supported by
6000 Netherlanders, was to advance through Picardy; 10,000 Germans were
to advance through Burgundy; and Bourbon was to head a body of
dissatisfied nobles of France. It was an excellent plan on paper; and,
indeed, the position of France seemed hopeless enough. Francis I. had
squandered his people's money, and was exceedingly unpopular; Wolsey's
diplomacy had helped to win over the Swiss to the imperial alliance; and
the indefatigable secretary Pace had been sent to Venice to detach the
republic from its connexion with France. It was believed that Wolsey was
jealous of Pace's influence with Henry VIII., and contrived to keep him
employed on embassies which removed him from the Court. At all events,
he certainly kept him busily employed till his health gave way under the
excessive pressure. To lend greater weight to Pace's arguments, Wolsey
descended to an act of overbearing insolence. Some Venetian galleys
trading with Flanders put in at Plymouth during a storm; they were laid
under an embargo, and were detained on many flimsy pretexts. It was in
vain that the Venetian ambassador remonstrated; Wolsey always had a
plausible answer. Probably he wished to show Venice that its trading
interests required the friendship of England. At all events the galleys
were not released till Venice was on the point of joining the imperial
alliance. Even then Wolsey had the meanness to carry off a couple of
guns from each vessel, and Venice had to make a present of them to the
English king with as much grace as the circumstances allowed. This
little incident certainly shows Wolsey's conduct at its worst, and
confirms the impression of contemporaries, that he had to some degree
the insolence of an upstart, and sometimes overrode the weak in a way to
leave behind a bitter feeling of resentment.
However, Venice joined the Emperor, and Pope Adrian VI., who had pursued
hitherto a policy of pacification, was at last overborne by the pressure
of England and the Emperor, so that he entered into a defensive league
against France. Thus France was entirely isolated. Distrusted at home
and unbefriended abroad, she seemed to be a prey to her enemies; and
Henry's hopes rose so high that he gleefully looked forward to being
recognised as "governor of France," and that "they should by this means
make a way for him as King Richard did for his father." Wiser men shook
their heads at the king's infatuation. "I pray God," wrote More to
Wolsey, "if it be good for his Grace and for this realm that then it may
prove so; and else in the stead thereof I pray God send his grace an
honourable and profitable peace."
The spirit that breathes through this prayer is not a martial spirit,
and no doubt More's feelings represented those of Wolsey, who, though
carried away by the king's military zeal, had little hopes of any great
success, and such hopes as he had were rapidly destroyed. The campaign
did not begin till the end of September; the contingent from the
Netherlands was late in appearing and was ill supplied with food. Till
the last moment Wolsey urged, as the first object of the campaign, the
siege of Boulogne, which, if successful, would have given England a
second stronghold on the French coast; but Wolsey was overruled, and an
expedition into the interior of France was preferred. It was a
repetition of the raid made in the last year, and was equally futile.
The army advanced to Montdidier, and expected tidings of its
confederate; but nothing was to be heard of Bourbon; his lanzknechts
began to devastate France and then disbanded. The army of Charles V.
contented itself with taking Fontarabia, and did not co-operate with the
English forces. After the capture of Montdidier the troops, who were
attacked by sickness, and had difficulty in finding provisions, withdrew
to the coast; and the Duke of Suffolk brought back his costly army
without having obtained anything of service to England. This expedition,
which was to do so much, was a total failure--there was positively
nothing to be shown in return for all the money spent.
Again the wisdom of Wolsey's policy was fully justified. He was right in
thinking that England had neither troops nor generals who were
sufficient for an expedition on the Continent, where there was nothing
tangible to be gained. So long as England was a neutral and mediating
power she could pursue her own interests; but her threats were more
efficacious than her performances. She could not conquer unaided, and
her allies had no intention of allowing her to win more than empty
glory. Even this had been denied in the last campaigns. England had
incurred debts which her people could ill afford to pay, and had only
lowered her reputation by a display of military incompetence. Moreover,
her expedition against France involved her in the usual difficulties on
the side of Scotland. Again there was a devastating war along the
Border; again the Duke of Albany was sent from France and raised an army
for the invasion of England. But this time Wolsey had taken his
precautions, and the Earl of Surrey was ready to march against him. When
in November Albany crossed the Tweed and besieged the Castle of Wark,
Surrey took the field, and again Albany showed his incapacity as a
leader. He retired before Surrey's advance, and wished to retire to
France, but was prevented by the Scottish lords. Again the Border raids
went on with their merciless slaughter and plunder, amidst which was
developed the sternness and severity which still mark the character of
the northern folk.
Still, though the Scots might be defeated in the field, their defeat and
suffering only served to strengthen the spirit of national independence.
The subjugation of Scotland to England was hindered, not helped, by the
alliance with the Emperor, which only drew Scotland nearer to France,
and kept alive the old feeling of hostility. It was hard to see what
England had to gain from the imperial alliance, and events soon proved
that Charles V. pursued his own interests without much thought of the
wishes of Henry VIII.
On 14th September died Pope Adrian VI., a weary and disappointed man.
Again there was a prospect of Wolsey's election to the papacy; again it
might be seen how much Charles V. would do for his English ally. Wolsey
had little hope of his good offices, and was his own negotiator in the
matter. He was not sanguine about his prospects of success, as he knew
that Cardinal Medici was powerful in Rome; and the disasters of the
pontificate of Adrian VI. led the cardinals to wish for a return to the
old policy of Leo X., of which Medici held the threads. So two letters
were sent to the English representatives in Rome, one in behalf of
Wolsey, the other in behalf of Medici. If things were going for Medici,
Wolsey was not to be pressed; only in case of a disagreement was Wolsey
to be put forward, and then no effort was to be spared; money was to be
of no object, as Henry would make good any promises made on his behalf
to secure Wolsey's election.
The conclave was protracted; it sat from 1st October to 17th November,
and there was ample opportunity for Charles to have made his influence
felt in Wolsey's behalf. He professed to Henry that he was doing so. He
wrote a letter recommending Wolsey to his envoy in Rome, and then gave
orders that the courier who carried the letter should be detained on the
way. Really his influence was being used for Medici, and though a strong
party in the conclave opposed Medici's election, it does not appear that
Wolsey was ever put forward as a competitor. The cardinals would hear
nothing of a foreigner, and the stubbornness of Medici's party was at
length rewarded by his election. There is no trace that Wolsey was
keenly disappointed at this result. In announcing it to Henry VIII., he
wrote, "For my part, as I take God to record, I am more joyous thereof
than if it had fortuned upon my person, knowing his excellent qualities
most meet for the same, and how great and sure a friend your Grace and
the Emperor be like to have of him, and I so good a father."
Few popes came to their office amid greater expectations, and few more
entirely disappointed them than did Guilio de' Medici. Clement VII.,
whose election Charles, Henry, and Wolsey united in greeting with joy,
suffered in a brief space entire humiliation at the hands of Charles,
caused the downfall of Wolsey, and drove Henry to sever the bond between
the English Church and the Holy See. It is impossible not to think how
different would have been the course of events if Wolsey had presided
over the destinies of the Church.