CHAPTER III

GERMAN INVADERS DRIVE THE IRON INTO THE SOUL OF UNPREPARED AMERICA

The next week was one of deep humiliation for the American people. Our

great fleet and our great Canal, which had cost so many hundreds of

millions and were supposed to guarantee the safety of our coasts, had

failed us in this hour of peril.

Secretary Alger, in the Spanish War, never received half the punishment

that the press now heaped on the luckless officials of the War and the

Navy Departments.

The New York _Tribune_, in a scathing attack upon the administration,

said:

The blow has fallen and the United States is totally unprepared to meet

it. Why? Because the Democratic party, during its eight years’ tenure of

office, has obstinately, stupidly and wickedly refused to do what was

necessary to make this country safe against invasion by a foreign power.

There has been a surfeit of talking, of explaining and of promising, but

of definite accomplishment very little, and to-day, in our extreme peril,

we find ourselves without an army or a navy that can cope with the

invaders and protect our shores and our homes.

Richard Harding Davis, in the _Evening Sun_, denounced unsparingly those

Senators and Congressmen who, in 1916, had voted against national

preparedness:

For our present helpless condition and all that results from it, let the

responsibility rest upon these Senators and Congressmen, who, for their

own selfish ends, have betrayed the country. They are as guilty of

treason as was ever Benedict Arnold. Were some of them hanged, the sight

of them with their toes dancing on air might inspire other Congressmen to

consider the safety of this country rather than their own re-election.

The New York _World_ published a memorable letter written by Samuel J.

Tilden in December, 1885, to Speaker Carlisle of the Forty-ninth Congress

on the subject of national defence and pointed out that Mr. Tilden was a

man of far vision, intellectually the foremost democrat of his day. In

this letter Mr. Tilden said:

The property exposed to destruction in the twelve seaports, Portland,

Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,

Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, Galveston and San Francisco, cannot be

less in value than five thousand millions of dollars.... While we may

afford to be deficient in the means of offence we cannot afford to be

defenceless. The notoriety of the fact that we have neglected the

ordinary precautions of defence invites want of consideration in our

diplomacy, injustice, arrogance and insult at the hands of foreign

nations.

To add to the general indignation, it transpired that the American

reserve fleet, consisting of ten predreadnoughts, was tied up in the

docks of Philadelphia, unable to move for lack of officers and men to

handle them. After frantic orders from Washington and the loss of

precious days, some two thousand members of the newly organised naval

reserve were rushed to Philadelphia; but eight thousand men were needed

to move this secondary fleet, and, even if the eight thousand had been

forthcoming, it would have been too late; for by this time a German

dreadnought was guarding the mouth of Delaware Bay, and these inferior

ships would never have braved its guns. So here were seventy-five million

dollars’ worth of American fighting-ships rendered absolutely useless and

condemned to be idle during the whole war because of bad organisation.

Meantime, the Germans were marching along the Motor Parkway toward New

York City with an army of a hundred and fifty thousand, against which

General Wood, by incredible efforts, was able to oppose a badly

organised, inharmonious force of thirty thousand, including Federals and

militia that had never once drilled together in large manoeuvres. Of

Federal troops there was one regiment of infantry from Governor’s Island,

and this was short of men. There were two infantry regiments from Forts

Niagara and Porter, in New York State. Also a regiment of colored cavalry

from Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, a battalion of field artillery from Fort

Myer, Virginia, a battalion of engineers from Washington, D. C., a

battalion of coast artillery organised as siege artillery from Fort

Dupont, Delaware, a regiment of cavalry from Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia,

two regiments of infantry from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, one regiment of

field artillery from Fort Sheridan, Illinois, one regiment of horse

artillery from Fort Riley, Kansas, one regiment of infantry and one

regiment of mountain guns from Fort D. A. Russell, Wyoming.

I may add that at this time the United States army, in spite of many

efforts to increase its size, numbered fewer than 70,000 men; and so many

of these were tied up as Coast Artillery or absent in the Philippines,

Honolulu, and the Canal Zone, that only about 30,000 were available as

mobile forces for the national defence.

As these various bodies of troops arrived in New York City and marched

down Fifth Avenue with bands playing “Dixie” and colours flying, the

excitement of cheering multitudes passed all description, especially when

Theodore Roosevelt, in familiar slouch hat, appeared on a big black horse

at the head of a hastily recruited regiment of Rough Riders, many of them

veterans who had served under him in the Spanish War.

Governor Malone reviewed the troops from the steps of the new Court House

and the crowd went wild when the cadets from West Point marched past, in

splendid order. At first I shared the enthusiasm of the moment; but

suddenly I realised how pathetic it all was and Palmer seemed to see that

side of it, too, though naturally he and I avoided all discussion of the

future. In addition to such portions of the regular army as General Wood

could gather together, his forces were supplemented by infantry and

cavalry brigades of militia from New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,

Connecticut, and Massachusetts, these troops being more or less

unprepared for battle, more or less lacking in the accessories of

battles, notably in field artillery and in artillery equipment of men and

horses. One of the aides on General Wood’s staff told me that the

combined American forces went into action with only one hundred and fifty

pieces of artillery against four hundred pieces that the Germans brought.

“And the wicked part of it is,” he added, “that there were two hundred

other pieces of artillery we might have used if we had had men and horses

to operate them; but--you can’t make an artillery horse overnight.”

“Nor a gun crew,” said I.

The Conquest of America: A Romance of Disaster and Victory, U.S.A., 1921 A.D. · 第 3 / 27 章