VII.

EXTRACTS FROM PRESIDENT BUCHANAN'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, DECEMBER 4,

1860.

The Fugitive-Slave Law has been carried into execution in every

contested case since the commencement of the present administration,

though often, it is to be regretted, with great loss and inconvenience

to the master, and with considerable expense to the Government. Let us

trust that the State Legislatures will repeal their unconstitutional

and obnoxious enactments. Unless this shall be done without unnecessary

delay, it is impossible for any human power to save the Union.

The Southern States, standing on the basis of the Constitution, have a

right to demand this act of justice from the States of the North.

Should it be refused, then the Constitution, to which all the States

are parties, will have been willfully violated, in one portion of them,

in a provision essential to the domestic security and happiness of the

remainder. In that event, the injured States, after having first used

all constitutional and peaceful means to obtain redress, would be

justified in revolutionary resistance to the Government of the Union.

* * * * *

What, in the meantime, is the responsibility and true position of the

Executive? He is bound by a solemn oath before God and the country "to

take care that the laws are faithfully executed;" and from this

obligation he cannot be absolved by any human power. But what if the

performance of this duty, in whole or in part, has been rendered

impracticable by events over which he could have exercised no control?

Such, at the present moment, is the case throughout the State of South

Carolina, so far as the laws of the United States, to secure the

administration of justice by means of the federal judiciary, are

concerned. All the federal officers within its limits, through whose

agency alone these laws can be carried into execution, have already

resigned. We no longer have a District Judge, a District Attorney, or a

Marshal, in South Carolina. In fact, the whole machinery of the Federal

Government, necessary for the distribution of remedial justice among

the people, has been demolished, and it would be difficult, if not

impossible, to replace it.

The only Acts of Congress upon the Statute Book bearing on this subject

are those of the 28th February, 1795, and 3d March, 1807. These

authorize the President, after he shall have ascertained that the

Marshal, with his posse comitatus, is unable to execute civil or

criminal process in any particular case, to call forth the militia, and

employ the army and navy to aid him in performing this service--having

first, by proclamation, commanded the insurgents to disperse and retire

peaceably to their respective homes within a limited time. This duty

can not by possibility be performed in a State where no judicial

authority exists to issue process, and where there is no Marshal to

execute it, and where, even if there were such an officer, the entire

population would constitute one sole combination to resist him.

The bare enumeration of these provisions proves how inadequate they

are, without further legislation, to overcome a united opposition in a

single State, not to speak of other States who may place themselves in

a similar attitude. Congress alone has power to decide whether the

present laws can or can not be amended, so as to carry out more

effectually the objects of the Constitution.

* * * * *

The course of events is so rapidly hastening forward, that the

emergency may soon arise when you may be called upon to decide the

momentous question, whether you possess the power, by force of arms, to

compel a State to remain in the Union. I should feel myself recreant to

my duty were I not to express an opinion upon this important subject.

The question, fairly stated, is: Has the Constitution delegated to

_Congress_ the power to coerce a State into submission which is

attempting to withdraw, or has virtually withdrawn, from the

Confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the

principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare

and to make war against a State. After much serious reflection, I have

arrived at the conclusion that no such power has been delegated to

Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government. It is

manifest, upon an inspection of the Constitution, that this is not

among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress; and it is

equally apparent that its exercise is not "necessary and proper for

carrying into execution" any one of these powers. So far from this

power having been delegated to Congress, it was expressly refused by

the Convention which framed the Constitution.

It appears, from the proceedings of that body, that on the 31st May,

1787, the clause authorizing the exertion of the force of the whole

against a delinquent State came up for consideration. Mr. Madison

opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract

but a single sentence. He observed: "The use of force against a State

would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of

punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a

dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound." Upon

his motion, the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I

believe, again presented. Soon afterwards, on the 8th June, 1787, when

incidentally adverting to the subject, he said: "Any Government for the

United States, founded upon the supposed practicability of using force

against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as

visionary and fallacious as the Government of Congress"--evidently

meaning the then existing Congress of the old Confederation.

Without descending to particulars, it may be safely asserted that the

power to make war against a State is at variance with the whole spirit

and intent of the Constitution.

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