ARGUMENT OF JAMES T. BRADY, ESQ.

_Mr. Brady_ inquired of Mr. Evarts for what purpose he intended to

refer to the statute against treason.

_Mr. Evarts_: Not in any other light than I have already referred to

the doctrine of treason, to wit, that a party cannot be shielded from

indictment for the crime of piracy by showing a warrant or assumed

authority for acts which made out that his crime was treason; that

showing a treasonable combination did not make out a warrant or

authority for that which was piracy or murder.

_Mr. Brady_ then proceeded to address the Jury on behalf of the

accused:

_May it please the Court: Gentlemen of the Jury_:

I feel quite certain that all of you are much satisfied to find that

this important trial is rapidly drawing to a close; and I think it

would be unbecoming in me, as one of the counsel for the accused, to

proceed a step farther in my address to you without acknowledging to

the Court the gratitude which we feel for their kindness in hearing so

largely discussed the grave legal questions involved in this

controversy; to the Jury, for their unvarying patience throughout the

investigation; and to our learned opponents, for the frank and open

manner in which the prosecution has been conducted. Our fellow-citizens

at the South--certainly that portion of them who cherish affection for

this part of the Union--will find in the course of this trial most

satisfactory evidence that respect for law, freedom of speech, freedom

of discussion, liberty of opinion, and the rights of all our

countrymen, here exist to the fullest extent. All of us have heretofore

been connected with interesting and exciting trials. I am warranted in

saying that, considering the period at which this trial has occured,

and all the facts and circumstances attending it, the citizens of New

York have reason to be proud that such a trial could proceed without

one word of acerbity, without one expression of angry feeling, or one

improper exhibition of popular sentiment. At the same time, as an

American citizen, loyal to the Union,--one who has never recognized as

his country any other than the United States of America; who has known

and loved his country by that name, and will so continue to know and

love it to the end of his existence,--I deeply regret that, for any

purpose of public policy, it has been deemed judicious to try any of

these "piratical" cases, as they are denominated, at this particular

juncture. I am not to assume that good reasons for such a proceeding

have not in some quarters been supposed to exist; and I certainly have

no right to complain of the officers of the law, charged with a high

duty, who bring to trial, in the usual course, persons charged with

crime. I have not a word to say against my friend the District

Attorney, for whom I feel a respect I am happy to express; nor against

his learned associate, Mr. Evarts, for whom I have high regard; nor our

brother Blatchford, who always performs the largest amount of labor

with the smallest amount of ostentation. Still I regret the occurrence

of this trial at a time when war agitates our country; for, apart from

all theories of publicists, all opinions of lawyers, for you or me to

say that there is not a war raging between two contending forces within

our territory, is to insult the common sense of mankind. A war carried

on for what? What is to be its end, gentlemen of the Jury? This war to

which you, like myself, and all classes and all denominations of the

North have given a cheerful and vigorous support--pouring out treasure

and blood as freely as water--what is it for? Not to look at the result

which must come out of it is folly; and it is the folly that pervades

the whole American people. Suppose it were now announced that the

entire Southern forces had fled in precipitate retreat before our

advancing hosts, and that the American flag waved over every inch of

American soil--what then? Are we fighting to subjugate the South in the

sense in which an emperor would make war upon a rebellious province? Is

that the theory? Are we fighting to compel the seceded States to remain

in the Union against their will? And do we suppose such a thing

practicable? Are we fighting simply to regain the property of the

Federal Government of which we have been despoiled in the Southern

States? Or are we fighting with a covert and secret intention, such as

I understand to have been suggested by an eloquent and popular divine,

in a recent address to a large public audience, some of them, like

himself, from the Bay State, "that Massachusetts understands very well

what she is fighting for"? Is it to effect the abolition of slavery all

over the territory of the United States? I will do the Administration

the justice to say that, so far as it has given the country any

statement of its design in prosecuting the war, it has repelled any

such object as negro emancipation. Who can justify the absurd aspect

presented by us before the enlightened nations of the Old World, when

they find one commander in our army treating slaves as contraband of

war; another declaring that they belong to their masters, to whom he

returns them; and another treating them all as free. I am an American,

and feel the strongest attachment to my country, growing out of

affection and duty; but I cannot see that we present before the world,

in carrying on this war, anything like a distinct and palpable theory.

But I tell you, and I stand upon that prophecy, as embodying all the

little intelligence I possess, that if it be a war for any purposes of

mere subjugation--that if it be for the purpose of establishing a

dictatorship, or designedly waged for the emancipation of all the

slaves, our people never will sustain it at the North. (Applause, which

was checked by the Court.)

You will see presently, gentlemen, why I have deemed it necessary, at

the very outset, to speak thus of what I call a state of civil war,--a

condition which, if the learned Judges on the bench, in their charge to

you, shall, as matter of law, declare to have existed, then this

commission, under which the acts charged in the indictment were

perpetrated, forms an absolute legal protection to the accused. Whether

such a war exists, is one of the great questions with which the Jury

have to deal; and I understand that the Jury _have_ to deal with this

case--that they are not mere _automata_--that we have not had twelve

men sitting in the jury-box for several days as puppets.

The great question for this Jury, absorbing all others, is, Have the

twelve men named in the indictment, or has either of them, committed

piracy, and thus incurred the penalty of death? It is a very

interesting inquiry, gentlemen,--interesting in its historical,

national, judicial, and political aspects,--interesting, too, because

of the character and description of the accused. We discover that eight

of them are foreigners, who have never been naturalized, and do not

judicially come under the designation of citizens of the United States.

Four of them are what we call natural-born citizens--two from the State

of South Carolina, one from North Carolina, and one from Philadelphia.

Two of them are in very feeble health; and I am sorry to say, some are

not yet of middle age--some quite young, including Passalaigue, who has

not yet attained his eighteenth year. I know my fellow-citizens of New

York quite well enough to be quite sure that even if there had been any

exhibition of popular prejudice, or feeling, or fury, with a view to

disturb their judgments in the jury-box, the sympathy that arises

properly in every well-constituted heart and mind, in favor of the

accused, their relatives and friends, would overcome any such wrong

impulse as might be directed to deprive them of that fair trial which,

up to this point, they have had, and which, to the end, I know they

will have.

Are they pirates and robbers? Have they incurred the penalty of death?

Gentlemen, it is a little curious, that during the present reign of

Victoria, a statute has been passed in England softening the rigor of

the punishment for piracy, and subjecting the person found guilty to

transportation, instead of execution, unless arms have been used in the

spoliation, or some act done aggravating the offence. I have used the

term "pirate," and the term "robber." There is another which, strangely

enough, was employed by a Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court in South

Carolina, in 1718, who calls these pirates and robbers, as we designate

them, "sea thieves;" and I am very glad to find that phrase, because

the words robber and pirate have fallen into mere terms of opprobrium;

while the word "thief" has a significance and force understood by every

man. You know what you thought a "thief" to be, when a boy, and how you

despised him; and you are to look at each prisoner mentioned in this

indictment, and say, on your consciences as men, in view of the facts

and of the law, as expounded by the learned Court, do you consider that

the word "thief" can be applied to any one of the men whom I have the

honor to assist in defending? That is the great practical question

which you are to decide.

[Here Mr. Brady briefly alluded to the question of jurisdiction as

already discussed fully enough, and made some observations on the Hicks

case, which had been referred to. He then continued as follows:]

This indictment charges two kinds of offence: Piracy, as that crime

existed by the _law of nations_,--which law may be said to have been

incorporated into the jurisprudence of the United States,--and Piracy

_under the ninth section of the Act of 1790_. Piracy by the law of

nations is defined by Wheaton, the great American commentator on

international law, on page 184 of his treatise on that subject.

"_Piracy_" says that eminent gentleman, who was an ornament to the

country which gave him birth, and an honor to my profession, "_Piracy

is defined by the text writers, to be the offence of depredating on the

seas_ WITHOUT BEING AUTHORIZED BY ANY SOVEREIGN STATE, _or with

commissions from_ DIFFERENT SOVEREIGNS _at war with_ EACH OTHER." The

last part of the definition you need not trouble yourselves about as I

only read it so as not to quibble the text. I will read the passage

without the latter part. "_Piracy is defined to be the offence of

depredating on the seas_ WITHOUT BEING AUTHORIZED BY ANY SOVEREIGN

STATE." Other definitions will hereafter be suggested.

This leads me to remark upon certain judicial proceedings in

Philadelphia against men found on board the Southern privateer

"Jefferson Davis," and who were convicted of piracy for having seized

and sent away as a prize the "Enchantress." Now my way of dealing with

juries is to act with them while in the jury box as if they were out of

it. I never imitate that bird referred to by the gentleman who preceded

me--the ostrich, which supposes that when he conceals his head his

whole person is hidden from view. I know, and every gentleman present

knows, that a jury in the city of Philadelphia has convicted the men

arrested on the "Jefferson Davis," of piracy. We are a nation certainly

distinguished for three things--for newspapers, politics, and tobacco.

I do not know that the Americans could present their social

individualities by any better signs. Everybody reads the papers, and

everybody has a paper given him to read. The hackman waiting for his

fare consumes his leisure time perusing the paper. The apple-woman at

her stall reads the paper. At the breakfast table, the dinner table,

and the supper table, the paper is daily read. I sometimes take my

meals at Delmonico's, and have there observed a gentleman who, while

refreshing himself with a hasty meal, takes up the newspaper, places it

against the castor, and eats, drinks and reads all at the same time.

Gentlemen, I say that a people so addicted to newspapers must have

ascertained that the men in Philadelphia were convicted; and how the

jury could have done otherwise upon the charge of Justices Grier and

Cadwalader I am incapable of perceiving. I have the pleasure of knowing

both those eminent Judges. My acquaintance with Judge Cadwalader is

slight, it is true, but of sufficient standing to ensure him the

greatest respect for his learning and character. With Judge Grier the

acquaintance is of longer duration; and as he has always extended to me

in professional occupations before him courtesies which men never

forget, I cannot but speak of him with affection. I have nevertheless

something to say about the law laid down by those Judges on that case.

No question on the merits was left to the jury, as I understand the

instructions. The jurymen were told that _if they believed the

testimony, then the defendants were guilty of piracy_. Now, as to the

aspect of this case in view of piracy by the law of nations, the

question for the jury is, in the first place, _Did these defendants, in

the act of capturing the "Joseph," take her by force, or by putting the

captain of her in fear_, WITH THE INTENT TO STEAL HER? That is the

question as presented by the indictment, and in order to convict under

either of the first five counts, the jury must be satisfied, beyond all

reasonable doubt, _that in attacking the "Joseph" the defendants were

actuated_ as described in the indictment, from which I read the

allegation that they, "with _force_ and _arms, piratically,

feloniously, and violently_, put the persons on board in _personal fear

and danger of their lives_, and in seizing the vessel did, as

aforesaid, _seize_, ROB, STEAL and carry her away." In this the

indictment follows the law. Another question of fact, in the other

aspect of the case, under the ninth section of the act of 1790, will

be, substantially, _whether the existence of a civil war is shown_.

That involves inquiry into the existence of the Confederate States as a

_de facto_ Government or as a _de jure_ Government.

The _animus furandi_, so often mentioned in this case, means nothing

but the intent to _steal_. The existence of that intent must be found

in the evidence, before these men can be called pirates, robbers, or

thieves; and whether such intent did or did not exist, is a question

entirely for you.

To convict under the ninth section of the Act of 1790, the prosecution

must prove that the defendants, being at the time of such offence

_citizens of the United States of America_, did something which by that

Act is prohibited. You will bear in mind that the Act of 1790, in its

ninth section, has no relation except to American-born citizens, and as

to that part of the indictment the eight foreigners charged are

entirely relieved from responsibility.

Well, on page 104, 5 Wheaton, in the case of _The United States_ vs.

_Smith_, the Jury found a special verdict, which I will read to

illustrate what is piracy and what is not piracy.

[Here Mr. Brady commented on the case referred to, saying, amongst

other things,--]

According to the evidence in the case of Smith, the defendants were

clearly pirates. They had no commission from any Government or

Governor, and were mere mutineers, who had seized a vessel illegally,

and then proceeded to seize others without any pretence or show of

authority, but with felonious intent. For these acts they were justly

convicted.

Now, we say, that this felonious intent as charged against these

defendants, must be proved. But what say my learned friends opposed?

Why (in effect), that it need not be proved to a Jury by any evidence,

but must be _inferred_, as a matter of law, or by the Jury first, from

the presumption that every man knows the law; and these men, in this

view, are pirates--though they _honestly believed that there was a

valid Government called the Confederate States_, and that they _had a

right to act under it_--because they _ought_ to have known the law;

_ought_ to have known that, although the Confederate States had

associated for the purpose of forming, yet they had not _completed_ a

Government; _ought_ to have known that, though Baker had a commission

signed by Jefferson Davis, the so-called President of the Confederate

States, under which he was authorized to act as a privateer, yet the

law did not recognize the commission.

There is, indeed, a rule of law, said to be essential to the existence

of society, that all men must be taken to know the law, except, I might

add, lawyers and judges, who seldom agree upon any proposition until

they must.

The whole judicial system is founded upon the theory that judges will

err about the law, and thus we have the Courts of review to correct

judicial mistakes and to establish permanent principles. Yet it is true

that every man is presumed to know the law; and the native of Manilla

(one of the parties here charged), _Loo Foo_, or whatever his name may

be, who does not, probably, understand what he is here for, is presumed

to know the law as well as one of us. If he did not know it better,

considering the differences between us, he might not be entitled to

rate high as a jurist. One of my brethren read to you an extract from a

recent German work, which presents a different view of this subject as

relates to foreign subjects in particular cases. I was happy to hear

MR. MAYER on the law of this case, more particularly as he declared

himself to be a foreign-born citizen; for it is one of the

characteristics of this Government--a characteristic of our free

institutions--that no distinction of birth or creed is permitted to

stand in the way of merit, come from what clime it may.

There is another presumption. Every man is presumed to _intend the

natural consequences of his own acts_. Now, what are the natural

consequences of the acts done by these defendants? The law on this

point is illustrated and applied with much effect in homicide cases.

Suppose a man has a slight contention with another, and one of the

combatants, drawing a dagger, aims to inflict a slight wound, say upon

the hand of the other; but, in the struggle, the weapon enters the

heart, and the injured party dies. The man is arrested with the bloody

dagger in his hand, the weapon by which death was unquestionably

occasioned; and the fact being established that he killed the deceased,

the law will presume the act to be murder, and cast upon the accused

the burthen of showing that it was something other than murder. I hope,

gentlemen, to see the day when this doctrine of law will no longer

exist. I never could understand how the presumption of murder could be

drawn from an act equally consistent with murder, manslaughter,

justifiable or excusable homicide, or accident, but such is the law,

and it must be respected.

I say, that neither of the defendants intended, as the ordinary and

natural consequence of his act, _to commit piracy or robbery_, though

what he did might, in law, amount to such an offence. He intended to

take legal prizes, and no more to rob than the man in the case I

supposed designed to kill.

The natural consequences of his acts were, to take the vessel and send

her to a port to be adjudicated upon as a prize. Now, I state to my

learned friends and the Court this proposition--that though a _legal

presumption_ as to intent might have existed in this case if the

prosecution had proved merely the forcible taking, yet if, in making

out a case for the Government, any fact be elicited which shows that

the actual intent was different from what the law in the absence of

such fact would imply, the presumption is gone. And when the

prosecution made their witness detail a conversation which took place

between Captain Baker and the Captain of the Joseph, with reference to

the authority of the former to seize the vessel, and when you find that

Captain Baker asserted a claim of right, that overcomes the presumption

that he despoiled the Captain of the Joseph with an intent to steal.

The _animus furandi_ must, in this case, depend on something else than

presumption. I will refer you for more particulars of the law on this

point, to _1 Greenleaf on Evidence_, sections 13 and 14, and I make

this citation for another purpose. When an act is in itself illegal,

sometimes, if not in the majority of cases, the law affixes to the

party the intent to perpetrate a legal offence. But this is not the

universal rule. In cases of procuring money or goods under false

pretences, where the intent is the essence of the crime, the

prosecution must establish the offence, not by proving alone the act of

receiving, but by showing the act and intent; so both must be proved

here. Now, I ask, has the prosecution entitled itself to the benefit of

any presumption as to intent? What are the facts--_the conceded facts_?

Baker, and a number of persons in Charleston, did openly and

notoriously select a vessel called the "Savannah," then lying in the

stream, and fitted her out _as a privateer_. Baker, in all of these

proceedings, acted under the authority of a commission signed by

Jefferson Davis, styling and signing himself President of the

Confederate States of America. Baker and his companions then went forth

as privateersmen, and in no other capacity, for the purpose of

despoiling the commerce of the United States, and _with the strictest

injunction not to meddle with the property of any other country_. The

instructions were clear and distinct on this head, as you know from

having heard them read. They went to sea, and overhauled the Joseph;

gave chase with the American flag flying--one of the ordinary devices

or cheats practiced in naval warfare; a device frequently adopted by

American naval commanders to whose fame no American dare affix the

slightest stigma. On nearing the Joseph, the Savannah showed the

secession flag, and Baker requested Captain Meyer to come on board with

his papers. The Captain asked by what authority, and received for

answer: "The authority of the Confederate States." The Captain then

went on board with his papers, when Baker, helping him over the side,

said: "I am very sorry to take your vessel, but I do so in retaliation

against the United States, with whom we are at war." Baker put a prize

crew on board the Joseph, and sent her to Georgetown; the Captain he

detained there as a prisoner. She was then duly submitted for judgment

as a prize. These are the facts upon which they claim that piracy at

common law is established.

My learned associate, Mr. Larocque, cited a number of cases to show

that though a man might take property of another, and appropriate it to

his own use, yet if he did so under color of right, under a _bona fide_

impression that he had authority to take the property, he would only be

a trespasser; he would have to restore it or pay the value of it, but

he could not be convicted of a crime for its conversion.

Let me state a case. You own a number of bees. They leave your land,

where they hived, and come upon mine, and take refuge in the hollow of

a tree, where they deposit their honey. They are your bees, but you

cannot come upon my land to take them away; and though they are in my

tree, I cannot take the honey. Such a case is reported in our State

adjudications. But, suppose that I did take the bees and appropriate

the honey to my own use: I might be unjustly _indicted_ for larceny,

because I took the property of another, but I am not, consequently, a

thief in the eye of the law; the absence of intent to steal would

ensure my acquittal.

That is one illustration. I will mention one other, decided in the

South, relating to a subject on which the South is very strict and very

jealous. A slave announced to a man his intention to escape. The man

secreted the slave for the purpose of aiding his escape and effecting

his freedom. He was indicted for larceny, on the ground that he

exercised a control over the property of the owner against his will.

The Court held that the object was not to steal, and he could not be

convicted. In _Wheaton's Criminal Proceedings_, page 397, this language

will be found, and it is satisfactory on the point under discussion.

"There are cases where taking is no more than a trespass: Where a

man takes another's goods _openly before him_, or where, having

otherwise than by _apparent robbery_, possessed himself of them, he

_avows the fact_ before he is questioned. This is _only a

trespass_."

Now all these principles are familiar and simple, and do not require

lawyers to expound them, for they appeal to the practical sense of

mankind. _It is certainly a most lamentable result of the wisdom of

centuries, to place twelve men together and ask them, from_ FICTIONS

_or_ THEORIES _to say, on oath, that a man is a thief, when every one

of them_ KNOWS THAT HE IS NOT. If any man on this Jury thinks the word

pirate, robber or thief can be truly applied to either of these

defendants, I am very sorry, for I think neither of them at all liable

to any such epithet.

But, suppose that the intent is to be inferred from the act of seizing

the Joseph, and the defendants must be convicted, unless justified by

_the commission issued for Captain Baker_; let us then inquire as to

the effect of that commission. We say that it _protects the defendants

against being treated as pirates_. Whether it does, or not, depends

upon the question whether the Confederate States have occupied such a

relation to the United States of America that they might adopt the

means of retaliation or aggression recognized in a state of war.

It is our right and duty, as advocates, to maintain that the

_Confederate Government was so situated_; and to support the

proposition by reference to the political and judicial history and

precedents of the past, stating for these men the principles and views

which they and their neighbors of the revolting States insist upon; our

personal opinions being in no wise called for, nor important, nor even

proper, to be stated at this time and in this place.

If it can be shown that the Confederate States occupy the same position

towards the Government of the United States that the thirteen revolted

Colonies did to Great Britain in the war of the Revolution, then these

men cannot be convicted of piracy.

I do not ask you to decide that the Southern States had the _right_ to

leave the Union, or secede, or to revolt--to set on foot an

insurrection, or to perfect a rebellion. That is not the question here.

I will place before the Jury such views of law and of history as bear

upon the case--endeavoring not to go over the ground occupied by my

associates. I will refer you to a small book published here in 1859,

entitled, "The History of New York from the Earliest Time," a very

reliable and authentic work. In this book I find a few facts to which I

will call your attention, one of which may be unpleasant to some of our

friends from the New England States, for we find that New York, so far

as her people were concerned--exclusive of the authorities--was in

physical revolt against the parent Government long before our friends

in New England, some of whom often feel disposed to do just what they

please, but are not quite willing to allow others the same privilege. I

will refer to it to show you what was the condition of things long

before the 4th of July, 1776, and to show that, though we now hurl our

charges against these men as pirates,--who never killed anybody, never

tried to kill anybody,--who never stole and never tried to steal,--yet

the men of New York city who committed, under the name of "Liberty

Boys," what England thought terrible atrocities, in New York, were

never touched by justice--not even so heavily as if a feather from the

pinion of the humming bird had fallen upon their heads. I find that,

about the year 1765, our people here began to grumble about the taxes

and imposts which Great Britain levied upon us. And you know, though

the causes of the Revolutionary war are set forth with much dignity in

the Declaration of Independence, the contest originated about taxes.

That was the great source of disaffection, directing itself more

particularly to the matter of tea, and which led to the miscellaneous

party in Boston, at which there were no women present, however, and

where salt water was used in the decoction. I find that the governor of

the city had fists, arms, and all the means of aggression at his

command; but at length, happily for us, the Government sent over a

young gentleman to rule us (Lord Monckford), who, when he did come,

appears to have been similar in habits to one of the accused, who is

described as being always idle. The witness for the prosecution

explained that separate posts and duties were assigned to each of the

crew of the Savannah; one fellow, he said, would do nothing. But he

will be convicted of having done a good deal, if the prosecution

prevail. A state of rebellion all this time and afterwards existed in

this particular part of the world, until the British came and made

themselves masters of the city. In the course of the acts then

committed by the citizens, and which the British Government called an

insurrection, a tumultuous rebellion and revolution, they offered, or

it was said they offered, an indignity to an equestrian statue of

George III. The British troops, in retaliation, and being grossly

offended at the conduct of Pitt, who had been a devoted friend of the

Colonists, mutilated the statue of him which stood on Wall street. The

remains of the statue are still with us, and can be seen at the corner

of West Broadway and Franklin street, where it is preserved as a relic

of the past--a grim memento of the perfect absurdity of charging

millions of people with being all pirates, robbers, thieves, and

marauders.

When the British took possession of this city, they had at _one time in

custody five thousand persons_. That was before any formal declaration

of independence--before the formation of a Government _de jure_ or _de

facto_--and yet did they ever charge any of the prisoners with being

robbers? Not at all. Was this from any kindness or humane spirit? Not

at all: for they adopted all means in their power to overcome our

ancestors. The eldest son of the Earl of Chatham resigned his

commission, because he would not consent to fight against the colonies.

The Government did not hesitate to send to Germany for troops. They

could not get sufficient at home. The Irish would not aid them in the

fight. The British did not even hesitate to employ Indians; and when,

in Parliament, the Secretary of State justified himself, saying that

they had a perfect right to employ "all the means God and nature" gave

them, he was eloquently rebuked. Even, with all this hostility, such a

thing was never thought of as to condemn men, when taken prisoners, and

hold them outside that protection which, according to the law of

nations, should be extended to men under such circumstances, even

though in revolt against the Government.

In October, 1774, the King, in his Message to Parliament, said that a

most daring spirit of resistance and disobedience to the laws existed

in Massachusetts, and was countenanced and encouraged in others of his

Colonies.

Now, I want you to keep your minds fairly applied to the point, on

which the Court will declare itself, as to whether I am right in

saying, that the day when that Message was sent to Parliament the

Colonies occupied towards the old Government a position similar to that

of the Confederate States in their hour of revolt to the United States.

But we will possibly see that the Confederate States occupy a stronger

position.

In the course of the discussion which ensued upon the Message, the

famous Wilkes remarked: "Rebellion, indeed, appears on the back of a

flying enemy, but revolution flames on the breastplate of the

victorious warrior."

If an illegal assemblage set itself up in opposition to the municipal

Government, it is a mere insurrection, though ordinary officers of the

law be incapable of quelling it, and the military power has to be

called out. That is one thing. But when a _whole State_ places itself

in an attitude of hostility to the other States of a Confederacy,

assumes a distinct existence, and has the power to maintain

independence, though only for a time, that is quite a different affair.

We remember how beautifully expressed is that passage of the Irish

poet, so familiar to all of us, and especially to those who, like

myself, coming from Irish ancestry, know so well what is the name and

history of rebellion:

"Rebellion--foul, dishonoring word,

Whose wrongful blight so oft hath stained

The holiest cause that tongue or sword

Of mortal ever lost or gained!

How many a spirit born to bless

Has sunk beneath thy withering bane,

Whom but a day's--an hour's success,

Had wafted to eternal fame!"

A remarkable instance, illustrating the sentiment of this passage, is

found in the history of that brave man, emerging from obscurity,

stepping suddenly forth from the common ranks of men, whose name is so

generally mentioned with reverence and love, and who so lately freed

Naples from the rule of the tyrant. This brave patriot was driven from

his native land, after a heroic struggle in Rome. History has recorded

how he was followed in this exile by a devoted wife, who perished

because she would not desert her husband; and how he came to this

country, where he established himself in business until such time as he

saw a speck of hope glimmer on the horizon over his lovely and beloved

native land. Then he went back almost alone. Red-shirted, like a common

toiling man, he gathered round him a few trusty followers who had

unlimited confidence in him as a leader, and accomplished the

revolution which dethroned the son of Bomba, and placed Victor Emanuel

in his stead. You already know that I speak of Garibaldi. And yet,

Garibaldi, it seems, should have been denounced as a pirate, had the

sea been the theatre of his failure; and a robber, had he been

unsuccessful upon land!

What do you think an eminent man said, in the British Parliament, about

the outbreak of our Revolution, and the condition of things then

existing in America? "_Whenever oppression begins, resistance becomes

lawful and right._" Who said that? The great associate of Chatham and

Burke--Lord Camden. At that time Franklin was in Europe, seeking to

obtain a hearing before a committee of Parliament in respect to the

grievances of the American people. It was refused.

The Lords and Commons, in an address to the King, declared in express

terms, that a "REBELLION _actually existed in_ MASSACHUSETTS;" and yet,

in view of all that, no legal prosecution of any rebel ever followed.

So matters continued till the war effectively began, Washington having

been appointed Commander-in-chief. Then some Americans were taken by

the British and detained as prisoners. Of this Washington complained to

General Gage, then in command of the British army. Gage returned answer

that he had treated the prisoners only too kindly, seeing that they

were rebels, and that "their lives, by the law of the land, were

destined for the cord." Yet not one of them so perished.

In view of these things, even so far as I have now advanced; in view of

the sacrifices of the Southern Colonies in the Revolution; in view of

the great struggle for independence, and the great doctrine laid down,

that, whenever oppression begins, resistance becomes lawful and

right,--is it possible to forget the history of the past, and the great

principles which gleamed through the darkness and the perils of our

early history? Are we to assert that the Constitution establishing our

Government is perfect in all its parts, and stands upon a corner stone

equivalent to what the globe itself might be supposed to rest on, if we

did not know it was ever wheeling through space? Is all the history of

our past, its triumphs and reverses, and the glorious consummation

which crowned the efforts of the people, all alike to be thrown aside

now, upon the belief that we have established a Government so perfect,

and a Union so complete, that no portion of the States can ever, under

any circumstances, secede, or revolt, or dispute the authority of the

others, without danger of being treated as pirates and robbers? The

Declaration of Independence has never been repudiated, I believe, and I

suppose I have a right to refer to it as containing the political creed

of the American people. I do not know how many people in the old world

agree with it, and a most eminent lawyer of our own country

characterized the maxims stated at its commencement as "glittering

generalities." But I believe the American people have never withdrawn

their approbation from the principles and doctrines it declares. Among

those we find the self-evident truth, that man has an inalienable right

to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that it is to secure

these rights that Governments are instituted among men, deriving their

just powers from the consent of the governed; and that whenever any

form of Government becomes destructive of those ends, it is right and

patriotic to alter and abolish it, and to institute a new Government,

laying its foundations on such principles, and conferring power in such

a form, as to them may seem most likely to secure their safety and

happiness. Is this a mockery? Is this a falsehood? Have these ideas

been just put forward for the first time? There has been a dispute

among men as to who should be justly denominated the author of this

document. The debate may be interesting to the historian; but these

principles, though they are embodied in the Constitution, were not

created by it. They have lived in the hearts of man since man first

trod the earth. I can imagine the time, too, when Egypt was in her

early glory, and in fancy see one of the poor, miserable wretches,

deprived of any right of humanity, harnessed, like a brute beast, to

the immense stone about being erected in honor of some monarch, whose

very name was destined to perish. I can imagine the degraded slave

pausing in his loathsome toil to delight over the idea that there might

come a time when the meanest of men would enjoy natural rights, under a

Government of the multitude formed to secure them.

Now, what says _Blackstone_ (_1st vol., 212_), the great commentator on

the law of England, when speaking of the revolution which dethroned

James II.: "_Whenever a question arises between the society at large

and any magistrate originally vested with powers originally delegated

by that society, it must be decided by the voice of the society itself.

There is not upon earth any other tribunal to resort to._"

Prior to the 23d March, 1776, the legislature of Massachusetts

authorized the issuing of letters of marque to privateers upon the

ocean, and when my learned friend, Mr. Lord, in his remarks so clear

and convincing, called attention to the lawfulness of privateering, my

brother Evarts attempted to qualify it by designating the granting of

letters of marque as reluctantly tolerated, and as if no such practice

as despoiling commerce should be permitted even in a state of war. I

will not again read from _Mr. Marcy's_ letter, but I will say here that

the position he took gratified the heart of the whole American people.

He said in substance, If you, England and France, have the right to

despoil commerce with armed national vessels we have a right to adopt

such means of protection and retaliation as we possess. We do not

propose, if you make war upon us, or we find it necessary to make war

upon you, that we, with a poor, miserable fleet, shall not be at

liberty to send out privateers, but yield to you, who may come with

your steel-clad vessels and powerful armament to practice upon us any

amount of devastation. No. We never had a navy strong enough to place

us in such a position as that with regard to foreign powers. Look at

it. Do you think that France or England has any feeling of friendship

towards this country as a nation? I do not speak of the people of these

countries, but of the cabinets and governments. No. Nations are

selfish. Nearly all the laws of nations are founded on interest.

Nations conduct their political affairs on that basis. They never

receive laws from one another--not even against crime. And when you

want to obtain back from another country a man who has committed

depredations against society, you do it only by virtue of a treaty, and

from no love or affection to the country demanding it. And if this war

continues much longer, I, for one, entertain the most profound

apprehension that both these powers, France and England, will combine

to break the blockade if they do not enter upon more aggressive

measures. If they for a moment find it their interest to do so, they

will, and no power, moral or physical, can prevent them. I say, then,

the right of revolution is a right to be exercised, not according to

what the Government revolted against may think, but according to the

necessities or the belief of the people revolting. If you belonged to a

State which was in any way deprived of its rights, the moment that

oppression began resistance became a duty. A slave does not ask his

master when he is to have his freedom, but he strikes for it at the

proper opportunity. A man threatened with death at the hands of

another, does not stop to ask whether he has a right to slay his

assailant in self-defence. If self-preservation is the first law of

individuals, so also is it of masses and of nations. Therefore, when

the American Colonies made up their minds to achieve independence,

whether their reasons were sufficient or not, they did not consent to

have the question decided by Great Britain, but at once decided it for

themselves. Very early in our history, in 1778, France recognized the

American Government. England, as you know, complained, and the French

Government sent back an answer saying, Yes, we have formed a treaty

with this new Government; we have recognized it, and you have no right

to complain; for you remember, England, said France, that during the

reign of Elizabeth, when the Netherlands revolted against Spain, you,

in the first place, negotiated secret treaties with the revolutionists,

and then recognized them; but, when Spain complained of this, you said

to Spain--The reasons which justify the Netherlands in their revolt

entitle them to our support. Was success necessary? Was the doctrine of

our opponents correct, that, though people may be in absolute revolt

against the parent Government, with an army in the field, and in

exclusive possession of the territories they occupy, yet they have no

right to be recognized by the law of nations, and are not entitled to

the humanities that accompany the conditions of a war between foreign

powers? Is success necessary? Why was it not necessary in the case of

the Colonies when recognized by France? Why not necessary in the case

of the Netherlands when recognized by England? Never has been put

forward such a doctrine for adjudication since the days of _Ogden and

Smith_, tried in this city in 1806. That was a period when we were in

profound peace with all the world. Our new country was proceeding on

the march towards that greatness which every one hoped would be as

perpetual as it was progressive. We had invited to our shores not only

the oppressed of other lands, but all they could yield us of genius,

eloquence, industry and wisdom. Among others who came to assist our

progress and adorn our history was that eminent lawyer and

patriot--that good and pure man whose monument stands beside St. Paul's

Church, on Broadway, and may be considered as pointing its white finger

to heaven in appeal against the severe doctrines under which these

prisoners are sought to be punished. I refer to THOMAS ADDIS EMMETT.

In 1806, two men, Smith and Ogden, were put upon trial, charged with

aiding Miranda and the people of Caraccas to effect a revolt against

the Government of Spain, which, it was said, was at peace with the

United States. They were indicted under a statute of the United States;

and if it had turned out on the trial that the United States was

certainly in a condition of peace with Spain, they might have been

convicted. However, that was a question of fact left to the Jury. The

learned Judges, pure and able men, entertained views very hostile to

the notions of the accused, and were quite as decided in those views as

his honor Judge Grier in the summary disposition he made of the

so-called pirates in Philadelphia. The trial came on, and, with the

names of the Jurors on that trial, there are preserved to us the names

of Counsel, whose career is part of history. Among them were NATHAN

SANFORD, PIERPOINT EDWARDS, WASHINGTON MORTON, CADWALLADER D. COLDEN,

JOSIAH OGDEN HOFFMAN, RICHARD HARRISON, and MR. EMMETT, already named.

Well, there was an effort made to disparage any such enterprise as

Miranda's, and any such aid thereto as the accused were charged with

giving. The Counsel endeavored to prove that the intent was a question

of law, and the fact had nothing to do with it. COLDEN, in his

argument, said, "Gentlemen, all _guilt_ is _rooted in the mind_, and

_if not to be found there, does not exist, and whoever will contend

against the proposition_ MUST FIGHT AGAINST HUMAN NATURE, AND SILENCE

HIS OWN CONSCIENCE."

We do not often find an opportunity, gentlemen, to regale ourselves

with anything that emanated from the mind of Mr. Emmett. It is peculiar

to the nature of his profession that most of what the advocate says

passes away almost at the moment of its utterance. When Mr. Emmett

comes to allude to the disfavor sought to be thrown on revolutionary

ideas by the eminent counsel for the prosecution, he says:

"In particular, I remember, he termed Miranda a fugitive on the

face of the earth, and characterized the object of the expedition

as something audacious, novel, and dangerous. It has often struck

me, gentlemen, as matter of curious observation, how speedily new

nations, like new made nobility and emperors, acquire the cant and

jargon of their station.

"Let me exemplify this observation by remarking, that here within

the United States, which scarcely thirty years ago were colonies,

engaged in a bloody struggle, for the purpose of shaking off their

dependence on the parent State, the attempt to free a colony from

the oppressive yoke of its mother country is called 'audacious,

novel, and dangerous.' It is true, General Miranda's attempt is

daring, and, if you will, '_audacious_,' but wherefore is it novel

and dangerous?

"Because he, a private individual, unaided by the public succor of

any state, attempts to liberate South America. Thrasybulus!

expeller of the thirty tyrants! Restorer of Athenian freedom!

Wherefore are _you_ named with honor in the records of history?

"Because, while a fugitive and an exile, you collected together a

band of brave adventurers, who confided in your integrity and

talents--because, without the acknowledged assistance of any state

or nation, with no commission but what you derived from patriotism,

liberty, and justice, you marched with your chosen friends and

overthrew the tyranny of Sparta in the land that gave you birth.

Nor are Argos and Thebes censured for having afforded you refuge,

countenance, and protection. Nor is Ismenias, then at the head of

the Theban government, accused of having departed from the duties

of his station because he obeyed the impulse of benevolence and

compassion towards an oppressed people, and gave that private

assistance which he could not publicly avow."

Mr. Emmett, remembering the history of his own name, and the fate of

that brother who perished ignominiously on the scaffold for an effort

to disenthrall his native land, after that outburst of eloquence,

indulged in the following exclamation:

"In whatever country the contest may be carried on, whoever may be

the oppressor of the oppressed, may the Almighty Lord of Hosts

strengthen the right arms of those who fight for the freedom of

their native land! May he guide them in their counsels, assist them

in their difficulties, comfort them in their distress, and give

them victory in their battles!"

I have thought proper to fortify myself, gentlemen, by reference to

this man of pure purpose, finished education, and thorough knowledge of

international law, in what I said to you, that the principles which lie

at the base of this American revolution, call it by what name you

please, have been known and recognized at least as long as the English

language has been spoken on the earth, and will be known forever--they

furnishing certain rules, the benefit of which, I hope and trust, under

the providence of God, after the enlightened remarks of the Court, and

through your intervention, may be extended to our clients.

Some people in New England take particular offence at applying these

doctrines to the present state of affairs. Has New England ever

repudiated them? Has the South ever maintained with more unhesitating

declaration, more vigorous resolve, more readiness for the deadly

encounter, than the North, these views which I present? Gentlemen, when

we look at history, we must take it as we find it. In the war of 1812,

the New England States, which had taken offence before at the embargo

of 1809, were found, to a very great extent among her people, in an

attitude of direct resistance to the war; and they were not afraid to

say so. New England said so through her individual citizens. She said

so in her public associations. She said so in the form of conventions

and solemn resolves. To one of these I will call attention. I do this

for no other purpose than to present analogies, principles, and

precedents showing what rights belong to those who oppose the

Government, or to a state of civil war, or revolution,--that men

situated like our clients are not to be treated as pirates and robbers.

I have here a book called "THE UNION FOREVER; THE SOUTHERN REBELLION,

AND THE WAR FOR THE UNION." It is an excellent compilation, prepared

and published under the superintendence of _James D. Torrey_, of this

city. I read from it:

"The declaration of war against Great Britain, June, 1812, brought

the excitement to its climax. A peace party was formed in New

England, pledged to offer all possible resistance to the war. * * *

The State Legislatures of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, &c.,

passed laws forbidding the use of their jails by the United States

for the confinement of prisoners committed by any other than

judicial authority, and directing the jailors at the end of thirty

days to discharge all British officers, prisoners of war, committed

to them. The President, however, applied to other States of the

confederacy for the use of their prisons, and thus the difficulty

was, in a measure, obviated."

Thus these men set themselves up pretty strongly against the

Government. It is an act of which I do not approve, gentlemen; but,

suppose I should say that the men who did that were, because their

political sentiments differed from mine, fools or idiots, knaves or

traitors, what would you think of the taste or justice of such an

observation? It is the intolerance, gentlemen, which abides in the

heart of almost every man, woman, and child, and the diffusion of it

over the land, that has led to our present dreadful condition. It is

the endeavor of one party, or of one set, to set itself up in absolute

judgment over the opinions, rights, persons, liberties and hearts of

other men. It is that notion which CROMWELL expressed when he said (I

quote from memory alone), "I will interfere with no man's liberty of

conscience; but, if you mean by that, solemnizing a mass, that shall

not be permitted so long as there is a Parliament in England." I have

no doubt that the men who did these acts in New England, which we would

call unpatriotic, were actuated by conscientious motives; and I want to

claim the same thing for the men who, in the South, are doing what is

very offensive to you and very offensive to me, and the more offensive

because I honestly and conscientiously believe that it is unnecessary

and wanton. I know that I differ with very eminent men who belonged to

the same political organization as myself when I make that remark; but

it is the result of the best judgment that I can form, after a careful

and just review of the circumstances attending the present unfortunate

breach in our relation to each other. And certainly, gentlemen, it is

in no spirit of anger that we, in this sacred temple of justice, should

deal with our erring brethren. We do not mean to pronounce, through the

forms of justice, from this jury-box, any anathema or denunciation

against our fellow-men, _merely_ for holding erroneous opinions. All

the dictates of every enlightened religion on earth are against any

such conduct. I take for granted that there is not one of you who has

not some friend engaged in the war, on one side or the other. I took up

a newspaper the other morning, and discovered that two men, with whom I

had been in the most intimate relations of personal friendship, were in

the same engagement, each commanding as colonel, and fighting against

each other. They were men who had been close friends during a long

series of years--men whom you and I might well be proud to know--each

of them a graduate of West Point. One of them is said to have been seen

to fall from his saddle, and the fate of the other (COLONEL COGSWELL)

is at this moment uncertain. You or I, while we remain loyal to our

flag and our country--while we wish and hope for success to our arms in

all the conflicts that may occur--may regard with pity men born on the

same territory, as well educated, as deftly brought up, as generous and

as high minded as ourselves, because we consider them wrong. But, to

look upon them as mere outlaws and outcasts, entitled to no protection,

sympathy, or courtesy, is something which I am perfectly sure this Jury

will never do, and which no community would feel justified or excusable

in doing.

Now, let me read more to you from this book:

"On the 18th of October, twelve delegates were elected to confer

with delegates from the other New England States. Seven delegates

were also appointed by CONNECTICUT, and four by RHODE ISLAND. NEW

HAMPSHIRE was represented by two, and VERMONT by one. The

Convention met at Hartford, Connecticut, on the 15th of December,

1814. After a session of twenty days a report was adopted, which,

with a slight stretch of imagination, we may suppose to have

originated from a kind of _en rapport_ association with the South

Carolina Convention of 1861. We may quote from the report."

Listen to this, gentlemen, and say how much right we have to stigmatize

as novel, unprecedented, base, or wicked, the notions on which the

Southern revolt is, in a certain degree, founded:

"Whenever it shall appear" (says this Report, the result of twenty

days' labor among calm and cool men of New England) "that the

causes are radical and permanent, _a separation_, _by equitable

arrangement_ will be _preferable to an alliance by constraint among

nominal friends, but real enemies, inflamed by mutual hatred and

jealousy, and inviting, by intestine divisions, contempt and

aggressions from abroad; but a severance of the Union by one or

more States against the will of the rest, and especially in time of

war, can be justified_ ONLY BY ACTUAL NECESSITY."

The report then proceeds to consider the several subjects of complaint,

the principal of which is the national power over the militia, claimed

by Government. We will not agree, say they, that the general Government

shall have authority over the militia; we claim that it shall belong to

us. The report goes on to say:

"In this whole series of devices and measures for raising men, this

Convention discerns a total disregard for the Constitution, and a

disposition to violate its provisions, demanding from the

individual States a firm and decided opposition. An iron despotism

can impose no harder service upon the citizen than to force him

from his home and occupation to wage offensive war, undertaken to

gratify the pride or passions of his master. _In cases of

deliberate, dangerous and palpable infraction of the Constitution,_

_affecting the sovereignty of a State and the liberties of the

people, it is not only the right but the duty of such State to

interpose its authority for the protection, in the manner best

calculated to secure that end. When emergencies occur, which are

either beyond the reach of the judicial tribunals or too pressing

to admit of the delay incident to their forms, States which have no

common umpire must be their own judges and execute their own

decisions._"

I think that is pretty strong secession doctrine. I do not see that it

is possible, in terms, to state it more distinctly. Well, it is true

that candid people in that section of the country did not approve these

views, but disapproved them; and yet they were the views, clearly and

forcibly expressed, of a large number of intelligent and moral people.

Now, this enables me to repeat, with a clearer view derived from

history, the proposition that the Confederate States are--_under the

law of nations_, and the principles embodied in the Declaration of

Independence, sustained in the Revolution, and recognized by our

people--in a condition not distinguishable from that of the Colonies in

'76, except that, if there be a difference, the position of the

Confederates, _in reference to legality, as a judicial question_, is

more justifiable, as it is certainly more formidable. This word

"secession" is, after all, only a word; a word, as MR. WEBSTER said in

one of his great speeches, answering Mr. Calhoun, of fearful import; a

word for which he could not according to his views, too strongly

express condemnation. But whether you use the word "secession," or the

familiar expression, "going out of the Union," or, "not consenting to

remain in the Union," the idea is one and the same. Much acumen and

ingenuity have been displayed, even by a mind profound as that of Mr.

Calhoun--a most acute man and a pure man, as Mr. Webster eloquently

attested in the Senate chamber, after the decease of that South

Carolina statesman--I say a good deal of acumen has been spent on the

question whether a State, or any number of States, have _a_ RIGHT UNDER

THE CONSTITUTION _to secede from the Union_. It is a quarrel about

phrases. It is not necessary in any point of view, political,

philological or moral, to use the word "secession" as either excusing

or justifying the act of the Confederate States. Suppose I grant, as a

distinct proposition, in accordance with what I admit to be the opinion

of the great majority of jurists, and orators, and statesmen at the

North, that there is no right in a State, under the Constitution, to

recede from the Union--what then? I shall not stop to give you the

argument with which the South presents a view of the question entirely

different from that of the North. Of what consequence is it,

practically, whether the right of the State to go out be found in any

part of the compact called the Constitution, or be derived from a

source extrinsic of it? You (let me suppose) are twelve States, and I

am the thirteenth. There is the original Confederacy of States, pure

and simple, under the agreement with each other; and there, according

to the views of Mr. Webster and the prosecution here, we became

constituted in a general Government, or, as Wheaton says, in a

"composite Government," giving great power to the general center. Now,

what difference does it make, if you twelve States conclude to leave

me, whether you do it by virtue of anything contained in the

Constitution, or inferable from the Constitution, or in virtue of some

right or claim of right that resides out of the Constitution? It is not

of the least consequence. I do not care for the word "secession." It

would be, at the worst, revolution. In that same great speech of Mr.

Webster's against Calhoun, in which I think I am justified in saying he

exhausts the subject and makes the most formidable argument against the

theory of secession that was ever uttered in the United States, all the

conclusion he comes to is this:--"_'Peaceable_ secession!' I cannot

agree to such a name. I cannot think it possible. _It would be_

REVOLUTION." Very well. Of what consequence is the designation? Who

cares for the baptism or the sponsors? It is the _thing_ you look to.

And if they have either the _right_ or the _power_ to secede or

revolutionize, they _may do it_, and there is no tribunal on earth to

sit in judgment upon them; though we have the right and the power, on

the other hand, to battle for the maintenance of the whole Union. Our

friend, _Mr. Justice Grier_, says: "_No band of_ CONSPIRATORS _can

overcome the Government_ MERELY _because they are dissatisfied with the

result of an election_." Now, gentlemen, with the deference he

deserves, I would ask the learned Justice Grier, or any other Justice,

or my learned friend, Mr. Evarts, how he will proceed to dispose of the

case which I am about to put? Suppose that all but one of our States

meet in their Legislatures, and, by the universal acclaim, and with the

entire approval of all the people, resolve that they will remain no

longer in association with the others--what will you do with them? That

solitary State, which may be Rhode Island, says: "I have in me the

sovereignty; I have in me all the attributes that belong to empire or

national existence; but I think I will have to let you go. Whether you

call it secession, or rebellion, or revolution, you may go, because

_you have the power to go_, if there be no better reason." And power

and right become, in reference to this subject, the same thing in the

end. Do they not? Is there any relation on earth that has a higher

sanction than marriage? So long as two parties, who have contracted

that holy obligation, have, in truth, no fault to find with each other,

is there any _right_ in either to go away from the other? There is no

such right, either by the law of God or of man. But there is a _power_

to do it, is there not? And if the wife flee from her husband, instead

of towards him, or if a husband go from his wife, is there any law of

society that can compel them to unite? And why not? Because mankind,

though they have perpetrated many follies, have, at least, recognized

that this was a remedy utterly impossible. In the relation of

partnership between two individuals, does not the same state of things

exist? and do not the same arguments suggest themselves? I ask my

learned brother what he can do in reference to the ten States that have

claimed to secede from the Union, and have organized themselves into a

Government? I will give him all the army he demands, and will let him

retain in the chair of State this honest, pleasant Mr. Lincoln, who is

not the greatest man in the world--nobody will pretend that--but is as

good and honest a person as there is in the world. There is not the

slightest question but that, in all his movements, he only proposes

what he deems consistent with the welfare and honor of the country. I

will give my learned brother the army now on the banks of the Potomac,

doing nothing, and millions of money, and then I desire him to tell us

how, with all these aids, he can coerce those ten States to remain in

the Confederacy. What was said by MR. BUCHANAN on the subject, in his

Message of December last? "_I do not propose_" said he, "_to attempt

any coercion of the States. I believe that it would be utterly

impossible. You cannot compel a State to remain in the Union. They may

refuse to send Senators to the Senate of the United States. They may

refuse to choose electors, and the Government stops._" Well, I grant

you that this is not the view of other men quite as eminent as Mr.

Buchanan. I grant you that the great CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL--a man to

whom it would be bad taste to apply any other word than great, because

that includes everything which characterized him--I grant you that

brilliant son of Virginia met an argument like this with the great

power that distinguished all his judgments, when a question arose in

the Supreme Court of the United States, affecting the State of Virginia

and a citizen. But of what importance is it what any man thinks about

it? What is your theory as compared with your practice? Now, I will

give my friend all the power he wants, and ask him to deal with these

ten States. Do you believe it to be within the compass of a possibility

to compel them to remain in the Union, as States, if they do not wish

it?

Thus I reach the conclusion, on even the weakest view of the case for

us, that the POWER to secede, and the POWER to organize a Government

existing, there is no power on earth which, on any rule of law, can

interfere with it, except that of war, conducted on the principles of

civilized war.

Now, then, let us look at those Confederate States a little more

closely. What says Vattel, in the passage referred to by my learned

friend, Mr. Larocque, and which it is of the utmost importance, in this

connection, to keep in mind?

[Here Mr. Brady read an extract, which will be found in the argument of

Mr. Larocque.[5]]

[5] See pages 105, 106, and 107.

Is not that clearly expressed, and easy to understand? All of us

comprehend and can readily apply it in this case. That resolves the

question, if indeed this be the law of the land, into this: _Have the

Confederate States, on any show of reason, or without it--for that does

not affect the inquiry--attained sufficient_ STRENGTH, _and_ BECOME

SUFFICIENTLY FORMIDABLE, _to entitle them to be treated, under that law

of nations, as in a condition of_ CIVIL WAR, _even if they have not

constituted a separate, sovereign_, and _independent nation?_ Really,

it seems to me, too clear for doubt, that they have. We had, in the

Revolution, thirteen Colonies, with a limited treasury, almost

destitute of means, and with some of our soldiers so behaving

themselves, in the early part of the struggle, that General Washington,

on one memorable occasion, threw down his hat on the ground and asked,

"Are these the men with whom I am to defend the liberties of America?"

And those of you, gentlemen, who have read his correspondence, know how

constantly he was complaining to Congress about the inefficiency of the

troops, and their liability to desertion. I remember that he says

something like this: "There is no doubt that patriotism may accomplish

much. It has already effected a good deal. But he who relies on it as

the means of carrying him through a long war will find himself, in the

end, grievously mistaken. It is not to be disguised that the great

majority of those who enter the service do so with a view to the pay

which they are to receive; and, unless they are satisfied, desertions

may be expected." He also remarked, at another period, in regard to the

troops of a certain portion of our country, which I will not name, that

they would have their own way; that when their term of enlistment

expired they would go home; and that they would sometimes go before

that period arrived. That, I am mortified to say, has been imitated in

the present struggle.

Such was the early condition of the Colonies.

Now, the Southern Confederacy have ten States--they had seven when this

commission was issued--with about eight millions of people. They have

separate State governments, which have existed ever since the Union was

formed, and which would exist if this revolution were entirely put

down. They have excluded us from every part of their territory, except

a little foothold in the Eastern part of Virginia, and "debateable

ground" in Western Virginia. We have not yet been able to penetrate

farther into the Confederate States. We cannot send even food to the

hungry or medicine to the afflicted there. We cannot interchange the

commonest acts of humanity with those of our friends who are shut up in

the South. I do think, with the conceded fact looking directly into the

face of the American people that, with all the millions at the command

of the Administration, there is yet found sufficient force and power in

the Confederate States to maintain their territory, their Government,

their legislature, their judiciary, their executive, and their army and

navy, it is vain and idle to say that they are not now in a state of

civil war, and that they ought to be excluded from the humanities

incident to that condition. Such an idea should not, I think, find

sanction in either the heart, the conscience, or intelligence of any

right-minded man.

Not only are the facts already stated true, but the Confederate States

have been RECOGNIZED AS A BELLIGERENT POWER by FRANCE and ENGLAND, as

we have proved by the proclamations placed before you; and _they have

been recognized_ by OUR _Government as belligerents, at least_. That I

submit, as _a distinct question of fact, to the Jury_, unless the Court

conceive that it is a pure question of law,--in which case I am

perfectly content that the Court shall dispose of it.

And where do I find this? I find it in the _admission of Mr. Lincoln,

in his Inaugural Address, that there is to be no attempt at any

physical coercion of these States_--a concession that it is a thing not

called for, not consistent with the views of the Administration, or

with the general course of policy of the American people. According to

his view, there was to be no war. I find it in the _correspondence of

General Anderson with Governor Pickens_, which has been read in the

course of the trial--which of course has been communicated to the

Government, will be found among its archives, and of which no

disapprobation has been expressed. And here I borrow a doctrine from

the District Attorney, who said, when I declared that the legislative

branch of the Government had not given their declaration as to what was

the true condition of the South, that their silence indicated what it

was; and so, the silence of the Government, in not protesting against

this correspondence, is good enough for my purpose.

The _proclamation of the President, calling for 75,000 troops_, and

then calling _for a greater number_, would, in any Court in

Christendom, outside of the United States, be regarded, under

international law, as conclusive evidence that those troops were to be

used against _a belligerent power_. Who ever heard of EIGHT MILLIONS of

people, or of ONE MILLION of people, being ALL TRAITORS, and being ALL

LIABLE TO PROSECUTION FOR TREASON AT ONCE. I find this recognition in

the _exchange of prisoners_, which we know, as a matter of history, has

occurred. I find it in the _capitulation at Hatteras_, at which, and by

which, GENERAL BUTLER, of his own accord, when he refused the terms of

surrender proposed by Commodore Barron, declared that the garrison

should be taken as PRISONERS OF WAR; and that has been communicated to

the Government, and no dissatisfaction expressed about it.

And, gentlemen, I rest it, also, as to the recognition by our

Government, on the fact to which MR. SULLIVAN so appropriately

alluded--_the exchange of flags of truce_ between the two contending

forces, as proved by one of the officers of the navy. A flag of truce

sent to rebels--to men engaged in lawless insurrection, in treasonable

hostility to the Government, with a view to its overthrow! Why,

gentlemen, it is the grandest, as it is the most characteristic, device

by which humanity protects men against atrocities which they might

otherwise perpetrate upon each other--that little white flag, showing

itself like a speck of divine snow on the red and bloody field of

battle; coming covered all over with divinity; coming in the hand of

peace, who rejoices to see another place where her foot may rest;

welcome as the dove which returned to the ark; coming, I say, in the

hand of peace, who is the great conqueror, and before whom the power of

armies and the bad ambitions and great struggles of men must ultimately

be extinguished. This, of itself, will be regarded by mankind, when

they reflect wisely, as sufficient to show that our Government must not

be brutal; and we seek to rescue the Administration from any imputation

that it wants to deny to the South the common humanities which belong

to warfare, by your refusing to let men be executed as pirates, or to

make a distinction between him who wars on the deep and him who wars

upon the land.

It is very strange if the poor fellows who had no means of earning a

meal of victuals in the city of Charleston, like some of those who

composed the crew of this vessel, shut up as if in a trap, should be

hanged as pirates for being on board a privateer, under a commission

from the Confederate States, and that those who have slain your

brothers in battle should be taken as prisoners of war, carefully

provided for, and treated with the benevolence which we extend to all

prisoners who fall into our hands--the same humanities that, as you

perceive, are provided for in the instructions from Jefferson Davis,

found on board the privateer, directing that the prisoners taken should

be dealt with gently and leniently, and to give them the same rations

as were supplied to persons in the Confederate service.

But it seems to be suggested in Vattel, and certainly is promulgated in

the opinion of Mr. Justice Grier, that, although the Confederate States

have obtained any proportions however large, any power however great,

there must be some _sound cause_, some _reasonable pretext_, for this

revolt. Well, who is to judge of that? We do not, says the Government,

admit that the cause is sufficient. The United States Government says

there is none. Now, I propose to show you _what the South says on that

subject_--to lay before you matters of history with which you are all

acquainted--to show you what is supposed by men as able as any of us,

as well acquainted with the history of the country, and as pure--what

is supposed by them to have created this state of things, entitling the

Confederate States to leave us and be a community by themselves. I will

hereafter appeal to the late Daniel Webster as a witness that one of

the causes assigned by the Southern States for their act is at least

the expression and proof of a great wrong done them.

In the first place, a large proportion of our people at the North claim

_the right to abolish slavery in places ceded to the United States, or

formed by contributions from the States, such as the District of

Columbia_. I do not know what my learned friends' views on that subject

are, but I know that the two great political parties of the country

have had distinct opinions on that subject. By one, it has been

steadily maintained, and with great energy, that, so far as the nation

has power over the subject of slavery, it shall exercise it to abolish

slavery. And the South says: "If you undertake to abolish slavery in

any fort, any ceded place, any territory that we have given you for the

purposes of the National Government, we will regard that as a breach of

faith; for, whether you abhor slavery, or only pretend to abhor it, it

is the means of our life. I, a Southerner, whose mother was virtuous as

yours--whom I loved as you loved your mother--received from her at her

death, as my inheritance, the slaves whom my father purchased--whom I

am taught, under my religious belief, to regard as property, and whom I

will so continue to regard as long as I live." That is the argument of

the South; and if men at the South conscientiously believe that, from

their knowledge of the sentiments, factions, or agitations at the

North, such as these, there is an intention to make a raid and foray on

the institution of slavery, deprive them of all the property they have

in the world, and condemn them to any stigma--is it any wonder that

they should express and act upon such an opinion?

Next, gentlemen, in the category of their complaints, is the _agitation

for the prohibition of what is called the inter-State slave trade_.

Next is _the exclusion of slavery from new territory_, which, says the

South, "we helped to acquire by our blood and treasure--towards which

we contributed as you did. If you had a gallant regiment in the field

in Mexico, had we not the Palmetto and other regiments, which came

back--such of them as survived--covered with glory?"

This has been the great subject that has recently divided our political

parties--the Republican party, so-called, proclaiming with great

earnestness and great decency its sincere conviction that it was a

moral and political right to prevent slavery from being carried into

new territory, and insisting that the slave-owner, if he went there

with his slaves, must bring them to a state of freedom.

There is another party of intelligent and upright men, claiming that

the South has the same right to go into the Territories with their

slaves as the North has to go with their implements of agriculture; and

these irreconcilable differences of opinion are only to be settled at

the polls, by determining the question which shall have sway either in

the executive councils or in the legislation of the Government. A grand

subject of debate, for some time, was the endeavor to acquire Texas;

and I need not tell you that the great reason why the acquisition of

Texas was opposed by the Whig party was, that they thought it might

induce to the extension of slavery. When MR. CHOATE made his great

speech against it in New York, he confessed that that was the point,

and said: "You may be told that this is a new garden of the Hesperides;

but do not receive any of its fruits: touch not, taste not, handle not,

for in the hour that you eat thereof you shall surely die."

Next, gentlemen, is _the nullification of the Fugitive-Slave Law by

several of the States of New England_, which say: "True it is that the

Constitution of the United States declares that the fugitive shall be

delivered up to his master; true it is that Congress has made provision

for his restoration; true it is that the Supreme Court of the United

States has declared that he must be given up; but we say--we, a

sovereign State--that if any officer of our Government lends any aid or

sanction for such purpose he shall be guilty of a crime. If you want

any slave delivered to his master, you must do it exclusively by the

authority of the Federal Government, by its power and officers." And

because, in the city of Boston, MR. LORING, a virtuous citizen, a

respectable lawyer, performed, in his official capacity, an official

act toward the restoration of a slave to his master, he was removed

from his judicial station by the Executive of Massachusetts.

_The District Attorney_: (To Mr. Evarts) He was not removed for that

reason.

_Mr. Brady_: The District Attorney says he was not removed for that

reason. Well, he was removed just about that time. (Laughter.) It was a

remarkable coincidence; it was like the caution given to the elder

Weller, when he was transferring a number of voters to the Eatonsville

election, not to upset them in a certain ditch, and, as he said, by a

very extraordinary coincidence, he got them into that very place.

But, gentlemen, this is a solemn subject, and is not to be dealt with

lightly. And here it is that I will refer to the great speech of Mr.

Webster, in the Senate of the United States, on the _7th of March,

1850_--to be found in the fifth volume of his works, _page_ 353. Mr.

Webster was a great man, gentlemen, like John Marshall, and he could

stand that test of a great man--to be looked at closely. Our country

produces an abundance of so-called great men. The very paving-stones

are prolific with them. Every village, and hamlet, and blind alley has

one, at least. And when we catch a foreigner, just arrived, we first

ask him what he thinks of our country, and then, pointing to some

person, say, "He is one of the most remarkable men in the country;"

until, finally, the foreigner begins to conclude that we are all

remarkable men; that, like children, we are all prodigies until we grow

up, when we give up the business of being prodigies very soon, as most

of us have had occasion to illustrate.

Mr. Webster, I say, was a great man, because he could stand the test of

being looked at very near, and he grew greater all the time. There is

no incident in my life of which I cherish a more pleasant or more vivid

recollection than being once in a small room, with some other counsel,

associated with Mr. Webster, about the time he made his last

professional effort, when, in a moment of melancholy, one night about

twelve o'clock, he came up, and, sitting down on the corner of a very

old-fashioned bedstead, put his arm around the post, and proceeded to

enlighten and fascinate us with a familiar, and sometimes playful,

account of his early life; his first arguments in the Supreme Court of

the United States; and the course, in its inner developments, of that

life which, in its public features, has been so interesting to the

country, and is to be always so interesting to mankind.

"Mr. President," said he, "in the excited times in which we live

there is found to exist a state of crimination and recrimination

between the North and South. There are lists of grievances produced

by each, and those grievances, real or supposed, alienate the minds

of one portion of the country from the other, exasperate the

feelings, and subdue the sense of fraternal affection, patriotic

love, and mutual regard. I shall bestow a little attention, sir,

upon these various grievances existing on the one side and on the

other. I begin with _complaints of the South_. I will not answer

further than I have the general statements of the honorable Senator

from South Carolina, that the North has prospered at the expense of

the South, in consequence of the manner of administering this

Government, in the collecting of its revenues, and so forth. These

are disputed topics, and I have no inclination to enter into them.

But I will allude to other complaints of the South, and _especially

to one which has, in my opinion, just foundation_; and that is,

that there has been found at the North, among individuals and among

legislators, a disinclination to perform fully their constitutional

duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service who have

escaped into the Free States. In that respect the South, in my

judgment, is right, and the North is wrong. Every member of any

Northern Legislature is bound by oath, like every other officer in

the country, to support the Constitution of the United States; and

the article of the Constitution (Art. iv., sec. 2, subd. 2) which

says to these States that they shall deliver up fugitives from

service, is as binding in honor and conscience as any other

article. No man fulfills his duty in any Legislature who sets

himself to find excuses, evasions, escapes, from this

constitutional obligation. I have always thought that the

Constitution addressed itself to the Legislatures of the States, or

to the States themselves. It says that those persons escaping to

other States 'shall be delivered up;' and I confess I have always

been of the opinion that it was an injunction upon the States

themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another

State, and coming, therefore, within the jurisdiction of that

State, shall be delivered up, it seems to me the import of the

clause is, that the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution,

shall cause him to be delivered up. That is my judgment. I have

always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now. But when

the subject, some years ago, was before the Supreme Court of the

United States, the majority of the Judges held that the power to

cause fugitives from service to be delivered up was a power to be

exercised under the authority of this Government. I do not know, on

the whole, that it may not have been a fortunate decision. My habit

is to respect the result of judicial deliberations and the

solemnity of judicial decisions. As it now stands, the business of

seeing that these fugitives are delivered up resides in the power

of Congress and the national judicature; and my friend at the head

of the Judiciary Committee (Mr. Mason) has a bill on the subject

now before the Senate, which, with some amendments to it, I propose

to support, with all its provisions, to the fullest extent. And I

desire to call the attention of all sober-minded men at the North,

of all conscientious men, of all men who are not carried away by

some fanatical idea or some false impression, to their

constitutional obligations. I put it to all the sober and sound

minds at the North, as a question of morals and a question of

conscience: What right have they, in their legislative capacity or

any other capacity, to endeavor to get around this Constitution, or

to embarrass the free exercise of the rights secured by the

Constitution to the persons whose slaves escape from them? None at

all--none at all. Neither in the forum of conscience, nor before

the face of this Constitution, are they, in my opinion, justified

in such an attempt. Of course, it is a matter for their

consideration. They, probably, in the excitement of the times, have

not stopped to consider of this. They followed what seemed to be

the current of thought and of motives, as the occasion arose; and

they have neglected to investigate fully the real question, and to

consider their constitutional obligations; which I am sure, if they

did consider, they would fulfill with alacrity. I repeat,

therefore, sir, that here is a well-founded ground of complaint

against the North, which ought to be removed; which it is now in

the power of the different departments of this Government to

remove; which calls for the enactment of proper laws authorizing

the judicature of this Government in the several States to do all

that is necessary for the recapture of fugitive slaves, and for

their restoration to those who claim them. Wherever I go, and

whenever I speak on the subject,--and when I speak here I desire to

speak to the whole North,--I say that the South has been injured in

this respect, and has a right to complain; and the North has been

too careless of what I think the Constitution peremptorily and

emphatically enjoins upon her as a duty."

Now, gentlemen, this may not accord with the sentiments of some of you;

but what right have you--if you should differ entirely with Mr.

Webster--if you should believe that there is a great law of our Maker,

a higher law than any created on earth, which requires you to refuse

obedience to that Fugitive-Slave Law, and makes it a high duty to

resist its execution--what right, I say, have you to _force_ that

opinion upon me? What right have you to require that I shall yield an

allegiance to all parts of the Constitution which _you_ approve, while

_you_ refuse it allegiance whenever you please?

They have assigned, as another cause, the notorious fact of _the

establishment of what is known as "the Underground Railroad," aiding in

the escape and running off of slaves_, and the clandestine removal of

property which belongs to the people of the South. They assign, as

another, the _rescue of persons claimed as fugitive slaves_, as in the

case of the _Jerry rescue_, in or near Syracuse. Passing once through

that city, I saw a placard announcing a grand demonstration to come off

in honor of that achievement--the forcible rescue of a man from the

hands of the Government who was claimed under the provisions of the

Constitution and an act of Congress which the Federal Courts had

declared to be constitutional!

They refer, also, to the _Creole case, in which, according to the

Southern view of the subject, it was virtually and practically decided

that no protection was to be afforded to slaves, as property of

Southern men, on the high seas_. That is their view of it, and it has

been expressed by able men with a great deal of force.

They also refer to the _John Brown raid_, which we have not

forgotten--to the invasion of Virginia by that man, who furnished the

negroes with implements of slaughter. With the results of that outrage

you are all familiar.

They refer to _the general assault on the institution of slavery_ which

many men at the North have felt it on their conscience to make,

including such distinguished orators as LLOYD GARRISON, GERRIT SMITH,

the fascinating and silver-tongued PHILLIPS--to whom I have listened

with pleasure, much as I detested his sentiments--and THEODORE PARKER,

the greatest of them all.

They refer to the declarations of cultivated men at the North, that

there were no means to which men might not resort to extirpate slavery;

and who, when against them were cited certain passages of Scripture

that were supposed to sanction the institution of slavery, fell back on

the position that our Constitution was _an "infidel Constitution,"_ and

that even the Bible was not to be regarded as any authority for such a

monstrous error as that.

They refer to _the declaration of Mr. Lincoln_, in one of his addresses

to the public, _that Government could not endure half slave and half

free_.

But, gentlemen, it was not strange to the American people to know that

there was danger of such a secession as has occurred. Some years ago it

would have been esteemed the most impossible thing in the world. It has

come to happen in your time and mine. It has been predicted. I know a

very remarkable instance in which that prediction was stated so clearly

that the author of it would seem to have been invested with the spirit

and power of prophecy. We cherished the abiding hope that this would

not occur; but we now see that the causes moving toward it were

irresistible, and that it has become an event of history.

Now, if these seceded States, on any reasoning, good or bad, on

sufficient cause, or on a belief that they had sufficient cause,

determined that it was not their interest to remain in the Union, they

only subscribed to those doctrines promulgated by the Hartford

Convention, and agreed with Blackstone, and with all the writers on

civil law, that a state of things having happened in which they could

have no redress, except by their own act, what course were they to

adopt? It is not for you or for me to say, at this time, whether they

were right or wrong in their opinions or reasons. I ask you, what

course were they to adopt? and what has been the argument heretofore?

Why, the argument that, when such a collision of interest took

place--when the States supposed that the General Government was

trespassing on them and usurping powers, making war upon their

institutions, oppressing them, or failing to accomplish the ends for

which the Government was established--they should appeal to the Supreme

Court of the United States as common arbiter, and that its decision

should be final. My friend, Mr. Larocque, has called attention to cases

that might happen, of collision between executives of States and of the

United States, which could not possibly be submitted to the decision of

the Supreme Court of the United States, and I shall not mar his

argument or his examples by repeating them or saying anything in

addition.

But, suppose that the next Congress should pass a law providing that

the State of New York should pay all the expenses of this war for ten

years to come, if it last so long; and that every boy of eighteen

years, in the State of New York, should be mustered into the service,

and coerced to march to Washington within ten days; and that no man in

the State of New York should be permitted to go into another State

without permission from the Executive; or should do anything of a

similar character,--what course would the State of New York have under

such circumstances? What course, but disobedience to the law, or

insurrection, or revolution? Will my learned friends say that, in a

case like that, you could appeal to the arbitrament of the Supreme

Court of the United States? Is that so? Has the Supreme Court of the

United States, under such circumstances, any way of redressing this

wrong? But, suppose I concede that it has: what said the Republican

party in reference to that Court? I instance that party, because it has

the administration of the General Government.

I remember distinctly that MR. CHASE, now one of the Cabinet officers,

in a public speech, shortly before the Presidential election, and MR.

WADE, of Ohio, a Senator of the United States--both able men, grave

men, honorable men--insisted, before the people, that the Supreme Court

of the United States was a mere organization of a certain number of

respectable gentlemen, whose opinions were entirely conclusive, no

doubt, as between parties litigant, but had no control over the

political sentiments, rights, or actions of the people; that their

adjudications would be a rule and a precedent in future cases of just

the same character; but, beyond that, should have no efficacy whatever.

Gentlemen, I will tell you what, in confirmation of these views, Mr.

Lincoln says. In the Message that has been read to you he states

exactly the same thing, with the addition that, if we were to submit to

the Supreme Court of the United States to decide for us what is right

in our Government, and what principles should be maintained, and what

course the Administration should adopt, we would be surrendering to the

Supreme Court the political power of the nation, and would become a

species of serfs and slaves.

When _nullification_ reared its head within our territory, and the

people of South Carolina claimed that an Act of the General Government

was an aggression upon them, against which they had a right to make

physical resistance, if necessary, the parties of this country were

divided into Whigs and Democrats. They were two formidable parties.

There had not then grown up any of these little schismatic

organizations, which are, in these latter days, numerous as the eddies

on the biggest stream. They were not the days for certain clubs of

professional politicians, with very imperfect wardrobes and more

imperfect consciences, who sit in judgment on the qualifications of

judicial officers, and measure their fitness for office by their

capacity to pay money to strikers.

"Now," said that great party claiming to be conservative, "South

Carolina has no right to resist. If she has suffered any wrong--if the

General Government has attempted any aggression on her--let her submit

the whole matter to the Supreme Court of the United States, and let its

arbitration be final." Yes; and so the cry continued, till it was

supposed that the Supreme Court of the United States was said to have

decided that the owner of slave property might carry it into the

Territories. Then the note was changed. Instantly the doctrine was

reversed, and the Supreme Court was no longer the great, solemn,

majestic, and omnipotent arbiter to dispose of this question. Then that

Court became "a convention of very respectable gentlemen," who took

their seats with black robes, and who were very competent to decide the

right of a controversy between John Doe and Richard Roe, but must not

lay their hands on politics. Why, they talk about the Earl of Warwick

being a King-maker; but your man who seats himself on the head of a

whisky barrel, in a corner grocery store, is a greater King-maker than

ever Warwick was; and such a man as that, in his prerogatives, is not

to be displaced by the Supreme Court of the United States! He may get

up a town meeting, at which it will be declared that the doctrine laid

down by the Supreme Court of the United States is all preposterous and

absurd, and that the people are not going to submit to that tribunal.

There is no recognition, therefore, by this Administration, of the idea

that the Supreme Court of the United States is capable of affording any

relief in such a case as that which has led to the action of the

seceded States. And so, that argument being out of the way, I ask you,

I ask the learned Court, and I ask our opponents, whether, under the

law of nations, as expounded, there was any other course left except

that which the seceding States have adopted, assuming that any action

whatever was to be taken?

Adjourned till Tuesday, 29th October, at 11 o'clock A.M.